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Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, DC 20554
In the Matter of
Dialing Services, LLC
)
)
)
)
)
File No.:  EB-TCD-12-00001812
NAL/Acct. No.:  201432170006
FRN:  0023613144
FORFEITURE ORDER
Adopted:  July 13, 2017 Released:  July 26, 2017
By the Commission:  Chairman Pai issuing a statement; Commissioner O’Rielly dissenting and issuing a 
statement.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. We impose a penalty of $2,880,000 against Dialing Services, LLC (Dialing Services or 
Company) for making robocalls to wireless phones using artificial or prerecorded voice messages without 
the prior express consent of the called parties.  Federal Communications Commission staff investigated 
Dialing Services in 2012 and found that the Company was responsible for more than 4.7 million calls to 
wireless phones over a three-month period.  The calls were non-emergency communications and were 
made without the called parties’ prior consent, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(TCPA).  The Enforcement Bureau (Bureau) issued a citation in 2013 warning the Company that it could 
be liable for monetary forfeitures if it made such unlawful calls to wireless phones in the future.  The 
Bureau subsequently investigated and determined that the Company continued to be responsible for 
unlawful robocalls.  The Commission issued a Notice of Apparent Liability in 2014, and now imposes a 
penalty of $2,880,000 against Dialing Services for subsequent violations.  
2. We have considered Dialing Services’ arguments and find, for the reasons set forth 
below, that the Company is deemed to have made or initiated the calls at issue, and thus was required—
but failed—to show that it or its customer(s) had obtained the called parties’ consent.  We also find that 
our decision advances Congress’ goal of protecting consumers from the nuisance, invasion of privacy, 
cost, and inconvenience that autodialed and prerecorded calls generate.
II. BACKGROUND
3. Dialing Services offers a robocalling service to third-party clients.  Dialing Services’ 
clients pay the Company, on a per-call basis, to make artificial or prerecorded voice calls to telephone 
numbers of the clients’ choosing.1 Among other things, Dialing Services records and stores messages for 
its clients and plays the sound recordings to the called party. Dialing Services’ clients may use the 
Company’s website to upload sound recordings (i.e., prerecorded voice messages) to the Company’s 
servers.2 Alternatively, clients may create prerecorded messages by dialing one of the Company’s phone 
numbers and recording a message over the phone.3 The calling party’s telephone number is blocked 
  
1 See Dialing Services Order Form, http://www.politicaller.com/ORDERFORM.pdf (on file in EB-TCD-12-
00001812) (“Dialing Services, LLC will dial the phone numbers and play the recorded message provided by 
Customer to live answered calls and/or answer machines as indicated by Customer on this order form”).  
2 See Letter from Mitchell Roth, Roth Doner Jackson, PLC, to Richard Hindman, Chief, Telecommunications 
Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau (June 13, 2012) at 5-8 (on file in EB-TCD-12-00001812) (June 13, 
2012 Response).
3 See id. at 7.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
2
unless the client enters in a phone number to display on the recipient’s caller ID.  That phone number may 
be a “spoofed” number, which modifies (rather than blocks) the originating number.  The Company has 
advertised the fact that it is able to make millions of robocalls for its clients:  “Reach thousands, hundreds 
of thousands or even millions of customers with your personal message.”4
4. This Forfeiture Order is the culmination of a long process during which the Commission 
endeavored to alert Dialing Services to its violations of the TCPA and work with the Company to come 
into compliance.  Rather than alter its practices, Dialing Services, during months of interaction with the 
Bureau, asserted that it was not violating the TCPA.5 This case began in 2012, when the Bureau initiated 
an investigation of Dialing Services’ compliance with the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, 
as amended (Act), governing robocalls.6 As part of its initial investigation, Bureau staff determined that, 
in just three months, Dialing Services made more than 4.7 million non-emergency robocalls to cell 
phones without prior express consent in violation of the TCPA7 provisions of the Act and the 
Commission’s rules (Rules).8 Bureau staff met with the Company to discuss the violations.  
Subsequently, on March 15, 2013, the Bureau cited Dialing Services for the apparent violations.9  The 
Citation notified Dialing Services of its obligations under the Communications Act and warned the 
Company that it could be liable for monetary forfeitures if it made any more unlawful robocalls to 
wireless phones in the future.10  The Citation directed the Company to file a certification affirming, under 
penalty of perjury, that Dialing Services had ceased making autodialed or prerecorded voice message 
calls to wireless phones, and that it had ceased making any prerecorded message calls that lacked the 
identification information required in Section 227(d)(3)(A) of the Act and Section 64.1200(b) of the 
Rules.11  In addition, the Citation provided Dialing Services an opportunity to meet with staff and file a 
written response.  On April 5, 2013, Dialing Services met with Bureau staff to discuss the Citation, and in 
particular, the certification.  Counsel stated that the Company was unclear on its obligations with respect 
to certain aspects of the certification, and on April 12, 2013, the Bureau suspended Dialing Services’ 
obligation to file the certification.  On April 15, 2013, Dialing Services filed a response to the Citation.12
5. Starting in June 2013, the Bureau conducted a follow-up investigation to determine if 
Dialing Services had ceased making robocalls after receiving the Citation.13 From the date of the Citation
  
4 See In Touch Systems Website, Products – In Touch, http://www.gointouch.com/products.html (on file in EB-TCD-
12-00001812).
5 The Commission believes that Dialing Services eventually did alter its practices several months after it received 
the Citation.
6  Dialing Services, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 29 FCC Rcd 5537, 5539–40, para. 7 & n.15 
(2014) (NAL).  The NAL includes a more complete discussion of the facts and history of this case and is incorporated 
herein by reference.
7 47 U.S.C. § 227.
8 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5539-40, para 7.
9 Dialing Services, LLC, Citation and Order, 28 FCC Rcd 1840 (2013) (Citation).  See infra note 91.
10 Even before the Citation, Bureau staff met with Dialing Services and its counsel and warned the Company that its 
activities violated the TCPA, and that if the Company continued to make unauthorized robocalls, it could be held 
liable for those calls.  See infra note 51.  
11 Id. at 1846–47, paras. 3, 22.
12 See Response and Petition for Reconsideration filed by Dialing Services, LLC (Apr. 15, 2013) (on file in 
EB-TCD-12-00001812) (Citation Response).  Dialing Services availed itself of the opportunity to meet with 
Commission staff after TCD issued the Citation.  See infra para. 31.
13 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5540, para. 9 & n.19.  See Letter from Mitchell Roth, Roth Doner Jackson, PLC, to Richard 
Hindman, Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau (Oct. 28, 2013) (on file in 
EB-TCD-12-00001812); see also Letter from Mitchell Roth, Roth Doner Jackson, PLC, to Richard Hindman, Chief, 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
3
through October 2013, Bureau staff discovered that Dialing Services had apparently made 2,153,748 non-
emergency robocalls.  In investigating the calls made during a two-week period in May 2013 (from May 9 
through May 20), Bureau staff verified that the Company made 184 additional unauthorized robocalls to 
cell phones after Dialing Services received the Citation.14 On May 8, 2014, the Commission issued a 
Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL), proposing a $2,944,000 forfeiture against Dialing Services for its 
apparent willful and repeated violation of Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act and Section 
64.1200(a)(1)(iii) of the Rules by delivering 184 unauthorized prerecorded message calls to wireless 
phones.15 On June 9, 2014, Dialing Services filed a response to the NAL.16
III. DISCUSSION
6. The Commission proposed a forfeiture in this case in accordance with Section 503(b) of 
Act,17 Section 1.80 of the Rules,18 and the Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement.19 When we assess 
forfeitures, Section 503(b)(2)(E) requires that we take into account the “nature, circumstances, extent, and 
gravity of the violation and, with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior 
offenses, ability to pay, and such other matters as justice may require.”20 In its response to the NAL, 
Dialing Services argues that the NAL should be cancelled and/or the forfeiture reduced.21 We examine 
both the application of the Section 503 factors in this case and the Company’s response in the discussion 
below.  
A. We Conclude That Dialing Services Violated the TCPA
7. Dialing Services disagrees with the Commission’s determination in the NAL that the 
Company is apparently liable for violations of the TCPA.  In its NAL Response, Dialing Services argues 
that (1) Dialing Services does not “make” or “initiate” robocalls, and therefore should not be held 
responsible for making robocalls to wireless phones without the prior consent of the recipients of the 
call,22 (2) the Commission’s investigation was tainted by questionable methods and accuracy,23 (3) the 
(Continued from previous page)    
Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau (Aug. 7, 2013) (on file in 
EB-TCD-12-00001812); E-mail from Mitchell Roth, Roth Doner Jackson, PLC, to Kristi Thompson, Deputy Chief, 
Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, and Lloyd Collier, Attorney Advisor, 
Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau (Aug. 7, 2013, 15:22 ET) (on file in 
EB-TCD-12-00001812).
14 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5540, para. 9.
15 See id. at 5549, para. 29.
16 Dialing Services, LLC’s Written Statement Seeking Cancellation and/or Reduction of the Proposed Forfeiture 
(June 9, 2014) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00001812) (NAL Response).
17 47 U.S.C. § 503(b).
18 47 CFR § 1.80.
19 The Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement and Amendment of Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the 
Forfeiture Guidelines, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 17087 (1997) (Forfeiture Policy Statement), recons. denied, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 303 (1999). 
20 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(E).
21 See NAL Response at i.
22 Id. at 15–19.
23 Id. at 10–13.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
4
Company did not “willfully” violate the law,24 and (4) the Commission improperly dismissed the Citation 
Response.25
8. We have fully considered Dialing Services’ NAL Response, and find the Company’s 
arguments in favor of canceling the NAL unpersuasive.  Although we do not rescind the forfeiture, the 
Company has produced sufficient evidence to persuade us that the proposed forfeiture should be reduced 
by $64,000.  We therefore affirm $2,880,000 of the forfeiture proposed in the NAL.
1. Dialing Services Is Deemed to Have “Made” the Calls for Purposes of 
Determining Liability Under the TCPA
9. Dialing Services disagrees with the NAL’s determination that in some cases, web 
platforms such as Dialing Services “make” or “initiate” robocalls for the purposes of liability under the 
TCPA.  The Company argues that the TCPA did not anticipate that prerecorded calls would migrate away 
from call centers and move onto Internet servers; therefore, according to Dialing Services, web-based 
hosted dialing companies cannot reasonably be viewed as responsible under the TCPA.26 We disagree.  
Both the TCPA and our implementing regulations apply broadly to any “person” who makes a call using 
an autodialer, an artificial voice, or a prerecorded voice, and there is no suggestion that “person” was 
intended to be limited to only those persons who use certain technological platforms.  All that is legally 
relevant is whether a person “makes” or “initiates” a covered call—an issue that we fully addressed in the 
NAL and herein.
10. The Company argues that its actions do not meet the dictionary definition of the word 
“initiate.”  Dialing Services quotes the U.S. Supreme Court for the proposition that “[a] fundamental 
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”27 After quoting from a dictionary definition for the word 
“initiate,”28 Dialing Services concludes that the Company’s clients “caused the beginning of” (and 
therefore “initiated”) the robocalls to cell phones.29 Dialing Services argues that, in contrast to its clients, 
the Company is merely a “conduit” for robocalls.30  
11. We disagree.  In the DISH Network declaratory ruling,31 the Commission addressed the 
meaning of the term “initiate” for the purposes of the TCPA—thus we need not rely on a non-contextual 
dictionary definition alone.32 Therein, the Commission clarified that a caller may be found to have made 
or initiated a call in one of two ways:  first, by “tak[ing] the steps necessary to physically place a 
telephone call;”33 and, second, by being “so involved in the placing of a specific telephone call as to be 
  
24 See id. at 2–10.
25 Id. at 13–15.
26 Id. at 15.
27 Id. at 16 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598 (1987) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 
(1979) (internal quotations omitted)).
28 NAL Response at 16.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 In re Joint Petition filed by DISH Network LLC, Declaratory Ruling, 28 FCC Rcd 6574 (2013) (DISH Network).
32 Id. at 6582–6586 (noting that the term “initiate” in the statute is undefined, and declaring that “a person or entity 
‘initiates’ a telephone call when it takes the steps necessary to physically place a telephone call, and generally does 
not include persons or entities, such as third-party retailers, that might merely have some role, however minor, in the 
causal chain that results in the making of a telephone call”).
33 Id. at 6583.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
5
directly liable for making it.”34 Following the issuance of the NAL, the Commission released the TCPA 
Omnibus Order that, among other things, addressed three petitions for declaratory ruling regarding 
whether the platform provider could be held liable under the TCPA as the “maker” of a call.35 The 
Commission provided some guidance as to how it would evaluate potential TCPA liability of platform 
providers, but said that it would consider “the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
placing of a particular call to determine:  (1) who took the steps necessary to physically place the call; and 
(2) whether another person or entity was so involved in placing the call as to be deemed to have initiated 
it, considering the goals and purposes of the TCPA.”36  
12. In the NAL, the Commission considered whether Dialing Services makes or initiates the 
calls.  The Commission applied the FCC’s holding in DISH Network and found that Dialing Services 
“makes” or “initiates” calls for the purposes of the TCPA.37 Dialing Services has not presented any 
evidence to alter that determination.  Dialing Services argues that even if the NAL’s reliance on DISH 
Network is appropriate, Dialing Services is still not the initiator of the calls, because it does not take “the 
steps necessary to physically place a telephone call.”38 Assuming arguendo this is true, Dialing Services 
is not the maker or initiator of the calls under the first prong of the DISH Network test.  Under the second 
prong, however, the totality of the circumstances may indicate that Dialing Services is so involved in the 
making of the calls as to be deemed to have made them.  As explained below, we find that to be the case. 
13. Dialing Services argues that the NAL improperly cited DISH Network out of context in 
order to find that Dialing Services is the initiator of the robocalls.39 In Dialing Services’ view, the 
Commission in DISH Network did not establish whether a telemarketer or a software dialing platform is 
the “initiator” of the calls.40  
14. Although the DISH Network declaratory ruling did not involve a software platform, the 
decision did not hinge on the technology used to make autodialed calls.  Rather, DISH Network addressed 
the circumstances under which a client or seller that engages telemarketers to make calls for it can be held 
vicariously liable for the calls that were physically made by the telemarketer; direct liability of the 
telemarketer was apparent.  As explained in the NAL, “the Commission’s analysis presumed that both a 
seller who engages a telemarketer, and the telemarketer so engaged, may be liable for TCPA violations.”41  
We have no doubt that, on the face of the statute, a company like Dialing Services that is so involved in 
placing the robocalls can be held liable under the TCPA.
  
34 Id.
35 Rules And Regulations Implementing The Telephone Consumer Protection Act Of 1991, Declaratory Ruling and 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd 7961, 7978-84 (2015) (TCPA Omnibus Order) (citing S. Rep. No. 102-178, 1st Sess., 102nd 
Cong., (1991) at 2, 4-5).  In two of the three cases, the Commission found that the platform provider could not be 
liable under the TCPA, but in the third case, the Commission found that the provider was sufficiently involved in 
making the calls that it could properly be deemed to have made or initiated the calls. 
36 Id. at 7980-81, para. 30.
37 See NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5542–5545, paras. 13–21.
38 See NAL Response at 16–18.  
39 See id. Dialing Services argues that even if the NAL’s reliance on DISH Network is appropriate, under DISH 
Network, Dialing Services is still not the initiator of the calls, because it does not take “the steps necessary to 
physically place a telephone call.”  Id. at 17–18 (citing DISH Network, 28 FCC Rcd at 6583, para. 26). While that 
may be the case, it is not the end of our inquiry.  As we explain, Dialing Services was so involved in the making of 
the calls at issue that it can be deemed, under the second prong of our test, to have initiated them, along with its 
client, even though Dialing Services did not take the steps necessary to physically place the calls under the first 
prong.  TCPA Omnibus Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7980-81, para. 30.
40 NAL Response at 17.
41 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5542, para. 15 (emphasis in original). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
6
15. In addition, the Company claims that it is merely a third party that plays a small role in 
the causal chain that results in the final placement of the call, and therefore Dialing Services should not be 
held responsible for those calls.42 The Company’s response to the NAL argues that the affirmative acts the 
Commission pointed to in the NAL as evidence of more than a minor role in the process were “inaccurate, 
grossly exaggerated or taken out of context.”43 Dialing Services minimizes its involvement and 
characterizes several of its actions discussed in the NAL as mere “technical support.”44 Dialing Services’ 
arguments are unpersuasive.  For example, the NAL noted that Dialing Services offers a spoofing 
functionality to its clients.45 The Company does not contest this fact, but states in its NAL Response that 
there is no indication that the calls at issue in the NAL were spoofed.46 But the fact that Dialing Services 
markets the ability to make thousands or millions of spoofed robocalls through its platform indicates that 
it is more than a mere conduit in the process.  In contrast to other functionalities Dialing Services may 
offer, Caller ID spoofing and blocking functionalities are designed to deceive consumers about the 
originating point of calls or to hide the originating point altogether, although in other contexts there may 
be legitimate reasons to change or block Caller ID.47 Moreover, Dialing Services does not refute that its 
service automatically blocks the originating number, requiring the called party to answer the call in order 
to learn who is calling. 
16. Significantly, the record also shows that Dialing Services was directly involved in 
creation of the content of illegal robocall campaigns.48 The NAL noted that Dialing Services assists 
  
42 NAL Response at 17–18 (citing DISH Network, 28 FCC Rcd at 6583, para. 26).  Dialing Services states that its 
clients upload the numbers and sound files, and click “dial” on the web page to start the calling program.  Based on 
that, Dialing Services concludes that its clients “initiate” the calls, and that without the Company’s clients, there 
would be no calls at all.  NAL Response at 18.  First, we are not persuaded that liability should be limited only to 
Dialing Services’ customers, in light of the fact that Dialing Services was, as described herein, so involved in the 
placement of the calls as to be deemed to have initiated them along with the client.  Second, in its effort to cast 
blame on its clients for clicking “dial,” Dialing Services ignores the fact that in DISH Network, the DISH 
telemarketers were in an analogous position (i.e., there would have been no calls by DISH telemarketers but for the 
DISH clients).  The question in that case was not whether the telemarketing company was liable for making the calls 
(the telemarketer was presumptively liable), the question was whether the company that hired the telemarketer—i.e., 
DISH Network—was also liable.  DISH Network, 28 FCC Rcd at 6584, para. 28.
43 NAL Response at 8–9.
44 Id. at 10.
45 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5544, para. 17.  
46 NAL Response at 9-10.  
47 If the spoofing functionality was not used to deceive the called party in a particular case—for example, because it 
was used instead to direct the called party to the client’s actual customer service number—proof of such use may be 
relevant in refuting the presumption that the offered spoofing services were inherently deceptive.  See Rules And 
Regulations Implementing The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, Report and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 9114, 9121-22, 9128, 
paras. 19-21, 35 (2011) (stating that the Truth in Caller ID rules “are consistent with Congressional intent to focus 
on whether a person or entity has knowingly manipulated the caller identification information in order to defraud, 
cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value” and that “a person or entity that blocks or seeks to block a 
caller identification service from transmitting or displaying that person or entity's own caller identification 
information shall not be liable for violating our rules implementing the Truth in Caller ID Act”).
48 Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (holding that “one who 
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties”). As 
was the case with the file-sharing software at issue in Grokster, Dialing Services went beyond merely providing a 
platform that some clients used unlawfully, and instead affirmatively designed its platform in such a way as to 
facilitate unlawful uses, or was so actively involved in the calls or the manner in which they were made that it can be 
deemed to have made or initiated the calls.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
7
clients in the “proper structuring of a message.”  In doing so, Dialing Services becomes a direct 
participant in determining the content of the calls at issue.  Dialing Services actively assists its clients 
with the creation and structure of those messages, the content of which would likely show that the calls 
will be targeted at recipients who neither consented to receive them nor had any other prior contact with 
the client.  These facts, in combination with Dialing Services’ offering of functions like caller ID spoofing 
and blocking, which it knows are likely to be used deceptively by its customers, reflect that Dialing 
Services provides more than passive involvement in, or technical assistance with, making robocalls.  
Rather, Dialing Services becomes “so involved” in the making of the calls that it can itself be deemed the 
maker or initiator of the calls together with its customer who asked it to provide the assistance.  While 
there may be instances in which a platform provider serves merely as a conduit for robocalls, that is not 
the case presented here.  When we consider Dialing Services’ role in placing the calls, we are convinced 
that Dialing Services is properly subject to liability under the TCPA.49  
17. Both the NAL and our decision here are consistent with the 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, 
and Dialing Services has not alleged otherwise.  Under the “totality of the facts and circumstances”50
approach detailed in the 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, Dialing Services satisfies several of the factors that 
the Commission said were relevant in determining whether a platform provider makes or initiates a call, 
or is deemed to have done so by being so involved in the call.  Moreover, Dialing Services was on notice 
that Commission staff believed that it was operating in violation of the TCPA, and it chose to continue its 
service offerings.51 In the 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, the Commission noted that in determining 
potential liability, the Commission would consider whether a person offering a calling platform “has 
knowingly allowed its client(s) to use that platform for unlawful purposes . . . .”52 These factors support 
the conclusion that Dialing Services may be liable under the TCPA for robodialed calls made without the 
called parties’ consent.  
18. Congress enacted the TCPA to protect consumers from the nuisance, invasion of privacy, 
cost, and inconvenience that autodialed and prerecorded calls generate.53 Dialing Services markets itself 
as a robocalling service.  It advertises that it can enable clients to reach “thousands, hundreds of 
thousands, or even millions of customers . . .”54 Its business plan depends on attracting clients that want a 
  
49 As the Commission has said, in determining whether a person may be held liable under the TCPA as the maker or 
initiator of the call will depend “upon the facts of each situation . . .”  TCPA Omnibus Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7980-
81, para. 30.
50 Id. at 7980-81, para. 30 (stating that identifying the party who made or initiates a call “look[s] to the totality of the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the placing of a particular call . . . .”).
51 Dialing Services received formal notice on March 15, 2013 that its platform was being used to make unlawful 
robocalls when the Commission issued the Company a citation stating that (1) Dialing Services had made millions 
of robocalls in violation of the TCPA, and (2) that any such future conduct would result in further enforcement 
action, including forfeitures.  Citation, 28 FCC Rcd 1840.  Even before that formal notice, Bureau staff met with 
Dialing Services and its counsel and warned the Company that its activities violated the TCPA, and that if the 
Company continued to make unauthorized robocalls, it could be held liable for those calls.  The fact that Dialing 
Services may have disagreed with the citation did not change the fact that it had actual notice that its clients were 
making autodialed, pre-recorded calls without the called party’s consent, nor did it alter its obligation to comply 
with the citation.  The Enforcement Bureau did not stay the effect of the Citation.  Under Section 1.102 of the Rules, 
non-hearing and interlocutory actions taken pursuant to delegated authority are effective upon release; the Bureau, 
acting on delegated authority, may, in its sole discretion, stay the effect of an action taken on delegated authority 
while a petition for reconsideration is pending.  See 47 CFR § 1.102.  Accordingly, Dialing Services was obligated 
to follow the directions of the citation and the warnings of FCC staff who directed the Company to cease the 
unauthorized robocalling of wireless phones.
52 TCPA Omnibus Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7980-81, para. 30.
53 S. Rep. No. 102-178, 1st Sess., 102nd Cong., (1991) at 2, 4-5.
54 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5539, para. 6 & n.14.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
8
provider to perform mass calling campaigns.  Dialing Services offers caller ID blocking and spoofing that 
are apparently used in a deceptive manner.55 Dialing Services assists customers in structuring the 
message of the call.  And the Company had specific notice that its service was being used to make 
unlawful robocalls.  Under both the holding in DISH Network and a “totality of the facts and 
circumstances” approach regarding the making of the unlawful calls, Dialing Services bears responsibility 
for them and, by this action, we hold Dialing Services accountable because we deem it to be the maker or 
initiator of the calls. 
2. The Bureau’s Investigation Was Thorough and Supports the Factual 
Findings of the NAL
19. Dialing Services argues that the Bureau’s investigation was flawed, and that these flaws 
undermine the legitimacy of the Commission’s proposed forfeiture.  Specifically, Dialing Services argues 
that by requiring the Company to produce documentary evidence of prior express consent of the called 
parties, the Commission held Dialing Services to a higher standard than is required by the TCPA.56 The 
Company also criticizes the outreach that Bureau staff performed when staff contacted the recipients of 
Dialing Services’ robocalls.57 Dialing Services accuses the Bureau of making “inflammatory” inquiries 
and questioning the ability of ordinary citizens to understand the meaning of “prior express consent.”58  
20. We disagree with both points.  First, Dialing Services was held to the correct standard 
under the TCPA.  As part of its investigation, the Bureau directed the Company to produce documentary 
evidence of prior express consent.59 Dialing Services argues that it cannot obtain prior express consent 
from consumers because (1) it has no direct relationship with the call recipients, (2) it is not the initiator 
of the messages, and (3) the call recipients have no knowledge of Dialing Services or its role.60 Dialing 
Services’ arguments61 are unavailing.  As a preliminary matter, we reject Dialing Services’ assertion that 
it does not make or initiate the calls, given that it was “so involved” in the customers’ making of the calls 
as to be deemed the maker or initiator of the calls along with the customers.  The fact that Dialing 
Services has no preexisting relationship with the called parties does not absolve the Company of its 
obligation to obtain consent.  In fact, that is exactly the kind of uninvited contact that the TCPA was 
designed to combat.  Similarly, the fact that the called parties are unaware of Dialing Services’ 
involvement, and thus do not have a way to consent (or refuse consent) to the contacts does not relieve 
Dialing Services of its obligation to obtain their respective consents.  
21. Dialing Services argues that its clients made the calls and thus had the responsibility to 
obtain consent from the called parties.  We disagree with the implicit assertion that only one party can be 
liable under the TCPA for illegal calls.  Indeed, the fact that the Commission recognized potential liability 
for (1) the maker of the call, and (2) a person so involved that it could be deemed to have made the call,62
  
55 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5544, para. 17.
56 NAL Response at 12.
57 See id. at 10–11.
58 See id. at 11–12.
59 See Letter from Richard Hindman, Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to 
Anthony C. Kolker, President, Dialing Services, LLC at 3 (June 28, 2013) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00001812); Letter 
from Richard Hindman, Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Anthony C. 
Kolker, President, Dialing Services, LLC at 3 (Sept. 27, 2013) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00001812).
60 NAL Response at 4–5.  Dialing Services asserts that it gave the Bureau enough information to investigate any of 
Dialing Services’ clients who may have been culpable, because Dialing Services merely facilitates but does not 
make the robocalls.  Id. at 12–13.  
61 See id. at 4–5; 10–13.
62 See TCPA Omnibus Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7980-81, para. 30.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
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reflects that responsibility to obtain consent may lie with more than one entity.  As the Commission stated 
in the NAL, and as set forth explicitly in the DISH Network, both a seller (or client, in this case) who 
engages a telemarketer (or robocaller, in this case) and the telemarketer (or robocaller) so engaged, may 
be liable for TCPA violations.63  
22. Moreover, Dialing Services could have required its clients (who, according to the 
Company, have the “direct relationship” with call recipients) to provide proof of their respective consents 
and furnished it to the Bureau as evidence.  It did not do so.  Dialing Services requires its clients to sign a 
terms of service agreement promising that the clients will comply with federal regulations governing 
prerecorded messages.64 But that falls short of demonstrating that the called parties expressly consented 
to the communications.  The TCPA prohibits autodialed and prerecorded calls made without the called 
party’s consent.  Nothing in the statute or our rules suggest that the consent requirement may be overcome 
by a general statement from third parties that they will not violate the law.  We reject the idea that the 
Company may satisfy its independent obligation under the TCPA by relying on a broad promise by a third 
party that it will not violate the TCPA.
23. Dialing Services also alleges that the Bureau failed to consider that prior express consent 
could have been given orally or in ways not easily documented.65 This argument is without merit.  As we 
held above, Dialing Services is deemed to have made the calls at issue and was responsible for ensuring 
that those calls complied with the TCPA and FCC Rules requirements concerning prior express consent.  
Dialing Services was asked to produce any and all evidence of prior express consent.66 Dialing Services 
was able to provide evidence of consent for only four (4) of the 184 robocalls it made after being warned 
to stop making unlawful calls.  As the Commission informed the Company in the Citation and reiterated 
in the NAL, it is well-settled that “[c]allers contending that they have the prior express consent to make 
prerecorded voice or autodialed calls to cell phones or other mobile service numbers have the burden of 
proof to show that they obtained such consent.”67 Dialing Services proceeded at its own risk by ignoring 
the citation and proceeding without either obtaining the required consents or ensuring that its customers 
  
63 See NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5542, para. 15.  
64 See Letter from Mitchell Roth, Roth Doner Jackson, PLC, to Richard Hindman, Chief, Telecommunications 
Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau at 4, 12 (June 13, 2012) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00001812).
65 NAL Response at 12.  Dialing Services points specifically to the ACA and GroupMe declaratory rulings, Rules 
and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, GroupMe, Inc./Skype 
Communications S.A.R.L. Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling, Declaratory Ruling, 29 FCC Rcd 3442 (2014) 
(GroupMe); Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC 
Rcd 559 (2008) (ACA).  The Company’s reliance on these decisions is misplaced.  In ACA, the Commission clarified 
that consumers effectively give prior express consent to receive autodialed or prerecorded messages pertaining to 
debts when they provide their wireless number on the application for the loan.  ACA, 23 FCC Rcd at 564–565, para. 
10.  In GroupMe, the Commission held that a sender of non-telemarketing autodialed or prerecorded calls may 
obtain prior express consent through an intermediary, but emphasized that when an intermediary fails to obtain 
consent, the sender of the autodialed or prerecorded calls is liable for any resulting violations.  GroupMe, 29 FCC 
Rcd at 3444, 3446, paras. 6, 11.  In contrast, Dialing Services failed to provide evidence that the call recipients 
furnished their numbers to Dialing Services or any intermediary whatsoever, with the exception of the four calls that 
a Dialing Services client arranged for the Company to make to his own wireless phone.
66 See Letter from Richard Hindman, Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to 
Anthony C. Kolker, President, Dialing Services, LLC (June 28, 2013) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00001812); Letter 
from Richard Hindman, Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Anthony C. 
Kolker, President, Dialing Services, LLC (Sept. 27, 2013) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00001812).
67 See Citation, 28 FCC Rcd at 1842–1843, para. 7; NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5541, para. 10; see also Rules and 
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd 559, 
565, para. 10 (2008) (concluding that “[s]hould a question arise as to whether express consent was provided, the 
burden will be on [the caller] to show it obtained the necessary prior express consent”).
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had obtained consent.  With respect to the four robocalls for which Dialing Services produced proof of 
consent, however, we will reduce the forfeiture amount by $64,000 ($16,000 per each of four calls, the 
forfeiture amount attributed to each call in the NAL68).
24. Dialing Services argues that—based on these four calls alone—the Bureau’s entire
investigation was necessarily “incomplete” and incapable of being the basis for a forfeiture. 69 Dialing 
Services is simply wrong.  As explained in the NAL, Bureau staff contacted a large sample size—52 
recipients—of the pool of robocalls made by Dialing Services.70 All but one of these consumers denied 
ever having given anyone permission to robocall them.71 These interviews, combined with Dialing 
Services’ failure to produce any evidence to the contrary,72 properly supported the conclusion that Dialing 
Services failed to obtain the necessary prior express consent to send robocalls to any of the consumers.73  
Dialing Services bears the burden of disproving the assertions of the recipients who insist that Dialing 
Services did not obtain their prior express consents to be called.74 Dialing Services neither claimed nor 
offered evidence that it had consent for the 180 calls upon which the forfeiture is based.  
25. Second, the Company also criticizes the outreach that Bureau staff performed when staff 
contacted the recipients of Dialing Services’ robocalls.  Dialing Services accuses the Bureau of making 
“inflammatory” inquiries and questions the ability of ordinary citizens to understand the meaning of 
  
68 See NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5548, para. 28 (stating “we again propose the statutory maximum penalty of $16,000 for 
each of Dialing Services’ 184 apparent violations at issue in this NAL . . . .”).
69 NAL Response at 13.
70 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5541–42, para. 12.
71 Id. The single consumer who indicated that he had given permission was excluded from the Commission’s tally 
of apparently unlawful robocalls cited in the NAL.  Id. at para. 12 & n.28.
72 See supra note 59; Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd 559, 565, para. 10 (2008) (concluding that “[s]hould a question arise as to whether 
express consent was provided, the burden will be on [the caller] to show it obtained the necessary prior express 
consent”).
73 Id. The Commission’s burden in the NAL was to prove, by preponderance of the evidence, that Dialing Services 
apparently violated the Communications Act and/or the Rules.  Under that standard, the Commission was required 
to show that it was more likely than not that the robocalls at issue were made to wireless phones without the prior 
express consent of the recipient.  As explained in the NAL, the Bureau identified robocalls that were made to 
wireless phones, and then contacted a significant sample of the recipients of those calls to find out whether the 
recipients had given their permission (i.e., prior express consent) to any third party to robocall them on that number.  
Based on the overwhelming majority of answers—51 “no” and only one “yes,” the Commission concluded that the 
preponderance of evidence indicated that the robocalls were unlawful.  Once the Commission meets its burden 
(preponderance of the evidence), the burden then shifts to the target (Dialing Services in this case) to produce 
evidence demonstrating that the Commission’s conclusion is in error.  See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d); S. Doc. No. 248, 79th 
Cong., 2d Sess. Administrative Procedure Act—Legislative History (1946).  In this case, Dialing Services only 
provided evidence to prove that four of the 184 calls were made in compliance with the Act and Rules but otherwise 
provided no such evidence as to the remaining 180 violations.  As discussed below, the Commission accepts Dialing 
Services evidence with respect to the four calls and has adjusted the forfeiture accordingly.
74 Id.  See Lyft, Inc., Citation and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 9858, 9861 (Sept. 11, 2015); Call-Em-All, Inc., Citation and 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd 4532 (May 4, 2015); Ifonoclast, Inc. d/b/a/ Phonevite, Citation and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 4541, 
4543 (May 4, 2015); M.J. Ross Group, Inc. d/b/a PoliticalRobocalls.com, Citation and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 4548, 
4550 (May 4, 2015); Telephone Consumer Protection Act Robocall Rules Political Campaigns And Promoters Are 
Reminded Of Restrictions On Autodialed And Prerecorded Calls, FCC Enforcement Advisory, 27 FCC Rcd 11017, 
11018 (Sept. 11, 2012) (advisory during the 2012 political campaign season reminding makers of political and other 
robocalls that “[c]allers contending that they have the prior express consent to make prerecorded voice or autodialed 
calls to cell phones or other mobile service numbers should know that they have the burden of proof to show that 
they obtained such consent”).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
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“prior express consent.”75 Specifically, Dialing Services claims that when the Bureau asked a sample of 
robocall recipients “whether they had ever given permission to anyone to make prerecorded message calls 
to their respective cell phones at any time,”76 the wording of the Bureau’s question was inflammatory.77  
26. We disagree.  The Bureau’s question to consumers was straightforward, factual, and 
could be answered with a simple yes or no.78 The anodyne nature of the calls becomes clear when we 
consider that one person responded that they had indeed given permission to receive robocalls.79 The fact 
that some consumers contacted by the Bureau expressed negative opinions about robocalls they had 
received is not a reflection of the question, but rather of the well-known and widespread dissatisfaction 
that consumers feel toward robocalls in general, and unwanted robocalls in particular.80
27. Dialing Services also argues that the Bureau’s questions to consumers were flawed 
because (1) by asking whether consumers gave “permission” instead of “prior express consent” the 
Bureau applied the wrong standard; and (2) the average consumer cannot “understand the nuances 
associated with this legal term of art [‘prior express consent’].”81  
28. The Company does not explain how the use of the word “permission” in place of the 
words “prior express consent” disadvantages the Company, nor how it would have altered the consumers’ 
responses.  Although Dialing Services argues that consumers may provide prior express consent “in 
several ways, which are more nuanced that [sic] mere ‘permission’ as phrased by the Enforcement 
Bureau’s investigators,”82 the Company fails to identify any such “nuanced” forms of prior express 
consent.  Moreover, the record in this case does not reveal any such nuanced forms in use by Dialing 
Services or its clients.  We reject Dialing Services’ argument that using the term “permission” rather than 
“prior express consent” prejudiced the Company.  To the extent that Dialing Services believed that 
consumers were mistaken or confused about whether they gave consent, the Company had an opportunity 
to produce supporting evidence, and it did not do so.
B. Dialing Services’ Violations of the Law Were Willful and Its Remedial Actions Were 
Insufficient and Untimely
29. Dialing Services argues that the Company’s actions were not “willful” violations of the
TCPA because (1) the Company did not intend to violate the TCPA,83 (2) the Company continuously 
communicated with the Bureau over the course of the investigation,84 and (3) the Company eventually 
took remedial action to prevent further violations.85  
  
75 NAL Response at 10–12.
76 Id. at 10–11 (quoting NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5541–5542, para. 12).
77 Id. at 10–11.
78 One consumer respondent did just that, confirming giving permission to be called.  See NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5542, 
para. 12 & n.28.
79 As noted in the NAL, the calls made to this person were not included in the 184 calls that led to the proposed 
forfeiture.  NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5542, para. 12 & n.28.
80 See id. at 5537–39, paras. 2–5.
81 NAL Response at 11–12.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 6–8, 19–20.
84 Id. at 3–4.  See NAL Response at 14–15 (arguing that the Company’s discussions about the applicability of the 
TCPA to its activities indicated no willful disregard for the law).
85 NAL Response at 7–8.
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30. The Company’s “intent” argument misapplies the way the Act defines a “willful” 
violation.  Section 503(b)(1)(B) of the Act states that any person who is determined by the Commission to 
have willfully or repeatedly failed to comply with any provision of the Act or any rule, regulation, or 
order issued by the Commission shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture penalty.86 Section 
312(f)(1) of the Act, which likewise applies to 503(b) of the Act,87 defines “willful” as the “conscious and 
deliberate commission or omission of [any] act, irrespective of any intent to violate” the law.88 Whether 
Dialing Services intended to violate the TCPA is not relevant to determining whether the Company’s 
conduct was willful.  Dialing Services willfully committed the act of making prerecorded message calls—
a service for which it received financial compensation from its clients—and those calls violated the 
TCPA.  Dialing Services’ violations were therefore willful.89  
31. Dialing Services’ arguments about communicating with the Bureau and its belated 
attempts to come into compliance do not mitigate the Company’s violations, as we discuss below.  
Dialing Services’ communications with staff over the course of the Bureau’s investigation are not 
evidence of any meaningful attempts to comply with the TCPA, nor do they mitigate or excuse the 
violations.  Dialing Services did, in fact, meet with the Bureau on several occasions: prior to the issuance 
of the Citation, after the Citation was issued, and prior to the issuance of the NAL.  In those meetings, 
Dialing Services argued that the Company did not “make” or “initiate” calls for the purposes of the TCPA 
and attempted to persuade the Bureau that Dialing Services should not be held liable for unlawful 
robocalls.  In response, Bureau staff told Dialing Services that the Bureau disagreed with the Company’s 
interpretations of the TCPA, did not find its arguments persuasive, and that the Company risked further 
enforcement action if it refused to comply.  Later, in 2013, the Citation formally warned the Company 
that if it continued to make robocalls to wireless phones, the Commission could take further enforcement 
action.90 Despite both formal and informal invitations from the Bureau to comply with the TCPA, the 
Company elected to continue its behavior.91
  
86 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B).  See NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5547–5548, para. 26; 47 CFR § 1.80(a).  
87 The legislative history to Section 312(f)(1) of the Act clarifies that this definition of willful applies to both 
Sections 312 and 503(b) of the Act.  See H.R. Rep. No. 97-765, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 51 (1982) (“This provision 
[inserted in Section 312] defines the terms ‘willful’ and ‘repeated’ for purposes of section 312, and for any other 
relevant section of the act (e.g., Section 503) . . . .  As defined[,] . . . ‘willful’ means that the licensee knew that he 
was doing the act in question, regardless of whether there was an intent to violate the law. ‘Repeated’ means more 
than once, or where the act is continuous, for more than one day.  Whether an act is considered to be ‘continuous’ 
would depend upon the circumstances in each case.  The definitions are intended primarily to clarify the language in 
Sections 312 and 503, and are consistent with the Commission’s application of those terms . . . .”).  The Commission 
has so interpreted the term in the Section 503(b) context.  See e.g., Southern California Broadcasting Co., 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 4387, 4388, para. 5 (1991), recon. denied, 7 FCC Rcd 3454 (1992).
88 47 U.S.C. § 312(f)(1) (emphasis added).
89 Moreover, Section 503(b)(1)(B) of the Act penalizes actions that are willful or repeated.  47 U.S.C. § 
503(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  There is no question that the actions giving rise to liability in this case were 
repeated; Dialing Services made 180 separate, unlawful robocalls to wireless telephones in violation of the TCPA.  
Accordingly, even if we were to agree with Dialing Services’ interpretation of the word “willful” (though we do 
not), doing so would not lessen the Company’s culpability under Section 503(b).
90 See Citation, 28 FCC Rcd at 1840, 1845–46, paras. 2, 17.
91 Dialing Services dedicates several pages of its NAL Response to discussion of the Bureau’s decision to suspend 
the Company’s requirement to comply with a separate order that the Bureau included in the Citation.  Specifically, 
the Citation ordered Dialing Services to submit a response to a request for information to confirm that the Company 
had ceased making any robocalls to cell phones except as permitted by the TCPA and FCC Rules, and ceased 
making any robocalls that lacked identifications required by the TCPA and FCC Rules.  See Citation, 28 FCC Rcd at 
1841, 1846–47, paras. 3, 22.  The Citation’s request for information is a separate matter that formed no part of, or 
basis for, the violations alleged in the NAL.  The Citation’s information request is therefore irrelevant to this 
proceeding.  That said, with respect to Dialing Services’ argument that the decision to suspend the Company’s 
(continued….)
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32. Similarly, the belated remedial steps that Dialing Services took do not excuse its unlawful 
actions.  Dialing Services argues that, after it learned that it was under investigation by the FCC in 2012, 
the Company sought to comply with the law.92 The Company states that, beginning in May 2012, it 
began to require its clients to promise (via a popup window) that the clients had obtained prior express 
consent from wireless phone recipients of their robocalls.93 It was only in late May 2013—more than two 
months after receiving the Citation and almost a year after FCC staff warned counsel for the Company 
that its calls to wireless phones were illegal94—that the Company finally required scrubbing wireless 
numbers from the lists of calls clients paid the Company to make.95 Dialing Services claims that as a 
result of its actions, there were zero violations after May 20, 2013.96 But the NAL and this Forfeiture 
Order pertain to unlawful calls made subsequent to the Citation and before Dialing Services took serious 
steps to address the TCPA violations.  Dialing Services’ remedial steps completed on May 20, 2013 do 
not excuse the violations that occurred before that date.
C. The NAL Properly Applied Section 503 Factors to Determine the Amount of the 
Forfeiture in this Case  
33. As the Commission stated in the NAL,97 Section 503(b)(2)(E) requires that “the 
Commission or its designee shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the 
violation and, with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability 
to pay, and such other matters as justice may require” when determining the amount of a proposed 
forfeiture.98 Our forfeiture guidelines also identify criteria, consistent with the Section 503(b)(2)(E) 
factors, that may influence whether we adjust the base amount downward or upward.99 For example, we 
may adjust a penalty upward for “[e]gregious misconduct,” an “[i]ntentional violation,” or where the 
subject of an enforcement action has engaged in “[r]epeated or continuous violation.”100 The maximum 
penalty per violation in the present case is $16,000.101
(Continued from previous page)    
obligation to comply with the request for information indicates that “the Enforcement Bureau is/was struggling with 
finding a manner in which to apply the TCPA Regulations to hosted dialer platforms” (NAL Response at 6), we 
disagree.  As discussed above, Bureau staff met with Dialing Services before the Citation was issued and warned the 
Company that the robocalls made on its platform violated the TCPA.   The Company disagreed with the Bureau and 
continued making unlawful robocalls.  The Bureau also met with Dialing Services after the Citation was issued and 
warned it that it could be held liable for forfeitures if it continued the same conduct in the future.  Dialing Services 
elected not to heed the Bureau’s repeated and consistent advice.
92 NAL Response at 7.
93 Id.
94 At the very first meeting between the staff and Dialing Services’ counsel, FCC staff warned that the Company’s 
actions were unlawful and that the Company should immediately cease all prerecorded message calls to wireless 
telephones unless it had the prior express consent of the called parties.  
95 Id.
96 Id. at 7–8.
97 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5547–5548, para. 26.
98 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(E).  
99 See 47 CFR § 1.80; Forfeiture Policy Statement, 12 FCC Rcd 17087.  The absence of a particular type of violation 
from the forfeiture guidelines must “not be taken to mean that the violation is unimportant or nonexistent,” and “the 
Commission retains discretion to impose forfeitures for other violations.”  Forfeiture Policy Statement, 12 FCC Rcd 
at 17110.  
100 47 CFR § 1.80(b)(8), Note to paragraph (b)(8).  
101 See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(E).  Section 503(b)(2)(D) of the Act provides for forfeitures of up to $10,000 for each 
violation or each day of a continuing violation, up to a maximum of $75,000 for a single continuing violation in 
(continued….)
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34. Dialing Services argues that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by 
proposing penalties at the statutory maximum level of $16,000 per violation.102  Specifically, Dialing 
Services argues that it was unfair to take into account the 4.7 million unlawful robocalls that Dialing 
Services made that predate the Citation, because when those calls were made, Dialing Services thought 
that it was in compliance with the law.103  
35. We disagree.  There is no question that the Commission may take into account violations 
that occurred before a citation was issued when the cited person or entity thereafter engages in the same 
unlawful conduct.104 The Commission considered the 4.7 million unlawful robocalls that Dialing Services 
made in three months in 2012 to inform its decision to impose the statutory maximum penalty.  These 
violations demonstrated the seriousness and egregiousness of Dialing Services’ conduct.  The 
Commission’s action was neither arbitrary nor capricious.  
36. Furthermore, as discussed in the NAL, Dialing Services’ pre-Citation unlawful conduct 
was not the only factor the Commission considered when it decided to set the penalty at the statutory 
maximum level. As discussed in the NAL, the Commission also considered the existence of more than 
300 additional post-Citation violations that fell outside of the statute of limitations.105 Although the 
Commission was barred by statute from assessing a forfeiture for these additional 300 violations, the 
existence of additional violations was a relevant factor to determining the amount of the forfeiture to 
impose for the violations that were not so barred.106 The Commission also found that Dialing Services 
intentionally disregarded the prohibitions against robocalls to wireless phones by continuing to make 
unlawful calls after being warned to stop by the Citation.107 The Commission further took into account 
the fact that Congress deemed robocalls a particularly pernicious threat to the privacy of wireless 
telephone consumers, and that Dialing Services’ egregious conduct therefore caused serious harm to 
consumers.108 All of these factors, together with the 4.7 million unlawful robocalls that Dialing Services 
made in 2012, properly justified assessing a penalty at the statutory maximum level.
(Continued from previous page)    
cases, as here, where the violation does not involve a Commission licensee or common carriers, among others. See
47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(D). In accordance with the inflation adjustment requirements contained in the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, Sec. 31001, 110 Stat. 1321, the Commission 
implemented an increase of the maximum statutory forfeiture under Section 503(b)(2)(D) to $16,000 for each 
violation or each day of a continuing violation, up to a maximum of $112,500 for any single continuing violation.
See 47 CFR § 1.80(b); see also Amendment of Section 1.80(b) of the Commission’s Rules, Adjustment of Forfeiture 
Maxima to Reflect Inflation, 23 FCC Rcd 9845 (2008). In 2013, the Commission increased its maximum statutory 
forfeitures to reflect further inflation. See Amendment Of Section 1.80(B) Of The Commission’s Rules, Adjustment 
of Civil Monetary Penalties to Reflect Inflation, Order, DA 13-1615, 78 Fed. Reg. 49371 (Rel. Aug. 1, 2013) 
(amending section 1.80(b) to reflect inflation of the forfeiture maxima applicable in this case).
102 NAL Response at 8.
103Id. In the NAL, the Commission applied the statutory maximum penalty in part based on evidence of Dialing 
Services’ 4.7 million unlawful robocalls to wireless phones that led to the Citation.  NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5548–
5549, para. 28. 
104 Congress expressly contemplated that the Commission would consider unlawful conduct that occurred before 
issuance of a citation at the NAL stage if the unlawful conduct continued.  See S. Rep. No. 95-580, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. at 9 (1977) (if a person or entity that has been issued a citation by the Commission thereafter engages in the 
conduct for which the citation of violation was sent, the subsequent notice of apparent liability “would attach not 
only for the conduct occurring subsequently but also for the conduct for which the citation was originally sent.” 
(emphasis added)).
105 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5548–49, para. 28.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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D. Dialing Services’ Objections to the Citation Are Without Merit  
37. Dialing Services argues that the Bureau improperly ignored the Citation Response, and 
that the Commission improperly dismissed the Company’s Citation Response as an unauthorized Petition 
for Reconsideration in the NAL.109 Specifically, Dialing Services argues that because the Citation
permitted the Company to file a written response, the Bureau was then obligated to respond to or 
otherwise act upon that response. 110  
38. Dialing Services’ argument is unavailing.  Not only did the NAL dismiss the Petition for 
Reconsideration on procedural grounds,111 but, far from ignoring Dialing Services’ pleading, the 
Commission fully considered and addressed the merits of Dialing Services’ arguments,112 as an 
independent and alternative basis for its decision.113 The fact that Dialing Services continues to disagree 
with the outcome does not create a defect on the part of the Commission.
IV. CONCLUSION
39. Based on the record before us and in light of the applicable statutory factors, we conclude 
that Dialing Services willfully and repeatedly violated Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act and Section 
64.1200(a)(1)(iii) of the Rules by making robocalls to wireless phones using artificial or prerecorded 
voice messages without the prior express consent of the consumers it called.  We also conclude that 
Dialing Services has presented evidence that four of the robocalls were not made in violation of the Act or 
the Rules. Accordingly, we reduce the proposed forfeiture by $64,000, and affirm $2,880,000 of the 
forfeiture proposed in the NAL.  
V. ORDERING CLAUSES
40. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 503(b) of the Act,114 and 
Section 1.80 of the Rules,115 Dialing Services, LLC IS LIABLE FOR A MONETARY FORFEITURE
in the amount of two million eight hundred eighty thousand dollars ($2,880,000) for willfully and 
repeatedly violating Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act and Section 64.1200(a)(1)(iii) of the Rules.
41. Payment of the forfeiture shall be made in the manner provided for in Section 1.80 of the 
Rules within thirty (30) calendar days after the release of this Forfeiture Order.116 If the forfeiture is not 
paid within the period specified, the case may be referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for 
enforcement of the forfeiture pursuant to Section 504(a) of the Act.117  
42. Payment of the forfeiture must be made by check or similar instrument, wire transfer, or 
credit card, and must include the NAL/Account Number and FRN referenced above.  Dialing Services, 
LLC shall send electronic notification of payment to Lisa Williford at Lisa.Williford@fcc.gov on the date 
said payment is made.  Regardless of the form of payment, a completed FCC Form 159 (Remittance 
  
109 NAL Response at 13–15.
110 Id. at 14.
111 NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5546, paras 23–24.
112 The Company argued, among other things, that it did not violate the Act and Commission’s Rules because it does 
not “initiate” robocalls to cell phones.  See Citation Response at 3.
113 See NAL, 29 FCC Rcd at 5546–5547, para. 25.
114 47 U.S.C. § 503(b).
115 47 CFR § 1.80.
116 Id.
117 47 U.S.C. § 504(a).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
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Advice) must be submitted.118 When completing the Form 159, enter the Account Number in block 
number 23A (call sign/other ID) and enter the letters “FORF” in block number 24A (payment type code).  
Below are additional instructions that should be followed based on the form of payment selected:
· Payment by check or money order must be made payable to the order of the Federal 
Communications Commission.  Such payments (along with completed Form 159) must be 
mailed to the Federal Communications Commission, P.O. Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 
63197-9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank – Government Lockbox #979088, 
SL-MO-C2-GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63101.
· Payment by wire transfer must be made to ABA Number 021030004, receiving bank 
TREAS/NYC, and Account Number 27000001.  To complete the wire transfer and ensure 
appropriate crediting of the wired funds, a completed Form 159 must be faxed to U.S. Bank 
at (314) 418-4232 on the same business day the wire transfer is initiated.
· Payment by credit card must be made by providing the required credit card information on 
FCC Form 159 and signing and dating the Form 159 to authorize the credit card payment.  
The completed Form 159 must then be mailed to Federal Communications Commission, 
P.O. Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank –
Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 
63101.
43. Any request for making full payment over time under an installment plan should be sent 
to: Chief Financial Officer – Financial Operations, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th 
Street, SW, Room 1-A625, Washington, D.C. 20554.119 Questions regarding payment procedures should 
be directed to the Financial Operations Group Help Desk by telephone, 1-877-480-3201, or by e-mail, 
ARINQUIRIES@fcc.gov.
44. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Forfeiture Order shall be sent by first 
class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested, to Dialing Services, LLC, Attn: Anthony C. Kolker, 
President, 5149 Cotton Road, Roswell, NM 88201; and to Mitchell N. Roth, Esquire, Roth Doner 
Jackson, PLC, 8200 Greensboro Drive, Suite 820, McLean, VA 22102.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
  
118 An FCC Form 159 and detailed instructions for completing the form may be obtained at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form159/159.pdf.
119 See 47 CFR § 1.1914.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
17
STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN AJIT PAI
Re:  Dialing Services, LLC, File No. EB-TCD-12-00001812.
This FCC has made consumers’ top priority—stopping unlawful robocalls—one of the agency’s 
top priorities.  We’re taking steps to allow voice providers to block spoofed phone numbers.  We’re 
exploring ways to make sure that calls can be authenticated.  Last month, we proposed the largest fine in 
FCC history—$120 million—against an individual who apparently unleashed almost 100 million 
robocalls on American consumers in just three months.
And today, we impose a $2.88 million fine against Dialing Services for its willful and repeated 
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, or TCPA.
Here’s why we are imposing this fine.
An investigation by our Enforcement Bureau found that Dialing Services was responsible for 
more than 4.7 million robocalls to cell phones in just three months—all without prior express consent.  
Then, after Dialing Services was issued a citation, staff found in a follow-up investigation that it was 
responsible for yet more unauthorized robocalls to cell phones.
Dialing Services offers a software-based robocalling service to third-party clients.  But make no 
mistake:  Although it may not have physically placed the calls itself, Dialing Services was not the 
unwitting conduit or passive technical support service it claims to be.  Indeed, one of the Company’s 
featured services is a spoofing functionality designed to provide deceptive information about a call’s 
originating point or to hide that information altogether.  But even more significant, the Company directly 
assists its clients in crafting and structuring their messages to help them conceal their true intentions, all 
for one purpose: to maximize the effectiveness of the illegal robocall campaigns that Dialing Services 
helps facilitate.
This is not the conduct of a merely passive actor.  No, these are the actions of a company “so 
involved” in the making of the illegal calls that it can itself be deemed the maker or initiator of the calls 
for purposes of liability under the TCPA.
This substantial forfeiture order is the latest step we’ve taken to stop the scourge of illegal 
robocalls.  But it won’t be the last.
I want to thank my colleague, Commissioner Clyburn, for her support on this item and her 
commitment to combating illegal robocalls.  I also want to thank the staff who worked so hard to bring 
this order to fruition: Michael Carowitz, Lloyd Collier, Lisa Gelb, Rosemary Harold, Richard Hindman, 
Michael Janson, Michael Scurato, and Kristi Thompson from the Enforcement Bureau; Rick Mallen, from 
the Office of General Counsel; and John B. Adams, Kurt Schroeder, Mark Stone, and Kristi Thornton 
from the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau.  It’s been a long time coming, but your work has 
given voice to millions of American consumers who have been spammed by these illegal robocalls.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
18
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O'RIELLY
Re:  Dialing Services, LLC, File No. EB-TCD-12-00001812.
It should come as no surprise that I continue to seek greater precision in our enforcement work.  I 
said as much in the past on numerous occasions, and I reemphasized the point at last month’s disposition 
of an Enforcement Bureau item.  When the Commission is seeking to impose substantial fines on a 
company and issue allegations that could seriously undermine a business, we better be sure we are right 
and have sufficiently addressed every component of the case.  The Commission must always present the 
best possible arguments, evidence and precedent.  Too often, at least in my opinion, the EB items fail to 
meet to this standard.  
After months of working on this case and hoping to reach common ground, we reached a point 
where additional edits and input weren’t getting us closer on a couple of key issues.  And so, we now 
have a Forfeiture Order to fine a company, Dialing Services, almost $2.9 million for operating a 
technology platform in violation of TCPA.  Unfortunately, the item before us today is so lacking that I do 
not have sufficient confidence that the allegations are correct.  Let me explain some of its problems.  
While the Commission’s desire to attack illegal robocalling is admirable, in this item, it seeks to 
punish a technology and its operator rather than the actual originators of alleged illegal robocalls – the 
companies that used the platform to contact consumers.  Did the Commission actually seek enforcement 
action against the companies or individuals that directly made the alleged illegal robocalls?  The item 
doesn’t tell us, but the NAL response suggests it did not.  Instead, the Commission attempts to deem the 
platform operator as violating the TCPA with little facts and questionable arguments.  Overall, this seems 
like an extremely far stretch under the law and begins to look a lot like those that sue gun makers 
whenever there is horrible event.  Moreover, it opens a huge can of worms given that this same platform 
technology can be used for completely legitimate purposes and often is.  So, the Commission is then 
forced to try to define what is a good use and what is an illegal use.  And, therein lies an even bigger 
problem.  
The TCPA applies to parties that “make” or “initiate” a call.  But here, it’s the actual callers who 
load the numbers to be dialed, execute the software and push send.  Is Microsoft liable if I were to use 
Windows 10 or Outlook to send a threatening email?  Of course, not.  
Therefore, the item focuses instead on whether Dialing Services is “so involved in the making of 
the calls as to be deemed to have made them.”  In doing so, the Commission essentially establishes a 
three-prong test on who is susceptible for being captured under this vague determination: it offers 
spoofing capability; is involved in creation of the call’s content; and markets that it can reach a wide 
audience.  But all of these features can be used for generate calls for legitimate purposes, a point the 
Commission completely concedes regarding spoofing.1  
On the first point, the NAL response notes that while the software can transmit calling party 
numbers provided by clients, there has been no indication that any telephone number supplied by a client 
to Dialing Services is spoofed or inaccurate.  Indeed, the Commission does not show that spoofing was 
present in this case so that should be a completely irrelevant factor here.  Yet the item asserts, without 
evidence, that Dialing Services knows that caller ID spoofing and blocking are likely to be used 
deceptively by its customers.  
Second, in terms of the content of the scripts, the Commission argues that Dialing Services 
actively assists its clients with the creation and structure of messages and that the messages would likely
show that the calls are designed to target recipients who didn’t consent to be called.  However, the NAL 
  
1 Supra, note 43.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-97
19
response states that the company has no involvement in the creation of scripts and that all content is 
created by the clients.  It reviews or edits messages only when necessary to prevent unlawful or fraudulent 
behavior by a client.  The easiest way to resolve this point of contention would have been to contact the 
clients.  It would also seem prudent to obtain copies of the messages rather than hypothesize about what 
might have been in them.  But it appears that this basic due diligence did not occur.  
Third, is it possible that other platforms would market themselves to suggest that they can reach a 
wide audience?  That would seem to be a no-brainer as being able to conduct mass calling campaigns 
would be appropriate for legitimate robocalls as well.  Thus, the Commission’s new “test” on its face 
appears to be arbitrary and capricious.   
To go so far as to implicate the technology platform provider, there should have to be some 
demonstrable evidence of clear intent to violate TCPA, not just speculation about what a company could 
have done or might have known.  This is certainly what I have been calling for as it relates to pirate radio 
broadcasting and the need to get to those that aid and abet them, such as property owners or advertisers –
clear intent.  Wasn’t there one Dialing Services’ email or a conversation from a former client to shed light 
on Dialing Services’ intent?  Yet that seems too much to wish for as the item doesn’t prove intent or even 
try but relies on the old “willful” standard.  I am sure that someone will say that willful is the standard in 
the law and I would agree.  However, since the Commission has taken TCPA far outside its original the 
bounds of the law or its intent, we should prove more than mere willfulness before further expanding the 
scope of the TCPA to cover platform liability.    
In addition, on its face it appears that this particular company certainly tried to address potential 
exposure points, at least according to the data presented in the item.  Specifically, paragraph 4 outlines the 
circumstances that led the Commission to issue its 2013 citation: the company was alleged to have made 
4.7 million illegal robocalls in a three-month period.  That’s an average of a little over 1.5 million per 
month.  Yet, when the Commission staff reviewed the company’s practices just months later, they found 
only 184 instances.  While not perfect, from 1.5 million to 184, that equates to a 99.99 percent decrease in 
a short amount of time.  In fact, the item explains later that Dialing Services did further work to scrub its 
calling lists to show compliance and there have been zero incidents since mid-2013.  Which makes you 
wonder, is the goal to get TCPA compliance or get enforcement victories?       
My knowledge of Dialing Services is limited to what is contained in the item and the NAL 
response, and I had no preconceived notions about whether they should be liable.  My interest is in 
making sure that they receive full consideration of their arguments and the outcome is just.  
Unfortunately, their response was given short shrift, and I am concerned about the outcome.  
Beyond the fate of this particular company, I worry even more about the precedential value of 
this item.  The Commission is fond of declaring that its enforcement actions stand as new guidelines by 
which others will be judged.  Thus, the “guidance” provided via this decision will affect other platforms 
that have struggled with the overbroad and bad TCPA decisions recently made by the Commission.  I 
think of Rob Sweeney of Mobile Media Technologies, who testified before a House Judiciary 
Subcommittee in June.  Mr. Sweeney stated that his business, which allows customers – like television 
stations, newspapers, schools, local governments, hospitals, hotels and not-for-profit organizations – to 
send non-commercial text messages to their opt-in patrons, has had to face huge legal bills, downsizing, 
and customer uncertainty because of TCPA actions and inactions by the Commission.  How does today’s 
action affect Mr. Sweeney’s business?  The Forfeiture Order’s vague statement that “there may be 
instances in which a platform provider serves merely as a conduit for robocalls” probably doesn’t help 
Mr. Sweeney keep his clients or grow his business.  
For the previous reasons, I vote no.