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Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
1
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, DC 20554
In the Matter of
Touch-Tel USA, LLC
)
)
)
)
)
File No.:  EB-TCD-12-00000409
NAL/Acct. No.:  201132170027
FRN:  0018234609
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted:  October 27, 2016 Released:  October 28, 2016
By the Commission: Chairman Wheeler issuing a statement; Commissioners Pai and O’Rielly dissenting 
and issuing separate statements.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. We dismiss in part and deny in part the Petition for Reconsideration filed by Touch-Tel 
USA, LLC (Touch-Tel) seeking reconsideration of a Forfeiture Order issued by the Commission.  In the 
Forfeiture Order, the Commission imposed a forfeiture of $5,000,000 against Touch-Tel for deceptively 
marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards through misleading, confusing, and inadequate disclosures 
of rates and charges that made it impossible for consumers to calculate the actual cost of a call.  
2. Upon review of the Petition for Reconsideration
1
and the entire record,
2
we find no basis 
for reconsideration.  A petition for reconsideration may be dismissed if, for example, it relies on facts or 
arguments that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding, 
or facts or arguments previously known but not timely raised.
3
  Touch-Tel’s Petition fails to present new 
facts, arguments, or changed circumstances that were previously unknown to it that would warrant 
reconsideration, and we do not find that reconsideration is otherwise required in the public interest.  Thus, 
as explained below, we dismiss Touch-Tel’s arguments to the extent they were previously raised and 
rejected by the Commission in the Forfeiture Order or untimely raised in its Petition, and deny Touch-
Tel’s other arguments on their merits for failing to demonstrate a material error or omission.  
Accordingly, we dismiss in part and deny in part Touch-Tel’s Petition. 
                                                     
1
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, Petition for Reconsideration of Forfeiture Order (Nov. 20, 2015) (on file in EB-TCD-12-
00000409) (Petition).
2
The Forfeiture Order and Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture include more complete discussions of the 
facts and history of this case and are incorporated herein by reference.  Touch-Tel USA, LLC, Forfeiture Order, 30 
FCC Rcd 11730 (2015) (Forfeiture Order); Touch-Tel USA, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 26 
FCC Rcd 12836 (2011) (Touch-Tel NAL).
3
47 CFR § 1.106(p) (providing that petitions for reconsideration of a Commission action that “[r]ely on arguments 
that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding” may be dismissed 
because they “plainly do not warrant consideration by the Commission”); see also 47 CFR § 1.106(c); EZ 
Sacramento, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 18257, 18257, para. 2 (EB 2000).  A Petition for 
Reconsideration may be granted when the Commission determines that consideration of the facts or arguments 
raised by the petitioner is in the public interest.  47 CFR § 1.106(c)(2).  However, unless a petitioner either 
demonstrates a material error or omission in the underlying order or raises additional facts not known or not existing 
until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to present such matters, a petition for reconsideration may be dismissed.  
See 47 CFR § 1.106(c).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
2
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Forfeiture Order Satisfied Due Process Requirements
3. In its Petition, Touch-Tel reprises arguments it previously raised with the Commission in 
response to the Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (Touch-Tel NAL)
4
that the Commission did 
not provide fair notice or guidance regarding what disclosures are required from prepaid calling card 
providers in their marketing materials.
5
  Specifically, Touch-Tel repeats its claim
6
that the Commission 
cannot find it liable in the absence of specific Commission rules regarding prepaid calling card marketing 
or specific consumer complaints about its marketing practices.
7
  Touch-Tel also repeats its argument
8
that 
the standard established by the Commission in the NOS NAL (and applied to it in the Touch-Tel NAL) –
that advertising denoting applicable rates associated with telecommunications services violates Section 
201(b) where it does not include clear and conspicuous disclosures that allow consumers to calculate the 
cost of a call – did not provide notice to Touch-Tel of what marketing activities were prohibited.
9
  Touch-
Tel further claims that the Commission’s actions constitute discriminatory enforcement because many 
other prepaid calling card providers used similar marketing disclosures without being penalized by the 
Commission.
10
                                                     
4
See Touch-Tel USA, LLC, Opposition to Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, at 3-5, 9-10 (Oct. 11, 2011) (on file in 
EB-TCD-12-00000409) (NAL Response).  
5
Petition at 3-8.  We also note that Touch-Tel’s reliance on cases like Fox and General Electric is misplaced.  See 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012) (Fox); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) (General Electric).  While both discuss due process, we find that the facts of each case are 
distinguishable.  In General Electric, the conduct at issue was highly technical in nature, involving specific 
guidelines for the disposal of toxic materials – something that required explicit instructions.  See General Electric, 
53 F.3d at 1326.  Moreover, the applicable standard was changed, causing confusion.  See id.  Fox is likewise 
distinguishable.  In that case, the court found that broadcasters did not have fair notice of what was required because 
of a change of policy and interpretation.  Specifically, under a prior policy and precedent, a fleeting expletive or 
brief shot of nudity was not considered a violation, but under a newer interpretation, such content would be 
considered a violation.  See Fox, 30 FCC Rcd at 2318-19.  In the present case there is no complex rubric of technical 
requirements or a change in policy.  Instead, based on past precedent, the Commission determined that Touch-Tel 
had fair notice that when advertising rates, it was prohibited from misleading customers about applicable rates and 
was required to provide disclosures sufficient to allow consumers to calculate the total cost of a call.  See Forfeiture 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11733, para. 9.
6
NAL Response at 2-4.
7
Petition at 3-4, 6-8.
8
NAL Response at 4-5.
9
Petition at 4-6 (citing NOS Commc’ns Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 16 FCC Rcd 8133 (NOS 
NAL)).
10
Id. at 5-6.  The dissenters raise the same or similar arguments that they raised in response to the Forfeiture Order.  
Those arguments were addressed in the Forfeiture Order, as supplemented by this item.  In addition, we note that 
there is no merit to the claim that it was “arbitrary” for the Commission to have “settled on 125 cards and 5 million 
dollars” in each of the four forfeiture orders addressed, collectively, in the dissent.  Even if the four relevant 
companies were of different sizes and sold different cards in different numbers, the Commission assessed the 
specific record before it in each case, and in each case reasonably inferred that the company committed at least 125 
violations; the Commission then calculated a forfeiture amount equivalent to a base forfeiture applied to 125 
violations.  See, e.g., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11735, para. 13 & n.39.  Far from being arbitrary, this was a 
lawful exercise of the Commission’s discretion that was grounded in the specific record before it in each case.    
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
3
1. Commission Rules and Consumer Complaints
4. Nearly all of these arguments (excepting the claim of discriminatory enforcement) were 
considered by the Commission and rejected in the Forfeiture Order.  As we stated in the Forfeiture Order, 
the prohibition on unjust or unreasonable practices contained in Section 201(b) of the Communications 
Act of 1934, as amended (Act), “reaches deceptive marketing (including the types of practices engaged in 
by Touch-Tel) and . . . does so even in the absence of implementing rules.”
11
  We also explained that “the 
Commission does not need to base its forfeiture orders on complaints or a showing of actual consumer 
harm.”
12
  We find no reason to reconsider those prior determinations here.
13
2. Precedential Value of the NOS NAL
5. We similarly find no reason to reconsider our conclusion that the standard established by 
the Commission in the NOS NAL “applies to the Commission’s evaluation of Touch-Tel’s advertising and 
marketing of prepaid calling cards under Section 201(b).”
14
  Touch-Tel suggests that Commission NALs 
lack any precedential value because they “may lead to a Consent Decree or other type of settlement.”
15
  
                                                     
11
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11732, para. 6 (citing STi Telecom Inc. (formerly Epana Networks, Inc.), 
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11742 (2015) (STi)).
12
Id. (citing STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11753-54, 11756, paras. 25, 32).  The Act empowers the Commission to 
“investigate and impose forfeitures on common carriers even in the complete absence of consumer complaints.”  
Preferred Long Distance, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 13711, 13717, para. 14 (2015).  See 47 U.S.C. § 403 
(“The Commission shall have full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, . . . 
relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act.”) (emphasis added).
13
47 CFR § 1.106(p)(3) (Petitions for reconsideration “plainly do not warrant consideration by the Commission” 
where such petitions “[r]ely on arguments that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within 
the same proceeding”).  Touch-Tel also makes a convoluted argument that the Commission’s examination of its 
marketing materials absent consumer complaints amounts to “the Commission [] instituting a de facto tariff approval 
process, whereby the Commission is approving and accepting a carrier’s terms and conditions of service, rather than 
letting the competitive marketplace dictate what is reasonable and what is unreasonable.”  Petition at 7.  The 
findings in the Touch-Tel NAL and Forfeiture Order do not institute a tariff approval process.  To the contrary, the 
underlying findings in this case hinge upon consumer-facing misleading or deceptive marketing and advertising, not 
the manner in which Touch-Tel sets its prices.  The Commission’s actions in this case do not second-guess carrier 
pricing, but rather ensure that carriers who advertise rates provide consumers with the information they need to 
calculate the cost of a call.  In the current post-tariff environment (where consumers do not have one centralized 
place to peruse pricing information), it is all the more crucial that carriers fulfill their responsibilities to customers 
by providing transparent pricing information.  See Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 421-22 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that tariffs served as a mechanism to assure compliance with Sections 201 and 202 of the Act, and that 
“[f]ollowing detariffing, those goals remain”).
14
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11733, para. 9.  Touch-Tel makes a misplaced argument that “NALs are not 
generally reviewed or voted upon by the entire Commission, but rather are issued by a bureau” and thus the NOS 
NAL lacks any precedential value.  Petition at 4.  In making this argument, Touch-Tel again sidesteps the fact that 
the NOS NAL was adopted by the Commission.  See NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8142, para. 20.  Even if an NAL is 
adopted by a bureau, bureaus can issue NALs on delegated authority from the Commission.  See, e.g., 47 CFR § 
0.311 (empowering Enforcement Bureau to issue NALs on delegated authority under certain circumstances); see 
also infra note 18.  As the Commission indicated when it first rejected this argument, the standard established in the 
NOS NAL applies in this case.  Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11733, para. 9.
15
Petition at 5.  Touch-Tel also contends that, even if the NOS NAL provided notice of the relevant standard for its 
marketing disclosures, the precedential value of the NOS NAL is diminished due to the time elapsed since the NOS 
NAL’s release.  Id.  Touch-Tel’s argument is unsupported and untimely.  First, Touch-Tel cites no support for the 
proposition that Commission precedent has an expiration date, or that Commission precedent attenuates over time.  
As the Commission confirmed in the Forfeiture Order and as restated above, the standard adopted in the NOS NAL
applies in this case. Supra para. 5.  Second, these claims fail to “rais[e] additional facts not known or not existing 
until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to present such matters.”  Supra para. 2.  Touch-Tel was aware of the time 
elapsed since the NOS NAL’s release after the Commission issued the Touch-Tel NAL in 2011.  But Touch-Tel 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
4
The relevant legal issue here is not the “precedential value” of the NOS NAL, but rather whether it 
provided fair notice to Touch-Tel.  As we explained at length in the Forfeiture Order, the Commission 
previously determined that the NOS NAL provided sufficient notice to telecommunications service 
providers that they “must provide clear and conspicuous disclosure on how to calculate the total cost of a 
call” in their marketing materials.
16
  The mere fact that the Commission subsequently resolved the NOS 
NAL through settlement “does not undermine the value of [it] in providing fair notice.”
17
  Due process 
requires fair notice and the Commission determined that the finding in the NOS NAL, coupled with the 
language of Section 201(b), “provides a person of ordinary intelligence with fair notice of the conduct 
that is required” from calling card providers.
18
  Touch-Tel points out that the NOS NAL settlement states 
that it is not “an adjudication of the merits, or any factual or legal finding.”
19
  However, Touch-Tel fails to 
mention that this limiting language only applied to the Commission’s “determination of noncompliance 
by the companies with the requirements of the Act,” not whether the underlying deceptive marketing 
standard adopted in the NOS NAL provided fair notice.
20
  The settlement of the NOS NAL did nothing to 
undermine the standard established by the Commission (and applied to Touch-Tel in the NAL) that when 
advertising rate information associated with telecommunications services, service providers must provide 
clear and conspicuous disclosures on how to calculate the cost of a call.
21
3. Claim of Discriminatory Enforcement  
6. The only nuance the Petition adds to Touch-Tel’s otherwise repetitive due process claims 
is its argument that penalizing it when “a number of other prominent prepaid calling card companies 
utilize substantially similar types of marketing . . . . is unfair . . . [and] violates due process.”
22
  Touch-
Tel’s discriminatory enforcement claim is untimely and fails to “rais[e] additional facts not known or not 
existing until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to present such matters.”
23
  Touch-Tel was aware that 
the Commission determined that its marketing practices and the similar practices of other carriers violated 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
presents its “diminished precedent” claim for the first time in its Petition – over four years later.  We therefore find 
that Touch-Tel’s arguments on this issue do not warrant reconsideration of the Forfeiture Order.  47 CFR § 1.106(b), 
(p) (Petitions for Reconsideration that fail to rely on new facts or changed circumstances may be dismissed).      
16
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11732, para. 7 (citing NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8138, para. 9) (internal 
quotations omitted); Touch-Tel NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12838, para. 6 (citing NOS NAL to conclude “[t]he 
Commission has found that unfair and deceptive marketing practices . . . constitute unjust and unreasonable 
practices under [S]ection 201(b)”).
17
Lyca Tel, LLC, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11792, 11795, para. 9 (2015).  See also Preferred Long Distance, 
30 FCC Rcd at 13718, para. 16 & n.53 (finding that an NAL, with other Commission decisions, “provided the 
requisite fair notice”).
18
Id. at 11796, para. 15 (internal citations omitted).  We also underscore that NALs, Forfeiture Orders, and 
rulemakings are not the only ways in which the Commission can put regulatees on notice of their obligations.  See, 
e.g., Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that an official interpretation issued by 
the Commission’s staff on delegated authority, such as a public notice or letter, has the same force and effect as 
other actions of the Commission).  
19
Petition at 5 (citing NOS Commc’ns Inc. and Affinity Network Inc., Order and Consent Decree, 17 FCC Rcd 
26853, 26857, para. 7 (2002) (NOS Consent Decree)).  
20
NOS Consent Decree, 17 FCC Rcd at 26857, para. 7.
21
See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11733, para. 9 (“Touch-Tel’s indefinite description of its fees make it 
impossible for a consumer to calculate the cost of a call at the point of sale.”); Touch-Tel NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 
12841, para. 14 (“Touch-Tel failed to disclose, in any meaningful way, material information about its rates, charges 
and practices at the point of sale.”).
22
Petition at 6 (citing Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11803 (Commissioner O’Rielly, dissenting)).
23
Supra para. 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
5
the Act after the Touch-Tel NAL’s release in 2011.  But Touch-Tel presents its “discriminatory 
enforcement” argument for the first time in its Petition – over four years later.  
7. In addition to its untimeliness, Touch-Tel’s discriminatory enforcement claim ignores our 
authority under the Act and relevant Commission precedent.  Section 403 of the Act provides the 
Commission with “full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, . . . 
relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act.”
24
  The Commission has broad discretion 
to initiate investigations “so long as the matter is within the agency’s jurisdiction.”
25
  The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly recognized that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or 
criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”
26
  Such 
considerable discretion is necessary because “[a]n agency generally cannot act against each technical 
violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.  The agency is far better equipped . . . to deal with the 
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”
27
  The Commission therefore holds 
“prosecutorial discretion in choosing to initiate investigations, and the absence of action against any or 
all potentially liable entities does not preclude it from enforcing against a specific violator.”
28
  The 
Commission remains in the best position to “weigh the benefits of pursuing an adjudication against the 
costs to the agency and the likelihood of success” and its decision to pursue enforcement action against an 
egregious violator like Touch-Tel falls fully within its broad prosecutorial discretion.
29
  We therefore find 
that the Commission’s investigation of Touch-Tel for deceptive marketing of prepaid calling cards did not 
violate due process requirements.
30
B. The Commission Provided Sufficient Specificity as to Touch-Tel’s Violations
8. Touch-Tel also asserts that the Commission failed to identify its violations with required 
specificity under Section 503(b)(4) of the Act, including the dates on which the violations occurred.
31
Touch-Tel contends that the forfeiture must be rescinded because the Commission “has not provided the 
name of even one customer who allegedly was confused by Touch-Tel’s disclosures.”
32
  Touch-Tel 
further argues that the Commission “cannot definitely state or point to specific instances that demonstrate 
that the exact number of cards at issue were sold during . . . the statute of limitations” and “arbitrarily 
presumes that Touch-Tel had at least 125 customers who were confused or mislead [sic]” by its marketing 
practices.
33
  
                                                     
24
47 U.S.C. § 403.  
25
Viacom Inc., ESPN Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 797, 804, para. 18 (2015) (Viacom/ESPN).  See Spanish 
Broad. Sys. Holding Co., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 27 FCC Rcd 11956, 11959, para. 8 & n.30 (EB 2012) (Section 403 
provides broad discretion as to the type of misconduct the Commission may investigate and subject to enforcement 
action).
26
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869)).
27
Id.
28
Viacom/ESPN, 30 FCC Rcd at 804, para. 17 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Radio One Licenses, LLC, 
Forfeiture Order, 19 FCC Rcd 23922, 23932, para. 24 (2004) (“The Commission is a regulatory agency with broad 
prosecutorial discretion in enforcement proceedings.”) (Radio One).
29
Radio One, 19 FCC Rcd at 23932, para. 24 (citing N.Y. State Dept. of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1213 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993)).
30
47 CFR § 1.106(b), (p).
31
Petition at 8-9.
32
Id. at 8.
33
Id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
6
9. Touch-Tel is mistaken.  As stated above, “the Commission does not need to base its 
forfeiture orders on complaints or a showing of actual consumer harm.”
34
  Touch-Tel also misinterprets 
the Commission’s findings – the Commission did not presume that there were at least 125 customers 
confused or misled by the company’s marketing practices, but rather was explaining that the forfeiture 
amount was the equivalent of applying the base forfeiture to only 125 violations, far less than the 
hundreds of cards sold each day (and associated advertising posters), all of which shared the same 
shortcoming – they did not include enough countervailing information to allow consumers to calculate the 
cost of the call.
35
  
10. In any event, the Commission has interpreted Section 503(b)(4) flexibly and we 
previously noted that the statute “does not require exact dates in every context.”
36
  As in the present case, 
when a carrier engages in an unjust or unreasonable “practice” under Section 201(b), we interpret the 
language of Section 503(b)(4)—“the date on which such conduct occurred”—to refer to the time period
during which the unlawful “practice” giving rise to the violation occurred.
37
  Thus, an NAL satisfies 
Section 503(b)(4)’s date requirement if it specifies the applicable time period within which the carrier 
engaged in the unlawful practice or conduct.
38
  This interpretation provides a practical reading of the 
statute and also gives effect to our interpretation of “practice” as used in Section 201(b),
39
while still 
providing sufficient information to satisfy the violator’s due process rights.  
11. In the Touch-Tel NAL, the Commission explained that each card Touch-Tel marketed 
using deceptive advertising constituted an independent violation of Section 201(b).
40
  In both the Touch-
Tel NAL and Forfeiture Order, the Commission also specified the time period during which Touch-Tel’s 
deceptive marketing practices occurred – the year preceding the Touch-Tel NAL’s release.
41
  It would not 
only be impractical to list the date that each of Touch-Tel’s cards were sold, but also unnecessary because 
the deceptive marketing practice giving rise to the violations (failure to include sufficient countervailing 
information about its rates that would enable consumers to calculate the cost of calls) was identical for 
every violation.  As such, the Commission satisfied the notice requirements of Section 503(b)(4) by 
identifying: (1) the specific provision of the Act that Touch-Tel violated (Section 201(b)); (2) the nature 
of Touch-Tel’s conduct that violated the Act (deceptive marketing of prepaid calling cards); and (3) the 
time period during which such conduct occurred (the year preceding the Touch-Tel NAL’s release).
42
  
Accordingly, Touch-Tel’s Section 503(b)(4) claims are without merit and denied.
                                                     
34
Supra para. 4, note 12.
35
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11735, para. 13 & n.39; Touch-Tel NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12842, para. 17 & n.41.
36
STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11749, para. 15 (citing E. Carolina Broad. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 
6154, 6155-56, para. 12 (1991); WROV Broadcasters, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 1421, 
1422, para. 12 (1991)).
37
Id. at 11749-50, para. 15.
38
Id. at 11750, para. 15.
39
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (“Statutory construction must begin with the 
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses 
the legislative purpose.”) (citations omitted).  
40
Touch-Tel NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12842, para. 17.  
41
Id.; Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11735, para. 13.
42
See Touch-Tel NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12842, para. 17; Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11735, para. 13.  See, e.g., 
Travelcomm Indus., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 26 FCC Rcd 6476, 6481, para. 12 (2011) (rejecting Section 503(b)(4) 
notice claim where NAL “described in detail the evidence upon which the proposed forfeiture was based”).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
7
III. CONCLUSION
12. Based on the record before us and in light of the applicable statutory factors, we affirm 
our conclusion that Touch-Tel willfully and repeatedly violated Section 201(b) of the Act by deceptively 
marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards, making it impossible for consumers to calculate the cost of 
a call.
43
  We further affirm our decision not to cancel or reduce the $5,000,000 forfeiture.
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
13. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 405 of the Act and Section 
1.106 of the Commission’s rules (Rules), the Petition for Reconsideration filed by Touch-Tel USA, LLC,
is hereby DISMISSED IN PART AND, in remaining part, DENIED.
44
14. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 503(b) of the Act and Section
1.80 of the Rules, Touch-Tel USA, LLC IS LIABLE FOR A MONETARY FORFEITURE of five 
million dollars ($5,000,000) for willfully and repeatedly violating Section 201(b) of the Act.
45
15. Payment of the forfeiture shall be made in the manner provided for in Section 1.80 of the 
Rules within thirty (30) calendar days after the release date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
46
If 
the forfeiture is not paid within the period specified, the case may be referred to the U.S. Department of 
Justice for enforcement of the forfeiture pursuant to Section 504(a) of the Act.
47
  
16. Payment of the forfeiture must be made by check or similar instrument, wire transfer, or 
credit card, and must include the NAL/Account Number and FRN referenced above.  Touch-Tel USA, 
LLC shall send electronic notification of payment to Lisa Williford at Lisa.Williford@fcc.gov on the date 
said payment is made.  Regardless of the form of payment, a completed FCC Form 159 (Remittance 
Advice) must be submitted.
48
  When completing the FCC Form 159, enter the Account Number in block 
number 23A (call sign/other ID) and enter the letters “FORF” in block number 24A (payment type code).  
Below are additional instructions that should be followed based on the form of payment selected:  
? Payment by check or money order must be made payable to the order of the Federal 
Communications Commission. Such payments (along with the completed Form 159) must be 
mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-
9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank – Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-
GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63101.
? Payment by wire transfer must be made to ABA Number 021030004, receiving bank 
TREAS/NYC, and Account Number 27000001. To complete the wire transfer and ensure 
appropriate crediting of the wired funds, a completed Form 159 must be faxed to U.S. Bank 
at (314) 418-4232 on the same business day the wire transfer is initiated.
? Payment by credit card must be made by providing the required credit card information on 
FCC Form 159 and signing and dating the Form 159 to authorize the credit card payment.  
The completed Form 159 must then be mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. 
Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank –
                                                     
43
47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
44
47 U.S.C. § 405; 47 CFR § 1.106.
45
47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 503(b); 47 CFR § 1.80.
46
47 CFR § 1.80.
47
47 U.S.C. § 504(a).
48
An FCC Form 159 and detailed instructions for completing the form may be obtained at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form159/159.pdf.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
8
Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 
63101.
17. Any request for making full payment over time under an installment plan should be sent 
to: Chief Financial Officer—Financial Operations, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th 
Street, SW, Room 1-A625, Washington, DC 20554.
49
  Questions regarding payment procedures should be 
directed to the Financial Operations Group Help Desk by phone, 1-877-480-3201, or by e-mail, 
ARINQUIRIES@fcc.gov.
18. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall 
be sent by first class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested, to Touch-Tel USA, LLC, Attention: 
Amanul Syed, Chief Executive Officer, and William Stankos, Chairman/Senior Officer, 5444 Westheimer 
Road, Suite 1535, Houston, TX, 77056; and to Thomas Crowe Law Offices, DC Agent for Service of 
Process, 1250 24th Street NW, Washington, DC, 20037; and to Adam Bowser, Esq., and Alan Fishel, 
Esq., Arent Fox LLP, 1717 K Street NW, Washington, DC, 20006.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
                                                     
49
See 47 CFR § 1.1914.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
9
STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER
Re:   Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452
The FCC has a statutory mandate to protect consumers who rely our nation’s networks, and 
meeting this responsibility is one of the Commission’s top priorities.  A key component of our consumer 
protection strategy has been smarter, tougher enforcement of our rules.  In recent years, our Enforcement 
Bureau has ramped up its efforts to ensure companies follow the rules and consumers get what they pay 
for.  We’ve taken actions and levied fines to crack down on a series of anti-consumer practices, from 
cramming to Wi-Fi blocking to failure to protect consumer data. 
Today, the Commission votes on a series of petitions to hold companies accountable for 
deceptively marketing prepaid calling cards.  
In October 2015, the Commission fined six companies that falsely advertised that their low-cost 
prepaid calling cards could allow consumers far more calling minutes than were in fact being sold.  In 
each case, the company marketed its cards in a way that promised hundreds or thousands of minutes of 
calling time for only a few dollars.  However, unless used in a single call, various fees and surcharges 
would diminish the minutes available and consumers would only receive a fraction of the promised 
minutes.  The marketing materials for the prepaid cards deceived consumers by failing to clearly or 
conspicuously disclose or explain the fees and surcharges that applied to the calling cards.  Many of the 
disclosures were also vague, offering only potential charges and ranges of fees. Some disclosures even 
said that the charges, fees, or minutes could be changed without notice.
The 2015 Forfeiture Orders all underscored the common sense notion that a company must 
provide sufficient information to consumers so that they can reasonably determine the actual cost of a 
call.
Today, the Commission considers four petitions for reconsideration.  They largely rely on 
arguments that have already been considered and rejected by the Commission.  To the extent that the 
companies raised new arguments at this late stage, they were without merit.
Since the Commission issued the forfeiture orders, the companies have failed to pay them as 
ordered, and the FCC has referred these matters to the U.S. Department of Justice, which has begun to file 
the appropriate proceedings in federal court.  Resolution of these petitions today will aid the expeditious 
prosecution of these cases by the Justice Department and facilitate collection efforts in federal court, 
promoting judicial efficiency.  
Today’s actions send two key messages to two key audiences.  To consumers, rest assured that 
the FCC has got your back.  To companies who would defraud consumers, please know that the FCC will 
hold you accountable and that if we levy fines, we will see that they are collected. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
10
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER AJIT PAI
Re:   Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452
I agree with the Commission that the four companies at issue here used blatantly misleading and 
deceptive marketing materials to sell prepaid calling cards.  This behavior should not be tolerated, 
especially when it involves preying upon vulnerable populations, such as immigrants.
Unfortunately, the Commission’s ability to lawfully impose forfeitures upon these companies has 
been fatally compromised by its inadequate and incomplete investigation into their conduct.  That’s why I 
dissented from the Forfeiture Orders imposed upon these companies last year, and that’s why I must 
dissent from these Orders denying their petitions for reconsideration.
Section 503(b)(4) of the Communications Act requires Notices of Apparent Liability to set forth, 
among other things, “the nature of the act or omission charged against such person and the facts upon 
which such charge is based” as well as “the date on which such conduct occurred.”
1
  In each of the cases 
here, the Commission has found that “a separate violation of section 201(b) occurred each time a 
consumer purchased” a misleading and deceptive prepaid calling card.
That raises a number of questions pertaining to each purported violation (i.e., each purchase of a 
prepaid calling card).  On which dates did the purchases of prepaid calling cards take place?  Who 
purchased them?  Where did these sales take place?  And which type of card was purchased?
The four underlying Notices of Apparent Liability did not answer any of these questions with 
respect to even a single purchase of a prepaid calling card.  The four Forfeiture Orders did not answer any
of these questions.  And the four Orders we are voting on today still do not answer any of these questions.  
Why is this information missing?  Because the Enforcement Bureau didn’t bother to ask for it.  To say the 
least, this is a problem.
To use an analogy, it’s as if a prosecutor decided to charge a suspect with robbing a whole bunch 
of people, and then at trial, failed to identify any of the victims, when they were robbed, where they were 
robbed, or what was stolen.  Regardless of the defendant’s guilt, there is no way that anyone could be 
convicted of robbery with such a lack of specific evidence.
As a result of the obvious deficiencies in the investigation, I do not believe that the Commission 
has complied with section 503(b)(4) of the Act or fundamental aspects of due process.
To be sure, the Commission has claimed that it was not required to include any of this specific 
information, including particular dates, in the Notices of Apparent Liability.  Instead, it contends that the 
companies were engaging in an unlawful “practice” that included activities repeated over time.  
Therefore, for example, the Commission argues that it was sufficient that the Notices of Apparent 
Liability “refer[red] to the time period during which the unlawful practice giving rise to the violation 
occurred.”
2
Had the Commission found that these four companies had each committed a single continuing 
violation of section 201(b) in the form of an unlawful practice, then I could perhaps understand the 
argument that the facts set forth in the Notices of Apparent Liability were sufficiently specific.  However, 
                                                     
1
See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).
2
Locus Telecommunications, Inc. Order at para. 9 (emphasis in original).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
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the Commission makes no such finding—probably because each company’s liability then would have 
been capped at $1.575 million.
3
  Instead, the Commission has concluded that each company committed a 
separate violation of section 201(b) each time that a consumer purchased a misleading and deceptive 
prepaid calling card.  At the same time, it’s failed to specify the basic facts underlying even a single sale.  
This is not legally permissible.
When it comes to enforcement, I have many times expressed the concern that the Commission is 
more interested in seeking headlines than respecting the rule of law.  These four Orders represent just the 
latest examples of this problem.  Here, the Commission appropriately identified four companies engaging 
in deeply problematic conduct.  But because its investigation of these companies was deeply flawed, I do 
not believe that it has lawfully imposed forfeitures on them.  These Orders will certainly generate some 
good press for the Commission, but I’m skeptical that a court will ever require these companies to pay 
these penalties.
                                                     
3
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(2).  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
12
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O'RIELLY
Re:   Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452
Since the Commission has done absolutely nothing to bolster the Forfeiture Orders, nothing in 
these latest orders on reconsideration persuades me that these companies should be subjected to 
unjustifiably large fines for conduct that is not covered by the Act, was not deceptive in any event, and 
did not actually harm a single consumer.  I dissent on each.
Fundamentally, I continue to object to the notion that the Commission has authority under section 
201(b) to regulate “deceptive marketing”.  In the underlying Forfeiture Orders, the Commission claimed
that deceptive marketing is an unjust and unreasonable practice.  However, as a former Commissioner 
noted, “if ‘practices’ includes advertising, then it is hard to imagine what it does not include.”
1
  Under this 
formulation, the Commission’s interpretation of section 201 is so boundless that such roving authority, if 
further embraced, will become the provision that swallows the rest of the Act.  And, in the hands of an 
Enforcement Bureau eager to expand the Commission’s reach, it’s beyond dangerous.
Because the Commission does not have rules on deceptive marketing and refuses to adopt any to 
everyone’s detriment, in my opinion, it continues to point to the 2001 NOS Communications Notice of 
Apparent Liability (NOS NAL).  I remain opposed to using adjudications to adopt new policy positions 
because there is no notice and no opportunity for all potentially impacted companies to provide comment.  
An NAL is not even a final decision of the Commission.  Indeed, when I first joined the Commission I 
was urged to support NALs even if I had concerns about the preliminary positions advanced in them, 
because I was told that parties would have a full and fair opportunity to rebut them in their responses, and 
the Commission would render a final decision on the merits at the forfeiture stage.  Now the Commission 
is trying to have it both ways. If NALs do not represent the Commission’s final determinations, then they 
cannot and do not provide notice of how the Commission might act in a future case.  That is particularly 
true where the Commission never issues a forfeiture order, but instead settles with the party, as was the 
case with NOS.
Even if one believes that an NAL does provide some degree of notice, which I don’t concede, the 
facts underlying the NOS NAL are so dissimilar that it could not have provided notice to these prepaid 
calling card providers that their markedly different advertisements would be considered problematic.  In 
the NOS NAL, the companies used a pricing methodology that “appear[ed] to be unique to these 
companies” and was so “complicated” and “confusing” that, even though the companies provided verbal 
and written instructions on how to calculate the rates, almost 900 consumers filed complaints.
2
  In 
contrast, these providers, who used standard advertisements and disclosures, would have had no basis to 
suspect that their marketing materials would be treated like those in the NOS NAL.
To start, the disclosures at issue here are neither “complicated” nor “confusing”.  They alert 
buyers to the fact that a specific set of fees could or would apply.  In some cases, the cards indicated that 
there would be a fee of “up to” a certain amount or that a “maximum” specified fee would apply.  In other 
instances, the cards noted that rates could be higher, for example, when calling wireless numbers.  I fail to 
see how a card could be considered deceptive when all categories of charges are spelled out with enough 
                                                     
1
Business Discount Plan, Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd 14461, 14475 (2000) (dissenting statement of 
Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth)
2
NOS Communications, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability, 16 FCC Rcd 8133, 8134, 8136, 8137 (2001).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-146
13
detail to enable a consumer to decide whether the card, overall, is a good deal.  A reasonable amount of 
imprecision should be considered acceptable when the companies do not control and cannot foresee 
exactly how consumers will choose to use the cards.  That’s not deceptive – it’s necessary for reasonable 
and flexible consumer usage.  And it is certainly distinctive from the NOS NAL where the companies 
provided customers with a specific formula that they falsely claimed would enable customers to easily 
calculate the exact charges.
Moreover, these practices are far from being “unique” compared to those of other calling card 
providers, as advertisements and disclosures at issue here appear to be commonplace elsewhere.  A quick 
search of other well-known prepaid calling card providers turned up disclosures with very similar 
qualifications.  In fact, the qualification that rates and/or terms and conditions are subject to change is 
commonly used in both the voice and broadband context by wireline, cable, wireless and other providers.  
In addition, posters with disclosures in smaller print on the bottom seem to be the norm.  If the NOS NAL
articulated a clear standard that provided companies with fair notice of the conduct required, as the 
Commission continues to allege, then why doesn’t anybody seem to know it?  As I said before, selective 
application of penalties when nobody appeared to be on notice is abusive.
Finally, not a single consumer filed a complaint.  If the advertisements were so unclear, you 
wouldn’t know it from the deafening silence of the public.  In fact, these cases demonstrate the complete 
absence of consumer harm.  The Commission responds that it is empowered by the Act to initiate 
enforcement on its own motion.  However, in an area as completely subjective as deceptive advertising, a 
vital factor must be whether anyone in the real world was actually deceived.  Seeing a null set should be 
telling to my colleagues and the general public.
Even though I would not have pursued enforcement actions against these companies in these 
instances, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the arbitrary approach the Commission used to 
calculate their fines, and which it refuses to reconsider. Because there were no instances of actual 
consumer complaints, the Commission had to find a way to approximate the supposed harm to 
consumers.  It did so by guessing how many cards might have been sold during the relevant timeframe 
and then assumed that all of those supposed sales involved deceptive marketing.  Using its discretion, 
however, the Commission has limited the fine in each item to 125 cards or 5 million dollars.  I'm 
supposed to believe that the Commission took into account the unique facts, circumstances, and 
egregiousness of each case but miraculously settled on 125 cards and 5 million dollars in each item? It is 
simply not credible that four companies of different sizes that sold different cards in different numbers 
would end up with the exact same fines.  Once again, the fines seem to be calculated to achieve a 
preordained result and headline, with no basis in fact or law.
As I said at the Forfeiture Order stage, some might dismiss these actions as an effort to clean up 
the backlog of items concerning an industry that is fading away.  However, providers of all types should 
be troubled by the Commission’s expansive reading of the statute, coupled with assertions that companies 
that were trying to follow the rules, followed standard industry practices, and never had any complaints 
lodged against them can nonetheless be fined millions of dollars.