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Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, DC 20554
In the Matter of
Locus Telecommunications, Inc.
)
)
)
)
)
File No.:  EB-TCD-12-00000452
NAL/Acct. No.:  201132170025
FRN:  0010729515
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted:  October 27, 2016 Released:  October 28, 2016
By the Commission: Chairman Wheeler issuing a statement; Commissioners Pai and O’Rielly dissenting 
and issuing separate statements.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. We dismiss in part and deny in part the Petition for Reconsideration filed by Locus 
Telecommunications, Inc. (Locus) seeking reconsideration of a Forfeiture Order issued by the 
Commission.  In the Forfeiture Order, the Commission imposed a forfeiture of $5,000,000 against Locus
for deceptively marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards through misleading, confusing, and 
inadequate disclosures of its rates and charges that made it impossible for consumers to calculate the 
actual cost of a call.
2. Upon review of the Petition for Reconsideration
1
and the entire record,
2
we find no basis 
for reconsideration.  A petition for reconsideration that relies on facts or arguments that have been fully 
considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding may be dismissed.
3
  Locus’s 
Petition for Reconsideration fails to present new facts or arguments warranting reconsideration, and we 
do not find that reconsideration is otherwise required in the public interest.  As explained below, we 
dismiss Locus’s arguments to the extent they were previously raised and rejected by the Commission in 
the Forfeiture Order and deny Locus’s other arguments on their merits for failing to demonstrate a 
material error or omission.  We therefore dismiss in part and deny in part Locus’s Petition.
                                                     
1
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., Petition for Reconsideration (Nov. 20, 2015) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00000452) 
(Petition).
2
The Forfeiture Order and Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture include more complete discussions of the 
facts and history of this case and are incorporated herein by reference.  Locus Telecommunications, Inc., Forfeiture 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11805 (2015) (Forfeiture Order); Locus Telecommunications, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability 
for Forfeiture, 26 FCC Rcd 12818 (2011) (NAL).
3
47 CFR § 1.106(p) (providing that petitions for reconsideration of a Commission action that “[r]ely on arguments 
that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding” may be dismissed 
because they “plainly do not warrant consideration by the Commission”); see also 47 CFR § 1.106(c); EZ 
Sacramento, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 18257, 18257, para. 2 (EB 2000).  A Petition for 
Reconsideration may be granted when the Commission determines that consideration of the facts or arguments 
raised by the petitioner is in the public interest.  47 CFR § 1.106(c)(2).  However, unless a petitioner either 
demonstrates a material error or omission in the underlying order or raises additional facts not known or not existing 
until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to present such matters, a petition for reconsideration may be dismissed.  
See 47 CFR § 1.106(c).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
2
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Commission Properly Exercised Jurisdiction over Locus’s Prepaid Calling 
Card Marketing Practices
3. In its Petition,
4
Locus reprises arguments it previously raised with the Commission in 
response to the Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NAL)
5
that the Commission lacks jurisdiction 
over its marketing practices under Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act).
6
  
Locus again contends that Section 201(b)’s prohibition on unjust and unreasonable practices does not 
cover marketing of prepaid calling cards.
7
  In addition, Locus repeats its claim that the Commission 
cannot impose liability against it in the absence of specific Commission rules regarding prepaid calling 
card marketing.
8
  Locus also rehashes its argument that it did not sell its prepaid calling cards on a 
common carriage basis and, consequently, falls outside the scope of Section 201(b).
9
1. Section 201(b) and Commission Rules  
4. These arguments were already considered by the Commission and rejected in the 
Forfeiture Order.  In the Forfeiture Order, we stated not only that “Section 201(b) reaches deceptive 
marketing – including the practices Locus engaged in,”
10
but also that Section 201(b) extends to Locus’s 
actions “even in the absence of implementing rules.”
11
  Locus contends that the Commission erred in the 
Forfeiture Order by “merely referr[ing]” to its rationale in rejecting jurisdictional claims raised by STi 
Telecom Inc. (STi) in a contemporaneous proceeding to reject Locus’s comparable arguments.
12
  Locus 
suggests that referencing the STi proceeding shows the Commission “failed to consider the unique 
arguments Locus raised in challenging the FCC’s exercise of jurisdiction.”
13
  We disagree.  The Forfeiture 
Order appropriately relied on the explanation in the companion STi Order, which reached certain 
generally applicable legal conclusions regarding the application of Section 201(b) to deceptive marketing.  
                                                     
4
Many of Locus’s jurisdictional arguments overlap with the due process challenges made in its Petition.  Compare 
Petition at 6-16, with id. at 16-21.  We address Locus’s arguments related to the Commission’s authority over its 
marketing practice under the Act in this section and address Locus’s claim that it lacked fair notice of the marketing 
disclosures required from prepaid calling card providers along with its other due process claims below.  See infra 
Section II.B.
5
See Locus Telecommunications, Inc., Request for Rescission of Notice of Apparent Liability (Oct. 21, 2011) (on 
file in EB-TCD-12-00000452) (NAL Response).
6
See Petition at i, 6-16; 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
7
Petition at 6-12; NAL Response at 15-19.
8
Petition at 6, 8; NAL Response at 16-18.
9
Petition at 12-16; NAL Response at 3-15.  The dissenters raise the same or similar arguments that they raised in 
response to the Forfeiture Order.  Those arguments were addressed in the Forfeiture Order, as supplemented by this 
item.  In addition, we note that there is no merit to the claim that it was “arbitrary” for the Commission to have 
“settled on 125 cards and 5 million dollars” in each of the four forfeiture orders addressed, collectively, in the 
dissent.  Even if the four relevant companies were of different sizes and sold different cards in different numbers, the 
Commission assessed the specific record before it in each case, and in each case reasonably inferred that the 
company committed at least 125 violations; the Commission then calculated a forfeiture amount equivalent to a base 
forfeiture applied to 125 violations.  See, e.g., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11813, para. 19 & n.68.  Far from 
being arbitrary, this was a lawful exercise of the Commission’s discretion that was grounded in the specific record 
before it in each case.
10
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11807, para. 6.
11
Id. (citing STi Telecom Inc. (formerly Epana Networks, Inc.), Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11742 (2015) (STi)).
12
Petition at 6-7.
13
Id. at 7.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
3
Most of Locus’s jurisdictional arguments (excepting only its common carrier status argument, discussed 
below), including its claims that Section 201(b) does not apply to prepaid calling card marketing and that 
the Commission must promulgate specific rules in order to take enforcement action, are not unique and 
were raised by a number of other prepaid calling card providers (including STi) and rejected by the 
Commission.
14
  In addition, these jurisdictional arguments represent generic, non-party-specific questions 
of law that were already addressed in the Forfeiture Order, not fact-specific determinations based on 
Locus’s particular marketing practices.
15
  Thus, the Commission validly concluded in STi that Section 
201(b) addresses deceptive marketing practices by providers of prepaid calling cards.  The fact that Locus 
did not have access to STi’s NAL Response does not disturb this precedent.  As a result, the references to 
the STi proceeding in the Forfeiture Order served to explain the Commission’s jurisdiction over deceptive 
advertising practices under Section 201(b), not supplant our consideration of the NAL Response, and 
addressed Locus’s comparable jurisdictional arguments.
16
  
2. Common Carrier Status
5. The only jurisdictional argument presented by Locus that arguably implicates “unique” 
facts relating to its business practices is its claim that it did not sell its prepaid calling cards on a common 
carriage basis.
17
  However, Locus previously made this argument in response to the NAL
18
and, as Locus 
recognizes in its Petition,
19
the Commission already fully addressed this argument in the Forfeiture Order 
and rejected it.
20
  The Commission found that “Locus is a common carrier engaged in the business of 
providing telecommunications service to consumers in the form of prepaid calling cards and, therefore, its 
advertising for such calling cards is subject to Section 201(b) of the Act.”
21
  Locus set destination rates, 
controlled “the number of minutes for which the cards [could] be used,” designed the cards and 
contracted with printers to print cards and advertising posters, retained final approval of designs and 
marketing materials, operated the customer service center, and issued “refunds and credits directly to 
customers who purchase[d] the cards.”
22
  While an entity “can be a common carrier with regard to some 
activities but not others,”
23
we found that Locus’s sale of “prepaid calling cards through a national 
distributor network”
24
constituted a common carrier service and “d[id] not change Company’s legal 
                                                     
14
See Touch-Tel USA, LLC, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11730, 11732, para. 6 & nn.19-20 (2015) (citing STi); 
Simple Network, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11765, 11767, para. 6 & nn.19-20 (2015) (same); NobelTel, 
LLC, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11779, 11781, para. 6 & nn.23-24 (2015) (same); Lyca Tel, LLC, Forfeiture 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11792, 11794, para. 6 & nn.18-19 (2015) (same).
15
See NOS Commc’ns, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 16 FCC Rcd 8133, 8136, para. 6 (2001) 
(finding deceptive marketing can “constitute unjust and unreasonable practices under [S]ection 201(b)”) (NOS 
NAL); STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11750-51, paras. 16-18 (finding Section 201(b) declares unjust and unreasonable 
marketing practices unlawful without the need for implementing regulations).
16
See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11807, para. 6 (citing STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11744-47, 11750-51, paras. 7-11, 
16-18).
17
Petition at 12-16.
18
NAL Response at 3-15 (arguing both that its distributors were not its agents and that it did not offer prepaid 
calling cards on a common carriage basis).
19
Petition at 6.
20
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11807-09, paras. 7-9 & n.42 (finding that Locus’s agency argument failed and 
that it exerted sufficient control over minutes, designs, access numbers, and marketing materials such that, even 
though using distributors, it was in a common carrier relationship with the consumers of its prepaid calling cards).
21
Id. at 11809, para. 9.
22
Id. at 11808-09, para 9. 
23
Nat’l Assoc. of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Petition at 13.
24
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11806, para. 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
4
status” as a common carrier.
25
  Locus states that the Commission erred by finding that its sale of calling 
cards directly to consumers through its website was “dispositive” of its common carrier status.
26
  
However, the Commission also stated that it still would have concluded that Locus operated as a common 
carrier “[e]ven if the Company did not sell cards directly to the public on its website . . . .”
27
  Moreover, 
the prepaid calling cards at issue in this case provided international toll voice service – a service that has 
long been understood to require Section 214 authorization because it may be offered only on a common 
carriage basis.
28
  We therefore find no basis to reconsider our prior determinations and find that the 
Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over Locus’s prepaid calling card marketing practices under 
Section 201(b) of the Act.
B. The Forfeiture Order Satisfied Due Process Requirements 
6. Locus also repeats the argument it raised with the Commission in response to the NAL 
that the Commission denied it due process by relying on purportedly “non-binding precedent” when 
assessing the marketing disclosures required from prepaid calling card providers.
29
  Locus asserts that the 
joint FCC/FTC Policy Statement regarding telecommunications offerings and the standard articulated by 
the Commission in the NOS NAL (and applied to it in the NAL) – that advertising denoting applicable 
rates associated with telecommunications services violates Section 201(b) where it does not include clear 
and conspicuous disclosures that allow consumers to calculate the cost of a call – did not provide notice to 
Locus of what marketing activities were prohibited.
30
  
                                                     
25
Id. at 11808-09, para. 9.
26
Petition at 12, 19.
27
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11808, para. 9 & n.42.  Indeed, the Commission referenced numerous indicia of 
control exercised by Locus over its calling cards that supported its common carrier status.  See id. (noting that Locus 
exercised “ultimate control” over the number of minutes for which its cards could be used and the marketing
materials for its cards).
28
See, e.g., Unipoint Techs., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 29 FCC Rcd 1633, 1637-38, paras. 14-16 (2014) (citing Time 
Machine, Inc., 11 FCC Rcd 1186, 1190, para. 25 (Com. Car. Bur. 1995)); see generally Qwest Servs. Corp. v. 
F.C.C., 509 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Regulation of Int’l Common Carrier Servs., Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 
7331 (1992); Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. Tariff FCC No. 35, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 3501 
(1991).  The prepaid calling card services at issue in this case remain a common carrier service, even when sold 
through resellers.  See Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs. and 
Facilities, Report and Order, 60 FCC2d 261 (1976).  The Commission has explained that “resale of communications 
service is a common carrier activity” and that “an entity engaged in the resale of communications service is a 
common carrier” that is “fully subject to the provisions of Title II of the Communications Act.”  Id. at 265, 308, 
paras. 8, 102.  The Commission went so far as to state that, “with the exception that some resellers may not own any 
transmission plant, we perceive no difference between resale and traditional communications common carriage.”  Id. 
at 308, para. 101.  In finding that resellers were also common carriers, the Commission contemplated a host of 
brokers and other “middlemen” who buy common carrier services and then sell them on a resale basis, including 
middlemen like Locus.  See id. at 272, para. 19.  
29
Petition at 8-12, 16-21; NAL Response at 16-22, 25-29.  Locus also states that other Commission precedent cited 
in support of the NAL is distinguishable from its conduct.  Id. at 11-12.  Locus is mistaken.  Attempts to distinguish 
the cases are unavailing because the Commission’s findings did not hinge on any differences in the industries 
involved or the services offered, but rather focused on whether sufficient information was provided to consumers.  
See NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12820, para. 7 & n.13 (citing NOS NAL; Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr.& Consumer 
Action, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd 2157 (Com.Car. Bur. 1989); Bus. Disc. Plan, Inc., Order of 
Forfeiture, 15 FCC Rcd 14461 (2000), recon. granted in part and denied in part, 15 FCC Rcd 24396 (2000)).    
Thus, the focus of the conduct at issue in these cases was whether or not the content of marketing and advertising 
information provided accurate information to consumers, not on any potentially unique aspects of post-paid services.  
As such, we reject Locus’ attempt to distinguish these cases.  
30
Petition at 16-18 (citing Joint FCC/FTC Policy Statement for the Advertising of Dial-Around and Other Long 
Distance Services to Consumers, Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd 8654 (2000); NOS NAL).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
5
7. As an initial matter, we note that the Commission did not base its violation findings on 
the Policy Statement.  Instead, the Commission based its violation findings on Section 201(b) of the Act, 
as informed by the Policy Statement and the NOS NAL.
31
  As stated above, the Commission has 
jurisdiction to enforce the Act’s deceptive marketing prohibition on prepaid calling card providers like 
Locus under Section 201(b).
32
  Moreover, we are not persuaded by Locus’s argument that the NOS NAL 
“carries absolutely no precedential weight” because the Commission ultimately resolved the matter 
through settlement.  The relevant legal issue here is not the “precedential weight” of the NOS NAL, but 
rather whether it provided fair notice to Locus. As we explained in the Forfeiture Order, the Commission 
clearly set forth the advertising requirements associated with telecommunications services in the NOS 
NAL – including the importance of not misleading consumers about the applicable rates for 
telecommunications services by ensuring that service providers include “clear and conspicuous disclosure 
on how to calculate the total cost of a call.”
33
  The mere fact that the Commission ultimately resolved the 
NOS NAL through settlement “does not undermine the value of [it] in providing fair notice.”
34
  The 
Commission previously determined that the finding in the NOS NAL, coupled with the language of 
Section 201(b), “provides a person of ordinary intelligence with fair notice of the conduct that is 
required” from calling card providers.
35
  We find no basis to reconsider our prior findings here.
36
  We 
therefore find that the Commission’s investigation of Locus for deceptive marketing of prepaid calling 
cards did not violate due process requirements.
37
    
C. The Commission Provided Sufficient Specificity as to Locus’s Violations and 
Support for the Forfeiture Amount
8. Locus concludes its Petition with a laundry list of repetitive arguments challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Commission’s violation findings and the forfeiture amount.
38
  
Locus argues that the NAL and Forfeiture Order lacked the requisite specificity under Section 503(b)(4) 
                                                     
31
See NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12820, 12823, paras. 7 & nn.13-14; Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11809-11, paras. 
10-15.
32
See supra Section II.A.
33
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11809, para. 10 (citing NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8137-38, para. 9).
34
Lyca Tel, 30 FCC Rcd at 11795, para. 5 & n.14.  See also Preferred Long Distance, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 
FCC Rcd 13711, 13718, para. 16 & n.53 (2015) (finding that an NAL, with other Commission decisions, “provided 
the requisite fair notice”).
35
Lyca Tel, 30 FCC Rcd at 11796, para. 15 (citations omitted).  We also underscore that NALs, Forfeiture Orders, 
and rulemakings are not the only ways in which the Commission can put regulatees on notice of their obligations.  
See, e.g., Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that an official interpretation 
issued by the Commission’s staff on delegated authority, such as a public notice or letter, has the same force and 
effect as other actions of the Commission).
36
47 CFR § 1.106(p).
37
Locus also asserts that the Commission’s application of Section 201(b) to its marketing practices “created a 
standard akin to tariffing.”  Petition at 23 & n.97.  The findings in the NAL and Forfeiture Order do not institute a 
tariff approval process.  To the contrary, the underlying findings in this case hinge upon consumer-facing misleading 
or deceptive marketing and advertising, not the manner in which Locus sets its prices.  The Commission’s actions in 
this case do not second-guess carrier pricing, but rather ensure that carriers who advertise rates provide consumers 
with the information they need to calculate the cost of a call.  In the current post-tariff environment (where 
consumers do not have one centralized place to access pricing information), it is all the more crucial that carriers 
fulfill their responsibilities to customers by providing transparent pricing information.  See Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 
309 F.3d 404, 421-22 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that tariffs served as a mechanism to assure compliance with Sections 
201 and 202 of the Act, and that “[f]ollowing detariffing, those goals remain”).
38
Petition at 21-25.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
6
of the Act regarding the “act or omission charged,” including the dates on which violations occurred.
39
  
Locus again suggests that the Commission must identify specific complaints or consumers harmed by its 
prepaid calling card practices in order to assess a forfeiture.
40
  But we previously stated in the Forfeiture 
Order that “the Commission is not required to rely on or refer to consumer complaints in order to 
investigate and impose forfeitures on common carriers.”
41
  The Act empowers the Commission to 
“investigate and impose forfeitures on common carriers even in the complete absence of consumer 
complaints.”
42
  We also reminded Locus that “the Commission need not demonstrate actual harm to 
consumers to find violations of Section 201(b).”
43
  Instead, all that is needed to support an enforcement 
action “is a determination that the Company has willfully or repeatedly failed to comply with a provision 
of the Act or an FCC order.”
44
  Under Section 201(b), Locus committed an unreasonable practice because 
its cards and advertising posters were misleading and Locus did not disclose sufficient countervailing 
information on its prepaid calling cards and associated advertising materials to allow a customer to 
calculate the cost of a call.
45
  Finally, Locus states that the Commission based its forfeiture amount “on an 
arbitrary 125 cards apparently sold during the year preceding the issuance of the NAL.”
46
  Locus 
misinterprets the Commission’s findings – the Commission was merely noting that the amount of the 
forfeiture was equivalent to a base forfeiture applied to 125 violations, not that only 125 violations 
occurred.
47
  
9. In any event, the Commission has interpreted Section 503(b)(4) flexibly and we 
previously noted that the statute “does not require exact dates in every context.”
48
  As in the present case, 
when a carrier engages in an unjust or unreasonable “practice” under Section 201(b), we interpret the 
language of Section 503(b)(4)—“the date on which such conduct occurred”—to refer to the time period
during which the unlawful “practice” giving rise to the violation occurred.
49
  Thus, an NAL satisfies 
Section 503(b)(4)’s date requirement if it specifies the applicable time period within which the carrier 
                                                     
39
Id. at 21-22.  We note that the requirements of Section 503(b)(4) only extend to the NAL issued in a proceeding.  
See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) (requiring the “notice” to provide information regarding the specific provision(s) of the 
law violated, what conduct violated the law, and when such violative conduct occurred).  However, as Locus argues 
that the Forfeiture Order also contained insufficient information, we deny these claims on their merits below.
40
Petition at 23; NAL Response at 36, 40.
41
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11813, para. 20.
42
Preferred Long Distance, 30 FCC Rcd at 13717, para. 14.  
43
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11807, para. 6.
44
STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11754, para. 25.
45
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11811, para. 14 (“In addition to vague or incomplete representations, Locus’s 
disclosures omit key facts that consumers would need to understand the rate structure.”); NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 
12822-23, para. 12 (finding Locus’s disclosures “are inadequate to inform consumers fully about the possible 
reduction in the number of advertised minutes, the circumstances under which those minutes will not be received, or 
how to calculate the actual number of minutes provided”).  Cf. NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8137-38, para. 9 
(concluding that a misleading rate structure “would almost certainly be misleading to consumers in the absence of . . 
. clear and conspicuous disclosure on how to calculate the total cost of a call”).
46
Petition at 21.
47
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11813, para. 19 & n.68; NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12825, para. 18 & n.40.  See also 
infra. para. 10 (discussing the forfeiture calculation).
48
STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11749, para. 15 (citing E. Carolina Broad. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 
6154, 6155-56, para. 12 (1991); WROV Broadcasters, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 1421, 
1422, para. 12 (1991)).
49
Id. at 11749-50, para. 15.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
7
engaged in the unlawful practice or conduct.
50
  This interpretation provides a practical reading of the 
statute and also gives effect to our interpretation of “practice” as used in Section 201(b),
51
while still 
providing sufficient information to satisfy Section 503(b)(4) of the Act.  As such, the Commission 
satisfied the notice requirements of Section 503(b)(4) by identifying: (1) the specific provision of the Act 
that Locus violated (Section 201(b)); (2) the nature of Locus’s conduct that violated the Act (deceptive 
marketing of prepaid calling cards); and (3) the time period during which such conduct occurred (the year 
preceding the NAL’s release).
52
  Accordingly, Locus’s Section 503(b)(4) claims are without merit and 
denied.
10. We also reject Locus’s repeated claim that that Commission failed to justify the forfeiture 
amount.
53
  The Commission issued the forfeiture in this case in accordance with Section 503(b) of the 
Act,
54
Section 1.80 of the Commission’s rules (Rules),
55
and the Commission’s Forfeiture Policy 
Statement.
56
  When we assess forfeitures, Section 503(b)(2)(E) requires that we take into account the 
“nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation and, with respect to the violator, the degree of 
culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and such other matters as justice may require.”
57
  
In this case, the Commission considered each of these factors and determined that a $5,000,000 forfeiture 
took into account “the extent and gravity of Locus’s egregious conduct, as well as its culpability.”
58
  The 
Commission further determined that the forfeiture must be significant enough to “protect the interests of 
consumers and serve as an adequate deterrent,” while recognizing “Locus’s failure to adequately provide 
material information about its rates to thousands of consumers who purchased the Company’s prepaid 
cards.”
59
  Also pursuant to such considerations, the Commission exercised its discretion in setting the 
forfeiture amount at the equivalent of only 125 violations, rather than applying the base forfeiture amount 
to every one of the hundreds of Locus cards sold each day.
60
  Having considered such factors in both the 
NAL and Forfeiture Order, we find the forfeiture assessment proper and see no reason to reconsider it 
here. 
                                                     
50
Id. at 11750, para. 15.
51
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (“Statutory construction must begin with the 
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses 
the legislative purpose.”) (citations omitted).  
52
See NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12824-25, para. 18; Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11814, para. 23.  See, e.g., 
Travelcomm Indus., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 26 FCC Rcd 6476, 6481, para. 12 (2011) (rejecting Section 503(b)(4) 
notice claim where NAL “described in detail the evidence upon which the proposed forfeiture was based”).
53
Petition at 24-25; NAL Response at 38-41.
54
47 U.S.C. § 503(b).
55
47 CFR § 1.80.
56
The Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement and Amendment of Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the 
Forfeiture Guidelines, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 17087 (1997) (Forfeiture Policy Statement), recons. denied, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 303 (1999). 
57
47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(E).
58
NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12825, para. 18.  See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11813-14, para. 21 (noting forfeiture 
amount was based on Section 503 factors).  Locus shares a close corporate relationship with Total Call Mobile, 
which is the target of a $51 million Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture for Lifeline-related violations. Total 
Call Mobile, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture and Order, 31 FCC Rcd 4191 (2016).  For example, 
both companies have the same corporate parent, KDDI America, and both have overlapping corporate officers, such 
as the chief executive officer and general counsel.
59
NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12825, para. 18.
60
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11813, para. 19 & n.68; NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12825, para. 18 & n.40.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
8
11. Locus also argues that if the Commission can base its violation findings on a time period 
during which deceptive marketing occurred, it cannot find that “each alleged card sale constituted a 
separate violation of Section 201(b).”
61
  However, Locus offers no legal support for this proposition and 
we find nothing to suggest that identifying the relevant time period during which violations took place in 
accordance with Section 503(b)(4) precludes us from assessing a forfeiture for each calling card sold.  As 
we previously stated:
[T]he very nature of an unlawful ‘practice’ under Section 201(b) is that it may include 
activities that are repeated over time and is not merely a discrete event on a single day.  
The violations charged in this case included the unlawful practices of making deceptive 
misrepresentations and failing to disclose material information about rates, charges, and 
practices at the point of sale for each calling card sold.
62
  
Likewise, in the present case, the violations involved inadequate advertising disclosures in connection 
with transactions that occurred with multiple consumers in multiple locations on multiple days; the 
violations were not a discrete event.  Accordingly, the Commission made clear that each card sold 
involved the same deceptive marketing practice (misleading cost disclosures that presented insufficient 
information to calculate the cost of a call) that violated the Act.
63
  Thus, the Commission found that 
Locus’s deceptive marketing of each prepaid calling card to consumers constituted a separate violation of 
Section 201(b) and properly calculated the forfeiture to account for the violations’ egregiousness, Locus’s 
culpability, and the need to ensure that deceptive marketing forfeitures “are not considered merely an 
affordable cost of doing business.”
64
  Locus advances no argument or new fact that warrants 
reconsideration of these findings.
65
  
III. CONCLUSION
12. Based on the record before us and in light of the applicable statutory factors, we affirm 
our conclusion that Locus willfully and repeatedly violated Section 201(b) of the Act by deceptively 
marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards, making it impossible for consumers to calculate the cost of 
a call.
66
  We further affirm our decision not to cancel or reduce the $5,000,000 forfeiture.     
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
13. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 405 of the Act and Section 
1.106 of the Rules, the Petition for Reconsideration filed by Locus Telecommunications, Inc., is hereby 
DISMISSED IN PART AND, in remaining part, DENIED.
67
                                                     
61
Petition at 24-25.
62
STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11748-49, para. 14 (citations omitted) (emphasis original).
63
See NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12824, para. 18; Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11812-13, para. 19.
64
NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12825, para. 18.
65
47 CFR § 1.106(b), (p) (Petitions for Reconsideration that fail to rely on new facts or changed circumstances may 
be dismissed).  Locus once again argues that the Commission neglected to consider Locus’s purported compliance 
with state laws as evidence that its marketing practices were not deceptive when assessing the forfeiture.  Petition at 
24; NAL Response at 22-25.  But we already determined that “the existence of state laws regulating advertising does 
not preclude the Commission from taking action to protect consumers from deceptive advertising on its own motion 
under the Act” and concluded that Locus’s marketing practices were deceptive under Section 201(b).  Forfeiture 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11809-12, paras. 10-17.  We find no basis to depart from our earlier findings here.  47 CFR § 
1.106(p).   
66
47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
67
47 U.S.C. § 405; 47 CFR § 1.106.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
9
14. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 503(b) of the Act and Section
1.80 of the Rules, Locus Telecommunications, Inc., IS LIABLE FOR A MONETARY FORFEITURE
of five million dollars ($5,000,000) for willfully and repeatedly violating Section 201(b) of the Act.
68
15. Payment of the forfeiture shall be made in the manner provided for in Section 1.80 of the 
Rules within thirty (30) calendar days after the release date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
69
16. Payment of the forfeiture must be made by check or similar instrument, wire transfer, or 
credit card, and must include the NAL/Account Number and FRN referenced above.  Locus 
Telecommunications, Inc., shall send electronic notification of payment to Lisa Williford at 
Lisa.Williford@fcc.gov on the date said payment is made.  Regardless of the form of payment, a 
completed FCC Form 159 (Remittance Advice) must be submitted.
70
  When completing the FCC Form 
159, enter the Account Number in block number 23A (call sign/other ID) and enter the letters “FORF” in 
block number 24A (payment type code).  Below are additional instructions that should be followed based 
on the form of payment selected:  
? Payment by check or money order must be made payable to the order of the Federal 
Communications Commission. Such payments (along with the completed Form 159) must be 
mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-
9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank – Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-
GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63101.
? Payment by wire transfer must be made to ABA Number 021030004, receiving bank 
TREAS/NYC, and Account Number 27000001. To complete the wire transfer and ensure 
appropriate crediting of the wired funds, a completed Form 159 must be faxed to U.S. Bank 
at (314) 418-4232 on the same business day the wire transfer is initiated.
? Payment by credit card must be made by providing the required credit card information on 
FCC Form 159 and signing and dating the Form 159 to authorize the credit card payment.  
The completed Form 159 must then be mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. 
Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank –
Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 
63101.
17. Any request for making full payment over time under an installment plan should be sent 
to: Chief Financial Officer—Financial Operations, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th 
Street, SW, Room 1-A625, Washington, DC 20554.
71
  Questions regarding payment procedures should be 
directed to the Financial Operations Group Help Desk by phone, 1-877-480-3201, or by e-mail, 
ARINQUIRIES@fcc.gov.
                                                     
68
47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 503(b); 47 CFR § 1.80.
69
47 CFR § 1.80.  The Department of Justice (DOJ) has filed a Complaint for Recovery of the forfeiture against 
Locus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  The court has granted the DOJ leave to file 
a motion requesting that the case be held in abeyance until such time as the Commission decides Locus’s Petition for 
Reconsideration.  
70
An FCC Form 159 and detailed instructions for completing the form may be obtained at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form159/159.pdf.
71
See 47 CFR § 1.1914.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
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18. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall 
be sent by first class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested, to Locus Telecommunications, Inc., 
Attention: Yasunori Matsuda, Chief Executive Officer; Andrew Miesiak, Chairman/Senior Officer; and 
Michael Morrissey, President/Senior Officer, 2200 Fletcher Avenue, Suite 600, Fort Lee, NJ, 07024; and 
to Jonathan S. Marashlian, Esq., Marashlian & Donahue, PLLC, 1420 Spring Hill Road, Suite 401, 
McLean, Virginia, 22102.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
11
STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER
Re:   Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452
The FCC has a statutory mandate to protect consumers who rely our nation’s networks, and 
meeting this responsibility is one of the Commission’s top priorities.  A key component of our consumer 
protection strategy has been smarter, tougher enforcement of our rules.  In recent years, our Enforcement 
Bureau has ramped up its efforts to ensure companies follow the rules and consumers get what they pay 
for. We’ve taken actions and levied fines to crack down on a series of anti-consumer practices, from 
cramming to Wi-Fi blocking to failure to protect consumer data. 
Today, the Commission votes on a series of petitions to hold companies accountable for 
deceptively marketing prepaid calling cards.  
In October 2015, the Commission fined six companies that falsely advertised that their low-cost 
prepaid calling cards could allow consumers far more calling minutes than were in fact being sold.  In 
each case, the company marketed its cards in a way that promised hundreds or thousands of minutes of 
calling time for only a few dollars.  However, unless used in a single call, various fees and surcharges 
would diminish the minutes available and consumers would only receive a fraction of the promised 
minutes.  The marketing materials for the prepaid cards deceived consumers by failing to clearly or 
conspicuously disclose or explain the fees and surcharges that applied to the calling cards.  Many of the 
disclosures were also vague, offering only potential charges and ranges of fees. Some disclosures even 
said that the charges, fees, or minutes could be changed without notice.
The 2015 Forfeiture Orders all underscored the common sense notion that a company must 
provide sufficient information to consumers so that they can reasonably determine the actual cost of a 
call.
Today, the Commission considers four petitions for reconsideration.  They largely rely on 
arguments that have already been considered and rejected by the Commission.  To the extent that the 
companies raised new arguments at this late stage, they were without merit.
Since the Commission issued the forfeiture orders, the companies have failed to pay them as 
ordered, and the FCC has referred these matters to the U.S. Department of Justice, which has begun to file 
the appropriate proceedings in federal court.  Resolution of these petitions today will aid the expeditious 
prosecution of these cases by the Justice Department and facilitate collection efforts in federal court, 
promoting judicial efficiency.  
Today’s actions send two key messages to two key audiences.  To consumers, rest assured that 
the FCC has got your back.  To companies who would defraud consumers, please know that the FCC will 
hold you accountable and that if we levy fines, we will see that they are collected. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
12
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER AJIT PAI
Re:   Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452
I agree with the Commission that the four companies at issue here used blatantly misleading and 
deceptive marketing materials to sell prepaid calling cards.  This behavior should not be tolerated, 
especially when it involves preying upon vulnerable populations, such as immigrants.
Unfortunately, the Commission’s ability to lawfully impose forfeitures upon these companies has 
been fatally compromised by its inadequate and incomplete investigation into their conduct.  That’s why I 
dissented from the Forfeiture Orders imposed upon these companies last year, and that’s why I must 
dissent from these Orders denying their petitions for reconsideration.
Section 503(b)(4) of the Communications Act requires Notices of Apparent Liability to set forth, 
among other things, “the nature of the act or omission charged against such person and the facts upon 
which such charge is based” as well as “the date on which such conduct occurred.
1
  In each of the cases 
here, the Commission has found that “a separate violation of section 201(b) occurred each time a 
consumer purchased” a misleading and deceptive prepaid calling card.
That raises a number of questions pertaining to each purported violation (i.e., each purchase of a 
prepaid calling card).  On which dates did the purchases of prepaid calling cards take place?  Who 
purchased them?  Where did these sales take place?  And which type of card was purchased?
The four underlying Notices of Apparent Liability did not answer any of these questions with 
respect to even a single purchase of a prepaid calling card.  The four Forfeiture Orders did not answer any
of these questions.  And the four Orders we are voting on today still do not answer any of these questions.  
Why is this information missing?  Because the Enforcement Bureau didn’t bother to ask for it.  To say the 
least, this is a problem.
To use an analogy, it’s as if a prosecutor decided to charge a suspect with robbing a whole bunch 
of people, and then at trial, failed to identify any of the victims, when they were robbed, where they were 
robbed, or what was stolen.  Regardless of the defendant’s guilt, there is no way that anyone could be 
convicted of robbery with such a lack of specific evidence.
As a result of the obvious deficiencies in the investigation, I do not believe that the Commission 
has complied with section 503(b)(4) of the Act or fundamental aspects of due process.
To be sure, the Commission has claimed that it was not required to include any of this specific 
information, including particular dates, in the Notices of Apparent Liability.  Instead, it contends that the 
companies were engaging in an unlawful “practice” that included activities repeated over time.  
Therefore, for example, the Commission argues that it was sufficient that the Notices of Apparent 
Liability “refer[red] to the time period during which the unlawful practice giving rise to the violation 
occurred.”
2
Had the Commission found that these four companies had each committed a single continuing 
violation of section 201(b) in the form of an unlawful practice, then I could perhaps understand the 
argument that the facts set forth in the Notices of Apparent Liability were sufficiently specific.  However, 
                                                     
1
See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).
2
Locus Telecommunications, Inc. Order at para. 9 (emphasis in original).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
13
the Commission makes no such finding—probably because each company’s liability then would have 
been capped at $1.575 million.
3
  Instead, the Commission has concluded that each company committed a 
separate violation of section 201(b) each time that a consumer purchased a misleading and deceptive 
prepaid calling card.  At the same time, it’s failed to specify the basic facts underlying even a single sale.  
This is not legally permissible.
When it comes to enforcement, I have many times expressed the concern that the Commission is 
more interested in seeking headlines than respecting the rule of law.  These four Orders represent just the 
latest examples of this problem.  Here, the Commission appropriately identified four companies engaging 
in deeply problematic conduct.  But because its investigation of these companies was deeply flawed, I do 
not believe that it has lawfully imposed forfeitures on them.  These Orders will certainly generate some 
good press for the Commission, but I’m skeptical that a court will ever require these companies to pay 
these penalties.
                                                     
3
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(2).  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
14
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O'RIELLY
Re:   Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452
Since the Commission has done absolutely nothing to bolster the Forfeiture Orders, nothing in 
these latest orders on reconsideration persuades me that these companies should be subjected to 
unjustifiably large fines for conduct that is not covered by the Act, was not deceptive in any event, and 
did not actually harm a single consumer.  I dissent on each.
Fundamentally, I continue to object to the notion that the Commission has authority under section 
201(b) to regulate “deceptive marketing”.  In the underlying Forfeiture Orders, the Commission claimed
that deceptive marketing is an unjust and unreasonable practice.  However, as a former Commissioner 
noted, “if ‘practices’ includes advertising, then it is hard to imagine what it does not include.”
1
  Under this 
formulation, the Commission’s interpretation of section 201 is so boundless that such roving authority, if 
further embraced, will become the provision that swallows the rest of the Act.  And, in the hands of an 
Enforcement Bureau eager to expand the Commission’s reach, it’s beyond dangerous.
Because the Commission does not have rules on deceptive marketing and refuses to adopt any to 
everyone’s detriment, in my opinion, it continues to point to the 2001 NOS Communications Notice of 
Apparent Liability (NOS NAL).  I remain opposed to using adjudications to adopt new policy positions 
because there is no notice and no opportunity for all potentially impacted companies to provide comment.  
An NAL is not even a final decision of the Commission.  Indeed, when I first joined the Commission I 
was urged to support NALs even if I had concerns about the preliminary positions advanced in them, 
because I was told that parties would have a full and fair opportunity to rebut them in their responses, and 
the Commission would render a final decision on the merits at the forfeiture stage.  Now the Commission 
is trying to have it both ways.  If NALs do not represent the Commission’s final determinations, then they 
cannot and do not provide notice of how the Commission might act in a future case.  That is particularly 
true where the Commission never issues a forfeiture order, but instead settles with the party, as was the 
case with NOS.
Even if one believes that an NAL does provide some degree of notice, which I don’t concede, the 
facts underlying the NOS NAL are so dissimilar that it could not have provided notice to these prepaid 
calling card providers that their markedly different advertisements would be considered problematic.  In 
the NOS NAL, the companies used a pricing methodology that “appear[ed] to be unique to these 
companies” and was so “complicated” and “confusing” that, even though the companies provided verbal 
and written instructions on how to calculate the rates, almost 900 consumers filed complaints.
2
  In 
contrast, these providers, who used standard advertisements and disclosures, would have had no basis to 
suspect that their marketing materials would be treated like those in the NOS NAL.
To start, the disclosures at issue here are neither “complicated” nor “confusing”.  They alert 
buyers to the fact that a specific set of fees could or would apply.  In some cases, the cards indicated that 
there would be a fee of “up to” a certain amount or that a “maximum” specified fee would apply.  In other 
instances, the cards noted that rates could be higher, for example, when calling wireless numbers.  I fail to 
see how a card could be considered deceptive when all categories of charges are spelled out with enough 
                                                     
1
Business Discount Plan, Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd 14461, 14475 (2000) (dissenting statement of 
Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth)
2
NOS Communications, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability, 16 FCC Rcd 8133, 8134, 8136, 8137 (2001).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-144
15
detail to enable a consumer to decide whether the card, overall, is a good deal.  A reasonable amount of 
imprecision should be considered acceptable when the companies do not control and cannot foresee 
exactly how consumers will choose to use the cards.  That’s not deceptive – it’s necessary for reasonable 
and flexible consumer usage.  And it is certainly distinctive from the NOS NAL where the companies 
provided customers with a specific formula that they falsely claimed would enable customers to easily 
calculate the exact charges.
Moreover, these practices are far from being “unique” compared to those of other calling card 
providers, as advertisements and disclosures at issue here appear to be commonplace elsewhere.  A quick 
search of other well-known prepaid calling card providers turned up disclosures with very similar 
qualifications.  In fact, the qualification that rates and/or terms and conditions are subject to change is 
commonly used in both the voice and broadband context by wireline, cable, wireless and other providers.  
In addition, posters with disclosures in smaller print on the bottom seem to be the norm.  If the NOS NAL
articulated a clear standard that provided companies with fair notice of the conduct required, as the 
Commission continues to allege, then why doesn’t anybody seem to know it?  As I said before, selective 
application of penalties when nobody appeared to be on notice is abusive.
Finally, not a single consumer filed a complaint.  If the advertisements were so unclear, you 
wouldn’t know it from the deafening silence of the public.  In fact, these cases demonstrate the complete 
absence of consumer harm.  The Commission responds that it is empowered by the Act to initiate 
enforcement on its own motion.  However, in an area as completely subjective as deceptive advertising, a 
vital factor must be whether anyone in the real world was actually deceived.  Seeing a null set should be 
telling to my colleagues and the general public.
Even though I would not have pursued enforcement actions against these companies in these 
instances, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the arbitrary approach the Commission used to 
calculate their fines, and which it refuses to reconsider. Because there were no instances of actual 
consumer complaints, the Commission had to find a way to approximate the supposed harm to 
consumers.  It did so by guessing how many cards might have been sold during the relevant timeframe 
and then assumed that all of those supposed sales involved deceptive marketing.  Using its discretion, 
however, the Commission has limited the fine in each item to 125 cards or 5 million dollars.  I'm 
supposed to believe that the Commission took into account the unique facts, circumstances, and 
egregiousness of each case but miraculously settled on 125 cards and 5 million dollars in each item? It is 
simply not credible that four companies of different sizes that sold different cards in different numbers 
would end up with the exact same fines.  Once again, the fines seem to be calculated to achieve a 
preordained result and headline, with no basis in fact or law.
As I said at the Forfeiture Order stage, some might dismiss these actions as an effort to clean up 
the backlog of items concerning an industry that is fading away.  However, providers of all types should 
be troubled by the Commission’s expansive reading of the statute, coupled with assertions that companies 
that were trying to follow the rules, followed standard industry practices, and never had any complaints 
lodged against them can nonetheless be fined millions of dollars.