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Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, DC 20554
In the Matter of
Best Insurance Contracts, Inc., and
Philip Roesel, dba Wilmington Insurance Quotes
)
)
)
)
)
)
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File No.: EB-TCD-16-00023195
NAL/Acct. No.: 201732170007
FRNs: 0026727396 (Best Insurance
Contracts, Inc.); 0026727446 (Roesel,
dba Wilmington Insurance Quotes)
NOTICE OF APPARENT LIABILITY FOR FORFEITURE
Adopted: August 3, 2017 Released: August 4, 2017
By the Commission: Chairman Pai and Commissioner Clyburn issuing separate statements; Commissioner
O’Rielly approving in part and concurring in part.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This Notice of Apparently Liability for Forfeiture (NAL) finds Best Insurance Contracts,
Inc. (BIC), and Philip Roesel, doing business as Wilmington Insurance Quotes, apparently liable for
perpetrating spoofed robocall campaigns involving more than 21 million robocalls during a three-month
period from late 2016 through early 2017. Accurate caller ID information allows consumers to make
informed decisions about which calls to accept, ignore, or block, and whether the party on the other end
of the phone line is reputable and deserving of their trust. Accurate Caller ID also allows the phone
companies and law enforcement to detect and combat unlawful calls, such as unlawful robocalls.
2. The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 and the Federal Communication Commission’s
(Commission or FCC) rules (Rules) prohibit any individual from falsifying or misrepresenting his or her
phone number with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value. This
prohibited practice is better known as “spoofing.” Spoofing can cause significant harm when used to
facilitate illegal robocalls, which are the number one consumer complaint received by the Commission.
With the proliferation of low cost and advanced technology, the combination of spoofing and illegal
robocalls has become more pervasive, making illegal robocalling campaigns more deceptive, disruptive,
and challenging to prevent. The Enforcement Bureau (Bureau) has investigated Roesel’s alleged scheme
involving apparently spoofed robocalls appearing to originate from unassigned telephone numbers.
3. Today, the Commission issues this NAL1 and proposes a penalty of $82,106,000 against
Roesel for apparently causing the display of misleading or inaccurate caller ID information with the intent
to cause harm or wrongfully obtain anything of value. The evidence shows that Philip Roesel, himself or
through BIC, apparently made 21,582,771 spoofed robocalls over a three-month period from late 2016
through early 2017. Philip Roesel, along with insurance agents working for or under his direction,
generated leads and sales by apparently falsifying caller ID information to illegally robocall hundreds of
thousands of consumers per day. Philip Roesel profited from his own insurance sales and from
commissions on sales that his agents made by using spoofed robocalls to generate leads and sales. The
spoofed numbers were an integral part of Philip Roesel’s scheme to mislead consumers and evade
1 The Commission also contemporaneously released a Citation and Order notifying Philip Roesel and BIC that he/it
violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by making more than 21 million illegal robocalls to
emergency lines, wireless phones, and residential phones. Best Insurance Contracts, Inc., and Philip Roesel, dba
Wilmington Insurance Quotes, Citation and Order, DA 17-662 (EB Aug. 4, 2017) (Roesel Citation).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
2
detection. We therefore find that BIC and Philip Roesel apparently violated the Truth in Caller ID Act of
2009, as codified in Section 227(e) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Communications
Act or Act),2 and Section 64.1604 of the Rules.3
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009
4. For many years, the Commission has recognized and emphasized the importance of
requiring telemarketers to transmit accurate caller ID information. Even before the Truth in Caller ID
Act, the Commission noted that “Caller ID allows consumers to screen out unwanted calls and to identify
companies that they wish to ask not to call again.”4 The Commission further stated that “[k]nowing the
identity of the caller is also helpful to consumers who feel frightened or threatened by hang-up or ‘dead
air’ calls.”5 The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 prohibits “caus[ing] any caller identification service,” in
connection with any telecommunications service or Internet Protocol-enabled service, to “knowingly
transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm,
or wrongfully obtain anything of value.”6 Congress observed that consumers place substantial value in
accurate and reliable caller ID information to assist them in deciding whether to answer a phone call and,
ultimately, whether to trust the caller on the other end of the line. Congress further noted that consumers’
widespread expectation is that any information that appears on caller ID represents the true originating
number of the person or entity making the call.7
5. In the years leading up to the Truth in Caller ID Act’s passage, consumers, telephone
carriers, the Commission, and other law enforcement authorities alike observed the proliferation of
intentional and malicious falsification of caller ID information as part of criminal frauds, scams, and other
harmful activities posing threats to American consumers, including the invasion of their privacy and the
potential dire financial consequences resulting from related frauds or scams. Congress was especially
concerned by instances where criminals used spoofed caller ID information for the purposes of defrauding
consumers or wrongfully obtaining something of value from the called consumers. For example,
Congress was aware that fraudsters could spoof the caller ID information of recognizable businesses and
thus “cause people to blame innocent businesses instead of the real source for the calls.”8 Such scams and
frauds were precisely the types of activities that Congress wanted to thwart when it adopted the Truth in
Caller ID Act.9
B. FCC Investigation into Philip Roesel’s Spoofed Robocalls
6. In recent years, there has been an uptick in robocalls being used within the health
insurance industry to generate health insurance leads and sales.10
2 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).
3 47 CFR § 64.1604.
4 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Report and Order, 18 FCC
Rcd 14014, 14122, para. 179 (2003).
5 Id.
6 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).
7 See 156 Cong. Rec. H2522, H2524 (2010) (“Now, if you see a caller ID and you see it has a phone number, most
people think that it’s ironclad that that’s the actual phone number that’s calling them when in truth it’s not.”).
8 Id. at H2525.
9 See 156 Cong. Rec. H2522, H2523 (2010) (“Caller ID spoofing has emerged as a useful tool for identifying thieves
and other scam artists.”).
10 See Michele Andrews, ‘You’ve Got Mail’: E-mails and Robocalls Hit Home in Promoting Medicaid Enrollment,
Kaiser Health News (May 26, 2017), available at http://khn.org/news/youve-got-mail-emails-and-robocalls-hit-
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
3
7. In December 2016, Sp?k, Inc. (Sp?k) submitted an informal complaint with the Bureau
about a significant robocalling event that was disrupting its emergency medical paging service.11 Sp?k,
headquartered in Springfield, Virginia, provides paging services for hospitals, emergency rooms, and
physicians. Paging services are essential in hospitals and emergency rooms across the country, with an
estimated 85 percent of hospitals relying on this technology to ensure that emergency room doctors,
nurses, EMTs, and other first responders receive immediate alerts.12 Because paging technology is not
equipped to handle voice calls, a large-scale robocalling campaign will disrupt—and potentially disable—
the network. Service outages, slowdowns, or other problems caused by robocalls flooding a paging
network are a serious risk to public safety because they interfere with critical hospital and emergency
room communications.
8. According to Sp?k, the robocalling event adversely affected 5,000 to 10,000 of its service
subscribers.13 The robocalling event harmed Sp?k’s customers by disrupting those customers’ pager
numbers, which are used by doctors, hospitals and emergency first responders. One of Sp?k’s subscribers
is Palmetto Health, which operates seven hospitals serving Columbia, Greenville, and Sumter, South
Carolina. Palmetto Health is the largest health resource in the South Carolina Midlands region.14
Palmetto Health experienced intermittent pager disruptions as a result of the massive influx of
unauthorized robocalls to Sp?k’s network.15 In its informal complaint with the Bureau, Sp?k stated that
the robocalls consisted of a prerecorded advertising message for health insurance policies.
9. From the information provided by Sp?k, the Commission traced the disruptive calls to
Philip Roesel.16 Philip Roesel does business under two different names. First, Philip Roesel sells
insurance plans (including medical insurance and life insurance) under the unregistered name
“Wilmington Insurance Quotes” and its accompanying website, wilmingtoninsurancequotes.com (WIQ).17
The WIQ domain name is registered to Philip Roesel in his personal name and at his
address; the website features a prominent photograph of Philip Roesel along with his name, personal e-
(Continued from previous page)
home-in-promoting-medicaid-enrollment/; see also Bridgette Small, Phony Calls about Health Insurance, February
18, 2016, Federal Trade Commission Website, available at https://www.consumer ftc.gov/blog/phony-calls-about-
health-insurance.
11 See E-mail from Dexter Lee, Corporate Technical Operations Director, Sp?k, Inc., to Kristi Thompson, Deputy
Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau (Dec. 14, 2016, 16:59 ET) (on file in
File No. EB-TCD-16-00023195).
12 See Hospitals turning a ‘pager’ on data hardware, The Boston Globe (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/02/01/beep-this-accessory-busy-doctors-finally-gets-
upgrade/gRcjTy7w3RuTJiqaeKTsEN/story html.
13 See E-mail from Dexter Lee, Corporate Technical Operations Director, Sp?k, Inc., to Kristi Thompson, Deputy
Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau (June 20, 2017, 10:16 ET) (on file in
File No. EB-TCD-16-00023195); see also Declaration of Kimbarly H. Taylor, May 22, 2017 (on file in File No. EB-
TCD-16-00023195).
14 See Palmetto Health Website, “About Palmetto Health,” https://www.palmettohealth.org/patients-guests/about-
palmetto-health.
15 As soon as Sp?k identified the apparently unlawful spoofed robocalls hitting its network, it immediately alerted its
carriers (AT&T and Verizon) and Bureau staff. After receiving Sp?k’s reports about the unauthorized nature of the
robocalls, and at Sp?k’s request, AT&T and Verizon were able to take steps to mitigate and reduce the number of
illegal robocalls before they reached Sp?k’s subscribers.
16 Sp?k has alerted Bureau staff to multiple large-scale robocalling events since 2015. Bureau staff has traced these
events to various robocallers. In this case, the robocalls that hit Sp?k’s network in mid-December 2016 originated
with Philip Roesel and BIC.
17 See LinkedIn page for Philip Roesel, https://www.linkedin.com/in/philiproesel/ (last visited July 5, 2017) (on file
in File No. EB-TCD-16-00023195).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
5
11. Bureau staff analyzed a sample of 82,106 spoofed robocalls Roesel made using four
specific numbers.28 The evidence shows that the telephone numbers used were unassigned (i.e., not
assigned to a carrier or a subscriber) during the relevant time frame. Accordingly, all the calls made by
Roesel that displayed one of these four numbers in the called parties’ caller IDs were not assigned to
Roesel and were therefore spoofed. Bureau staff also examined robocall complaints by consumers filing
on www.donotcall.gov between late October 2016 and January 2017, and compared them to the records
of calls that Roesel made during the same period. Bureau staff matched 44 complaints to the call records
of robocalls made by Roesel.
12. Based on the evidence collected during the investigation, the Bureau cited BIC and Philip
Roesel dba Wilmington Insurance Quotes for making illegal robocalls in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).29 Those violations are separate from, and in addition to, the apparent
spoofing violations set forth in this NAL.
III. DISCUSSION
13. We find that Philip Roesel (directly or through BIC) apparently violated Section 227(e)
of the Act and Section 64.1604 of the Rules by knowingly causing the display of misleading or inaccurate
caller ID information, or “spoofing,” with unlawful intent, for the purpose of aiding an illegal robocalling
campaign. Section 227(e) of the Act and Section 64.1604 of the Rules prohibit any person within the
United States, in connection with any telecommunications service or Internet Protocol-enabled voice
service, to knowingly cause, directly or indirectly, any caller ID service to transmit or display misleading
or inaccurate caller ID information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything
of value.30
A. Roesel Apparently Knowingly Caused the Display of Inaccurate Caller ID
Information
14. The evidence shows that Philip Roesel (directly or through BIC) apparently knowingly
caused the display of inaccurate caller ID information. As discussed above, Philip Roesel used a third-
party calling platform ( ) to make telemarketing robocalls to consumers. According to ,
Philip Roesel/BIC controlled the caller ID inputs and selected what number would appear as the caller ID
for each call.31 Bureau staff analyzed a representative sample of four numbers that either (1) Philip
Roesel or his agents, or (2) BIC used as the spoofed caller ID number. Philip Roesel/BIC used those four
numbers to make at least 82,106 robocalls. These numbers were unassigned during the relevant time
frame; thus, by inserting these four unassigned numbers into the caller ID of his robocalls, Philip Roesel
knowingly displayed, or caused to be displayed, misleading or inaccurate caller ID information. Philip
Roesel knowingly chose to have the calls appear to be originating from unassigned telephone numbers
that he selected, rather than from his own telephone number. Accordingly, we find that Philip
Roesel/BIC apparently caused the display of inaccurate or misleading caller ID information.
28 Such robocalls constitute “any telecommunications service or Internet Protocol-enabled voice service” for the
purposes of Section 227 of the Act.
29 See Roesel Citation.
30 47 U.S.C. § 227(e); 47 CFR § 64.1604(a). The Commission used slightly different language in section 64.1604(a)
to make clear, consistent with the intent of Congress, that “the person or entity ‘knowingly’ causing [the]
transmission or display of inaccurate or misleading caller identification must be the same person or entity that is
acting with intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.” Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, Report and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 9114, 9120-21, paras. 17-20
(2011) (Truth in Caller ID Order).
31 See Response at 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
7
and life insurance products.41 Further, the employee told investigators that Philip Roesel made money
from his own sales and commissions from his associated agents’ sales.42 The employee noted that Philip
Roesel was involved in a large robocalling enterprise and that he was well aware that his robocall
activities were illegal.43 Not only did Philip Roesel openly admit to the illegality of his operation, he told
his staff that making illegal robocalls was a minor violation akin to driving above the speed limit.44 Philip
Roesel’s employee told the Bureau that the robocalls were targeted toward vulnerable segments of
society, including economically disadvantaged and less sophisticated consumers.45 Philip Roesel’s
employee stated the following:
• Philip Roesel and his staff repeatedly “joked” and “laughed” about their robocalls being
“illegal.”
• Philip Roesel would make 50,000 illegal robocalls in just a few hours. The robocalls
were continuously made throughout the business day.
• Philip Roesel has been making illegal robocalls for “years.”
• Philip Roesel “makes a lot of money” from his illegal robocalls.
• Philip Roesel instructed the former employee to hang up on consumers if “they asked too
many questions.”
• Philip Roesel told the employee that the goal was to market to economically
disadvantaged and unsophisticated consumers, stating that “the dumber and more broke,
the better.”46
18. Philip Roesel’s/BIC’s spoofed robocall campaigns caused significant consumer harms.
His entire marketing approach targeted the elderly, the infirm, and low-income families. The BIC
company website states that “[o]ur focus is Medicare Supplements and Medicare Advantage Plans, but
we also carry popular Senior products such as life, final expense, and annuities, and cost-effective dental,
health, auto, homeowners, and business insurance when requested.”47 Moreover, when Bureau staff
reached out to recipients of the robocalls, staff discovered that most of the victims they spoke to appeared
to be elderly consumers. Senior citizens in the United States are particularly vulnerable to telephone-
based frauds, and report higher averages of unwanted text and phone messages than other age groups.48
As the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) recently noted, the top 10 robocall scams
affecting elderly consumers in 2016 included “calls specifically aimed at seniors to pitch antiaging
products, cemetery plots, health insurance and Medicare scams.”49 As the whistleblower stated to Bureau
staff, Philip Roesel deliberately aimed his robocalling campaigns at unsophisticated consumers and
consumers in precarious financial situations (“the dumber and more broke, the better”) as well as
41 See Declaration of Kimbarly H. Taylor, May 25, 2017 (on file in File No. EB-TCD-16-00023195) (Taylor May
25th Declaration).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Declaration of Kristi Thompson, June 30, 2017 (on file in File No. EB-TCD-16-00023195).
45 See Taylor May 25th Declaration.
46 Id.
47 See Best Insurance Contracts Website, https://bestinsurancecontracts.com/wp/ (last visited July 31, 2017).
48 See Press Release, Truecaller, 27M Americans Lost an Average of $274 in Phone Scams Last Year, According to
New Report from Truecaller (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=201897.
49 See Sid Kircheimer, 2016’s Surprising Top Robocall Scams, AARP Blog (Aug. 5, 2016),
http://blog.aarp.org/2016/08/05/2016s-surprising-top-robocall-scams.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
8
inattentive or unquestioning consumers (directing staff to hang up on consumers with “too many
questions”). One recipient of Philip Roesel’s sales pitch told Bureau staff that she received calls after
submitting job applications online; the consumer stated that although she was very concerned about
obtaining health insurance, she ended the call when the agent demanded her credit card information while
she was asking about coverage options.50
19. As is typical with large-scale robocalling operations, Roesel’s/BIC’s robocalling
campaigns generated significant consumer outrage at having received the spoofed unsolicited robocalls in
the first place. Several consumers filed complaints on donotcall.gov which have the hallmarks of the
Roesel/BIC operation, including noting the specific spoofed numbers that BIC and Philip Roesel
frequently used. Additionally, online postings reflect that consumers that received similar calls, from the
same set of spoofed numbers, during the period (mid- to late-2016) covered by this NAL. The postings
about these calls reflect significant consumer anger:
• “[I]n the last 6 months or so, I have been receiving an increased number of phone calls
and I intend to start listening to each one of them and start reporting each one of them. I
am afraid to answer my phone any more. Just like when I used to have an answering
machine. It has been so nice for the past however many years knowing that when I get a
call, it truly is someone I wish to speak to. And now that has all disappeared. So
disappointing!”51
• “Called my cell, twice. Left no message. I don’t need to talk to a scammer. I didn’t give
them my cell. People I know I give my cell number. I don’t know this person.”52
• “[P]lease stop these people[.]”53
• “[C]alled me[,] didn’t answer because I figured they were some punk [***] marks
[telemarketers], and I was right.”54
• “I activated my cell phone two days ago, and no one knew, but somehow the telemarketer
found me. Unbelievable!”55
• “Telemarketers have NOTHING BETTER TO DO THAN ANNOY YOU with a plethora
of useless non working phone calls! I was resting[,] got woken up by someone with no
life! We have lives[.] I wish someone would figure out who these people are and block
their access [to] phone services!”56
20. Moreover, in light of the whistleblower evidence stating that Philip Roesel knew he was
engaged in an illegal practice (and even joked about it), he apparently spoofed the caller ID to avoid
detection, evade law enforcement, and deprive consumers of their legal rights under the TCPA. For
example, without accurate caller ID information, consumers were unable to point investigators at the
FCC, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and states’ attorneys general to the culprit because they
could not identify the person or originating phone number responsible for the harms they suffered. This
50 Declaration of Daniel Stepanicich, July 13, 2017 (on file in File No. EB-TCD-16-00023195). The consumer
suspected that Philip Roesel obtained information from the job applications the consumer submitted to third parties
online. Id.
51 Complaint #74852141 (Consumer Sentinel, July 26, 2016).
52 Complaint by “Private,” December 16, 2016, http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-713-211-8439.
53 Complaint #746757964 (Consumer Sentinel, Sept. 20, 2016).
54 Complaint by “Blue,” January 16, 2017, http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-803-211-9887.
55 Complaint by “LD,” November 22, 2016, http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-281-211-8439.
56 Complaint by “Anonymous,” November 17, 2016, http://whocalledchecker net/phone-number/1-252-211-8439.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
9
spoofing thereby allowed BIC and Philip Roesel to avoid or delay triggering “red flags” that might
otherwise result in investigation and enforcement. Further, it deprived consumers of their ability to alert
the Better Business Bureau (BBB), which could have flagged Philip Roesel and BIC as bad actors, as well
as consumer protection sites on the Internet that allow consumers to identify and warn other consumers
about abusive business practices. In addition, Roesel’s/BIC’s use of multiple spoofed numbers made it
more difficult for consumers to use call blocking services to block the robocalls.57 In short, Roesel/BIC
harmed consumers by depriving them of valuable consumer protection rights afforded them by Congress
through the TCPA and the laws of the various states.
21. The Roesel/BIC robocalling operations also caused significant disruption to Sp?k’s
paging network. This disruption caused harmful effects not only for the network that was adversely
affected, but for every consumer who needed the acute medical services provided by Sp?k’s subscribers.
For example, the December 2016 Roesel/BIC robocalling campaign adversely affected the pagers used by
Palmetto Health medical staff in Columbia, South Carolina.58 Sp?k’s medical pagers are vital
communications tools used by doctors, EMTs, and other first responders to ensure they are available at a
moment’s notice. Roesel/BIC caused service disruptions that harmed the effectiveness of emergency
services that consumers rely on in life-and-death situations. Telecommunications services used by
emergency personnel receive greater protections in the Communications Act precisely because the stakes
are so high.
22. As we stated in Abramovich,59 “[e]xtensive illegal robocalling can overwhelm a
network’s capacity, and spoofing makes it harder for carriers to detect those calls and take remedial
action.”60 Spoofed robocalls, like those found in this case, harm telecommunications carriers by “(1)
burdening the carriers’ networks with illegal calls, and (2) enraging consumer recipients of the illegal
robocalls—whose complaints add to the workload of customer service agents, decrease the perceived
value of the service, and increase carrier costs.”61 The more difficult it is to detect the origin of the calls,
the longer these harms persist and the more damage they exact.
23. Finally, the repeated use by Roesel/BIC of unassigned numbers as the caller ID for
millions of illegal robocalls effectively rendered those specific numbers unsuitable for assignment to any
legitimate subscriber. For example, one unassigned number used by Roesel, 843-211-9757, is flagged as
untrustworthy by caller identification service Showcaller. Based on user feedback, Showcaller reports
that the “Spam Activity Level” for the number is “High,” and the number is flagged as one associated
with telemarketing calls.62 Any carrier that allocates this phone number to a subscriber in the future risks
saddling the subscribing consumer with a toxic phone number. Moreover, as additional
whitelist/blacklist-based call blocking tools appear in the market for consumer use, consumers who obtain
toxic numbers may find themselves unable to contact other end users who have blocked the number to cut
off an illegal robocaller.63 Such misuse of unassigned numbers in this way causes harm by
(1) constricting the supply of quality phone numbers available for assignment; and (2) causing blocking
apps to over-block in an effort to give users relief from unwanted calls.
57 See, e.g., NoMoRobo Website, https://www nomorobo.com/ (last visited June 20, 2017).
58 Fortunately, in this case, the mitigating efforts by Sp?k and its carriers minimized the disruption to Sp?k’s
individual subscribers. Had those efforts not been successful or timely, the harm to hospitals like Palmetto Health
could have been significantly worse.
59Abramovich NAL at para. 19.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See Showcaller Website, https://www.show-caller.com/us/+18432119757 (last visited June 29, 2017).
63 See Complaint #77600034 (Consumer Sentinel Oct. 19, 2016) (“I don’t answer callers when caller ID says
‘unknown’ they are almost always scam and Internet research verified this as a scam number.”).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
10
24. Intent to Wrongfully Obtain Anything of Value. The Truth in Caller ID Act and our Rules
prohibit knowingly displaying misleading or inaccurate caller ID information with the intent to defraud,
cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.64 Although the term “anything of value” is not
defined in the statute nor elucidated by the legislative history, we have little question that Roesel/BIC
were spoofing the numbers to obtain something of value. As discussed below, the spoofed numbers were
a key element of the large-scale, for-profit robocall telemarketing campaign designed to generate sales for
BIC and Roesel and help Roesel/BIC evade law enforcement (and potential monetary penalties) and
private civil lawsuits.
25. At a minimum, we find the phrase “anything of value” to encompass tangible and
intangible benefits, including money. We find, too, that “anything of value” includes intangible assets.
For example, the Second Circuit, in a case involving criminal embezzlement, stated that the words ‘thing
of value’ “are found in so many criminal statutes throughout the United States that they have in a sense
become words of art. . . . [T]he phrase is generally construed to cover intangibles as well as tangibles.”65
In fact, the majority of federal circuits have held that Congress intended an “expansive reading” of the
phrase to include more than just money, goods, or services, in various statutes where the phrase appears.66
We believe that Congress was aware of these decisions when it used the phrase “anything of value” in
Section 227 of the Act.67 Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that the interpretation of the phrase
“anything of value” should be at least as expansive in a civil context as it is when a defendant is subject to
criminal penalties. In any event, it appears that Roesel was using spoofed telephone numbers to obtain
significant monetary benefits.
26. As a preliminary matter, Roesel/BIC was seeking to profit (i.e., gain something of value)
by making unlawful, and thus wrongful, spoofed robocalls. The fact that Philip Roesel and BIC intended
to make insurance sales derived from unlawful conduct demonstrates that Roesel/BIC intended to
wrongfully obtain something of value by means of the spoofed calls. As discussed above, the evidence
also shows that one of Philip Roesel’s businesses involved selling marketing leads to other insurance
agents—the BIC website offers marketing leads at a cost of $6 per consumer phone number.68 BIC and
Philip Roesel intended to profit from his apparent illegal activity and, thus, intended to obtain “anything
of value.”
64 47 U.S.C. § 227(e); 47 CFR § 64.1604.
65 U.S. v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2nd Cir. 1979).
66 See, e.g., U.S. v. Nilsen, 967 F.2d 539, 542-43 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Congress' frequent use of ‘thing of value’ in
various criminal statutes has evolved the phrase into a term of art which the courts generally construe to envelope
both tangibles and intangibles. This broad interpretation is based upon a recognition that monetary worth is not the
sole measure of value.”); U.S. v. Picquet, 963 F.2d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that sales taxes constitute “a thing
of value” for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2)’s prohibition of using unauthorized access devices to obtain
“anything of value”); U.S. v. Draves, 103 F.3d 1328 (7th Cir. 1997) (agreeing with and applying 5th Circuit’s
expansive interpretation of phrase “anything of value” in Picquet); U.S. v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 680 (9th Cir.
1986) (noting broad range of intangibles that have been found to be “things of value” by prior courts); U.S. v.
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999)
(agreeing with Picquet); see also U.S. v. Sheker, 618 F.2d 607, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that “value” includes
anything recognized or appreciated by others); U.S. v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 622-23 (2nd Cir. 1983) (holding that
the district court properly construed the meaning of the term “anything of value” to “focus on the value that the
defendants subjectively attached to the items received”).
67 See e.g., Jerman v. Carlisle, 599 U.S. 573, 589-90 (2010) (“We have often observed that when ‘judicial
interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new
statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well.’”) (citations
omitted).
68 See Best Insurance Contracts Website, https://bestinsurancecontracts.com/wp/health-leads-20-per-lead/ (offering
“health leads” at $6 per phone number of $18 per direct mail contact).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
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27. In addition, the evidence shows that Philip Roesel knew his robocall campaigns were
illegal. It appears that BIC and Roesel falsified the caller ID information of the calls specifically to avoid
detection, evade law enforcement, and deprive consumers of their legal rights under the TCPA.
Avoidance of culpability is a benefit that qualifies as a “[thing] of value.” In this case, avoidance of
culpability has a specific, ascertainable dollar value—namely, up to $19,246 per unlawful call in a
forfeiture action brought by the FCC, and up to $40,654 in civil penalties for each violation of the
Telemarketing Sales Rule in a lawsuit brought by the FTC.69 Moreover, by spoofing and preventing
consumers from discovering the true origin of the calls, Roesel and BIC evaded consumer litigation
actions in which they could have been subject to pay damages of up to $1,500 for every illegal robocall.70
Roesel and BIC obtained these valuable shields “wrongfully.” The predatory nature of the marketing
campaign, the lack of any legitimate purpose for using unassigned phone numbers in the caller ID, and
the fact that every one of the apparently unlawfully falsified caller IDs was attached to an unlawful
robocall are evidence of the “wrongful” nature of Roesel’s appropriation.
28. Based on the forgoing, we find that in just three months, Roesel/BIC made nearly 22
million apparently illegal spoofed robocalls, disrupting and exploiting consumers.71 This is disruptive
and an invasion of privacy, and exactly the type of harmful activity that Congress sought to prevent with
Truth in Caller ID Act. Based on the fact that every call that we investigated in the representative sample
was apparently unlawfully spoofed, we conclude that Roesel/BIC made 21,582,771 spoofed telemarketing
robocalls with the intent to cause harm or wrongfully obtain anything of value—each call an apparent
violation of the Truth in Caller ID Act and our Rules.
C. Proposed Forfeiture
29. Section 227(e) of the Act and the Section 1.80 of the Rules authorize the Commission to
impose a forfeiture against any person that engages in unlawful spoofing.72 Specifically, the Act and
Rules authorize a forfeiture of up to $11,052 for each spoofing violation, or three times that amount for
each day of a continuing violation, up to a statutory maximum of $1,105,241 for any single act or failure
to act.73 The Truth in Caller ID Act empowers the Commission “to proceed expeditiously to stop and . . .
assess a forfeiture penalty against, any person or entity engaged in prohibited caller ID spoofing without
first issuing a citation” against the violator.74
69 See “Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule,” FTC, https://www ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/complying-telemarketing-sales-rule#penalties.
70 47 U.S.C. § 227.
71 See Roesel Citation.
72 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(5); 47 CFR § 1.80(b)(4). The Truth in Caller ID Act and the Rules contain a two-year statute
of limitations on proposing forfeitures for unlawful spoofing. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(5)(A)(iv); 47 CFR § 1.80(c)(3).
Unlike forfeitures assessed under Section 503(b) of the Act, “the Truth in Caller ID Act does not require ‘willful’ or
‘repeated’ violations to justify imposition of a penalty.” Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 9133, para. 48.
Thus, the Bureau is not required to demonstrate the “conscious and deliberate commission or omission of any act” or
that such act happened more than once or for more than one day to propose a forfeiture for apparently unlawful
spoofing. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(f)(1)-(2) (defining “willful” and “repeated” under the Act). We nevertheless find
that Philip Roesel/BIC willfully and repeatedly spoofed caller ID information with the intent to harm.
73 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(5)(A); 47 CFR § 1.80(b)(4). In the alternative and in lieu of the Act’s general criminal
penalty provisions in Section 501 of the Act, the Truth In Caller ID Act also provides for criminal fines up to
$10,000 for each violation, or three times that amount for each day of a continuing violation. 47 U.S.C. §
227(e)(5)(B). See Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties to Reflect Inflation, Order, DA 16-1453, (Dec. 30, 2016).
74 Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 9132-33, para. 47. Under Section 503(b)(5) of the Act, a person who
does not hold a license, permit, certificate, or other authorization issued by the Commission, or is not an applicant
for the same, may not be issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture unless: (1) that person is first sent a
citation of the violation charged, (2) is given an opportunity for a personal interview with an official of the
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
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D. Truth in Caller ID Violations
1. Base Forfeiture for Truth in Caller ID Violations
30. The Act and Section 1.80 of the Rules set a maximum forfeiture amount for spoofing
apparent violations under the Truth in Caller ID Act. 75 Because Abramovich involved analogous
apparent spoofing violations under the Truth in Caller ID Act, we use it as guidance in proposing an
appropriate forfeiture in this case.
31. In Abramovich, we proposed a forfeiture designed to deter other large scale spoofing
operations and notify bad actors that the Commission takes spoofing violations seriously.76 When it
adopted the spoofing rules, the Commission said that it would “seek substantial penalties” against
violators. In Abramovich, we applied a base forfeiture in the amount of $1,000 per unlawful spoofed
call.77 We then multiplied the base by the number of spoofed calls that the Bureau verified (80,000).78
Finally, we took into account the statutory factors required under Section 503 of the Act and found an
upward adjustment was warranted.79
2. Number of Violations
32. We find that Roesel/BIC committed multiple apparent violations of the Truth in Caller ID
Act for which we are authorized to impose a forfeiture. In this regard, BIC and Philip Roesel together
made 21,582,771 calls from October 23, 2016, to January 23, 2017.80 The Bureau verified that 82,106 of
the 21,582,771 calls were, in fact, spoofed. In addition, the Bureau verified that each of the 82,106
spoofed calls were made either personally by Philip Roesel, or Philip Roesel working through BIC. As
described in detail above, Roesel/BIC spoofed the caller ID information of each of these 82,106 calls with
an apparent intent to cause harm or wrongfully obtain anything of value. Accordingly, we find each call
an apparent violation of the Truth in Caller ID Act.
3. Calculation of Proposed Forfeiture
33. In determining the proposed forfeiture in this case, we apply a $1,000 base forfeiture to
each of the 82,106 spoofed calls verified by the Bureau81 during the October 23, 2016 to January 23, 2017
(Continued from previous page)
Commission, and (3) subsequently engages in conduct of the type described in such citation. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(5).
By contrast, the Truth In Caller ID Act only requires that the Commission provide the notice required under Section
503(b)(3) of the Act (notice and opportunity for a hearing before the Commission or an administrative law judge) or
Section 503(b)(4) of the Act (Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture) before assessing a forfeiture for unlawful
spoofing. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(5)(A). Here, we provide the required notice under Section 503(b)(4) of the Act
through this Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture.
75 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(e) (setting a statutory maximum at $10,000 per violation); 47 CFR § 1.80 (adopting the
statutory maximum with the required inflation adjustment); Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties to Reflect
Inflation, Order, DA 16-1453, (Dec. 30, 2016).
76 Abramovich NAL at paras. 24-26.
77 In Abramovich, the Commission recognized that Section 1.80 of the Commission’s rules sets forth base forfeiture
amounts for a wide variety of apparent violations. Id. at para. 22. The Commission also observed that the base
forfeitures in Section 1.80 range from $1,000 (failure to provide station identification, for example) to the statutory
maximum (misrepresentation/lack of candor). Id. at para. 25. Because there were no directly analogous violations
covered within the existing range of base forfeitures to those apparent spoofing violations found in Abramovich, the
Commission found that establishing the base forfeiture amount of $1,000 was reasonable as applied to the specific
facts in that case. Id.
78 Abramovich NAL at para. 25.
79 Id. at para. 26.
80 See Response.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
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period for a total proposed base forfeiture of $82,106,000.82 In contrast to our recent finding in
Abramovich, however, in this case we find that the application of the facts to the statutory factors in
Section 50383 do not warrant an upward adjustment to the base forfeiture. Roesel/BIC did not engage in
the kind of fraudulent activities that were at the heart of Adrian Abramovich’s apparently unlawful
robocalling campaign. Specifically, the record does not contain evidence that Roesel/BIC made
misrepresentations to consumers (with the exception, of course, of the caller ID information itself). Philip
Roesel was not misrepresenting the product he was selling, nor was he modifying the telephone numbers
to falsely appear to be originating from the same area code and prefix as the called party (neighbor
spoofing). In addition, the instant action appears to be the first time that Philip Roesel or BIC has run
afoul of the TCPA. While not as egregious as the apparent spoofing in Abramovich, it appears that Philip
Roesel is highly culpable; the records show that the calls were made both by Philip Roesel in his personal
capacity as well as in the name of BIC. Moreover, the sheer volume of calls—21,582,771 calls in a three-
month period—are egregious in number. On balance, we find that neither an upward adjustment nor a
further downward adjustment84 to the proposed base forfeiture of $82,106,000 is necessary to punish
misconduct and deter future wrongdoing.
4. Philip Roesel Personally Liable for Proposed Forfeiture
34. Consistent with prior NALs, the proposed penalty here applies to Philip Roesel
personally, whether acting in his own name, the dba name “Wilmington Insurance Quotes,” or through
BIC.85 We find that Philip Roesel may be held personally liable under the principles of piercing the
(Continued from previous page)
81 See Abramovich NAL at para. 25. Even though we limit the total number of violations here to the 82,106 spoofed
calls verified, we reserve the right in the future, especially with large scale spoofing violations, to use the total
number of calls made where there is a high likelihood of violations based on the use of a representative sampling of
calls.
82 See Reviewed Call Detail Records (on file in File No. EB-TCD-16-00023195) (containing the call records,
including the dates and times the calls were made). For purposes of this NAL, we take action only with respect to
those violations occurring within the three-month period identified above. See id.; Purple Communications, Inc.,
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 14892, 14899-900, paras. 21-23 (2015) (stating that the notice requirements of
Section 503 are satisfied when the Notice of Apparent Liability identifies the conduct resulting in the violations and
provides “(1) specific cite references to the record (i.e., specific citations to files and documents provided by the
violator that identified relevant dates sufficient to allow the violator to lodge its defense) or, (2) citations to the
records containing dates and other relevant information”). Id. at 14899, para. 22 (“We interpret Section 503 as
requiring sufficient notice to provide the violator with the information he or she needs to mount a defense to the
violations charged in a Notice of Apparent Liability.”).
83 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(E) (“[I]n determining the amount of such a forfeiture penalty, the Commission or its
designee shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation and, with respect to
the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and such other matters as justice
may require.”).
84 We note that by selecting a base forfeiture in the amount of $1,000 per apparently unlawful call, we are already
significantly lowering the potential penalty—which may reach up to a statutory maximum of $11,052 per call. As
we explained in Abramovich, “we recognize that in cases involving massive spoofing campaigns, there is a risk that
the fine will far exceed any person or company’s ability to pay,” but nevertheless “we calculate the proposed
forfeiture to account for the egregiousness of the harm caused by this massive spoofing activity and to serve as both
a punishment and a deterrent to future wrongdoing.” Abramovich NAL at paras. 24-25.
85 See Scott Malcolm, DSM Supply, LLC, Somaticare, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 29 FCC Rcd
2476, 2483-84, paras. 16-19 (2014); Scott Malcolm, DSM Supply, LLC, Somaticare, LLC, Forfeiture Order, 31 FCC
Rcd 1652, 1653, para. 5 (2016); see also Patrick Keane a/k/a/ The Street Map Co., Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture, 27 FCC Rcd 13757, 13762, para. 13 (2012); Patrick Keane a/k/a The Street Map Co., Forfeiture Order,
28 FCC Rcd 6688, 6690, para. 6 (2013); Tim Gibbons/United Emp. Benefits Grp., Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture, 27 FCC Rcd 11432, 11438-39, para. 15 (2012); Tim Gibbons/United Emp. Benefits Grp., Forfeiture
Order, 28 FCC Rcd 6679, 6681, para. 8 (2013).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
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corporate veil. As the FCC has found in similar cases, personal liability is appropriate (and the
Commission will pierce the corporate veil) where the individual, like Philip Roesel, is an officer of a
closely held corporation and directly participates in, oversees, authorizes or otherwise directs the
commission of the wrongful act. For example, in a recent case involving violations of the TCPA’s
prohibitions against unsolicited faxes, the Commission found that personal liability attached to the
individual who served as his company’s sole member and sole corporate officer.86
35. Similar to the facts of that case, in this case, the evidence shows that the “Best Insurance
Contracts” entity merely functions as an instrumentality of Philip Roesel, and Philip Roesel cannot be
allowed to circumvent personal liability simply by forming a corporate entity to hide behind.87 There are
a number of significant factors that illustrate why the corporate veil should be pierced in this case. Philip
Roesel failed to maintain separate identities between BIC and himself.
36. According to the North Carolina Secretary of State, BIC was incorporated in September
2016.88 In BIC’s incorporation document, Philip Roesel is stated as the company’s sole incorporator, the
sole shareholder, and the sole registered agent.89 BIC’s mailing address, registered office, and principal
office are each listed as , which—according to North
Carolina property records—is a single family residence owned by Philip Roesel and members of his
immediate family.90 The BIC website lists Philip Roesel as the Founder and CEO of BIC;91 but the
company’s website domain name, “bestinsurancecontracts.com,” is registered to Philip Roesel personally,
rather than Best Insurance Contracts, Inc.92 As set forth in this NAL, BIC has been used for an illegal or
wrongful purpose – making spoofed robocalls. Similarly, Philip Roesel uses BIC’s telephone number for
his personal insurance operation/dba name WIQ, and prominently features this phone number on the WIQ
website. The robocalling operation used a third-party robocall platform provider called . As noted
previously, Philip Roesel set up the account under which he conducted all of his robocalls in his
own personal name and email address. As part of its investigation, the Bureau obtained billing records
for the robocalls that Roesel made via the platform. Those billing records show that Philip Roesel
sometimes paid with financial accounts in the name of BIC, while at other times the robocalling
services were paid for using Philip Roesel’s own financial accounts—indicating that he commingled his
86 See Scott Malcolm, DSM Supply, LLC, Somaticare, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 29 FCC Rcd
2476, 2483-84, paras. 16-19 (2014); Scott Malcolm, DSM Supply, LLC, Somaticare, LLC, Forfeiture Order, 31 FCC
Rcd 1652, 1653, para. 5 (2016).
87 See Texas v. Am. Blastfax, 164 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897-98 (W.D. Texas 2001) (“[I]f the officer directly participated
in or authorized the statutory violation, even though acting on behalf of the corporation, he may be personally
liable” for violations of the TCPA); see also United States v. Pollution Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133, 134-35
(2nd Cir. 1985) (“In light of the clear congressional intent to hold ‘person[s]’ liable for violations [of the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriations Act], we see no reason to shield from civil liability those corporate officers who are
personally involved in or directly responsible for statutorily proscribed activity.”). Like in Oswego, the TCPA
embodies the congressional intent to hold “persons” liable for violations. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1); see also 47
U.S.C. § 153(39) (defining a “person” to include individuals as well as corporate entities). In other contexts, courts
have found the responsible corporate officer of a company to be personally liable for unlawful acts where the
corporate officer was in a position of responsibility vis-à-vis the illegal conduct, had the power to prevent others
from engaging in such conduct or to promptly correct the violation, and failed to take action. See e.g. United States
v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557, 560-62 (6th Cir. 1985).
88 See Best Insurance Contracts, Inc. Corporate Filing, North Carolina Secretary of State Website,
https://www.sosnc.gov/Search/profcorp/12410762 (last visited June 14, 2017).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91See Best Insurance Contracts Website, https://bestinsurancecontracts.com/wp/ (last visited July 31, 2017).
92 See GoDaddy.com WHOIS results, www.bestinsurancecontracts.com (June 27, 2017) (on file in EB-TCD-16-
00023195).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
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personal expenditures with those of BIC.93 All of these factors strongly suggest that the corporate veil
should be pierced and that Philip Roesel is personally liable for the apparently unlawful conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
37. Based on the foregoing, we find that Best Insurance Contracts, Inc. and Philip Roesel dba
Wilmington Insurance Quotes, apparently willfully and repeatedly violated Section 227(e) of the Act and
Section 64.1604 of the Rules. We have further determined that Philip Roesel, dba Wilmington Insurance
Quotes, personally and together with Best Insurance Contracts, Inc. are jointly and severally apparently
liable for a forfeiture in the amount $82,106,000.
V. ORDERING CLAUSES
38. IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Sections 227(e)(5)(A)(i) and 503(b) of the Act94 and
Sections 1.80 of the Rules,95 Best Insurance Contracts, Inc., and Philip Roesel, doing business as
Wilmington Insurance Quotes, are hereby NOTIFIED of their APPARENT JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY FOR A FORFEITURE in the amount of eighty-two million, one hundred and six thousand
dollars ($82,106,000) for willful and repeated violations of Section 227(e) of the Act,96 Section 64.1604
of the Rules,97 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Truth In Caller ID Act of 2009.98
39. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 1.80 of the Rules,99 within thirty
(30) calendar days of the release date of this Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, Best Insurance
Contracts, Inc., or Philip Roesel, doing business as Wilmington Insurance Quotes, SHALL PAY the full
amount of the proposed forfeiture or SHALL FILE a written statement seeking reduction or cancellation
of the proposed forfeiture consistent with paragraphs 42-43, below.
40. Payment of the forfeiture must be made by check or similar instrument, wire transfer, or
credit card, and must include the NAL/Account Number and FRN referenced above. Best Insurance
Contracts, Inc., or Philip Roesel, doing business as Wilmington Insurance Quotes, shall send electronic
notification of payment to Lisa Williford at Lisa.Williford@fcc.gov on the date said payment is made.
Regardless of the form of payment, a completed FCC Form 159 (Remittance Advice) must be
submitted.100 When completing the FCC Form 159, enter the Account Number in block number 23A (call
sign/other ID) and enter the letters “FORF” in block number 24A (payment type code). Below are
additional instructions that should be followed based on the form of payment selected:
• Payment by check or money order must be made payable to the order of the Federal
Communications Commission. Such payments (along with the completed Form 159) must be
mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-
9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank – Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-
GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63101.
• Payment by wire transfer must be made to ABA Number 021030004, receiving bank
TREAS/NYC, and Account Number 27000001. To complete the wire transfer and ensure
93 See Response.
94 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(e)(5)(A)(i), 503(b).
95 47 CFR § 1.80.
96 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).
97 47 CFR § 64.1604.
98 Truth in Caller ID Order.
99 47 CFR § 1.80.
100 An FCC Form 159 and detailed instructions for completing the form may be obtained at
http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form159/159.pdf.
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appropriate crediting of the wired funds, a completed Form 159 must be faxed to U.S. Bank
at (314) 418-4232 on the same business day the wire transfer is initiated.
• Payment by credit card must be made by providing the required credit card information on
FCC Form 159 and signing and dating the Form 159 to authorize the credit card payment.
The completed Form 159 must then be mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O.
Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank –
Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO
63101.
41. Any request for making full payment over time under an installment plan should be sent
to: Chief Financial Officer—Financial Operations, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th
Street, SW, Room 1-A625, Washington, DC 20554.101 Questions regarding payment procedures should
be directed to the Financial Operations Group Help Desk by phone, 1-877-480-3201, or by e-mail,
ARINQUIRIES@fcc.gov.
42. The written statement seeking reduction or cancellation of the proposed forfeiture, if any,
must include a detailed factual statement supported by appropriate documentation and affidavits pursuant
to Sections 1.16 and 1.80(f)(3) of the Rules.102 The written statement must be mailed to the Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554, ATTN:
Enforcement Bureau – Telecommunications Consumers Division, and must include the NAL/Account
Number referenced in the caption. The statement must also be e-mailed to Kristi Thompson, Deputy
Division Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division, at Kristi.Thompson@fcc.gov, and Kimbarly
Taylor, Attorney Advisor, Telecommunications Consumers Division, at Kimbarly.Taylor@fcc.gov.
43. The Commission will not consider reducing or canceling a forfeiture in response to a
claim of inability to pay unless the petitioner submits: (1) federal tax returns for the most recent three-
year period; (2) financial statements prepared according to generally accepted accounting practices; and
(3) any other reliable and objective documentation that accurately reflects the petitioner’s current
financial status. Any claim of inability to pay must specifically identify the basis for the claim by
reference to the financial documentation.
44. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture, together with the Reviewed Call Detail Records, shall be sent by first class mail and certified
mail, return receipt requested, to Best Insurance Contracts, Inc., and Philip Roesel, dba Wilmington
Insurance Quotes, at .
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
101 See 47 CFR § 1.1914.
102 47 CFR §§ 1.16, 1.80(f)(3).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
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STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN AJIT PAI
Re: Best Insurance Contracts, Inc., and Philip Roesel, dba Wilmington Insurance Quotes, File No.:
EB-TCD-16-00023195.
In one scene of the 1973 classic, The Sting,103 villain Doyle Lonnegan gets fleeced at poker by
Paul Newman’s character, Henry Gondorff. The villain then asks Newman’s sidekick, Johnny Hooker,
played by Robert Redford, what the secret is. Johnny simply replies: “He cheats.”104
And so it seems to be with the subjects of today’s Notice of Apparent Liability, Philip Roesel and
his company, Best Insurance Contracts, Inc.
Today, we find them apparently liable for violating the Truth in Caller ID Act. Over a three-
month period from late 2016 through early 2017, Mr. Roesel was responsible for more than 200,000
robocalls a day—21.5 million altogether.
Like many for whom illegal robocalls are a business model, he sought to hide his tracks: He
knowingly used unassigned phone numbers to display inaccurate caller ID information so that he could
avoid detection and evade law enforcement.
Bad stuff, as far as it goes. Perhaps worse is the gall he evidently paired with his gumption. The
record shows that he instructed his employees which consumers to pick on: “the dumber and more broke
the better.” He was even quoted as repeatedly bragging and “joking” to co-workers that his actions were
minor legal violations, akin to driving above the speed limit.
But today, the whole operation hits a big speed bump. We find Mr. Roesel and his company
apparently liable for $82,106,000. And we send another message to illegal robocallers who don’t follow
the advice of FBI Agent Polk in The Sting to “try not to live up to our expectations”: We will do
everything in our power to put you out of business.
I want to extend my thanks for their work on this item to Vilma Anderson, Tamara Baxter,
Michael Carowitz, Lisa Gelb, Susan German, Rosemary Harold, Jermaine Haynes, Rick Hindman,
Matthew Hoke, Lisa Landers, Coly Marierose, Ann Morgan, Phil Priesman, Nakasha Ramsey, Terrell
Richardson, Mary Romano, Stacy Ruffin-Smith, Mika Savir, Michael Scurato, Daniel Stepanicich,
Kimbarly Taylor, Kristi Thompson, Bridgette Washington, and Lisa Williford of the Enforcement
Bureau; Kurt Schroeder, Mark Stone, and Kristi Thornton of the Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau; and Terry Cavanaugh, Neil Dellar, Billy Layton, and Rick Mallen in the Office of General
Counsel.
Because of your efforts, we are putting an end to Mr. Roesel’s apparent sting.
103 The Sting (Universal Pictures 1973).
104 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LixYFIjT7wM.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-107
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STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MIGNON L. CLYBURN
Re: Best Insurance Contracts, Inc., and Philip Roesel, dba Wilmington Insurance Quotes, File No.:
EB-TCD-16-00023195.
Have you ever taken your kids (or maybe a niece or nephew) to play Whac-A-Mole down at the
local arcade? I pose this question for two reasons: One, because it is hard to believe this game has been
around for 40 years and two, when it comes to stopping illegal robocalls, the execution is very similar: as
soon as you stop one, another pops right back up.
In June, this agency levied its largest fine in history when we adopted a $120 million Notice of
Apparent Liability (NAL) against an individual who made nearly 100 million spoofed robocalls. Today,
we issue an NAL for $82.1 million against Best Insurance Contracts, Inc. (BIC) and Philip Roesel who
apparently made more than 21 million spoofed robocalls over a three-month period.
While the circumstances in each differ slightly, at the crux of both allegations are an intent to
cause harm and/or wrongfully obtain anything of value with misleading or inaccurate caller ID
information. As the NAL directly notes, “harm” should be broadly interpreted to encompass “financial,
physical and emotional” impairment.
The consumer harm from the flood of robocalls is very significant and real. The disruption to
emergency medical paging service used by the staff of Palmetto Health in my second hometown of
Columbia, South Carolina adversely harmed their emergency communications between doctors, EMTs,
and other first responders and could have risked lives.
Just as alarming as it is heartless, by whistleblower accounts, is how this robocall scheme directly
and systematically targeted three of the most vulnerable populations: the elderly, the infirmed and poor
people. In fact, Mr. Roesel is reported to have told one of his former employees, “the dumber and more
broke, the better.” This attributed, unconscionable statement is among the many reasons I support today’s
action and the significant financial penalty associated with it.
My thanks as always, to the staff of the Enforcement Bureau for your continuing efforts to stop
illegal robocalls for good and for sending out a strong signal that these types of practices should be
whacked.