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Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
)
)
In the Matter of
)
APCC Services, Inc.,
)
Data Net Systems, LLC,
)
Davel Communications, Inc.,
)
Jaroth, Inc. d/b/a Pacific Telemanagement File No. EB-003-MD-011
)
Services, and
)
Intera Communications Corp.,
)
Complainants,
)
v.
)
)
)
NetworkIP, LLC, and )
Network Enhanced Telecom, LLP, )
)
Defendants. )
order on review
Adopted: September 14, 2006 Released: September 15, 2006
By the Commission:
I. Introduction
1. In this Order on Review, we deny an Application for Review filed by
NetworkIP, LLC, and Network Enhanced Telecom, LLP (collectively,
"Network") pursuant to section 1.115 of our rules. The Application
challenges a Memorandum Opinion and Order released by the Enforcement
Bureau ("Bureau") granting a liability complaint filed by Complainants
(collectively, "APCC") against Network pursuant to section 208 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended ("Act"). The Bureau Liability
Order found, inter alia, that Network's failure to compensate APCC for
certain completed payphone calls in accordance with section 64.1300 of
our rules violated section 201(b) of the Act. As explained below,
Network's Application presents no facts or arguments that persuade us
that the Bureau made any procedural or substantive errors.
Consequently, we affirm the Bureau Liability Order and deny the
Application. In doing so, we reiterate that, consistent with common
industry parlance, the term "facilities-based" carrier, as used in our
payphone compensation rules and orders, means an entity that has a
possessory interest in a switch involved in routing the calls for
which compensation is sought.
II. Background
2. The Bureau Liability Order explains in detail the factual and legal
background of the dispute raised in this formal complaint proceeding.
In brief, Complainants are, or act as the billing and collection
agents of, payphone service providers ("PSPs"). Network is a
telecommunications carrier that owns switches and offers other
entities a package of telecommunications services that enables those
entities ("Debit Card Providers") to provide pre-paid calling cards to
end-user customers. The parties dispute whether it is Network or the
Debit Card Providers who bears the responsibility under our rules and
orders for payment of dial-around compensation to APCC for certain
completed "coinless" payphone calls, i.e., coinless calls that were
routed, in part, by a Network-owned switch, and that were made by end
users from APCC's payphones using prepaid calling cards sold by Debit
Card Providers.
3. As the Bureau Liability Order stated, the applicable rule during the
relevant period was the following: with respect to each call at
issue, whichever entity -- Network or a Debit Card Provider -- was the
last identified "facilities-based" carrier before the terminating
local exchange carrier ("LEC") in the chain of entities responsible
for the call (hereinafter, the "last `facilities-based' carrier") must
compensate APCC for the use of its payphones to place those calls.
The Bureau Liability Order further found, based on Commission
precedent, that to be "facilities-based," a carrier must have a
possessory interest in a switch used to route the calls.
4. Applying those standards to the facts here, the Bureau Liability Order
concluded that Network, and not the Debit Card Providers, was the last
"facilities-based" carrier, because Network, and not the Debit Card
Providers, was the last non-LEC carrier in the chain of entities
responsible for the call who had a possessory interest in a switch
used to route the calls. In so concluding, the Bureau Liability Order
rejected Network's argument that the Debit Card Providers were
"facilities-based" because the Debit Card Providers could track call
completion data from Network's switches via the Internet. In other
words, the Bureau Liability Order rejected Network's contentions that,
in this context, call tracking ability equates to switching
capability, and switching capability makes an entity
"facilities-based." Accordingly, the Bureau Liability Order granted
the Complaint and held that Network is the entity responsible for
paying payphone compensation to APCC.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Bureau Correctly Determined that Network Is Liable for Payment
of Dial-Around Compensation.
5. In its Application for Review, Network reiterates the same arguments
it made below regarding the meaning of the relevant payphone
compensation requirements. As it asserted previously, Network argues
that, prior to the issuance of the Bureau Liability Order, the
Commission had not clearly expressed the requirement that, to be
considered "facilities-based" for payphone compensation purposes, an
entity must have a possessory interest in a switch used to route the
coinless payphone calls at issue. According to Network, the Commission
had previously suggested that an entity may be considered a
"facilities-based" carrier under the payphone compensation rules, even
if the entity has no possessory interest in a switch, as long as the
entity somehow manages, in some other way, to "maintain its own
switching capability." Network also asserts, as it did below, that the
Debit Card Providers do "maintain their own switching capability,"
even though they do not have a possessory interest in a switch,
because the Debit Card Providers have what Network describes as "call
tracking ability." Thus, in Network's view, the Bureau erred by
applying a "possessory interest" standard and by declining to find
that the Debit Card Providers are "facilities-based" carriers liable
for payphone compensation.
6. We reject Network's assertions and affirm the Bureau's determinations,
including the Bureau's interpretation of our precedent that "switching
capability" means a possessory interest in a switch, such as a lease
interest or ownership interest. We conclude that Network's
construction of Commission precedent (i) ignores the commonly
understood meaning of the term "facilities-based;" (ii) overlooks a
reasonable interpretation of governing language in a key Commission
order; and (iii) undermines the primary purpose of the payphone
compensation rules. We also agree with the Bureau that Network's claim
must fail, even assuming, arguendo, that an entity who "maintains its
own switching capability" can be considered a "facilities-based"
carrier despite lacking a possessory interest in a switch (which is
not actually possible). Here, the Debit Card Providers had only call
tracking ability. "Switching capability" and "call tracking ability"
are not synonymous; the former encompasses far more functions than the
latter. Thus, Network has failed to demonstrate that the Debit Card
Providers "maintain their own switching capability." Hence, we affirm
in its entirety the Bureau Liability Order granting the Complaint, and
find that Network is liable for payment of dial-around compensation to
APCC.
A. The Bureau Did Not Commit Error in Deferring its Ruling on Two
Motions.
7. As permitted by our rules, APCC "bifurcated" its claims, asking for a
ruling on liability issues first and, then, if liability were found, a
subsequent ruling on the amount of damages owed. During this liability
phase of the proceeding, the Bureau decided to defer until the damages
phase (if any) ruling on two motions filed by APCC. These two motions
essentially concern whether the statute of limitations reduces the
amount of damages for which Network is potentially liable.
8. Network asserts that the Bureau's deferral constitutes prejudicial
error, because APCC's motions are obviously meritless, and "it is not
practical to conduct an investigation until the parties know the
relevant time period in dispute." Network states that the Commission
should, therefore, rule now that the statute of limitations reduces
the scope of APCC's potential damages.
9. We disagree. In complaint proceedings bifurcated into liability and
damages phases, the Commission has provided Bureau staff with
discretion to determine which issues should be reached in which phase
in order to manage the matter in the most efficient and fair manner.
Encompassed within that discretion is the determination whether a
statute of limitations issue should be reached in the liability phase
or the damages phase, especially where, as here, the defendant
concedes that a material portion of the alleged damages accrued within
the limitations period. Indeed, Network itself seems to acknowledge
that the statute of limitations issue here pertains more to the
"investigation of damages" than to the investigation of liability.
Accordingly, we conclude that it was reasonable and not prejudicial
for the Bureau to defer ruling on APCC's motions in the liability
phase of this proceeding. Consequently, we deny Network's Application
for Review on this ground.
C. Network's Failure to Pay Dial-Around Compensation Constitutes an
Unjust and Unreasonable Practice in Violation of Section 201(b) of the
Act.
10. As stated above, the Bureau Liability Order held that Network's
failure to pay dial-around compensation constitutes a violation of
section 201(b) of the Act, which prohibits a common carrier from
engaging in any "practice[ ] ... in connection with ... communication
service ...that is unjust and unreasonable." Put differently, the
Bureau Liability Order held that Network's failure to pay payphone
compensation as required by rule 64.1300 is an unjust and unreasonable
practice in connection with communication service within the meaning
of section 201(b) of the Act.
11. After the release of the Bureau Liability Order, federal courts have
differed about whether the Commission has sufficiently ruled that a
violation of its payphone compensation rules constitutes a violation
of section 201(b) of the Act, such that a payphone service provider
has a private cause of action under the Act to recover unpaid payphone
compensation. In light of this split of authority, we take this
opportunity to reaffirm and amplify what the Commission has concluded
twice before: that "failure to pay in accordance with the Commission's
payphone rules, such as the rules expressly requiring such payment ...
, constitutes ... an unjust and unreasonable practice in violation of
section 201(b) of the Act." This interpretation rests on the plain
language of section 201(b) and on the crucial importance of ensuring
fair compensation for payphone service providers.
12. The question presented is: whether a failure to pay payphone
compensation in accordance with the Commission's rules is, within the
meaning of section 201(b), a (i) "practice in connection with" (ii)
"communication service" (iii) that is "unjust and unreasonable." We
answer in the affirmative, for the following reasons.
13. First, the "communication service" referenced in section 201(b)
plainly includes the "communication by wire" referenced in section
201(a). The Act defines "communication by wire" as "the transmission
of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by aid
of wire, cable, or other like connection between the points of origin
and reception of such transmission...." When a carrier receives and
transports payphone calls, it engages in the transmission of sounds by
aid of wire between the points of origin and reception of such calls.
Accordingly, when a carrier receives and transports payphone calls, it
engages in "communication service" within the meaning of section
201(b).
14. Second, a carrier's obligation to pay payphone compensation under our
rules arises solely from its receipt and transport of a payphone call.
It follows that a carrier's failure to fulfill that obligation is a
"practice in connection with" its communication service of
transmitting the call.
15. Third, a carrier's failure to pay payphone compensation rises to the
level of being "unjust and unreasonable." This misconduct achieves
such "magnitude," for at least two reasons. First, a failure to pay
payphone compensation is not a tariff or contract violation, but a
direct violation of Commission rules. Second, a carrier's failure to
pay payphone compensation in accordance with the Commission's rules
undermines the attainment of an express Congressional goal - to
"promote the widespread deployment of payphone services to the benefit
of the general public...." Specifically, to help achieve the goal of
widespread deployment of payphones, Congress directed the Commission
to adopt swiftly rules to ensure that "all payphone service providers
are fairly compensated for each and every completed intrastate and
interstate call using their payphone...." Thus, Congress viewed our
payphone compensation rules - and, ergo, carriers' compliance with
those rules -- as crucial to the statutory scheme. As the Commission
has explained:
"[S]ection 276 makes it our responsibility to ensure that inadequate
compensation does not cause deployment to drop to levels insufficient to
serve the public interest.... The purpose of that rate prescription [in
our payphone compensation rules] is ... to support, to the extent
possible, a functioning market and promote payphone deployment by ensuring
that dial-around calls bear an appropriate share of the costs of operating
payphones."
In other words, a carrier's failure to pay payphone compensation in
accordance with our rules reduces payphone revenues, which, in turn, can
ultimately facilitate a reduction in the deployment of payphones.
Consequently, a carrier's failure to pay payphone compensation in
accordance with our rules strikes at the heart of Congress' design for
implementing an important statutory objective. Such misconduct clearly
amounts to unjust and unreasonable action.
16. Accordingly, we reiterate here what the Commission has previously
stated both expressly and implicitly: failure to pay in accordance
with the Commission's payphone compensation rules constitutes an
unjust and unreasonable practice in violation of section 201(b) of the
Act.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
17. In sum, we agree with the Bureau that, because Network has a
possessory interest in switches used to route the payphone calls at
issue, Network is a facilities-based carrier whose failure to pay
dial-around compensation to APCC constitutes a violation of section
64.1300 of our rules, and thus section 201(b) of the Act. Moreover,
we disagree with Network that the Bureau committed error by failing to
address immediately two motions related to Network's statute of
limitations defense. Consequently, we deny Network's application for
review and affirm the Bureau Liability Order.
I. Ordering Clause
18. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 201(b),
208, and 276 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
SS 154(i), 154(j), 201(b), 208, and 276, and sections 1.115,
1.720-1.736, and 64.1300 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. SS
1.115, 1.720-1.736, and 64.1300, that Network's Application for Review
IS DENIED, APCC's motion to strike IS DISMISSED as moot, and the
Bureau Liability Order IS AFFIRMED to the extent described herein.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
Application for Review, File No. EB-003-MD-011 (filed Mar. 1, 2005)
("Application").
47 C.F.R. S 1.115
APCC Services, Inc. v. NetworkIP, LLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20
FCC Rcd 2073 (Enf. Bur. Feb. 1, 2005) ("Bureau Liability Order").
Formal Complaint, File No. EB-003-MD-011 (filed June 3, 2003)
("Complaint").
47 C.F.R. S 208.
47 C.F.R. S 64.1300. Unless otherwise indicated, all C.F.R. references to
Part 64 of the Commission's rules are to the rules in effect during the
period October 7, 1997 through November 23, 2001.
47 U.S.C. S 201. See, e.g., Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2074, P
1, and 2085, P 26.
APCC filed a motion to strike Network's Application on procedural grounds.
Complainants' Motion to Strike Defendants' Application for Review, File
No. EB-003-MD-011 (filed Mar. 16, 2005). See Opposition to Complainants'
Motion to Strike, File No. EB-03-MD-011 (filed Mar. 23, 2005). Because we
are denying the Application on substantive grounds, we dismiss APCC's
motion as moot.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2074-78, PP 2-13. We incorporate by
reference those explanations.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2074, P 2.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2077, PP 9-10.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2078-79, P 13, 2080-81, P 17,
2082-83, P 21, 2083, P 22, 2084, P 24.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2077-78, PP 10-11. Network
effectively acknowledged that rule below (Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC
Rcd at 2079, P 14) and does not challenge that rule here.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2079-82, PP 14-20.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2077-78, PP 10-12, 2082, P 20.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2083-84, PP 22-23.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2079-80, 2085, PP 14-16, 26.
Application at 12-16; Reply to Opposition to Application for Review, File
No. EB-003-MD-011, at 2, 4, n.3 (filed Mar. 25, 2005) ("Reply").
Application at 12-16; Reply at 4.
Application at 16-18; see Reply at 3-4 (arguing that "switching
capability" and "call tracking ability" are synonymous).
See, e.g., In the Matter of Implementation of the Pay Telephone
Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd 21233, 21277 at P 92 (1996)
(subsequent history omitted).
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2079, 2081, PP 15-16, 19.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2081, P 18.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2082, P 20.
Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2083-84, PP 22-23.
As it did below, Network makes some cursory arguments about how the
Commission has previously recognized that certain novel arrangements for
conveying assets have been deemed to convey possessory interests. Reply at
5. We agree with the Bureau that there is no material resemblance between
Network's agreements with the Debit Card Providers and the arrangements
listed in Network's Reply. See Bureau Liability Order, 20 FCC Rcd at
10-11, P 21.
47 C.F.R. S 1.722(d).
Complaint at 24. APCC has now filed a supplemental complaint for damages.
Supplemental Complaint for Damages, File No. EB-003-MD-011 (filed April 4,
2005) ("Supplemental Complaint").
APCC v. NetworkIP, LLC, Letter from Radhika Karmarkar, FCC, to Counsel,
File No. EB-03-MD-011 (rel. July 8, 200[3]); APCC v. NetworkIP, LLC,
Letter from Radhika Karmarkar, FCC, to Counsel, File No. EB-03-MD-011
(rel. June 13, 2003).
The first motion seeks waiver of the "relation back" deadline in 47 C.F.R.
S 1.718, Complainants' Motion for Partial Waiver of Section 1.718 of the
Commission's Rules, File No. EB-003-MD-011 (filed June 3, 2003); and the
second motion seeks permission to file a reply regarding Network's
response to the first motion. Complainants' Conditional Motion for Leave
to File Reply, File No. EB-003-MD-011 (filed June 17, 2003).
Application at 5-6. See id. at 4, 8-9.
Application at 4-10. We note that, in the damages phase of the proceeding,
the Enforcement Bureau did rule on the two motions at issue here. APCC v.
NetworkIP, LLC, Order, 20 FCC Rcd 16727 (Enf. Bur. 2005).
See, e.g., Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Amendment
of Rules Governing Procedures to be Followed When Formal Complaints are
Filed Against Common Carriers, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 22497, 22501,
P 5, 22511, P 30, 22539, P 95, 22549, P 116, 22558-22559, PP 143-44,
22575, P 178, 22581, P 194 (1997) (describing the broad discretion that
the Commission delegated to staff to structure complaint proceedings)
(subsequent history omitted).
See generally AT&T Corp. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 23898, 23915 at P 45 (2005) (deferring to
the damages phase the question of the extent to which the statute of
limitations affected the amount of recoverable damages).
See Application at 5-6.
47 U.S.C. S 201(b).
Compare APCC Services, Inc. v. Sprint Comm. Co., 418 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir.
2005) ("APCC v. Sprint") (holding that the Commission has not yet made a
"clear statement (and analysis)" that a violation of its payphone
compensation rules constitutes a violation of section 201(b) of the Act),
with Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. v. Global Crossing
Telecommunications, Inc., 423 F.3d 1056 (9^th Cir. 2005), cert granted,
126 S.Ct. 1329 (2006) ("Metrophones v. Global Crossing") (holding that the
Commission has already made a "fair and considered judgment" that a
violation of its payphone compensation rules constitutes a violation of
section 201(b) of the Act); Flying J, Inc .v. Sprint Communications Co.,
2006 WL 18603 (D. Utah Jan. 4, 2006) (same as Metrophones v. Global
Crossing); APCC v. Sprint, 418 F.3d at 1253-1255 (dissenting opinion of
Chief Judge Ginsburg) (same as Metrophones v. Global Crossing).
In the Matter of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 18 FCC
Rcd 19975, 19990, P32 (2003) ("2003 Report and Order"), aff'd, Order on
Reconsideration, 19 FCC Rcd 21457, 21459 n.17 (2004) ("2004 Recon Order").
As Chief Judge Ginsburg observed in dissent in APCC v. Sprint, "[t]he
court can say `[t]here was no authoritative interpretation of S 201(b) in
this case' only because it makes no mention of the 2003 Report and Order
and fails to note that the Commission filed an amicus brief in this case
advancing the same position." APCC v. Sprint, 423 F.3d at 1254.
47 U.S.C. S 201(b).
See Metrophones v. Global Crossing, 423 F.3d at 1067-1070 (finding that a
failure to pay payphone compensation in accordance with the Commission's
rules is, within the meaning of section 201(b), a practice in connection
with communication service that is unjust and unreasonable, for the
reasons we explain below); APCC v. Sprint, 418 F.3d at 1254-1255
(dissenting opinion) (same).
47 U.S.C. SS 201(a), (b).
47 U.S.C. S 153(51).
In various contexts, the Commission has treated payphone service as a
communications service. See, e.g., In the Matter of Implementation of the
Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd
21233, 21340-41, P 244 (1996) (stating that "all payphones serve the
public interest by providing access to basic communications services")
(subsequent history omitted); In the Matter of Implementation of the Pay
Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order, 12 FCC Rcd 20997 (1997) (discussing
tariffing requirement for basic payphone services provided by the Bell
Companies); In the Matter of Request to Update Default Compensation Rate
for Dial-Around Calls from Payphones, Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 15636,
15644, P 20 (2004) (finding "payphone services are particularly critical
to those with few other communications service options"); see also APCC
v. Sprint, 418 F.3d at 1254-1255 (dissenting opinion).
See Metrophones v. Global Crossing, 423 F.3d at 1067-1070; APCC v. Sprint,
418 F.3d at 1254-1255 (dissenting opinion).
APCC v. Sprint, 418 F.3d at 1248 (noting that, in a 1999 order, the
Commission did not specify that a failure to pay payphone compensation
reached the "magnitude" of an unjust and unreasonable act).
The fact that a failure to pay payphone compensation directly violates
Commission rules specifically requiring such payment distinguishes this
situation from other situations where the Commission has repeatedly
declined to entertain "collection actions." See, e.g., U.S. Telepacific
Corp. v. Tel-America of Salt Lake City, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 19 FCC Rcd 24552, 24555-56, PP 8-10 (2004) ("Telepacific v.
Tel-America Order"). Specifically, whereas the payphone compensation rules
directly impose payment duties on the payor, the rules and statutory
provisions regarding the charges at issue in other kinds of "collection
actions" impose duties only on the payee (i.e., duties to impose charges
in a certain manner and/or in a certain amount) and not on the payor. See,
e.g., Telepacific v. Tel-America Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 24556, n.28. Thus,
the failure to pay in the latter situation does not contravene the Act or
our rules, though it may be unlawful on other grounds and thus actionable
in court. See, e.g., TelePacific v. Tel-America Order, 19 FCC Rcd at
24555-56, PP 8-10.
47 U.S.C. S 276(b)(1). The Commission recently explained some of the
reasons why Congress believed it important to promote the widespread
deployment of payphones: "We acknowledge, as did Congress in passing
section 276, that payphones ... provide a unique back-up communications
option when subscription services - whether wireline or wireless - are
unaffordable or unavailable. Payphone services are particularly critical
to those with few other communications service options - including
low-income customers, the elderly, and residents of rural areas. Payphones
also enhance access to emergency (public health and safety) services." In
the Matter of Request to Update Default Compensation Rate for Dial-Around
Calls From Payphones, Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 15636, 15644 at P 20
(2004) ("Compensation Rate Order") (footnotes omitted).
47 U.S.C. S 276(b)(1)(A).
Compensation Rate Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 15644-15645, PP 21, 25. Id. at
15645, P 24 (noting the connection between payment of the dial-around
compensation rate under our rules and the level of payphone deployment).
See generally Compensation Rate Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 15644-, PP 21
("[D]eclining [payphone] deployment is causing inconvenience to consumers
and may even be starting to pose a public safety issue. The public,
community organizations, and government officials view the decline in
deployment as a negative development.") (footnotes omitted).
See Metrophones v. Global Crossing, 423 F.3d at 1067-1070; APCC v. Sprint,
418 F.3d at 1254-1255 (dissenting opinion). See generally Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001) (stating that a private cause of action
lies for violation of an agency regulation that authoritatively interprets
a statutory provision within the agency's delegated authority). We note
that there is no basis for limiting the scope of section 201(b) to
violations only of Commission rules promulgated pursuant to section 205 of
the Act, 47 U.S.C. S 205. See, e.g., Metrophones v. Global Crossing, 423
F.3d at 1067-1070 (and Commission orders cited therein); APCC v. Sprint,
418 F.3d at 1254-55 (and Commission orders cited therein) (dissenting
opinion).
2003 Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 19990, P 32; 2004 Recon Order, 19 FCC
Rcd at 21459 n.17.
See, e.g., In the Matter of Implementation of the Pay Telephone
Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Third Report and Order, and Order on Reconsideration of the
Second Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 2545, 22648 at P 232 (1999) (citing
section 201as authority for promulgating payphone compensation rules)
(subsequent history omitted); Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc. v. Frontier and
Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc. v. MCI Telecom. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 16 FCC Rcd 8112 (2001) (granting two complaints for damages for
failure to pay dial-around compensation). See also APCC Services, Inc. v.
TS Interactive, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 10456
(Enf. Bur. 2004) (granting complaint for damages for failure to pay
dial-around compensation); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. One Call
Communications, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 16697 (Enf.
Bur. 2001) (granting complaint for damages for failure to pay dial-around
compensation).
Because our finding of a violation of section 201(b) of the Act will
afford APCC all of the relief to which it would be entitled upon a finding
of a violation of section 276 of the Act, we need not and do not reach the
Bureau's conclusion that Network's conduct violated section 276 as well as
section 201(b). See generally APCC v. Sprint, supra; Greene v. Sprint
Communications Co., 340 F.3d 1047 (9^th Cir. 2003) (both decisions holding
that section 276 does not establish a private cause of action to recover
payphone compensation).
(...continued from previous page)
(continued....)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 06-139
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Federal Communications Commission FCC 06-139