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Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, DC 20554
In the Matter of
William F. Crowell
Licensee of Amateur Radio Station W6WBJ
Diamond Springs, California
)
)
)
)
)
)
File No.:  EB-FIELDWR-15-00019827
NAL/Acct. No.:  201632960001
FRN:  0014454912
FORFEITURE ORDER
Adopted:  August 1, 2016 Released:  August 2, 2016  
By the Director, Office of the Field Director, Enforcement Bureau:  
I. INTRODUCTION
1. We impose a penalty of $25,000 against William F. Crowell for operating an amateur 
station in violation of Section 333 of the Communications Act
1
and Sections 97.101(d) and 97.113(a)(4) 
of the Commission’s rules,
2
by intentionally causing interference to other amateur radio operators and 
transmitting prohibited communications, including music.  The penalty represents the full amount proposed 
in the Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NAL), and is based on the full base forfeiture amount as 
well as an upward adjustment reflecting Mr. Crowell’s decision to continue his misconduct after being 
warned that his actions violated the Communications Act and the Commission’s rules.
3
  
2. Deliberate interference undermines the utility of the Amateur Radio Service by preventing 
communications among licensed users who comply with the Commission’s Rules.  Mr. Crowell’s deliberate 
interference to other users, using voice, noises and music, directly contravenes the Amateur Radio Service’s 
fundamental purpose as a voluntary noncommercial communications service to contribute to the 
advancement of radio art, expand the existing reservoir of trained operators, technicians, and electronic 
experts, and continue the amateur’s unique ability to enhance international goodwill.  Mr. Crowell does not 
deny that he made the transmissions that prompted the NAL in this proceeding, but argues, in large part, that 
those transmissions were protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
4
  After reviewing Mr. 
Crowell’s arguments, we find no reason to cancel, withdraw, or reduce the forfeiture penalty proposed in 
the NAL. 
II. BACKGROUND
3. Section 333 of the Act states that “[n]o person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with 
or cause interference to any radio communications of any stations licensed or authorized by or under the 
Act or operated by the United States Government.”
5
  The legislative history for Section 333 of the Act 
                                                     
1
47 U.S.C. § 333. 
2
47 C.F.R. §§ 97.101(d), 97.113(a)(4).  
3
William F. Crowell, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 30 FCC Rcd 14267 (Enf. Bur., Western Region, 
San Francisco Office, 2015) (NAL).    
4
Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco Office, Western Region, 
Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission (dated Jan. 15, 2016) (Crowell NAL Response).  
5
47 U.S.C. § 333.
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
2
explains that willful and malicious interference is “intentional jamming, deliberate transmission on top of 
the transmissions of authorized users already using specific frequencies in order to obstruct their 
communications, repeated interruptions, and the use and transmission of whistles, tapes, records, or other 
types of noisemaking devices to interfere with the communications or radio signals of other stations.”
6
  
Section 97.101(d) of the Rules states that “[n]o amateur operator shall willfully or maliciously interfere 
with or cause interference to any radio communication or signal.”
7
  Section 97.113(a)(4) of the Rules states 
that “[n]o amateur station shall transmit . . . [m]usic using a phone emission except as specifically provided 
elsewhere in this section.”
8
   
4. On August 25 and 27, 2015, in response to multiple complaints of interference, primarily 
from members of the Western Amateur Radio Friendship Association (WARFA),
9
Field Agents from the 
Enforcement Bureau’s (Bureau’s) Western Region and the Commission’s High Frequency Direction 
Finding (HFDF) Center conducted investigations using mobile direction-finding techniques to find the 
source of the interference.
10
  During these investigations, the Agents and the HFDF Center observed Mr. 
Crowell’s amateur radio station intentionally interfering with other amateur licensees by transmitting on 
top of other amateurs, and repeatedly interrupting amateurs using noises on the WARFA net, recordings 
and music, so as to not allow them to transmit on 3908 kHz.
11
  Specifically, between 7:45 P.M. and 9:45 
P.M. PDT, on both August 25 and August 27, the Agents and the HFDF Center observed at least a dozen 
instances, lasting from thirty seconds to at least four minutes each, of Mr. Crowell intentionally 
transmitting on top of and repeatedly interrupting amateurs on the WARFA net.
12
  Based on those 
investigations, the Bureau found that Mr. Crowell had apparently willfully and repeatedly violated the Act 
and the rules, by intentionally causing interference to other amateur radio operators, transmitting on top of 
other operators, and transmitting prohibited communications and emissions, including music, at 3908 kHz.
13
     
5. On December 18, 2015, the Bureau released the NAL in this proceeding, proposing a 
$25,000 forfeiture against Mr. Crowell for apparent violations of Section 333 of the Act and Sections 
97.101(d) and 97.113(a)(4) of the rules.  Specifically, the NAL proposed a forfeiture of $7,000 for the 
interference observed on each day of investigation, and $4,000 for the unauthorized emissions on each 
day, for a total of $22,000.
14
  The Bureau also found that an upward adjustment of $3,000 appeared to be 
warranted, because Mr. Crowell continued to cause interference after being warned that such conduct 
violated the Commission’s rules.
15
                                                     
6
H.R. Rep. No. 101-316, at 8 (1989).  
7
47 C.F.R. § 97.101(d).  See 47 C.F.R. § 97.101(a) (stating that “each amateur radio station must be operated in 
accordance with good engineering and good amateur practice”). 
8
47 C.F.R. § 97.113(a)(4).
9
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14267-68, para. 3.  WARFA operates a “net” that meets three times a week at 3908 kHz.  See 
NAL, 30 FCC at 14267 n.3.  In the context of the amateur service, a net or a network is a group of amateur radio 
stations that share some common interest and exchange messages among themselves.  Uses and Capabilities of 
Amateur Radio Service Communications in Emergencies and Disaster Relief: Report to Congress Pursuant to 
Section 6414 of The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Report, 27 FCC Rcd 10039, 10041 n.21 
(WTB and PSHSB, 2012).   
10
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14267-68, para. 3. 
11
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268-69, para. 7.  
12
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268-69, para. 7.      
13
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14269-70, para. 7.  
14
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14271, para. 10.  
15
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14271, para. 10.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
3
6. On January 15, 2015, Mr. Crowell filed a response to the NAL.  Mr. Crowell later filed 
several supplements to his response.
16
  As discussed in detail below, Mr. Crowell admits making the 
transmissions cited in the NAL, but maintains that those transmissions were either protected by the 
Constitution or justified on the basis of other operators’ actions.  Alternatively, Mr. Crowell maintains 
that someone else caused the interference or transmitted prohibited communications at issue in this 
proceeding.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Jamming 
1.  Background
7. As noted above, Section 333 of the Act states that “[n]o person shall willfully or 
maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio communications of any stations licensed or 
authorized by or under the Act or operated by the United States Government.”
17
  Similarly, Section 
97.101(d) of the Rules states that “[n]o amateur operator shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or 
cause interference to any radio communication or signal.”
18
  Mr. Crowell has not raised any argument that 
warrants cancellation or reduction of the proposed forfeiture amount.
2. Freedom of Speech  
8. Background.  Mr. Crowell also asserts that the NAL was directed toward the content of 
his transmissions, and that it therefore violates the First Amendment.
19
  For example, in the NAL, the 
Bureau found that Mr. Crowell apparently willfully and repeatedly violated the Communications Act and 
the Commission’s Rules, by causing intentional interference to licensed radio operations and using music as 
part of his interfering transmissions.
20
  Mr. Crowell responds that repetitive transmissions are speech that is 
protected by the First Amendment.
21
  Mr. Crowell also claims that this alleged restriction on repetitive 
transmissions should be found to be void for vagueness, because the Commission has not provided 
adequate notice on how much repetition is unreasonable.
22
     
9. Mr. Crowell argues further that the Bureau characterized his transmissions as jamming or 
interference because it does not like what he wants to say.
23
In response, Mr. Crowell maintains that, 
because his transmissions are protected by the Freedom of Speech clause of the First Amendment, they 
cannot be prohibited as jamming.
24
  He argues further that, because the NAL was unconstitutional, it 
exceeded the Commission’s statutory authority.
25
  Mr. Crowell states that the U.S. Government cannot 
                                                     
16
Mr. Crowell’s supplements are listed in Appendix A to this Forfeiture Order. 
17
47 U.S.C. § 333.
18
47 C.F.R. § 97.101(d).  
19
Crowell NAL Response at 1. 
20
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14267, para. 2, citing 47 U.S.C. § 333, 47 C.F.R. §§ 97.101(d), 97.113(a)(4).  See also 47 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (giving the Commission authority to impose forfeiture penalties for “willfully and or 
repeatedly” violating the Communications Act or the Commission’s rules). 
21
Crowell NAL Response at 5.   
22
Crowell NAL Response at 6. 
23
Crowell NAL Response at 1-2, 28.
24
Crowell NAL Response at 1-2, 23. 
25
Crowell NAL Response at 21-22, 25; Crowell Supplement.   
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
4
condition the grant of a license on “an unconstitutional premise.”
26
Finally, Mr. Crowell asserts that the 
NAL is censorship, and so is inconsistent with Section 326 of the Act.
27
  
10. Discussion.  As an initial matter, to the extent that Mr. Crowell believes that the Bureau 
adopted the NAL merely because his transmissions were repetitive, he misunderstands the NAL.  The 
Bureau adopted the NAL in part because some of Mr. Crowell’s transmissions caused intentional 
interference to licensed radio operations, and because he made those interfering transmissions on a willful 
and repeated basis.
28
  To the extent that Mr. Crowell contends that the Commission has not provided 
adequate notice on the meaning of “repeatedly,” we disagree.  We have explained on many occasions 
that, for purposes of Section 503(b), the term “repeated” means the commission or omission of any act more 
than once or for more than one day.
29
   
11. Mr. Crowell is mistaken in assuming that the violations of Section 333 of the Act and 
Section 97.101(d) alleged in the NAL were based on the content of his transmissions.  Rather, the NAL
was clear that these violations resulted from the manner in which he made his transmissions.
30
  
Specifically, our Field Agents observed Mr. Crowell intentionally interfering with other amateur licensees,
by transmitting on top of other amateurs attempting to transmit, and repeatedly interrupting other amateurs 
using noises, recordings and music, so as to not allow them to transmit on 3908 kHz.
31
  This is precisely the 
kind of behavior that Congress sought to prohibit when it adopted Section 333 of the Act.
32
          
12. Further, if there were any merit in Mr. Crowell’s contention that the prohibition on 
willful and malicious interference is a content-based restriction of speech, he would still be mistaken in 
asserting that the restriction violates the Freedom of Speech clause of the First Amendment, or constitutes 
censorship in violation of Section 326 of the Act.  It is well-established that regulation of radio in general 
does not violate the First Amendment or Section 326,
33
and courts have made clear that this conclusion 
                                                     
26
Crowell NAL Response at Cover Letter, citing West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(Barnett); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 212-15 (1991) (Rust); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)
(Dolan).
27
Crowell NAL Response at 4.
28
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14267, para. 2.  Mr. Crowell further asserts that WARFA net’s transmissions were as 
repetitive as his were.  Crowell NAL Response at 5.  Because the forfeiture penalty proposed in the NAL was not 
based on the repetition of transmissions per se, we need not reach the issue of whether Mr. Crowell’s transmissions 
were more or less repetitive than transmissions by WARFA net’s members.   
29
Section 312(f)(2) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 312(f)(2), which also applies to violations for which forfeitures are 
assessed under Section 503(b) of the Act, provides that “[t]he term ‘repeated’, when used with reference to the 
commission or omission of any act, means the commission or omission of such act more than once or, if such 
commission or omission is continuous, for more than one day.”  See Callais Cablevision, Inc., Notice of Apparent 
Liability for Monetary Forfeiture, 16 FCC Rcd 1359, 1362, para. 9 (2001), cited in NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268-69, 
para. 5.  
30
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14269-70, para. 7.  The NAL mentioned that Mr. Crowell’s interfering transmissions 
included racial, ethnic, and sexual slurs and epithets, but this was in the context of background information, not in 
the context of an apparent rule violation.  NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268, para. 3. 
31
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14269-70, para. 7. 
32
The NAL noted that, in the legislative history for Section 333, Congress described “willful and malicious 
interference” as “intentional jamming, deliberate transmission on top of the transmissions of authorized users 
already using specific frequencies in order to obstruct their communications, repeated interruptions, and the use and 
transmission of whistles, tapes, records, or other types of noisemaking devices to interfere with the communications 
or radio signals of other stations.”  NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14269, para. 6, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-316, at 8 (1989). 
33
See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (NBC).  
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
5
applies to the amateur service as well.
34
  Accordingly, Mr. Crowell misplaces his reliance on the Freedom 
of Speech clause of the First Amendment.  Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Crowell believes that his 
license has been conditioned on “an unconstitutional premise,”
35
that belief is not supported by the cases 
he cites.
36
   
3. Checking In  
13. Mr. Crowell argues for a number of reasons that the interference he caused was justified 
because WARFA net would not let him “check in,” or participate in their conversations.  For reasons 
discussed in detail below, we reject those arguments.   
a. Right to Check In 
14. Background. Section 97.101(b) of the Commission’s rules reads as follows:
Each station licensee and each control operator must cooperate in selecting transmitting 
channels and in making the most effective use of the amateur service frequencies. No 
frequency will be assigned for the exclusive use of any station.
Mr. Crowell claims that WARFA net monopolizes the frequency, and refuses to let Mr. Crowell check 
in.
37
  According to Mr. Crowell, this constitutes violation of Section 97.101(b) of the Commission’s 
rules.
38
  Mr. Crowell argues further that such a violation provides justification for his conduct, because it 
                                                     
34
Gross v. FCC, 480 F.2d 1288, 1291 (2d Cir. 1973)(Gross), quoting NBC, 319 U.S. at 226.  Mr. Crowell claims 
that the Field Agents that inspected his station asserted incorrectly that the Commission is not subject to the 
Constitution.  Crowell NAL Response at 22, Crowell June 29 e-mail.  During that inspection, the Field Agents 
advised Mr. Crowell that causing harmful interference and playing music were violations of the Part 97 rules, 
without mentioning the Constitution specifically.  However, even if the Field Agents had asserted that the 
Commission was not subject to the Constitution, we note that the Bureau did not rely on any such assertion in the 
NAL, and we do not rely on any such assertion now.  Accordingly, Mr. Crowell’s claim regarding the Field Agents’ 
advice during the station inspection is not relevant to in this proceeding.    
35
Crowell NAL Response at Cover Letter.   
36
The cases on which Mr. Crowell bases his “unconstitutional premise” assertion are not on point, in that none of 
those cases address whether prohibiting a Commission licensee from causing willful or malicious interference to 
other licensees is an unconstitutional restriction on speech.  In fact, one of the cases cited by Mr. Crowell, Dolan, 
does not appear to address freedom of speech at all, but rather focuses on an eminent domain issue.  Dolan, 512 U.S. 
374.  Moreover, one of Mr. Crowell’s cases seems to reject arguments similar to the one he makes here.  In Rust, the 
majority opinion found that restricting government funding for facilities that advocate abortion as a method of 
family planning is not an unconstitutional restriction on the First Amendment rights of the employees of the 
facilities otherwise eligible to receive such funding.  Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-96.  There is nothing in the majority 
opinion in Rust that could be interpreted as providing any support for Mr. Crowell’s assertion that prohibiting 
amateur licensees from causing willful or malicious interference might violate the First Amendment.  (Mr. Crowell 
cites a dissenting opinion in Rust in support of his assertion.)   
37
Crowell NAL Response at 6, 13-14, 17-20, 28, Crowell February 14 E-mail.  See also Crowell NAL Response at 
26 (criticizing WARFA net for failing to allow everyone to check in to its net, and claiming that such failure is a 
violation of Section 97.101(b)); Crowell April 15 E-mail (forwarding an e-mail from a third party to the 
Commission, in which the third party criticizes members of WARFA net for not allowing him to check in); Crowell 
April 27 E-mail (forwarding an e-mail from another third party to the Commission, criticizing members of WARFA 
net for not allowing him to check in); Crowell December 31 E-mail (recommending that the Bureau discuss this 
issue with a former Commission employee who was precluded from checking into a net in 1982).     
38
Crowell NAL Response at 5, First Crowell January 21 E-mail.  Mr. Crowell claims further that WARFA net’s 
violation of Section 97.101(b) is motivated by its opposition to his speech, and criticizes the Commission because it 
has not taken action against the alleged WARFA net violations.  Crowell NAL Response at 6-7.
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
6
constitutes a waiver of WARFA net’s right to be protected from interference.
39
  Alternatively, Mr. 
Crowell maintains that he was exercising “self-policing,” in order to prevent WARFA net from further 
violating Section 97.101(b).
40
  As another legal theory, Mr. Crowell likens an amateur license to a form of 
contract between the licensee and the U.S. Government,
41
and argues that WARFA net breached its 
contract by refusing to let him check in, and that such a breach relieves other licensees from any 
obligation to cooperate with it.
42
  
15. Discussion.  As an initial matter, Mr. Crowell is mistaken in assuming that Section 
97.101(b) gives him a right to check in to any net, or that it places an obligation on operators of nets to let 
anyone check in.  Section 97.101(b) gives all amateur licensees the right to operate on any amateur
frequency, provided that there are no other licensees that are already using the frequency.  At least one 
federal court has found that transmitting without first finding a clear channel is “patently inconsistent with 
the plain language of 47 C.F.R. § 97.101(b) requiring cooperation among amateur radio licensees.”
43
  
That court explained further that, “[a]s a matter of law, any conscious and deliberate interference with 
other ongoing communications caused by those transmissions constitutes a willful violation for which 
[the licensee] is subject to forfeiture penalties.”
44
  Thus, Section 97.101(b) does not give Mr. Crowell or 
any other amateur operator authority to interrupt ongoing transmissions, for purposes of checking in to a 
net or for any other reason.  On the contrary, Section 97.101(b) prohibits such transmissions.         
16. In addition, by trying to check in when another operator was transmitting, Mr. Crowell 
caused harmful interference to other amateur operators in violation of Section 97.101(d).  Mr. Crowell’s 
contention that his transmissions were justified because he was trying to check in to a net was considered 
and rejected by the Commission.  Specifically, in the Paroli Review Order, the Commission confirmed a 
Compliance and Information Bureau Order that concluded that interference caused while trying to check 
in to a net violates Section 97.101(d).
45
     
17. Mr. Crowell’s argument that WARFA net’s participants waived their right to be protected 
from interference has no merit.  As an initial matter, as noted above, Mr. Crowell is mistaken in assuming 
that WARFA net violated the Commission’s rules by refusing to allow him to check in.  Furthermore, 
even if WARFA net had violated a Commission rule, that would not by itself justify the interference that 
Mr. Crowell caused.  Section 97.101(d) prohibits all amateur licensees from causing harmful interference, 
and does not provide any exception for interference caused to other amateurs whom the interferer believes
have violated a Commission rule.  Third, the operating authority conferred by a Commission license is 
subject to the Communications Act and the Commission’s rules.  Such licenses are not contracts, and so 
are not subject to contract law concepts such as “breach of contract.”  As a result, Mr. Crowell’s 
contention that a licensee’s rule violation could cause an immediate modification of its operating 
authority is unfounded.  The Commission can modify an amateur license, but only pursuant to the 
                                                     
39
Crowell NAL Response at 5, 7, 18. 
40
Crowell NAL Response at 6.   
41
Crowell NAL Response at 5, 6, 19.
42
Crowell NAL Response at 5.
43
United States v. Baxter, 841 F.Supp.2d 378, 395 (D.Me. 2012) (Baxter), judgment aff’d, Docket No. 12-1196 (1st 
Cir., Sept. 10, 2012) (internal quotations omitted). 
44
Baxter, 841 F.Supp.2d at 395, citing, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 97.101(d). 
45
Vernon A. Paroli Amateur Radio Station KA5OWW, Order, 10 FCC Rcd 7596 (Compliance and Information Bur., 
1995) (Paroli Order), aff’d Vernon A. Paroli Amateur Radio Station KA5OWW, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
11 FCC Rcd 3055 (1996) (Paroli Review Order). 
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
7
procedure set forth in Section 316 of the Communications Act and Section 97.27 of the Commission’s 
rules.
46
18. Finally, Mr. Crowell argues that he was practicing “self-policing” in order to prevent 
WARFA net from further violating Section 97.101(b).
47
  This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons.  
First, as explained above, WARFA net has not violated Section 97.101(b).  Second, Mr. Crowell is 
incorrect that his harmful interference can be justified as “self-policing.”  While use of amateur volunteers 
for the purpose of monitoring violations in the amateur service is permitted by the Communications Act,
48
the Act prohibits such volunteers from doing anything other than monitoring and reporting to the 
Commission:  “Nothing in this clause shall be construed to grant individuals recruited and trained under 
this subparagraph any authority to issue sanctions to violators or to take any enforcement action other 
than any action which the Commission may prescribe by rule.”
49
  
b. Freedom of Association 
19. Background. In addition to Mr. Crowell’s assertions addressed above, that Section 
97.101(b) obligated WARFA net to allow him to check in, he contends that he has a right to check in that 
is protected by the Freedom of Association Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
50
     
20. Discussion.  The case that Mr. Crowell cites in support of his freedom of association 
argument is not on point.  In NAACP v. Alabama, at issue was whether the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was in compliance with the State of Alabama’s foreign 
corporation registration statute.  In the context of a state court proceeding addressing that issue, the 
Alabama State Court directed the NAACP to disclose the names and addresses of its members in 
Alabama.  The NAACP refused, and the Alabama State Court found the NAACP to be in contempt.
51
The U.S. Supreme Court found that requiring the NAACP to disclose the names and addresses of its 
members could entail the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by those members of their 
right to freedom of association.
52
  The Supreme Court found further that the State of Alabama had not 
demonstrated an interest in the disclosures of member names and addresses sufficient to justify the 
potential restraint of the members’ exercise of their right of association, because the member names and 
                                                     
46
47 U.S.C. § 316, 47 C.F.R. § 97.27. 
47
Crowell NAL Response at 6.   
48
In fact, the amateur radio community has distinguished itself for its self-policing operations. See H.R.Rep. No. 
765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982) (Commission reporting to Congress the success of amateur self-monitoring 
efforts); cited in Paroli Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 7596, para. 7.  
49
47 U.S.C. § 154(f)(4)(C).
50
Crowell NAL Response at 26.  Mr. Crowell also asserts that his right to freedom of association is protected by the 
14
th
Amendment. Crowell NAL Response at 28, citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).  However, he also 
argues that 14
th
Amendment does not apply to the Federal government, but contends that his right to freedom of 
association should be protected from Federal government action as well.  Crowell NAL Response at 28.  Mr. 
Crowell’s right to freedom of association is protected from infringement by the Federal Government by the First  
Amendment.  To the extent that Mr. Crowell argues that the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated in this 
proceeding, he is mistaken.  However, whether his right is protected by the Fourteenth or the First Amendment is 
not relevant to his substantive argument, that his transmissions are justified as an exercise of right to freedom of 
association as discussed in NAACP v. Alabama. We address this argument below.   
51
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 451-54.
52
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462-63.
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
8
addresses to be disclosed did not have a substantial bearing on whether the NAACP was in compliance 
with Alabama’s foreign corporation registration statute.
53
    
21. NAACP v. Alabama is not relevant to this proceeding.  There is nothing in the Bureau’s 
NAL that would require Mr. Crowell to disclose publicly any personal information.  Moreover, there is 
nothing in that case that is relevant to determining whether the Section 333 prohibition on harmful 
interference can reasonably be interpreted as a restraint on Mr. Crowell’s right of association, or, if it can, 
whether there is any government interest sufficient to justify any such restraint.  Accordingly, Mr. 
Crowell has failed to provide adequate support for his contention that the harmful interference he caused 
can be excused as an exercise of his First Amendment freedom of association rights.
c. Freedom Not to Associate  
22. Background. In addition, Mr. Crowell asserts that WARFA net is asserting a “right not to 
associate” by refusing to allow him to check in, and that such a right is not protected by the First 
Amendment.
54
  
23. Discussion.  Mr. Crowell’s argument is not relevant to the conclusion we reached above.  
In other words, we found above that the record in this proceeding does not support Mr. Crowell’s 
assertion that the Freedom of Association clause of the First Amendment authorizes him to cause harmful 
interference to the participants in WARFA net, and the state of the record is not affected by whether or to 
what extent those participants’ “right not to associate” is constitutionally protected.  
24. Moreover, Mr. Crowell overstates his case by arguing that WARFA net has “no right not 
to associate with [him] that the federal government may recognize.”
55
  Contrary to Mr. Crowell’s 
contention, the Supreme Court in Roberts recognized that there is a constitutionally protected “right not to 
associate”: 
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an 
association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire. 
Such a regulation may impair the ability of the original members to express only those 
views that brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes 
a freedom not to associate.
56
Thus, Mr. Crowell did not accurately describe the Roberts case on which he relies.   
25. Finally, in addition to concluding incorrectly that the Constitution does not recognize a 
“right not to associate” as a general proposition, Mr. Crowell’s NAL response could not support a 
conclusion that the Constitution does not recognize such a right in WARFA net’s specific case. The 
Roberts Court noted that the constitutional protection of freedom of association can vary depending on 
the nature of the association at issue.
57
  The Roberts Court also observed that government infringements 
on this “right not to associate” may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, 
                                                     
53
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 463-65.    
54
Crowell NAL Response at 5.  See also Crowell NAL Response at 22, citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 
(1984) (Roberts).
55
Crowell NAL Response at 22.
56
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (emphasis added), citing Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 
(1977).  See also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627, quoting Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 
122 (1981) (recognizing the right of political parties to “protect themselves ‘from intrusion by those with adverse 
political principles’”).
57
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-22.   
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
9
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive 
of associational freedoms.
58
  However, Mr. Crowell did not discuss the nature of WARFA net with 
respect to the extent of its right not to associate, nor did it identify any compelling state interest that might 
justify infringement of WARFA net’s right in this case. 
d.  Equal Protection
26. Background.  Mr. Crowell claims that adopting the NAL was tantamount to giving 
WARFA net a frequency assignment, contrary to Part 97, and that the alleged award of this assignment 
was racially motivated.
59
  Mr. Crowell claims further that such a racially motivated frequency assignment 
would violate the equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
60
  
27. Discussion.  As noted above, in Baxter, and in the Paroli Order, Section 97.101(d) 
prohibits amateur licensees from causing harmful interference to other licensees’ ongoing transmissions.
61
  
The Bureau issued the NAL to Mr. Crowell in part because he appears to have violated this rule.
62
  
However, issuing the NAL does not preclude Mr. Crowell from operating on the frequency WARFA net’s 
members use when that frequency is clear, nor does it preclude any other licensee from such operations.  
Thus, contrary to Mr. Crowell’s claim, the NAL does not constitute a frequency assignment for any 
member of WARFA net, or for any other amateur licensee.  Because the NAL does not constitute a 
frequency assignment, we need not reach Mr. Crowell’s allegations of racial motivation, or his equal 
protection issue.  
e.  Regulatory Interpretation 
28. Background.  Mr. Crowell claims without explanation that the Commission has 
unreasonably “interpreted Section 97.101(b) out of existence.”
63
    
29. Discussion.  The Supreme Court has long accorded considerable weight to an 
administrative agency’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.
64
  When the 
construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is at issue, Courts have determined that 
                                                     
58
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.  In Roberts, the U.S. Jaycees had a policy limiting its “regular membership” to men 
between 18 and 35.  Women were permitted only “associate membership,” a status that did not have voting rights.  
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612-13.   The State of Minnesota determined that this policy violated the Minnesota Human 
Rights Act.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614-17, quoting Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982). The Court in Roberts found 
that Minnesota’s interest in adopting its Human Rights Act, preventing discrimination against Minnesotan women, 
was a compelling state interest that warranted infringement of the Jaycees’ freedom of association.  Roberts, 468 
U.S. at 623-24.  
59
Crowell NAL Response at 19.  
60
Crowell NAL Response at 21.  See also Crowell NAL Response at 26-27, citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 397 
(1954), stating that this proceeding raises the question of “to what extent does the 14th Amendment's guarantee of 
equal protection under the laws apply to the federal government?”  
61
Baxter, 841 F.Supp.2d at 395; Paroli Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 7596, para. 6.  
62
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14270, para. 8. 
63
Crowell NAL Response at 6, 20-21, 28.  See also Crowell June 29 E-mail, asserting that the Commission’s 
interpretation of Section 97.101(b) is contrary to the plain meaning of the rule, and so it does not warrant judicial 
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(Chevron).   
64
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (1984), citing, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).  
See also City of Arlington v. FCC, ___ U.S. ___,  133 S.Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013), citing AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities 
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) (“Statutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable 
interpretation, not by the courts but by the administering agency”).
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
10
deference is even more clearly in order.
65
  As discussed above, we interpret Section 97.101(b) as
prohibiting any amateur operator from transmitting on top of another operator, and this interpretation was 
affirmed by the Court in Baxter.
66
  Mr. Crowell offers only an unsupported assertion that this 
interpretation does not warrant judicial deference under Chevron.  This is not a sufficient reason to 
conclude that the current interpretation of Section 97.101(b) is unreasonable.      
4.  Selective Prosecution 
30. Background.  Mr. Crowell asserts that the NAL was motivated by the Bureau’s opposition 
to the content of his transmissions.
67
  For example, Mr. Crowell seems to assume that the NAL was 
motivated by his criticism of WARFA net’s refusal to let him “check in.”
68
  Mr. Crowell asserts that 
others were making similar criticisms on the nights in question, but the Commission’s NAL singled him 
out based on an assumption that he was “the ringleader.”
69
  Alternatively, Mr. Crowell assumes that the
NAL was prompted by his broadcasts of racial epithets.  While he denies broadcasting any such epithets, 
he also asserts that the Bureau considers some racial epithets as violative of Part 97 but others as not.
70
  
Under a third theory, Mr. Crowell claims that the NAL was a retaliatory measure, in response to his claim 
that amateurs are permitted to broadcast music under Part 97.
71
  He also claims that other amateurs 
broadcast recordings, and that he has been singled out unfairly for his broadcasts.
72
  Mr. Crowell 
generally accuses the Bureau of having a “closed mind,” and of “trying to throw its weight around.”
73
    
31. Discussion.  In summary, Mr. Crowell does not provide a sufficient basis for concluding 
that the Bureau acted inappropriately in adopting the NAL. The Bureau is subject to a “presumption of 
regularity” that Government agencies have properly discharged their official duties, and to overcome this 
presumption, Mr. Crowell must provide “clear evidence to the contrary.”  While Mr. Crowell asserts that 
he has been singled out unfairly, his assertions do not provide “clear evidence” of the kind needed to 
overcome the presumption of regularity.  
32. With respect to criminal charging decisions, the Supreme Court has made clear that the 
government’s decision “as to whom to prosecute” is generally unreviewable: 
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to 
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength 
of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s 
                                                     
65
NARUC v. FCC, 746 F.2d 1492, 1502 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“[T]he FCC’s interpretation of its own policies and 
regulations is entitled to ‘great deference’”), and Washington Association for Television & Children v. FCC, 712 
F.2d 677, 684 (D.C.Cir.1983) (“[T]this court gives ‘great deference’ to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations”).   
66
Baxter, 841 F.Supp.2d at 395 (Transmitting without first finding a clear channel is “patently inconsistent with the 
plain language of 47 C.F.R. § 97.101(b).”)
67
Crowell NAL Response at 7-8, 26 (contending that the NAL was prompted by the content of Mr. Crowell’s 
communications); Crowell NAL Response at 19 (claiming that, by issuing the NAL, the Bureau showed its “bias and 
prejudice” against Mr. Crowell). 
68
Crowell NAL Response at 17.  In this order above, we considered and rejected Mr. Crowell’s contention that 
WARFA net’s refusal to allow him to check in violated Part 97.    
69
Crowell NAL Response at 17. 
70
Crowell NAL Response at 17. 
71
Crowell NAL Response at 24-25.  We address Mr. Crowell’s arguments regarding amateur broadcasts of music 
below.   
72
Crowell NAL Response at 25. 
73
Crowell NAL Response at 22. 
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
11
enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall 
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are 
competent to undertake.
74
33. As a result, there is a “presumption of regularity” that supports the Government’s 
prosecutorial decisions. In “the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,” courts presume that 
Government agencies have properly discharged their official duties.
75
   In the ordinary case, “so long as 
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the 
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests 
entirely in his discretion.”
76
  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has 
also determined that this traditional nonreviewability of prosecutorial decisions applies to administrative 
cases.
77
34. Mr. Crowell alleges that the Bureau has failed to prosecute WARFA net when it has 
engaged in conduct comparable to that discussed in the NAL. However, these allegations by themselves 
are not sufficient to provide clear evidence that the Bureau has not properly discharged its official duties.  
Therefore, we find that these allegations do not provide a basis for reducing or eliminating the forfeiture 
amount proposed in the NAL. 
5.  Duration of Transmissions 
35. Background.  Mr. Crowell claims that his transmissions were not of sufficient duration to 
constitute jamming.  He observes that, in a 1982 license renewal proceeding, the Kerr Initial Decision, the 
licensee seeking renewal was found to have played recordings in the amateur service for an extended 
period of time.
78
  Mr. Crowell distinguishes his transmissions from those discussed in the Kerr Initial 
Decision, claiming that his recordings lasted no longer than 15 seconds each.
79
36. Discussion.  Mr. Crowell misinterprets the Kerr Initial Decision.  Although the Kerr 
Initial Decision noted that the licensee at issue in that proceeding repeatedly made transmissions without 
a break for period ranging from 29 minutes to three hours,
80
there is nothing in either the Kerr Initial 
Decision or the Kerr Review Order to suggest that causing harmful interference to other amateur 
operators for periods of time shorter than 29 minutes might be permissible.  Moreover, if there were any 
such conclusion in the Kerr proceeding, it would have been superseded by Congress when it adopted 
Section 333 of the Communications Act in 1989, which, as noted above, prohibits all willful or malicious
                                                     
74
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985), quoted in Secretary of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 
151, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Twentymile Coal).   
75
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Armstrong), quoting United States v. Chemical 
Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).  
76
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465, quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
77
Twentymile Coal, 456 F.3d at 157, quoting Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 71 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
“FAA’s action in this case was ... analogous to an exercise of ‘prosecutorial discretion,’ ” and noting that “when 
prosecutorial discretion is at issue, the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law”); Beverly 
Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Feinstein, 103 F.3d 151, 153 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (holding that the NLRB General 
Counsel’s decision to issue an unfair labor practice complaint is unreviewable because, inter alia, review would 
“invade the realm of prosecutorial discretion”).    
78
Crowell NAL Response at 25-26, citing Application of Gary W. Kerr for Renewal of Amateur License WA6JIY, PR 
Docket No. 81-66; 91 FCC 2d 110 (1982) (Kerr Initial Decision).  See also Application of Gary W. Kerr for 
Renewal of Amateur License WA6JIY, PR Docket No. 81-66; 91 FCC 2d 107 (1982) (Kerr Review Order).  Mr. 
Crowell mistakenly asserts that the transmissions at issue in the Kerr proceeding lasted for three days.  In fact, those
transmissions lasted from 29 minutes to three hours.  Kerr Initial Decision, 91 FCC 2d at 113-14, para. 14. 
79
Crowell NAL Response at 26.    
80
Kerr Initial Decision, 91 FCC 2d at 113-14, para. 14.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
12
interference.  Section 333 does not make exceptions for such willful or malicious interference of less than 
a particular duration. 
6. Denials of Jamming    
37. Background.  As noted above, on August 25 and 27, 2015, Field Agents from the 
Bureau’s Western Region and the HFDF Center observed Mr. Crowell’s amateur radio station 
intentionally interfering with other amateur licensees by transmitting on top of other amateurs, and 
repeatedly interrupting amateurs using noises on the WARFA net, recordings and music, so as to not 
allow them to transmit on 3908 kHz.
81
  The NAL stated that, during the two nights of monitoring 3908 
kHz, between 7:45 P.M. and 9:45 P.M. PDT, the Agents and the HFDF Center observed at least a dozen 
instances per night, lasting from thirty seconds to at least four minutes each, of Mr. Crowell intentionally 
transmitting on top of and repeatedly interrupting amateurs on the WARFA net.
82
  
38. In addition to arguing that he has a constitutionally protected right to interrupt amateurs
on the WARFA net, as discussed in detail above, Mr. Crowell denies making any such interruptions.  In 
particular, Mr. Crowell claims that his transmissions were “short and to the point.”
83
  In response to 
allegations that noises were made on the frequency in question, Mr. Crowell asserts that they were made 
by amateur operators participating in WARFA net, and took the form of insults at his expense, or efforts 
to block him and others from checking into the Net.
84
  Mr. Crowell also asserts that “pile-ups”
85
are a 
common occurrence in ham radio, that such “pile-ups” result in unintentional interference, and so do not 
constitute jamming.
86
  Alternatively, Mr. Crowell denies causing harmful interference, because WARFA 
net “had nothing to communicate in the first instance.”
87
Mr. Crowell also asserts that WARFA net has 
no right to be protected from interference, because Part 97 does not provide for such nets.
88
   
39. Discussion.  As an initial matter, Mr. Crowell’s transmissions were not “short and to the 
point,” as he claims.  Rather, Mr. Crowell made transmissions that were as much as four minutes long.
89
  
Moreover, the interference we observed was not caused by any member of WARFA net, and were not the 
result of pile-ups, but were caused by Mr. Crowell intentionally transmitting on top of and interrupting 
other amateur transmissions.
90
  While Mr. Crowell describes at length the transmissions he claims were 
made by members of WARFA net, his claims are not supported by or consistent with the observations of 
our Field Agents and the Commission’s HFDF Center.    
                                                     
81
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268-69, para. 7.  
82
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268-69, para. 7.      
83
Crowell NAL Response at 5. 
84
Crowell NAL Response at 10-15. 
85
Wikipedia defines “pile-up” as the presence of many ham operators trying to communicate with a distant entity, 
all in the same time.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pileup_(disambiguation) (last visited June 7, 2016).
86
Crowell NAL Response at 26.  In addition, he criticizes WARFA net for failing to clear the “pile-ups” properly.  
Crowell NAL Response at 26-27.  
87
Crowell NAL Response at 9.   
88
Crowell NAL Response at 7, 18-19, citing From a Monitoring Enforcement Viewpoint, Frank M. Kratkovil, QST 
Magazine, Dec. 1965 at 32-33, for the proposition that “[n]o net has an exclusive franchise on any frequency.”   
89
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268-69, para. 7.  
90
The NAL states that Commission staff observed at least a dozen instances of interference during each of the two 
days that they monitored Mr. Crowell’s transmissions, ranging from 30 second to four minutes in duration.  NAL, 30 
FCC Rcd at 14268-69, para. 7.  Specifically, staff observed 20 instances of interference on August 25, and 15 
instances on August 27.  These instances of interference occurred throughout the two-hour period monitored on each 
night.    
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
13
40. Second, Mr. Crowell is mistaken in suggesting that the occurrence of harmful 
interference turns on the content of the communications of the parties suffering the interference.  Section 
333 of the Communications Act prohibits all willful or malicious interference to any station licensed 
under the Act, and makes no exceptions for stations that, in Mr. Crowell’s or anyone else’s opinion, have 
“nothing to communicate in the first instance.”
91
41. Third, although WARFA net is not a Commission licensee, and so has no right to be 
protected from interference, the individual members of WARFA net are Commission licensees and so 
have such interference protection rights.  The proposed forfeiture penalty in the NAL was based in part on 
the interference Mr. Crowell appeared to have caused to the individual members of WARFA net, not to 
WARFA net as an organization.
92
  Mr. Crowell’s assertion that WARFA net is not an entity with 
interference protection rights is not relevant to our conclusion that he violated Section 97.101(d) by 
causing harmful interference to members of WARFA net.  
7.  Efficacy of Direction-Finding 
42. Background.  In the NAL, the Bureau noted that its Field Agents used direction-finding 
techniques to determine that Mr. Crowell was the source of the radio signals causing harmful interference 
to other operators on 3908 kHz.
93
  Mr. Crowell claims that the Commission cannot prove that he was the 
operator that was causing harmful interference, or that his transmissions prevented any station from 
communicating with another station.
94
  Mr. Crowell also maintains that it is physically impossible to 
simultaneously locate the source of a signal and determine whether interference is occurring on that 
frequency, and that, therefore, the Commission’s findings that he has caused harmful interference are 
unreliable.
95
         
43. Discussion.  We are not persuaded by Mr. Crowell’s arguments regarding the reliability 
of the technical evidence. The Bureau’s Field Agents are well trained in direction-finding techniques, and 
the use of such techniques has been found to provide probative and reliable evidence.
96
  Furthermore, the 
issue raised by Mr. Crowell arises when there is only one set of observations of a given signal.  However, 
in these investigations, the Bureau used multiple teams of Field Agents, and those teams’ direction-
finding operations were supplemented by observations by the HFDF Center.  As a result, Commission 
staff was able to monitor Mr. Crowell’s transmissions, as well as the transmissions of other amateur 
operators on 3908 kHz.  Subsequently, after staff had compared and synthesized all the observations of 
Bureau Field Agents and the HFDF Center, they were able to determine not only that Mr. Crowell’s 
station was the source of the transmissions at issue, but also that Mr. Crowell had consistently caused 
interference to other amateur operators, by transmitting on top of and interrupting those other operators.  
The questions Mr. Crowell raises regarding direction-finding techniques do not take into account the 
involvement of multiple teams of Field Agents and the Commission’s HFDF Center in the investigations
on August 25 and 27.    
                                                     
91
See Crowell NAL Response at 9.
92
“[The Commission] observed at least a dozen instances per night, lasting from thirty seconds to at least four minutes 
each, of Mr. Crowell intentionally transmitting on top of and repeatedly interrupting other amateurs on the WARFA 
net.” NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268-69, para. 7 (emphasis added).   
93
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14267-68, para. 3.  
94
Crowell NAL Response at 8-9.  
95
Crowell NAL Response at 23. 
96
Jeffrey G. Guss, Forfeiture Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20368, 20371, para. 15 (CIB 1998), citing Ernest M. Petter, 57 
FCC 2d 716 (1976).  
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
14
B. Prohibited Transmissions  
1.  Background
44. Section 97.113(a)(4) of the Commission’s Rules states that “[n]o amateur station shall 
transmit . . . [m]usic using a phone emission except as specifically provided elsewhere in this section.”
97
  On 
August 25 and 27, 2015, Western Region agents monitored Mr. Crowell’s transmissions for approximately 
two hours each night and heard multiple instances of Mr. Crowell transmitting music and other 
recordings.
98
  As discussed further below, Mr. Crowell claims that transmissions of music and other 
recordings are protected by the First Amendment, or that his particular transmissions are not subject to the 
prohibition. His arguments are not persuasive. 
2.  Freedom of Speech 
45. Background.  Mr. Crowell argues that the playing of music by amateurs is protected by 
the First Amendment.
99
  He argues further that there is no basis for distinguishing recordings from spoken 
words for purposes of the Freedom of Speech clause of the First Amendment.
100
    
46. Discussion.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has 
considered and rejected claims that Commission prohibitions on certain types of transmissions by amateur 
licensees violate the First Amendment.  The court found that, because the electromagnet spectrum is a 
limited resource, public policy demands placing some restrictions on certain transmissions.
101
  
Since the early 1920’s the demands for spectrum space always have exceeded the supply.
As a result, it has been necessary to determine which uses of radio will be permitted, to 
allocate specific frequencies to such uses, and to prohibit transmissions over these 
frequencies clearly inconsistent with such uses.
102
  
The court went on to explain that the Commission can prohibit a certain type of conversation over a 
particular frequency where the alternative would be to deny many intended users any access to the 
frequency.
103
   Finally, the court held that the prohibitions in Section 97.113 are reasonable exercises of 
the Commission’s authority to “[c]lassify radio stations” and to “[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be 
rendered by each class of licensed stations and each station within any class.”
104
  Accordingly, on several 
occasions, the Commission has prohibited amateur radio operators from broadcasting music.
105
                                                     
97
47 C.F.R. § 97.113(a)(4).
98
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268, para. 4, 14270, para. 8.      
99
Crowell NAL Response at 9, 24.   
100
Crowell NAL Response at 26.  See also Crowell June 29 E-mail (repeating his contention that playing recordings 
on the air by amateurs is protected by the First Amendment, and criticizing Field Agents who advised him 
otherwise).  
101
Gross, 480 F.2d at 1291-92, quoting NBC, 319 U.S. at 226.   
102
Gross, 480 F.2d at 1291. 
103
Gross, 480 F.2d at 1291, citing Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1965).  
104
Gross, 480 F.2d at 1291, citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), (b).
105
Michael Guernsey, Licensee of Amateur Radio Station KZ8O Parchment, Michigan, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC 
Rcd 7354 (Enf. Bur. 2015) (Enf. Bur., Northeast Region, 2015) (Guernsey Forfeiture Order); Jack Gerritsen Bell, 
California, Forfeiture Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19256 (Enf. Bur., Western Region, 2005) (Bell Forfeiture Order); Ronald 
E. Sauer, Licensee of Amateur Radio Station WE8E, Bedford Heights, Ohio, Forfeiture Order, 19 FCC Rcd 14884 
(Enf. Bur. 2004) (Sauer Forfeiture Order); Scott E. Kamm, Licensee of Amateur Station NOUGN, Sioux City, Iowa, 
Forfeiture Order, 18 FCC Rcd 9379 (Enf. Bur. 2003) (Kamm Forfeiture Order); James C. Thompson, Suspension of 
License Amateur Radio Operator License Call Sign KA2YYBP, Order, 15 FCC Rcd 25362 (WTB 2000) (Thompson
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
15
Moreover, in 2004, the Commission considered and rejected a proposal to revise Section 97.113 to permit 
amateurs to transmit music, concluding that doing so “would be inconsistent with the definition and 
purpose of the amateur service.”
106
  Mr. Crowell does not address this precedent, let alone provide an 
adequate reason to depart from it.
3.  Commercially Viable Music
47. Background.  Mr. Crowell maintains that the purpose of the restriction on broadcasting is 
to prevent amateur licensees from competing unfairly with broadcast radio stations.  According to Mr. 
Crowell, it follows that, under the Radio Act of 1927, music was understood to be “commercially viable” 
music, and he asserts that that understanding was incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934 and 
Part 97 of the Commission’s rules.  He argues further that “non-commercially viable” music is therefore 
not subject to any Part 97 restriction on music.
107
  Finally, Mr. Crowell contends that, if the Commission 
does not distinguish between “commercially viable” and “non-commercially viable” music, the definition 
of “music” for purposes of Section 97.113(a)(4) would be unconstitutionally vague.
108
  
48. Discussion.  As an initial matter, Mr. Crowell does not cite any of the legislative history 
of the Radio Act of 1927 or the Communications Act of 1934, or any Commission Order, to support his 
theory that Part 97 has historically been interpreted as distinguishing between “commercially viable” and 
“non-commercially viable” music, or that amateurs have historically been allowed to broadcast “non-
commercially viable” music.  On the contrary, as discussed above, the Commission has a long history of 
prohibiting amateur licensees from broadcasting music, without distingusiing certain types of music from 
others for purposes of the prohibition.
109
49. Moreover, Mr. Crowell does not provide a reasonable basis for distinguishing between 
“commercially viable” and “non-commercially viable” music.  While the Commission adopted the 
restriction on broadcasting in part to ensure that amateur service frequencies were not used as a substitute 
for other communication services, as Mr. Crowell suggests,
110
he overlooks another important function 
served by this restriction.  As explained above, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has found that the Commission can prohibit a certain type of conversation over a particular 
frequency where the alternative would be to deny any access to the frequency to many intended users.
111
  
Allowing some amateurs to broadcast music on amateur frequency bands would deny to many other 
amateurs any access to those bands, regardless of whether the music at issue is “commercially viable” or 
“non-commercially viable.”
112
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
Consent Decree); Revocation of License of James W. Smith, Initial Decision, PR Docket Nos. 84-774 and 84-775, 
102 FCC 2d 262 (1985) (Smith Revocation Order), aff’d 1 FCC Rcd 594 (1986); Andres Calandria, New Orleans, 
La., Suspension of Amateur Radio Operator License (K5MVP), Initial Decision, Docket No. 14548, 33 FCC 739 
(1962) (Calandria Suspension Order); Louis Raymond Choiniere, Holyoke, Mass., Suspension of Amateur Radio 
Operator License, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Commission, Docket No. 5777, 8 FCC 201 (1940) 
(Choiniere Suspension Order). 
106
Amendment of Part 97 of the Commission’s Rules Governing the Amateur Radio Services, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking and Order, WT Docket No. 04-140, 19 FCC Rcd 7293, 7313-14, para. 41 (2004) (2004 Part 97 Order).
     
107
Crowell NAL Response at 9-10. 
108
Crowell NAL Response at 9-10. 
109
See Guernsey Forfeiture Order; Bell Forfeiture Order; Sauer Forfeiture Order; Kamm Forfeiture Order; 
Thompson Consent Decree; Smith Revocation Order; Calandria Suspension Order; Choiniere Suspension Order.
110
2004 Part 97 Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 7212, para. 39. 
111
Gross, 480 F.2d at 1291.  
112
Mr. Crowell considers rap music to be “non-commercially viable” music, and so argues that it is speech protected 
by the First Amendment.  Crowell NAL Response at 13.  Because we find here that amateur licensees are prohibited 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
16
50. Finally, we reject the claim that Section 97.113(a)(4) is unconstitutionally vague.  “It is 
established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and 
standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits . . .  .”
113
  Section 97.113(a)(4) 
does not leave the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits.  It clearly prohibits amateur licensees 
from transmitting in a fashion that monopolizes the frequency at issue and causes interference to other 
amateur operators.
114
    
4.  Force and Effect of Section 97.113(a)(4) 
51. Background.  Alternatively, Mr. Crowell asserts that the Part 97 restriction against 
playing music has no force or effect, because a summary of the rule was not published in the Federal 
Register.
115
  He also argues that Enforcement Advisories do not constitute rules.
116
52. Discussion.  Mr. Crowell is mistaken with respect to his first point.  A summary of the 
Order adopting Section 97.113(a)(4) was published in the Federal Register.
117
  The basis of Mr. Crowell’s 
Enforcement Advisory argument is not clear, because he does not identify any Enforcement Advisory in 
his Response.  In any case, the Bureau did not treat any Enforcement Advisory as a rule, nor did it cite 
any Enforcement Advisory in its NAL.
5.  Manufacture of Recording Equipment
53. Background.  Mr. Crowell maintains that amateur equipment manufacturers have 
included digital audio recorders “for years,” for purposes of permitting the playing of music.  He argues 
further that prohibiting amateur licensees from broadcasting recordings would necessitate issuing an 
advisory to such manufacturers to cease manufacture of such equipment.
118
  
54. Discussion.  We conclude that no such advisory is needed at this time.  The 
Commission’s rules require equipment manufacturers to obtain equipment authorizations before 
marketing their equipment in the United States.
119
  The equipment authorization process is designed to 
verify that communications equipment marketed in the United States can be operated in compliance with 
the Commission’s rules.
120
  Thus, the Commission does not place an obligation on equipment 
manufacturers to ensure that the operators purchasing their equipment comply with the Commission’s 
rules.
121
  With respect to the digital audio recorders cited by Mr. Crowell, if the only purpose they served 
was to enable the unlawful broadcast of music by amateur licensees, the Commission would not have 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
under Section 97.113(a)(4) from broadcasting all music, regardless of its genre, we need not determine here what 
genres of music should be treated as “commercially viable” or “non-commercially viable.”  
113
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999), quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 
(1966).   
114
Smith Revocation Order, 102 FCC 2d at 286. 
115
Crowell NAL Response at 24-25. 
116
Crowell NAL Response at 24. 
117
Relaxing Restrictions on the Scope of Permissible Communications in the Amateur Service, Final Rule, 58 FR 
43071 (Aug. 13, 1993). 
118
Crowell NAL Response at 25.
119
47 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart J.
120
See 47 C.F.R. § 2.915(a).  
121
WARNING: FCC Authorized Equipment Must be Used in Compliance with All Laws and Rules; Persons or 
Businesses Using Authorized Equipment in a Manner that Violates Federal Law or the Commission’s Rules Are 
Subject to Enforcement Action, Public Notice, 31 FCC Rcd 5397 (Enf. Bur. 2016).    
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
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authorized that equipment.
122
However, such equipment can be used consistently with the Commission’s 
rules.  For example, such recorders could be used to record conversations with other amateurs and to play 
back those conversations later when the licensee is not operating his or her transmitter.  In light of this, 
we find that it is not necessary to recommend to equipment manufacturers that they cease manufacture of 
transmitters designed for amateur use with digital audio recorders. 
6. Denial of Transmission of Music      
55. Background.  Mr. Crowell admits that a song he refers to as “his race relations 
improvement song” was played on the air in its entirety, as well as long segments of commercial rock 
songs, other recordings, and “a long segment of static-like noise.”  However, Mr. Crowell denies that he 
was the party who made any of these transmissions.
123
      
56. Discussion.  Based on our Field Agents’ observations of Mr. Crowell’s transmissions 
August 25 and 27, 2015, discussed in detail above, it is clear that he transmitted music on those nights, in 
violation of Section 97.113(a)(4).  His claim that he was not the licensee who played “his” song is simply 
unpersuasive in light of those observations. 
C.  Other Issues      
57. Mr. Crowell makes a number of additional arguments, none of which cause us to question 
whether he violated the Commission’s rules as discussed in the NAL.  For example, Mr. Crowell contends 
that indecent language should not be prohibited from the amateur service, notwithstanding Section 
97.113(a)(4).
124
  Mr. Crowell argues further his transmissions were not “anywhere near as rude, insulting 
and objectionable” as transmissions made by certain participants in WARFA net.
125
  However, the NAL
does not include any allegation that Mr. Crowell may have transmitted indecent language.  Rather, the 
violation of Section 97.113(a)(4) cited in the NAL was based on Mr. Crowell’s transmission of music.
126
  
Accordingly, the indecent speech issue raised by Mr. Crowell is not relevant to this proceeding, and so we 
need not reach the arguments he offers for revisiting prior Commission statements regarding indecent 
speech in the amateur service.
127
  
                                                     
122
See, e.g. Taylor Oilfield Manufacturing, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture and Order, 28 FCC Rcd 
4972, 4975 (para. 7) (2013) (noting that jamming devices cannot be certified or authorized because they cannot 
comply with the FCC’s technical standards and therefore cannot be operated or imported lawfully in the United 
States or its territories.)      
123
Crowell NAL Response at 15-16. 
124
Crowell NAL Response at 27.   
125
Crowell NAL Response at 5, 7, 17.  See also First Crowell May 7 E-mail (alleging that members of WARFA net 
had said “terrible things” about a Commission employee).    
126
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14268, para. 4, 14270, para. 8.            
127
See, e.g., New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licensees, 
Public Notice, 2 FCC Rcd 2726, 2728 (1987) (concluding that the Commission’s indecency standards apply to 
amateur licensees).  Nor do we need to reach the issue of whether any of Mr. Crowell’s transmissions, including but 
not limited to the racial, ethnic, and sexual slurs and epithets mentioned in the NAL, are more or less “rude, 
insulting, and objectionable” than the statements he ascribes to members of WARFA net.  See NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 
14268, para. 3. 
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
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58. Mr. Crowell also denies statements regarding this proceeding that were made during a 
congressional hearing.
128
  Because we did not rely on any statement in that congressional hearing in the 
NAL or this forfeiture order, we do not need to reach this issue.  
59. Mr. Crowell further alleges that he received a threat from another amateur operator in 
January 2016, and that the threat violated Sections 97.103(a) and 97.113(a)(4) of the Commission’s 
Rules.
129
  Determining whether the transmission cited by Mr. Crowell constitutes a violation of any 
Commission rule would not affect our determination above that Mr. Crowell violated Sections 97.101(d)
and 97.113(a)(4).
130
60. Mr. Crowell also makes numerous ad hominem attacks against members of WARFA net, 
Commission employees, and a member of the U.S. House of Representatives.
131
  Those ad hominem
attacks are not relevant to our conclusion that Mr. Crowell violated Sections 97.101(d) and 97.113(a)(4).  
However, we note that Mr. Crowell professes to be an attorney.
132
  As such, he is subject to the 
requirements of Section 1.24 of the Commission’s rules.
133
  While all participants in the administrative 
process are expected to act in an appropriate manner when appearing before this agency, members of the 
bar have the added responsibility to uphold the ethics of their profession.
134
  The Commission will not 
permit lawyers practicing before it to act disrespectfully or otherwise abuse its processes,
135
and under 
Section 1.24, the Commission can take action against any attorney who engages in such misconduct.
136
Mr. Crowell is hereby on notice that, in the event that he engages in an ad hominem attack in the future 
that rises to the level of misconduct within the meaning of Section 1.24, the Commission may take 
appropriate action, including but not limited to referring Mr. Crowell’s actions to the California Bar 
Association for possible disbarment, or to the U.S. Department of Justice.
137
  
61. Finally, Mr. Crowell questions whether the Commission would be successful in a trial de 
novo pursuant to Section 504 of the Communications Act, to recover any forfeiture imposed in this 
proceeding, and in fact suggests that the suit might be dismissed under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.
138
  Mr. Crowell also contends that that the Commission may become liable to him under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Equal Access to Justice Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of issuing 
                                                     
128
Crowell March 19 E-mail.
129
Crowell Second January 21 E-mail. 
130
Mr. Crowell also states that he has reported this matter to El Dorado County, California, Sheriff's Office.  
Crowell Second January 21 E-mail.  We will defer to the El Dorado County Sheriff's Office before determining 
what if any Commission action is warranted.    
131
Crowell NAL Response at 3-4, 11, 17, 18; Crowell First January 21 E-mail. 
132
Crowell NAL Response at 6. 
133
47 C.F.R. § 1.24.  
134
Opal Chadwell, Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd 3458, 3458, para. 3 (1987) (Opal Chadwell Order).  
135
Opal Chadwell Order, 2 FCC Rcd at 3458, para. 3.  
136
See Amendment of Section 1.24 of the Commission’s Rules to Incorporate Procedures Concerning Attorney 
Misconduct in Commission Proceedings, Order, 10 FCC Rcd 10330, 10330, para. 2 (1995) (incorporating the 
standards and procedures announced in the Opal Chadwell Order into Section 1.24). 
137
Example of inappropriate, unprofessional, or disrespectful statements in this proceeding by Mr. Crowell that 
arguably rises to the level of misconduct within the meaning of Section 1.24 and the Opal Chadwell Order are set 
forth in Appendix B.   
138
Crowell NAL Response at 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, Second Crowell May 7 E-Mail; Crowell 
June 22 E-mail.
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
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the NAL in this proceeding.
139
  Mr. Crowell’s contentions regarding Rule 12 or the statutes he cites would 
become relevant only if we had found any merit in any of the other arguments he has made in this 
enforcement proceeding.  As discussed in detail above, Mr. Crowell’s arguments in this proceeding have 
no merit.  Moreover, even if any of his arguments had any merit, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would not be relevant, 
because that statute applies only to actions by state and local entities, not by the federal government.
140
  
D.  Proposed Forfeiture Amount 
62. Background.  Mr. Crowell does not argue explicitly for reduction of the forfeiture amount 
proposed in the NAL, instead contending for the reasons discussed above that the forfeiture amount 
should be eliminated in its entirety.  However, Mr. Crowell makes two arguments that could be read as 
implicitly advocating a downward adjustment of the proposed forfeiture amount.   
63. First, Mr. Crowell asserts that he is “in full compliance with Part 97.”
141
  In particular, 
Mr. Crowell maintains that he has complied with the operating parameters of his license, and with 
applicable Part 97 power and emissions limits.
142
  Mr. Crowell also states that he identifies his station, as 
required by Part 97.
143
  Further, Mr. Crowell asserts that WARFA net has accused him of operating at 
excessive power levels, and denies doing so.
144
64. Second, the NAL notes that Mr. Crowell was warned that, by causing interference and by 
broadcasting music and other recordings, he was violating the Commission’s rules.  The NAL also 
observed that Mr. Crowell chose to continue violating the rules after receiving the warning, and 
concluded that an upward adjustment to the proposed forfeiture amount was warranted.
145
  Mr. Crowell 
now asserts that it would have been inappropriate for him to stop his transmissions upon receiving that
warning, claiming that he is “privileged to ignore the statements and opinions of FCC staff members.”
146
        
                                                     
139
Crowell January 28 E-mail, citing 5 U.S.C. § 504; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The Federal Tort Claims Act is the 
exclusive waiver of sovereign immunity for actions sounding in tort against the United States, its agencies, and its 
employees acting within the scope of their employment.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2679, Shrieve v. United States, 16 
F.Supp.2d 853, 856 (N.D. Ohio 1998).  The Equal Access to Justice Act provides a mechanism for prevailing parties 
in adversary adjudicatory proceedings before administrative agencies to recover their legal expenses, “unless the 
adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency was substantially justified or that special 
circumstances make an award unjust.”  5 U.S.C. § 504.  Section 1983 makes a cause of action available to any 
person who has been deprived of a Constitutional right as a result of any law adopted by a state, territory, or the 
District of Columbia.  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
140
Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10
th
Cir. 2000).  
141
Crowell NAL Response at 28. 
142
Crowell NAL Response at 1, 2, 26. 
143
Crowell NAL Response at 1.  Mr. Crowell contends that failure to identify a station is one of the primary indicia 
of intentional interference in the amateur service.  Crowell NAL Response at 22.
144
Crowell NAL Response at 24.  Mr. Crowell also asserts that, during the Commission’s inspection of his station, 
the Commission asked him to operate his facilities in a way that would cause damage to them.  He claims further 
that the request reflects either a lack of Commission expertise or an effort to “concoct evidence” that he was 
operating at excessive power.  Crowell NAL Response at 24.  We need not address any of these contentions, because 
there is nothing in the NAL to suggest that Mr. Crowell may be apparently liable for violating the applicable Part 97 
power limits. 
145
NAL, 30 FCC Rcd at 14270, para. 10. 
146
Crowell June 29 E-mail, citing Allen Leeds, Order on Reconsideration, 22 FCC Rcd 1508, 1524, para. 13 (WTB 
2007) (Leeds Order); Hinton Telephone Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd 
11625, 11637, para. 42 (1995) (Hinton Reconsideration Order).    
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
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65. Discussion.  As an initial matter, we disagree with Mr. Crowell’s general assertion that he 
is in full compliance with Part 97, given his violation of Sections 97.101(d) and 97.113(a)(4) discussed 
above.  Regarding his assertions that he has complied with his license, with Part 97 power and emission 
limits, and with Part 97 station identification requirements, we note that the NAL never suggested 
otherwise.  However, determining whether he has or has not complied with those other requirements is 
not relevant to our determination above that he has violated Sections 97.101(d) and 97.113(a)(4).
147
66. Second, Mr. Crowell misinterprets the orders he cites to support his claim that he is 
permitted to ignore warnings by Commission Field Agents.  The orders cited by Mr. Crowell stand for the 
proposition that, in the event that Commission staff provides advice that is contrary to the Commission’s 
rules, the Commission may still enforce its rules, despite any reliance by the public.
148
Mr. Crowell’s 
argument turns this proposition on its head.  In effect, he argues that, when the staff provides advice that 
is consistent with the Commission’s rules, it relieves the public from any requirement to comply with 
those rules.  This is diametrically opposed to the one of the orders Mr. Crowell cites.
149
  Thus, Mr. 
Crowell’s claim that he is “privileged to ignore the statements and opinions of FCC staff members”
150
is 
unfounded.  Moreover, he has failed to show that the upward adjustment to the proposed forfeiture 
amount in the NAL is unwarranted. 
E.  License Renewal Proceeding 
67. A proceeding to determine whether to revoke Mr. Crowell’s amateur license is currently 
pending.
151
  Mr. Crowell asserts that his license renewal proceeding cannot proceed while this 
enforcement action is pending.
152
  We disagree.  Under Section 4(j) of the Communications Act, the 
Commission may conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of 
business and to the ends of justice.
153
  Mr. Crowell provides no reason to conclude that taking action in 
the license renewal proceeding prior to issuing this forfeiture order would somehow be inconsistent with 
Section 4(j).  In any case, we are issuing this forfeiture order before taking action in the license renewal 
proceeding.  We find that this adequately addresses Mr. Crowell’s concern.
154
              
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
68. In sum, based on the record before us, and in light of the applicable statutory factors and 
the Commission’s forfeiture guidelines, we conclude that William F. Crowell willfully and repeatedly 
violated Section 333 of the Communications Act
155
and Sections 97.101(d) and 97.113(a)(4) of the 
                                                     
147
A history of compliance with the Commission’s rules might be relevant to determining whether a downward 
adjustment to a proposed forfeiture penalty is warranted.  47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(8), Note.  However, Mr. Crowell does 
not propose any downward adjustment, and we find that there is nothing in the record in this proceeding that 
provides any justification for any downward adjustment to the forfeiture penalty proposed in the NAL. 
148
Hinton Reconsideration Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 11637, para. 42, citing Malkan FM Associates v. FCC, 935 F.2d 
1313 (D.C.Cir.1991); Leeds Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 1513, para. 11, quoting Hinton Reconsideration Order, 10 FCC 
Rcd at 11637, para. 42.    
149
Leeds Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 1513, para. 11 (“It is a well-established principle that Commission staff lack the 
authority to modify Commission rules.”).  
150
Crowell June 29 E-mail.    
151
William F. Crowell, Hearing Designation Order, 23 FCC Rcd 1865 (Mobility Div., WTB, 2008).   
152
Crowell NAL Response at 21.
153
47 U.S.C. § 154(j). 
154
Mr. Crowell also asserts that the Commission cannot process its mail in a timely fashion in ALJ cases, and that 
this somehow affects his due process rights in the license renewal proceeding.  Crowell NAL Response at 21.  We 
will address this argument to the extent warranted in the context of the license renewal proceeding. 
155
47 U.S.C. § 333. 
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
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Commission’s rules,
156
by intentionally causing interference to other amateur radio operators and 
transmitting prohibited communications, including music.  We further find that Mr. Crowell has not 
provided any basis for eliminating or reducing the $25,000 forfeiture proposed in the NAL in this 
proceeding. 
V.  ORDERING CLAUSES
69. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 503(b) of the Act,
157
and 
Section 1.80 of the Commission’s rules,
158
William F. Crowell IS LIABLE FOR A MONETARY 
FORFEITURE in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for willfully and repeatedly 
violating Section 333 of the Act and Sections 97.101(d), and 97.113(a)(4) of the Commission’s rules.
70. Payment of the forfeiture shall be made in the manner provided for in Section 1.80 of the 
Commission’s rules within thirty (30) calendar days after the release of this Forfeiture Order.
159
  If the 
forfeiture is not paid within the period specified, the case may be referred to the U.S. Department of 
Justice for enforcement of the forfeiture pursuant to Section 504(a) of the Act.
160
  
71. Payment of the forfeiture must be made by check or similar instrument, wire transfer, or 
credit card, and must include the NAL/Account Number and FRN referenced above.  William F. Crowell 
shall send electronic notification of payment to WR-Response@fcc.gov on the date said payment is made.  
Regardless of the form of payment, a completed FCC Form 159 (Remittance Advice) must be 
submitted.
161
  When completing the FCC Form 159, enter the Account Number in block number 23A (call 
sign/other ID) and enter the letters “FORF” in block number 24A (payment type code).  Below are 
additional instructions that should be followed based on the form of payment selected:
? Payment by check or money order must be made payable to the order of the Federal 
Communications Commission.  Such payments (along with the completed Form 159) must be 
mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-
9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank – Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-
GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63101. 
? Payment by wire transfer must be made to ABA Number 021030004, receiving bank 
TREAS/NYC, and Account Number 27000001.  To complete the wire transfer and ensure 
appropriate crediting of the wired funds, a completed Form 159 must be faxed to U.S. Bank 
at (314) 418-4232 on the same business day the wire transfer is initiated. 
? Payment by credit card must be made by providing the required credit card information on 
FCC Form 159 and signing and dating the Form 159 to authorize the credit card payment. 
The completed Form 159 must then be mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. 
Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank –
Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 
63101. 
72. Any request for making full payment over time under an installment plan should be sent 
to:  Chief Financial Officer—Financial Operations, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th 
                                                     
156
47 C.F.R. §§ 97.101(d), 97.113(a)(4).  
157
47 U.S.C. § 503(b).
158
47 C.F.R. § 1.80.
159
Id.
160
47 U.S.C. § 504(a).
161
An FCC Form 159 and detailed instructions for completing the form may be obtained at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form159/159.pdf.
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Street, S.W., Room 1-A625, Washington, DC  20554.
162
  Questions regarding payment procedures should 
be directed to the Financial Operations Group Help Desk by telephone, 1-877-480-3201, or by e-mail, 
ARINQUIRIES@fcc.gov.
73. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Forfeiture Order shall be sent by first 
class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested, to William F. Crowell at his address of record.   
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Charles Cooper
  Field Director
Enforcement Bureau
  
                                                     
162
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1914.
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
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APPENDIX A
List of Supplements to the Record 
Filed by William F. Crowell
1. Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco Office, 
Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, dated Jan. 17, 
2016 (Crowell Supplement).
2. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco 
Office, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission; and 
Margaret Egler, Regional Counsel, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal 
Communications Commission, dated Dec. 31, 2015 (Crowell December 31 E-mail).
3. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco 
Office, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission; and 
Margaret Egler, Regional Counsel, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal 
Communications Commission, dated Jan. 21, 2016 (First Crowell January 21 E-mail).
4. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco 
Office, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, dated Jan. 
21, 2016 (Second Crowell January 21 E-mail). 
5. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell Margaret Egler, Regional Counsel, Western Region, 
Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, dated Jan. 28, 2016 (Crowell 
January 28 E-mail).     
6. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco 
Office, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission; and 
Margaret Egler, Regional Counsel, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal 
Communications Commission, dated Feb. 14, 2016 (Crowell February 14 E-mail).
7. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco 
Office, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission; and 
Margaret Egler, Regional Counsel, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal 
Communications Commission, dated Mar. 19, 2016 (Crowell March 19 E-mail).
8. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco 
Office, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission; dated Apr. 
15, 2016 (Crowell April 15 E-mail). 
9. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco 
Office, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission; dated Apr. 
27, 2016 (Crowell April 27 E-mail). 
10. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco 
Office, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, dated May 
7, 2016 (First Crowell May 7 E-mail).
11. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to David Hartshorn, District Director, San Francisco 
Office, Western Region, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, dated May 
7, 2016 (Second Crowell May 7 E-mail).
12. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to Steven Spaeth, Field Counsel, Enforcement Bureau, 
Federal Communications Commission; dated June 22, 2016 (Crowell June 22 E-mail). 
13. E-mail Letter from William F. Crowell to Steven Spaeth, Field Counsel, Enforcement Bureau, 
Federal Communications Commission; dated June 29, 2016 (Crowell June 29 E-mail). 
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
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APPENDIX B 
Selected Excerpts of Submissions 
By William F. Crowell
“In short, tell me you are kidding! You must be making this stuff up for some reason. Maybe because the 
President's skin is black, and/or because you're nothing but a race baiter?”  Crowell NAL Response at 1. 
“Didn't you ever ask yourself why the WARFA group represents itself to the public as an interracial 
friendship organization, but claimed to Congressman Walden that is a Black group? They did that because 
they are fundamentally devious and hypocritical in advancing their outdated, irrelevant, race-based 
grievances.”  Crowell NAL Response at 3.
“Real republicans oppose the kind of federal government overreach and abuse represented by this case. 
Real Republicans are supposed to support Constitutional free-speech rights. Real Republicans don't 
pander to a racial minority. Congressman Walden simply doesn't do any of the things that real 
Republicans are supposed to do. What a phony! The man should be absolutely ashamed of himself for 
calling himself a Republican. I don't think a federal district court judge or jury in a Sec. 504 forfeiture 
collection action is going to be very impressed with Congressman Walden's phony, hypocritical, 
pandering display of raw political power based on skin color. Although we have come to expect that kind 
of thing from President Obama, real Republicans are not supposed to do that.”  Crowell NAL Response at 
4.
“You just don't like the content of my communications because I am justifiably critical of the 
Commission and I point out the obvious racism of the ’WARFA net’. I make public the ’WARFA net’'s 
never-ending, unjustified, self-serving race-based complaints, grievances, demands for reparations and 
justification of lawbreaking by Black people, and their insistence upon segregating themselves from 
“racist” white people on the band, so you are calling my transmissions ’interference’ ’noise’ and ’music’
just to shut me up. That is a classic constitutional violation of my free-speech rights. You're the racists, 
not me!”  Crowell NAL Response at 7 (emphasis in original).
“Next I heard someone play a recording of ‘Moody's Little Mouthpiece’, his daughter Moni Law, 
lecturing the all-Black City of Berkeley, California racial justice commission about how “Black lives 
matter” and how the City of Berkeley (which from all appearances is run entirely by Black people) needs 
to establish a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” because there is no essential difference between the 
race relations in Berkeley today and those in South Africa under apartheid.”  Crowell NAL Response at 
14.
“Somebody played a Black self-help recording by Alexxis Tyler which everyone enjoyed very much and 
from which we have all benefited. One of the recordings taught us how to clean our rectums and private 
parts properly, while the second Alexxis Tyler recording instructed young Black women how to avoid 
being abused by Black men. Among other pertinent exclamations, I heard Ms. Tyler repeatedly say that 
‘Vagina power is a motherfucking revolution!’ Please remember that I did not play these recordings; 
however Ms. Tyler's sentiments are certainly appropriate under Section 97.111(a)(1) of Part 97 as 
transmissions necessary to exchange messages with other stations in the amateur service (i.e., highly-
commendable, core political free speech of significant socially-redeeming value).”  Crowell NAL 
Response at 16.
“Maybe by then we'll have a President who's not antisemitic, an FCC Chairman who's not totally 
intimidated by a Black President, and an Attorney General who doesn't believe in federal government 
overreach, so by then perhaps the U.S. Attorney will refuse to prosecute the case any further.”  Crowell 
NAL Response at 17.
Federal Communications Commission DA 16-877
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“Why in the world would you two, presumably intelligent, people, listen to a thing this liar says! Llisten 
to how he deliberately, and with intent to interfere, started talking over one station that was talking to 
another last night on 3840 kc.. He again deliberately tried to cause trouble. He thinks it is perfectly OK 
for him to get on 3840 kc. and jam everybody out, but that he has the exclusive right to determine who 
can use 3908 kc. Face it, he's a Black separatist racist who loves to poke white people, and we are sick of 
it. If you think his testimony is going to have any credibility with a jury, you are living in a dream world. 
Why would you align yourself with a race hustler like him?”  First Crowell January 21 E-mail.