Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of

VOICESTREAM WIRELESS CORPORATION, and

POWERTEL, INC.,
Transferors,

and

DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG,
Transferee,

Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
APPLICATIONS FOR CONSENT TO TRANSFER OF CONTROL

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government. Rather, the question of how to account for DT’s contribution is simply a political
and historical issue that has no bearing on DT’s operation of its wireless business.

4. Finally, Senator Hollings relies on a boilerplate provision of the VoiceStream-DT
merger agreement stating that DT waives any sovereign immunity rights it may have in any
subsequent dispute with VoiceStream. This precautionary measure, designed to resolve any
future uncertainty, does not establish that DT in fact possesses any sovereign immunity, much
less that any such legal status would answer the question here — whether DT would use its U.S.
wireless licenses on behalf of or in connection with the German government. Rather, DT merely
agreed (at VoiceStream’s request) that, “to the extent that it . . . is or becomes entitled to any
immunity on the grounds of sovereignty or otherwise based on its status as an agency or
instrumentality of the government, it . . . expressly, irrevocably, and unconditionally waives . . .
any such immunity.”139/ This routine waiver provision is included in such documents any time
there is any ownership interest — whether controlling or noncontrolling — by a governmental
entity. DT is a private corporation that can be sued in Germany just like any other corporation,
and a waiver provision in a merger document does not change this fact.

III. THE COMMISSION SHOULD SUMMARILY REJECT COMMENTERS’
REQUESTS TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS RELATING TO DT’S INTERACTION
WITH NEW ENTRANTS IN GERMANY AND OTHER MATTERS THAT HAVE
NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PROPOSED TRANSACTIONS OR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST ANALYSIS.

The German Competitors ask the Commission to reverse its decision in the Foreign
Participation Order to forego the ECO test for entry from WTO signatory countries and to
impose a wide-ranging set of conditions to remedy alleged anticompetitive practices by DT in

139/ Agreement and Plan of Merger Between Deutsche Telekom AG and VoiceStream
Wireless Corp. at 61, July 23, 2000 (emphasis added).
the German market.\footnote{See Comments of GTS at 4-5; Comments of Novaxess at 2-9; Comments of QSC at 25-29.} In essence, these commenters are seeking reconsideration of that order three years too late. The Commission should summarily reject this request and any others that seek conditions unrelated to the proposed transactions' effects on competition in the United States, national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, or trade. Such grab-bag requests seek what would amount to a limitless expansion of the Commission's authority in license-transfer proceedings to second-guess its German and E.U. counterparts, in direct violation of the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement, the Commission's \textit{Foreign Participation Order}, and basic principles of comity.\footnote{See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 23940-41 ¶ 112-13 (defining scope of public interest analysis as including only very high risks to competition and concerns regarding national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade).} The unsubstantiated allegations of the German Competitors also have no connection to the proposed transactions, and for this reason too provide no basis for the relief sought.\footnote{See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 3160, 3207 ¶ 96 (1999) ("AT&T-TCI") (holding that open access issues did not provide a basis for conditioning or denying the merger because such "issues would remain equally meritorious (or non-meritorious) if the merger were not to occur"); Applications of Pacific Telesis Group, Transferor, and SBC Communications, Inc., Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of Pacific Telesis Group and its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 2624, 2626-27 ¶ 2 (1997) ("PacTel-SBC") (finding that competition issues that existed before the merger were irrelevant to the license-transfer proceeding).} In any event, Appendix A makes clear that the German Competitors' assertions are an exaggerated and misleading account of the routine issues that arise in the course of progress toward full local wireline competition in many countries. In fact, Germany has one of the world's most open and competitive telecommunications markets.
A. The Commission Should Reject the German Competitors’ Calls To Usurp the Authority of RegTP and the European Commission in Violation of the Foreign Participation Order and the GATS.

The German Competitors make a series of remarkable assertions in beseeching the Commission to join RegTP as a co-regulator of the German telecommunications market, in bold disregard of the United States’ WTO commitments and the WTO dispute resolution procedures. They contend that the Commission (1) must undertake a “full inquiry” under the ECO test, even though that test was abandoned in 1997 for carriers based in WTO member countries;139/ (2) should pretend DT is from a non-WTO country, notwithstanding that Germany, a WTO member, is indisputably DT’s “home market”;140/ and (3) should impose affirmative obligations on DT’s regulators — i.e., RegTP and the European Commission.141/ Simply to recite these requests is to refute their validity, but, in any event, the German Competitors themselves readily concede that there is no lawful basis for the imposition of such conditions. Because they do “not submit that entry of DTAG poses a ‘very high risk’ to competition in the United States,”142/ they cannot justify any inquiry into market conditions in Germany, much less the imposition of onerous conditions that would usurp the regulatory prerogatives of RegTP, the European Commission, and the WTO dispute resolution process.

The German Competitors ask the Commission to travel a road it has already left far behind. When the Commission adopted the Foreign Participation Order, it expressly rejected pleas to maintain the ECO test, or to examine “the extent to which a WTO Member has made a

139/ See Comments of QSC at 10.

140/ Id. at 25.

141/ See Comments of Novaxess at 12.

142/ Id. at 3. See also Comments of QSC at 2 (conceding that the standard for denying the applications has not been met); Comments of GTS at 3 (same).
market opening commitment or the extent to which that commitment has been implemented in determining whether a carrier from that country should enter the U.S. market. The Commission stated: “[W]e find that the potential for harm from carriers from countries that have not implemented their market-opening commitments to allow competition in their telecommunications markets does not justify imposing . . . strict limitations on entry. . . .”

The Commission further recognized that “discriminating among foreign applicants based on the quality of their WTO commitment or the extent of the implementation of their commitment could raise serious GATS concerns. Adopting such a policy could damage relations with our trading partners and serve as a poor example to other countries also implementing their market opening commitments.”

Because neither the German Competitors nor any other commenter claims that the proposed transactions would pose a very high risk to U.S. competition, there is no warrant for examining competitive practices in Germany. Indeed, as the Commission itself has recognized, to do so could be treated as a violation of Article II of the GATS. Nor have any commenters alleged threats to national security, law enforcement, or foreign policy. And, while one commenter makes vague allusions to trade policy, it is clear that supplanting the WTO

143/ Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd 23907-08, ¶¶ 37-39.
144/ Id. at ¶ 39.
145/ Id. at ¶ 40.
146/ See id. (“In contrast to our policy that considers the competitive impact of a firm’s entry into the U.S. market, a policy of discrimination among carriers based on their WTO commitment alone could be interpreted by other WTO Members as discriminating among ‘like’ service suppliers based solely on foreign market conditions. This could be perceived as a violation of Article II of the GATS.”) (emphasis added).
147/ See Comments of QSC at 28.
process with a heavy-handed effort by the Commission to regulate the German market would severely hamper, rather than promote, U.S. interests on the trade front.\textsuperscript{148} The German Competitors put forth no sound reason to justify departing from the \textit{Foreign Participation Order}.

Attempting to evade the plain language of the \textit{Foreign Participation Order}, the German Competitors argue that the open-entry standard adopted there should not apply because DT is a "global" telecommunications provider, and the Commission could not have considered such a development in 1997.\textsuperscript{149} There is no basis whatever for that assertion. Because the Commission \textit{did} anticipate the increasing importance of global markets, it made clear that it would determine the applicability of the open-entry presumption based on a foreign carrier's ""principal place of business"" or ""home market.""\textsuperscript{150} The German Competitors have not asserted, nor could they, that DT no longer maintains its principal place of business in Germany (a WTO member country), or that Germany is not DT's home market.\textsuperscript{151}

The German Competitors try to create another loophole by arguing that the \textit{Foreign Participation Order} has no application to the Commission's imposition of conditions on, as opposed to an outright denial of, the Applications.\textsuperscript{152} This, too, is without merit. The Commission does not — and cannot — even consider imposing conditions in the absence of a

\textsuperscript{148} See Comments of CWA at 11-12; Comments of Chamber of Commerce at 3-6; Comments of OFII at 5-9; Comments of IIE at 1.

\textsuperscript{149} See, \textit{e.g.}, Comments of Novaxess at 3; Comments of QSC at 11.

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Foreign Participation Order}, 12 FCC Rcd at 23941-42 ¶ 116.

\textsuperscript{151} To the contrary, QSC expressly makes reference to ""DTAG's German home market."" Comments of QSC at 27.

\textsuperscript{152} See Comments of GTS at 6.
demonstrated harm to the public interest.\textsuperscript{153} There is no demonstrated harm of that kind here, if for no other reason than that the German Competitors' proposals are not merger-specific: They have nothing whatever to do with DT's transactions with VoiceStream and Powertel, but would remain the same irrespective of whether DT were proposing to merge with a U.S. wireless carrier. The Commission has often stated that it does not use license-transfer proceedings to address such non-merger-specific issues.\textsuperscript{154} In any event, because VoiceStream, Powertel, and DT have overwhelmingly demonstrated that this merger is in the public interest, there is no basis for imposing conditions.\textsuperscript{155}

Moreover, in seeking to have the Commission impose conditions, the German Competitors invite it to evaluate other countries' implementation of WTO commitments — the very role that the Commission rejected in the \textit{Foreign Participation Order}. The German Competitors are not without recourse if they believe their claims are meritorious. They can seek redress directly from RegTP and from the European Commission. In addition, as the Commission recognized in the \textit{Foreign Participation Order}, USTR continuously monitors WTO members' "compliance with their WTO obligations and [can] pursue consultation and dispute settlement where noncompliance is found. Where a WTO Member fails to implement its

\textsuperscript{153} See Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications Inc., Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14712, 14854 ¶ 348 ("[I]f our analysis ended at this point [without consideration of proposed conditions], we would have to conclude that the Applicants have not demonstrated that the proposed transaction, on balance, will serve the public interest, convenience and necessity.")

\textsuperscript{154} See AT&T-TCI, 14 FCC Rcd at 3207 ¶ 96; PacTel-SBC, 12 FCC Rcd at 2626-27 ¶ 2.

\textsuperscript{155} While the German Competitors conclusorily assert that DT's supposedly anticompetitive conduct could harm U.S. consumers, they supply no facts in support of that assertion, as required by section 309(d)(1), \textit{see supra} Part I-B; and the assertion of a threat to competition in the United States in any event is demonstrably false, \textit{id}.
commitment, the United States has the ability to enforce a Member’s commitment. Thus, if Germany lagged in complying with the Basic Telecom Agreement — which it does not — the appropriate remedy would be for the United States to raise the issue bilaterally with the German government or to bring a WTO complaint, not for the Commission unilaterally to resurrect the ECO test.

QSC therefore has it backwards when it alludes to USTR’s review of Germany’s WTO compliance as a supposed basis for the Commission’s imposition of conditions. That review — in which USTR has not found any basis for a WTO complaint against Germany — provides the appropriate mechanism for addressing the German Competitors’ complaints.

In any event, all of the competitive issues these commenters raise, far from identifying a need for unilateral intervention by the Commission in violation of its orders and international law, are commonplace byproducts of the transition from a local wireline monopoly to full and unfettered competition. Even if the German Competitors’ allegations were valid — and they are not — the issues raised are general competitive matters that have nothing to do with the effects of the specific proposed transactions. Indeed, several issues raised by the commenters are identical to competitive disputes between incumbent LECs and new entrants in the U.S.

156/ Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 23903, 23908 ¶¶ 28, 39. The Commission further recognized that other countries have a similar incentive to hold WTO members’ to their commitments. See id.


telecommunications market. In this context, principles of comity have compelling force. If the Commission were to intervene in the routine disputes between new entrants and DT in Germany, that would open the door to foreign regulators' conditioning the entry of U.S. carriers on their compliance with requirements that usurp this Commission's role as local regulator.

RegTP thus is grappling with the same issues as the Commission, and the commenters advance no basis for concluding that the German regulator, or the European Commission, will fail to implement policies that promote competition. Just as it would be unreasonable to suggest that the longstanding regulatory disputes and litigation concerning collocation and loop provisioning in this country cast doubt on this Commission's ability to adjudicate these disputes that are endemic to the transition to local wireline competition, so too would it be unfair to impugn RegTP's effectiveness or independence as a result of such disputes in Germany. That is particularly so because that transition began two years later in Germany than it did here. Indeed,

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Footnote: For example, the German Competitors' complaints regarding DT's provisioning of interconnection, local loops, and collocation space are virtually identical to the kinds of objections raised by new entrants regarding the RBOCs' performance. In fact, a similar process of voluntary negotiations followed by regulatory decisionmaking applies in both countries. Just as the state commissions and the FCC resolve disputes between incumbents and new entrants in this country, RegTP "is empowered to order, at the request of an interconnecting party, public telecommunications network operators to interconnect and to define the conditions of interconnection, and sets the deadline for implementation of the decision." European Commission, Fifth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, Annex 3, at 6 (Nov. 11, 1999). The substance of disputes often is the same, as well: While the German Competitors argue that collocation provisioning takes too long, see, e.g., QSC at 21-24, the Commission recently completed a proceeding on this very same issue, in which U.S. competitors made identical requests regarding incumbent LECs' practices. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98, FCC 00-297 (rel. Aug. 10, 2000) (imposing new provisioning requirements at the behest of new entrants); see also Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Memorandum Opinion and Order, DA 00-2528, CC Docket No. 98-147 (rel. Nov. 7, 2000) (conditionally waiving certain requirements in response to objections by incumbent LECs).
the United States surely would cry "foul" if a WTO-member government were to use concerns about provisioning intervals of an incumbent LEC in the United States (such as Verizon, SBC, BellSouth, or Qwest) to deny that company access.\footnote{169/}

B. The Commission Also Should Reject Any Demands for Access to Spectrum for Designated Entities as Beyond the Scope of This Proceeding.

Finally, UTStarcom's vague suggestions that VoiceStream should be required to make spectrum available in rural markets, and that designated entities should be the beneficiaries,\footnote{161/} have nothing to do with the proposed merger and should therefore be rejected.\footnote{162/} Whether the

\footnote{169/} In addition to the proposed conditions regarding DT's conduct in Germany, Novaxess asks the Commission to force the German government to "commit itself to sell its stake in DTAG within a reasonable time period." Comments of Novaxess at 2. The Commission should reject this proposal for the same reasons stated above, chief among these being the Commission's dual obligation to follow its own orders and to take no action that would contravene the lawful and binding foreign commitments of the United States, and the absence of any merger-related competitive effects of such governmental ownership. It would be particularly inappropriate for the Commission to impose conditions on the German government, which, unlike DT, is not even a party to this license-transfer proceeding. In any event, the German government has stated its intent to reduce its interest in DT to zero, as market conditions permit. \textit{See} Letter from Michael Steiner, Foreign Policy and Security Adviser of the Federal Chancellor, to Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at 1 (Sept. 21, 2000) ("The German Government is fully committed to the full privatization of Deutsche Telekom and to the objective to reduce its direct stake not just to 25% but to zero."). There has been no showing remotely approximating that necessary to justify the draconian step of forcing that process to go forward irrespective of market conditions.

\footnote{161/} \textit{See} UTStarcom at 1.

\footnote{162/} \textit{See} CIRI/VoiceStream Order at ¶ 19 (rejecting a similar request to deny a transfer of control of designated entity licenses to VoiceStream premised on alleged harm to rural consumers). As the Bureaus noted in that order, "[t]he Commission has found that existing build-out requirements meet Congress' directive . . . in section 309(j)(4)(B) of the Act to adopt rules to 'include performance requirements, such as appropriate deadlines and penalties for performance failures, to ensure prompt delivery of service to rural areas, to prevent stockpiling or warehousing of spectrum by licensees or permittees, and to promote investment in and rapid deployment of new technologies and services.'" \textit{Id.} (citing 47 U.S.C § 309(j)(4)(B) and \textit{Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act — Competitive Bidding, Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 5532, 5570, ¶ 90 (1994)). These build-out requirements apply to all PCS licenses, regardless of the licensee.
APPENDIX A

THE COMMENTS REGARDING DT'S PRACTICES IN GERMANY ARE EXAGGERATED AND MISLEADING

Even if the comments of the German Competitors (Global TeleSystems ("GTS"), Novaxess, and QS Communications ("QSC")) were not beyond the scope of the Commission's public interest analysis, their allegations of anticompetitive practices in the German market are misleading and should be accorded no weight. A majority of neutral sources make clear that Germany has one of the world's most competitive telecommunications markets, especially for mobile telephony, and that many of the particular allegations in the comments distort reality.

Contrary to the German Competitors' allegations of anticompetitive practices and of German market control by DT, numerous third-party studies and relevant market data reveal that competition in the telecommunications market in Germany is robust. Germany opened its mobile telephony market in 1992, and all other sectors of its telecommunications market by January 1998. See Sprint Corp.: Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 310(b)(4) and (d), Declaratory Ruling and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 17223, 17228 ¶ 14 (1998) ("Sprint Corp.") ("We agree with Sprint that the French and German telecommunications markets are now open to competition."). In doing so, Germany has been one of the European Union's pioneers in effective market liberalization.\(^1\) As a result of Germany's liberalization of its telecommunications market, competition has developed and thrived in each of the market

\(^1\) See Teligen, Study on Market Entry Issues in EU Telecommunications Markets After 1st January 1998: A Report for the European Commission, at 2 (July 26, 2000) ("Study on Market Entry Issues") ("Of the countries that liberalised in January 1998, Germany has seen the fastest development of competition over the period."); FT Telecoms, Financial Times, Nov. 15, 2000 ("In just over two-and-a-half years Germany has transformed itself from a country famous for its monopolistic telecoms regime to having one of the most competitive telecoms service markets in the world.").
sectors, prices have declined dramatically, and DT, as a former monopoly, has witnessed a precipitous decline in its market shares.

I. THE GERMAN REGULATORY SYSTEM HAS ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO FOSTER ROBUST COMPETITION.

The German telecommunications market is the product of the procompetitive regulatory framework created by Germany’s Telecommunications Act and implemented by the regulatory authority, RegTP. The Commission itself has acknowledged that Germany’s regulatory system possesses each of the elements necessary to foster such vigorous competition.\(^2\) In brief, Germany enjoys (1) a strong independent regulator; (2) a liberalized market that welcomes entry by foreign carriers, including those that are partially owned by foreign governments; and (3) domestic regulations and incentives that encourage and facilitate market entry.

**Independent Regulatory Authority.** The German telecommunications market is monitored by an independent regulator, RegTP. Although RegTP officially is overseen by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, no decision taken by the Ruling Chambers of RegTP can be overturned by the Ministry. Rather, that authority rests solely with Germany’s Administrative Courts and their appellate divisions, just as the FCC’s decisions are subject to review in the U.S. courts of appeals. The Ministry is empowered to issue only general directives regarding the interpretation of the Telecommunications Act, and regulatory transparency requires that they be published in the Federal Gazette, the *Bundesanzeiger*. Notably, no such directive has ever been given. Finally, the German government’s remaining shares in DT are supervised

\(^2\) See *Sprint Corp.*, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 17223, 17228 ¶ 14 (1998) ("We agree with Sprint that the French and German telecommunications markets are now open to competition.").
not by the Ministry of Economics and Technology, but by a third, separate entity, the Ministry of Finance.\(^3\) Consequently, RegTP is substantially insulated from potential political manipulation.

GTS and Novaxess have mischaracterized the relationship between RegTP and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. GTS suggests that a recent Commentary Paper issued by the Ministry contains binding directives, and Novaxess declares that DT "will [thereby] be released from many of its dominant carrier restrictions."\(^4\) Neither of these statements is true. The Commentary Paper, a nonbinding discussion paper, merely affirms that significant competitive growth in certain markets, particularly the international market, points in the direction of possible price deregulation in the future (just as the FCC relied on growth in competition to deregulate the interexchange market, for example). Far from representing a statement of anticompetitive policy, this is an express goal of Germany’s procompetitive Telecommunications Act, just as it is of section 10 of the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996.

QSC also is mistaken in characterizing DT’s relationship with RegTP as “tangled and overbearing.”\(^5\) As RegTP’s mandate requires, and as its rulings illustrate, the German regulatory authority serves the interests of competition, not of DT. For example, since the end of 1999 RegTP has twice ordered substantial reductions in interconnection rates charged to DT’s competitors.\(^6\) RegTP also has ordered DT to provide number portability at no charge.\(^7\) And in


\(^4\) Comments of Global TeleSystems ("GTS") at 10; Comments of Novaxess at 5.

\(^5\) Comments of QS Communications ("QSC") at 4.

November 2000, over the objection of DT, RegTP ruled that DT must offer interconnection to ISPs on a flat-rate basis as of February 1, 2001.\textsuperscript{8} Belying GTS's charge of "lax regulatory oversight,"\textsuperscript{9} these procompetitive decisions are illustrative of just how committed RegTP is to market liberalization, rather than protection of the incumbent, and just how independent a body it is. Far from having the power to set policy unilaterally, as the German Competitors allege, DT failed to dissuade RegTP from adopting these orders and many other procompetitive decrees.

Consumer groups have applauded RegTP's "clear commitment to provid[ing] residential customers with choice and competitive prices."\textsuperscript{10} In the words of a market analyst, "DT has... experienced greater competitive pressure than any other EU incumbent as the German regulator has embraced not just the letter, but the spirit of EU guidelines."\textsuperscript{11} GTS suggests that the newly appointed interim president of RegTP, Matthias Kurth, will somehow compromise RegTP's commitment to market liberalization.\textsuperscript{12} But Kurth's history with DT's long-time rival Colt Telecom, as well as his tenure at RegTP, expose that prediction as entirely unfounded; indeed,
Kurth's appointment has been hailed as a victory for new entrants, as he is seen as a strong supporter of competition.\footnote{See Ralph Atkins, \textit{German Watchdog to Name New Chief}, FT.com (Dec. 5, 2000), \textit{available at} globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?id=001205000316&query=Germany+to+name+watchdo.}

**Liberal Market Entry Policies and Procedures.** Another procompetitive hallmark of the German regulatory system is its liberal rules and procedures for entry into the telecommunications market. Germany, in fact, places no restrictions on foreign ownership.\footnote{See Klaus-Dieter Scheurle, Pres., Regulatory Authority for Telecomms. and Posts, \textit{Importance of Telecommunications for Germany}, Address at Dusseldorf, at 3 (Feb. 2, 1999), \textit{available at} www.regtp/de/en/aktuelles/reden/01146/index.html.}

Consequently, numerous non-German companies — BellSouth, AT&T, WorldCom, Sprint, and British Telecom, to name only a few — have entered all telecommunications sectors in Germany. America Online is now the second largest ISP in Germany, a market that will soon match the Internet density of the United States and is predicted to have 20 million subscribers by the end of the year 2000.\footnote{See Gary C. Hufbauer & Edward M. Graham, "\textit{No} to Foreign Telecoms Equals "\textit{No} to the New Economy!"}, International Economics Policy Briefs, No. 00-7, IIE (Sept. 2000). Indeed, DT is the \textit{only} major player in the German telecommunications marketplace that is not substantially owned or controlled by non-German companies.

Germany also welcomes into its market carriers that are foreign \textit{government}-owned or -controlled. For instance, KPN, the partially government-owned Dutch carrier, holds shares of E-Plus, Germany's third-largest mobile carrier. Foreign government-owned companies including France Telecom, Sonera, and KPN are also part-owners of entities that have recently
obtained valuable third-generation mobile licenses.\textsuperscript{16} Swisscom, owned in part by the
government of Switzerland, owns Debitel, the telecommunications company that was formerly a
subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler.

Largely because Germany has no special licensing requirements for foreign carriers, the
number of participants in the German telecommunications market has soared. As of June 2000,
321 Class 4 licenses for provision of voice telephony services and 559 Class 3 licenses for
provision of transmission lines had been granted.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, as of December 31, 1999, more
than 1,200 providers of telecommunications services not subject to any licensing requirements at
all, such as resellers, had been registered with RegTP.\textsuperscript{18} In its \textit{Mid-Year Report 2000}, RegTP
interpreted this "consistently high number of providers" as a reflection of "the intensity of
competition in the German telecoms market."\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Procompetitive Regulatory Measures.} Germany has complemented its liberal policies
on ownership and licensing with proactive measures to open the existing telecommunications
infrastructure for use by new market players. First, Germany's cost-based interconnection rates
are among the lowest in the world. At the end of 1999, RegTP cut interconnection rates by more
than 24 percent on average; and on September 8, 2000, RegTP ordered a further 23-percent

\textsuperscript{16} See Edmund L. Andrews, \textit{The German Auction of Wireless Networks Uncovered Deep
Fissures in the European Telecommunications Landscape}, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2000, at C4; A
Tender for Selling Licenses for Researching and Developing 3G Networks (UMTS) Finished in
Germany, Telecommunications Services Market, Aug. 28, 2000; Sandra Wendelken, \textit{Six Groups
to Offer 3G in Germany}, Radio Communications Report, Aug. 21, 2000; Jonathan Collins, \textit{The

\textsuperscript{17} See Federal Republic of Germany, Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and
("RegTP Mid-Year Report 2000").

\textsuperscript{18} See Deutsche Telekom AG, SEC Form 20-F at 44 (filed April 19, 2000).

\textsuperscript{19} RegTP \textit{Mid-Year Report 2000} at 10.
reduction, effective June 1, 2001. Thus far, DT has negotiated and finalized at least 117 interconnection agreements with its competitors. Second, Germany also led the way within the EU in requiring full unbundled access to local loops from the outset of market liberalization in January of 1998. Even by the end of 2000, no other large European country had imposed such a requirement; the United Kingdom will not do so until July of 2001. The price of local loop access in Germany — which was established by order of RegTP, rather than by DT — now is comparable to or below the price of such access in the United States and the European Commission reports that, as of December 2000, there were 87 local loop access agreements in place between DT and its competitors. Finally, in order to encourage market entry and competition to the fullest extent possible, the German government added other key requirements: number portability, carrier selection, and third-party billing and collection, all of which are essential building blocks for the development of competition. This approach to market liberalization, called the “‘big bang’ approach” by one analyst, “allowed entrants to enter the

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21/ See RegTP Mid-Year Report 2000 at 12; European Comm. Sixth Implementation Report, Annex 2, at 123.


24/ See Declaration of J. Gregory Sidak at 25 (“Sidak Decl.”) (attached as Appendix B).

25/ See European Comm. Sixth Implementation Report, Annex 2, at 123. Alleging unreasonable delays in the provisioning of local loop access, GTS and QSC complain that DT should have to accept binding provisioning intervals and contractual penalties for breach thereof. See Comments of GTS at 22-23; Comments of QSC at 20-21. They fail to mention that, even though DT already includes such terms in contracts with other carriers, neither GTS nor QSC has expressed an interest in negotiating those terms with DT.

26/ See Teligen, Study on Market Entry Issues, at 27.
[German] market rapidly offering a variety of services, whereas their counterparts elsewhere were more restricted by regulation.27/

In light of all these procompetitive developments, a recent study comparing the telecommunications markets of the United States and eight European countries reported that from 1998 to 1999 Germany had surpassed the United States in the degree to which its market had been liberalized.28/

II. COMPETITION CONTINUES TO GROW IN EACH SECTOR OF THE GERMAN MARKET.

As shown above, Germany has dedicated itself to liberalizing its telecommunications market and to welcoming competition from both domestic and foreign competitors. The result of this process of reform is a German market that is fiercely competitive in nearly every sector. The wireless, long distance, and Internet markets, in particular — and increasingly the local market — all have multiple participants, relatively low rates, and other indicia of thriving, competitive markets.

Wireless. Germany's vibrant mobile telephony market has become a battleground for international mobile market players. In fact, of all the wireless competitors in Germany — including the new third-generation licensees — T-Mobil, DT's wireless operating subsidiary, is the only major wireless competitor in Germany that is owned exclusively by a German parent. It ranks second in subscribership behind Vodafone AirTouch, which acquired control of

27/ Id.

28/ See Dieter Elixmann, Gabriele Kulenkampff, & Ulrike Schimmel, The Development of Telecommunication Markets in Selected European Countries and in the U.S., WIK, Report presented at the 11th European Regional ITS-Conference, Sept. 9-11, 2000, Lausanne, Switzerland. This Report is based on findings made at the request of Mannesmann AG, DT’s most important competitor in Germany.
Mannesmann Mobilfunk last year. The fourth-largest carrier is Viag Interkom, which British Telecommunications Plc recently agreed to acquire. As of mid-2000, their respective market shares were approximately 41 percent (Vodafone), 39 percent (DT), 15 percent (E-Plus), and 5 percent (Viag Interkom). On the service competition and sales level, there is also vigorous competition among these network operators and numerous service providers (resellers) including MobilCom, Talkline, and Debitel. Overall, 14 different service providers have a retail market share of about one-third of the German mobile services market. This competitive environment has resulted in price reductions for wireless services of up to 60 percent in the past two years, and of more than 20 percent in 1999 alone. The European Commission notes that “following a 50% reduction by the two leading mobile operators on 1 January 2000, German [fixed-to-] mobile interconnection

29/ See RegTP Mid-Year Report 2000 at 20.

30/ See id.; see also BellSouth Corp., SEC Form 10-K, at 22 (filed Mar. 2, 2000).


32/ See RegTP Mid-Year Report 2000 at 20.

33/ See Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Telekom AG: T-ing Up the World, Mar. 17, 2000, at 32.

34/ See RegTP Annual Report 1999 at 16; see also RegTP Mid-Year Report 2000 at 21 (mobile telephony prices have decreased 13 percent from June 1999 to June 2000).
tariffs are now among the lowest in Europe."\textsuperscript{35/} The recently completed third-generation wireless auction, which was open to carriers from any country and employing any technical standard, will introduce additional competition (including more foreign participation) in Germany, as new entrants MobilCom and Group 3G have acquired valuable new licenses.\textsuperscript{36/} MobilCom is backed by France Telecom (which is majority government owned), and Group 3G brings together Telefonica S.A. and Sonera Ltd. (the latter of which is majority government owned). All of this new activity has led market analyst Goldman Sachs to opine that "Germany now has the most competitive mobile market in Europe."\textsuperscript{37/}

**Long Distance.** The European Commission reported in November of 1999 that there were then some 47 carriers offering long distance service in Germany — more than any other national market in the European Union\textsuperscript{38/} — and that these carriers already had captured 40 percent of the long distance market, and approximately 48 percent of the market for international long distance.\textsuperscript{39/} Among these providers are numerous foreign telecommunications carriers, including U.S. long distance providers AT&T, WorldCom, Sprint, Qwest, GTS, and Primus Telecommunications. As the number of market participants has grown, so, too, have the competitive pressures on DT and its rivals. A recent study of the German market observes that

\textsuperscript{35/} European Comm. Sixth Implementation Report, Annex 2, at 127.

\textsuperscript{36/} See German '3G' Winners Take Hit from Credit Rating Agency S&P, TR Daily, Aug. 21, 2000 (noting that having six distinct licensees will produce "fierce" competition); German '3G' Spectrum Auction Tops U.K. Bidding Total by $10 Billion, TR Daily, Aug. 17, 2000.

\textsuperscript{37/} Goldman Sachs, Global Equity Research, Telecom Services: Mobile Europe, 1 (August 30, 2000).

\textsuperscript{38/} See European Comm. Fifth Implementation Report, Annex 4, at 150-51.

\textsuperscript{39/} See Application by VoiceStream Wireless Corp. and Deutsche Telekom AG for Transfer of Control and Petition for Declaratory Ruling, filed Sept. 18, 2000, at 14.
these "competitive pressures in long-distance, both domestic and international, gained momentum quickly in 1999, forcing Deutsche Telekom to stem market share erosion with substantial price cuts.\textsuperscript{40} In the short time since the German market was liberalized, rates for domestic long-distance calls have fallen by as much as 85 percent (to as little as 2 cents per minute), and rates for international long-distance calls have dropped by as much as 93 percent.\textsuperscript{41} RegTP reports that, in the first six months of the year 2000 alone, call-by-call long-distance charges dropped as much as 40 percent.\textsuperscript{42} What is more, the competitive pressures that brought about these price reductions show no sign of diminishing. Goldman Sachs estimated that in June of 2000 DT was still "losing around 1% per month in DLD [domestic long distance] market share and 1.5% per month in ILD [international long distance] market share."\textsuperscript{43}

Local Services. The local telephony market in Germany also is becoming increasingly competitive. As of November 1999, there were 147 carriers authorized to provide local service,\textsuperscript{44} and, in its number of operators offering local calling, Germany now ranks second in the European Union.\textsuperscript{45} While QSC states that competitors’ market share of local service is a

\textsuperscript{40} Goldman Sachs, \textit{Fixed Income Research: Deutsche Telekom, Connecting to Growth}, 4 (June 6, 2000).


\textsuperscript{42} \textit{See Reg TP Mid-Year Report} at 17.

\textsuperscript{43} Goldman Sachs, Global Equity Research, \textit{Deutsche Telekom (DTEG.F): Telecom Services}, at 56 (July 26, 2000).

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{European Comm. Fifth Implementation Report}, Annex 4, at 229.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{European Comm. Sixth Implementation Report}, Annex 1, at 11-12.
mere 1.1 percent, statistics from the European Commission reveal that this percentage has risen to as much as 5 percent, which is comparable to the experience of the United States. Moreover, new entrants are beginning significant deployment of wireless local loop technology; in 1998 and 1999, RegTP allocated wireless local loop frequencies to 18 operators, many of which were U.S. companies. Many business customers have a choice of provider, and consumers in more than half of the 83 largest German cities now do as well. These choices are certain to widen further, since DT’s declining interconnection charges are expected to save competitors an estimated 13 percent in interconnection costs in 2001, and 23 percent in 2002.

Germany’s leadership in mandating unbundled network access has resulted not only in increasing local competition, but also in a burgeoning DSL services market, in which “nearly 70 companies are lining up to offer high-speed DSL services using Deutsche Telekom’s basic copper network.” In June 2000, RegTP specifically ordered that DT “provision colocation space in its local exchanges within 10 weeks if space is available.” According to RegTP’s Mid-Year Report 2000, there were already half a dozen competitors of DT offering DSL access.

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46/ See Comments of QSC at 19.


49/ Id. at 12.


51/ See William Boston, How to Shift the Internet into High Gear: Speed up Competition in Local Phone Services, Wall St. J. Eur., June 13, 2000, at 11.

services and another dozen expected to launch service before the end of 2000.53/ Furthermore, these new entrants serve 30 of the 60 German towns and regions in which DSL service is now available.54/

Other Sectors. The remaining sectors of Germany’s telecommunications market also are experiencing a sharp rise in the number of competitors, with many of them from the United States. AOL is the second largest Internet service provider in Germany, and Compuserve enjoys a significant market share as well.55/ With these new market entrants and intensifying competition, DT has again seen its market share decline. Contrary to the claims of QSC,56/ this competitive atmosphere is certain to grow even more vibrant, because on December 15, 2000 DT launched its new wholesale flat rate for competing ISPs that purchase narrowband access from DT and resell it to end customers.57/ This offer came a full one and a half months earlier than RegTP had ordered.58/

As these German markets grow ever more competitive, there are also more and more American companies participating in them. Cisco, Global Crossing, IBM, Qwest, UUNet, and other U.S. firms provide Internet backbone, data transmission, and computer hardware in Germany, and American companies such as Lockheed Martin (formerly COMSAT), GE

53/ See RegTP Mid-Year Report 2000 at 16.
55/ See Reg TP Mid-Year Report at 23.
56/ See Comments of QSC at 23.
58/ See German Regulator Orders Deutsche Telekom to Charge Flat Monthly Rate to ISPs, AFX (UK), Nov. 11, 2000.
American Communications, and SPACELINK have entered the country's satellite communications market. Additionally, as DT divests substantial portions of its cable television network, U.S. concerns — Callahan Associates, for example — have been the first to take controlling interests in some regions of Germany. 59/ DT is currently negotiating with other U.S. companies with respect to its cable networks in other regions. 60/

III. THE COMMENTERS' PARTICULAR ALLEGATIONS DISTORT REALITY.

Notwithstanding this evidence of a regulatory environment conducive to the development of local competition, and strong signs that such competition is increasingly robust, the German Competitors level a series of charges about DT's conduct in the German market and the effectiveness of RegTP. 61/ While their claims are beyond the scope of the Commission's public interest test, they are sufficiently misleading to warrant a brief response.

Flat-Rate Services. GTS complains that DT's flat-rate tariffs — for example, the XXL tariff, "which allows customers to make free phone calls and online connections on Sundays and public holidays for a small additional fee" 62/ — enable DT to engage in predatory pricing, price squeezes, and similar anticompetitive activities. 63/ But GTS ignores the fact that RegTP, the independent regulatory authority, must approve DT's flat-rate tariffs. When considering flat-rate tariffs for bundled services, the regulator examines the cost-orientation of each of the regulated

59/ See Deutsche Telekom AG, SEC Form 20-F, at 6 (filed Apr. 19, 2000).
60/ Id.
61/ See generally Comments of GTS; Comments of QSC; Comments of Novaxess.
62/ Deutsche Telekom's Free Phone Calls Blocked by German Court, AFX News (UK), June 6, 2000.
63/ See Comments of GTS at 20.
services separately, looking specifically for the possibility of anticompetitive conduct.\textsuperscript{64} The formula for calculating an acceptable price floor is the approved, cost-oriented interconnection fee plus a 25 percent surcharge to cover attendant billing, collection, and other services.\textsuperscript{65} The surcharge enables competitors to make offers comparable to those of DT. Under these requirements, DT cannot cross-subsidize its services or engage in the other anticompetitive activities alleged by the German Competitors.

The recent decision by RegTP to mandate flat-rate interconnection for ISPs also underscores the hollowness of the German Competitors' claims. The fact that RegTP did not dictate an exact rate to be charged — a point seized on and misinterpreted by GTS\textsuperscript{66} — is no more than adherence to standard legal procedure, since such flat-rate tariffs are never subject to \textit{a priori} regulation; DT proposes a price and RegTP reviews it. Moreover, in a good-faith response to new entrants' concerns, DT already has begun to offer flat-rate access — several weeks \textit{earlier} than required by RegTP.\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{License Fees.} The data do not support the claims of GTS and QSC that the license fees set by RegTP and required for entry into the German market are "exorbitant" or that the fees constitute barriers to market entry.\textsuperscript{68} As noted above, Germany had issued 321 Class 4 licenses for provision of voice telephony services and 559 Class 3 licenses for provision of transmission

\textsuperscript{64} See RegTP Resolution BK2-1-00/035 (Feb. 16, 2000), at 21-22, Annex 1.
\textsuperscript{65} See \textit{id.} at 19-21, Annex 1.
\textsuperscript{66} See Comments of GTS at 20.
\textsuperscript{68} See Comments of GTS at 12; Comments of QSC at 27.
lines by June of the year 2000. These figures place Germany near the top of the European Union in this category and refute any notion that the license fees have barred market entry. A recent Teligen study further refutes the charge that Germany’s license fees are inflated by pointing out that, “whereas most other countries have an annual fee, some linked to turnover,” Germany’s fee is a one-time event. The study therefore concludes that, “compared to the business potential [Germany’s fees] [are] a relatively low barrier to entry.” Furthermore, as required under the EC Licensing Directive of 1997, national license fees are supposed to reflect actual “administrative costs.” The Upper Administrative Court of Northrhine-Westfalia ruled in October 1999 that the license fees established by RegTP — which, given their one-time nature, must cover administrative expenses for as much as 30 years — are consistent with EU law. Moreover, the German government is currently considering amending statutory law to lower license fees, and the EU also is considering eliminating the imbalance in fees charged by member states.

Billing and Collection Services. As an initial matter, it is noteworthy that DT — unlike incumbent carriers in the United States — is required to provide billing and collection services to its competitors. The congressional testimony submitted by each of the German Competitors nevertheless alleges that problems implementing this requirement impede competition.

69/ See RegTP Mid-Year Report 2000 at 29.
70/ Teligen, Study on Market Entry Issues, at 28.
71/ Id.
Specifically, the testimony charges that DT’s most recent offer to competitors increases charges for billing and collection services by as much as 600 percent, and that DT requires competitors to submit an individual direct debit authorization for each customer.\textsuperscript{24} Both assertions are wrong. As of February 1, 2001, DT’s fees for billing and collection services are scheduled to increase from 40 to 80 percent, subject to the outcome of an arbitration proceeding and depending on the specific structure of the services provided by a contracting carrier. The increases reflect, and simply recoup, the costs incurred by DT in providing these services. Indeed, since the end of 1998, DT has been required to offer these services without being able to cover its costs. As for required debit authorizations, DT and its competitors have agreed in recent negotiations to include clauses in each carrier’s general terms and conditions that enable DT to debit amounts owed from an end customer’s account without risk. This double authorization will more than satisfy the need for explicit permission for DT directly to debit the accounts of competitors’ customers, and by no means constitutes a barrier to competition.

QSC also is wrong in its claim that DT stifles competition by refusing to provide new market participants with billing services.\textsuperscript{25} RegTP’s rulings and current DT practice show that charge to be baseless. On February 21, 2000, RegTP ruled that DT must continue to provide billing and collection services for voice telephony (call-by-call and preselection), directory inquiry, value-added, and Internet-by-call services. Currently, DT provides these services for a host of carriers and service providers, and DT will do so for any requesting company. Additionally, under the online billing procedure — \textit{i.e.}, where DT resells other providers’

\textsuperscript{24} See, \textit{e.g.}, Comments of Novaxess, Annex A (Lipman Testimony), at 21-22.

\textsuperscript{25} See Comments of QSC at 27.
services to end-users — billing and collection services are directly offered for all value-added services, which appear on the customer's DT bill as DT services.

**Interconnection.** The German Competitors are further mistaken in suggesting that DT, rather than RegTP, dictates the rules and conditions for interconnection.\(^{76}\) First, RegTP "is empowered to order, at the request of an interconnecting party, public telecommunications network operators to interconnect and to define the conditions of interconnection, and sets the deadlines for implementation of the decision."\(^{77}\) In nearly every case, RegTP becomes involved because one of the parties to a negotiation will invoke the dispute settlement procedure, which prescribes that a decision must be made within six weeks (with limited extensions up to another four weeks) and enforcement shall occur within three months. Second, the rules for provision of interconnection are published in the Official Gazette as a general administrative order — just as all interconnection rates are published as basic offers.

As mandated under EU law, RegTP has authority to publish elements of interconnection agreements that "are expected to be part of the reference interconnection offer (RIO)."\(^{78}\) The EU Commission's *Fifth Implementation Report* observed that Germany's RIO has been created "progressively" and "on the basis of decisions of the Ruling Chambers on tariff authorisation and dispute settlement, which have then been published by RegTP as part of the RIO (Grundangebot)."\(^{79}\) As parties to these interconnection agreements and to the specific disputes brought before RegTP's Ruling Chambers, DT and its competitors have had a voice in the

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\(^{76}\) See, e.g., Comments of Novaxess, Annex A (Lipman Testimony) at 17 (emphasis added).


\(^{78}\) Id., Annex 3, at 7.

\(^{79}\) Id.
development of the RIO, and the terms of interconnection are well known to them. As for the
interconnection delays complained of by GTS and QSC,\textsuperscript{80} they ignore that it takes time to fulfill
an increasing rush of requests: DT has provided or received orders for some 71,000 points of
interconnection, “which corresponds to the capacity needed to transport all German
telecommunications.”\textsuperscript{81}

RegTP also has asserted its authority in regulating the costs of interconnection. After
slashng rates by more than 24 percent at the end of 1999,\textsuperscript{82} in 2000 RegTP again “lowered the
charges that competitors must pay Deutsche Telekom AG to tie into the dominant phone
company’s network.”\textsuperscript{83} In addition, the new interconnection fees will no longer be based on
distance, but rather on the network elements used (switches, loops) and the number of central
offices to which a carrier connects. They are understood to reflect “the government’s goal of
rewarding companies that build infrastructure and thus create jobs and improve overall
service.”\textsuperscript{84} Although it is “difficult to compare the [current, distance-based] German
interconnection tariffs with the EU best practice benchmark,”\textsuperscript{85} which is element-based, the

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\textsuperscript{80} See Comments of GTS at 13; Comments of QSC at 27.

\textsuperscript{81} European Comm. Sixth Implementation Report, Annex 2, at 126 (describing provisioned
and unprovisioned points of interconnection).

\textsuperscript{82} See RegTP Annual Report 1999 at 14.

\textsuperscript{83} William Boston, Government Cuts Charges to Tie Into Giant’s Lines, Wall St. J., Sept.
12, 2000. See supra n.6.

\textsuperscript{84} Id.

\textsuperscript{85} European Comm. Sixth Implementation Report, Annex 2, at 126.
European Commission has observed that the prospective tariffs and conditions recently approved by RegTP have “removed a major concern of new entrants.”

Conclusion

The comments of the German Competitors provide a distorted view of competition in the German telecommunications market. The Commission recognized in 1998 that Germany had in place all the necessary hallmarks for the development of competition, as a result of these conditions, most market sectors are now fiercely competitive. Competition in the market for local telephony is not yet as robust as in the markets for wireless and long distance services, just as new entrants in the United States have been relatively slow to aggregate substantial market share. But the German Competitors’ claims of anticompetitive practices are unfounded. RegTP has adopted and enforced strongly procompetitive policies, often rejecting the positions advanced by DT. Given time, local competition will flourish, as competition has in every other market sector. RegTP is poised to ensure this outcome, and there is plainly no warrant for any intervention by the FCC.

86/ Id. at 127.