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                                   Before the

                       FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

                             Washington, D.C. 20554

   In the Matter of )

   )

   APCC Services, Inc., )

   )

   Complainant, ) File No.: EB-10-MD-002

   )

   v. )

   )

   Intelco Communications, Inc., )

   )

   Defendant. )

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

   Adopted: March 5, 2013 Released: March 5, 2013

   By the Chief, Enforcement Bureau:

   I. INTRODUCTION

    1. In this Memorandum Opinion and Order (Order), we grant in part an
       unopposed Motion for Default  Judgment^ against Intelco
       Communications, Inc. (Intelco), thereby resolving a formal complaint
       filed by APCC Services, Inc. (APCC)^ against Intelco pursuant to
       section 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act).^ The
       Complaint alleges that Intelco violated sections 201(b) and 276(b) of
       the Act^ by failing to comply with the Commission's rules that require
       Intelco to pay dial-around compensation to APCC for calls originating
       from APCC's payphones.^ For the following reasons, we grant APCC's
       Motion for Default  Judgment and order Intelco to pay APCC damages in
       the amount of $1,026,267.84, plus interest.

   II. BACKGROUND

    A. Per-Call Payphone Compensation

    2. Section 276 of the Act directed the Commission to establish a per-call
       compensation plan to ensure that all payphone service providers (PSPs)
       are fairly compensated for "each and every completed intrastate and
       interstate call using their payphone."^ Included among the calls
       subject to this payment mandate are certain categories of coinless
       payphone calls--known as "dial-around calls"--during which the caller
       makes a coinless call using an access code or toll-free number to
       reach a carrier other than the payphone's presubscribed long distance
       carrier.^ The Commission's implementing rules place the responsibility
       for paying such "dial-around compensation" on the "Completing
       Carrier," which is the "long distance carrier or switch-based long
       distance reseller that completes a coinless access code or subscriber
       toll-free payphone call."^ From April 21, 1999, to September 26, 2004,
       the default compensation per-call rate for these calls, to be paid by
       the Completing Carrier to the PSP, was $.24, and after September 27,
       2004, the default compensation rate is $.494.^

    B. The Parties

    3. APCC is an agent for certain PSPs for the billing and collection of
       dial-around call compensation.^ According to APCC, Intelco was at all
       relevant times a common carrier that provided interexchange
       telecommunications service in the United States as a switch-based
       reseller of long distance calls, including calls originating from
       payphones owned by PSPs represented by APCC, and was the Completing
       Carrier with respect to the calls at issue.^

    4. On March 12, 2010, APCC filed the instant Complaint against Intelco
       seeking to recover unpaid dial-around compensation allegedly due under
       section 276 of the Act and the Commission's rules.^ Specifically, APCC
       alleges that Intelco failed to pay dial-around compensation from July
       1, 2004, to September 30, 2009 (the Complaint Period) for calls
       originating from APCC's PSPs' payphones and completed by Intelco.^
       APCC also alleges that Intelco has violated Commission rules requiring
       payphone call tracking systems, quarterly reports, financial
       certification, and annual audits and audit reports.^

    C. Procedural History

    5. In June 2006, pursuant to section 208 of the Act, and sections
       1.711-1.718 of the Commission's rules,^ APCC filed two informal
       complaints against Intelco^ alleging that Intelco had violated
       sections 201(b) and 276 of the Act, and sections 64.1300-64.1320 of
       the Commission's rules,^ by failing to pay payphone dial-around
       compensation allegedly due to PSPs represented by APCC. Intelco
       responded to the second informal complaint,^ thus establishing a
       six-month period within which the parties could try to resolve the
       dispute without the need for APCC to file a formal complaint.^ On
       March 12, 2010, after both parties had jointly sought and received
       numerous extensions of the deadline for APCC to "convert" the
       unresolved informal complaints to a formal complaint under rule
       1.718,^ APCC filed the instant Complaint against Intelco.^

    6. On March 26, 2010, pursuant to section 1.735 of the Commission's
       rules,^ the Commission sent a copy of the Complaint to Intelco, with
       April 16, 2010, as the deadline for filing an answer.^ Intelco did
       not, however, file an answer to the Complaint, as required by the
       Commission's formal complaint rules.^ ^  Consequently, on April 23,
       2010, the Commission notified Intelco in writing that the Commission
       has authority to impose penalties for failure to respond to a
       Commission request for information or for a violation of Commission
       rules, and that the Commission may also enter a default judgment
       against a defendant that fails to participate in a formal complaint
       proceeding.^ The Commission also directed Intelco to indicate, by
       April 29, 2010, whether it intended to respond to the Complaint. ^ ^

    7. On April 27, 2010, Intelco informally indicated in a facsimile to
       Commission staff, i.e., not in a pleading properly filed with the
       Secretary's office or in conformance with any other Commission
       procedural rule, that Intelco would "not be filing a response to the
       formal complaint" because, as a purported Canadian company, Intelco
       believed the Commission lacked personal jurisdiction over it.^
       Notably, the Intelco Fax acknowledged that Intelco was "in receipt of"
       Commission staff's April 23 Notification Letter, thus showing that
       Intelco received actual notice of the Complaint.^

    8. In a letter ruling dated May 14, 2010,^ Commission staff weighed the
       consequences of Intelco's failure to submit an answer, and determined
       that, on or before June 7, 2010, APCC should either withdraw the
       Complaint (in order to file an informal complaint against Intelco
       alleging identical claims) or file a motion for default  judgment.^
       Commission staff also stated that a failure to take either of these
       steps could result in a dismissal for failure to prosecute.^ On June
       7, 2010, APCC filed a Motion for Default Judgment.^ Intelco did not
       file an opposition to APCC's Motion for Default Judgment.

    9. Because the record lacked information regarding damages (that is, the
       only information regarding the number of calls completed by Intelco
       was information provided by intermediate carriers regarding the number
       of calls delivered to Intelco), on August 5, 2010, Commission staff
       directed the parties to "supplement the record with information that
       would provide a basis for calculating or estimating the number or
       percentage of total calls that were completed."^ On August 20, 2010,
       APCC provided a summary of data that could be used to calculate the
       number of calls that Intelco completed.^ Again, Intelco failed to file
       a response that complied with the Commission's rules. Rather, on
       August 24, 2010, Intelco sent a letter to APCC, copying Commission
       staff (but not filed with the Commission's Secretary) that (1)
       acknowledged receipt of Commission staff's August 2010 Letter, and (2)
       objected to the disclosure of certain information in the APCC Data
       Letter.^ Subsequently, on September 8, 2010, APCC proposed a proxy for
       estimating the number of completed calls.^

   III. DISCUSSION

   10. The key facts of this proceeding are not in dispute because Intelco
       purposefully chose not to participate in this proceeding. We therefore
       need only address two threshold issues before addressing damages:
       first, we discuss the Commission's personal jurisdiction over Intelco;
       and second, we consider APCC's request for a default judgment. As
       explained below, we find the Commission has personal jurisdiction over
       Intelco, and based on APCC's unopposed submissions, we grant the
       request for default judgment.

   A. The Commission Has Personal Jurisdiction Over Intelco.

   11. Under section 1.724 of the Commission's rules, a defendant in a formal
       complaint proceeding, unless otherwise directed by the Commission,
       must file an answer within twenty days of service of the formal
       complaint, and "[t]he answer shall advise the complainant and the
       Commission fully and completely of the nature of any defense, and
       shall respond specifically to all material allegations of the
       complaint."^ Section 1.724 also provides that "[a]verments in a
       complaint . . . are deemed to be admitted when not denied in the
       answer."^ Thus, in an ordinary case, a defendant in a formal complaint
       proceeding must raise the affirmative defense of lack of personal
       jurisdiction in the answer (or alternatively seek to make a limited
       appearance for purposes of contesting jurisdiction), or it waives this
       defense.^

   12. But this is not the ordinary case of a domestic defendant filing an
       answer and failing to raise in the answer a defense of lack of
       personal jurisdiction. Instead, here, a putatively foreign defendant
       has failed to file any answer or otherwise officially participate at
       all in this formal complaint proceeding. And the complainant is now
       seeking a default judgment as a result. These circumstances are not
       directly addressed by our formal complaint rules. Accordingly, it is
       appropriate for us to consult federal court procedural law for
       guidance.^

   13. Under similar circumstances, federal courts have ruled that, before
       entering a default judgment against a foreign defendant, a court
       should determine, sua sponte, whether the court has personal
       jurisdiction over the foreign defendant who may not have technically
       appeared in a case, and whether adequate notice has been provided.^
       The plaintiff's burden of proving personal jurisdiction, however, is
       relatively low: the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing,
       and such showing may rest on documentation only, such as pleadings,
       affidavits and other written materials.^ We believe that approach
       makes sense and apply it here.

   14. Therefore, although Intelco failed to appear in this proceeding and,
       under normal circumstances, would have waived the defense of lack of
       personal jurisdiction, in the interest of fairness we consider sua
       sponte whether the Commission has personal jurisdiction over this
       (apparently) foreign defendant.^ As discussed below, in response to
       Commission staff's May 14 Letter requiring APCC to withdraw the
       complaint or seek default judgment, APCC describes how Intelco's
       activities support specific personal jurisdiction, which can be
       justified by a single significant contact - also known as the "minimum
       contacts doctrine."^ We agree and conclude that the Commission has
       jurisdiction here because Intelco had more than sufficient "minimum
       contacts" with the United States such that the exercise of
       jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
       substantial justice."^

   15. In International Shoe, the Supreme Court recognized that jurisdiction
       over a defendant corporation not physically present in the forum state
       would exist where that defendant had availed itself of that forum's
       benefits, such that it would be reasonable to require it to defend a
       suit related to those activities.^ Applying that standard here, we
       find that Intelco could reasonably have anticipated defending an
       action involving calls it completed from APCC's payphones, i.e., calls
       that Intelco purposefully received and from which it benefitted. In
       particular, the record reflects that Intelco had arrangements with
       telecommunications carriers to carry 3,414,812 calls^ over several
       years^ from APCC's United States-based payphones to Intelco's calling
       card platform, and that these arrangements, and the Intermediate
       Carrier Reports that resulted from (and provide evidence of) them,
       show substantial continuous contacts with the United States and the
       PSPs' payphones.^ Further, APCC provides uncontested testimony
       indicating that Intelco marketed calling cards in the United
       States--cards that were used to make dial-around calls from APCC's
       payphones.^ APCC's President and General Manager, with extensive
       experience dealing with Intermediate Carriers and Completing Carriers,
       describes in detail how APCC collected data and determined Intelco was
       the Completing Carrier for the calls at issue.^ We are persuaded that
       APCC's evidence shows Intelco purposefully sought to reap the benefits
       of calls originating from APCC's United States-based payphones, i.e.,
       Intelco directed its business activities towards the United States.
       Further, we note that Intelco could have requested to appear in this
       proceeding for the limited purpose of addressing jurisdiction; it did
       not, however, submit such a request.^

   16. Lastly, as discussed above, we note again that the record shows that
       Intelco had adequate notice of this proceeding at each stage.^ For
       example, the record shows that:

        * Intelco actively participated in the related informal complaint
          process;^

        * Intelco was served with, and responded to, the Complaint (albeit
          not with an answer as required by the Commission's rules);^

        * Intelco was served with, and responded to, several
          Complaint-related communications from Commission staff;^ and

        * Intelco was served with, and acknowledged, the Motion for Default
          and APCC's subsequent supplementation regarding damages.^

        * Accordingly, based on the record evidence showing that Intelco
          purposefully directed, and benefitted from, its substantial
          contacts with APCC's payphones in the United States, we find that
          the Commission has personal jurisdiction over Intelco.

          B. Request for Default Judgment

           18. In connection with the requirement in section 1.724(a) of the
               Commission's rules, described above, to file an answer,^
               section 1.724(d) of the Commission's rules states that
               "[a]verments in a complaint . . . are deemed to be admitted
               when not denied in the answer."^ If the defendant fails to
               file an answer, the Commission has at its disposal "a wide
               range of sanctions to address violations or abuses of [its]
               formal complaint rules, including summary grant or dismissal
               of a complaint."^ Although the Commission's formal complaint
               rules do not specifically address default  judgments, when a
               defendant knowingly fails to answer a complaint against it,
               the Commission may find the defendant in default, and may
               consider the material facts alleged in the complaint to be
               admitted.^

           19. In determining whether to issue a default  judgment, the
               Commission has considered Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55
               for guidance.^ Rule 55 states that, when a party against whom
               a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
               plead or otherwise defend, a default  judgment may be entered
               against it.^ In APCC v. TS Interactive, we utilized the
               courts' approach to applying Rule 55, and considered the
               following factors: whether the facts alleged in the complaint
               state a valid claim; whether the defendant has clearly failed
               to defend; whether the defendant's failure to defend has
               continued for a significant period of time; whether the
               defendant's failure to defend derives from excusable neglect
               or a good faith mistake; whether the defendant's failure to
               defend has substantially prejudiced the plaintiff's rights;
               whether the plaintiff has prosecuted the matter properly;
               whether the claim concerns important matters of public policy;
               and whether the claim seeks substantial monetary damages.^ We
               find it appropriate here to again consider these factors, and
               for the reasons described below, we conclude that APCC is
               entitled to a default  judgment on liability.

           20. First, the alleged facts, if true, constitute a violation of
               law.^ As stated previously, for payphone traffic during the
               Complaint Period, the Commission's rules and orders required a
               long distance carrier or switch-based reseller to pay
               compensation to a PSP for every dial-around call originated
               from the PSP's payphones and completed by that long distance
               carrier or switch-based reseller.^ In this case, the unopposed
               Complaint and Motion for Default Judgment credibly allege that
               Intelco was the Completing Carrier for the calls described in
               the Intermediate Carrier Reports, as modified below in the
               damages discussion.^ Specifically, the unrebutted testimony
               and evidence submitted by APCC shows that Intelco purposefully
               carried, and benefitted from, well over 3 million calls from
               APCC's U.S.-based payphones over several years.^ Thus,
               applying the alleged facts to the applicable law, we conclude
               that the Complaint states a valid basis for requiring Intelco
               to pay dial-around compensation to APCC for dial-around calls
               pertaining to the Complaint Period.

           21. Next, we conclude that Intelco has clearly failed to defend
               the Complaint; that Intelco's failure to defend has continued
               for a significant period of time; and that Intelco's failure
               to defend does not derive from excusable neglect or a good
               faith mistake. First, we note that Intelco actively
               participated in the informal complaint process and only later
               chose to refrain from further participation in our
               proceedings.^ The Intelco Fax shows that Intelco received
               notice of the Complaint and of the deadline for filing the
               answer. Also, as evidenced by the Intelco Fax, Intelco
               consciously elected to not file an answer, or to respond to
               subsequent correspondence sent by Commission staff^ setting
               forth procedures for APCC to move for a default judgment,
               i.e., Intelco's failure to respond was clearly not due to
               excusable neglect or a good faith mistake. This failure to
               participate or otherwise defend the Complaint has continued
               for over two years, and Intelco has not offered a legitimate
               rationale for its failure to participate or indicated that it
               will change its position. We therefore find that Intelco
               clearly, knowingly, and repeatedly failed to defend against
               the Complaint for a significant period of time.

           22. We also conclude that APCC has been substantially prejudiced
               by the delay caused by Intelco's failure to defend the
               Complaint. As described above, the unopposed Complaint
               demonstrates that APCC is entitled to dial-around
               compensation, and Intelco's failure to participate in this
               proceeding has significantly delayed the payment of this
               compensation. We further find that APCC has properly
               prosecuted this case. APCC complied with the Commission's
               formal complaint rules (including the rules regarding service
               and filing),^ and has been responsive to staff's requests for
               additional information. Moreover, the record reflects that
               APCC entered into settlement negotiations with Intelco during
               the initial stage of this proceeding.^ Only when further
               settlement talks appeared fruitless, and Intelco failed to
               participate in this proceeding, did APCC file its Motion for
               Default Judgment.

           23. Finally, the claim presented here is not an important matter
               of public policy, such as a constitutional or statutory
               construction issue, but rather is a straightforward, private
               payment dispute under the Commission's payphone rules.
               Moreover, we find that the amount of damages--as described
               below and based on APCC's submission provided at staff's
               request (and unopposed by Intelco)--is not so large as to
               preclude a default judgment.^

           24. For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that Intelco is in
               default regarding the liability alleged in the Complaint.
               Thus, we grant APCC's Motion for Default Judgment on
               liability.

          C. Damages

           25. In accordance with APCC v. Radiant,^  we estimate the number
               of completed calls and determine that APCC is entitled to
               per-call compensation from Intelco in the amount of
               $1,026,267.84, plus interest.  As discussed above, APCC is
               entitled to be paid for completed calls. While certain key
               facts regarding the calls at issue are not in dispute, the
               Complaint and the Motion for Default Judgment are unclear
               regarding the number of completed calls. That is, the record
               does not contain a set of audited data to calculate completed
               calls, and because Intelco apparently failed to comply with
               the Commission's call tracking rules, we cannot ascertain the
               exact number of calls for which Intelco is liable.

           26. In APCC v. Radiant, the Commission recognized that it would be
               "implausible" for every call delivered to the defendant
               carrier to have been actually completed.^ Moreover, as the
               Commission explained in APCC v. Radiant, to accept a damages
               proposal "for all calls regardless of whether they are
               actually completed would contravene section 276's directive
               that compensation be paid only for `completed intrastate and
               interstate call[s].'"^ Thus, the Commission endeavored to find
               an appropriate proxy "to ensure that the represented PSPs
               collect the monies they are owed and that [the defendant] is
               not unjustly enriched."^ In APCC v. Radiant, however, as here,
               the defendant failed to comply with the Commission's rules
               regarding implementing an audited and certified call tracking
               system.^

           27. Nonetheless, APCC requested in the Complaint and the Motion
               for Default Judgment that the Commission assume 100% of the
               calls delivered to Intelco were completed.^ That is, APCC
               originally calculated its damages amount by "multiplying the
               FCC-prescribed compensation rate by the number of dial-around
               calls reported by Intermediate Carriers in their respective
               Intermediate Carrier Reports as delivered to [Intelco]" for
               the period in question, plus accrued interest.^ Previously,
               when similarly faced with unaudited/uncertified payphone data,
               the Commission sought to arrive at a proxy for calculating
               completed calls.^ Accordingly, on August 5, 2010, in light of
               the lack of information in the record regarding the actual
               number of completed calls, Commission staff directed the
               parties to supplement the record, stating that "[s]uch
               supplementation might include data regarding the use of
               proxies for call completion calculations, and might involve
               industry standards or practices, expert opinion, evidence
               provided in other cases, or other persuasive documentation."^

           28. APCC submitted a supplement; Intelco did not.^ Based on the
               approaches taken in APCC v. Radiant and APCC v. CCI, where the
               Commission recognized not every call would have been
               "completed,"^ APCC proposes the Commission average the results
               from those cases, with the proposed completion percentage here
               as 63.64% of the delivered calls to Intelco.^ We find this
               proposal reasonable, and due in large part to Intelco's
               failure to provide audited data, otherwise comply with the
               Commission's call tracking rules, or to respond to the
               Commission's request or to APCC's proposal, we believe this
               estimate provides a sufficient basis to meet the requirements
               of section 276. Therefore, applying this percentage to APCC's
               original damages figure of $1,612,614.46, we find that Intelco
               must compensate APCC, before interest, in the amount of
               $1,026,267.84. Regarding the interest calculation, as we
               stated in APCC v. Radiant, interest in unpaid dial-around
               compensation cases during the period in question accrues at an
               annual rate of 11.25%, starting on the first day of the
               quarter that is one quarter after the one in which the billed
               call was made.^ Intelco must also pay APCC this interest.

          IV. ORDERING CLAUSES

           29. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i),
               4(j), 208 and 276 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
               amended, 47 U.S.C. SS 151, 154(i), 154(j), 208, and 276,
               sections 1.720-1.736 and 64.1300-64.1320 of the Commission's
               rules, 47 C.F.R. SS 1.720-1.736, 64.1300-64.1320, and
               authority delegated by sections 0.111 and 0.311 of the
               Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. SS 0.111, 0.311, that the Motion
               for Default Judgment  IS GRANTED to the extent indicated
               herein.

           30. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j),
               208, and 276 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
               U.S.C. SS 151, 154(i), 154(j), 208, and 276, sections
               1.720-1.736 and 64.1300-64.1320 of the Commission's rules, 47
               C.F.R. SS 1.720-1.736, 64.1300-64.1320, and authority
               delegated by sections 0.111 and 0.311 of the Commission's
               rules, 47 C.F.R. SS 0.111, 0.311, that the Defendant in this
               proceeding IS IN DEFAULT and the factual averments contained
               in the Complaint  ARE DEEMED ADMITTED to the extent indicated
               herein.

           31. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 208
               and 276 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
               U.S.C. SS 151, 154(i), 154(j), 208, and 276, sections
               1.720-1.736 and 64.1300-64.1320 of the Commission's rules, 47
               C.F.R. SS 1.720-1.736, 64.1300-64.1320, and authority
               delegated by sections 0.111 and 0.311 of the Commission's
               rules, 47 C.F.R. SS 0.111, 0.311, that the above-captioned
               Complaint  IS GRANTED to the extent indicated herein.

           32. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j),
               201, 208, and 209 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
               amended, 47 U.S.C. SS 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201, 208, and 209,
               and sections 1.720-1.736 and 64.1300-64.1320 of the
               Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. SS 1.720-1.736, 64.1300-64.1320,
               that, within ninety (90) days of the release of this Order,
               Intelco Communications, Inc. shall pay APCC Services, Inc.
               damages in the amount of $1,026,267.84, together with interest
               on such damages at the rate of 11.25%, accruing on the first
               day of the quarter that is one quarter after the one in which
               the billed call was made.

          FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

          P. Michele Ellison

          Chief, Enforcement Bureau

          ^ Motion for Default Judgment with Supporting Memorandum of Law,
          File No. EB-10-MD-002 (filed June 7, 2010) (Motion for Default
          Judgment).

          ^ Formal Complaint, File No. EB-10-MD-002 (filed Mar. 12, 2010)
          (Complaint).

          ^ 47 U.S.C. S 208.

          ^ 47 U.S.C. SS 201(b), 276(b).

          ^ See 47 C.F.R. SS 64.1300-64.1320. The Commission promulgated
          these rules to implement section 276 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. S 276.

          ^ 47 U.S.C. S 276(b)(1)(A).

          ^ See, e.g., Request to Update Default Compensation Rate for
          Dial-Around Calls from Payphones, Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd
          15636, 15638, para. 3 & n.9 (2004) (Rate Increase Order)
          (subsequent history omitted).

          ^ 47 C.F.R. S 64.1300(a)-(b), (d). "Dial-around compensation"
          refers to the per-call payments that interexchange carriers (IXCs)
          must make to PSPs for certain categories of completed coinless
          calls originating from payphones, including access code calls and
          calls to subscriber toll-free numbers. 47 C.F.R. SS
          64.1300-64.1310.

          ^ See, e.g., Rate Increase Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 15637, 15640-41,
          paras. 1, 8-13 (modifying the default compensation rate from $.24
          to $.494); 47 C.F.R. S 64.1300(d).

          ^ Complaint at 4; Complaint, Exhibit 4, Declaration of Ruth Jaeger
          (Jaeger Decl.) at paras. 5-6. Because APCC is the agent for the
          PSPs at issue, APCC is referred to herein as if it were the
          relevant PSP. The list of the represented PSPs is attached to the
          Complaint as Exhibit 1.

          ^ See, e.g.,  Complaint at 5, paras. 9-10; Jaeger Decl. at paras.
          8-11; Complaint, Exhibit 7, Intermediate Carrier Report Data
          (Intermediate Carrier Reports).

          ^ See, e.g.,  Complaint at 2; 47 C.F.R. SS 64.1300-64.1310; 47
          U.S.C. S 276.

          ^ Under Commission rule 1.718, 47 C.F.R. S 1.718, the Complaint
          relates back to the filing date of the two informal complaints to
          establish the "Complaint Period."

          ^ See, e.g.,  Complaint at 2-3; 47 C.F.R. SS 64.1310-64.1320.

          ^ 47 U.S.C. S 208; 47 C.F.R. SS 1.711-1.718.

          ^ See Informal Complaint for Collection of Unpaid Payphone
          Compensation, File No. EB-06-MDIC-0038 (filed June 26, 2006);
          Informal Complaint for Collection of Unpaid Payphone Compensation,
          File No. EB-08-MDIC-0044 (filed June 30, 2008).

          ^ 47 U.S.C. SS 201(b), 276; 47 C.F.R. SS 64.1300-64.1320.

          ^ Response to Informal Complaint of APCC Services, Inc., File No.
          EB-08-MDIC-0044 (filed Aug. 15, 2008).

          ^See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. S 1.718 (providing that an informal complaint
          complainant must file a formal complaint within six months of the
          defendant's response in order for the filing date of the formal
          complaint to "relate back" to the filing date of the informal
          complaint for purposes of the statute of limitations).

          ^ See, e.g., Request for Waiver, File No. EB-08-MDIC-0044 (filed
          Feb. 6, 2009); Request for Waiver, File No. EB-08-MDIC-0044 (filed
          Jan. 5, 2010).

          ^ This formal complaint proceeding includes the claims from both of
          APCC's informal complaints.

          ^ 47 C.F.R. S 1.735.

          ^ Letter from Alexander P. Starr, Market Disputes Resolution
          Division, FCC, to Bassim Kano and Serge Farman, Intelco, File No.
          EB-10-MD-002 (dated Mar. 26, 2010) (Notice of Formal Complaint).
          The Commission sent the Notice of Formal Complaint by U.S. Mail and
          by e-mail on March 26, 2010. When it became clear that the e-mail
          transmission was incomplete, staff contacted Intelco's former
          counsel and ascertained a valid e-mail address and fax number, and
          the Commission again emailed and faxed the Notice of Formal
          Complaint on April 23, 2010.

          ^ See 47 C.F.R. SS 1.720, 1.724.

          ^ Letter from Jacqueline Spindler, Market Disputes Resolution
          Division, FCC, to Bassim Kano and Serge Farman, Intelco, File No.
          EB-10-MD-002 (dated Apr. 23, 2010) (April 23 Notification Letter)
          (citing 47 U.S.C. SS 502, 503(b)(1)(B) and APCC Services, Inc. v.
          TS Interactive, Inc., Order, 17 FCC Rcd 25523 (Enf. Bur. 2002)).
          The Commission sent the April 23 Notification Letter to Intelco by
          U.S. Mail, e-mail, and facsimile.

          ^ Id.

          ^ Letter sent via facsimile from Adrian Grad Deleanu, Chief
          Financial Officer, Intelco, to Jacqueline Spindler, Market Disputes
          Resolution Division, FCC (dated Apr. 27, 2010) (Intelco Fax).
          Notably, the Intelco Fax includes no evidentiary support (e.g.,
          declarations or affidavits), no legal analysis, and no reference to
          the File Number of this proceeding. Accordingly, as addressed
          below, the Intelco Fax is not a pleading in this proceeding and is
          only mentioned to illustrate Intelco's conscious failure to file an
          answer to the Complaint. The full text of the Intelco Fax is as
          follows: "Intelco Communication, Inc., as a corporate citizen of
          Canada, with neither retail customers, nor assets, in the United
          States will not concede personal jurisdiction in a formal
          adjudicatory proceeding. If the FCC still seeks a more detailed
          explanation of why it lacks jurisdiction to regulate Intelco,
          please refer to our responses to the informal complaints filed
          against it, which you reference on page two of your letter."
          Although Intelco implies that it has filed multiple responses to
          APCC's informal complaints against Intelco, we have received only
          one. Intelco submitted a response to APCC's 2008 related informal
          complaint. See supra note 18. Intelco did not respond to APCC's
          other related 2006 informal complaint, APCC v. Intelco, File No.
          EB-06-MDIC-0038 (filed June 26, 2006).

          ^ Commission staff transmitted a copy of Intelco's statement to
          APCC by e-mail the next day. E-mail from Jacqueline Spindler, FCC,
          to Daniel Collins, APCC, File No. EB-10-MD-002 (dated Apr. 29,
          2010).

          ^ Letter from Alexander P. Starr, Market Disputes Resolution
          Division, FCC, to Daniel Collins, APCC, and Adrian Grad Deleanu,
          Serge Farman, and Bassim Kano, Intelco, File No. EB-10-MD-002
          (dated May 14, 2010) (May 14 Letter).

          ^ May 14 Letter  at 1-2.

          ^ May 14 Letter  at 2.

          ^ APCC served a copy of the Motion for Default Judgment on Intelco
          by overnight courier and fax. See Motion for Default Judgment at
          20, Certificate of Service.

          ^ Letter from Jacqueline Spindler, Market Disputes Resolution
          Division, FCC, to Daniel Collins, APCC, and Adrian Grad Deleanu,
          Serge Farman, and Bassim Kano, Intelco, File No. EB-10-MD-002
          (dated Aug. 5, 2010) (August 2010 Letter). Staff suggested that
          such supplementation might include data regarding the use of
          proxies, industry best practices, evidence provided in other cases,
          or other persuasive documentation or arguments.

          ^ Letter from Daniel Collins, APCC, to Jacqueline Spindler, Market
          Disputes Resolution Division, FCC, File No. EB-10-MD-002 (dated
          Aug. 20, 2010) (APCC Data Letter). APCC served a copy of the APCC
          Data Letter on Intelco by hand delivery and fax. See APCC Data
          Letter at 2, Certificate of Service.

          ^ In a letter to APCC (not filed with the Commission (e.g., the
          Secretary), but only copied to Commission staff), Intelco objected
          to the APCC Data Letter, arguing that it violated a non-disclosure
          agreement between the parties. Letter from Jonathan Lee, Counsel
          for Intelco, to Daniel Collins, APCC (dated Aug. 24, 2010) (Intelco
          August 24, 2010 Letter). Because this letter was not filed pursuant
          to the Commission's rules, it is not part of the record in this
          proceeding. Nonetheless, we note that APCC responded, in a letter
          filed with the Secretary, stating that throughout this proceeding
          Intelco "seeks to maintain the fiction" that it is not "before" the
          Commission by writing directly to APCC, and only copying Commission
          staff. Letter from Daniel Collins, APCC, to Jacqueline Spindler,
          Market Disputes Resolution Division, FCC, File No. EB-10-MD-002, at
          4 (dated Sep. 8, 2010). In addition, on August 23, 2010, Commission
          staff assigned to this case received a facsimile letter from
          Intelco's Controller advising that Adrian Grad Deleanu no longer
          worked for Intelco. This facsimile further shows that Intelco had
          been receiving the Commission's correspondence. See Facsimile from
          Nancy Toroyan, Controller, Intelco, to Jacqueline Spindler, Market
          Disputes Resolution Division, FCC (dated Aug. 23, 2010) (Intelco
          August 23, 2010 Letter).

          ^ Letter from Daniel Collins, APCC, to Jacqueline Spindler, Market
          Disputes Resolution Division, FCC, File No. EB-10-MD-002 (dated
          Sep. 8, 2010).

          ^ 47 C.F.R. S 1.724(b).

          ^ 47 C.F.R. S 1.724(d).

          ^ This requirement parallels Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Fed.
          R. Civ. P.) 12, which provides that the defense of lack of personal
          jurisdiction is waived unless it is raised in the defendant's
          responsive pleading, or by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (h);
          see, e.g., e360 Insight v. The Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594 (7th
          Cir. 2007). As discussed below, where appropriate, we look to the
          Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for procedural guidance in
          Commission adjudicatory proceedings. See, e.g.,  APCC Services,
          Inc. v. TS Interactive, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC
          Rcd 10456, 10460, para. 10 (Enf. Bur. 2004) (APCC v. TS Interactive
          Damages Order).

          ^ See, e.g., APCC Services, Inc. v. TS Interactive, Inc., Order, 17
          FCC Rcd 25523, 25526-27, para. 7 (Enf. Bur. 2002) (APCC v. TS
          Interactive); Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
          Amendment of Rules Governing Procedures to be Followed When Formal
          Complaints Are Filed Against Common Carriers, Report and Order, 12
          FCC Rcd 22497, 22535, para. 85 (1997) (subsequent history omitted)
          (Formal Complaints Order) (adopting a rule similar to Fed. R. Civ.
          P. 26(a)(1) for section 208 formal complaint proceedings). See
          Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Amendment of
          Rules Governing Procedures to be Followed When Formal Complaints
          are Filed Against Common Carriers, Second Report and Order, 13 FCC
          Rcd 17018, 17052, para. 60 (1998) (subsequent history omitted)
          (Formal Complaints Second Report and Order) (adopting a rule
          similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) for Accelerated Docket
          proceedings).

          ^ See, e.g., Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6-14 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
          Dennis Garberg & Associates, Inc. v. Pack-Tech International Corp.,
          115 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir. 1997) (Garberg v. Pack-Tech); Fed. R.
          Civ. P. 4(k)(2).

          ^ See, e.g., Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d at 7; Garberg v.
          Pack-Tech, 115 F.3d at 773.

          ^ See, e.g., Garberg v. Pack-Tech, 115 F.3d at 772. Intelco has not
          appeared in this formal complaint proceeding and the procedurally
          deficient April 27, 2010, Intelco Fax states without support that
          Intelco is a "corporate citizen of Canada." Nonetheless, the record
          indicates that certain Intelco employees are in Canada. See Motion
          for Default Judgment at 5. Consequently, in the interest of
          fairness, we consider sua sponte the Commission's jurisdiction over
          Intelco as a foreign defendant that has technically not entered an
          appearance.

          ^ Motion for Default Judgment at 7-10. See, e.g., World-Wide
          Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Burger King Corp.
          v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (Burger King); Asahi Metal
          Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).

          ^ International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
          (1945) (International Shoe); see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476
          ("Jurisdiction ... may not be avoided merely because the defendant
          did not physically enter the forum State.") (emphasis in original).
          See Motion for Default Judgment at 7-10 (describing Intelco's
          contacts with the United States in light of International Shoe).

          ^ International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-18; see also 21^st Century
          Fax(es) Ltd., Forfeiture Order, 17 FCC Rcd 1384, 1386-87, para. 6
          (2002) (stating, in applying International Shoe, that "[c]ontrary
          to 21^st Century's suggestion, its status as a foreign-registered
          and controlled company with its principal place of business in the
          UK does not preclude a finding that the company also is `within the
          United States.'").

          ^ See Jaeger Decl. at para. 11; see also Intermediate Carrier
          Reports.

          ^ Complaint at 2 (describing the "Complaint Period"); Jaeger Decl.
          at paras. 8-11.

          ^ Complaint at 5, 9-10; Intermediate Carrier Reports; Jaeger Decl.
          at 8-11; Motion for Default Judgment, Declaration of Ruth Jaeger
          (Jaeger Motion Decl.) at paras. 5-10. We note that because specific
          information regarding Intelco's practices would largely be in
          Intelco's possession, and because Intelco purposefully failed to
          respond to APCC's interrogatories, see Complainant's Initial
          Interrogatories, File No. EB-10-MD-002 (filed Mar. 12, 2010), we
          give significant weight to the Intermediate Carrier Reports
          submitted by APCC and the two Jaeger declarations.

          ^ Jaeger Motion Decl. at paras. 7-10.

          ^ See Jaeger Decl. at paras. 1-22; Jaeger Motion Decl. at 1-10.

          ^ See, e.g., In the Matter of Telerent Leasing Corp., Memorandum
          Opinion and Order, 43 FCC 2d 487 (1973) (granting a request by the
          North Carolina Utilities Commission to participate in a proceeding
          for the limited purpose of addressing the Commission's
          jurisdiction) (subsequent history omitted). Because the record
          reflects that Intelco purposefully directed its activities at the
          United States, Intelco has the burden of presenting a "compelling
          case" that other considerations of fair play would render
          jurisdiction unreasonable. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. Because it
          affirmatively chose not to appear in this proceeding, if only for
          the purpose of addressing jurisdiction, and therefore provided no
          basis for concluding jurisdiction over Intelco is not proper,
          Intelco has not met its burden.

          ^ See supra paragraphs 6-7.

          ^ See, e.g., supra note 18.

          ^ See, e.g., supra note 27.

          ^ See, e.g., supra notes 25, 27, 28, 32, and 35.

          ^ See, e.g., supra note 35.

          ^ 47 C.F.R. S 1.724(a).

          ^ 47 C.F.R. S 1.724(d).

          ^ Formal Complaints Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 22610, para. 278. See
          Formal Complaints Second Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 17054,
          para. 65.

          ^ See, e.g., APCC v. TS Interactive, 17 FCC Rcd at 25526, para. 6.

          ^ See, e.g., APCC v. TS Interactive, 17 FCC Rcd at 25526-27, para.
          7.

          ^ Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.

          ^ APCC v. TS Interactive, 17 FCC Rcd at 25526-29, paras. 7-13.

          ^ Consistent with section 1.724(d) of the Commission's rules, we
          consider the facts alleged by APCC to be admitted.

          ^ See supra paragraph 2.

          ^ See, e.g., Complaint at 9-10, para. 25; Intermediate Carrier
          Reports; Jaeger Decl. at 8-9; Motion for Default Judgment at 6-10.

          ^ See supra paragraph 15.

          ^ See, e.g., Intelco Response to Informal Complaint, File No.
          EB-08-MDIC-0044 (filed Aug. 15, 2008).

          ^ See supra notes 27, 33.

          ^ See, e.g., supra paragraphs 6-9.

          ^ Complaint at 25-26, paras. 105-10.

          ^ Section 1.727(e) of the Commission's rules provides that a
          "[f]ailure to oppose any motion may constitute grounds for granting
          of the motion."  47 C.F.R. S 1.727(e). Here, Intelco failed to
          respond to APCC's Motion for Default Judgment. Thus, section
          1.727(e) further supports our decision to grant APCC's motion.

          ^ APCC Services, Inc. v. Radiant Telecom, Inc., Memorandum Opinion
          and Order, 23 FCC Rcd 8962 (2008) (APCC v. Radiant).

          ^ APCC v. Radiant, 23 FCC Rcd at 8971, para. 29.

          ^ 47 U.S.C. S 276(b)(1)(a) (emphasis added).

          ^ APCC v. Radiant, 23 FCC Rcd at 8972, para. 30.

          ^ APCC v. Radiant, 23 FCC Rcd at 8970, para. 25. Jaeger Decl. at
          paras. 15-17.

          ^ Complaint at 21-23, paras. 75-78; Motion for Default Judgment at
          16-17.

          ^ Complaint at 3, para. 3.

          ^ APCC Services, Inc. v. CCI Communications, LLC, Memorandum
          Opinion and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8224, 8227-28, paras. 10-13 (Enf.
          Bur. 2010) (APCC v. CCI).

          ^ August 2010 Letter.

          ^ Letter from Daniel Collins, APCC, to Jacqueline Spindler, Market
          Disputes Resolution Division, FCC, File No. EB-10-MD-002 (dated
          Sep. 8, 2010) at 5 (noting that the Commission's methodology first
          articulated in APCC v. Radiant and followed in APCC v. CCI resulted
          in the defendants being liable for 61.53% of the Intermediate
          Carrier reported calls and 65.75% of the Intermediate Carrier
          reported calls, respectively, and asking the Commission to utilize
          in this case the average of those percentages - i.e., 63.64%).
          Because the record does not contain any credible evidence regarding
          the duration of calls, we cannot use the precise formula that the
          Commission employed in APCC v. Radiant, i.e., calculating the
          number of "completed" calls by adding all of the calls lasting 30
          seconds or longer and half of the calls lasting less than 30
          seconds.

          ^ APCC v. Radiant, 23 FCC Rcd at 8971, para. 29; APCC v. CCI, 25
          FCC Rcd at 8227-28, paras. 10-13.

          ^ Letter from Daniel Collins, APCC, to Jacqueline Spindler, Market
          Disputes Resolution Division, FCC, File No. EB-10-MD-002, at 5-6
          (dated Sep. 8, 2010).

          ^ APCC v. Radiant, 23 FCC Rcd at 8974, para. 34.

          (Continued from previous page)

          Federal Communications Commission DA 13-303

          7

          Federal Communications Commission DA 13-303