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Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of )
)
Bruce Gilmore, Claudia McGuire, )
The Great Frame Up Systems, )
Inc., and Pesger, Inc., d/b/a )
The Great Frame Up, )
)
Complainants, )
) File No. EB-02-TC-F-006
v. )
)
Southwestern Bell Mobile )
Systems, L.L.C., d/b/a Cingular )
Wireless, )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted: September 1, 2005
Released: September 2, 2005
By the Commission:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this Order, based on the specific facts at
issue here, we deny a formal complaint filed by Bruce
Gilmore, Claudia McGuire, The Great Frame Up Systems, Inc.,
and Pesger, Inc., d/b/a The Great Frame Up, (Complainants)
against Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, L.L.C., d/b/a
Cingular Wireless (Cingular), pursuant to section 208 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act).1
Complainants allege that Cingular's ``Corporate
Administrative Fee'' (Fee), which Cingular charges to
corporate account wireless customers, is unjust and
unreasonable in violation of section 201(b) of the Act2
because: (1) the amount of the Fee is not reasonably related
to unique or increased corporate account administrative
costs; and (2) the Fee is the product of misleading and
deceptive marketing and billing practices. Complainants
additionally allege that the Fee is discriminatory in
violation of section 202(a) of the Act3 because the Fee is:
(1) charged only to certain corporate account customers and
not to other customers; and (2) not charged to non-corporate
account customers who receive similar administrative goods
and services. Based on our review of the record, we find
that Complainants have not established that Cingular
violated sections 201(b) or 202(a) of the Act, and we
therefore deny the formal complaint.
2. We note that at the time of the events at issue
Cingular was not subject to our Truth-in-Billing Rules.
Subsequently the Commission extended these rules to CMRS
carriers like Cingular.4 This case is therefore decided
under a different regulatory environment than now exists.
Accordingly, the outcome of cases like this in the future
could be different.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
3. In March 1995, Cingular announced in billing
inserts sent to corporate wireless customers that it would
begin charging them a corporate administrative fee.
Cingular began charging the $1.50 Fee in April 1995.5 In
February 1998, Cingular announced that the Fee would
increase to $2.95, and in March 1998 Cingular began charging
$2.95 to corporate customers.6
4. Complainant Bruce Gilmore is an individual
residing in Woodstock, Illinois.7 Mr. Gilmore apparently
opened a corporate account in 1993, which continued in force
until at least March 2001.8 In 1995, Cingular began
assessing the Fee for the 1993 account, after providing
notice to Mr. Gilmore in the March 1995 billing insert, and
Mr. Gilmore paid the Fee. He remains a Cingular customer to
this day.9
5. Complainant Claudia McGuire is a resident of
Chicago who contracted with Cingular for cellular telephone
service in March or April of 1995.10 Ms. McGuire agreed
initially to a two-year contract, but she continued in that
rate plan beyond the initial term of the contract until July
1997, when she lost her phone and terminated her service.11
Cingular provided Ms. McGuire notice of the Fee in April
1995 in her first monthly bill.12 Ms. McGuire paid the Fee
for each month that she was a customer, except for
approximately $40 that was written off when she lost her
phone and terminated her service.13
6. Complainant The Great Frame Up Systems, Inc.
(Systems) is a Delaware corporation, currently headquartered
in Houston, Texas. In December of 1994, Systems contracted
with Cingular for corporate cellular service that it used in
its seven Chicago stores.14 Systems' December 1994
corporate account was initiated as a two-year contract, but
Systems continued in at least one corporate account rate
plan beyond the initial term of the contract, until at least
April 2000.15 Cingular provided Systems notice of the Fee
in a March 1995 billing insert. The parties agree that
Systems paid the Fee each month from approximately April
1995 until April 27, 2000.16 Systems remains a customer of
Cingular to this day.17
7. The record reflects that each Complainant
apparently signed a contract with Cingular, prior to
initiation of the Fee, that contemplated imposition of
additional charges such as the Fee. The relevant contract
language provides that:
Company can modify or amend this Agreement at
any time by sending Customer a written notice
in the monthly bill or separately. If
Customer does not agree to the changes made
to this Agreement, Customer must notify
Company to cancel Service within thirty (30)
days and pay all charges owed to the Company
otherwise Customer will be conclusively
deemed to have agreed to the changes
described in the notice. Such changes may
include, without limitation, rates,
prime/non-prime periods, deposits, rate plan
availability, billing practices, late charges
and any and all other terms and conditions of
this Agreement.18
B. Procedural History
8. On March 19, 2001, Complainants filed their
initial complaint in Illinois state court on behalf of a
putative class of corporate cellular customers who were
charged a Corporate Administrative Fee by Cingular.19
Complainants' initial complaint sought relief on breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, common law fraud, and statutory
fraud grounds.20 It was amended after removal to the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, and was based upon alleged violations of the Act,
violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, and common law fraud.21 Leave was
granted to file a second amended complaint that again cited
the Act but dropped the references to a breach of contract,
fraud, or deception.22 On July 25, 2002, the Federal
District Court dismissed the case without prejudice,
referring the Act-related issues to the Commission under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction and retaining jurisdiction
to resolve any remaining issues, including damages, once the
Commission ruled on liability.23 This formal complaint was
filed on May 28, 2003.24
III. DISCUSSION
9. As described above, the current complaint before
the Commission alleges both that Cingular's Fee is unjust
and unreasonable in violation of section 201(b) of the Act
and that the Fee is discriminatory in violation of section
202(a) of the Act.25 For the reasons discussed below, we
disagree with Complainants and conclude that they have not
demonstrated that Cingular violated sections 201(b) or
202(a) of the Act.
III.A. Section 201(b) Allegations
10. Under section 201(b) of the Act, ``all charges,
practices, classifications and regulations for and in
connection with'' communications services offered by common
carriers must be just and reasonable.26 Complainants make
two arguments in support of their claim that Cingular's
assessment of the Fee violates section 201(b) of the Act.
First, Complainants contend that the Fee violates section
201(b) because it is not cost-based but rather designed for
the sole purpose of raising revenues without appearing to
raise rates.27 Second, Complainants contend that the Fee is
misleading and deceptive in violation of section 201(b).
Cingular denies these allegations. It is well settled that
the burden of pleading and proving a violation of section
201 of the Act is on the complainant.28
1. Application of the Three-Part White Test
11. In the Second Truth-in-Billing Order,
the Commission extended its truth-in-billing rules to
wireless carriers. The instant proceeding, however, is
governed by precedent that existed prior to the adoption of
the Second Truth-in-Billing Order. Cingular defends against
Complainants' cost-based arguments by asserting that, as a
provider of CMRS services in a competitive market, its
surcharge is lawful under Commission precedent that governed
at the time the complaint was filed. Based upon this prior
precedent, and the specific evidence submitted in this
matter by the parties, we agree with Cingular's position.
Under the applicable precedent, the Commission considers
three factors in determining whether a CMRS provider has
violated section 201(b) of the Act: (1) the relationship of
carrier costs to billing charges or practices; (2)
consumers' expectations based on their wireline experience;
and (3) the role of competitive markets.29 Both
Complainants and Defendant agree that the factors set forth
in White are controlling in this proceeding.30
12. We now consider the first prong of the White test
and analyze the practice at issue ``in terms of whether [it]
reasonably reflect[s] a carrier's cost . . . .''31
Complainants assert that the sole purpose of the Fee was to
increase revenue and that the fee was unrelated to costs
borne by Cingular for providing service to business
customers.32 In response, Cingular argues that there was a
sufficient relationship between the Fee and its costs to
satisfy the White test. Specifically, Cingular argues:
The documents and deposition testimony in the
case establish that a variety of services
were provided to corporate account customers.
The Fee was imposed as an attempt to defray a
portion of the costs of providing various
services to corporate customers.33
13. We conclude that Complainants have failed to
demonstrate the Fee is not reasonably related to Cingular's
costs under the first prong of the White test. As discussed
in paragraph 24 below, Cingular offered services to its
corporate customers to which individual customers were not
entitled. There is testimonial evidence that there were
additional costs associated with these special services.34
Complainants have provided no persuasive, specific evidence
that Cingular's Fee was not ``reasonably related'' to the
additional costs for providing these additional services to
business customers. Absent such specific evidence, and
given that it is undisputed that additional services were in
fact provided, we must conclude that the first prong of the
White test is satisfied.
14. The second prong of the White test concerns
consumer expectations based on their wireline experience.
The contracts at issue specifically contemplated rate
increases and changes in the terms and conditions of
service.35 Importantly, customers also were given the
opportunity to cancel service if they wished to do so upon
being informed of the new charge.36 We note that there is
no evidence that Cingular charged customers a fee for early
termination based on the customers' decision to terminate
due to imposition of the Fee. Given these circumstances, we
conclude that the second prong of the White test is
satisfied.
15. The third prong of the White test concerns the
role of competitive markets. In Chicago, where Defendant
was providing corporate cellular service to Complainants,
the parties stipulated that at least three other companies
were providing similar services when the Fee was first
assessed in 1995.37 The parties also stipulated that in
1996 and 1997, three more companies began offering
competitive services in the Chicago area.38 Given these
stipulations, we find that there were three to six carriers
throughout the period at issue in the relevant market for
the relevant services and that the market was competitive.
16. As stated above, the complainant bears the burden
of proof in a complaint proceeding. Based on the above
facts and Commission precedent, we find that Complainants
have not met their burden of proving that: (1) there was no
reasonable relationship between the Fee and Cingular's
costs; (2) the Fee was not reasonable in light of consumer
expectation; and (3) there was insufficient competition in
the Chicago-area market to allow Complainants the
opportunity to select another CMRS provider if they were
unhappy with Cingular's service. Accordingly, based upon
the three-prong test in White, we find that Complainants
have not established that Cingular's ``Corporate
Administrative Fee'' violates section 201(b) of the Act.
2. Misleading Nature of the Fee
17. Complainants also argue that the Fee is the
product of misleading and deceptive marketing and billing
practices that: (1) disguised the fact that the Fee was
really a rate increase rather than a legitimate charge for
unique and additional corporate account administrative
services; (2) hid the Fee in such a way as to avoid
detection and minimize scrutiny; and (3) hindered
competition by making it difficult for customers to compare
their rates with those of their competitors. 39
18. Based on the circumstances at the time, we
disagree. First, as noted above, Cingular was exempt from
the Truth-in-Billing rules at the time of the events in
question.40 Further, Complainants incorrectly interpret the
Commission's prior precedent with regard to section 201(b)'s
prohibition against deceptive and misleading practices.
While the Truth-in-Billing rules cited by Complainants
highlights the Commission's commitment to ensure that all
consumers are provided with the basic information they need
to make informed choices in a competitive telecommunications
marketplace,41 nothing in the record indicates that Cingular
withheld the type of basic information necessary for
consumers to make an educated decision about their service
provider. 42
19. Nor did Cingular's actions amount to false and
deceptive practices. Cingular did not hide the Fee in small
print or describe the Fee in a way that would mislead
customers as to the overall amount or general nature of the
Fee as a surcharge. Nor did it attempt to disguise the
charge as a mandatory regulatory fee, a concern the
Commission addressed in the Second Truth-in-Billing Order.43
Rather, Cingular displayed the Fee in the ``Other Charges
and Credits'' section of the bill to notify customers that
the Fee is a flat charge per line that does not fluctuate
depending on the number of minutes of airtime used in a
month. Moreover, Cingular notified the Complainants of the
Fee as required by the contracts.44 There is no evidence
that Cingular's description of the Fee as a ``corporate
administrative fee'' was incorrect. The record demonstrates
that corporate customers received additional services, and
that the costs of administering those services were
increasing over time, as acknowledged by Complainants'
primary witness.45
20. We might reach a different conclusion based upon
different factual circumstances. For example, if a carrier
imposes a ``corporate administrative fee'' but there are no
additional services that corporate customers receive beyond
the services that other customers receive, or if
complainants demonstrated that the cost of additional
"corporate administrative" services was so small in relation
to the new charge that the charge could not be reasonably
called a "corporate administrative fee," we would likely
find such a fee to be misleading. Similarly, if a fee was
described as being federally-mandated when in fact it was
not, this too might lead us to a different result.
Complainants have not demonstrated that any of these
situations are present here, however. We note that in
circumstances where complainants do not have access to the
information needed to make such a demonstration, they may
petition the FCC to compel the licensee to disclose such
information.
21. We find that, under the facts of this case,
Complainants have failed to prove that Cingular's assessment
of the fee was a misleading or deceptive billing practice.46
Accordingly, we conclude that Complainants have not
established that Cingular's marketing and billing practices
associated with the Fee violated section 201(b).
22. We do note, however, that in the Commission's
recent decision to apply the truth-in-billing rules to CMRS
providers, it stated its ongoing interest in allowing
consumers to better understand their telephone bills,
compare service offerings, and thereby promote a more
efficient competitive marketplace.47 At that time, the
Commission also reiterated that "[t]he proper functioning of
competitive markets is predicated on consumers having access
to accurate, meaningful information in a format that they
can understand.''48 As touched on above, this case is
decided under a different regulatory environment than the
one that now is in place.49 Unless consumers are adequately
informed about the service choices available to them and are
able to make reasonable price comparisons between service
offerings, they are unlikely to be able to take full
advantage of the benefits of competitive forces.
B. Section 202(a) Allegations
23. Complainants also allege that the Fee is
discriminatory in violation of section 202 of the Act
because: (1) it was imposed only on corporate account
customers and not on similarly situated individual account
customers; and (2) it was not imposed on corporate account
customers who called Cingular about the imposition of the
Fee.50
1. Fee Imposed Only on Corporate Customers
24. Section 202(a) of the Act makes it unlawful for
any common carrier to discriminate unjustly or unreasonably
among customers in its provision of ``like communications
service.''51 In determining whether a CMRS provider has
violated section 202(a) of the Act, the Commission applies a
three-step inquiry: (1) whether the services at issue are
``like''; (2) if they are, whether there are differences in
the terms and conditions pursuant to which the services are
provided; and (3) if so, whether the differences are
reasonable.52 Complainants have the burden of establishing
the first two components of the test, after which the burden
switches to the Defendant to demonstrate that any
discrimination is reasonable.53
25. In the instant case, Complainants allege that
corporate customers receive the same administrative goods
and services that are provided to non-corporate customers
yet the Fee is assessed only on corporate customers.54 In
addition, Complainants contend that Cingular's records do
not indicate that it incurred more corporate account costs
than non-corporate account costs.55 We do not find
Complainants' assertions persuasive. In determining whether
services are ``like'' for purposes of section 202(a) of the
Act, the Commission must determine whether the services in
question are ``functionally equivalent.''56 An important
aspect of the test relies upon customer perception to help
determine whether the services being compared provide the
same or equivalent functions.57 We find that there were a
number of differences between plans offered to corporate
customers and those offered to residential customers,
including different rate packages with different associated
customer services.58 For instance, Cingular explains that
it traveled to the business location of the corporate
account customer and brought necessary equipment to make it
easier to sign up employees.59 Corporate customers also
received features such as call waiting and call forwarding
as part of their rate plans for which non-corporate
customers were assessed separate charges.60 Furthermore,
corporate account customers received a specialized corporate
account newsletter and were eligible for an in-building
wireless system that allowed them to use cellular phones
inside the building.61 These packages were clearly tailored
to the specific needs and expectations of corporate
customers. Furthermore, each contract was individually
negotiated, which, under existing case law, often prevents a
finding of ``likeness.''62 We therefore find that the
services being compared by Complainants are not ``like'' for
purposes of section 202(a) of the Act and deny Complainants'
allegations.
2. Waiver of Fee
26. Complainants further argue that Cingular's Fee is
discriminatory because Cingular removed the charge from
certain corporate customers' accounts after they called and
complained about the Fee.63 Under the Commission's holding
in Orloff, which was affirmed by the DC Circuit Court of
Appeals, this argument fails. In Orloff, the Commission
found it reasonable for a customer to negotiate a better
deal with a wireless carrier where no market failure
prevented a customer from switching carriers if they were
dissatisfied.64 According to Defendant, it occasionally
waived the Fee for customers who complained about it, but as
Cingular argues, this was an individualized negotiation that
it was willing to entertain without any guarantees that the
Fee would be waived or that the customer would remain a
Cingular customer.65 We therefore find that by waiving the
Fee in certain instances, Cingular did not violate section
202(a) of the Act.
IV. ORDERING CLAUSE
27. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections
4(i), 4(j), 201(b), 202(a), and 208 of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j),
201(b), 202(a), and 208, that the Complaint filed by Bruce
Gilmore, et al., is DENIED and that this proceeding IS
TERMINATED as of the Release Date of this Order.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
_________________________
147 U.S.C. § 208.
2Id. § 201(b).
3Id. § 202(a).
4Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, Second Report and
Order, Declaratory Ruling, and Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 6448 (2005) (``Second Truth-
in-Billing Order'').
5See Amended Joint Statement of Stipulated and Disputed
Facts and Legal Issues, filed July 25, 2003, at 2-3 (Joint
Statement).
6Id. at 3.
7Id.
8Parties disagree about who initially took service under
this account. See Complaint at 6; Answer at 2. Cingular
argues that Mr. Gilmore took over a previously established
account, and therefore lacks standing to act as a class
representative. For purposes of this proceeding, we will
interpret the facts in a light most favorable to
Complainants and assume Mr. Gilmore was the party whom
Cingular serviced under this account.
9See Joint Statement at 3.
10Id. at 4.
11Id.
12See Answer at Ex. 7.
13See Joint Statement at 4.
14Id. at 5
15Id. at 6.
16Id.
17Id.
18See Complaint at Ex. 9. See also Letter from Mr. Terrence
Buehler, Buehler Reed & Williams, to David Hunt, Federal
Communications Commission, (June 29, 2004). While
Complainants only provided the Terms and Conditions for the
Systems contract, they do not contend that the Terms and
Conditions in the other contracts differed materially.
Rather, Complainants acknowledge that all the pre-Fee
contracts authorized Cingular to modify or amend the terms
and conditions ``by sending customers a written notice in
the monthly bill or separately.'' Complaint at 9.
19Complaint at 3.
20See Gilmore v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, L.L.C.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, (Case No. 01 C 2900, N.D. Ill)
(District Court Order).
21Id.
22Id. The District Court Judge noted that ``[a]rguably, the
second amended complaint could be construed as still
claiming that § 201 or federal common law is violated
because of a contract breach, fraud, and/or deception.'' In
response to defendant's motion to dismiss, however,
``plaintiffs expressly state that their § 201 claim does not
rely on fraud, deception, or breach of contract, but instead
relies only on the direct contention that the rate was
unreasonable in light of the services being provided.'' Id.
23Id. For purposes of clarity, the Commission notes that it
is not permitted to adjudicate complaints under section 208
on a class action basis. See Halprin, Temple, Goodman and
Sugrue v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 22568, 22581, ¶ 29 (1998) (``class
action lawsuits are neither contemplated by, nor consistent
with, the private remedies created under sections 206
through 209 of the Act'').
24Service was originally attempted by hand delivery upon
Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh on May 16, 2003, but was initially
refused. Service was subsequently effected on May 28, 2003
by mail. In the staff's Notice of Formal Complaint, sent to
the parties on May 29, 2003, we accepted the May 28 date as
the formal filing date and based the timing of all
subsequent pleadings and filings on that date.
25See Complaint at 18, 19. Complainants concede that the
fraud and breach of contract counts included in the
Complaint are barred because the Commission does not have
jurisdiction to resolve common law causes of action. See
Complainants' Reply to Defendant's Answer and Affirmative
Defenses to Complainants' Complaint, filed June 24, 2003 at
8 (Complainants' Reply).
2647 U.S.C. § 201(b). Persons engaged in the provision of
CMRS are treated as common carriers under the Act. See id.
§ 332(c)(1)(A).
27See Complaint at 10, 25, 26.
28See Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. MCI Communications,
Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 14027, 14029,
(2000); American Message Centers v. FCC, 50 F.3d 35, 40-41
(D.C.Cir. 1995).
29See Petition for Declaratory Ruling on Issues Contained in
Count I of White v. GTE, 16 FCC Rcd 11558 (2001) (White).
30See Answer at 37; Complaint at 23.
31See White, 16 FCC Rcd at 11561.
32See Complaint at 10.
33Answer at 39. Cingular goes on to describe some of the
specialized services corporate customers receive to which
individual customers are not entitled, such as traveling to
the business location of the corporate client; certain
features such as call waiting, call forwarding, voice-mail,
three-way calling, and phone replacement were included free-
of-charge as part of the rate plan; and being eligible for
an in-building wireless system which allowed customers to
use cellular phone inside the building. Id. at 40. See
also Complaint at Ex. 20.
34See Answer, Ex. 4.
35See paragraph 7, supra.
36See, e.g., Complaint, Ex. 12.
37See Joint Statement at 3.
38Id.
39Complaint at 18.
40Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, First Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd
7492, 7502 (1999) (First Truth-in-Billing Order).
41Complaint at 33.
42Although CMRS carriers were exempt from the requirements
of the Truth-in-Billing rules, Complainants correctly note
that the Commission intended the ``broad principles adopted
to promote truth-in-billing to apply to all
telecommunications carriers, both wireline and wireless.''
See Complaint at n. 31 (citing First Truth-in-Billing Order,
14 FCC Rcd at 7501 and n.32). For that reason, the
Commission emphasized that its decision in the Truth-in-
Billing proceeding in no way lessened a CMRS carrier's
obligations under section 201(b). Id.
43See Second Truth-in-Billing Order.
44See Answer at 42, 43 (citing Exs. 6, 7); see also
Complaint, Ex. 14; paragraph 6, supra. As explained supra,
Cingular notified Gilmore and Systems of the Fee by billing
inserts in March 1995. It is unclear whether Ms. McGuire
received a billing insert in March 1995, because she appears
to have signed her contract that month. She did, however,
receive notice of the imposition of the Fee in her first
monthly bill in April 1995. See Complaint at Ex. 7.
Complainants do not argue, however, that Ms. McGuire did not
receive adequate notice because of this timing issue.
Absent further evidence suggesting that this was the case,
we will assume that she knew of the new charges upon
initiating service
45See Answer at Ex. 4.
46Complainants also argue that mislabeling the Fee is
actionably deceptive because it is designed to manipulate
customers' contractual right to terminate their service
agreements. See Complaint at 37, 38. The evidence
provided by Complainants to support this contention,
however, is not persuasive. Complainants contend that the
service agreements permit modifications or amendments by
Defendant only ``by sending customer a written notice in the
monthly bill or separately.'' Id. at 37. Absent the
written notice, Complainants argue, customers are not
permitted to cancel their contracts prior to the expiration
of the specified term. Id. at 38. Given the fact that
Cingular did notify Complainants by bill insert or in the
bill itself, we do not understand how Cingular in any way
prevented customers from exercising their contractual right
to terminate service. See paragraph 3, supra.
47Second Truth-in-Billing Order at 6450.
48Id.
49See para 2, supra.
50See Complaint at 18, 19.
5147 U.S.C. § 202(a) (``It shall be unlawful for any common
carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in
charges, practices, classifications, regulations,
facilities, or services for or in connection with like
communication service....'').
52See Orloff v. Vodafone Airtouch, 17 FCC Rcd 8987, 8994
(2002) (Orloff); aff'd, Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 2907 (2004).
53Id.
54See Complaint at 18, 19, 38. Complainants allege that all
customers had access to similar calling services and
features, and that all customers were billed in writing and
had someone to call in case of questions. See Complainants'
Reply at 28.
55See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum and Additional
Proposed Findings, filed Aug. 29, 2004 at 5.
56See Cellexis International, Inc., v. Bell Atlantic Nynex
Mobile Systems, Inc., et al, 16 FCC Rcd 22887, 22892 (2001).
57Id. (citing Beehive Telephone, Inc. v. Bell Operating
Companies, 10 FCC Rcd 10562, 10567 (1995)).
58See Answer at 40 (citing Morrison Deposition, Ex. 2).
59Id.
60Id.
61Id.
62See Competitive Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 998 F.2d
1058, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
63See Complaint at 18, 19.
64See Orloff, 17 FCC Rcd at 8996.
65See Answer at 44, 45.