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Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, DC 20554
In the Matter of
NobelTel, LLC
)
)
)
)
)
File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
NAL/Acct. No.: 201232170011
FRN: 0018234609
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted: October 27, 2016 Released: October 28, 2016
By the Commission: Chairman Wheeler issuing a statement; Commissioners Pai and O’Rielly dissenting
and issuing separate statements.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. We dismiss in part and deny in part the Petition for Reconsideration filed by NobelTel,
LLC (NobelTel) seeking reconsideration of a Forfeiture Order issued by the Commission. In the
Forfeiture Order, the Commission imposed a forfeiture of $5,000,000 against NobelTel for deceptively
marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards through misleading, confusing, and inadequate disclosures
of its rates and charges that made it impossible for consumers to calculate the actual cost of a call.
2. Upon review of the Petition for Reconsideration1 and the entire record,2 we find no basis
for reconsideration. A petition for reconsideration may be dismissed if, for example, it relies on facts or
arguments that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding,
or facts or arguments previously known but not timely raised.3 NobelTel’s Petition fails to present new
facts, arguments, or changed circumstances that were previously unknown to it that would warrant
reconsideration, and we do not find that reconsideration is otherwise required in the public interest. Thus,
as explained below, we dismiss NobelTel’s arguments to the extent they were previously raised and
rejected by the Commission in the Forfeiture Order or untimely raised in its Petition, and deny NobelTel’s
other arguments on their merits for failing to demonstrate a material error or omission. Accordingly, we
dismiss in part and deny in part NobelTel’s Petition.
1 NobelTel, LLC, Petition for Reconsideration (Nov. 20, 2015) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00000412) (Petition).
2 The Forfeiture Order and Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture include more complete discussions of the
facts and history of this case and are incorporated herein by reference. NobelTel, LLC, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC
Rcd 11779 (2015) (Forfeiture Order); NobelTel, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 27 FCC Rcd
11760 (2012) (NobelTel NAL).
3 47 CFR § 1.106(p) (providing that petitions for reconsideration of a Commission action that “[r]ely on arguments
that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding” may be dismissed
because they “plainly do not warrant consideration by the Commission”); see also 47 CFR § 1.106(c); EZ
Sacramento, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 18257, 18257, para. 2 (EB 2000). A Petition for
Reconsideration may be granted when the Commission determines that consideration of the facts or arguments
raised by the petitioner is in the public interest. 47 CFR § 1.106(c)(2). However, unless a petitioner either
demonstrates a material error or omission in the underlying order or raises additional facts not known or not existing
until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to present such matters, a petition for reconsideration may be dismissed.
See 47 CFR § 1.106(c).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
2
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Forfeiture Order Satisfied Due Process Requirements
3. In its Petition, NobelTel reprises arguments it previously raised with the Commission in
response to the Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NobelTel NAL)4 that the Commission did not
provide fair notice regarding what disclosures are required from prepaid calling card providers in their
marketing materials.5 NobelTel once again claims that the absence of specific consumer complaints about
its advertising practices demonstrates that it did not know that its actions violated the law.6 NobelTel also
argues that the standard established by the Commission in the NOS NAL (and applied to it in the NobelTel
NAL) – that advertising denoting applicable rates associated with telecommunications services violates
Section 201(b) where it does not include clear and conspicuous disclosures that allow consumers to
calculate the cost of a call – did not provide notice to NobelTel of what marketing activities were
prohibited.7 NobelTel contends that because Commission NALs “can be settled or modified,” they “are
not final law” and lack any precedential value.8 In addition, NobelTel argues that the NobelTel NAL and
Forfeiture Order represent “discriminatory enforcement” of the deceptive marketing rules because other
prepaid calling card providers used similar marketing disclosures without being penalized by the
Commission.9
1. Consumer Complaints
4. Nearly all of these arguments (excepting the claim of discriminatory enforcement) were
already made by NobelTel,10 and then considered by the Commission and rejected in the Forfeiture Order.

4 See NobelTel USA, LLC, Response to Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, at 7-12 (Nov. 19, 2012) (on file
in EB-TCD-12-00000412) (NAL Response).
5 Petition at i, 4-10.
6 Id. at 2-4, 8; NAL Response at 11-12.
7 Petition at 8-9 (citing NOS Commc’ns Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 16 FCC Rcd 8133 (2001)
(NOS NAL)).
8 Id. at 8.
9 Id. at 9-10. The dissenters raise the same or similar arguments that they raised in response to the Forfeiture Order.
Those arguments were addressed in the Forfeiture Order, as supplemented by this item. In addition, we note that
there is no merit to the claim that it was “arbitrary” for the Commission to have “settled on 125 cards and 5 million
dollars” in each of the four forfeiture orders addressed, collectively, in the dissent. Even if the four relevant
companies were of different sizes and sold different cards in different numbers, the Commission assessed the
specific record before it in each case, and in each case reasonably inferred that the company committed at least 125
violations; the Commission then calculated a forfeiture amount equivalent to a base forfeiture applied to 125
violations. See, e.g., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11784, para. 13 & n.43. Far from being arbitrary, this was a
lawful exercise of the Commission’s discretion that was grounded in the specific record before it in each case.
10 NAL Response at 7-12, 16-19. We also underscore that NobelTel’s reliance on Fox and General Electric is
misplaced. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012) (Fox); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d
1324, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (General Electric). While both discuss due process, we find that the facts of each case
are distinguishable. In General Electric, the conduct at issue was highly technical in nature, involving specific
guidelines for the disposal of toxic materials – something that required explicit instructions. See General Electric,
53 F.3d at 1326. Moreover, the applicable standard was changed, causing confusion. See id. Fox is likewise
distinguishable. In that case, the court found that broadcasters did not have fair notice of what was required because
of a change of policy and interpretation. Specifically, under a prior policy and precedent, a fleeting expletive or
brief shot of nudity was not considered a violation, but under a newer interpretation, such content would be
considered a violation. See Fox, 30 FCC Rcd at 2318-19. In the present case there is no complex rubric of technical
requirements or a change in policy. Instead, based on that past precedent, the Commission determined that
NobelTel had fair notice that when advertising rates, it was prohibited from misleading customers about applicable
rates and was required to provide disclosures sufficient to allow consumers to calculate the total cost of a call. See
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11782-83, para. 11.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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As we stated in the Forfeiture Order, “the Commission does not need to base its forfeiture orders on
complaints.”11 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act), empowers the Commission to
“investigate and impose forfeitures on common carriers even in the complete absence of consumer
complaints.”12 NobelTel therefore cannot escape liability because the Commission did not cite to specific
consumers complaints about its deceptive marketing practices. Consequently, we find NobelTel’s
arguments on this issue do not warrant reconsideration of the Forfeiture Order.13
2. Precedential Value of the NOS NAL
5. We similarly find no reason to reconsider NobelTel’s repetitive challenge to the
precedential value of the NOS NAL. The relevant legal issue here is not the “precedential weight” of the
NOS NAL, but rather whether it provided fair notice to NobelTel. As we explained at length in the
Forfeiture Order, the Commission clearly set forth the advertising requirements associated with
telecommunications services in the NOS NAL – including the importance of not misleading consumers
about the applicable rates for telecommunications services by ensuring that service providers include
“clear and conspicuous disclosure on how to calculate the total cost of a call.”14 The mere fact that the
Commission subsequently resolved the NOS NAL through settlement “does not undermine the value of
[it] in providing fair notice.”15 Due process requires fair notice and the Commission previously
determined that the finding in the NOS NAL, coupled with the language of Section 201(b), “provides a
person of ordinary intelligence with fair notice of the conduct that is required” from calling card
providers.16 Indeed, the Commission already applied this standard to find five other carriers apparently
liable for similar deceptive marketing practices related to prepaid calling cards over a year prior to the
NobelTel NAL’s release.17 Although the standard established by the Commission in the NOS NAL
already provided fair notice to NobelTel that its deceptive marketing practices violated the Act, these
NALs provided further notice that the Commission would find carriers liable for misleading, confusing,
and inadequate disclosures regarding their prepaid calling card rates and charges. We therefore find that
11 Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11781, para. 6 (citing STi Telecom Inc. (formerly Epana Networks, Inc.),
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11742 (2015) (STi)).
12 Preferred Long Distance, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 13711, 13717, para. 14 (2015).
13 47 CFR § 1.106(p) (providing that petitions for reconsideration of a Commission action that “[r]ely on arguments
that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding” may be dismissed
because they “plainly do not warrant consideration by the Commission”).
14 Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11782-83, para. 11 (citing NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8137-38, para. 9).
15 Lyca Tel, LLC, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11792, 11795, para. 9 (2015). See also Preferred Long Distance,
30 FCC Rcd at 13718, para. 16 & n.53 (finding that an NAL, with other Commission decisions, “provided the
requisite fair notice”).
16 Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11783, para. 11 (internal quotations omitted). We also underscore that NALs,
Forfeiture Orders, and rulemakings are not the only ways in which the Commission can put regulatees on notice of
their obligations. See, e.g., Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that an official
interpretation issued by the Commission’s staff on delegated authority, such as a public notice or letter, has the same
force and effect as other actions of the Commission).
17 NobelTel NAL, 27 FCC Rcd at 11763, para. 6 (citing STi Telecom Inc. (formerly Epana Networks, Inc.), Notice
of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 26 FCC Rcd 12808 (2011), aff’d, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11742 (2015);
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 26 FCC Rcd 12818 (2011), aff’d,
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11805 (2015); Lyca Tel, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 26 FCC
Rcd 12827 (2011), aff’d, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11792 (2015); Touch-Tel USA, LLC, Notice of Apparent
Liability for Forfeiture, 26 FCC Rcd 12836 (2011), aff’d, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11730 (2015); Simple
Network, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 30 FCC Rcd 11765 (2011), aff’d, Forfeiture Order, 30
FCC Rcd 11730 (2015)).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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NobelTel’s arguments on this issue (which have already been fully vetted and rejected in the Forfeiture
Order18) do not warrant further consideration.19
3. Claim of Discriminatory Enforcement
6. The only nuance the Petition adds to NobelTel’s otherwise repetitive due process claims
is its argument that the NobelTel NAL and Forfeiture Order “ha[ve] and will lead to discriminatory
enforcement.”20 NobelTel states that its marketing disclosures that the Commission found violated the
law “are not unique”21 and that “other well-known prepaid calling card providers” use “very similar
qualifications” on their rates and charges.22 NobelTel suggests that the Forfeiture Order and similar
penalties issued against five other carriers for deceptive marketing of prepaid calling cards represent a
“random selection of targets” that is “arbitrary and discriminatory” in violation of its due process rights.23
7. NobelTel’s argument is untimely. NobelTel’s discriminatory enforcement claim fails to
“rais[e] additional facts not known or not existing until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to present
such matters.”24 NobelTel was aware that the Commission determined that its marketing practices and the
similar practices of other carriers violated the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act), after the
NobelTel NAL’s release in 2012. But NobelTel presents its “discriminatory enforcement” argument for
the first time in its Petition – over three years later.
8. In addition to its untimeliness, NobelTel’s discriminatory enforcement claim ignores our
authority under the Act and relevant Commission precedent. Section 403 of the Act provides the
Commission with “full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, . . .
relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act.”25 The Commission has broad discretion
to initiate investigations “so long as the matter is within the agency’s jurisdiction.”26 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or
criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”27 Such
considerable discretion is necessary because “[a]n agency generally cannot act against each technical
violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped . . . to deal with the
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”28 The Commission therefore holds
“prosecutorial discretion in choosing to initiate investigations, and the absence of action against any or
18 Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11781, 11782-83, paras. 6, 11 (citing STi).
19 47 CFR § 1.106(p)(3) (petitions for reconsideration “plainly do not warrant consideration by the Commission”
where such petitions “[r]ely on arguments that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within
the same proceeding”).
20 Petition at 9-10.
21 Id. at 10.
22 Id. (citing Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11803 (Commissioner O’Rielly, dissenting)).
23 Id.
24 Supra para. 2.
25 47 U.S.C. § 403.
26 Viacom Inc., ESPN Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 797, 804, para. 18 (2015) (Viacom/ESPN). See Spanish
Broad. Sys. Holding Co., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 27 FCC Rcd 11956, 11959, para. 8 & n.30 (EB 2012) (Section 403
provides broad discretion as to the type of misconduct the Commission may investigate and subject to enforcement
action).
27 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869)).
28 Id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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all potentially liable entities does not preclude it from enforcing against a specific violator.”29 The
Commission remains in the best position to “weigh the benefits of pursuing an adjudication against the
costs to the agency and the likelihood of success” and its decision to pursue enforcement action against an
egregious violator like NobelTel falls fully within its broad prosecutorial discretion.30 Consequently, we
find that the Commission’s investigation of NobelTel for deceptive marketing of prepaid calling cards did
not violate due process requirements.31
B. The Commission Provided Sufficient Specificity as to NobelTel’s Violations and
Support for the Forfeiture Amount
9. In its Petition, NobelTel repeats arguments it previously raised with the Commission in
its NAL Response32 that the Commission failed to provide sufficient information under Section 503(b)(4)
of the Act regarding the “action and facts” supporting its findings that it engaged in deceptive
marketing.33 NobelTel again suggests that the Commission must identify specific complaints or
consumers harmed by its prepaid calling card marketing practices in order to assess a forfeiture.34
NobelTel indicates that, without such evidence, the Commission requires it “to defend each and every
card sale . . . . [and] prove the negative – that no customers were deceived by the calling card they
purchased.”35 NobelTel also challenges the Commission’s forfeiture calculation methodology.36
1. The Commission Provided Sufficient Specificity as to NobelTel’s Violations
10. We considered NobelTel’s Section 503(b)(4) claim in the Forfeiture Order and rejected
it. Not only did we determine that the Commission provided “sufficient specificity” regarding NobelTel’s
violations under Section 503(b)(4), we reminded NobelTel that “the Commission does not need to base its
forfeiture orders on complaints or a showing of actual consumer harm.”37 Both the NobelTel NAL and
the Forfeiture Order identified: (1) the specific provision of the Act that NobelTel violated (Section
201(b)); (2) the nature of NobelTel’s conduct that violated the Act (deceptive marketing of prepaid
29 Viacom/ESPN, 30 FCC Rcd at 804, para. 17 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Radio One Licenses, LLC,
Forfeiture Order, 19 FCC Rcd 23922, 23932, para. 24 (2004) (“The Commission is a regulatory agency with broad
prosecutorial discretion in enforcement proceedings.”) (Radio One).
30 Radio One, 19 FCC Rcd at 23932, para. 24 (citing N.Y. State Dept. of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1213 (D.C.
Cir. 1993)).
31 47 CFR § 1.106(b), (p) (Petitions for Reconsideration that fail to rely on new facts or changed circumstances may
be dismissed).
32 See NAL Response at 12-19.
33 Petition at 11-13. We note that the requirements of Section 503(b)(4) only extend to the NAL issued in a
proceeding. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) (requiring the “notice” to provide information regarding the specific
provision(s) of the law violated, what conduct violated the law, and when such violative conduct occurred). The
NobelTel NAL set forth the details of NobelTel’s apparent violations in 2012 and the company had the opportunity
to raise any Section 503(b)(4) claim in its NAL Response, but failed to do so. NobelTel’s Section 503(b)(4) claim
therefore fails to “rais[e] additional facts not known or not existing until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to
present such matters,” and can be dismissed under Section 1.106 of the Commission’s rules. Supra para. 2.
However, as NobelTel argues that the Forfeiture Order also contained insufficient information, we deny these claims
on their merits below.
34 See Petition at 11; NAL Response at 16-19.
35 Petition at 12.
36 Id. at i, 13-15.
37 Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11781, para. 6 (citing STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11748-50, 11753-54, 11756, paras. 12-
15, 25, 32).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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calling cards); and (3) the time period during which such conduct occurred (the year preceding the
NobelTel NAL’s release).38
11. NobelTel’s mistakenly asserts that it must prove a negative in order to contest our
violation findings. The applicable standard is whether, after advertising certain rates associated with its
prepaid calling cards, the information provided on each prepaid calling card sold and the associated
marketing posters contained sufficient information to allow customers to calculate the cost of a call.39 Far
from proving a negative, NobelTel needed only to show that, when advertising rates, its prepaid calling
card disclosures provided enough countervailing rate information to allow a consumer to calculate the
cost of a call. We found the disclosures failed to meet this standard.40 We therefore dismiss NobelTel’s
repetitive Section 503(b)(4) claims.41
2. The Commission Provided Sufficient Support for the Forfeiture Amount
12. We also reject NobelTel’s argument that the Commission adopted “shifting rationales”
for the fines by applying “two inconsistent bases for calculating the forfeiture.”42 The Commission issued
the forfeiture in this case in accordance with Section 503(b) of the Act,43 Section 1.80 of the
Commission’s rules (Rules),44 and the Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement.45 When we assess
forfeitures, Section 503(b)(2)(E) requires that we take into account the “nature, circumstances, extent, and
gravity of the violation and, with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior
offenses, ability to pay, and such other matters as justice may require.”46 In this case, the Commission
38 See NobelTel NAL, 27 FCC Rcd at 11767-68, para. 17; Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11784, para. 14. See
also Travelcomm Indus., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 26 FCC Rcd 6476, 6481, para. 12 (2011) (rejecting Section
503(b)(4) notice claim where NAL “described in detail the evidence upon which the proposed forfeiture was
based”).
39 See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11781-82, paras. 7-10; NobelTel NAL, 27 FCC Rcd at 11763-66, paras. 7-
13; NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8138, para. 9.
40 See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11782, para. 10 (“NobelTel’s disclosures omitted key facts that consumers
need in order to understand the rate structure and calculate the cost of a call.”); NobelTel NAL, 27 FCC Rcd at
11765, para. 10 (“NobelTel’s disclosures do not provide the information necessary for a consumer to determine
what fees apply, the amounts of those fees, and when and how they will affect the number of calling minutes
offered.”).
41 47 CFR § 1.106(p)(3). We also affirm our finding that Section 503(b)(4) presents a flexible standard that “does
not require exact dates in every context.” STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11749, para. 15 (citing E. Carolina Broad. Co.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 6154, 6155-56, para. 12 (1991); WROV Broadcasters, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 1421, 1422, para. 12 (1991)). We reiterate that when a carrier
engages in an unjust or unreasonable “practice” under Section 201(b), we interpret the language of Section
503(b)(4)—“the date on which such conduct occurred”—to refer to the time period during which the unlawful
“practice” giving rise to the violation occurred. Id. at 11749-50, para. 15. See also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”) (citations
omitted). Thus, an NAL satisfies Section 503(b)(4)’s date requirement if it specifies the applicable time period
within which the carrier engaged in the apparent unlawful practice or conduct. STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11750, para. 15.
42 Petition at i, 13-15.
43 47 U.S.C. § 503(b).
44 47 CFR § 1.80.
45 The Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement and Amendment of Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the
Forfeiture Guidelines, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 17087 (1997) (Forfeiture Policy Statement), recons. denied,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 303 (1999).
46 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(E).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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considered each of these factors and determined that a $5,000,000 forfeiture took into account “the extent
and gravity of NobelTel’s egregious conduct, as well as its culpability.”47 The Commission further
determined that the forfeiture must be significant enough to “protect the interests of consumers and serve
as an adequate deterrent,” while recognizing “NobelTel’s failure to adequately provide material
information about its rates to thousands of consumers who purchased the Company’s prepaid cards.”48
The Commission also based the $5,000,000 forfeiture on the penalties proposed against five other carriers
over a year before the NobelTel NAL for similar deceptive marketing of prepaid calling cards.49 Also
pursuant to such considerations, the Commission exercised its discretion in setting the forfeiture amount
at the equivalent of only 125 violations, rather than applying the base forfeiture amount to every one of
the hundreds of NobelTel cards sold each day.50 Having considered such factors in both the NAL and
Forfeiture Order, we find the forfeiture assessment proper and see no reason to reconsider it here.
13. NobelTel also argues that if Section 503(b)(4) can be satisfied by identifying a time
period rather than each specific date its calling cards were sold, then the Commission cannot then
calculate the forfeiture on a “per-card-sold basis.”51 However, NobelTel offers no legal support for this
proposition and we find nothing to suggest that identifying the relevant time period during which
violations took place in accordance with Section 503(b)(4) precludes us from assessing a forfeiture for
each calling card sold. NobelTel claims that the “Commission . . . argues that practices are not discrete
events . . . .”52 This is incorrect. As we previously stated:
[T]he very nature of an unlawful ‘practice’ under Section 201(b) is that it may include
activities that are repeated over time and is not merely a discrete event on a single day.
The violations charged in this case included the unlawful practices of making deceptive
misrepresentations and failing to disclose material information about rates, charges, and
practices at the point of sale for each calling card sold.53
Likewise, in the present case, the violations involved inadequate advertising disclosures in connection
with transactions that occurred with multiple consumers in multiple locations on multiple days; the
violations were not a discrete event.54 Accordingly, the Commission made clear that each card sold
involved the same deceptive marketing practice (misleading cost disclosures that presented insufficient
information to calculate the cost of a call) that violated the Act.55 Thus, the Commission found that
NobelTel’s deceptive marketing of each prepaid calling card to consumers constituted a separate violation
of Section 201(b) and properly calculated the forfeiture while accounting for the violations’
egregiousness, NobelTel’s culpability, and the need to ensure that deceptive marketing forfeitures “are

47 NobelTel NAL, 27 FCC Rcd at 11768, para. 17. See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11783, para. 13 (noting
forfeiture amount was based on Section 503 factors).
48 NobelTel NAL, 27 FCC Rcd at 11768, para. 17.
49 Id.
50 Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11784, para. 13 & n.43; NAL, 27 FCC Rcd at 11768, para. 17 & n.66.
51 Petition at 14.
52 Id.
53 STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11748-49, para. 14 (citations omitted) (emphasis original).
54 NobelTel concedes that it “sold approximately pre-paid calling cards in 2011.” Letter from Robert J.
Aamoth and Barbara A. Miller, Esq., Counsel to NobelTel, LLC, to Kimberly A. Wild, Assistant Division Chief,
Telecommunications Consumers Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, at 13 (Feb. 3, 2012) (on file in EB-TCD-12-
00000412).
55 See NobelTel NAL, 27 FCC Rcd at 11767, para. 16; Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11784-85, para. 13 (citing
NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8141, para. 19).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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not considered merely an affordable cost of doing business.”56 NobelTel advances no argument or new
fact that warrants reconsideration of these findings.
III. CONCLUSION
14. Based on the record before us and in light of the applicable statutory factors, we affirm
our conclusion that NobelTel willfully and repeatedly violated Section 201(b) of the Act by deceptively
marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards, making it impossible for consumers to calculate the cost of
a call.57 We further affirm our decision not to cancel or reduce the $5,000,000 forfeiture.
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
15. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 405 of the Act and Section
1.106 of the Rules, the Petition for Reconsideration filed by NobelTel, LLC, is hereby DISMISSED IN
PART AND, in remaining part, DENIED.58
16. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 503(b) of the Act and Section
1.80 of the Rules, NobelTel, LLC IS LIABLE FOR A MONETARY FORFEITURE of five million
dollars ($5,000,000) for willfully and repeatedly violating Section 201(b) of the Act.59
17. Payment of the forfeiture shall be made in the manner provided for in Section 1.80 of the
Rules within thirty (30) calendar days after the release date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.60 If
the forfeiture is not paid within the period specified, the case may be referred to the U.S. Department of
Justice for enforcement of the forfeiture pursuant to Section 504(a) of the Act.61
18. Payment of the forfeiture must be made by check or similar instrument, wire transfer, or
credit card, and must include the NAL/Account Number and FRN referenced above. NobelTel, LLC
shall send electronic notification of payment to Lisa Williford at Lisa.Williford@fcc.gov on the date said
payment is made. Regardless of the form of payment, a completed FCC Form 159 (Remittance Advice)
must be submitted.62 When completing the FCC Form 159, enter the Account Number in block number
23A (call sign/other ID) and enter the letters “FORF” in block number 24A (payment type code). Below
are additional instructions that should be followed based on the form of payment selected:
? Payment by check or money order must be made payable to the order of the Federal
Communications Commission. Such payments (along with the completed Form 159) must be
mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-
9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank – Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-
GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63101.
56 NobelTel NAL, 27 FCC Rcd at 11767-68, para. 17.
57 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
58 47 U.S.C. § 405; 47 CFR § 1.106.
59 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 503(b); 47 CFR § 1.80.
60 47 CFR § 1.80.
61 47 U.S.C. § 504(a).
62 An FCC Form 159 and detailed instructions for completing the form may be obtained at
http://www fcc.gov/Forms/Form159/159.pdf.
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9
? Payment by wire transfer must be made to ABA Number 021030004, receiving bank
TREAS/NYC, and Account Number 27000001. To complete the wire transfer and ensure
appropriate crediting of the wired funds, a completed Form 159 must be faxed to U.S. Bank
at (314) 418-4232 on the same business day the wire transfer is initiated.
? Payment by credit card must be made by providing the required credit card information on
FCC Form 159 and signing and dating the Form 159 to authorize the credit card payment.
The completed Form 159 must then be mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O.
Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank –
Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO
63101.
19. Any request for making full payment over time under an installment plan should be sent
to: Chief Financial Officer—Financial Operations, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th
Street, SW, Room 1-A625, Washington, DC 20554.63 Questions regarding payment procedures should be
directed to the Financial Operations Group Help Desk by phone, 1-877-480-3201, or by e-mail,
ARINQUIRIES@fcc.gov.
20. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall
be sent by first class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested, to NobelTel, LLC, Attention:
Richard Mahfouz, Chief Executive Officer, and Colleen Guffey, Chairman/Senior Officer, 5973 Avenida
Encinas, Suite 202, Carlsbad, CA, 92008; and to Corporation Service Company, DC Agent for Service of
Process, 1100 New York Avenue NW, W Tower, #500, Washington, DC, 20005; and to Steven A.
Augustino, Esq., and Dawn R. Damschen, Esq., Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, 3050 K Street NW, Suite
400, Washington, DC, 20007.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary

63 See 47 CFR § 1.1914.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER

Re: Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452

The FCC has a statutory mandate to protect consumers who rely our nation’s networks, and
meeting this responsibility is one of the Commission’s top priorities. A key component of our consumer
protection strategy has been smarter, tougher enforcement of our rules. In recent years, our Enforcement
Bureau has ramped up its efforts to ensure companies follow the rules and consumers get what they pay
for. We’ve taken actions and levied fines to crack down on a series of anti-consumer practices, from
cramming to Wi-Fi blocking to failure to protect consumer data.

Today, the Commission votes on a series of petitions to hold companies accountable for
deceptively marketing prepaid calling cards.

In October 2015, the Commission fined six companies that falsely advertised that their low-cost
prepaid calling cards could allow consumers far more calling minutes than were in fact being sold. In
each case, the company marketed its cards in a way that promised hundreds or thousands of minutes of
calling time for only a few dollars. However, unless used in a single call, various fees and surcharges
would diminish the minutes available and consumers would only receive a fraction of the promised
minutes. The marketing materials for the prepaid cards deceived consumers by failing to clearly or
conspicuously disclose or explain the fees and surcharges that applied to the calling cards. Many of the
disclosures were also vague, offering only potential charges and ranges of fees. Some disclosures even
said that the charges, fees, or minutes could be changed without notice.

The 2015 Forfeiture Orders all underscored the common sense notion that a company must
provide sufficient information to consumers so that they can reasonably determine the actual cost of a
call.

Today, the Commission considers four petitions for reconsideration. They largely rely on
arguments that have already been considered and rejected by the Commission. To the extent that the
companies raised new arguments at this late stage, they were without merit.

Since the Commission issued the forfeiture orders, the companies have failed to pay them as
ordered, and the FCC has referred these matters to the U.S. Department of Justice, which has begun to file
the appropriate proceedings in federal court. Resolution of these petitions today will aid the expeditious
prosecution of these cases by the Justice Department and facilitate collection efforts in federal court,
promoting judicial efficiency.

Today’s actions send two key messages to two key audiences. To consumers, rest assured that
the FCC has got your back. To companies who would defraud consumers, please know that the FCC will
hold you accountable and that if we levy fines, we will see that they are collected.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER AJIT PAI

I agree with the Commission that the four companies at issue here used blatantly misleading and
deceptive marketing materials to sell prepaid calling cards. This behavior should not be tolerated,
especially when it involves preying upon vulnerable populations, such as immigrants.
Unfortunately, the Commission’s ability to lawfully impose forfeitures upon these companies has
been fatally compromised by its inadequate and incomplete investigation into their conduct. That’s why I
dissented from the Forfeiture Orders imposed upon these companies last year, and that’s why I must
dissent from these Orders denying their petitions for reconsideration.
Section 503(b)(4) of the Communications Act requires Notices of Apparent Liability to set forth,
among other things, “the nature of the act or omission charged against such person and the facts upon
which such charge is based” as well as “the date on which such conduct occurred.”1 In each of the cases
here, the Commission has found that “a separate violation of section 201(b) occurred each time a
consumer purchased” a misleading and deceptive prepaid calling card.
That raises a number of questions pertaining to each purported violation (i.e., each purchase of a
prepaid calling card). On which dates did the purchases of prepaid calling cards take place? Who
purchased them? Where did these sales take place? And which type of card was purchased?
The four underlying Notices of Apparent Liability did not answer any of these questions with
respect to even a single purchase of a prepaid calling card. The four Forfeiture Orders did not answer any
of these questions. And the four Orders we are voting on today still do not answer any of these questions.
Why is this information missing? Because the Enforcement Bureau didn’t bother to ask for it. To say the
least, this is a problem.
To use an analogy, it’s as if a prosecutor decided to charge a suspect with robbing a whole bunch
of people, and then at trial, failed to identify any of the victims, when they were robbed, where they were
robbed, or what was stolen. Regardless of the defendant’s guilt, there is no way that anyone could be
convicted of robbery with such a lack of specific evidence.
As a result of the obvious deficiencies in the investigation, I do not believe that the Commission
has complied with section 503(b)(4) of the Act or fundamental aspects of due process.
To be sure, the Commission has claimed that it was not required to include any of this specific
information, including particular dates, in the Notices of Apparent Liability. Instead, it contends that the
companies were engaging in an unlawful “practice” that included activities repeated over time.
Therefore, for example, the Commission argues that it was sufficient that the Notices of Apparent
Liability “refer[red] to the time period during which the unlawful practice giving rise to the violation
occurred.”2
Had the Commission found that these four companies had each committed a single continuing
violation of section 201(b) in the form of an unlawful practice, then I could perhaps understand the
argument that the facts set forth in the Notices of Apparent Liability were sufficiently specific. However,

1 See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).
2 Locus Telecommunications, Inc. Order at para. 9 (emphasis in original).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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the Commission makes no such finding—probably because each company’s liability then would have
been capped at $1.575 million.3 Instead, the Commission has concluded that each company committed a
separate violation of section 201(b) each time that a consumer purchased a misleading and deceptive
prepaid calling card. At the same time, it’s failed to specify the basic facts underlying even a single sale.
This is not legally permissible.
When it comes to enforcement, I have many times expressed the concern that the Commission is
more interested in seeking headlines than respecting the rule of law. These four Orders represent just the
latest examples of this problem. Here, the Commission appropriately identified four companies engaging
in deeply problematic conduct. But because its investigation of these companies was deeply flawed, I do
not believe that it has lawfully imposed forfeitures on them. These Orders will certainly generate some
good press for the Commission, but I’m skeptical that a court will ever require these companies to pay
these penalties.

3 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(2).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O'RIELLY

Since the Commission has done absolutely nothing to bolster the Forfeiture Orders, nothing in
these latest orders on reconsideration persuades me that these companies should be subjected to
unjustifiably large fines for conduct that is not covered by the Act, was not deceptive in any event, and
did not actually harm a single consumer. I dissent on each.
Fundamentally, I continue to object to the notion that the Commission has authority under section
201(b) to regulate “deceptive marketing”. In the underlying Forfeiture Orders, the Commission claimed
that deceptive marketing is an unjust and unreasonable practice. However, as a former Commissioner
noted, “if ‘practices’ includes advertising, then it is hard to imagine what it does not include.”1 Under this
formulation, the Commission’s interpretation of section 201 is so boundless that such roving authority, if
further embraced, will become the provision that swallows the rest of the Act. And, in the hands of an
Enforcement Bureau eager to expand the Commission’s reach, it’s beyond dangerous.
Because the Commission does not have rules on deceptive marketing and refuses to adopt any to
everyone’s detriment, in my opinion, it continues to point to the 2001 NOS Communications Notice of
Apparent Liability (NOS NAL). I remain opposed to using adjudications to adopt new policy positions
because there is no notice and no opportunity for all potentially impacted companies to provide comment.
An NAL is not even a final decision of the Commission. Indeed, when I first joined the Commission I
was urged to support NALs even if I had concerns about the preliminary positions advanced in them,
because I was told that parties would have a full and fair opportunity to rebut them in their responses, and
the Commission would render a final decision on the merits at the forfeiture stage. Now the Commission
is trying to have it both ways. If NALs do not represent the Commission’s final determinations, then they
cannot and do not provide notice of how the Commission might act in a future case. That is particularly
true where the Commission never issues a forfeiture order, but instead settles with the party, as was the
case with NOS.
Even if one believes that an NAL does provide some degree of notice, which I don’t concede, the
facts underlying the NOS NAL are so dissimilar that it could not have provided notice to these prepaid
calling card providers that their markedly different advertisements would be considered problematic. In
the NOS NAL, the companies used a pricing methodology that “appear[ed] to be unique to these
companies” and was so “complicated” and “confusing” that, even though the companies provided verbal
and written instructions on how to calculate the rates, almost 900 consumers filed complaints.2 In
contrast, these providers, who used standard advertisements and disclosures, would have had no basis to
suspect that their marketing materials would be treated like those in the NOS NAL.
To start, the disclosures at issue here are neither “complicated” nor “confusing”. They alert
buyers to the fact that a specific set of fees could or would apply. In some cases, the cards indicated that
there would be a fee of “up to” a certain amount or that a “maximum” specified fee would apply. In other
instances, the cards noted that rates could be higher, for example, when calling wireless numbers. I fail to
see how a card could be considered deceptive when all categories of charges are spelled out with enough

1 Business Discount Plan, Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd 14461, 14475 (2000) (dissenting statement of
Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth)
2 NOS Communications, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability, 16 FCC Rcd 8133, 8134, 8136, 8137 (2001).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-147
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detail to enable a consumer to decide whether the card, overall, is a good deal. A reasonable amount of
imprecision should be considered acceptable when the companies do not control and cannot foresee
exactly how consumers will choose to use the cards. That’s not deceptive – it’s necessary for reasonable
and flexible consumer usage. And it is certainly distinctive from the NOS NAL where the companies
provided customers with a specific formula that they falsely claimed would enable customers to easily
calculate the exact charges.
Moreover, these practices are far from being “unique” compared to those of other calling card
providers, as advertisements and disclosures at issue here appear to be commonplace elsewhere. A quick
search of other well-known prepaid calling card providers turned up disclosures with very similar
qualifications. In fact, the qualification that rates and/or terms and conditions are subject to change is
commonly used in both the voice and broadband context by wireline, cable, wireless and other providers.
In addition, posters with disclosures in smaller print on the bottom seem to be the norm. If the NOS NAL
articulated a clear standard that provided companies with fair notice of the conduct required, as the
Commission continues to allege, then why doesn’t anybody seem to know it? As I said before, selective
application of penalties when nobody appeared to be on notice is abusive.
Finally, not a single consumer filed a complaint. If the advertisements were so unclear, you
wouldn’t know it from the deafening silence of the public. In fact, these cases demonstrate the complete
absence of consumer harm. The Commission responds that it is empowered by the Act to initiate
enforcement on its own motion. However, in an area as completely subjective as deceptive advertising, a
vital factor must be whether anyone in the real world was actually deceived. Seeing a null set should be
telling to my colleagues and the general public.
Even though I would not have pursued enforcement actions against these companies in these
instances, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the arbitrary approach the Commission used to
calculate their fines, and which it refuses to reconsider. Because there were no instances of actual
consumer complaints, the Commission had to find a way to approximate the supposed harm to
consumers. It did so by guessing how many cards might have been sold during the relevant timeframe
and then assumed that all of those supposed sales involved deceptive marketing. Using its discretion,
however, the Commission has limited the fine in each item to 125 cards or 5 million dollars. I'm
supposed to believe that the Commission took into account the unique facts, circumstances, and
egregiousness of each case but miraculously settled on 125 cards and 5 million dollars in each item? It is
simply not credible that four companies of different sizes that sold different cards in different numbers
would end up with the exact same fines. Once again, the fines seem to be calculated to achieve a
preordained result and headline, with no basis in fact or law.
As I said at the Forfeiture Order stage, some might dismiss these actions as an effort to clean up
the backlog of items concerning an industry that is fading away. However, providers of all types should
be troubled by the Commission’s expansive reading of the statute, coupled with assertions that companies
that were trying to follow the rules, followed standard industry practices, and never had any complaints
lodged against them can nonetheless be fined millions of dollars.