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Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of )

) Recommendations of the Independent Panel ) Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on ) EB Docket No. 06-119 Communications Networks )

)

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

Adopted: June 16, 2006 Released: June 19, 2006

Comment Date: [30 days from date of publication in Federal Register]
Reply Comment Date: [45 days from date of publication in Federal Register]

By the Commission: Chairman Martin and Commissioners Copps, Adelstein,
Tate and McDowell issuing separate statements.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice), we initiate a
comprehensive rulemaking to address and implement the recommendations
presented by the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks (Independent Panel). Congress has
charged the Commission with promoting the safety of life and property
through the use of wire and radio communications.^1 In this regard, the
Commission has already taken a number of steps to fulfill this mandate and
we will continue to do so. The Independent Panel's report described the
impact of the worst natural disaster in the Nation's history, as well as
the overall public and private response and recovery efforts. Our goal in
this proceeding is to take the lessons learned from this disaster and
build upon them to promote more effective, efficient response and recovery
efforts, as well as heightened readiness and preparedness, in the future.
To accomplish this goal, we invite comment on what actions the Commission
can take to address the Independent Panel's recommendations.

II. BACKGROUND

2. On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of
the United States, causing significant damage in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. The destruction to communications companies' facilities in
the region, and therefore to the services upon which citizens rely, was
extraordinary. Hurricane Katrina knocked out more than three million
customer phone lines in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The wireline
telecommunications network sustained enormous damage - dozens of central
offices and countless miles of outside plant were damaged or destroyed as
a result of the hurricane or the subsequent flooding. Local wireless
networks also sustained considerable damage - more than a thousand cell
sites were knocked out of service by the hurricane. At the hurricane's
height, more than thirty-five Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) were
out of service,

^1 See 47 U.S.C. S 151.

and some parishes in Louisiana remained without 911 or enhanced 911 (E911)
service for weeks.^2

1. 3. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J. Martin established the
Independent Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Public Law 92-463, as amended.^3 The mission of the Independent Panel
was to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the
telecommunications and media infrastructure in the areas affected by
the hurricane. Specifically, the Independent Panel was to study the
impact of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of the telecommunications
and media industries, including public safety communications. In
addition, the Independent Panel was to review the sufficiency and
effectiveness of the recovery effort with respect to the
communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel was tasked with
making recommendations to the Commission, by June 15, 2006, regarding
ways to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability, and
communications among first responders such as police, fire fighters,
and emergency medical personnel.^4

2. 4. The Independent Panel met directly on five occasions. Four of these
meetings were used to examine the facts surrounding the impact of
Hurricane Katrina and to obtain evidence concerning the extent of the
damage and the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery
efforts.^5 On one occasion, the Independent Panel met in the area
struck by Hurricane Katrina to hear first-hand from victims of the
disaster. In addition to the in-person meetings, the Independent Panel
also received written comments from interested members of the public.
Finally, the Independent Panel's informal working groups met on
numerous occasions via conference call and in person to discuss their
progress.

3. 5. On June 9, 2006, the Independent Panel held its final meeting in
Washington, DC to conclude its analysis and deliberations. The
Independent Panel finalized its findings and recommendations and
submitted its report on June 12, 2006. A copy of the report is
attached to this Notice at Appendix B.

III. DISCUSSION

6. We seek comment on the recommendations presented by the Independent
Panel in its final report. The Independent Panel's recommendations are
organized into four areas: (1) pre-positioning

^2 See generally Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks, Report and Recommendations to the
Federal Communications Commission, 5-31 (Independent Panel Report); see
also Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Order, 20 FCC Rcd
16883, para. 2 (2005) (Katrina USF Order).

^3 5 U.S.C. App. 2 (1988).

^4 See the Independent Panel Charter available at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/HKIPCharter.pdf (last visited June 15, 2006);
see also the Notice of Establishment of the Commission's Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 71
Fed. Reg. 933 (2006).

See Public Notice, FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks Announces Final Meeting
Scheduled for June 9, 2006 at FCC Headquarters, DA 06-1085 (May 24, 2006);
Public Notice, FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks Announces Next Meeting Scheduled for
May 12, 2006 at FCC Headquarters, DA 06-925 (Apr. 26, 2006); Public
Notice, FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina
on Communications Networks Announces Next Meeting Scheduled for Tuesday,
April 18, 2006 at FCC Headquarters, DA 06-781 (Apr. 3, 2006); Public
Notice, FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina
on Communications Networks Announces Next Meeting Scheduled for Monday,
March 6, 2006 at the Mississippi e-Center at Jackson State University in
Jackson, Mississippi, DA 06-371 (Feb. 17, 2006); Public Notice, Notice of
Appointment of Members to Serve on Federal Communications Commission's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks; and Independent Panel's First Meeting Scheduled
for January 30, 2006, DA 06-57 (Jan. 12, 2006).

the communications industry and the government for disasters in order to
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency; (2) improving recovery
coordination to address existing shortcomings and to maximize the use of
existing resources; (3) improving the operability and interoperability of
public safety and 911 communications in times of crisis; and (4) improving
communication of emergency information to the public.^6 In some cases, the
Independent Panel recommends actions that require the Commission to modify
its rules pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking. In other cases, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission take actions that are not
dependent upon rulemakings, such as increased outreach and education
campaigns, or recommends measures that may not fall within the
Commission's statutory authority and jurisdiction. In advocating
implementation of the Independent Panel's recommendations, commenters
should note what actions would fall within the Commission's statutory
authority and jurisdiction, and what the Commission could do to encourage
the appropriate entities (e.g., state and local authorities) to take
action. In evaluating the Independent Panel's recommendations, our goal is
to determine what actions the Commission should take to promote greater
resiliency and reliability of communications infrastructure, as well as
the actions the Commission should take to strengthen and improve response
and recovery efforts. We therefore invite broad comment on the Independent
Panel's recommendations and on the measures the Commission should take to
address the problems identified. We also generally seek comment on
whether, in adopting any of the Independent Panel's recommendations, any
additional safeguards should be implemented to limit disclosure of
sensitive infrastructure information or commercial information to prevent
exposing potential targets to wrongdoers and subjecting regulated entities
to competitive harm.

7. In addition to presenting recommendations, the Independent Panel's
final report describes the Independent Panel's observations regarding the
hurricane's impact and the sufficiency of the recovery efforts.^7 We also
seek comment on whether the Independent Panel's observations warrant
additional measures or steps beyond the report's specific recommendations.
Thus, to the extent parties believe additional measures beyond the
Independent Panel's recommendations or different actions are warranted, we
welcome these suggestions and recommendations. We also seek comment
whether we should rely on voluntary consensus recommendations, as
advocated by the Independent Panel, or whether we should rely on other
measures for enhancing readiness and promoting more effective response
efforts.

A. Pre-Positioning for Disasters

8. The Independent Panel recommendation notes that the sheer force of
Hurricane Katrina and the extensive flooding that occurred severely tested
the reliability and resiliency of communications networks in the Gulf
Coast region. To help speed response efforts, the Independent Panel
recommends the adoption of a proactive (rather than reactive) program for
network reliability and resiliency. At the heart of the Independent
Panel's recommendations are steps the Independent Panel believes the
communications industry, public safety organizations, and the Commission
should take for a faster, more effective response to disasters and
emergencies.^8 In particular, the Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission work with industry sectors, associations, and other
organizations to establish a "Readiness Checklist" for the communications
industry that would include developing formal business continuity plans,
conducting training exercises, developing suitable plans and procedures,
and maintaining pre-positioned supplies and equipment to help in disaster
response. We seek comment on these recommendations. The Independent Panel
recommends that we rely on checklists developed by

Independent Panel Report at 31-42.

^7 The Independent Panel's observations address the areas of network
reliability and resiliency, recovery coordination and procedures, first
responder communications, and emergency communications to the public.
Independent Panel Final Report at 5-30.

^8 Id. at 31-34.

industry consensus groups, such as the Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council (NRIC) and the Media Security and Reliability
Council (MSRC). We seek comment on this recommendation, including whether
we should rely on the results of voluntary consensus recommendations or
instead rely on other measures. We invite parties to comment on the
appropriate breadth of business continuity plans. Are the suggested
elements presented by the Independent Panel adequate, or are other
elements useful or necessary? We seek comment on whether we should adopt
guidance or criteria for developing business continuity plans, conducting
exercises, developing and practicing communications plans, or routinely
archiving critical system back-ups for secure off-site facilities.

1. 9. The Independent Panel also recommends enhancing the awareness of
the public safety community in non-traditional emergency alternatives
through community education campaigns. We seek comment on this
recommendation and on other steps we can take within our jurisdiction
and statutory authority to assist the public safety community response
to disasters and other emergencies. The Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission establish a prioritized system of automatically
waiving regulatory requirements, or of granting automatic Special
Temporary Authority (STA) in certain instances, and provides a list of
specific Commission requirements. We invite comment on this
suggestion. Are there other areas where regulatory relief would be
appropriate? Should we establish specific thresholds or requirements
in the Commission's rules pertaining to demonstrations that should be
made? The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission
coordinate all federal outage and infrastructure reporting
requirements in times of crisis.^9 We seek comment on this
recommendation and on the measures the Commission can take within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction. Parties should address the
appropriate content of emergency outage reports, format, frequency,
distribution, and related issues. We seek comment on whether
additional safeguards should be implemented to address issues
concerning potential disclosure of sensitive infrastructure
information or commercial information to avoid potential harm to
communications providers or others. Finally, we invite comment on
other steps beyond those recommended by the panel that we could take
within our statutory authority and jurisdiction to improve or
strengthen network resiliency and reliability.

2. 10. We seek comment on whether and how the Commission can assist
organizations whose primary business is not communications (e.g.,
hospitals, nursing homes, day care facilities, and so forth) with
developing communications plans for an emergency. We also seek comment
on whether the Commission should develop a hotline and/or Website to
assist these entities.

B. Recovery Coordination

11. The Independent Panel observed significant challenges to maintenance
and restoration of communications services after Hurricane Katrina due in
part to problems with access to the affected area and key resources such
as power and/or generator fuel. The Independent Panel "generally supports
the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC's)
recommendation for a national standard for credentialing
telecommunications repair workers."^10 The Independent Panel advocates,
however, expanding the NSTAC's credentialing recommendations to include
repair workers of all communications infrastructure (e.g., wireline,
wireless, WISP, cable, broadcasting, satellite).^11 The Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission work with other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies to promptly develop national credentialing
requirements and guidelines to enable communications infrastructure
providers and their contracted workers to access affected areas post

Id. at 33-34.

Id. at 34.

Id.

disaster.^12 The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission
"encourage states to develop and implement a credentialing program
consistent with [the NSTAC's guidelines]."^13 We seek comment on these
recommendations, including measures the Commission can take within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction. The Independent Panel also
recommends that the Commission work with Congress and appropriate federal
departments and agencies to implement the NSTAC's recommendation that
telecommunications infrastructure providers should be afforded emergency
responder status under the Stafford Act and that this designation should
be incorporated into the National Response Plan and state and local
emergency response plans.^14 The Independent Panel further recommends that
the emergency responder designation be expanded to include all
communications services providers (e.g., wireline, wireless, WISP,
satellite, cable, and broadcast media) and their contract workers.^15 The
Commission seeks comment on these recommendations and on other steps we
can take within our statutory authority and jurisdiction.

12. The Independent Panel makes several recommendations related to
improving and enhancing communications and coordination among Federal,
state, and local authorities and the private sector.^16 In particular, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission "should encourage, but
not require, each regional, state and local [Emergency Operating Center
(EOC)] and the [Joint Field Office (JFO)] to engage in the following
activities:^17

1. 0M Facilitate coordination between communications infrastructure
providers and state and local emergency preparedness officials;

2. 0M Develop credentialing requirements and procedures for the purposes
of allocating communications infrastructure providers (and their
contractors and security teams) into disaster areas to perform
repairs;

3. 0M Develop and facilitate inclusion in the state's Emergency
Preparedness Plan, where appropriate, one or more clearly identified
post-disaster coordination areas for communications infrastructure
providers;

4. 0M Share information and coordinate resources to facilitate repair of
key communications infrastructure;

5. 0M Facilitate electric and other utilities' maintenance of priority
lists for commercial power restoration.

We seek comment on these recommendations and on other measures the
Commission could take within its statutory authority and jurisdiction to
encourage other Federal agencies, state and local authorities, and the
private sector to address the Independent Panel's recommendations in this
regard.

^12 The Independent Panel also recommends that the credentialing program
include a requirement to complete basic National Incident Management
System training as a condition of credentialing and work with the
communications industry to develop such an appropriate basic training
course for communications repair workers that can be completed online. See
Independent Panel Report at 34.

Id.

^14 Independent Panel Report at 35.

Id.

Id. at 35-36.

Id. at 35.

1. 13. In addition to recommending the Commission encourage other
governmental bodies to engage in these activities, the Independent
Panel notes its support for communications infrastructure providers
forming an industry-only group for disaster planning, coordinating
recovery efforts, and other purposes. The Independent Panel also
recommends that the Commission work with the National Communications
System, an organization within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), to broaden the membership of the National Coordinating Center
for Telecommunications (NCC) to include representation of all types of
communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite, and
other new technologies. We seek comment on these recommendations,
including how the Commission can work within its statutory authority
and jurisdiction to promote greater membership in the DHS's National
Communications System coordination body. We seek comment on how the
Commission could best work within its own jurisdiction and statutory
authority to assist in promoting extensive, cross-jurisdictional
coordination. We also seek comment generally on how we can better
facilitate coordination during times of crisis.

2. 14. The Independent Panel also recommended that the Commission work
with the DHS's National Communications System to promote the use of
existing priority communications services, such as Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless Priority Service
(WPS), and Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP). In particular,
the Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with the
DHS's National Communications System to promote WPS, GETS and TSP to
all eligible government, public safety, and critical industry
groups.^19 We seek comment on how the Commission can address these
recommendations within its statutory authority and jurisdiction.
Finally, the Independent Panel recommends that the Commission create
two websites identifying: (1) the key state emergency management
contacts and post-disaster staging areas for communications providers;
and

(2) contact information for the Commission's Task Force that coordinates
disaster response efforts and procedures for facilitating disaster
response and outage recovery. We seek comment on these recommendations.

C. First Responder Communications

15. The Independent Panel made several recommendations intended to
facilitate the restoration of public safety communications capabilities.
As with other recommendations, the Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission encourage state and local authorities to take actions, and to
assist in supporting these efforts consistent with our statutory authority
and jurisdiction. For example, the Independent Panel recommended that the
Commission encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and maintain
a cache of equipment components that would be needed to immediately
restore existing public safety communications within hours of a
disaster.^20 Such a cache of pre-positioned equipment would include
Radiofrequency (RF) gear (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) gateways, dispatch
consoles, etc), trailers, tower system components (e.g., antenna systems
and hydraulic masts), back-up power equipment, and fuel. We seek comment
on these recommendations. We invite parties to comment on the capabilities
and content of pre-positioned equipment, as well as the functionalities
most critical to support in the early stages of a crisis. The Independent
Panel Report also includes recommendations intended to facilitate
interoperability among first responder communications, including a
recommendation that the Commission encourage the expeditious development
of regional plans for the use of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to
review and approve such plans.^21 The Commission seeks

Id. at 36.

^19 Id. at 36 for a full list of the recommendations addressing these
priority services.

^20 For a complete list of these recommendations, see Independent Panel
Report at 37-38.

^21 Id. at 38-39.

comment on these recommendations, including how they should be implemented
within our statutory authority and jurisdiction.

1. 16. The Independent Panel also made recommendations intended to ensure
a more robust 911 and E911 service. For example, the panel recommends
that the Commission encourage the implementation of certain NRIC best
practices intended to promote the reliability and resiliency of the
911 and E911 architecture.^22 In particular, the Independent Panel
recommends that service providers and network operators should
consider placing and maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice
transport facilities and should ensure availability of emergency
back-up power capabilities (located on-site, when appropriate). The
Independent Panel further recommends that network operators should
consider deploying dual active 911 selective router architectures as a
means for eliminating single points of failure. The Independent Panel
also recommends that network operators, service providers, equipment
suppliers, and public safety authorities should establish alternative
methods of communication for critical personnel. We seek comment on
how the Commission can best encourage implementation of these
recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction, and we welcome further suggestions on measures that
could be taken to strengthen 911 and E911 infrastructure and
architecture.

2. 17. With respect to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), the
Independent Panel recommends the designation of a secondary back-up
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary
and secondary PSAPs are disabled.^23 The Independent Panel also
recommends that the Commission work with other federal agencies to
enhance funding for 911 enhancement and interoperability. The
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work to assist the
emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and
effectiveness of their emergency communications system. The
Independent Panel report includes four recommendations regarding the
emergency medical community, stating that the Commission should, inter
alia, educate the emergency medical community about emergency
communications and the various priority communications services and
help to coordinate this sector's emergency communications efforts.^24
We seek comment on how to address these recommendations consistent
with our statutory authority and jurisdiction. We also invite comment
on what additional steps the Commission can take within its statutory
authority to assist the emergency medical community enhance its
disaster response capabilities.

D. Emergency Communications to the Public

18. The Independent Panel report also includes recommendations intended to
facilitate and complement use of the Emergency Alert System (EAS),
including recommendations that the Commission educate state and local
officials about the existing EAS, its benefits, and how it can be
utilized. Further, the report recommends that the Commission develop a
program for educating the public about EAS and promote community awareness
of potential mechanisms for accessing those alerts sent during power
outages or broadcast transmission failures.^25 In order to ensure that all
Americans, including persons with disabilities and persons who do not
speak English, are able to receive emergency communications, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission: (1) promptly find a
mechanism to resolve any technical hurdles in the current EAS to ensure
that persons with hearing or vision disabilities and persons who do not
speak English have equal access to public warnings; (2) work with the
various industry trade associations to create and publicize best practices
for serving persons with disabilities and persons who do not speak
English; and (3) encourage state and local government agencies who provide
emergency

Id. at 39.

Id.

^24 Id. at 40.

^25 See Independent Panel Report at 40-41.

information to take steps to make critical emergency information
accessible to persons with disabilities and persons who do not speak
English. We seek comment on how to address these recommendations
consistent with our statutory authority and jurisdiction. With respect to
item (1), we note that the issue is the subject of the Commission's
ongoing EAS rulemaking proceeding, and we expect to address these and
related issues in that proceeding.^26

IV. PROCEDURAL MATTERS

19. Comments and Reply Comments. Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of
the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. SS 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may
file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the
first page of this document. All filings should refer to EB Docket No.
06-119. Comments may be filed using: (1) the Commission's Electronic
Comment Filing System (ECFS), (2) the Federal Government's eRulemaking
Portal, or (3) by filing paper copies. See Electronic Filing of Documents
in Rulemaking Proceedings, 13 FCC Rcd 11322, 11326 (1998). For additional
information on this proceeding, please contact Lisa Fowlkes ((202)
418-7452) or Jean Ann Collins ((202) 418-2792).

* ** Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using
the Internet by accessing the ECFS: http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/ or
the Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. Filers
should follow the instructions provided on the website for
submitting comments.

* ** For ECFS filers, if multiple docket or rulemaking numbers appear
in the caption of this proceeding, filers must transmit one
electronic copy of the comments for each docket or rulemaking
number referenced in the caption. In completing the transmittal
screen, filers should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service
mailing address, and the applicable docket or rulemaking number.
Parties may also submit an electronic comment by Internet e-mail.
To get filing instructions, filers should send an e-mail to
ecfs@fcc.gov, and include the following words in the body of the
message, "get form." A sample form and directions will be sent in
response.

* ** Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an
original and four copies of each filing. If more than one docket or
rulemaking number appears in the caption of this proceeding, filers
must submit two additional copies for each additional docket or
rulemaking number.

Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial
overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal
Service mail (although we continue to experience delays in
receiving U.S. Postal Service mail). All filings must be addressed
to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission.

** The Commission's contractor will receive hand-delivered or
messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary at
236 Massachusetts Avenue, NE., Suite 110, Washington, DC 20002. The
filing hours at this location are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand
deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners.
Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the building.

^26 See Review of the Emergency Alert System, First Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, EB Docket No.
04-296, FCC 05-191 (rel. Nov. 10, 2005); see also Review of the
Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, EB Docket
No. 04-296, 19 FCC Rcd 15775 (2004).

1. ** Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East
Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.

2. ** U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail
should be addressed to 445 12^th Street, SW, Washington DC
20554.

1. 20. Comments and reply comments must include a short and
concise summary of the substantive discussion and questions
raised in the Notice. We further direct all interested parties
to include the name of the filing party and the date of the
filing on each page of their comments and reply comments. We
strongly encourage that parties track the organization set
forth in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in order to
facilitate our internal review process. Comments and reply
comments must otherwise comply with section 1.48 and all other
applicable sections of the Commission's rules.^27

2. 21. People with Disabilities: To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (Braille,
large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail
to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty).

3. 22. Ex Parte Rules. These matters shall be treated as a
"permit-but-disclose" proceeding in accordance with the
Commission's ex parte rules.^28 Persons making oral ex parte
presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the
presentations must contain summaries of the substance of the
presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the
views and arguments presented is generally required.^29 Other
requirements pertaining to oral and written presentations are
set forth in section 1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.^30

4. 23. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. As required by
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended, 5 U.S.C. S
604, the Commission has prepared an Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis ("IRFA") for this NPRM, of the possible
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities by the policies and rules proposed in this NPRM. The
IRFA is in Appendix A. Written public comments are requested
on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the
IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments on the
NPRM. The Commission will send a copy of the NPRM, including
this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration.^31 In addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or
summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal
Register.^32

5. 24. Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis. This
document may contain proposed new or modified information
collection requirements. The Commission, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the
general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
to comment on the information collection requirements
contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. Public and agency
comments are due [60 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE
FEDERAL REGISTER]. Comments should address: (a) whether the
proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the Commission, including
whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the
accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c) ways to
enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information

^27 See 47 C.F.R. S 1.48.

^28 47 C.F.R. SS 1.1200-1.1216.

^29 47 C.F.R. S 1.1206(b)(2).

^30 47 C.F.R. S 1.1206(b).

^31 See 5 U.S.C. S 603(a).

^32 Id.

collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of
information on the respondents, including the use of automated
collection techniques or other forms of information technology. In
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of
2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44

U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might
"further reduce the information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.

V. ORDERING CLAUSE

1. 25. IT IS ORDERED, that pursuant to sections 1, 4(i) and (o),
201, 303(r), 403, and 706 of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, 47 U.S.C. SS 151, 154(i) and (o), 201, 303(r),
403, and 606, this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking IS hereby
ADOPTED.

2. 26. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission's Consumer and
Government Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, SHALL
SEND a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including
the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief
Council for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Marlene H. Dortch Secretary

APPENDIX A INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS

1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA),^33 the Commission has prepared this present Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities by the
policies and rules proposed in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (
Notice). Written public comments are requested on this IRFA.
Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be
filed by the deadlines for comments on the Notice provided in
Section IV of the item. The Commission will send a copy of the
Notice, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of
the Small Business Administration (SBA).^34 In addition, the Notice
and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal
Register.^35

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

1. 2. On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the
Gulf Coast of the United States, causing significant damage in
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The destruction to
communications companies' facilities in the region, and
therefore to the services upon which citizens rely, was
extraordinary. Hurricane Katrina knocked out more than three
million customer phone lines in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. The wireline telecommunications network sustained
enormous damage - dozens of central offices and countless
miles of outside plant were damaged or destroyed as a result
of the hurricane or the subsequent flooding. Local wireless
networks also sustained considerable damage - more than a
thousand cell sites were knocked out of service by the
hurricane. At the hurricane's height, more than thirty-five
Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) were out of service,
and some parishes in Louisiana remained without 911 or
enhanced 911 (E911) service for weeks.^36

2. 3. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J. Martin established the
Independent Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, Public Law 92-463, as amended.^37 The mission of the
Independent Panel was to review the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on the telecommunications and media infrastructure in
the areas affected by the hurricane. Specifically, the
Independent Panel was to study the impact of Hurricane Katrina
on all sectors of the telecommunications and media industries,
including public safety communications. In addition, the
Independent Panel was to review the sufficiency and
effectiveness of the recovery effort with respect to the
communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel was
tasked with making recommendations to the Commission, by June
15, 2006, regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness,
network reliability, and communications among first responders
such as police, fire fighters, and emergency medical
personnel.^38

33 See 5 U.S.C. S 603. The RFA, see 5 U.S.C. SS 601-612, has been
amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857
(1996).

^34 See 5 U.S.C. S 603(a).

^35 Id.

See generally Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks, Report and Recommendations to
the Federal Communications Commission, 5-31 (Independent Panel
Report); see also Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
Order, 20 FCC Rcd 16883, para. 2 (2005) (Katrina USF Order).

^37 5 U.S.C. App. 2 (1988).

^38 See the Independent Panel Charter available at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/HKIPCharter.pdf (last visited June 15,
2006); see also the Notice of Establishment of the Commission's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, 71 Fed. Reg. 933 (2006).

1. 4. On June 12, 2006, the Independent Panel submitted its
Report and Recommendations. As explained in the Notice,
Congress has charged the Commission with promoting the safety
of life and property through the use of wire and radio
communications. In this regard, we have already taken a number
of steps to fulfill this mandate and we will continue to do
so. The Independent Panel's report described the impact of the
worst natural disaster in the Nation's history as well as the
overall public and private response and recovery efforts. Our
goal in this proceeding is to take the lessons learned from
this disaster and build upon them to promote more effective,
efficient response and recovery efforts, as well as heightened
readiness and preparedness, in the future. To accomplish this
goal, we invite comment on what actions the Commission can
take to address the Independent Panel's recommendations.

2. 5. As we note in the Notice, in some cases, the Independent
Panel recommends action that require the Commission to modify
its rules pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking. In other
cases, the Independent Panel recommends that the Commission
take actions that are not dependent upon rulemakings, such as
increased outreach and education campaigns, or recommends
measures that may not fall within the Commission's statutory
authority and jurisdiction. In advocating implementation of
the Independent Panel's recommendations, commenters should
note what actions would fall within the Commission's statutory
authority and jurisdiction and what the Commission could do to
encourage the appropriate entities (e.g., states and local
authorities) to take action.

3. 6. To speed response efforts, the Independent Panel recommends
that adoption of a proactive (rather than reactive) program
for network reliability and resiliency. Specifically, the
Independent Panel recommends working with industry sectors,
associations and other organizations to establish a "Readiness
Checklist" for the communications industry that would include
developing formal business continuity plans, conducting
training exercises, developing suitable plans and procedures,
and maintaining pre-positioned supplies and equipment to help
in disaster response. The Notice seeks comment on these
recommendations. The Independent Panel also recommends that we
rely on checklists developed by industry consensus groups,
such as the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council
(NRIC) and the Media Security and Reliability Council (MSRC).
The Notice seeks comment on this recommendation, including
whether we should rely on the results of voluntary consensus
recommendations or instead rely on other measures. The Notice
also seeks comment on whether we should adopt guidance or
criteria for developing business continuity plans, conducting
exercises, developing and practicing communications plans, or
routinely archiving critical system back-ups for secure
off-site facilities.

4. 7. The Independent Panel also recommends enhancing the public
safety community's awareness of non-traditional emergency
alternatives through community education campaigns. The Notice
seeks comment on this recommendation and other steps we can
take within our jurisdiction and statutory authority to assist
the public safety community in responding to disasters and
other emergencies. The Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission establish a prioritized system of automatically
waiving regulatory requirements, or of granting automatic
Special Temporary Authority (STA) in certain instances, and
provides a list of specific Commission requirements. The
Notice seeks comment on this suggestion. The Notice also seeks
comment on the Independent Panel's recommendation that the
Commission coordinate all federal outage and infrastructure
reporting requirements in times of crisis. In addition, the
Notice seeks comment on other steps beyond those recommended
by the Panel that the Commission could take within our
statutory authority and jurisdiction to improve or strengthen
network resiliency and reliability.

* 8. As discussed in the Notice, the Independent Panel
generally supports the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC's)
recommendation for a national standard for credentialing
telecommunications repair workers. The Independent Panel,
however, advocates expanding the NSTAC recommendations to
include repair workers of all communications
infrastructure. The Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission work with other appropriate Federal
departments and government agencies to promptly develop
national credentialing requirements and guidelines to

* enable communications infrastructure providers and their
contracted workers to access affected areas
post-disaster. The Independent Panel also recommends that
the Commission encourage states to develop and implement
a credentialing program consistent with the NSTAC
guidelines. The Notice seeks comment on these
recommendations as well as measures the Commission can
take within its statutory authority and jurisdiction.

* 9. The Notice seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendation that the Commission work with Congress and
appropriate federal departments and agencies to implement
the NSTAC's recommendation that telecommunications
infrastructure providers should be afforded emergency
responder status under the Stafford Act and that this
designation should be incorporated into the National
Response Plan and state and local emergency response
plans. With respect to this proposal, the Independent
Panel also recommends that the emergency responder
designation include all types of communications services.

* 10. In order to enable the communications industry and
state and local emergency officials to better coordinate
their preparation for and response to disasters affecting
communications infrastructure, the Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission work with state and local
emergency officials and the communications industry to
encourage the formation of coordinating and planning
bodies at the state or regional level. As set forth in
the Notice, the Panel's recommendation also lists
activities that the Commission should encourage each
state or regional coordinating body to engage in. The
Notice seeks comment on this recommendation and on the
measures the Commission could take within its statutory
authority and jurisdiction to encourage other Federal
agencies, state and local authorities and the private
sector to address the Independent Panel's recommendations
in this regard.

* 11. The Independent Panel recommends that the Commission
work with the National Communications System (NCS) to
broaden the membership of the National Coordinating
Center for Telecommunications to include representation
from all types of communications systems, including
broadcast, cable, satellite, and other new technologies.
The Notice seeks comment on this recommendation,
including how the Commission can work within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction to promote greater
membership in the DHS's National Communications System
coordination body.

* 12. The Notice seeks comment on several recommendations
designed to facilitate the use of existing priority
communications services, such as Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless Priority
Service (WPS) and Telecommunications Service Priority
(TSP), all of which are administered by DHS's National
Communications System. In addition, the Notice seeks
comment on the Independent Panel's recommendation that
the Commission create two websites identifying: (1) the
key state emergency management contacts and post-disaster
staging areas for communications providers; and (2)
contact information for the Commission's Task Force that
coordinates disaster response efforts and procedures for
facilitating disaster response and outage recovery.

* 13. In the Notice, the Commission seeks comment on
several recommendations intended to facilitate the
restoration of public safety communications capabilities.
For example, it seeks comment on the Panel's
recommendation that the Commission encourage state and
local jurisdictions to retain and maintain a cache of
equipment components that would be needed to immediately
restore existing public safety communications within
hours of a disaster. The Notice also seeks comment on a
number of recommendations intended to facilitate
interoperability among first responder communications,
including a recommendation that the Commission encourage
the expeditious development of regional plans for the use
of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to review and
approve such plans.

* 14. Regarding 911 and E911 service, the Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission encourage the
implementation of certain NRIC best practices intended to
promote the reliability and resiliency of the 911 and
E911 architecture. The Panel recommends that: (1) service
providers and

network operators consider placing and maintaining 911
circuits over diverse interoffice transport facilities
and should ensure availability of emergency back-up power
capabilities (located on-site, when appropriate); (2)
network operators consider deploying dual service 911
selective router architectures as a means for eliminating
single points of failure; and (3) network operators,
service providers, equipment suppliers, and public safety
authorities establish alternative methods of
communication for critical personnel. The Notice seeks
comment on these recommendations.

15. With respect to Public Safety Answering Points
(PSAPs), the Independent Panel recommends

(1) the designation of a secondary back-up PSAP that is
more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary
and secondary PSAPs are disabled; (2) that the Commission
work with other federal agencies to enhance funding for
911 enhancement and interoperability; and (3) that the
Commission work to assist the emergency medical community
to facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness of their
emergency communications system. The Notice seeks comment
on these recommendations. In addition, the Independent
Panel's Report and Recommendations includes four
recommendations regarding the emergency medical
community, stating that the Commission should, inter
alia, educate the emergency medical community about
emergency communications and the various priority
communications services and help to coordinate this
sector's emergency communications efforts. The Notice
seeks comment on these recommendations.

16. Finally, the Notice seeks comment on the Independent
Panel's recommendations that the Commission: (1) work
with various industry trade associations to create and
publicize best practices for serving persons with
disabilities and persons who do not speak English; and
(2) encourage state and local government agencies to
provide emergency information to take steps to make
critical emergency information accessible to persons with
disabilities and persons who do not speak English.^39

B. Legal Basis

17. Authority for the actions proposed in this Notice may
be found in sections 1, 4(i), 4(o), 303(r), 403, and 706
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, (Act) 47
U.S.C. SS 151, 154(i) 154(o), 303(r), 403 and 606.

C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small
Entities to Which Rules Will Apply

18. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of,
and, where feasible, an estimate of, the number of small
entities that may be affected by the rules adopted
herein.^40 The RFA generally defines the term "small
entity" as having the same meaning as the terms "small
business," "small organization," and "small governmental
jurisdiction."^41 In addition, the term "small business"
has the same meaning as the term "small business concern"
under the Small Business Act.^42 A "small business

^39 The Independent Panel also submitted recommendations
regarding the Emergency Alert System. We note that this
issue is the subject of the Commission's ongoing EAS
rulemaking proceeding and we expect to address those and
related issues in that proceeding.

^40 5 U.S.C. S 604(a)(3).

^41 5 U.S.C. S 601(6).

^42 5 U.S.C. S 601(3) (incorporating by reference the
definition of "small-business concern" in the Small
Business Act, 15 U.S.C. S 632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. S
601(3), the statutory definition of a small business
applies "unless an agency, after consultation with the
Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration
and after opportunity for public comment, establishes one
or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to
the activities of the agency and publishes such
definition(s) in the Federal Register." 5 U.S.C. S
601(3).

concern" is one which: (1) is independently owned and
operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation;
and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by
the Small Business Administration (SBA).^43

19. Nationwide, there are a total of approximately 22.4
million small businesses, according to SBA data.^44 A
"small organization" is generally "any not-for-profit
enterprise which is independently owned and operated and
is not dominant in its field."^45 Nationwide, as of 2002,
there were approximately

1. 1.6 million small organizations.^46 The term "small
governmental jurisdiction" is defined generally as
"governments of cities, towns, townships, villages,
school districts, or special districts, with a
population of less than fifty thousand."^47 Census
Bureau data for 2002 indicate that there were 87,525
local governmental jurisdictions in the United
States.^48 We estimate that, of this total, 84,377
entities were "small governmental jurisdictions."^49
Thus, we estimate that most governmental
jurisdictions are small.

2. 20. Television Broadcasting. The SBA has developed a
small business sized standard for television
broadcasting, which consists of all such firms
having $13 million or less in annual receipts.^50
Business concerns included in this industry are
those "primarily engaged in broadcasting images
together with sound."^51 According to Commission
staff review of the BIA Publications, Inc. Master
Access Television Analyzer Database (BIA) on October
18, 2005, about 873 of the 1,307 commercial
television stations^52 (or about 67 percent) have
revenues of $12 million or less and thus quality as
small entities under the SBA definition. We note,
however, that, in assessing whether a business
concern qualifies as small under the above
definition, business (control) affiliations^53must
be included.^54 Our estimate,

^43 15 U.S.C. S 632.

^44 See SBA, Programs and Services, SBA Pamphlet No.
CO-0028, at page 40 (July 2002).

5 U.S.C. S 601(4).

^46 Independent Sector, The New Nonprofit Almanac & Desk
Reference (2002).

^47 5 U.S.C. S 601(5).

^48 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 2006, Section 8, page 272, Table 415.

^49 We assume that the villages, school districts, and
special districts are small, and total 48,558. See U.S.
Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
2006, section 8, page 273, Table 417. For 2002, Census
Bureau data indicate that the total number of county,
municipal, and township governments nationwide was
38,967, of which 35,819 were small. Id.

^50 13 C.F.R. S 121.201, North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) code 515120.

^51 Office of Management and Budget, North American
Industry Classification System: United States, at 509
(1997). This category description continues, "These
establishments operate television broadcasting studios
and facilities for the programming and transmission of
programs to the public. These establishments also produce
or transmit visual programming to affiliated broadcast
television stations, which in turn broadcast the programs
to the public on a predetermined schedule. Programming
may originate in their own studios, from an affiliated
network, or from external sources." Separate census
categories pertain to businesses primarily engaged in
producing programming. Id. at 502-05, NAICS code 512120,
Motion Picture and Video Production; NAICS code 512120,
Motion Picture and Video Distribution; NAICS code 512191,
Teleproduction and Other Post-Production Services; and
NAICS code 512199, Other Motion Picture and Video
Industries.

^52 Although we are using BIA's estimate for purposes of
this revenue comparison, the Commission has estimated the
number of licensed commercial television stations to be
1,368. See News Release, "Broadcast Station Totals as of
June 30, 2005" (dated Aug. 29, 2005); see
http;://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/totals/bt050630.html.

^53 "Concerns are affiliates of each other when one
concern controls or has the power to control the other or
a third party or parties controls or has to power to
control both." 13 C.F.R. S 121.103(a)(1).

therefore, likely overstates the number of small entities
that might be affected by our action, because the revenue
figure on which it is based does not include or aggregate
revenues from affiliated companies. There are also 2,127
low power television stations (LPTV).^55 Given the nature
of this service, we will presume that all LPTV licensees
qualify as small entities under the SBA size standard.

1. 21. Radio Stations. The proposed rules and policies
potentially will apply to all AM and commercial FM
radio broadcasting licensees and potential
licensees. The SBA defines a radio broadcasting
station that has $6.5 million or less in annual
receipts as a small business.^56 A radio
broadcasting station is an establishment primarily
engaged in broadcasting aural programs by radio to
the public.^57 Included in this industry are
commercial, religious, educational, and other radio
stations.^58 Radio broadcasting stations which
primarily are engaged in radio broadcasting and
which produce radio program materials are similarly
included.^59 However, radio stations that are
separate establishments and are primarily engaged in
producing radio program material are classified
under another NAICS number.^60 According to
Commission staff review of BIA Publications, Inc.
Master Access Radio Analyzer Database on March 31,
2005, about 10,840 (95%) of 11,410 commercial radio
stations have revenue of $6 million or less. We
note, however, that many radio stations are
affiliated with much larger corporations having much
higher revenue. Our estimate, therefore, likely
overstates the number of small entities that might
be affected by our action.

2. 22. Cable and Other Program Distribution. The Census
Bureau defines this category as follows: "This
industry comprises establishments primarily engaged
as third-party distribution systems for broadcast
programming. The establishments of this industry
deliver visual, aural, or textual programming
received from cable networks, local television
stations, or radio networks to consumers via cable
or direct-to-home satellite systems on a
subscription or fee basis. These establishments do
not generally originate programming material."^61
The SBA has developed a small business size standard
for Cable and Other Program Distribution, which is:
all such firms having $13.5 million or less in
annual receipts.^62 According to Census Bureau data
for 2002, there were a total of 1,191 firms in this
category that operated for the entire year.^63 Of
this total, 1,087 firms had annual receipts of under
$10 million, and 43 firms had receipts of $10
million or more but less than $25 million.^64 Thus,
under this size standard, the majority of firms can
be considered small.

(...continued from previous page)

"SBA counts the receipts or employees of the concern
whose size is at issue and those of all its domestic
concern's size." 13 C.F.R. S 121.103(a)(4).

^55 Broadcast Station Totals as of September 30, 2002,
FCC News Release (rel. Nov. 6, 2002).

^56 See 13 C.F.R. S 121.201, NAICS code 515112 (changed
from 513112 in Oct. 2002).

^57 Id.

^58 Id.

^59 Id.

^60 Id.

^61 U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS Definitions, "517510
Cable and Other Program Distribution";
http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF517.HTM.

13 C.F.R. S 121.201, NAICS code 517510.

^63 U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census, Subject
Series: Information, Table 4, Receipts Size of Firms for
the United States: 2002, NAICS code 517510 (issued
November 2005).

^64 Id. An additional 61 firms had annual receipts of $25
million or more.

1. 23. Cable Companies and Systems. The Commission has
also developed its own small business size
standards, for the purpose of cable rate regulation.
Under the Commission's rules, a "small cable
company" is one serving 400,000 or fewer
subscribers, nationwide.^65 Industry data indicate
that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but
eleven are small under this size standard.^66 In
addition, under the Commission's rules, a "small
system" is a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer
subscribers.^67 Industry data indicate that, of
7,208 systems nationwide, 6,139 systems have under
10,000 subscribers, and an additional 379 systems
have 10,000-19,999 subscribers.^68 Thus, under this
second size standard, most cable systems are small.

2. 24. Cable System Operators. The Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, also contains a size standard
for small cable system operators, which is "a cable
operator that, directly or through an affiliate,
serves in the aggregate fewer than 1 percent of all
subscribers in the United States and is not
affiliated with any entity or entities whose gross
annual revenues in the aggregate exceed
$250,000,000."^69 The Commission has determined that
an operator serving fewer than 677,000 subscribers
shall be deemed a small operator, if its annual
revenues, when combined with the total annual
revenues of all its affiliates, do not exceed $250
million in the aggregate.^70 Industry data indicate
that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but
ten are small under this size standard.^71 We note
that the Commission neither requests nor collects
information on whether cable system operators are
affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues
exceed $250 million,^72 and therefore we are unable
to estimate more accurately the number of cable
system operators that would qualify as small under
this size standard.

3. 25. Multipoint Distribution Systems. The established
rules apply to Multipoint Distribution Systems (MDS)
operated as part of a wireless cable system. The
Commission has defined "small entity" for purposes
of the auction of MDS frequencies as an entity that,
together with its affiliates, has average gross
annual revenues that are not more than $40 million
for the preceding three calendar years.^73 This

^65 47 C.F.R. S 76.901(e). The Commission determined that
this size standard equates approximately to a size
standard of $100 million or less in annual revenues.
Implementation of Sections of the 1992 Cable Act: Rate
Regulation, Sixth Report and Order and Eleventh Order on
Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd 7393, 7408 (1995).

These data are derived from: R.R. Bowker, Broadcasting &
Cable Yearbook 2006, "Top 25 Cable/Satellite Operators,"
pages A-8 & C-2 (data current as of June 30, 2005);
Warren Communications News, Television & Cable Factbook
2006, "Ownership of Cable Systems in the United States,"
pages D-1805 to D-1857.

^67 47 C.F.R. S 76.901(c).

^68 Warren Communications News, Television & Cable
Factbook 2006, "U.S. Cable Systems by Subscriber Size,"
page F-2 (data current as of Oct. 2005). The data do not
include 718 systems for which classifying data were not
available.

47 U.S.C. S 543(m)(2); see 47 C.F.R. S 76.901(f) & nn.
1-3.

47 C.F.R. S 76.901(f); see Public Notice, FCC Announces
New Subscriber Count for the Definition of Small Cable
Operator, DA 01-158 (Cable Services Bureau, Jan. 24,
2001)..

^71 These data are derived from: R.R. Bowker,
Broadcasting & Cable Yearbook 2006, "Top 25
Cable/Satellite Operators," pages A-8 & C-2 (data current
as of June 30, 2005); Warren Communications News,
Television & Cable Factbook 2006, "Ownership of Cable
Systems in the United States," pages D-1805 to D-1857.

The Commission does receive such information on a
case-by-case basis if a cable operator appeals a local
franchise authority's finding that the operator does not
qualify as a small cable operator pursuant to S 76.901(f)
of the Commission's rules. See 47 C.F.R. S 76.909(b).

^73 47 C.F.R. S 21.961(b)(1).

definition of small entity in the context of MDS auctions
has been approved by the SBA.^74 The Commission completed
its MDS auction in March 1996 for authorizations in 493
basic trading areas. Of 67 winning bidders, 61 qualified
as small entities. At this time, we estimate that of the
61 small business MDS auction winners, 48 remain small
business licensees.

1. 26. MDS also includes licensees of stations
authorized prior to the auction. As noted above, the
SBA has developed a definition of small entities for
pay television services, cable and other
subscription programming, which includes all such
companies generating $13.5 million or less in annual
receipts.^75 This definition includes MDS and thus
applies to MDS licensees that did not participate in
the MDS auction. Information available to us
indicates that there are approximately 392 incumbent
MDS licensees that do not generate revenue in excess
of $11 million annually. Therefore, we estimate that
there are at least 440 (392 pre-auction plus 48
auction licensees) small MDS providers as defined by
the SBA and the Commission's auction rules which may
be affected by the rules adopted herein.

2. 27. Instructional Television Fixed Service. The
established rules would also apply to Instructional
Television Fixed Service (ITFS) facilities operated
as part of a wireless cable system. The SBA
definition of small entities for pay television
services also appears to apply to ITFS.^76 There are
presently 2,032 ITFS licensees. All but 100 of these
licenses are held by educational institutions.
Educational institutions are included in the
definition of a small business.^77 However, we do
not collect annual revenue data for ITFS licensees,
and are not able to ascertain how many of the 100
noneducational licensees would be categorized as
small under the SBA definition. Thus, we tentatively
conclude that at least 1,932 are small businesses
and may be affected by the established rules.

3. 28. Wireless Service Providers. The SBA has
developed a small business size standard for
wireless small businesses within the two separate
categories of Paging^78 and Cellular and Other
Wireless Telecommunications. ^79 Under both SBA
categories, a wireless business is small if it has
1,500 or fewer employees. According to Commission
data,^80 1,012 companies reported that they were
engaged in the provision of wireless service. Of
these 1,012 companies, an estimated 829 have 1,500
or fewer employees and 183 have more than 1,500
employees. This SBA size standard also applies to
wireless telephony. Wireless telephony includes
cellular, personal communications services, and
specialized mobile radio telephony carriers.
According to the data, 437 carriers reported that
they were engaged in the provision of wireless
telephony.^81 We have estimated that 260 of these
are small businesses under the SBA small business
size standard.

29. Broadband Personal Communications Service. The
broadband personal communications

^74 See Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the Commission's
Rules With Regard to Filing Procedures in the Multipoint
Distribution Service and in the Instructional Television
Fixed Service and Implementation of Section 309(j) of the
Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, MM Docket No.
94-131 and PP Docket No. 93-253, Report and Order, 10 FCC
Rcd 9589 (1995).

^75 13 C.F.R. S 121.201, NAICS code 515210.

^76 13 C.F.R. S 121.201, NAICS code 515210.

^77 5 U.S.C. S 601(3).

^78 13 C.F.R. S 121.201, NAICS code 517211.

^79 13 C.F.R. S 121.201, NAICS code 517212.

^80 FCC, Wireline Competition Bureau, Industry Analysis
and Technology Division, Trends in Telephone Service at
Table 5.3 (June 2005) (Trends in Telephone Service). This
source uses data that are current as of October 1, 2004.

^81 Id. Table 5.3, page 5-5.

services (PCS) spectrum is divided into six frequency
blocks designated A through F, and the Commission has
held auctions for each block. The Commission has created
a small business size standard for Blocks C and F as an
entity that has average gross revenues of less than $40
million in the three previous calendar years.^82 For
Block F, an additional small business size standard for
"very small business" was added and is defined as an
entity that, together with its affiliates, has average
gross revenues of not more than $15 million for the
preceding three calendar years.^83 These small business
size standards, in the context of broadband PCS auctions,
have been approved by the SBA.^84 No small businesses
within the SBA-approved small business size standards bid
successfully for licenses in Blocks A and B. There were
90 winning bidders that qualified as small entities in
the Block C auctions. A total of 93 "small" and "very
small" business bidders won approximately 40 percent of
the 1,479 licenses for Blocks D, E, and F.^85 On March
23, 1999, the Commission reauctioned 155 C, D, E, and F
Block licenses; there were 113 small business winning
bidders.^86 On January 26, 2001, the Commission completed
the auction of 422 C and F Broadband PCS licenses in
Auction No. 35. Of the 35 winning bidders in this
auction, 29 qualified as "small" or "very small"
businesses.^87 Subsequent events, concerning Auction 35,
including judicial and agency determinations, resulted in
a total of 163 C and F Block licenses being available for
grant.^88

30. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs).
We have included small incumbent local exchange carriers
in this present IRFA analysis. As noted above, a "small
business" under the RFA is one that, inter alia, meets
the pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a
telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer
employees), and "is not dominant in its field of
operation."^89 The SBA's Office of Advocacy contends
that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent LECs are not
dominant in their field of operation because any such
dominance is not "national" in scope.^90 We have
therefore included small incumbent local exchange
carriers in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize that
this RFA action has no effect on Commission analyses and
determinations in other, non-RFA contexts. Neither the
Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business
size standard

^82 See Amendment of Parts 20 and 24 of the Commission's
Rules - Broadband PCS Competitive Bidding and the
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Spectrum Cap, Report and
Order, 11 FCC Rcd 7824, 7850-52, paras. 57-60 (1996)
(Broadband PCS Report and Order); see also 47 C.F.R. S
24.720(b).

^83 See Broadband PCS Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at
7852, para. 60.

See Letter to Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions and Industry
Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
Federal Communications Commission, from Aida Alvarez,
Administrator, Small Business Administration, dated
December 2, 1998.

^85 FCC News, Broadband PCS, D, E and F Block Auction
Closes, No. 71744 (rel. Jan. 14, 1997).

^86 See C, D, E, and F Block Broadband PCS Auction
Closes, Public Notice, 14 FCC Rcd 6688 (WTB 1999).

^87 See C and F Block Broadband PCS Auction Closes;
Winning Bidders Announced, Public Notice, 16 FCC Rcd 2339
(2001).

In addition, we note that, as a general matter, the
number of winning bidders that qualify as small
businesses at the close of an auction does not
necessarily represent the number of small businesses
currently in service. Also, the Commission does not
generally track subsequent business size unless, in the
context of assignments or transfers, unjust enrichment
issues are implicated.

^89 15 U.S.C. S 632.

^90 Letter from Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, SBA, to William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC (May
27, 1999). The Small Business Act contains a definition
of "small-business concern," which the RFA incorporates
into its own definition of "small business." See 15
U.S.C. S 632(a) (Small Business Act); 5 U.S.C. S 601(3)
(RFA). SBA regulations interpret "small business concern"
to include the concept of dominance on a national basis.
See 13

C.F.R. S 121.102(b).

specifically for incumbent local exchange services. The
appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the
category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that
size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500
or fewer employees.^91 According to Commission data,^92
1,303 carriers have reported that they are engaged in the
provision of incumbent local exchange services. Of these
1,303 carriers, an estimated 1,020 have 1,500 or fewer
employees and 283 have more than 1,500 employees.
Consequently, the Commission estimates that most
providers of incumbent local exchange service are small
businesses that may be affected by our proposed rules.

1. 31. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive
LECs), Competitive Access Providers (CAPs),
"Shared-Tenant Service Providers," and "Other Local
Service Providers." Neither the Commission nor the
SBA has developed a small business size standard
specifically for these service providers. The
appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the
category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under
that size standard, such a business is small if it
has 1,500 or fewer employees.^93 According to
Commission data,^94 769 carriers have reported that
they are engaged in the provision of either
competitive access provider services or competitive
local exchange carrier services. Of these 769
carriers, an estimated 676 have 1,500 or fewer
employees and 93 have more than 1,500 employees. In
addition, 12 carriers have reported that they are
"Shared-Tenant Service Providers," and all 12 are
estimated to have 1.500 or fewer employees. In
addition, 39 carriers have reported that they are
"Other Local Service Providers." Of the 39, an
estimated 38 have 1,500 or fewer employees and one
has more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the
Commission estimates that most providers of
competitive local exchange service, competitive
access providers, "Shared-Tenant Service Providers,"
and "Other Local Service Providers" are small
entities that may be affected by our proposed rules.

2. 32. Satellite Telecommunications and Other
Telecommunications. There is no small business size
standard developed specifically for providers of
satellite service. The appropriate size standards
under SBA rules are for the two broad census
categories of "Satellite Telecommunications" and
"Other Telecommunications." Under both categories,
such a business is small if it has $13.5 million or
less in average annual receipts.^95

3. 33. The first category of Satellite
Telecommunications "comprises establishments
primarily engaged in providing point-to-point
telecommunications services to other establishments
in the telecommunications and broadcasting
industries by forwarding and receiving
communications signals via a system of satellites or
reselling satellite telecommunications."^96 For this
category, Census Bureau data for 2002 show that
there were a total of 371 firms that operated for
the entire year.^97 Of this total, 307 firms had
annual receipts of under $10 million, and 26 firms
had receipts of $10 million to $24,999,999.^98
Consequently, we estimate that the majority of
Satellite Telecommunications firms are small
entities that might be affected by our action.

^91 13 C.F.R. S 121.201, NAICS code 517110.

^92 Trends in Telephone Service, Table 5.3.

^93 13 C.F.R. S 121.201, NAICS code 517110.

^94 Trends in Telephone Service, Table 5.3.

13 C.F.R. S 121.201 , NAICS codes 517410 and 517910.

^96 U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS Definitions, "517410
Satellite Telecommunications";
http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF517.HTM.

U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census, Subject Series:
Information, "Establishment and Firm Size (Including
Legal Form of Organization)," Table 4, NAICS code 517410
(issued Nov. 2005).

^98 Id. An additional 38 firms had annual receipts of $25
million or more.

D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and
Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

34. This Notice contains proposals that may result in
specific reporting or recordkeeping requirements. The
Notice seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendation that the Commission coordinate all federal
outage and infrastructure reporting requirements in times
of crisis. Specifically, the Notice seeks comment on the
appropriate content of emergency outage reports, format,
frequency, distribution and related issues. The Notice
requests suggestions on the appropriate content of
emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution
and related issues. The Notice also seeks comment on the
Independent Panel's recommendation that the Commission
establish a "Readiness Checklist" for the communications
industry that would include, inter alia, developing
formal business continuity plans. The Notice requests
comment on the appropriate breadth of business continuity
plans as well as whether the Commission should adopt
guidance or criteria for the elements that would comprise
the Readiness Checklist.

E. Steps Taken to Minimize the Significant Economic
Impact on Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives
Considered

35. The RFA requires an agency to describe any
significant alternatives that it has considered in
developing its approach, which may include the following
four alternatives (among others): "(1) the establishment
of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available
to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation,
or simplification of compliance and reporting
requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3)
the use of performance rather than design standards; and
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part
thereof, for such small entities."^99 We invite comment
on whether small entities should be subject to different
requirements if we adopt rules to promote more effective,
efficient response and recovery efforts, and whether
differentiating such requirements based on the size of
the entities is warranted. For example, should there be
timing differences for requirements imposed on small
entities? Should small entities be subject to different
continuity of operations requirements? .

F. Federal Rules that May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict
with the Proposed Rules

36. None.

^99 5 U.S.C. S 603(c)(1) - (c)(4).

APPENDIX B

INDEPENDENT PANEL REVIEWING THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FEDERAL COMMUNCIATIONS COMMISSION

Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks

Report and Recommendations to the
Federal Communications Commission

June 12, 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
.............................................................................................................
i

INTRODUCTION
...........................................................................................................................
1

I. Panel Formation and Charge
................................................................................................
1

II. Process and Activities of the Panel
......................................................................................
2

PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE
KATRINA ON
THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND THE SUFFICIENCY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE RECOVERY EFFORT
...........................................................................................................
5

I. Network Reliability and Resiliency
.....................................................................................
5

A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Various Types of
Communications Networks ....... 6

B. Major Problems Identified Following Katrina
.......................................................
13

II. Recovery Coordination and Procedures
.............................................................................
15

A. Access to the Affected Area and Key Resources
................................................... 15

B. Coordination Between Industry and Government
................................................. 19

C. Emergency Communications Services and Programs
........................................... 21

III. First Responder Communications
......................................................................................
22

A. Lack of Advanced Planning for Massive System Failures
.................................... 23

B. Lack of Interoperability
.........................................................................................
25

C. PSAP Rerouting
.....................................................................................................
27

D. Emergency Medical Communications
...................................................................
27

IV. Emergency Communications to the Public
........................................................................
27

A. Lack of Activation
.................................................................................................
28

B. Limitations on Coverage
........................................................................................
28

C. Reaching Persons with Disabilities and Non-English
Speaking Americans ......... 29

D. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency Information
................................................. 30

RECOMMENDATIONS
...............................................................................................................
31

CONCLUSION
..............................................................................................................................
43

APPENDIX A: Members of the Independent Panel

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks ("Katrina Panel" or
"Panel") hereby submits its report to the Federal
Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC"). The
Panel is charged with studying the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on the telecommunications and media
infrastructure in the areas affected by the hurricane and
making recommendations for improving disaster
preparedness, network reliability and communications
among first responders.

FINDINGS

Hurricane Katrina had a devastating impact on the Gulf
Coast region, including its communications networks. The
sheer force of this deadly hurricane and the extensive
flooding from the breached levees in New Orleans severely
tested the reliability and resiliency of the
communications infrastructure in the area. Indeed, every
sector of the communications industry was impacted by the
storm. The Panel observed that most of the region's
communications infrastructure fared fairly well through
the storm's extreme wind and rain, with the coastal areas
suffering the worst damage. However, the unique
conditions in Katrina's aftermath - substantial flooding,
widespread, extended power outages, and serious security
issues - were responsible for damaging or disrupting
communications service to a huge geographic area for a
prolonged period of time. Indeed, in reviewing the impact
on each communications sector, there appeared to be three
main problems that caused the majority of communications
network interruptions:

(1) flooding; (2) lack of power and/or fuel; and (3)
failure of redundant pathways for communications traffic.
In addition, a fourth item - inadvertent line cuts during
restoration - resulted in additional network damage,
causing new outages or delaying service restoration.

The Panel also observed significant impediments to the
recovery effort resulting from:

1. o Inconsistent and unclear requirements for
communications infrastructure repair crews and their
subcontractors to gain access to the affected area;

2. o Limited access to power and/or generator fuel;

3. o Limited security for communications
infrastructure and personnel;

4. o Lack of pre-positioned back-up equipment;

5. o Lack of established coordination between the
communications industry and state and local
officials as well as among federal, state and local
government officials with respect to communications
matters; and

6. o Limited use of available priority communications
services, such as GETS, WPS and TSP.

On a more positive note, in the wake of the storm, lines
of communication between the communications industry and
the federal government were established and seemed
generally effective in facilitating coordination,
promptly granting needed regulatory relief, and gathering
outage information. The FCC was widely praised as playing
a critical role in helping to restore communications
connectivity. In addition, ad hoc, informal sharing of
fuel and equipment among communications industry
participants helped to maximize the assets available and
bolster the recovery effort. However, additional
coordination of personnel and assets within industry and
among government agencies could have substantially
facilitated restoration of communications networks.

With respect to emergency communications, Hurricane
Katrina significantly hampered the functionality of these
typically resilient systems. The areas in and around New
Orleans were seriously impacted, due to heavier storm
impact and the levee flooding. As a result, more than
2,000 police, fire and emergency medical service
personnel were forced to communicate in single channel
mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing only three mutual aid
frequencies. This level of destruction did not extend to
inland areas, which generally did not lose their
communications capabilities and were soon operating at
pre-Katrina capabilities. In the hardest hit areas,
however, the disruption of public safety communications
operability, as well as a lack of interoperability,
frustrated the response effort and caused tremendous
confusion among official personnel and the general
public.

The Panel observed that lack of effective first responder
communications after the storm revealed inadequate
planning, coordination and training on the use of
technologies that can help to restore emergency
communications. Very few public safety agencies had
stockpiles of key equipment on hand to implement rapid
repairs or alternative, redundant systems to turn to when
their primary systems failed. To the extent alternative
systems were available, lack of training and familiarity
with the equipment limited functionality and impeded the
recovery effort. Communications assets that could have
been used to fill gaps were apparently not requested or
deployed in sufficient quantities to have a significant
impact. Hurricane Katrina also highlighted the
long-standing problem of interoperability among public
safety communications systems operating in different
frequency bands and with different technical standards.
Additionally, 911 emergency call handling suffered from a
lack of preprogrammed routing of calls to PSAPs not
incapacitated by the hurricane. Finally, the emergency
medical community seemed lacking in contingency
communications planning and information about
technologies and services that might address their
critical communications needs.

The use of communications networks to disseminate
reliable emergency information to the public is critical
- before, during and after such events. While the Panel
understands that the National Weather Service used the
Emergency Alert System ("EAS") to provide severe weather
warnings to citizens in the Gulf States in advance of
Katrina making landfall, the system was apparently not
utilized by state and local officials to provide
localized emergency evacuation and other important
information. In the absence of EAS activation,
inconsistent or erroneous information was sometimes
provided within the affected area. Further, the Panel
heard about notification technologies that may permit
emergency messages to be sent to wireline and wireless
telephones as well as personal digital assistants and
other mobile devices, thus complementing the traditional
broadcast-based EAS. Ensuring emergency communications
reach Americans with hearing or visual disabilities or
who do not speak English was a major challenge. Although
the broadcast industry has taken significant steps to
provide on-screen sign language interpreters, closed
captioning, and critical information in a second
language, these steps were reported to be insufficient in
certain instances. Shelters also generally did not have
communications capabilities for those with hearing or
speech disabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. > Pre-positioning the communications industry and
the government for disasters in order to achieve
greater network reliability and resiliency. These
recommendations include:

1. o Pre-positioning for the Communications
Industry--A Readiness Checklist. The FCC
should work with and encourage each industry
sector, through their organizations or
associations, to develop and publicize
sector-specific readiness recommendations.

2. o Pre-positioning for Public Safety - An
Awareness Program for Non-Traditional
Emergency Alternatives. The FCC should take
steps to educate the public safety community
about the availability and capabilities of
non-traditional technologies that might
provide effective back-up solutions for
existing public safety communications systems.

3. o Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory
Requirements - An A Priori Program for
Disaster Areas. The FCC should explore
amending its rules to permit automatic grants
of certain types of waivers or special
temporary authority (STA) in a particular
geographic area if the President declares that
area to be a "disaster area".

4. o Pre-positioning for Government Outage
Monitoring - A Single Repository and Contact
with Consistent Data Collection. The FCC
should coordinate with other federal and state
agencies to identify a single repository/point
of contact for communications outage
information in the wake of an emergency. The
Panel suggests that the FCC is the federal
agency best situated to perform this function.

2. > Improving recovery coordination to address
existing shortcomings and to maximize the use of
existing resources. These recommendations include:

1. o Remedying Existing Shortcomings - National
Credentialing Guidelines for Communications
Infrastructure Providers. The FCC should work
with other appropriate federal departments and
agencies and the communications industry to
promptly develop national credentialing
requirements and process guidelines for
enabling communications infrastructure
providers and their contracted workers access
to the affected area post-disaster.

2. o Remedying Existing Shortcomings - Emergency
Responder Status for Communications
Infrastructure Providers. The Panel supports
the National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee's ("NSTAC's")
recommendation that telecommunications
infrastructure providers and their contracted
workers be afforded emergency responder status
under the Stafford Act, but recommends that it
be broadened to include all communications
infrastructure providers.

3. o Remedying Existing Shortcomings -
Utilization of State/Regional Coordination
Bodies. The FCC should work with state and
local government and the communications
industry (including wireline, wireless, WISP,
satellite, cable and broadcasting) to better
utilize the coordinating capabilities at
regional, state and local Emergency Operations
Centers, as well as the Joint Field Office.

4. o Maximizing Existing Resources - Expanding
and Publicizing Emergency Communications
Programs (GETS, WPS, and TSP). The FCC should
work with the National Communications System
("NCS") to actively and aggressively promote
GETS, WPS and TSP to all eligible government,
public safety, and critical industry groups.

5. o Maximizing Existing Resources - Broadening
NCC to Include All Communications
Infrastructure Sectors. The FCC should work
with the NCS to broaden the membership of the
National Coordination Center for
Telecommunications ("NCC") to include adequate
representation of all types of communications
systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite
and other new technologies, as appropriate.

6. o Maximizing Existing Resources - FCC Website
for Emergency Coordination Information. The
FCC should create a password-protected
website, accessible by credentialed entities,
listing the key state emergency management
contacts, as well as post-disaster
coordination areas for communications
providers.

7. o Maximizing Existing Resources - FCC Website
for Emergency Response Team Information. The
FCC should create a website to publicize the
agency's emergency response team's contact
information and procedures for facilitating
disaster response and outage recovery.

3. > Improving the operability and interoperability
of public safety and 911 communications in times of
crisis. These recommendations include:

1. o Essential Steps in Pre-positioning
Equipment, Supplies and Personnel - An
Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and
Alternatives Inventory. The FCC should
encourage state and local jurisdictions to
retain and maintain, including through
arrangements with the private sector, a cache
of equipment components that would be needed
to immediately restore existing public safety
communications. The FCC should also work with
the NCC to develop inventories of alternative
communications assets.

2. o Essential Steps in Enabling Emergency
Communications Capabilities - Facilitating
First Responder Interoperability. The FCC
should take several steps to facilitate
interoperability among first responder
communications, including maintaining the
schedule for commercial spectrum auctions to
fund the federal public safety grant programs;
working with the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration ("NTIA") and
the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") to
establish appropriate criteria for these
grants; encouraging the expeditious
development and approval of 700 MHz regional
plans; working with NTIA and DHS to develop
spectrum sharing among federal, state and
local agencies for emergency response
purposes; and publicizing interoperability
successes and best practices.

3. o Essential Steps in Addressing E-911 Lessons
Learned - A Plan for Resiliency and
Restoration of E-911 Infrastructure and Public
Safety Answering Points ("PSAPs"). The FCC
should encourage implementation of certain
Network Reliability and Interoperability
Council ("NRIC") best practice recommendations
to ensure more robust E-911 service. In
addition, the FCC should recommend and take
steps to permit the designation of a secondary
back-up PSAP more than 200 miles away, as well
as urge applicable federal programs to expand
eligibility for 911
enhancement/interoperability grants.

4. o Essential Steps in Addressing Lessons
Learned Concerning Emergency Medical and
Hospital Communications Needs - An Outreach
Program to Educate and Include the Emergency
Medical Community in Emergency Communications
Preparedness. The FCC should work to assist
the emergency medical community to facilitate
the resiliency and effectiveness of their
emergency communications systems through
education and clarification of Stafford Act
classification and funding eligibility.

4. > Improving communication of emergency information
to the public. These recommendations include:

1. o Actions to Alert and Inform - Revitalize
and Publicize the Underutilized Emergency
Alert System. The FCC should revitalize and
publicize the underutilized EAS through
education and the exploration of complementary
notification technologies.

2. o Actions to Alert and Inform - Commence
Efforts to Ensure that Persons with
Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking
Americans Receive Meaningful Alerts. The FCC
should commence efforts to ensure that persons
with disabilities and non-English-speaking
Americans receive meaningful alerts, including
resolving technical hurdles to these
individual's utilization of EAS, publicizing
best practices for serving these individuals,
and encouraging state and local emergency
agencies to make critical emergency
information accessible to persons with
disabilities and non-English-speaking
Americans.

3. o Actions to Alert and Inform - Ensure
Consistent and Reliable Emergency Information
Through a Consolidated and Coordinated Public
Information Program. The FCC should work with
federal, state and local agencies to ensure
consistent and reliable emergency information
through a consolidated and coordinated public
information program.

* * * * *

INTRODUCTION

The Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks ("Katrina Panel" or
"Panel") hereby submits its report to the Federal
Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC"). The
Panel is charged with studying the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on the telecommunications and media
infrastructure^1 in the areas affected by the hurricane.
As directed by the Commission, this report presents the
Panel's findings as well as recommendations for improving
disaster preparedness, network reliability and
communications among first responders.

I. Panel Formation and Charge

On September 15, 2005, FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin
announced that he would establish an independent expert
panel to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the
communications infrastructure.^2 Chairman Martin made the
announcement at the FCC's Open Meeting focusing on the
effects of Hurricane Katrina, which was held in Atlanta,
Georgia. He stated that the Panel would be composed of
public safety and communications industry
representatives.^3 The twenty-seven members of the Panel,
reflecting that diverse composition, are identified in
Appendix A. Chairman Martin appointed Nancy J. Victory of
Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, the former Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Communications and Information and
Administrator of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, to chair the Panel.^4

In accordance with the requirements of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, the FCC published a notice
announcing the establishment of the Katrina Panel in the
Federal Register on January 6, 2006.^5 The Panel's
charter details the Katrina Panel's objectives and the
scope of its activity.^6 Specifically, the Charter
directs the Panel:

Throughout this report, the terms "communications
infrastructure" and "communications networks" are
intended to refer to both telecommunications (e.g.,
telephony, wireless, satellite, WISP) and media (e.g.,
radio, television, cable) infrastructure. "Communications
providers" is intended to refer to the operators of these
networks.

Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission, Open Meeting on the Effects of
Hurricane Katrina, Atlanta, GA, at 3 (Sept. 15, 2005),
available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-261095A1.pdf
[hereinafter "Martin Sept. 15 Statement"]; see also FCC
Takes Steps to Assist in Hurricane Katrina Disaster
Relief, 2005 FCC LEXIS 5109 (rel. Sept. 15, 2005)
(Commission news release).

Martin Sept. 15 Statement at 3.

Chairman Kevin J. Martin Names Nancy J. Victory as Chair
of the Federal Communication Commission's Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, 2005 FCC LEXIS 6514 (rel. Nov.
28, 2005) (Commission news release).

See Federal Communications Commission, Federal Advisory
Committee Act, Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 933 (Jan. 6, 2006),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/hkipnoe.pdf.
Access to the public comments filed with and notices
generated by the Katrina Panel (unless otherwise noted
with a URL designation in the citations which follow) is
through the Panel's website, available at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/.

1. o to study the impact of Hurricane Katrina on all
sectors of the telecommunications and media
industries, including public safety communications;

2. o to review the sufficiency and effectiveness of
the recovery effort with respect to this
infrastructure; and

3. o to make recommendations to the Commission by June
15, 2006 regarding ways to improve disaster
preparedness, network reliability, and communication
among first responders such as police, fire
fighters, and emergency medical personnel.^7

Pursuant to the Charter, the Panel became operational on
January 9, 2006. The Charter also provides that the Panel
will terminate on June 15, 2006 and must carry out its
duties before that date.

II. Process and Activities of the Panel

In order to gather information to fulfill the directives
of its Charter, the Panel called upon the experiences of
its members, many of whom were directly involved in the
recovery efforts following Hurricane Katrina. The Panel
also solicited broad public input by providing processes
by which interested parties could submit written
comments^8 and provide oral presentations.^9 The Panel
additionally invited certain experts to present to the
Panel or demonstrate new technologies and applications.
The written comments received by the Panel, as well as
transcripts of the Panel's meetings, are publicly
available at the FCC's Public Reference Room and on the
Panel's website. Finally, the Panel also reviewed
publicly available information regarding matters under
the Panel's consideration.

The Panel met five times to hear oral presentations, to
discuss draft findings and recommendations, and to
finalize and approve this report. Those meetings occurred
on January 30, March 6-7, April 18, May 12, and June 9,
2006. The March 6-7 meeting was held in Jackson,
Mississippi, where the Panel was able to hear oral
presentations by interested parties. All other meetings
of the Panel occurred in Washington, DC. All of these
meetings were public, with prior notice of their date,
time and location provided to the public.^10

See FCC Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, Charter
(filed Jan. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/HKIPCharter.pdf.

Id. at 1- 2.

See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Federal
Advisory Committee Act; Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks,
Notice of opportunity to provide oral presentations, 71
Fed. Reg. 5846 (Feb. 3, 2006), available at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20061800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/pdf/06-1057.pdf.

Id.

See, e.g., Notice of Appointment Of Members To Serve On
Federal Communications Commission's Independent Panel
Reviewing The Impact Of Hurricane Katrina On
Communications Networks; And Independent Panel's First
Meeting Scheduled For January 30, 2006, Public Notice, 21
FCC Rcd 197 (2006). The Commission

The Panel formed informal working groups ("IWGs"), made
up of small numbers of Panel members, to help it
effectively review and process the necessary information
within the time required. The working groups met numerous
times in person and telephonically during the Panel's
existence. These working groups were not decision-making
bodies. Rather, they compiled and sorted information in
particular issue areas for presentation to the full
Panel. The Panel had three informal working groups:

1. o IWG-1: Infrastructure Resiliency. This working
group focused its discussions and efforts on four
main areas: (1) reviewing how and why certain
portions of the communications networks failed; (2)
identifying which portions of the communications
networks continued to work and withstood the
hurricane and why; (3) examining how communications
technology can be made less vulnerable to failing;
and (4) studying what steps can be taken, pre-event,
to strengthen the communications infrastructure.
Marion Scott, Vice President - Operations,
CenturyTel, served as the Chair of this working
group and Steve Dean, Fire Chief of Mobile, Alabama,
served as Vice-Chair.

2. o IWG-2: Recovery Coordination and Procedures. This
working group focused on seven main issues: (1)
examining ways to increase the speed with which
communications networks can be restored post-event;
(2) reviewing whether communications technology
could have been used more effectively during the
recovery period, including issues relating to
consumer education and post-event deployment of
communications technology; (3) reviewing the
intra-industry procedures that communications
providers use to coordinate recovery efforts; (4)
reviewing the industry-government procedures that
private communications firms and federal, state and
local governments use to coordinate recovery
efforts; (5) studying ways that private industry can
obtain faster and more efficient access to impacted
areas; (6) reviewing the security and protection
procedures utilized by private communications
industry members when they send their first
responders to impacted areas; and (7) reviewing how
well emergency communications services, including
Telecommunications Service Priority, Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service, and Wireless
Priority Service, performed during Katrina and the
extent to which emergency responders used these
services. Steve Davis, Senior Vice President -
Engineering, Clear Channel Radio, served as the
Chair of this working group and Lt. Colonel Joseph
Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State
Police, served as Vice-Chair.

3. o IWG-3: Emergency Communications. This working
group focused on six main issues:

(1) identifying means for ensuring or enabling rapid
deployment of interoperable communications in the wake of
an event like Hurricane Katrina that can be implemented
in the short term; (2) identifying any coordination that
needs to occur among public safety entities to facilitate
implementation of such a system in the wake of a
disaster; (3) reviewing Hurricane Katrina's impact on the
Gulf Coast Region's 911 and E-911

also published notices in the Federal Register announcing
Panel meetings. See, e.g., Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Advisory Committee Act; Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, Notice of public meeting, 71
Fed. Reg. 2233 (Jan. 13, 2006). The Panel's website at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/Meetings.html contains more
information about meeting notices.

systems; (4) reviewing the impact of the hurricane on
PSAPs and the procedures used to re-route emergency
calls; (5) examining whether and how the communications
networks could have provided greater 911 connectivity for
private citizens; and (6) reviewing the adequacy of
emergency communications to the public before, during and
after the hurricane, and the best ways to alert and
inform the public about emergencies in the future. Steve
Delahousey, Vice President - Operations, American Medical
Response, served as the Chair of this working group and
Jim Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network Group, served
as Vice-Chair.

Typically, discussion about various findings and
recommendations occurred first within the working groups.
The working groups then presented draft findings and
recommendations to the full Panel for further discussion.
Certain issues were referred back to the working groups
for additional discussion and revision.

The Panel held its final meeting on June 9, 2006. During
this meeting, the Panel discussed the final draft report,
including recommendations to the Commission. The Panel
then unanimously approved this report for submission to
the Commission.^11

The Panel would like to recognize and express
appreciation to Lisa Fowlkes and Jean Ann Collins, the
Designated and Alternate Designated FACA Officers for the
Panel, for their important contributions in enabling the
Panel to carry out its mission under the Charter. In
addition, the Panel would like to thank Michael A. Lewis,
Thomas Dombrowsky, and Brendan T. Carr of Wiley Rein &
Fielding LLP for their considerable assistance in
preparing this report.

PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE
KATRINA ON THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND THE SUFFICIENCY
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOVERY EFFORT

The Katrina Panel has been charged with studying the
impact of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of the
telecommunications and media industries, including public
safety communications. The Panel has also been directed
to review the effectiveness of the recovery effort with
respect to this infrastructure. To inform its views on
these issues, the Panel heard oral presentations and
reviewed written comments from numerous government and
industry representatives, as well as other interested
members of the public. The Panel members also brought to
bear their own experiences with Hurricane Katrina and its
aftermath. As a result of digesting and discussing all of
this information, the Panel members identified a number
of areas where problems were observed or communications
recovery and restoration efforts could have been more
effective. The Panel also identified areas where
successes were achieved - successes that should be
repeated. These observed problems and successes, which
are detailed below, generally formed the basis for the
Panel's recommendations to the Commission.

The Panel's observations below are divided into four
sections. Section I, Network Reliability and Resiliency,
discusses the successes and failures in the resiliency
and reliability of various types of communications
networks from an operational perspective. This section
looks at the effects of both the hurricane itself and the
subsequent levee breaches on communications
infrastructure. Section II, Recovery Coordination and
Procedures, reviews the challenges communications
infrastructure providers encountered in restoring and
maintaining communications service, particularly with
regard to access and credentialing issues, restoration of
power, and security. Section III, First Responder
Communications, examines the challenges posed to public
safety and emergency first responders in the days
following Hurricane Katrina. And finally Section IV,
Emergency Communication to the Public, focuses on the
adequacy and effectiveness of emergency communications to
the public before, during and after Hurricane Katrina.

I. Network Reliability and Resiliency

The sheer force of Hurricane Katrina and the extensive
flooding resulting from the breached levees severely
tested the reliability and resiliency of communications
networks in the Gulf Coast region. Katrina also affected
areas of the Gulf Coast in varied fashions. In the high
impact zones near Gulfport, MS and New Orleans, LA, the
hurricane created much heavier damage to the
infrastructure due to strong winds and, in New Orleans,
extensive flooding in the days after the storm. In less
impacted areas, damage was less severe and recovery
efforts were more easily accomplished. Katrina taxed each
type of communications infrastructure in a variety of
ways: (1) strong winds and rain made it difficult for
technical staff to support and maintain the networks and
blew antennas out of alignment; (2) heavy flooding
following Katrina overwhelmed a large portion of the
communications infrastructure, damaging equipment and
impeding recovery; (3) single points of failure in vital
communications links led to widespread communications
outages across a variety of networks; and (4) the
duration of power outages far outlasted most generator
fuel reserves, leading to the failure of otherwise
functional infrastructure. However, there were resiliency
successes in the aftermath: (1) a large portion of the
communications infrastructure withstood the storm's wind
and rain with only minor damage (as distinguished from
post-storm flooding from levee breaches and power
outages, which had a more devastating impact); (2)
satellite networks, although taxed by extensive numbers
of additional users, remained available and usable
throughout the affected region; and (3) the
communications networks operated by utilities appeared to
have a very high rate of survivability. By examining the
failures in network resiliency and reliability, along
with the successes, we can better prepare communications
infrastructure to withstand or quickly recover from
future catastrophic events.

A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Various Types of
Communications Networks.

Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath had a devastating
impact on communications networks in the Gulf Coast
region. In the affected areas of Louisiana, Mississippi
and Alabama, more than three million customer telephone
lines were knocked out of service. Both switching centers
and customer lines sustained damage. Thirty-eight 911
call centers went down. Approximately 100 broadcast
stations were unable to transmit and hundreds of
thousands of cable customers lost service.^12 Even
generally resilient public safety networks experienced
massive outages. In short, Katrina had a catastrophic
impact over a huge geographic area. Further, due to the
unique circumstances associated with this disaster,
repair and activation of the communications
infrastructure in the region was not a matter of days,
but rather a long and slow process.

To understand the precise impact that Hurricane Katrina
had on communications networks, it is useful to
distinguish between the impact of the storm itself (i.e.,
hurricane force winds and rain) and the effect of what
came later - extensive flooding from breached levees and
widespread, long term power outages. As detailed below,
it appears that most communications infrastructure in the
areas impacted by Katrina fared fairly well through the
storm's wind and rain, in most cases sustaining only
minor damage or damage that should have been promptly
repairable. Indeed, the tower industry reported that of
all the towers in the path of the 2005 hurricanes in the
Southeastern and Gulf Coast areas of the United States,
less than 1 percent suffered any structural damage.^13
The coastal areas that bore the brunt of the storm
suffered the worst infrastructure damage from the
hurricane. Not to diminish the significant impact of the
hurricane itself, what made Katrina unique and
particularly catastrophic were the unique conditions
after the winds subsided - substantial flooding and
widespread, extended power outages. These developments
impacted communications networks greatly, causing
irreparable damage to submerged electronics and prolonged
outages in many cases. The Panel's observations on how
each type of communications infrastructure withstood
Katrina and its challenging aftermath is presented below.

See Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman,
Federal Communications Commission, Hearing on Public
Safety Communications from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical
Public Policy Lessons, Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, at
2 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-261417A1.pdf
[hereinafter "Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement"].

See Comments of PCIA - The Wireless Infrastructure
Association, at 1 (May 15, 2006).

1. Public Safety Communications Networks. Public safety
communications networks are generally built to be
reliable in extreme conditions.^14 To ensure this, the
systems are planned to accommodate everyday peak service
times as well as large incidents. They are also designed
to account for radio system disruptions, such as power
outages, transmission failures, system interconnect
failures, and personal radio equipment failures. However,
these systems are generally not designed for widespread
catastrophes of long duration - the situation resulting
from Katrina.^15 As a result of the storm and its
aftermath, public safety networks in the Gulf states
experienced a large number of transmission outages that
impacted the functionality of both primary and back-up
systems. The loss of power and the failure of switches in
the wireline telephone network also had a huge impact on
the ability of public safety systems to function.^16
Public safety personnel's apparent lack of familiarity
with the operation of back-up or alternate systems (such
as satellite systems) also limited functionality.

1. a. Tower Failures. In general, public safety's
antenna towers remained standing after the storm.
The winds did blow antennas out of alignment,
requiring readjustment. However, the main cause of
transmission failures was loss of power (as
discussed below). Most public safety radio systems
by design are able to handle and manage a single or
isolated subsystem failure or loss.^17 However,
Katrina affected parts of four states, causing
transmission losses at a much greater number and
over a larger area than public safety planning had
envisioned.

2. b. Power Failures. Power for radio base stations and
battery/chargers for portable radio devices are
carefully planned for public safety systems.
However, generators are typically designed to keep
base stations operating for 24 to 48 hours. The long
duration of power outages in the wake of Katrina
substantially exceeded the capabilities of most of
public safety's back-up generators and fuel
reserves.^18 Similarly, portable radios and back-up
batteries generally have an 8 to 10 hour duty
cycle.^19 Without access to power to recharge the
devices and backup batteries, portable devices
quickly ran out of power.

3. c. Wireline and Network Infrastructure Failures.
Katrina and the subsequent levee breaches caused
significant failures of the Public Switched
Telephone Network ("PSTN"), particularly in the New
Orleans area.^20 Public safety radio networks rely
on interconnection with the PSTN or by fixed
microwave links to get communications through to

See, e.g., Written Statement of Chief Harlin R. McEwen,
Chairman, Communications and Technology Committee,
International Association of Chiefs of Police, at 2 (Mar.
6, 2006) [hereinafter "McEwen Mar. 6 Written Statement"].

15 Id. at 4.

16 See id. at 6.

17 See id. at 5.

18 See id.

19 Id. at 6.

20 Id.

public safety responders. Given PSTN failures, as well as
damage to fixed microwave links, public safety
communications were significantly affected.

d. Training Issues. Because of failures of the primary
public safety networks, public safety personnel had to
utilize back-up or alternative communications
technologies with which they may not have had substantial
experience. Confusion or unfamiliarity with the
capabilities or operational requirements of the
alternative technology seemed to result in limitations in
functionality.^21 For example, some public safety
personnel handed satellite phones were not familiar with
their special dialing requirements and, as a result,
thought the phones did not work.^22 Public safety
personnel did not seem to have adequate training on
alternative communications technologies, such as paging,
satellite, license-exempt WISP systems, and thus were not
able to transition seamlessly to these alternatives when
existing public safety communications networks failed.
Additionally, because alternative technologies were used
so infrequently, there were reported problems with upkeep
and maintenance of the equipment.^23

1. 2. Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs). Handling
of 911 calls was identified as a problem during
Katrina. As a result of the storm and subsequent
flooding, thirty-eight 911 call centers ceased to
function.^24 Limited training and advanced planning
on how to handle rerouting of emergency calls under
this situation created serious problems.^25 As an
example, the City of Biloxi was able to relocate
their 911 call center prior to landfall; however,
representatives relocated to the facility did not
have full 911 capabilities. This severely hampered
their ability to effectively route 911 calls to the
appropriate agencies. The Katrina experience
identified that there appeared to be a lack of 911
PSAP failovers and some deficits in training on
routing and handling of calls when a crisis and
rerouting occurs. Nevertheless, the vast majority of
911 call centers, especially in the less impacted
portions of the region, were up and running by
September 9.^26

2. 3. Wireline. According to FCC data, more than 3
million customer phone lines were knocked out in the
Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama area following
Hurricane Katrina.^27 The wireline telephone network
sustained significant damage both to the switching

See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Sandy Bogucki, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Tr. at 5455
(Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter "Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony"].

Written Testimony of David Cavossa, Executive Director,
Satellite Industry Association, Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina, at 4-5 (Mar. 3, 2006) [hereinafter "Cavossa-SIA
Written Testimony"]; Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr.
at 55.

23 See Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 55.

24 See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.

25 See, e.g., Comments of Comcare at 2 (May 11,
2006) (there was no plan to bring in additional

telecommunicators to the region to keep up with the
influx of 911calls from victims and rescue response
teams).

See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 27.

See Written Statement of Kenneth P. Moran, Director,
Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, FCC, on
Hurricane Katrina, Before the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, United States House of

centers that route calls and to the lines used to connect
buildings and customers to the network.^28 Katrina
highlighted the dependence on tandems and tandem access
to SS7 switches.^29 The high volume routes from tandem
switches, especially in and around New Orleans were
especially critical and vulnerable. Katrina highlighted
the need for diversity of call routing and avoiding
strict reliance upon a single routing solution. One
tandem switch, which was critical for 911 call routing,
was lost from September 4 to September 21. This switch
went down due to flooding that did not allow for fuel to
be replenished. Due to the high winds and severe
flooding, there were multiple breaks in the fiber network
supporting the PSTN. Katrina demonstrated that in many
areas there may be a lack of multiple fiber routes
throughout the wireline network and that aerial fiber was
more at risk than underground fiber. As with other
private sector communications providers, lack of access
to facilities (due to both flooding and inadequate
credentialing), lack of commercial power, and lack of
security greatly hampered recovery efforts. Nevertheless,
ten days after Katrina, nearly 90 percent of wireline
customers in the Gulf region who had lost service had
their service restored.^30 However, the vast majority of
these customers were in the less impacted regions of the
Gulf; regions that were harder hit sustained more
infrastructure damage and continued to have difficulty in
restoring service.

4. Cellular/PCS. Local cellular and personal
communications service ("PCS") networks received
considerable damage with more than 1000 base station
sites impacted.^31 In general, cellular/PCS base stations
were not destroyed by Katrina, although some antennas
required adjustment after the storm. Rather, the majority
of the adverse effects and outages encountered by
wireless providers were due to a lack of commercial power
or a lack of transport connectivity to the wireless
switch (wireline T1 line lost or fixed microwave backhaul
offline). The transport connectivity is generally
provided by the local exchange carrier. With either
failure, wireless providers would be required to make a
site visit to return the base station to operational
status. Wireless providers cited security for their
personnel, access and fuel as the most pressing needs and
problems affecting restoration of wireless service.
However, within one week after Katrina, approximately 80
percent of wireless cell sites were up and running.^32
Consistent with other systems, the 20 percent of base
stations still affected were in the areas most impacted
by Katrina. Cellular base stations on wheels ("COWs")
were successfully used as needed to restore service
throughout the affected region. Over 100 COWs were
delivered to the Gulf Coast region.^33 In addition to
voice services, text messaging was used successfully
during

Representatives, at 2 (Sept. 7, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260895A1.pdf
[hereinafter "Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement"].

Id. at 2-3.

See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Woody Glover, Director, St.
Tammany Parish Communications District, Tr. at 64-67
(Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter "Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony"].

30 Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 43.

31 Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.

32 Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 44.

S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov't Affairs, 109th Cong., Hurricane
Katrina: A Nation Still

Unprepared at 18-4, May 2006, available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf
[hereinafter "Senate Report on Katrina"].

the crisis and appeared to offer communications when the
voice networks became overloaded with traffic.
Additionally, wireless providers' push-to-talk services
appeared to be more resilient than interconnected voice
service inasmuch as they do not necessarily rely upon
connectivity to the PSTN.^34

1. 5. Paging. Paging systems seemed more reliable in
some instances than voice/cellular systems because
paging systems utilize satellite networks, rather
than terrestrial systems, for backbone
infrastructure.^35 Paging technology is also
inherently redundant, which means that messages may
still be relayed if a single transmitter or group of
transmitters in a network fails.^36 Paging signals
penetrate buildings very well, thus providing an
added level of reliability.^37 Additionally, pagers
benefited from having a long battery life and thus
remained operating longer during the power
outages.^38 Other positive observations concerning
paging systems included that they were effective at
text messaging and were equipped to provide
broadcast messaging.^39 Finally, although it is
unclear whether this function was utilized, group
pages can be sent out during times of emergencies to
alert thousands of pager units all at the same
time.^40

2. 6. Satellite. Satellite networks appeared to be the
communications service least disrupted by Hurricane
Katrina.^41 As these networks do not heavily depend
upon terrestrial-based infrastructure, they are
typically not affected by wind, rain, flooding or
power outages.^42 As a result, both fixed and mobile
satellite systems provided a functional, alternative

See Written Testimony of Dave Flessas, VP, Network
Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp, Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina, at 3 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "Sprint Nextel
Jan. 30 Written Testimony"].

See, e.g., Written Testimony of Vincent D. Kelly,
President and Chief Executive Officer, USA Mobility,
Before the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina at 7 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
"Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written Testimony"];
Oral Testimony of Bruce Deer, President, American
Association of Paging Carriers, Tr. at 122-123 (Mar. 6,
2006) [hereinafter "Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony"].

36 See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6
Written Testimony at 7-8.

37 Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 123.

38 Id.

39 See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6
Written Testimony at 3.

40 See, e.g., Comments of Interstate Wireless,
Inc., at 1 (May 10, 2006).

See, e.g., Comments of Globalstar LLC, at 1
41 (Jan. 27, 2006) [hereinafter "Globalstar
Comments"].

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-9
42 ("satellite phones do not rely on terrestrial .
. . infrastructure that

is necessary for land mobile radio, land-line, and
cellular communications"); Written Statement of Tony
Trujillo, Chairman, Satellite Industry Association,
Hearing on Public Safety Communications From 9/11 to
Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of
Representatives, at 3 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/09292005Hearing1648/Trujillo.pdf
[hereinafter "Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement"].

communications path for those in the storm-ravaged
region.^43 Mobile satellite operators reported large
increases in satellite traffic without any particular
network/infrastructure issues.^44 More than 20,000
satellite phones were deployed to the Gulf Coast region
in the days following Katrina.^45 Broadband capacity was
provided by fixed satellite operators for voice, video
and data network applications. Nevertheless, there were
functionality issues with satellite communications -
largely due to lack of user training and equipment
preparation.^46 Some satellite phones require specialized
dialing in order to place a call. They also require line
of sight with the satellite and thus do not generally
work indoors.^47 Users who had not been trained or used a
satellite phone prior to Katrina reported frustration and
difficulty in rapid and effective use of these
devices.^48 Satellite phones also require charged
batteries. Handsets that were not charged and ready to go
were of no use as there was often no power to recharge
handsets. Additionally, most of Louisiana's parishes (all
but three) did not have satellite phones on hand because
they had previously chosen to discontinue their service
as a cost-saving measure.^49 Finally, users expressed the
observation that satellite data networks (replacing
wireline T1 service) were more robust and had fewer
difficulties in obtaining and maintaining communications
with the satellite network than voice services.

7. Broadcasting. The television and radio broadcasting
industry was also hard hit by Katrina. Approximately 28
percent of television stations experienced downtime in
the storm zone; approximately 35 percent of radio
stations failed in one fashion or another.^50 In

See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel Jeff Smith,
Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness, Hurricane Katrina:
Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana,
Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, United
States House of Representatives, at 12 (Dec. 14, 2005),
available at
http://katrina.house.gov/hearing/12-14-05/smith_121405.doc
[hereinafter "Jeff Smith Written Statement"]; Written
Statement of Bruce Baughman, Director, Alabama State
Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina:
Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama, Before
the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, United
States House of Representatives, at 4 (Nov. 9, 2005),
available at
http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/11_09_05/baughman_110905.doc;
Written Statement of Robert Latham, Director, Mississippi
Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina:
Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi,
Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, United
States House of Representatives, at 4 (Dec. 7, 2005),
available at
http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12_07_05/latham_120705.pdf.

Globalstar Comments at 2.

Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement at 4.

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-9 (problems
with satellite phones do not appear to have been caused
by the phones themselves or the satellite networks; a
combination of user error and obstruction of satellite
signals were most likely the problems); Cavossa-SIA
Testimony at 4-5; Bogucki Mar. 6 Public Testimony, Tr. at
55.

Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 5.

Id. at 4.

See Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, H.R. Rep. No. 109-377, at 172-73 (2006),
available at
http://www.gpo.access.gov/serialset/creports/Katrina.html,
[hereinafter "House Report"].

See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 45;
Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission, Hearing on Communications in a
Disaster, Before the Senate Comm. on

addition, in New Orleans and the surrounding area, only 4
of the 41 broadcast radio stations remained on the air in
the wake of the hurricane.^51 Some broadcasters continued
broadcasting only by partnering with other broadcasters
whose signals were not interrupted.^52 Broadcasters
reported very few tower losses as a result of Katrina.
Instead, the wind displacing and causing misaligning
antennas was the biggest cause of broadcast outages.
Although this type of damage could be readily repaired,
the lengthy power outages - which substantially exceeded
back-up generator capabilities - prevented many broadcast
stations from coming back on the air. Power outages at
the viewer/listener end were also an issue as they
prevented broadcast transmissions from being successfully
received. Additionally, the lack of security for
broadcast facilities and repair personnel impeded
recovery efforts. Nevertheless, within three weeks after
Katrina, more than 90 percent of broadcasters were up and
running in the affected region.^53 However, in the areas
most impacted by the storm, the vast majority of stations
remained down much longer.

1. 8. Cable. As with the broadcasting industry, cable
companies in the region reported limited
infrastructure damage to their head ends following
Katrina. In the areas hardest hit by the storm
itself, aerial cable infrastructure was heavily
damaged. Some cable facilities are underground; the
storm's wind and rain had only minimal effects on
them. However, the opposite was true in areas where
the levees' breach caused heavy flooding. There,
underground facilities were heavily damaged and the
electronics in those facilities were generally
completely lost. The cable industry indicated that
new cable plants generally allowed for multiple
points of failure and system workarounds that
permitted the network to operate in spite of some
widespread faults in the infrastructure. However,
lack of power to cable facilities and security
proved to be key problems. The cable operator
serving New Orleans indicated that, even where its
network was intact, lack of power/fuel prevented it
from restoring operations in those areas.^54 Also,
similar to broadcasting, power outages at the viewer
end prevented cable programming from being
successfully received.

2. 9. Utilities. Electric utility networks (including
utility-owned commercial wireless networks) appeared
to have a high rate of survivability following
Katrina.^55 These communications systems did not
have a significant rate of failure because: (1) the
systems were designed to remain intact to aid
restoration of electric service following a
significant storm event;

(2) they were built with significant onsite back-up power
supplies (batteries and generators); (3) last mile
connections to tower sites and the backbone transport are
typically owned by the utility

Commerce, Science, and Transportation at 2 (Sept. 22,
2005) (an estimated 100 broadcast stations were knocked
off the air).

Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.

Oral Testimony of Dave Vincent, Station Manager, WLOX-TV,
Before the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, Tr. at
309 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter "Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6
Oral Testimony"] (WLOX in Biloxi partnered with WXXV in
Gulfport, Mississippi, which carried WLOX's signal until
they could get back on the air).

53 Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 45.

54 See, e.g., Comments of Greg Bicket, Cox
Communications, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2006).

See, e.g., UTC Comments, Hurricanes of 2005:
55 Performance of Gulf Coast Critical
Infrastructure

Communications Networks, at 2 (Jan. 27, 2006).

and have redundant paths (both T1 and fixed microwave);
and (4) the staff responsible for the communications
network have a focus on continuing maintenance of network
elements (for example, exercising standby generators on a
routine basis).

1. 10. License Exempt Wireless (WISPs). The License
Exempt Wireless or wireless internet service
provider ("WISP") infrastructure, in general, was
not heavily damaged by Katrina or the subsequent
flooding, although some antennas required adjustment
because of high winds. Rather, the majority of the
adverse effects and outages encountered by WISP
providers were due to a lack of commercial power and
difficulty with fuel resupply. WISP providers cited
access difficulties as their most pressing problem
in restoring their networks.

2. 11. Amateur Radio Service. As with other
communications services, amateur radio stations were
also adversely affected by Katrina. Equipment was
damaged or lost due to the storm and trained
amateurs were difficult to find in the immediate
aftermath. However, once called into help, amateur
radio operators volunteered to support many
agencies, such as FEMA, the National Weather
Service, Hurricane Watch and the American Red
Cross.^56 Amateurs provided wireless communications
in many locations where there was no other means of
communicating and also provided other technical aid
to the communities affected by Katrina.^57

B. Major Problems Identified Following Katrina.

In reviewing the detailed reports from each
communications sector, there were three main problems
that caused the majority of communications network
interruptions: (1) flooding; (2) lack of power and/or
fuel; and (3) failure of redundant pathways for
communications traffic. In addition, a fourth item -
inadvertent line cuts during restoration - resulted in
additional network damage, causing new outages or
delaying service restoration. Each of these areas of
concern is detailed below.

1. Flooding. Hurricanes typically have flooding
associated with them due to the torrential rainfall and
storm surge associated with the storms. However, in
addition to these sources of flooding, the levee breaks
in New Orleans caused catastrophic flooding that was
extremely detrimental to the communications networks.^58
While communications infrastructure had been hardened to
prepare against strong winds from a hurricane, the
widespread flooding of long duration associated with
Katrina destroyed or disabled substantial portions of the
communications networks and impeded trained personnel
from reaching and operating the facilities.^59 In
addition, as detailed below, the massive flooding caused
widespread power outages that were not readily remedied
(electric substations could not be reached nor were there

See Hurricane Katrina Amateur Radio Emergency
Communications Relief Effort Operations Review Summary,
Written Statement submitted by Gregory Sarratt, W4OZK, at
2 (Mar. 7, 2006).

Id. at 4.

See, e.g., House Report at 164 (reporting that flooding
knocked out two telephone company switches and hindered
the communications abilities of six out of eight police
districts in New Orleans, as well as the police
department headquarters).

See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Juliette M. Saussy,
Director, Emergency Medical Services of the City of New
Orleans, Louisiana, Tr. at 43-44 (Mar. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter "Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony"].

personnel available to remedy the outages). The flooding
also wiped out transportation options, preventing fuel
for generators from getting where it needed to be.

1. 2. Power and Fuel. Katrina caused extensive damage
to the power grid. Significant portions of
electrical facilities in Mississippi, Alabama and
Louisiana - including both power lines and electric
plants - were severely impaired due to wind and
flooding. As a result, power to support the
communications networks was generally unavailable
throughout the region.^60 This meant that, for
communications systems to continue to operate,
backup batteries and generators were required. While
the communications industry has generally been
diligent in deploying backup batteries and
generators and ensuring that these systems have one
to two days of fuel or charge, not all locations had
them installed. Furthermore, not all locations were
able to exercise and test the backup equipment in
any systemic fashion. Thus, some generators and
batteries did not function during the crisis. Where
generators were installed and operational, the fuel
was generally exhausted prior to restoration of
power. Finally, flooding, shortages of fuel and
restrictions on access to the affected area made
refueling extraordinarily difficult.^61 In some
instances, fuel was confiscated by federal or local
authorities when it was brought into the Katrina
region.^62

2. 3. Redundant pathways. The switches that failed,
especially tandems, had widespread effects on a
broad variety of communications in and out of the
Katrina region. In addition, T1 and other leased
lines were heavily used by the communications
networks throughout the region, with those failures
leading to loss of service. As an example, a major
tandem switch in New Orleans was isolated, which
meant that no communications from parts of New
Orleans to outside the region could occur. This
switch, an access tandem that carried long distance
traffic through New Orleans and out to other
offices, had two major routes out of the city (one
to the east and one to the west). The eastern route
was severed by a barge that came ashore during the
hurricane and cut the aerial fiber associated with
the route. If only this route had been lost, the
access tandem traffic could have continued. However,
the western route was also severed - initially by
large trees falling across aerial cables, then
subsequently by construction crews removing debris
from highway rights-of-way. While there were
provisions for rerouting traffic out of the city,
the simultaneous loss of both of these major paths
significantly limited communications service in
parts of New Orleans.

3. 4. Line cuts. During the restoration process
following Katrina, there were numerous instances of
fiber lines cut accidentally by parties seeking to
restore power, phone, and cable, remove trees and
other debris, and engage in similar restoration
activities.^63 BellSouth indicated in its comments
to the Katrina Panel that several of its major
routes were cut multiple

60 House Report. at 166.

61 Id. at 164.

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4
62 (citing Committee staff interview of William
Smith, Chief

Technology Officer, BellSouth, conducted on Jan. 25,
2006) (FEMA commandeered communications fuel reserves in
order to refuel helicopters).

See, e.g., Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 66
(Mar. 6, 2006).

times.^64 For example, on Monday, September 12th, a major
fiber route from Hammond, Louisiana to Covington,
Louisiana was cut by a tree trimming company.^65 Cox
Communications reported that, by the eleventh day after
the storm, more outages of its network in the region were
caused by human damage than storm damage. Public safety
entities also noted similar cuts in service during the
restoration process.^66

In addition to these major causes of network
interruptions, security and access to facilities were
consistently mentioned as significant issues affecting
restoration of communications services. These problems
are discussed in detail in the following section.

II. Recovery Coordination and Procedures

After Katrina's wind and rain subsided, challenges to
communications service maintenance and restoration
continued. Flooding, which submerged and damaged
equipment and blocked access for restoration, was a major
problem. The Panel also observed significant challenges
to the recovery effort resulting from (1) inconsistent
and unclear requirements for communications
infrastructure repair crews and their subcontractors to
gain access to the affected area; (2) limited access to
power and/or generator fuel; (3) limited security for
communications infrastructure and personnel and lack of
pre-positioned back-up equipment; (4) lack of established
coordination between the communications industry and
state and local officials as well as among federal, state
and local government officials with respect to
communications matters; and (5) limited use of available
priority communications services. On the other hand,
lines of communication between the communications
industry and the federal government were established and
seemed generally effective in facilitating coordination,
promptly granting needed regulatory relief, and gathering
outage information. In addition, ad hoc, informal sharing
of fuel and equipment among communications industry
participants helped to maximize the assets available and
bolster the recovery effort. However, additional industry
coordination of personnel and assets internally and among
governments could have substantially facilitated
restoration of communications networks.

A. Access to the Affected Area and Key Resources.

1. Perimeter Access and Credentialing. Communications
restoration efforts were hampered significantly by the
inability of communications infrastructure repair crews
and their contracted workers to access the impacted area
post-disaster.^67 For important safety and

See Comments by William L. Smith, BellSouth, Before the
FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks, at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter "Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written
Statement").

Id.

See, e.g., Comments of Robert G. Bailey, National
Emergency Number Association, Harris County Emergency
Communications, at 1 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "Bailey
Jan. 30 Written Testimony"].

See, e.g., Oral Testimony of William L. Smith, Chief
Technology Officer, BellSouth Corp., Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina, Tr. at 188 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
"Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral Testimony"]; see also
Statement of Jim Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network
Group, Before the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 125 (Jan. 30, 2006)

security reasons, law enforcement personnel set up a
perimeter around much of the impacted region and imposed
restrictions on who could access the area. Communications
infrastructure repair crews from all sectors of the
industry had great difficulty crossing the perimeter to
access their facilities in need of repair.^68 This seemed
to be a particular problem for smaller or nontraditional
communications companies,^69 who tended to have lower
levels of name recognition with law enforcement personnel
guarding the perimeter.

Although some jurisdictions provided credentials to
communications infrastructure repair crews to permit them
to access the affected area, the process appeared to be
unique for each local jurisdiction. Communications
providers reported that credentials that permitted access
through one checkpoint would not be honored at
another.^70 In many cases, different checkpoints required
different documentation and credentialing before
permitting access.^71 As a result, repair crews needed to
carry multiple credentials and letters from various
federal, state and local officials.^72 There was no
uniform credentialing method in place whereby one type of
credential would permit access at any checkpoint.^73
Communications providers were also not clear about which
agency had authority to issue the necessary
credentials.^74 And there did not appear to be any
mechanism in place for issuing credentials to those who
needed them prior to Katrina making landfall.

Once communications infrastructure repair crews gained
access to the impacted area, they had no guarantee they
would be allowed to remain there. The enforcement of
curfews and other security procedures at times
interrupted repair work and required communications
restoration crews to exit the area. In at least one
instance, law enforcement personnel insisted that
communications

[hereinafter "Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony"];
Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement at 9; Comments of
M/A-Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (repair
workers sometimes had difficulty gaining access to their
equipment and facilities because the police and National
Guard refused to let crews enter the affected area);
Federal Support to Telecommunications Infrastructure
Providers in National Emergencies: Designation as
"Emergency Responders (Private Sector)", The President's
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee,
Legislative and Regulatory Task Force, at 7 (Jan. 31,
2006) [hereinafter "Jan. 31 NSTAC Report"].

See, e.g., Comments of the Satellite Industry Association
at 6 (January 27, 2006) (describing how satellite system
repair crews had difficulty obtaining access to the
impacted area); Comments of Xspedius Communications, LLC,
at 2, 6 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter "Comments of
Xspedius"].

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (citing
Committee staff interview of Christopher Guttman-McCabe,
Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, conducted on
Jan. 24, 2006) (industry representatives said that their
technicians would benefit from having uniform
credentialing that is recognized by the multiple law
enforcement agencies operating in a disaster area).

See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 5
(stating that a credential that permitted access in one
county was sometimes not honored in a different county).

See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 2-3.

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at Findings at 8
(efforts by private sector to restore communications
efforts were hampered by the fact that the government did
not provide uniform credentials to gain access to
affected areas).

See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 3.

technicians cease their work splicing a key
telecommunications cable and exit the area in order to
enforce a curfew.^75 Although such practices may have
been necessary from a security standpoint, they did
interrupt and hamper the recovery process.

The problems with access were not all one-sided. Law
enforcement personnel also expressed frustration with the
access situation, particularly with respect to the
different credentials issued and not knowing what to ask
for or what to honor. It was also reported that
credentialed communications infrastructure repair
personnel sometimes allowed non-credentialed individuals
to ride in their vehicles through checkpoints, which
compromised the security of the area. It also caused law
enforcement personnel at the perimeter to be wary of
persons seeking to access the affected area and the
credentials they presented, potentially further slowing
the access process.

2. Fuel. Problems with maintaining and restoring power
for communications infrastructure significantly affected
the recovery process. As described in Section I.B.2
above, many facilities could have been up and operating
much more quickly if communications providers had access
to sufficient fuel. The commercial power upon which the
vast majority of communications networks depended for
day-to-day operations was knocked out over a huge
geographic area. Back-up generators and batteries were
not present at all facilities. Where they were deployed,
most provided only enough power to operate particular
communications facilities for 24-48 hours - generally a
sufficient period of time to permit the restoration of
commercial power in most situations, but not enough for a
catastrophe like Hurricane Katrina.

Access to fuel reserves or priority power restoration
appeared extremely limited for the communications
industry.^76 Only a few communications providers had
stockpiles of fuel or special supplier arrangements.
However, if the fuel was not located fairly near to the
perimeter, it was difficult and expensive to get it where
it was needed in a timely fashion. Perimeter access
issues also impeded the ability to bring reserve fuel
into the region. Moreover, many roads and traditional
means of accessing certain facilities could not be used
due to the extensive flooding that followed Hurricane
Katrina. And many communications providers did not
anticipate the need for alternative means of reaching
their facilities. In addition, some providers reported
having their limited fuel reserves confiscated by law
enforcement personnel for other pressing needs.^77
Although electric and other utilities maintain priority
lists for commercial power restoration, it does not
appear that commercial communications providers were on
or eligible for such lists. Indeed, one wireless provider
speaking at the Katrina Panel's January 2006 meeting -
more than 4 months after Katrina's landfall - reported
that it had 23 cell sites in the impacted

Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
75 191; see also Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at

125.

76 See, e.g., Comments of Mississippi Assn. of
Broadcasters at 1-2 (Jan. 27, 2006).

House Report at 167 ("[O]ne of
77 See, e.g., Nextel's fuel trucks was
id.; stopped at gunpoint and its
fuel

taken for other purposes while en route to refuel cell
tower generators, and the Mississippi State Police
redirected a fuel truck carrying fuel designated for a
cell tower generator to fuel generators at Gulfport
Memorial Hospital.").

area still running on backup generators.^78 Most
communications providers also did not appear to be able
to access any government fuel reserves.

On a positive note, several companies apparently shared
their reserve fuel with other communications providers
who needed it, even their competitors.^79 This sharing
occurred on a purely ad hoc basis.^80 There did not
appear to be any forum or coordination area for fostering
industry sharing of fuel or other equipment.

3. Security.Limited security for key communications
facilities and communications infrastructure repair crews
also hampered the recovery effort.^81 Security concerns,
both actual and perceived, led to delays in the
restoration of communications networks.^82 Communications
providers reported generators being stolen from key
facilities, even if they were bolted down. Lack of
security for communications infrastructure repair workers
at times delayed their access to certain facilities to
make repairs.^83 Some providers employed their own
security crews.^84 However, obtaining credentials to
allow these individuals to access the affected area was
sometimes a problem. Further, communications
infrastructure repair crews generally did not receive
security details from law enforcement. Clearly, law
enforcement had other very significant responsibilities
in the wake of Katrina. In addition, communications
providers are apparently not considered "emergency
responders" under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act^85 and the National Response
Plan and thus are not eligible to receive non-monetary
Federal assistance, like security protection for critical
facilities and repair personnel.^86 In one instance,
however, a major communications provider successfully
sought governmental security for its Poydras St. office
in New Orleans, which serves as a regional hub for
multiple telecommunications carriers. Both the Louisiana

See Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 123.

See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
312 (describing how the radio station shared fuel with a
nearby news organization).

See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Steve Davis, Senior Vice
President of Engineering, Clear Channel Radio, Before the
FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina, Tr. at 81-82 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "Steve
Davis-Clear Channel Jan. 30 Oral Testimony"].

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4.

The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons
Learned, February 2006, at 40, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/.

Jan. 31 NSTAC Report at 5.

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (when
government security proved unavailable, many
telecommunications providers hired private security to
protect their workers and supplies); Written Statement of
Dave Flessas, Vice President for Network Operations,
Sprint Nextel Corp., Before the FCC's Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 2 (Jan. 30,
2006) (security issues forced Sprint to hire armored
guards to protect its employees and contractors); Jan. 31
NSTAC Report at 5.

Pub. L. No. 93-288, as amended [hereinafter "Stafford
Act"].

See, e.g., Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement at
9; Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 125; see
also Oral Testimony of Captain Thomas Wetherald, Deputy
Operations Director, National Communications System,
Before the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 24 (Apr. 18, 2006)
[hereinafter "Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony"].

State Police and the FBI provided security so that
BellSouth workers could return to the office and keep it
in service.^87

Apparently, several companies that had their own security
forces shared them with other communications providers by
forming a convoy to go to a particular area.^88 Such
arrangements seemed to occur on a purely informal basis.
There did not appear to be any forum or staging area for
fostering industry sharing of security forces or other
resources.

4. Pre-positioning of Equipment. Limited pre-positioning
of communications equipment may have slowed the recovery
process. While some individual companies and
organizations had some backup communications technologies
on-hand for use after a disaster, most did not appear to
locate strategic stockpiles of communications equipment
that could be rapidly deployed and immediately used by
persons in the impacted area.

B. Coordination Between Industry and Government.

1. Industry - Federal Government Coordination. Despite
problems related above at the scene of the disaster, at
the federal level, industry and government recovery
coordination for the communications sector appeared to
function as intended. Under the National Response Plan,
the lead federal agency for emergency support functions
regarding communications is the National Communications
System ("NCS"). NCS manages the National Coordination
Center for Telecommunications ("NCC") in Washington, DC,
which is a joint industry-federal government endeavor
with 36 member companies.^89 The NCC meets on a regular
basis during non-emergency situations; during and
immediately after Katrina, it met daily and conducted
analysis and situational monitoring of ongoing events and
response capabilities.^90 The Katrina Panel heard that
this group played an important and effective role in
coordinating communications network recovery and allowing
for information sharing among affected industry
members.^91 Yet, NCC membership is limited to only
certain providers and does not represent a broad
cross-section of the communications industry (for
example, no broadcasters, WISPs, or cable providers are
members).^92 Accordingly, certain industry sectors or
companies that might have been helpful were not a part of
this coordination effort. State and local government are
also not a part of this coordination effort.

87 Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement at
8-9.

88 See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 3.

89 The NSTAC Report on the National Coordinating
Center (4/27/06 Draft), The President's National

Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, May 10,
2006, at 9-10 [hereinafter "May 10 NSTAC Report"].

See Written Statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Director,
National Communications System, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Ensuring Operability During
Catastrophic Events, Before the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Committee on Homeland Security, United
States House of Representatives, at 2, 6 (Oct. 26, 2005),
available at
http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyFonash.pdf.

See, e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
17 -18.

See May 10 NSTAC Report at 4.

The FCC was widely praised as playing a critical role in
helping to restore communications connectivity in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina.^93 During and immediately
after Katrina, the Commission stayed open 24 hours a day,
seven days a week to respond to the disaster.^94 Within
hours of Katrina's landfall in the Gulf Coast region, the
Commission established an internal Task Force to
coordinate its response efforts,^95 focusing on providing
regulatory relief where necessary, coordinating efforts
with other federal agencies, and providing information
and assistance to evacuees. To assist communications
providers in their recovery, the Commission established
emergency procedures to streamline various waiver and
special temporary authority processes to speed needed
relief,^96 reached out to various providers to determine
their needs, and assisted communications providers in
obtaining access to necessary resources.^97

These actions by the Commission appeared substantially to
assist the industry in the recovery effort. The
emergency, 24/7 contacts the Commission made available
and the new streamlined processes clearly accelerated the
time frame for receiving necessary regulatory approvals.
However, the extensive communications outages made
accessing this new information about who to contact and
how to comply with the new processes difficult.
Similarly, repair crews often did not know what repairs
they needed to make until they reached the site.

In addition, while it was generally clear to
communications providers that the Commission was the
right agency to contact for regulatory relief after the
disaster, the roles of other federal agencies in the
recovery effort were not as clear to a large portion of
the industry.^98 Communications providers who needed
federal assistance (such as obtaining fuel authorizations
or access to the impacted area), often did not know whom
to contact. Industry participants also appeared generally
unclear about which federal agency was responsible for
implementing important recovery programs or distributing
resources to communications companies operating in the
impacted area. Competing requests for outage information
from government entities at the federal, state and local
level added to the confusion about agency roles. And
responding to duplicative, repeated inquiries in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was cited by some as a
distraction to communications providers' restoration
efforts.

See, e.g., The Federal
93 Response to Hurricane (February 2006).
Katrina: Lessons Learned at
142-43

94 See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29
Written Statement at 3.

95 Moran Sept. 7 Written
Statement at 4.

See, e.g., International Bureau Announces
96 Procedures to Provide Emergency Communications
in Areas

Impacted by Hurricane Katrina, FCC Public Notice (rel.
Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260835A1.pdf.

See Steve Davis-Clear Channel Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr.
at 83 (describing how the Audio Division of the FCC's
Media Bureau helped radio licensees secure access to
fuel).

See, e.g., Written Statement of C. Patrick Roberts,
President of the Florida Association of Broadcasters,
Before the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina, at 3 (Mar. 7, 2006) (observing that
American must have a more cohesive and comprehensive
program among federal, state, and local governments to
prepare for disasters); see also Sprint-Nextel Jan. 30
Written Testimony at 4-5 (recognizing that there is a
need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the
government agencies that are involved telecommunications
restoration).

1. 2. Industry - State and Local Government
Coordination. In general, coordination between
communications providers and state and local
government officials in the affected region for
communications network recovery purposes did not
appear to exist except on an ad hoc basis. For the
most part, there did not appear to be in existence
any organized mechanism for communications providers
to share information with local officials or to seek
their assistance with respect to specific recovery
issues, like access and fuel. Following Katrina, the
Panel heard that state and local government
representatives were exchanging business cards with
communications providers in their area for the first
time. Local government officials noted that they
sometimes did not know where to turn to figure out
why communications to and from key government
locations did not work and how to express their
priorities for communications service restoration.
In addition, coordinating credentialing, access,
fuel sharing, security and other key recovery
efforts was difficult because there were no
identified staging areas or coordination points for
the communications industry.

2. 3. Federal Government - State and Local Government
Coordination. The Panel is not aware of
pre-established mechanisms through which the federal
government coordinated with state and local
governments concerning communications network
restoration issues in the wake of Katrina. For
example, the Panel heard that civilian public safety
officials were often unable to communicate with
military officials brought in to assist local law
enforcement. In addition, state and local
governments are not a part of the NCC^99 and,
therefore, were not able to directly coordinate with
that industry-federal government group. As noted
above, and due in part to a lack of pre-arranged
recovery procedures, state and local government
officials did not seem to be part of communications
network recovery efforts. This meant that their
restoration priorities may not have been effectively
conveyed to communications providers and that
communications providers did not have an identified
place to turn for assistance with access and other
recovery issues.

C. Emergency Communications Services and Programs.

The federal government, through the NCS, has established
several programs for priority communications services
during and following an emergency.^100 These are the
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service ("GETS"),
which enables an eligible user to get priority call
completion for wireline telephone calls; the Wireless
Priority Service ("WPS"), which enables an eligible user
to get access to the next free channel when making a
wireless call; and Telecommunications Service Priority
("TSP"), which enables a qualifying user to get priority
restoration and provisioning of telecommunications
services.^101 During and after Katrina, these priority
services seemed to work well for those who subscribed to
them. However, only a small percentage of those eligible
for the services appeared to do so. This is particularly
true of public safety users - many eligible public safety
entities have not signed up for these services. It also
appears to be true for some communications providers,
including

See May 10 NSTAC Report at 3.

100

See, e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
18.

101

See, e.g., Written Statement of Dr. Peter Fonash, Deputy
Manager, National Communications System, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Gov't Affairs, Hearing on Managing
Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe at
3-4 (Feb. 6, 2006), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/020606Fonash.pdf.

broadcast, WISP, and cable companies. These priority
services could be an extremely useful tool in network
restoration efforts. Yet, they are tools that appear not
fully utilized. Like other emergency tools, they require
training and practice. In some cases, users who had
access to these services did not fully understand how to
use them (e.g., that a WPS call requires inputting a GETS
code so the call would get priority treatment when it
reached the landline network).

III. First Responder Communications

In the days following Hurricane Katrina, the ability of
public safety and emergency first responders to
communicate varied greatly across the affected region.
The areas in and around New Orleans were seriously
impacted.^102 New Orleans EMS was forced to cease 911
operations in anticipation of Katrina's landfall and,
after the levees were breached, a total loss of EMS and
fire communications ensued.^103 The communications
infrastructure in coastal areas was heavily damaged due
to winds or flooding.^104 As a result, more than 2000
police, fire and EMS personnel were forced to communicate
in single channel mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing only
three mutual aid frequencies.^105 Some mutual-aid
channels required each speaker to wait his or her turn
before speaking, sometimes up to twenty minutes.^106 This
level of destruction did not extend to inland areas
affected by the hurricane so, in contrast to New Orleans,
neither Baton Rouge nor Jackson County, Mississippi,
completely lost their communications capabilities and
were soon operating at pre-Katrina capabilities.^107 In
the hardest hit areas, however, the disruption of public
safety communications operability, as well as a lack of
interoperability, frustrated the response effort and
caused tremendous confusion among official personnel^108
and the general public.

State and local first responders are required to act and
communicate within minutes after disasters have occurred
and not hours or days later when Federal or other
resources from outside the affected area become
available. As further described below, the lack of
effective emergency communications after the storm
revealed inadequate planning, coordination and training
on the use of technologies that can help to restore
emergency communications. Hurricane Katrina also
highlighted the long-standing problem of interoperability
among public safety communications

102

See, e.g., Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43.

103

Id.

104

Jeff Smith Written Statement at 12.

105

Presentation of Major Mike Sauter, Office of Technology
and Communications, New Orleans Police Department, Before
the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina, at 1 (Feb.1, 2006) [hereinafter
"Sauter Written Statement"].

106

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 21-6 (NOFD and
NOPD were forced to use a mutual aid channel, rather than
the 800 MHz trunk system they were supposed to operate
on; transmission over the mutual aid channel was limited
and could not reach certain parts of the city).

107

See Oral Testimony of George W. Sholl, Director, Jackson
County Emergency Communications District, Before the
FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina, at Tr. at 58-59 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
"Scholl Mar. 6 Oral Testimony'].

108

Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43-44.

systems operating in different frequency bands and with
different technical standards.^109 One advantage that New
Orleans had was the fact that no broadcasters were using
the 700 MHz spectrum set aside for public safety, thus
freeing it up immediately for first responder use.^110 As
a result of this availability, communications providers
were able to provide emergency trucks and hundreds of
radios that operated on this spectrum as soon as first
responders needed them.^111 Finally, 911 emergency call
handling suffered from a lack of preprogrammed routing of
calls to PSAPs not incapacitated by the hurricane.

A. Lack of Advanced Planning for Massive System Failures.

It was described to the Panel that public safety
officials plan for disasters but that Hurricane Katrina
was a catastrophe.^112 This left many state and local
agencies - those who are required to respond first to
such emergencies - ill-prepared to restore communications
essential to their ability to do their jobs.^113 Very few
public safety agencies had stockpiles of key equipment on
hand to implement rapid repairs or patches to their
systems. Had they been available, spare radios, batteries
and chargers as well as portable repeaters or
self-sufficient communications vehicles (also known as
"communications on wheels") would have enabled greater
local communications capabilities.^114 Further, when the
primary communications system failed, many public safety
entities did not have plans for an alternative, redundant
system to take its place.^115 Similarly, public safety
entities, including state and local government offices,
did not appear to have plans in place for call forwarding
or number portability to route their calls to alternative
locations when they relocated. The apparent absence of
contingency plans to address massive system failures,
including widespread power outages, ^116 was a major
impediment to the rapid restoration of first responder
communications.

Public safety agencies rely heavily on their equipment
vendors to support them during such disasters by
providing replacement parts and spare radios. Motorola
stated that 72 hours prior to Katrina's landfall, it had
mobilized more than 100,000 pieces of equipment and more
than 300

109

See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel (ret.) Terry J.
Ebbert, Director, Homeland Security for New Orleans,
Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State
of Louisiana, Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, United States House of Representatives, at 3-4
(Dec. 14, 2005), available a
http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12_14_05/ebbert_121405.doc.

110

See Written Statement of Kelly Kirwin, Vice President,
Motorola Comm. & Electronics, Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina, at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "Kirwin Jan.
30 Written Statement"] (in some major cities (e.g., New
York, Los Angeles, San Francisco), the 700 MHz spectrum
would not be available to first responders).

111

See id.

112

Written Statement of Sheriff Kevin Beary, Major County
Sheriffs Assn. at 1 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "Beary
Jan. 30 Written Statement"].

113

Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43-44.

114

Beary Jan. 30 Written Statement at 1.

115

Presentation of Sheriff Ted Sexton, Sr. National Sheriffs
Assn at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006); McEwen Mar. 6 Oral Testimony,
Tr. at 35-36.

116

McEwen Mar. 6 Written Statement at 5-6.

employees to support their customers.^117 Similarly,
M/A-Com supported the restoration and maintenance of the
New Orleans 800 MHz system as well as the systems for
Mobile, Biloxi, Gulfport, and St. Tammany Parish.^118
Reports indicate that these efforts with established
vendors were generally well-executed, except for problems
with access into New Orleans.

However, the Panel was made aware of a variety of
non-traditional, alternative technologies that could have
served as effective, back-up communications for public
safety until their primary systems were repaired. As
noted in Section I, satellite infrastructure was
generally unaffected by the storm and could have provided
a viable back-up system. Two-way paging operations
remained generally operational during the storm and did
provide communications capabilities for some police, fire
emergency medical personnel, but could have been more
widely utilized.^119 Other types of non-traditional
technology that can be deployed quickly, such as WiFi and
WiMax, or self-contained communications vehicles, could
also have been effectively utilized. These all appear
deserving of exploration as back-up communications
options to primary public safety systems.

First responders' lack of training on alternative,
back-up communications equipment was also an impediment
in the recovery effort.^120 This lack of training may
have accounted for a sizeable number of communications
failures during the first 48 hours after Katrina.^121
Public safety officials noted that that there was little
time after Katrina to investigate the capabilities of new
technologies for which none of their personnel had been
adequately trained. This highlights the need for public
safety entities to have contingency communications plans
with training as a key component. The lack of training
issue evidenced itself in particular with the
distribution of satellite phones. These phones proved to
be a beneficial resource to some, while others described
the service as spotty and capacity strained. In many
cases, it appears that complaints about spotty coverage
really resulted from the user's lack of understanding
about how to use the phone (e.g., some satellite phones
have a unique dialing pattern and they generally do not
work indoors).^122 However, the uncontrolled distribution
of satellite phones could also have triggered capacity
issues in certain areas.^123 Additionally, public safety
officials reminded the Panel that users must be properly
trained before they can be expected to competently use
technologies during high stress events.^124

117

Kirwin Jan. 30 Written Statement at 2.

118

Comments of M/A-Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).

119

Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written Testimony at
7-9; Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 122-23.

120

See, e.g., Written Statement of James Monroe III, Chief
Executive Officer, Globalstar LLC, Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina at 4 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
"Monroe-Globalstar Written Statement"] (some first
responders failed to keep handset batteries charged,
others did not realize that satellite phones require a
clear line of sight between the handset and the
satellite).

121

Id.

122

Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 4-5.

123

See Report of Ed Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge Fire
Department, Hurricane Katrina Independent Panel Meeting,
at 1 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "Written Report of Ed
Smith"].

124

See, e.g., Scholl Oral Testimony, Tr. at 57-58, 61-62.

Finally, it seems that communications assets that were
available and could have been used by first responders
were not requested or deployed. There have been reports
that federal government communications assets operated
and maintained by FEMA and USDA were available, but not
utilized, for state and local public safety
operations.^125 This underutilization may have been due
to the fact that FEMA's pre-staged communications
vehicles apparently were located 250-350 miles away from
the devastated areas,^126 and that FEMA did not request
deployment of these vehicles until twenty-four hours
after landfall.^127 Further, first responders were not
made aware of these assets and/or did not know how to
request them.^128 As noted above, many public safety
officials failed to subscribe to the GETS, TSP and WPS
priority programs, despite their eligibility.^129
Communications assets made available by the private
sector also appear to have been underutilized by first
responders. The Panel heard that manufacturers of
alternative public safety communications systems were
unable to gain the attention of key public safety
officials to effectuate their proposed donation of
equipment and services. Some offered equipment or access
to their network in Katrina's aftermath but "found no
takers".^130 These and other outlets could have provided
some measure of communications capabilities, while
repairs to primary systems were completed.

B. Lack of Interoperability.

Because of its scope and severity, Hurricane Katrina
demanded a coordinated response from federal and affected
state and local agencies, as well as volunteers from
states both neighboring and distant. The Panel heard
evidence that, in many cases, responders in different
agencies were unable to communicate due to incompatible
frequency assignments.^131 When the existing
infrastructure for the New Orleans system was
incapacitated by flooding, communications were almost
completely thwarted as too many users attempted to use
the three mutual aid channels in the 800 MHz band.^132 In
addition, communications between the military and first
responders

125

The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons
Learned, February 2006, at 55.

126

Senate Report on Katrina at 12-19 (citing Committee staff
interview of James Attaway, Telecommunications
Specialist, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006).

127

Senate Report on Katrina at 12-19 (citing Committee staff
interview of William Milani, Chief Mobile Operations
Section, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006).

128

See, e.g., Monroe-Globalstar Written Statement at 5
(first responders generally did not have pre-emergency
deployment plans that they could invoke in advance of the
actual emergency).

129

During and after Katrina, the NCS issued 1,000 new GETS
access code numbers to first responders, and the GETS
system was used to make more than 35,000 calls between
August 28 and September 9. House Report at 176. During
Katrina, the NCS enabled and distributed more than 4,000
new WPS phones. Id. The NCS also completed more than
1,500 TSP assignments following Hurricane Katrina. Id. at
177. It would have been helpful if these assets had been
in place before the disaster and first responders were
fully trained in how to use them.

130

Statement of Jerry Knoblach, Chairman & CEO, Space Data
Corporation, Before the Federal Communications
Commission's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, at 6 (Mar.
7, 2006).

131

A Failure to Communicate: A Stocktake of Government
Inaction to Address Communications Interoperability
Failures Following Hurricane Katrina, First Response
Coalition, December 2005.

132

Sauter Written Statement at 1; Written Report of Ed Smith
at 1.

also appeared to suffer from lack of
interoperability.^133 In some cases, the military was
reduced to using human runners to physically carry
messages between deployed units and first responders.^134
In another case, a military helicopter had to drop a
message in a bottle to warn first responders about a
dangerous gas leak.^135

While most observers characterized "operability" as the
primary communications failure following Katrina,^136
increased ability to interoperate with other agencies
would have provided greater redundant communications
paths and a more coordinated response. While
technological solutions, such as IP gateways to integrate
frequencies across multiple bands,^137 are a critical
tool for improving interoperability, the Panel was
reminded that technology is not the sole driver of an
optimal solution.^138 Training, agreement on standard
operating procedures, governance or leadership and proper
usage are all critical elements of the interoperability
continuum.^139 However, the Panel heard testimony that
Project SAFECOM, which is intended to provide a solution
for interoperability among Federal, state and local
officials, will take years to achieve its objectives.^140
However, the Panel is also aware of more expedient
proposals, such as the M/A-COM, Inc. proposal to mandate
construction of all Federal and non-Federal mutual aid
channels to provide baseline interoperability to all
emergency responders that operate across multiple
frequency bands using disparate technologies.^141

133

See Written Statement of Dr. William W. Pinsky on behalf
of the American Hospital Association, The State of
Interoperable Communications: Perspectives from the
Field, Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security,
United States House of Representatives, at 5 (Feb. 15,
2006), available at
http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyPinsky.pdf.

134

See, e.g., Written Statement of The Honorable Timothy J.
Roemer, Director, Center for National Policy, Public
Safety Communications From 9/11 to Katrina: Critical
Public Policy Lessons, Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, at
5 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/hearings/09292005Hearing1648/Roemer.pdf
(describing the use of human couriers by the National
Guard).

135

Heather Greenfield, Katrina Revealed Gaps In Emergency
Response System, THE WASH. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, at B1,
available at
http://washingtontimes.com/metro/20051227-095134-3753r.htm.

136

The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons
Learned, February 2006, at 55; Saussy Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 44.

137

See, e.g., Presentation to the Meeting of the Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, Dr. John Vaughan, Vice President
TYCO Electronics: M/A-COM, March 6, 2006; see also
Presentation to the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks,
Wesley D. Smith, Technical Director, ARINC (Mar. 7,
2006).

138

See Interoperability Continuum Brochure, Project Safecom,
Dept. of Homeland Security (April 5, 2005), available at
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/NR/rdonlyres/5C103F66-A36E-4DD1-A00A-54C477B47AFC/0/ContinuumBrochure40505.pdf.

139

Id. at 4.

140

Oral Testimony of Dr. David G. Boyd, Director of SAFECOM,
Dept. of Homeland Security, Tr. at 29-30 (Apr. 18, 2006);
see also Stephen Losey, Defense re-examines homeland
role, tactics, Federal Times.com (Oct. 18, 2005),
available at
http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=1174164.

141

See Further Comments of M/A-Com, Inc. (May 30, 2006).

C. PSAP Rerouting.

When a PSAP becomes disabled, 911 emergency calls from
the public are typically diverted to a secondary
neighboring PSAP using preconfigured traffic routes. In
many cases, Katrina disabled both the primary and
secondary PSAPs, which resulted in many unanswered
emergency calls. Additionally, many PSAPs in Louisiana
did not have protocols in place to identify where 911
calls should go and had not arranged for any rerouting,
resulting in dropped emergency calls.^142 The Panel heard
testimony that Katrina has highlighted a need to identify
additional back-up PSAPs at remote locations. However,
FCC regulations may currently restrict the ability of
local phone companies to establish pre-configured routes
across LATA boundaries.^143 In addition, the routing of
calls to more distant PSAPs would require specific
planning to ensure appropriate and timely response to
emergency calls.

D. Emergency Medical Communications.

There are indications that the emergency medical
community was lacking in contingency communications
planning and information about technologies and services
that might address their critical communications
needs.^144 In particular, this group of first responders
did not seem to avail itself of existing priority
communications services, such as GETS, WPS and TSP. It
also appeared that emergency medical personnel were not
always integrated into a locality's public safety
communications planning.

IV. Emergency Communications to the Public.

The communications infrastructure, in all of its forms,
is a key asset in delivering information to the American
public. In emergencies and disaster situations, ensuring
public safety is the first priority. The use of
communications networks to disseminate reliable and
relevant information to the public is critical - before,
during and after such events. Moreover, to the extent a
more well-informed citizenry is better able to prepare
for and respond to disasters, there should be less strain
on already taxed resources, thereby benefiting recovery
efforts.

The Emergency Alert System ("EAS") and its predecessor
systems have long made use of broadcast radio and
television stations as the principal tools for
communicating with the public about emergencies and
disaster situations. The Panel heard stories of heroic
efforts by broadcasters and cable operators to provide
members of the public impacted by Katrina with important
storm-related information. However, there were also
reports of missed opportunities to utilize the EAS and
limitations in existing efforts to deliver emergency
information to all members of the public. New
technologies may address some of these limitations by
facilitating the provision of both macro- and micro-level
information about impending disasters and recovery
efforts.

142

House Report at 173.

143

Bailey Jan. 30 Written Testimony at 3.

144

See House Report at 269.

A. Lack of Activation.

The EAS can be activated by the federal government as
well as by state and local officials to disseminate
official news and information to the public in the event
of an emergency. The Panel understands that the National
Weather Service used the EAS to provide severe weather
warnings to citizens in the Gulf States in advance of
Katrina making landfall.^145 However, the Panel also
heard that the EAS was not utilized by state and local
officials to provide localized emergency evacuation and
other important information. ^146 That means that an
existing and effective means of distributing timely
information to our citizens was not fully utilized.

B. Limitations in Coverage.

The primary source of emergency information about Katrina
came through broadcast (including satellite broadcast)
and cable infrastructure, whether through the EAS or
local or national news programming. Citizens who were not
watching TV or listening to the radio at the time of the
broadcast missed this emergency information. Damage to
communications infrastructure made it difficult for news
and emergency information to reach the public, as did
power outages.^147 As a result, a fairly large percentage
of the public likely were uninformed. The Panel heard
about notification technologies that may permit emergency
messages to be sent to wireline and wireless telephones
as well as personal digital assistants and other mobile
devices.^148 For example, the Association of Public
Television Stations has developed a means for utilizing
the digital transmissions of public television stations
to datacast emergency information to computers or
wireless devices.^149 In addition, the St. Charles Parish
Public School District used a telephone-based,
time-sensitive notification technology to send out
recorded evacuation messages to over 21,000 phone numbers
in advance of Katrina's landfall.^150 The District
continued to utilize this technology to provide members
of the public with specific information regarding
conditions in the community in the storm's aftermath.
While the use of phone-based technologies for
post-disaster communications is necessarily dependent on
the state of the telephone network, such technologies -
which are less subject to disruption from power outages -
offer the potential for complementing the traditional
broadcast-based EAS.

The Panel also understands that the FCC is considering
extending the reach of the existing emergency alert
system to other technologies, such as wireless and the
Internet.^151 The Panel

145

The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons
Learned, February 2006, at 28.

146

Comments of Hilary Styron of the National Organization on
Disability Emergency Preparedness Initiative at 2 (Mar.
6, 2006) [hereinafter "Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony"].

147

Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.

148

Comments of Notification Technologies, Inc., EB Docket
No. 04-296 (Jan. 24, 2006).

149

Written Testimony of John M. Lawson, President and CEO,
Association of Public Television Stations, Before the
FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks (April 18, 2006).

150

Id. at 12.

151

Review of the Emergency Alert System, First Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC
Rcd 18,625, 18,653 (P 69) (2005).

understands that there are ongoing collaborative
industry-government efforts to overcome the hurdles to
extending alerts to other technologies.

C. Reaching Persons with Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking Americans.

Ensuring emergency communications reach all Americans,
even those with hearing and visual disabilities or who do
not speak English, remains a major challenge.
Unfortunately, accessibility to suitable communications
devices for the deaf and hard of hearing was difficult
during and after Hurricane Katrina.^152 This problem was
intensified by the fact that Katrina brought humidity,
rain, flooding, and high temperatures (which translate
into perspiration), all of which reduce the effectiveness
of hearing aids and cochlear implants.^153 For persons
with visual impairments, telephone and broadcast outages
made information very hard to obtain, and many people
with vision loss were unable to evacuate.^154

The broadcast industry has taken significant steps to
provide on-screen sign language interpreters and close
captioning. Broadcasters also sometimes broadcast
critical information in a second language where there are
a significant number of non-English speaking residents in
the community. For example, a Spanish-language radio
station in the New Orleans area provided warnings, and
information about family members and disaster relief
assistance.^155

However, the Panel also heard that written or captioned
information was at times inadequate and that station
logos or captions sometimes covered up the sign-language
interpreter or close-captioning.^156 Additionally,
personnel who provided these critical services often
evacuated, leaving the station with no ability to deliver
these services. Further, specialized radios relied upon
by the hearing-impaired, because they can display text
messages, are not currently designed to be
battery-operated and thus became useless when power goes
out.^157 The distribution of emergency weather
information in languages other than English appeared
limited, based primarily on the willingness and ability
of local weather forecasting offices and the availability

152

See, e.g., Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 2 (over 80%
of shelters did not have access to communications devices
for the deaf; over 60% of shelters did not have
captioning capabilities utilized on the televisions
screens and several broadcasters did not caption their
emergency information, even though it is required by the
FCC); Oral Testimony of Cheryl Heppner, Vice Chair, Deaf
and Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network, FCC
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks, Tr. at 283 (Mar. 6,
2006) [hereinafter "Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony"] (many
television stations did not provide visual information).

153

Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 282.

154

Comment of the American Council of the Blind and American
Foundation for the Blind, at 2 (May 3, 2006).

155

See, e.g., Comments by the National Council of La Raza,
In the Eye of the Storm: How the Gov't and Private
Response to Hurricane Katrina Failed Latinos at 5 (Apr.
24, 2006) [hereinafter "La Raza Comments"].

156

Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 283-84; Remarks by
Cheryl Heppner, Deaf and Hard of Hearing Consumer
Advocacy Network, at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006).

157

Heppner Mar. 6. Oral Testimony at 283-85.

of ethnic media outlets.^158 Innovative notification
technologies, such as those described above, may provide
a partial answer to the emergency communications needs of
persons with disabilities and non-English-speaking
members of the public as such technologies can be used to
deliver targeted messages in a specified format.

Relatedly, individuals with disabilities often had a
difficult time using communications capabilities at
shelters or other recovery areas.^159 Phone and computer
banks provided at these locations generally did not have
capabilities to assist the hearing or
speech-impaired.^160

D. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency Information.

One of the benefits of the EAS is that it facilitates the
communication of a uniform message to the public by an
authoritative or credible spokesperson, thereby
minimizing confusion and contributing to an orderly
public response. However, as noted above, the EAS was not
activated in several jurisdictions. Moreover, while
broadcasters, cable operators and satellite providers
went to considerable lengths to provide the public with
information regarding Katrina and its impact, the Panel
understands that inconsistent or erroneous information
about critical emergency issues was sometimes provided
within the affected region. For example, information
regarding conditions in one portion of New Orleans did
not necessarily accurately depict conditions in other
areas of the city. The dissemination of targeted
information from an authoritative source through the EAS
or other notification technologies might have assisted
with this problem.

158

See, e.g., La Raza Comments at 5 (citing Interview with
official at the National Weather Service, Jan. 6, 2006).

159

Id.; Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 2.

160

See, e.g., id.; Comments of the Consortium for Citizens
With Disabilities at 1-2 (April 13, 2006); Styron Mar. 6
Oral Testimony, Tr. at 291.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon its observations regarding the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on communications networks and the
sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort, the
Panel has developed a number of recommendations to the
FCC for improving disaster preparedness, network
reliability and communications among first responders. As
with its observations, these recommendations are grouped
into four sections. The first contains recommendations
for steps to better preposition the communications
industry and the government for disasters in order to
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency. The
second section presents suggestions for improving
recovery coordination to address existing shortcomings
and to maximize the use of existing resources. The third
section focuses on first responder communications issues,
recommending essential steps for improving the
operability and interoperability of public safety and 911
communications in times of crisis. And finally, the last
group of recommendations presents the Panel's suggestions
for improving emergency communications to the public. All
of our citizens deserve to be sufficiently informed
should a major disaster strike in the future.

Pre-positioning for Disasters - A Proactive, Rather than
Reactive Program for Network Reliability and Resiliency

1. Pre-positioning for the Communications Industry - A
Readiness Checklist - The FCC should work with and
encourage each industry sector, through their
organizations or associations, to develop and publicize
sector-specific readiness recommendations. Such a
checklist should be based upon relevant industry best
practices as set forth by groups such as the Media
Security and Reliability Council ("MSRC") and the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council ("NRIC"). Any
such checklist should include the following elements:

1. a. Developing and implementing business continuity
plans, which would at a minimum address:

2. i. power reserves,

3. ii. cache of essential replacement equipment,

4. iii. adequate sparing levels,

5. iv. credentialing,

6. v. Emergency Operations Center ("EOC")
coordination,

7. vi. training/disaster drills, and

8. vii. appropriate disaster preparedness checklists;

2. b. conducting exercises to evaluate these plans and
train personnel;

3. c. developing and practicing a communications plan
to identify "key players" and multiple means of
contacting them (including alternate communications
channels, such as alpha pagers, Internet, satellite
phones, VOIP, private lines, BlackBerrytype devices,
etc.);

4. d. routinely archiving critical system backups and
providing for their storage in a "secure off-site"
facilities.

2. Pre-positioning for Public Safety - An Awareness
Program for Non-Traditional Emergency Alternatives - The
FCC should take steps to educate the public safety
community about the availability and capabilities of
non-traditional technologies that might provide effective
back-up solutions for existing public safety
communications systems. Examples of these technologies
would be pagers, satellite technology and phones,
portable towers and repeaters, point-to-point microwave
links, license-exempt WISP systems, other systems less
reliant on the PSTN, and bridging technologies/gateways
that would facilitate interoperability. One means for the
FCC to do this would be to organize an exhibit area or
demonstration of these technologies in conjunction with
one or more large public safety conferences, such as:

1. a. APCO International Annual Conference and
Exposition
August 6-10, 2006; Orlando, FL

2. b. IAFC Fire Rescue International
September 14-16, 2006; Dallas, TX

3. c. International Association of Chiefs of Police
Conference
October 14-18, 2006; Boston, MA

4. d. NENA Annual Conference and Trade Show
June 9-14, 2007; Fort Worth, TX

5. e. National Sheriff's Association Annual Conference
June 23-27, 2007; Salt Lake City, UT

6. f. National Fraternal Order of Police
August 13-16, 2007; Louisville, KY

The FCC should also consider organizing a similar
exhibit/demonstration for other industry sectors that
might benefit from this information

3. Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory Requirements - An A
Priori Program for Disaster Areas - The FCC should
explore amending its rules to permit automatic grants of
certain types of waivers or special temporary authority
(STA) in a particular geographic area if the President
declares that area to be a "disaster area". As a
condition of the waiver or STA, the FCC could require
verbal or written notification to the Commission staff
contemporaneously with activation or promptly after the
fact. Further, the FCC should examine expanding the
on-line filing opportunities for STA requests, including
STA requests for AM broadcast stations. Examples of
possible rule waivers and STAs to study for this
treatment include:

1. a. Wireline.

2. i. Waiver of certain carrier change requirements to
allow customers whose long distance service was
disrupted to be connected to an operational long
distance provider.

3. ii. Waiver of aging residential numbers rules for
customers in the affected area. This allows
carriers to disconnect temporarily customers'
telephone service, upon request, and reinstate the
same number when the service is reconnected.

4. iii. Waiver of number portability requirements to
allow rerouting of traffic to switches unaffected
by the crisis.

5. iv. Waiver of reporting filings, such as Form 477
on local competition and broadband data, during the
crisis.

6. b. Wireless.

7. i. Waiver of amateur radio and license exempt rules
permitting transmissions necessary to meet
essential communications needs.

8. ii. Waiver of application filing deadlines (e.g.,
renewals, construction notifications,
discontinuance notices, etc.), construction
requirements, and discontinuance of service
requirements.

9. iii. Streamlined STA process, such that parties in
the affected area may simply notify the FCC in
writing or verbally of a need to operate in order
to restore service.

10. c. Broadcast and Cable.

11. i. Waiver of non-commercial educational ("NCE")
rules to permit NCE television and radio stations
in the affected area to simulcast and rebroadcast
commercial station programming during a crisis.

12. ii. Waiver of requirements for notifying the FCC of
use of emergency antennas within 24 hours.

13. iii. Waiver of limits on AM nighttime operations,
so long as operation is conducted on a
noncommercial basis.

14. iv. Waiver of rules on limited and discontinued
operations.

15. v. Tolling of broadcast station construction
deadlines.

16. vi. Automatic STAs, or STAs granted through written
or oral notification, for broadcast stations to go
silent.

17. vii. Waiver of restrictions on simulcast
programming of commonly owned stations within the
same band.

18. viii. Waiver of location and staffing requirements
of a main studio within the community.

19. ix. Waiver of activation and post-event Section
73.1250 reporting requirements related to
transmission of point-to-point communications
during a declared emergency.

2. d. Satellite.

i. Waiver of requirements for notifying the FCC of use of
emergency antenna equipment within 24 hours.

ii. Streamlined STA process for satellite operators
responding to a declared emergency.

4. Pre-positioning for Government Outage Monitoring - A
Single Repository and Contact with Consistent Data
Collection - The FCC should coordinate with other federal
and state agencies to identify a single repository/point
of contact for communications outage information in the
wake of an emergency. The Panel suggests that the FCC is
the federal agency best situated to perform this
function. The FCC should work with affected industry
members and their trade associations to establish a
consolidated data set and geographic area for data
collection. Once broad agreement is reached on the
appropriate outage information to be collected, it should
be consistently applied and not subject to routine
changes. To the extent practical, the frequency of
voluntary reporting and duration of reporting
requirements should be specified as part of any emergency
outage reporting plan. The Panel suggests that reporting
no more than once a day would strike the right balance
between supplying important outage information and not
distracting resources from critical recovery efforts.
Additionally, any proprietary information that is
gathered through voluntary outage reporting must be kept
confidential, with only aggregated information provided
to appropriate government entities, such as the local
EOC, during a crisis situation. Any carrier-specific data
should be disclosed to other agencies only with
appropriate confidentiality safeguards (such as
non-disclosure agreements) in place.

Recovery Coordination - Critical Steps for Addressing
Existing Shortcomings and Maximizing Use of Existing
Resources

1. 1. Remedying Existing Shortcomings - National
Credentialing Guidelines for Communications
Infrastructure Providers - The Panel generally
supports the National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee's ("NSTAC's") recommendation for
a national standard for credentialing
telecommunications repair workers, but believes this
should be broadened to include repair workers of all
communications infrastructure providers (including
wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and
broadcasting infrastructure providers).
Specifically, the Panel recommends that the FCC work
with other appropriate federal departments and
agencies and the communications industry to promptly
develop national credentialing requirements and
process guidelines for enabling communications
infrastructure providers and their contracted
workers access to the affected area post-disaster.
The FCC should encourage states to develop and
implement a credentialing program consistent with
these guidelines as promptly as possible and
encourage appropriate communications industry
members to secure any necessary credentialing. Under
this program, credentials should be available to be
issued to communications infrastructure providers at
any time during the year, including before, during
and after a disaster situation. The credentials
should be issued directly to communications
infrastructure providers, which will then be
responsible for distributing these credentials to
their employees and contracted workers. These
credentials, together with company-issued employee
or contractor identification should be sufficient to
permit access. As a condition of credentialing, the
program should require that communications
infrastructure providers receiving credentials
ensure that their employees and contracted workers
receiving credentials complete basic National
Incident Management System ("NIMS") training (i.e.,
"Introduction to NIMS"). The FCC should work with
the communications industry to develop an
appropriate basic NIMS training course (no more than
one hour) for communications repair workers that can
be completed online. Once developed, this
communications-specific training course should
replace "Introduction to NIMS" as the requirement
for credentialing. The FCC should also encourage
states to recognize and accept credentials issued by
other states.

2. 2. Remedying Existing Shortcomings - Emergency
Responder Status for Communications Infrastructure
Providers - The Panel supports the NSTAC's
recommendation that telecommunications
infrastructure providers and their contracted
workers be afforded emergency responder status under
the Stafford Act and that this designation be
incorporated into the National Response Plan, as
well as state and local emergency response plans.
However, the Panel suggests that this recommendation
be broadened to include all communications
infrastructure providers (including wireline,
wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting
infrastructure providers) and their contracted
workers. The FCC should work with Congress and the
other appropriate federal departments and agencies
to implement this broadened recommendation.

1. 3. Remedying Existing Shortcomings -
Utilization of State/Regional Coordination
Bodies

2. - The FCC should work with state and local
government and the communications industry
(including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite,
cable and broadcasting) to better utilize the
coordinating capabilities at regional, state
and local EOCs, as well as the Joint Field
Office ("JFO"). The FCC should encourage, but
not require, each regional, state and local EOC
and the JFO to engage in the following
activities:

3. a. Facilitate coordination between
communications infrastructure providers
(including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite,
cable and broadcasting providers, where
appropriate) and state and local emergency
preparedness officials (such as the state
emergency operations center) in the state or
region at the EOC or JFO. The parties should
meet on a periodic basis to develop channels of
communications (both pre-and post-disaster), to
construct joint preparedness and response
plans, and to conduct joint exercises.

4. b. Develop credentialing requirements and
procedures for purposes of allowing
communications infrastructure providers, their
contracted workers and private security teams,
if any, access to the affected area
post-disaster. These requirements and
procedures should be consistent with any
nationally-developed credentialing guidelines.
Where possible, web-based applications should
be created to pre-clear or expedite movement of
communications infrastructure providers into a
disaster area.

5. c. Develop and facilitate inclusion in the
state's Emergency Preparedness Plan, where
appropriate, one or more clearly identified
post-disaster coordination areas for
communications infrastructure providers, their
contracted workers, and private security teams,
if any, to gather post-disaster where
credentialing, security, escorts and further
coordination can be achieved. The state's
Emergency Preparedness Plan should describe the
process for informing communications
infrastructure providers where these
coordination area(s) will be located.

6. d. Post-disaster, share information and
coordinate resources to facilitate repair of
key communications infrastructure.
Specifically, this would include identifying
key damaged infrastructure; if necessary,
assigning priorities for access and scarce
resources (fuel, security, etc.) to repair this
infrastructure. Additionally, the coordination
body and staging area can provide a means for
industry to share

and maximize scarce resources (share surplus equipment,
double and triple up on

security escorts to a particular area, etc.).

e. Facilitate electric and other utilities' maintenance
of priority lists for commercial power restoration.
Include commercial communications providers on this
priority list and coordinate power restoration activities
with communications restoration.

The Panel would also support communications
infrastructure providers in a state or region forming an
industry-only group for disaster planning, coordinating
recovery efforts and other purposes. Nevertheless, the
Panel believes that coordinating capabilities and
staffing of regional, state and local EOCs, as well as
the JFO, need to be better utilized for the purposes
described above.

4. Maximizing Existing Resources - Expanding and
Publicizing Emergency Communications Programs (GETS, WPS
and TSP) - To facilitate the use of existing emergency
communications services and programs, the FCC should:

1. a. Work with the National Communications System
("NCS") to actively and aggressively promote GETS,
WPS and TSP to all eligible government, public
safety, and critical industry groups. As part of
this outreach effort, the Commission should target
groups that have relatively low levels of
participation. For example, the Panel recommends
that the Commission reach out to the emergency
medical community and major trauma centers to make
them aware of the availability of these services.

2. b. Work with the NCS to clarify whether broadcast,
WISP, satellite, and cable company repair crews are
eligible for GETS and WPS under the Commission's
existing rules. If so, the Commission should promote
the availability of these programs to those entities
and urge their subscribership. If the Commission
determines that these entities are not eligible, the
Panel recommends that the Commission revise its
rules so that these entities can subscribe to WPS
and GETS.

3. c. Work with the NCS to explore whether it is
technically and financially feasible for WPS calls
to automatically receive GETS treatment when they
reach landline facilities (thus avoiding the need
for a WPS caller to also enter GETS information).
The Commission may desire to set up an industry task
force to explore this issue.

4. d. Work with the NCS and the communications sector
to establish and promote best practices to ensure
that all WPS, GETS, and TSP subscribers are properly
trained in how to use these services.

1. 5. Maximizing Existing Resources - Broadening NCC to
Include All Communications Infrastructure Sectors -
The FCC should work with the NCS to broaden the
membership of the National Coordination Center for
Telecommunications ("NCC") to include adequate
representation of all types of communications
systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite and
other new technologies, as appropriate.

2. 6. Maximizing Existing Resources - FCC Website for
Emergency Coordination Information - The FCC should
create a password-protected website, accessible by
credentialed entities (under recovery coordination
recommendation #1), listing the key state emergency
management contacts (especially the contacts for
communications coordinating bodies), as well as
post-disaster coordination areas for communications
providers. During an emergency, this website should
be updated on a 24/7 basis.

3. 7. Maximizing Existing Resources - FCC Website for
Emergency Response Team Information - The FCC should
create a website to publicize the agency's emergency
response team's contact information and procedures
for facilitating disaster response and outage
recovery.

First Responder Communications - Essential Steps for
Addressing Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina

1. Essential Steps in Pre-positioning Equipment, Supplies
and Personnel - An Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and
Alternatives Inventory - To facilitate the restoration of
public safety communications capabilities, the FCC
should:

a. Encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and
maintain, including through arrangements with the private
sector, a cache of equipment components that would be
needed to immediately restore existing public safety
communications within hours of a disaster. At a minimum,
the cache should include the necessary equipment to
quickly restore communications capabilities on all
relevant mutual aid channels. Such a cache would consist
of:

i. RF gear, such as 800 MHz, UHF, VHF, Mutual Aid, IP
Gateway, and dispatch consoles;

ii. trailer and equipment housing;

iii. tower system components (antenna system, hydraulic
mast);

1. iv. power system components (generator, UPS,
batteries, distribution panel); and

2. v. fuel.

The cache should be maintained as a regional or
state-wide resource and located in areas protected from
disaster impacts. The cache should be included as an
element of the National Response Plan.

1. b. Encourage state and local jurisdictions to
utilize the cache through training exercises on a
regular basis.

2. c. Support the ongoing efforts of the NCC to develop
and maintain a database of state and local public
safety system information, including frequency
usage, to allow for more efficient spectrum sharing,
rapid on-site frequency coordination, and emergency
provision of supplemental equipment in the event of
system failures.

3. d. Urge public safety licensees to familiarize
themselves with alternative communications
technologies to provide communications when normal
public safety networks are down. Such technologies
include satellite telephones, two-way paging
devices, and other technologies less reliant on the
PSTN. Most importantly, public safety agencies
should be reminded/encouraged to train and use such
devices prior to emergencies.

4. e. Support the efforts of the NCC to develop an
inventory of available communications assets
(including local, state, federal civilian and
military) that can be rapidly deployed in the event
of a catastrophic event. The list should include
land mobile radios, portable infrastructure
equipment, bridging technologies/gateways, and
backup power system components. This information
should include the steps necessary for requesting
the deployment of these assets. The FCC should work
with the NCC and the appropriate agencies to educate
key state and local emergency response personnel on
the availability of these assets and how to request
them.

5. f. Coordinate with the NCS/NCC to assure that,
immediately following any large disaster, there is
an efficient means by which federal, state and local
officials can identify and locate private sector
communications assets that can be made rapidly
available to first responders and relief
organizations. One such means to be considered would
be a website maintained by either the FCC or NCC
through which the private sector could register
available assets along with product information. The
website should be designed with a special area for
registering available equipment to assist persons
with disabilities in their communications needs.

2. Essential Steps in Enabling Emergency Communications
Capabilities - Facilitating First Responder
Interoperability - To facilitate interoperability among
first responder communications, the FCC should:

1. a. Consistent with recent legislation, maintain the
schedule for commencing commercial spectrum auctions
before January 28, 2008 to fully fund the $1 billion
public safety interoperability program.

2. b. Work with National Telecommunications and
Information Administration ("NTIA") and the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") to establish
appropriate criteria for the distribution of the $1
billion in a manner that best promotes
interoperability with the 700 MHz band. Among other
things, such criteria should mandate that any radios
purchased with grant monies must be capable of
operating on 700 MHz and 800 MHz channels
established for mutual aid and interoperability
voice communications.

3. c. Encourage the expeditious development of regional
plans for the use of 700 MHz systems and move
promptly to review and approve such plans.

4. d. Expeditiously approve any requests by
broadcasters to terminate analog service in the 700
MHz band before the end of the digital television
transition in 2009 in order to allow public safety
users immediate access to this spectrum.

5. e. Work with the NTIA and DHS to develop strategies
and policies to expedite allowing Federal (including
the military), state and local agencies to share
spectrum for emergency response purposes,
particularly the Federal incident response channels
and channels established for mutual aid and
interoperability.

6. f. Publicize interoperability successes and/or best
practices by public safety entities to serve as
models to further interoperability.

3. Essential Steps in Addressing E-911 Lessons Learned -
A Plan for Resiliency and Restoration of E-911
Infrastructure and PSAPs - In order to ensure a more
robust E911 service, the FCC should encourage the
implementation of these best practice recommendations
issued by Focus Group 1C of the FCC-chartered NRIC VII:

1. a. Service providers and network operators should
consider placing and maintaining 911 circuits over
diverse interoffice transport facilities (e.g.,
geographically diverse facility routes,
automatically invoked standby routing, diverse
digital cross-connect system services, self-healing
fiber ring topologies, or any combination thereof).
See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-0566.

2. b. Service providers, network operators and property
managers should ensure availability of
emergency/backup power (e.g., batteries, generators,
fuel cells) to maintain critical communications
services during times of commercial power failures,
including natural and manmade occurrences (e.g.,
earthquakes, floods, fires, power brown/blackouts,
terrorism). The emergency/backup power generators
should be located onsite, when appropriate. See NRIC
VII Recommendation 7-7-5204.

3. c. Network operators should consider deploying dual
active 911 selective router architectures to enable
circuits from the caller's serving end office to be
split between two selective routers in order to
eliminate single points of failure. Diversity should
also be considered on interoffice transport
facilities connecting each 911 selective router to
the PSAP serving end office. See NRIC VII
Recommendations 7-7-0571.

4. d. Network operators, service providers, equipment
suppliers and public safety authorities should
establish alternative methods of communication for
critical personnel. See NRIC VII Recommendation
7-7-1011.

In addition, the FCC should:

1. a. Recommend the designation of a secondary back-up
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away to answer
calls when the primary and secondary PSAPs are
disabled. This requires the FCC to eliminate any
regulatory prohibition against the transport of 911
across LATA boundaries. The Panel recommends that
the FCC expeditiously initiate such a rulemaking.
This rulemaking should also consider permitting a
backup E-911 tandem across a LATA boundary.

2. b. Recommend that the FCC urge the DHS, Fire Grant
Act, and other applicable federal programs to permit
state or local 911 commissions or emergency
communications districts, which provide 911 or
public safety communications

services, to be eligible to apply for 911 enhancement and
communications enhancement/interoperability grants.

4. Essential Steps in Addressing Lessons Learned
Concerning Emergency Medical and Hospital Communications
Needs - An Outreach Program to Educate and Include the
Emergency Medical Community in Emergency Communications
Preparedness - The FCC should work to assist the
emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency
and effectiveness of their emergency communications
systems. Among other things, the FCC should:

1. a. Educate the emergency medical community about
emergency communications and help to coordinate this
sector's emergency communications efforts;

2. b. Educate the emergency medical community about the
various priority communications services (i.e.,
GETS, WPS and TSP) and urge them to subscribe;

3. c. Work with Congress and the other appropriate
federal departments and agencies to ensure emergency
medical personnel are treated as public safety
personnel under the Stafford Act; and

4. d. Support DHS efforts to make emergency medical
providers eligible for funding for emergency
communications equipment under the State Homeland
Security Grant Program.

Emergency Communications to the Public - Actions to Alert
and Inform

1. Actions to Alert and Inform - Revitalize and Publicize
the Underutilized Emergency Alert System - To facilitate
and complement the use of the existing Emergency Alert
System ("EAS"), the FCC should:

1. a. Educate state and local officials about the
existing EAS, its benefits, and how it can be best
utilized.

2. b. Develop a program for educating the public about
the EAS and promote community awareness of potential
mechanisms for accessing those alerts sent during
power outages or broadcast transmission failures.

3. c. Move expeditiously to complete its proceeding to
explore the technical and financial viability of
expanding the EAS to other technologies, such as
wireless services and the Internet, recognizing that
changes to communications networks and equipment
take time to implement.

4. d. Consistent with proposed legislation, work with
Congress and other appropriate federal departments
and agencies to explore the technical and financial
viability of establishing a comprehensive national
warning system that complements existing systems and
allows local officials to increase the penetration
of warnings to the public as well as target, when
necessary, alerts to a particular area.

5. e. Work with the DHS and other appropriate federal
agencies on pilot programs that would allow more
immediate evaluation and testing of new notification
technologies.

6. f. Work with the Department of Commerce to expand
the distribution of certain critical non-weather
emergency warnings over NOAA weather radios to
supplement the EAS.

2. Actions to Alert and Inform - Commence Efforts to
Ensure that Persons with Disabilities and
Non-English-Speaking Americans Receive Meaningful Alerts
- To help to ensure that all Americans, including those
with hearing or visual disabilities or who do not speak
English, can receive emergency communications, the FCC
should:

1. a. Promptly find a mechanism to resolve any
technical and financial hurdles in the current EAS
to ensure that non-English speaking people or
persons with disabilities have access to public
warnings, if readily achievable.

2. b. Work with the various industry trade associations
and the disabled community to create and publicize
best practices for serving persons with disabilities
and non-English-speaking Americans.

3. c. Encourage state and local government agencies who
provide emergency information (through video or
audio broadcasts or websites) to take steps to make
critical emergency information accessible to persons
with disabilities and non-English-speaking
Americans.

3. Actions to Alert and Inform - Ensure Consistent and
Reliable Emergency Information Through a Consolidated and
Coordinated Public Information Program - Public
information functions should be coordinated and
integrated across jurisdictions and across functional
agencies, among federal, state, local and tribal
partners, and with private sector and non-governmental
organizations. The FCC should work with all involved
parties to help facilitate the following:

1. a. Integration of media representatives into the
development of disaster communications plans (ESF
#2). These plans should establish systems and
protocols for communicating timely and accurate
information to the public during crisis or emergency
situations.

2. b. Designation of a public information officer at
each EOC. This individual should be accessible to
the media to handle media and public inquiries,
emergency public information and warnings, rumor
monitoring and response, and other functions
required to coordinate, clear with appropriate
authorities, and disseminate accurate and timely
information related to the incident, particularly
regarding information on public health, safety and
protection.

3. c. During large scale disasters, the formation of a
Joint Information Center ("JIC") for the collocation
of representatives from federal, regional, state,
local and/or tribal EOCs tasked with primary
incident coordination responsibilities. The JIC
would provide the mechanism for integrating public
information activities across

jurisdictions and with private sector and
non-governmental organizations. Media operations should
be an integral part of the JIC.

CONCLUSION

The Katrina Panel commends Chairman Martin and the
Commission for their actions to assist industry and first
responders before, during and after Hurricane Katrina and
for forming this Panel to identify steps to be taken to
enhance readiness and recovery in the future. The Panel
thanks the Commission for the opportunity to address the
important issues associated with this devastating
hurricane's effect on our nation's communications
networks. In this effort, the Panel members have brought
to bear a broad background of public safety and industry
experiences, including (for many) first-hand knowledge of
the devastation wrought by Katrina. The Panel has also
benefited from information provided in the many comments
and expert presentations. The Panel hopes that its
resulting observations and recommendations prove useful
to the Commission in helping to ensure that the
communications industry, first responders, and government
at all levels are better prepared for future hurricanes
and any other disasters that might lie ahead for us.

APPENDIX A

Members of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks

Chair: Nancy J. Victory, Partner, Wiley Rein & Fielding
LLP

Carson Agnew, Executive Vice President, Mobile Satellite
Ventures, LP

Michael R. Anderson, Chairman, PART-15.ORG

Robert G. (Gil) Bailey, ENP, Telecommunications Manager,
Harrison County, MS Emergency Communications Commission

Kevin Beary, Sheriff, Orange County, FL

Greg Bicket, Vice President/Regional Manager, Cox
Communications

Lt. Colonel Joseph Booth, Deputy Superintendent,
Louisiana State Police

Steve Davis, Senior Vice President - Engineering, Clear
Channel Radio

Robert G. Dawson, President & CEO, SouthernLINC Wireless

Stephen A. Dean, Fire Chief, City of Mobile, AL

Steve Delahousey, Vice President - Operations, American
Medical Response

Dave Flessas, Vice President - Network Operations, Sprint
Nextel Corp.

Martin D. Hadfield, Vice President - Engineering,
Entercom Communications Corp.

Jim O. Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network Group

Tony Kent, Vice President - Engineering & Network
Operations, Cellular South

Kelly Kirwan, Vice President - State and Local Government
and Commercial Markets Division, The Americas Group,
Government, Enterprise, and Mobility Solutions, Motorola
Communications and Electronics, Inc

Jonathan D. Linkous, Executive Director, American
Telemedicine Association

Adora Obi Nweze, Director, Hurricane Relief Efforts,
NAACP; President, Florida State Conference, NAACP;
Member, National Board of Directors, NAACP

Eduardo Pena, Board Member, League of United Latin
American Citizens

Billy Pitts, President of Government Affairs, The NTI
Group

Major Michael Sauter, Commander, Office of Technology and
Communications, New Orleans Police Department

Marion Scott, Vice President - Operations, CenturyTel

Kay Sears, Senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing,
G2 Satellite Solutions, PanAmSat Corporation

Edmund M. "Ted" Sexton, Sr., President, National Sheriffs
Association

Edwin D. Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge Fire Department

William L. Smith, Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth
Corporation

Patrick Yoes, President, Louisiana Fraternal Order of
Police, National Secretary, Fraternal Order of Police

Federal Communications Commission FCC 06-83

STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN KEVIN J. MARTIN

Re: Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing
the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks, EB Docket No. 06-119

I would like to thank the members of the Independent
Panel for taking the time to study the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on communications networks. I would
also like to thank Nancy Victory for agreeing to Chair
the Independent Panel. We all appreciate the hard work
that went into studying the lessons of this terrible
disaster and developing recommendations for improving our
response in the future.

The devastation of Hurricane Katrina highlighted the
importance of telecommunications and media to our daily
lives, and our dependency on our national communications
infrastructure. For the past six months, experts from
public safety organizations, the communications industry,
and public interest groups have worked together to study
the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the telecommunications
and media infrastructure and to review the sufficiency of
the recovery effort with respect to this infrastructure.

In its final report, the Independent Panel has presented
recommendations for increasing the readiness of the
communications industry, improving response and recovery
after major disasters, enhancing the operability and
interoperability of public safety and 911 communications,
and strengthening our emergency alert communications. I
am particularly pleased to see the Independent Panel's
recommendations to provide a Readiness Checklist for the
communications industry, to inform the public safety
community about technologies to improve the operability
and interoperability of their communications, to
strengthen the resiliency of Public Safety Answering
Points (PSAPs) and other 911 infrastructure, and to take
actions to ensure the public gets timely information in
times of emergency.

With this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we are asking
for comments and suggestions from the public on how to
best address and implement the Independent Panel's
recommendations. I look forward to studying the
Independent Panel's report and to reviewing the public's
responses for additional follow-up action so that we can
improve our response and recovery efforts for the future.

STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL J. COPPS

Re: Report and Recommendations to the Federal
Communications Commission, from the Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on the
Communications Networks.

Ten months ago, the nation viewed with horror the images
of destruction coming out of the Gulf Coast. Many of us
found it nearly impossible to believe that such
dislocation and suffering could occur in our country, the
wealthiest and most technologically-advanced in the
world. I visited the Coast with Chairman Martin and other
telecommunications leaders in the days after Katrina, and
I can tell you that none of us will ever forget the
images of devastation we witnessed.

It is now clear that the causes of our national failure
were multiple, including serious breakdowns in
leadership, planning, engineering, policing, and
emergency management. But it is also common knowledge -
on both sides of the political aisle - that the failure
of our national communications system played a terrible
role in exacerbating all of these problems.^1 As
historian Douglas Brinkley puts it: "That was the
consensus, the one fiasco everyone agreed on - whatever
else Katrina did to New Orleans, it had clearly broken
down all standard modes of communications."^2

Today's report does an admirable job documenting how our
public and private communications networks failed during
the storm and were not repaired nearly quickly enough in
its wake. The country owes an enormous debt of gratitude
to those who served on the Panel, to Nancy Victory who
chaired it, and to the many individuals who testified
before it or participated in compiling this report. They
did so without compensation, while holding down full-time
jobs, and solely out of a spirit of public service. I
cannot thank them enough for their hard work and
dedication.

The Panel's report describes our country's communications
shortfalls in the dispassionate, objective language of
the professional engineer. This is entirely fitting and
proper. For now that the Gulf Coast has begun the arduous
process of rebuilding, our task - indeed our solemn duty
- here in Washington is to learn all that we can from
this tragedy. We must ensure that we are better prepared
as a nation for the next disaster, whether it be another
hurricane (possibly even stronger than Katrina), an
earthquake, or a

^1 See also Final Report of the Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response
to Hurricane Katrina, H.R. Rep. No. 109-377, at 165
(2006), available at
http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm ("The
near total failure of regional communications degraded
situational awareness and exacerbated problems with
agency coordination, command and control, logistics, and
search and rescue operations."); Ivor Van Heerden and
Mike Bryan, The Storm (Viking 2006), at 95 ("Simply put,
along with everything else during Hurricane Katrina, we
had a ridiculous, tragic failure to communicate.")

^2 Douglas Brinkley, The Great Deluge (HarperCollins
2006), at 215.

terrorist attack. Sadly, if we can be sure of anything,
it is that there will be a next disaster and that we are
not prepared for it.

Each failure of communications documented in this report
is also a story of human suffering and often even loss of
life. Consider the story of Lafon Nursing Home of the
Holy Family in New Orleans, where 100 elderly patients
found themselves left behind to weather the storm. On the
third harrowing day, "They finally caught a break.
Someone's cell phone chirped to life, offering
communication with the outside world."^3 This momentary
lifeline allowed a social worker to contact her brother
in Atlanta who eventually managed to charter a private
bus to bring the patients to safety. But not all of them
- rescue workers eventually recovered 22 bodies.^4

The fact that "within one week after Katrina,
approximately 80 percent of wireless cell sites were up
and running" is therefore cold comfort indeed.^5 If these
sites had been up and running sooner, would we have had
fewer stories like Lafon?^6

Measured in these terms, this report is a shocking
indictment of the disaster readiness of our existing
communications networks. Put simply, it concludes that
both our public safety and commercial networks: (1) are
not capable of operating without power for more than a
day or two, (2) are not designed with sufficient
redundancy, and

(3) can withstand wind and rain but not flooding. This is
true of the wireless and wireline networks that all of us
rely upon to call 911 and our families during a crisis.
It is also true of the multiple networks that police
officers, firefighters, and other first responders rely
upon to protect us in cases of emergency.^7 Because power
outages, multiple sources of disruption, and flooding are
all entirely predictable outcomes in New Orleans and
elsewhere, it seems clear that we need to take immediate
and serious corrective action.

By way of contrast, it appears that our electric utility
companies have developed networks that both survived the
storm and managed to operate during the aftermath, even
with the power outages.^8 These are the private networks
that the companies use to communicate with their
employees and monitor the status of their facilities. The
utility companies' networks worked better during the
storm and its aftermath, the report explains, because
these companies designed their systems: (1) "to remain
intact . . . following a significant storm event," (2)
"with significant onsite back-up power supplies
(batteries and generators)," (3) with redundant fixed and
wireless backhaul, and (4) with

^3 Anne Hull and Doug Struck, "A City's Most Helpless
Left To Fend for Themselves," Washington Post (Sept. 23,
2005).

^4 Id.

^5 Report at 9.

^6 See e.g., The Storm at 62 ("The nursing home trade
group for Louisiana concluded after the flood that at
least two thirds of the city's fifty-three nursing homes
were not evacuated, with tragic results.")

^7 Nor were the military's systems anything close to
adequate for the task. As today's report discusses, in
order to communicate with civilian first responders, the
military was reduced to using human runners to carry
messages and, in one case, to dropping a message in a
bottle from a helicopter. Report at 26.

^8 Id. at 12-13.

staff "focus[sed] on continuing maintenance of network
elements (for example, exercising standby generators on a
routine basis)."^9 For heaven's sakes - shouldn't our
public safety and commercial networks be built with the
same concerns in mind?^10

In light of these sobering conclusions, I think that the
central question raised by the report is how - and not
whether - the communications industry should begin to
incorporate more rigorous standards into how it
constructs and maintains networks. To be fair, I
recognize that there are important concerns about cost
and scalability in incorporating innovations developed by
utility companies into public safety and commercial
networks. But, at a minimum, let's begin by confronting
the issue.

For these reasons, I appreciate my colleagues'
willingness to open a comprehensive rulemaking addressing
how we can improve the reliability and disaster readiness
of our nation's communications networks. I am especially
pleased that we seek comment on whether voluntary
implementation is enough or whether we need to consider
other measures. The most important thing, of course, is
that we be certain the job is getting done. By the first
anniversary of Katrina, I hope and expect we can have new
rules in place that will improve our nation's
communications and protect the public safety.

Even before we complete our new rulemaking, the
Commission can and should move forward with a number of
the Panel's recommendations. Of particular importance, we
need to complete our pending proceeding to overhaul the
antiquated Emergency Alert System (EAS). The report tells
us that "a fairly large percentage of the public likely
were uninformed" about the progress of the storm.^11 We
need to do better, especially for our disabled and
non-English-speaking citizens who are poorly served by
our current broadcast-based systems. I believe the Panel
is on the right track in saying the Commission needs to
be thinking about extending EAS to newer wireless and
IP-based devices.

I am also glad that we seek comment on whether, and how,
the Commission should position itself as a clearinghouse
of ideas for better preparing organizations of every size
for the next disaster. I have advocated this approach for
a long time. Why should every hospital, day care center,
nursing home, charitable organization, and small business
have to start at square one, devising its own plan,
developing its options, figuring out how to respond to a
crisis, as if no one else has been down this road before?

How much better it would be if they could call someone -
say the FCC - and talk to experts who could tell them
what has been tried and works and what has been tried and
doesn't work, and give them a hand along the way.

^9 Id.

^10 See also Mike Scott, Harrison County, MS: Radio
System Weathers the Storm in Mississippi, 9-1-1 MAGAZINE,
Jan/Feb 2006, at 33 ("The normal construction standard
looks at 100-year flood plans. ... In public safety, we
have to look at 500-year flood plans.").

^11 Report at 28.

Finally, I want to emphasize again my conviction that the
FCC must be front and center when it comes to
safeguarding the nation's communications security. This
agency has the best people and the best expertise in
government on communications. As Title I of our enabling
statute makes clear, we also have a statutory duty to
ensure the safety of our people through secure
communications networks. We therefore must continually
ask ourselves: Are we doing absolutely everything within
our power to make sure that our institutional knowledge
and competence are being fully and properly used? To the
extent they aren't, we fail our charge. I am not now, and
never have been, in favor of waiting for others to do our
job.

At the end of the day, the Commission's goal should be do
such a good job that communications is not a focus in the
aftermath of a disaster. It should be an afterthought or
not a thought at all. Police and other first responders,
hospital workers, nursing home staff, and concerned
family members should be free to focus on their primary
missions. They should not have to worry, in the middle of
a crisis, about whether their communications equipment
will work. Unfortunately, the Katrina experience shows us
that we as a nation have not met our responsibilities.
The only question now is whether - as a new hurricane
season is upon us - we will accept our challenge and
develop solutions to the problems this report so
carefully identifies. History will not and should not
forgive us if we fail to do so.

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JONATHAN S. ADELSTEIN

Re: Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on

Communications Networks; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking;
EB Docket No. 06

119

I want to extend my deepest thanks to the members of the
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina for investing so much of their time and effort to
draw out lessons from this disaster and to better prepare
our communities for the future. The release of their
Report brings back memories of the devastation wrought by
the storm and its aftermath, and of the heroic and
continuing efforts of those communities to regroup and
rebuild.

Shortly after the storm, I had an opportunity to witness
first hand some of the widespread destruction and
personal loss in the Gulf Coast, which was far worse than
I could have ever imagined. More importantly, I also was
able to meet and talk with communications workers, who
labored around the clock to restore connectivity to the
Gulf Coast, often at great personal sacrifice. It was
humbling to see Americans act so selflessly when others
are in need, particularly when so many were themselves
suffering the loss of homes, communities, or loved ones.
To all of these citizens, we owe an honest assessment of
our strengths, weaknesses, and our commitment to
preparedness.

Our experience with Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that
the role of communications is essential during
emergencies, whether citizens are trying to find out what
is happening with their families, or emergency personnel
are responding to an urgent situation. This Report
confirms that our nation's communications systems were
put to the test, with unfortunately mixed results. I
welcome the coming public dialogue on the Independent
Panel's recommendations, and look forward to working with
my colleagues and the broader community to improve our
preparedness and response.

This Report also highlights how critical it is that the
Commission provides the best leadership possible to
ensure that communications are fully operational during
the most serious events. It can play a key role in
improving our nation's disaster preparedness, network
reliability, and communications among first responders.
As the Report suggests, the Commission must also take the
lead in coordinating with state and local governments in
advance of future disasters and in working with other
federal agencies to ensure that credentialing procedures
and other requirements are developed in advance to ensure
access by communications workers to affected areas
post-disaster.

At the same time, this Report highlights the importance
of advance planning and provides important
recommendations on how we can ready ourselves before
disaster strikes. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
the Commission received high marks for ensuring that it
was responsive in the wake of these tragedies. But with
the first tropical storm of 2006 already hitting the Gulf
Coast, we must move more quickly to better position
ourselves for the inevitable next challenges. So I
wholeheartedly support the simultaneous release of our
NPRM to better allow us to move promptly forward on the
important Panel recommendations.

Finally, I want to thank Chairman Martin for convening
this group and Nancy Victory for stepping forward in
leading the panel. A disaster like this demonstrates how
important it is that we all work together in times of
crisis. Efforts like this are essential to achieve the
continual improvement necessary to protect ourselves in
the event of future disasters, be they natural or
man-made. Thank you again for all of your effort and for
your commitment to the hard work ahead.

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER DEBORAH TAYLOR TATE

Re: Recommendation of the Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks,
EB Docket No. 06-119

When disaster strikes, our first reaction is to reach out
to those we love. We call for help, we call loved ones to
tell them we are okay, and we call to offer assistance to
those in need. The Commission plays a critical role in
ensuring the continuity of essential communications
systems that are relied on for public safety, for public
officials, for relief efforts, and for every single
citizen touched by a disaster. The FCC is filled with
engineers, economists, and attorneys with an intimate
knowledge of the communications industry. These people
are also parents and caring human beings who want to help
in times of great need. This collective experience is a
valuable resource for everyone involved in a disaster
response, including first responders, state and local
government, other federal agencies, and of course, the
public. That is why I am pleased to support today's
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice) because the
comments we receive will be invaluable to the Commission,
to the industries we regulate, and to the American
people.

Certainly, we all owe Nancy Victory a sincere debt of
gratitude for her leadership of the independent panel
reviewing the impact of Hurricane Katrina. To those
members of the panel who suffered great personal loss, we
particularly thank you for your efforts and continue our
prayers for recovery and renewal.

I encourage the industry to continue to develop and share
their own thoughts, strategies, and ideas on disaster
preparedness and emergency system interoperability in
response to this Notice. The industry has already
developed some extraordinary disaster recovery plans, and
I have been able to see emergency response equipment set
up by several companies, including AT&T's Disaster
Recovery equipment. In addition, I hope that we can learn
lessons from all types of businesses - from Home Depot to
Wal-Mart and beyond - about how to better prepare and
react to a crisis.

I would also hope we recognize that not all disasters
come in the form of hurricanes. The threat of
bioterrorism or a pandemic flu will strain our resources
in ways entirely different from wind and rain. We must
not simply react to past disasters, but look ahead to
future threats and be prepared to do our part to ensure
the safety and security of all Americans.

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ROBERT M. MCDOWELL

Re: Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing
the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks (EB Docket No. 06-119)

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the FCC worked
around the clock to bring much needed help and to make
available funds to help restore communications and
provide a lifeline for thousands of Americans. Under the
leadership of Chairman Martin, the FCC was a model of
swift governmental response and support in time of need.

The job of the Independent Panel was to study the effect
of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of the
telecommunications and media industries, to review and
critique the recovery effort with respect to the
communications infrastructure, and to present their
findings and recommendations on improving disaster
preparedness, network reliability, and communications
among first responders. I applaud the Chairman for his
leadership in the FCC's response to Hurricane Katrina and
in establishing this panel, and I thank Nancy Victory and
the members of the panel for their hard work.

The lessons learned from the Katrina experience will
allow us to be better prepared, not just in the Gulf
Coast region or in the event of a hurricane, but in the
face of any impending disaster to provide the critical
infrastructure and interoperability of communications
systems so vital to protecting lives and property. As we
seek comment on how best to act on the recommendations of
the Independent Panel and put these measures in place, I
urge everyone to weigh in on this important issue. The
power of every American to serve the public good has
never been stronger, the need to act as one community to
defend against the threat of harm has never been more
urgent, and the opportunity to come together to make a
difference has never been greater than now.