Click here for Adobe Acrobat version
Click here for Microsoft Word version

******************************************************** 
                      NOTICE
********************************************************

This document was converted from Microsoft Word.

Content from the original version of the document such as
headers, footers, footnotes, endnotes, graphics, and page numbers
will not show up in this text version.

All text attributes such as bold, italic, underlining, etc. from the
original document will not show up in this text version.

Features of the original document layout such as
columns, tables, line and letter spacing, pagination, and margins
will not be preserved in the text version.

If you need the complete document, download the
Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat version.

*****************************************************************



 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 
Before the 
Federal Communications Commission 
Washington, DC 20554  
 
In the Matter of 
 
Steven Blumenstock and Gary Braver 
 
 
  ) 
  ) 
  ) 
  ) 
  ) 
  
 
                 
 
File No.:  EB-TCD-15-00020134 
NAL/Acct. No.:  201632170007 
              
NOTICE OF APPARENT LIABILITY FOR FORFEITURE 
 
Adopted:  August 2, 2016 Released:  August 2, 2016 
 
By the Chief, Enforcement Bureau: 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Consumers rely on caller ID information to make decisions about what calls to accept, 
ignore, or block.  The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 and the Commission’s rules prohibit any individual 
from falsifying or faking his or her phone number with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully 
obtain anything of value.  This prohibited practice is better known as spoofing.  Increasingly, bad actors 
use inexpensive third-party services to spoof the caller ID information of businesses, government 
facilities, and other legitimate sources in order to gain unauthorized access to consumer information, 
place false emergency calls to law enforcement (otherwise known as “swatting”), and facilitate other 
criminal activities.  Congress and the Commission recognized that criminals also use spoofing to trick 
victims into answering calls for the purposes of harassment and stalking.  Accurate caller ID information 
is therefore a vital tool that consumers use to protect their privacy, avoid fraud, and ensure peace of mind.  
Spoofing caller ID information for the purposes of harassment and stalking represents an egregious 
violation of federal law and the Commission is committed to taking swift enforcement action against 
those who engage in such malicious misconduct. 
2. Today, we propose penalties of $25,000 each against Steven Blumenstock and Gary 
Braver for apparently causing the display of misleading or inaccurate caller ID information with the intent 
to cause harm.  Specifically, the evidence shows that over the course of four months, Mr. Blumenstock 
and Mr. Braver made 31 spoofed telephone calls to Mr. Braver’s ex-wife as part of a campaign of 
harassment and stalking of Mr. Braver’s ex-wife.  We therefore find that Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver 
apparently violated the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, as codified in Section 227(e) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act),1 and Section 64.1604 of the Commission’s rules 
(Rules).2 
II. BACKGROUND  
A. The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 
3. The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 outlaws “caus[ing] any caller identification service to 
knowingly transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, 
cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.”3  At the time of the Truth in Caller ID Act’s 
                                                     
1 47 U.S.C. § 227(e). 
2 47 CFR § 64.1604. 
3 Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-331, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).  Congress narrowly tailored 
the statutory language to permit legitimate blocking of the transmission of caller ID information.  For example, the 
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 2 
passage, Congress observed that consumers greatly value accurate, reliable caller ID information to help 
them decide whether to answer a phone call and whether to trust the caller on the other end of the line.4  
Moreover, Congress noted that consumers’ widespread expectation is that any information that appears on 
caller ID represents the true originating number of the person or entity making the call.5   
4. In the years leading up to the Truth in Caller ID Act’s passage, consumers, telephone 
carriers, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC), and other law enforcement 
authorities observed a growing, troubling trend—deliberate falsification of caller ID information as part 
of criminal frauds and other harmful activities posing threats to the pocketbooks, privacy, and peace of 
mind of millions of American consumers.6  Congress was especially concerned by cases where criminals 
used spoofed caller ID information for the purposes of defrauding consumers7 or wrongfully obtaining 
something of value from the called persons.8         
5. The use of falsified caller ID information to facilitate fraud and identity theft were not 
Congress’ only worries regarding spoofing.  Congress was equally alarmed by use of spoofed caller ID 
information to cause physical or emotional harm to victims, or endanger public safety.  In one such 
instance recounted in the legislative record, a woman in New York called a pregnant woman whom she 
viewed as her romantic rival.9  Spoofing the phone number of the woman’s pharmacist, she tricked the 
woman into taking a drug used to cause an abortion.10  Congress also anticipated that caller ID spoofing 
could result in harm in cases of stalking and harassment, allowing stalkers to spoof caller ID information of 
a trusted source to trick victims into answering the telephone, giving out personal information, or even 
revealing their current whereabouts.11  As the Truth in Caller ID Act’s legislative history and the 
prohibition on “caus[ing] harm” in the statute make clear, Congress explicitly outlawed the use of falsified 
caller ID information for the purposes of harassing and stalking another person.  Accordingly, when the 
FCC adopted rules implementing the Truth in Caller ID Act, it stated that harm “is a broad concept that 
encompasses . . . emotional harm, includ[ing] stalking, harassment, and the violation of protective and 
                                                     
law does not outlaw domestic abuse shelters from altering their caller ID information when their clients are required 
to communicate with the abuser.  See 156 CONG. REC. H8376 (2010).  Nor does it prohibit, for example, law 
enforcement officials from disguising their telephone numbers during an investigation.  Id. at H8378. 
4 155 CONG. REC. S170-02, S173 (2009).  
5 156 CONG. REC. H2522, H2524 (explaining “. . . if you see a caller ID and you see it has a phone number, most 
people think that it’s ironclad that that’s the actual phone number that’s calling.”). 
6 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Junk Fax Prevention Act of 
2005, Report and Order and Third Order on Reconsideration, 21 FCC Rcd 3787, 3805 n. 122 (2006) (“Verizon 
alleges that there is a growing trend by fax broadcasters to engage in ‘caller ID spoofing,’ whereby they manipulate 
their caller ID data to disguise the true telephone number from which the calls have been placed . . . we will monitor 
caller ID spoofing to determine whether action is warranted to address the practice in the future.”). 
7 In one example cited by Congress, a fraudster used false caller ID information to make calls appear to originate 
from a county courthouse; the fraudster called victims, claimed they had missed a court date, and then demanded 
that the victims provide credit card information for payment of a nonexistent fine.  See 156 CONG. REC. H8376, 
H8379 (2010). 
8 In another example cited by Congress, identity thieves bought several stolen credit card numbers, then set up caller 
ID information to make it look like their calls actually originated from the credit card holders’ phone lines.  The thieves 
then called Western Union and used the stolen credit card numbers to order cash transfers, which the thieves then 
picked up.  See 155 CONG. REC. S170-02, S173 (2009). 
9 156 CONG. REC. H8376, H8378 (2010). 
10 Id. 
11 155 CONG. REC. S170, S173 (2009). 
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 3 
restraining orders.”12  The Commission further stated that spoofing “for the purposes of harassing or stalking 
someone [is] an egregious violation of the Act,” and warned that it intended to pursue spoofing-related 
enforcement “vigorously, including against those who engage in such malicious practices.”13 
B. Complaint of Robin Braver and FCC Investigation into Harmful, Spoofed Calls 
6. On September 11, 2015, the National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV) 
contacted FCC staff regarding spoofed calls received by one of its clients.14  Specifically, NNEDV 
explained that someone was “misusing spoofing services to stalk and harass” Ms. Robin Braver.15  After 
speaking to FCC staff about the situation, NNEDV referred Ms. Braver to the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau 
(Bureau).  In addition to reaching out to Bureau staff, Ms. Braver also filed a complaint with the Nassau 
County Police Department in New York.  Based on the serious nature of the violations alleged in Ms. 
Braver’s complaint, Bureau staff opened an investigation.16   
7. During the Bureau’s investigation, Ms. Braver provided information and call logs she 
collected over the course of several months (from May 2015 to September 2015)17 documenting a sustained 
campaign of harassment and stalking through spoofed calls she received.  During this period, Ms. Braver 
received 31 harassing phone calls spoofing the caller ID information of various sources, including local 
correctional facilities, her child’s school, and even her parents’ home.18  On some days, Ms. Braver would 
receive multiple harassing calls from spoofed numbers, sometimes within minutes of each other.19  Ms. 
Braver stated that the caller used a voice modulator to disguise his voice during the calls, and described the 
caller’s voice as menacing and the calls themselves as harassing in nature.20  She also stated that the caller 
made references to specific, personal information regarding Ms. Braver’s life and schedule that were not 
common knowledge, such as her divorce and child custody proceedings.21   
8. During the period Ms. Braver received the harmful, spoofed calls, she had a court-
ordered Temporary Order of Protection against her ex-husband.22  The Order of Protection compelled Mr. 
                                                     
12 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, WC Docket No. 11-39, Report and 
Order, 26 FCC Rcd 9114, 9122-23, para. 22 (2011) (Truth in Caller ID Order). 
13 Id. 
14 Email from Kaofeng Lee, Deputy Director, Safety Net Project, National Network to End Domestic Violence, to 
Nicole McGinnis, Associate Chief, Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau (Sept. 11, 2015, 13:49pm EDT). 
15 Id. 
16 FCC staff accepted the information and documentation provided by Ms. Braver as an informal request for 
Commission action under Section 1.41 of the Rules.  47 CFR § 1.41. 
17 The victim continued receiving harassing, spoofed calls while the Bureau’s investigation was underway.  The 
victim received the last such call of which the Bureau is aware on January 20, 2016.  Shortly thereafter, on February 
6, 2016, Ms. Braver filed the complaint with the Nassau County Police Department. 
18 Affidavit of Robin Braver, Apr. 14, 2016 (on file in File No. EB-TCD-15-00020134) at 2-3 (Robin Braver 
Affidavit).  The Attachment lists the spoofed calls received by Ms. Braver as well as the true owner of the spoofed 
number. 
19 See Attachment. 
20 Robin Braver Affidavit at 1-4. 
21 Id. at 1, 3-4. 
22 Order of Protection, New York Family Court, County of Nassau, Order No. 2015-002263, Docket No. O-04361-
15 (May 4, 2015). 
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 4 
Braver to “refrain from assault, stalking, harassment, aggravated harassment, menacing, . . . intimidation, 
threats, . . . or any criminal offense” against Ms. Braver and her daughter.23   
9. Ms. Braver provided the Bureau with recordings of some of the spoofed phone calls she 
received.  Many of the initial calls spoofed the numbers of local jails and prisons and made lurid 
suggestions that Ms. Braver would be “joining” the inmates there.24  For example, on May 19, 2015, and 
August 3, 2015, Ms. Braver received calls spoofing the caller ID information of Sing Sing Correctional 
Facility, a maximum security prison operated by the State of New York.  Using the voice modulator 
feature of the spoofing service, the caller told Ms. Braver that “We look forward to you joining us here” 
or “We are waiting for you.”25  A pair of spoofed calls received by Ms. Braver on July 23, 2015, 
displaying the caller ID information of the New York City Department of Corrections, were even more 
explicit: “We have a cell here for you.”26  
10. Over time, the spoofed calls increased in frequency and the messages referred to matters 
specific to Ms. Braver, her minor child, and/or Mr. Braver.27  For example, on August 12, 2015, Ms. 
Braver received calls spoofing the home landline number of Ms. Braver’s parents.28  On September 8, 
2015 and September 24, 2015, Ms. Braver received harassing calls spoofing the phone number of the 
school district where Ms. Braver’s minor child attends school.29  On September 7, 2015, she received a 
spoofed call asking about how she spent her day with her daughter.30   
11. Ms. Braver complained to Bureau staff and local law enforcement that she felt harassed 
and intimidated by the repeated menacing calls.  She also stated to Bureau investigators that the spoofed 
phone numbers selected—in particular calls from local prisons and the district where her minor child 
attends school—were deeply upsetting and disturbing to her.31  Bureau investigators reviewed recordings 
of some of the calls that Ms. Braver received, which supported her claims. 
12. Ms. Braver told Bureau staff that she believed the calls originated from her former husband, 
Gary Braver, and one of his work colleagues, Steven Blumenstock.32  Ms. Braver explained that she used a 
third-party “unmasking” service for some of the spoofed calls she received to reveal the true caller ID 
                                                     
23 Id. 
24 See Robin Braver Affidavit, id. at 1 (“Beginning May 19, 2015, I began receiving spoofed calls . . . . The caller 
pretends to call from different New York correctional facilities in a spooky voice saying they are looking forward to 
me joining them to stay there.”). 
25 See id. at 1-2. 
26 See id. at 1. 
27 See id. (“As time went on, the calls occurred more and more frequently and all were related to activities between 
me and my daughter and/or Gary Braver.”). 
28 See id. at 2. 
29 See id.  As noted above, Ms. Braver continued to receive harassing calls from spoofed numbers after the Bureau 
began its investigation.  Supra note 17.  For example, on November 11, 2015, Ms. Braver received multiple calls 
spoofing the number of the New York Family Court Clerk’s Office, where the Bravers have ongoing child custody 
proceedings.  According to Ms. Braver, the caller used the voice modulator and referenced upcoming court dates:  
“Don’t forget to bring your tax returns tomorrow to court,” “Don’t forget about court tomorrow and bring your tax 
return.  Don’t forget.”  See Robin Braver Affidavit at 3.  The timing of the calls appeared to have been specifically 
orchestrated by Mr. Braver, as he and Ms. Braver were scheduled to appear in court regarding child support on the 
following day.  The Bureau may, in the future, pursue a separate action against Mr. Braver and Mr. Blumenstock for 
these additional apparent violations. 
30 See Attachment (call received September 7, 2015, asks Ms. Braver “how’s your mother/daughter day going?”). 
31 See id. Robin Braver Affidavit at 3-4. 
32 Id. at 4.  
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 5 
information of the caller.33  For each of the calls that Ms. Braver unmasked, the true caller ID information 
was the wireless phone number of Mr. Blumenstock.34   
13. Bureau staff subpoenaed call records for Mr. Blumenstock’s wireless phone and compared 
the calling records to the log of spoofed calls that the victim provided to Bureau investigators.  The call 
records obtained by the Bureau show that on 31 occasions from May 2015 to September 2015, Mr. 
Blumenstock used his wireless phone to dial an access number belonging to spoofing service provider 
CallerIDFaker.com.35  Call records from Ms. Braver’s carrier show that each time Mr. Blumenstock dialed 
the CallerIDFaker.com access number, Ms. Braver received a simultaneous spoofed call.36  
CallerIDFaker.com’s parent company, BSD Telecom, confirmed in response to an FCC subpoena that Mr. 
Blumenstock used its service to place the calls to Ms. Braver.37  On February 16, 2016, in response to the 
criminal complaint that Ms. Braver filed, Nassau County Police arrested Mr. Blumenstock38 and charged 
him with one count of stalking in the third degree39 and one count of aggravated harassment in the second 
degree.40 
14. Although Mr. Blumenstock purportedly dialed all of the spoofed calls, Ms. Braver alleged 
that he made the calls at the request and with the involvement of Ms. Braver’s ex-husband, Gary Braver.  
Ms. Braver provided a sworn affidavit stating that she has no independent relationship with Mr. 
Blumenstock.41  Ms. Braver also attested that, to the best of her knowledge, she has never called Mr. 
Blumenstock.42  Independent analysis of the call records of Mr. Blumenstock and Ms. Braver confirms that 
Ms. Braver did not call Mr. Blumenstock at any time during the period she received the harmful, spoofed 
calls.  In addition, according to Ms. Braver, the caller who made the harassing calls frequently referenced 
                                                     
33 Id. at 2-3.  
34 Id. at 3-4. 
35 The CallerIDFaker.com service allows customers to falsify their caller ID information.  See CallerIDFaker.com 
website, available at http://www.calleridfaker.com (last visited June 3, 2016) (voiceover in embedded video on front 
page of the website states “Ever want to be someone else?  With CallerIDFaker, you can be whoever you want to 
be.”).  CallerIDFaker.com customers dial one of several ten digit numbers belonging to the service and enter a 
customer access code.  After entering the access code, the customer is prompted to enter the number of the person (s)he 
wants to call and the false caller ID information (s)he wants to display on the recipient’s phone.  The service provides 
the caller with the option to use a voice modulator to disguise his or her voice.  This process is described in detail in a 
YouTube user video documenting how the CallerIDFaker.com service works.  See CallerIDFaker Tutorial, available 
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAXEL3hAk8Y (last visited Jul. 26, 2016).  We note that the Commission 
declined to hold third-party spoofing service providers like CallerIDFaker.com liable for harassing calls made by their 
customers, unless the providers “knowingly manipulated the caller identification information in order to defraud, cause 
harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.”  Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 9121-22, para. 20.  See id. at 
9125, para. 25 (“[T]he the transmission of incorrect caller ID information . . . without the requisite intent to defraud, 
cause harm or wrongfully obtain anything of value does not violate the Truth in Caller ID Act or our rules 
implementing the Truth in Caller ID Act.”).  We do not opine in this Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture 
whether CallerIDFaker.com or its parent company, BSD Telecom, might also be liable for the spoofed calls placed 
by Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver, or its other customers. 
36 See Attachment. 
37 See Response of BSD Telecom of May 20, 2016 (on file in File No. EB-TCD-15-00020134). 
38 Nassau County, New York, First District Court, Case No. 2016NA004625, Arrest No. R300448.  
39 New York Penal Law § 120.50. 
40 New York Penal Law § 240.30.  The criminal case against Mr. Blumenstock remains ongoing. 
41 See Robin Braver Affidavit at 4 (“I have no relationship with Steven Blumenstock.  I do not mix with him socially 
or professionally.  Other than our shared connection with Gary Braver, we have nothing in common.”). 
42 Id. 
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 6 
non-public information about events involving the Bravers’ ongoing child custody proceedings that Mr. 
Blumenstock likely would not have known unless Mr. Braver revealed it to him.43  Ms. Braver stated that 
Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver are close friends and work colleagues.44  A review of the phone records 
for both Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver shows a pattern of frequent, sometimes daily, communication 
between the two.45  The evidence also shows that Mr. Braver was directly involved in at least some of the 
harassing calls that Ms. Braver received.  For example, on September 8, 2015, Mr. Braver used his wireless 
phone to call Mr. Blumenstock’s landline phone at his home.  Moments later, while still on the line with Mr. 
Braver, Mr. Blumenstock dialed the CallerIDFaker.com access numbers.  Ms. Braver then received harmful, 
spoofed calls originating from the CallerIDFaker.com service. 
III. DISCUSSION 
15. Section 227(e) of the Act and Section 64.1604 of the Rules prohibit any person within the 
United States, in connection with any telecommunications service or IP-enabled voice service, to 
knowingly cause, directly or indirectly, any caller ID service to transmit or display misleading or 
inaccurate caller ID information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of 
value.46  We find that Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver apparently violated Section 227(e) of the Act and 
Section 64.1604 of the Rules by spoofing caller ID information for the purpose of conducting a harmful 
campaign of harassment and stalking against Ms. Braver.  
A. Blumenstock and Braver Made Spoofed Calls to Robin Braver with the Intent to 
Cause Her Harm  
16. Record of Calls to Victim.  As described in detail above, the Bureau’s evidence shows that 
Mr. Blumenstock used the CallerIDFaker.com spoofing service for the purposes of making harmful calls to 
Ms. Braver.47  On 31 occasions from May 2015 to September 2015, Mr. Blumenstock used his wireless 
phone to dial a CallerIDFaker.com access number.48  Call records from Ms. Braver’s carrier show that each 
time Mr. Blumenstock dialed the CallerIDFaker.com access number, Ms. Braver received a simultaneous 
spoofed call.49  CallerIDFaker.com’s parent company likewise confirmed that Mr. Blumenstock used its 
service to place the calls to Ms. Braver, and Mr. Blumenstock was later arrested and charged with stalking 
and aggravated harassment.50 
17. In addition, as stated above, the evidence shows that Mr. Blumenstock engaged in the 
campaign of harassment and stalking at the request and with the involvement of Ms. Braver’s ex-husband, 
Gary Braver.51  Ms. Braver had no prior relationship with Mr. Blumenstock and the harassing calls she 
received frequently referenced personal information known to Mr. Braver.52  The fact that Mr. Braver 
purportedly did not dial the spoofed calls himself does not absolve him of liability for the harassment and 
stalking of his ex-wife.  Federal law prohibits “directly or indirectly” causing the transmission or display of 
                                                     
43 See supra para. 7. 
44 See Robin Braver Affidavit at 4. 
45 See 2015 Phone Records of Steven Blumenstock and Gary Braver (on file in File No. EB-TCD-15-00020134). 
46 47 U.S.C. § 227(e); 47 CFR § 64.1604. 
47 See supra para. 13. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See supra para. 14. 
52 See id. 
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 7 
spoofed caller ID information.53  The Commission specifically prohibited “indirect” unlawful spoofing “to 
foreclose those acting with the requisite harmful intent from arguing that they are not liable merely 
because they have engaged a third party to cause the transmission or display of inaccurate or misleading 
caller identification information.”54  Consequently, Mr. Braver cannot escape liability for the harmful, 
spoofed calls made by Mr. Blumenstock when Mr. Blumenstock made such calls at his direction.  
Moreover, as stated previously, the evidence shows that Mr. Braver was directly involved in at least some of 
the harassing calls that Ms. Braver received.55  Based on the calling records, the content of the voice 
recordings, and Ms. Braver’s affidavit that she had no prior relationship with Mr. Blumenstock, it appears 
that Mr. Braver not only was a knowing participant in the harassing calls that Ms. Braver received, but 
directed Mr. Blumenstock to make the calls.  Accordingly, both Mr. Braver and Mr. Blumenstock are 
apparently liable for the spoofed calls that Ms. Braver received. 
18. Harmful Nature of the Spoofed Calls.  As explained in detail above, both the Truth in 
Caller ID Act and the Rules make it unlawful to spoof a telephone number when the caller’s purpose for 
doing so is to “cause harm.”56  The Commission specifically stated that the term “harm” covered not only 
physical or financial harm, but also “encompasses . . . emotional harm, including stalking, harassment, 
and the violation of protection and restraining orders.”57   
19. During the period Ms. Braver received the harmful, spoofed calls from Mr. Blumenstock 
at the direction or with the participation of Mr. Braver, she had a court-ordered Temporary Order of 
Protection against her ex-husband.58  The Commission specifically identified the violation of protection 
orders as an example of a “harm” covered by the Truth in Caller ID Act and the Rules.59  The malicious 
calls made by Mr. Blumenstock at the direction or with the participation of Mr. Braver are precisely the 
type of spoofing by abusive spouses that Congress sought to punish under the Truth in Caller ID Act.60     
20. The evidence indicates that Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver intended to cause harm to 
Ms. Braver through their spoofed calls.  They executed an extensive calling campaign that appears 
specifically designed to intimidate, harass, and threaten Ms. Braver.  For example, Mr. Blumenstock and 
Mr. Braver (1) specifically selected spoofed phone numbers designed to intimidate Ms. Braver or induce 
her to answer the calls; (2) they disguised their voices by using the voice modulation feature of 
CallerIDFaker.com’s spoofing service; and (3) they conveyed bizarre, threatening, and/or disturbing 
messages, in order to elicit the maximum amount of harm to the victim.  Between May and September 
2015, Mr. Blumenthal and Mr. Braver’s campaign of harassment and stalking became increasingly 
personal, spoofing numbers with special meaning to Ms. Braver, such as those belonging to her child’s 
school and her parents’ home.61  The spoofed calls repeatedly referenced personal information regarding 
                                                     
53 47 CFR § 64.1604(a) (emphasis added). 
54 Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 9122, para. 21.  The inclusion of “indirect” violations of the 
Commission’s spoofing rules is logical and necessary.  Otherwise, violators could escape liability any time they 
used a third-party service to transmit the spoofed call.  See id. 
55 See supra para. 13. 
56 See supra paras. 4-5. 
57 Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 9122, para. 22 (emphasis added). 
58 See supra para. 14. 
59 Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 9122, para. 22. 
60 Id. at 9122-23, para. 22 (stating record “offers substantial evidence that abusive spouses use third-party caller ID 
services to harass and stalk their victims”). 
61 See supra para. 9. 
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 8 
Ms. Braver and her daughter.62  There is no reason for Mr. Blumenstock or Mr. Braver to spoof such 
numbers, let alone communicate such messages, except to harass and disturb the recipient, Ms. Braver. 
21. Ms. Braver told Bureau staff and local law enforcement that she felt harassed and 
intimidated by the repeated menacing calls.63  She also stated to Bureau investigators that the spoofed 
phone numbers selected by Mr. Braver and Mr. Blumenthal—in particular calls from a local prisons and 
the district where her minor child attends school—were deeply upsetting and disturbing to her.64  Bureau 
review of the recorded calls supports Ms. Braver’s claims.  Moreover, the fact that Ms. Braver had 
obtained an Order of Protection against Mr. Braver supports her statements that these contacts, which 
either came from him or were made at his direction, were intended to cause harm.  In this case, the use of 
the modulation tool, the malicious tone, the content of the messages and the personal references therein 
show that the spoofed calls were intentionally harmful in nature. 
22. Based on both the information provided by Ms. Braver and the evidence uncovered in the 
Bureau’s investigation, we find that Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver apparently violated Section 227(e) 
of the Act and Section 64.1604 of the Rules by knowingly causing, directly or indirectly, a caller ID 
service to transmit or display misleading or inaccurate caller ID information with the intent to cause harm 
to Ms. Braver. 
B. Proposed Forfeiture  
23. Section 227(e) of the Act and the Section 1.80 of the Rules authorize the Commission to 
impose a forfeiture against any person that engages in unlawful spoofing.65  Specifically, the Act and 
Rules authorize a forfeiture of up to $10,000 for each spoofing violation, or three times that amount for 
each day of a continuing violation, up to a statutory maximum of $1,025,000 for any single act or failure 
to act.66  The Truth in Caller ID Act empowers the Commission “to proceed expeditiously to stop and . . . 
assess a forfeiture penalty against, any person or entity engaged in prohibited caller ID spoofing without 
first issuing a citation” against the violator.67  In exercising our forfeiture authority under the Truth in 
                                                     
62 See supra paras. 9, 13. 
63 See supra para. 10. 
64 See supra para. 9. 
65 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(5); 47 CFR § 1.80(b)(4).  The Truth in Caller ID Act and the Rules contain a two-year statute 
of limitations on proposing forfeitures for unlawful spoofing.  47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(5)(iv); 47 CFR § 1.80(c)(3).  
Unlike forfeitures assessed under Section 503(b) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b), “the Truth in Caller ID Act does not 
require ‘willful’ or ‘repeated’ violations to justify imposition of a penalty.”  Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd 
at 9133, para. 48.  As a result, the Bureau is not required to demonstrate the “conscious and deliberate commission 
or omission of any act” or that such act happened more than once or for more than one day to propose a forfeiture 
for apparently unlawful spoofing.  See 47 U.S.C. § 312(f)(1)-(2) (defining “willful” and “repeated” under the Act).  
We nevertheless find that Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver willfully and repeatedly spoofed caller ID information 
with the intent to cause harm. 
66 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(5)(A); 47 CFR § 1.80(b)(4).  In the alternative and in lieu of the Act’s general criminal 
penalty provisions in Section 501, 47 U.S.C. § 501, the Truth In Caller ID Act also provides for criminal fines up to 
$10,000 for each violation, or three times that amount for each day of a continuing violation.  47 U.S.C. § 
227(e)(5)(B). 
67 Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 9132-33, para. 47.  Under Section 503(b)(5) of the Act, a person who 
does not hold a license, permit, certificate, or other authorization issued by the Commission, or is not an applicant 
for the same, may not be issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture unless:  (1) that person is first sent a 
citation of the violation charged, (2) is given an opportunity for a personal interview with an official of the 
Commission, and (3) subsequently engages in conduct of the type described in such citation.  47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(5).  
By contrast, the Truth In Caller ID Act only requires that the Commission provide the notice required under Section 
503(b)(3) of the Act (notice and opportunity for a hearing before the Commission or an administrative law judge) or 
Section 503(b)(4) of the Act (Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture) before assessing a forfeiture for unlawful 
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 9 
Caller ID Act, we must consider the “nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation and, with 
respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and such 
other matters as justice may require.”68  In addition, the Commission has established forfeiture guidelines; 
they identify criteria that we consider when determining the appropriate penalty in any given case.69  
Under these guidelines, we may adjust a forfeiture upward for violations that are egregious, intentional, or 
repeated, or that cause substantial harm or generate substantial economic gain for the violator.70  We may 
also adjust proposed forfeitures downward in cases where the violation is minor in nature, when there is 
evidence of good faith action or voluntary disclosure of the violations, when the violator has a history of 
overall compliance, or when the violator demonstrates an inability to pay.71 
24. The Commission has stated that “alteration of caller identification information for the 
purpose of harassing or stalking someone [is] an egregious violation of the Act and of our rules 
implementing the Act,”72 and warned that it can seek “substantial penalties” against violators for unlawful 
spoofing.73  In this case, the culpability of the violators is clear and the apparent violations were 
egregious, intentional, repeated, and caused substantial harm to the victim.74  Consequently, the proposed 
forfeitures must be significant enough to deter repeat offenses by the apparent violators and dissuade 
similar misconduct by others in the future.75  The proposed forfeitures must also account for the fact that 
Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver appear to be first-time violators of the Act.76  The Bureau previously 
assessed $25,000 forfeitures against individuals for egregious, intentional, and repeated violations of the 
Act and Rules,77 as well as in other cases impacting public safety.78  As we found in those cases, we find 
that a $25,000 fine is appropriate against individuals who engaged in egregious misconduct.  We 
therefore find that proposed forfeitures of $25,000 each against Mr. Blumenstock and Mr. Braver 
appropriately account for the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violations while serving as 
a sufficient deterrent against unlawful spoofing.  As noted below, we may reduce the forfeiture if Mr. 
                                                     
spoofing.  47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(5)(A).  Here, we provide the required notice under Section 503(b)(4) of the Act 
through this Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture.  
68 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(E); Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 9132, para. 46 (“In order to provide guidance 
about the factors the Commission will use in determining the amount of penalty it will assess for violations of the 
Truth in Caller ID Act, we adopt the Commission’s proposal to employ the balancing factors the Commission 
typically considers when determining the amount of a forfeiture penalty. Those factors are set out in section 
503(b)(2)(E) of the Communications Act.”).  
69 47 CFR § 1.80(b)(8), Note to paragraph (b)(8).  
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Truth in Caller ID Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 9123, para. 22. 
73 Id. at 9114, para. 2. 
74 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(E); 47 CFR § 1.80(b)(8). 
75 The Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement and Amendment of Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the 
Forfeiture Guidelines, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 17087, 171097, para. 19 (1997) (“[F]orfeiture amounts 
should be set high enough to serve as a deterrent and foster compliance with our rules).   
76 Id. at 17101-02, paras. 30-31; 47 CFR § 1.80(b)(8). 
77 See, e.g., Damian Anthony Ojouku Allen, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 29 FCC Rcd 2982 (Enf. Bur. 
2014); Fabrice Polynice, Forfeiture Order, 28 FCC Rcd 4297 (Enf. Bur. 2013); Estevan J. Gutierrez, Forfeiture 
Order, 28 FCC Rcd 15486 (Enf. Bur. 2013). 
78 See, e.g., Drew Buckley, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 165 (Enf. Bur. 2015) AT&T Servs., Inc., Notice of 
Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 29 FCC Rcd 1949 (Enf. Bur. 2014); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., Notice of Apparent 
Liability for Forfeiture, 28 FCC Rcd 15455 (Enf. Bur. 2013). 
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 10 
Blumenstock and Mr. Braver provide sufficient financial information demonstrating an inability to pay 
the proposed penalties.79 
IV. CONCLUSION 
25. We have determined that Steven Blumenstock and Gary Braver apparently violated 
Section 227(e) of the Act and Section 64.1604 of the Rules.80  As such, Steven Blumenstock is apparently 
liable for a forfeiture of $25,000 and Gary Braver is apparently liable for a forfeiture of $25,000. 
V. ORDERING CLAUSES 
26. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 227(e) of the Act81 and Section 
1.80 of the Rules,82 Steven Blumenstock is hereby NOTIFIED of this APPARENT LIABILITY FOR 
A FORFEITURE in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for violating Section 227(e) 
of the Act83 and Section 64.1604 of the Rules.84   
27. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 227(e) of the Act85 and Section 
1.80 of the Rules,86 Gary Braver is hereby NOTIFIED of this APPARENT LIABILITY FOR A 
FORFEITURE in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for violating Section 227(e) of 
the Act87 and Section 64.1604 of the Rules.88   
28. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 1.80 of the Rules,89 within thirty 
(30) calendar days of the release date of this Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, Steven 
Blumenstock SHALL PAY the full amount of the proposed forfeitures or SHALL FILE a written 
statement seeking reduction or cancellation of the proposed forfeitures consistent with paragraph 32 
below. 
29. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 1.80 of the Rules,90 within thirty 
(30) calendar days of the release date of this Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, Gary Braver 
SHALL PAY the full amount of the proposed forfeitures or SHALL FILE a written statement seeking 
reduction or cancellation of the proposed forfeitures consistent with paragraph 32 below. 
30. Payment of the forfeiture must be made by check or similar instrument, wire transfer, or 
credit card, and must include the NAL/Account Number and FRN referenced above.  Steven Blumenstock 
and Gary Braver shall send electronic notification of payment to Johnny Drake at johnny.drake@fcc.gov 
and the date said payment is made.  Regardless of the form of payment, a completed FCC Form 159 
(Remittance Advice) must be submitted.91  When completing the FCC Form 159, enter the Account 
                                                     
79 See infra para. 33. 
80 47 U.S.C. § 227(e); 47 CFR § 64.1604. 
81 47 U.S.C. § 227(e). 
82 47 CFR § 1.80. 
83 47 U.S.C. § 227(e). 
84 47 CFR § 64.1604. 
85 47 U.S.C. § 227(e). 
86 47 CFR § 1.80. 
87 47 U.S.C. § 227(e). 
88 47 CFR § 64.1604. 
89 47 CFR § 1.80. 
90 Id. 
91 An FCC Form 159 and detailed instructions for completing the form may be obtained at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form159/159.pdf. 
 Federal Communications Commission DA 16-872 
 
 11 
Number in block number 23A (call sign/other ID) and enter the letters “FORF” in block number 24A 
(payment type code).  Below are additional instructions that should be followed based on the form of 
payment selected:  
• Payment by check or money order must be made payable to the order of the Federal 
Communications Commission.  Such payments (along with the completed Form 159) must be 
mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-
9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank – Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-
GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63101. 
• Payment by wire transfer must be made to ABA Number 021030004, receiving bank 
TREAS/NYC, and Account Number 27000001.  To complete the wire transfer and ensure 
appropriate crediting of the wired funds, a completed Form 159 must be faxed to U.S. Bank 
at (314) 418-4232 on the same business day the wire transfer is initiated. 
• Payment by credit card must be made by providing the required credit card information on 
FCC Form 159 and signing and dating the Form 159 to authorize the credit card payment.  
The completed Form 159 must then be mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. 
Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank – 
Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 
63101. 
31. Any request for making full payment over time under an installment plan should be sent 
to:  Chief Financial Officer—Financial Operations, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th 
Street, SW, Room 1-A625, Washington, DC 20554.92  Questions regarding payment procedures should be 
directed to the Financial Operations Group Help Desk by phone, 1-877-480-3201, or by e-mail, 
ARINQUIRIES@fcc.gov. 
32. The written statement seeking reduction or cancellation of the proposed forfeiture, if any, 
must include a detailed factual statement supported by appropriate documentation and affidavits pursuant 
to Sections 1.16 and 1.80(f)(3) of the Rules.93  The written statement must be mailed to the Office of the 
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554, ATTN:  
Enforcement Bureau – Telecommunications Consumers Division, and to Richard A. Hindman, Chief, 
Telecommunications Consumers Division, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, 
445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554, and must include the NAL/Account Number referenced in 
the caption.  The statement must also be e-mailed to Kristi Thompson at kristi.thompson@fcc.gov.   
33. The Commission will not consider reducing or canceling a forfeiture in response to a 
claim of inability to pay unless the petitioner submits:  (1) federal tax returns for the most recent three-
year period; (2) financial statements prepared according to generally accepted accounting practices; or 
(3) some other reliable and objective documentation that accurately reflects the petitioner’s current 
financial status.  Any claim of inability to pay must specifically identify the basis for the claim by 
reference to the financial documentation. 
                                                     
92 See 47 CFR § 1.1914. 
93 47 CFR §§ 1.16, 1.80(f)(3).