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                           Before the
                FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
                      Washington, DC  20054

Global NAPs, Inc.,               )
                                )
    Complainant,                )
                                )
         v.                     )       File No.  EB-01-MD-010
                                )
Verizon Communications,          )
Verizon New England, Inc., and   )
Verizon Virginia, Inc.,          )
                                )
    Defendants.                 )

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

  Adopted:  February 21, 2002      Released: February 28, 2002

By the Commission:

I.   INTRODUCTION

          In this Order, we grant in part and deny in part a 
formal complaint that Global NAPs, Inc. (``Global NAPs''), filed 
against Verizon Communications, Verizon New England, Inc., and 
Verizon Virginia, Inc. (collectively, ``Verizon''),1 pursuant to 
section 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended 
(``Act'' or ``Communications Act'').2  We grant Global NAPs' 
claim that Verizon violated section 201(b) of the Act3 by 
refusing to permit Global NAPs to opt into certain provisions of 
an interconnection agreement that are eligible for adoption 
across state lines in accordance with a condition of the 
Commission's approval of the merger application of Bell Atlantic 
Corp. and GTE Corp.4  We deny Global NAPs' claim for damages, 
however, because such claim is premature.

II.   BACKGROUND

          Global NAPs is a telecommunications carrier that offers 
interstate and intrastate telecommunications services.5  Pursuant 
to sections 251 and 252 of the Act,6 Global NAPs and its 
affiliates have interconnection agreements with Verizon 
concerning the provision of local telecommunications services in 
a number of states.7  Verizon is an incumbent local exchange 
carrier (``LEC'') that provides, among other services, local 
exchange and exchange access services in the states that are 
relevant to this complaint.8

          In 1998, pursuant to section 252(a) of the Act,9 Global 
NAPs and Bell Atlantic - Rhode Island signed a negotiated 
interconnection agreement governing the exchange of 
telecommunications traffic in the state of Rhode Island (``Rhode 
Island Agreement'').10  That agreement contains section 5.7.2.3, 
which provides, inter alia, that Verizon will pay Global NAPs 
reciprocal compensation (as defined in the agreement) for the 
delivery of traffic from Verizon's network to Global NAPs' 
internet service provider (``ISP'') customers (``ISP-bound 
traffic'') until such time as this Commission or a court 
determines that ISP-bound traffic is not ``local traffic'' or is 
otherwise not compensable.11

          On February 26, 1999, the Commission ruled that ISP-
bound traffic is largely interstate traffic that is not subject 
to the reciprocal compensation scheme of section 251(b)(5) of the 
Act.12  Nevertheless, the Commission stated that state commission 
findings as to whether reciprocal compensation provisions of 
interconnection agreements applied to ISP-bound traffic would 
remain in place pending adoption of a Commission rule 
establishing an appropriate interstate compensation mechanism.13  
On November 16, 1999, the Rhode Island Public Utilities 
Commission (``PUC'') issued an order finding that the 
requirements of section 5.7.2.3 remain in effect, notwithstanding 
the Commission's Declaratory Ruling.14  The Rhode Island PUC held 
that the Commission's Declaratory Ruling did not fulfill the 
Rhode Island Agreement's requirement of fully resolving the issue 
of whether ISP-bound traffic would remain in the reciprocal 
compensation scheme as local traffic.  Thus, the Rhode Island PUC 
continued to require Bell Atlantic-Rhode Island to pay reciprocal 
compensation to Global NAPs for this traffic.15

          On March 24, 2000, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated the Declaratory Ruling.16  
The court stated, inter alia, that the Commission had not 
adequately explained why ISP-bound traffic falls outside the 
rubric of section 251(b)(5) of the Act.17  Thus, the court 
remanded the matter to the Commission for further explanation.

          On June 16, 2000, while the D.C. Circuit's remand of 
the Declaratory Ruling remained pending at the Commission, the 
Commission released the Merger Order approving the transfer of 
licenses from GTE to Bell Atlantic.18  The Commission concluded, 
inter alia, that, because of the conditions to which the parties 
had voluntarily committed, the proposed transfer of licenses 
would serve the public interest.19  One such condition set forth 
in the Merger Order is the subject of the instant complaint.  In 
brief, that condition requires Verizon, under certain specified 
circumstances, to permit requesting carriers to adopt in one 
state an interconnection agreement that was voluntarily 
negotiated in another state.  The condition states, in pertinent 
part:

     32. In-Region Pre-Merger Agreements.  Subject to the 
     Conditions specified in this Paragraph, Bell Atlantic/GTE 
     shall make available: (1) in the Bell Atlantic Service Area 
     to any requesting telecommunications carrier any 
     interconnection arrangement, UNE, or provisions of an 
     interconnection agreement (including an entire agreement) 
     subject to 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) and Paragraph 39 of these 
     Conditions that was voluntarily negotiated by a Bell 
     Atlantic incumbent LEC with a telecommunications carrier, 
     pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1), prior to the Merger 
     Closing Date and (2) in the GTE Service Area to any 
     requesting telecommunications carrier any interconnection 
     arrangement, UNE, or provision of an interconnection subject 
     to 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) that was voluntarily negotiated by a 
     GTE incumbent LEC with a telecommunications carrier, 
     pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1), prior to the Merger 
     Closing Date, provided that no interconnection arrangement 
     or UNE from an agreement negotiated prior to the Merger 
     Closing Date in the Bell Atlantic Area can be extended into 
     the GTE Service Area and vice versa.20

          On April 27, 2001, in response to the D.C. Circuit's 
remand, the Commission released an order determining, inter alia, 
that ISP-bound traffic constitutes ``information access'' under 
section 251(g) of the Act and is, therefore, excluded from the 
reciprocal compensation provision of section 251(b)(5).21  At the 
same time, the Commission established an interim compensation 
arrangement for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic, in which 
incumbent LECs generally pay competitive LECs a progressively 
decreasing per-minute rate.22  The Commission emphasized, 
however, that the new compensation regime applies only 
prospectively ``as carriers renegotiate expired or expiring 
interconnection agreements,'' and ``does not alter existing 
contractual obligations, except to the extent that parties are 
entitled to invoke contractual change-of-law provisions.''23

          On July 24, 2000, Global NAPs notified Verizon that, 
pursuant to paragraph 32 of the merger conditions, it wished to 
adopt the Rhode Island Agreement in Virginia and Massachusetts.24  
On November 15, 2000, Global NAPs and Verizon agreed that, 
effective July 24, 2000, Global NAPs could adopt, in 
Massachusetts and Virginia, all provisions of the Rhode Island 
Agreement that it could adopt consistent with paragraph 32 of the 
merger conditions.25  The parties disagreed, however, about 
whether paragraph 32 of the merger conditions entitles Global 
NAPs to adopt in Massachusetts and Virginia section 5.7.2.3 of 
the Rhode Island Agreement.  The parties attempted to settle 
their disagreement for about nine months.26  Throughout the 
course of their dispute, Verizon continued to send Global NAPs 
ISP-bound traffic in Massachusetts and Virginia, but Verizon did 
not pay Global NAPs intercarrier compensation for that traffic.27

          On April 27, 2001, Global NAPs filed its complaint 
alleging that paragraph 32 of the merger conditions required 
Verizon to allow Global NAPs to opt into section 5.7.2.3 of the 
Rhode Island Agreement in Massachusetts and Virginia.28  Global 
NAPs asserts that ``Verizon's conditioning and limitation of 
adoption of the Rhode Island Agreement in Virginia and 
Massachusetts constitutes a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) 
entitling Global NAPs to a payment of money'' damages.29  The 
complaint alleges, therefore, that Verizon owes Global NAPs 
``reciprocal compensation payments from July 24, 2000 to the 
present for ISP-bound traffic in those states at the appropriate 
rate(s) based on the Rhode Island Agreement,''30 which allegedly 
amounts to $26,871,153.92. 31  According to Global NAPs, this is 
the amount of reciprocal compensation that Verizon owes Global 
NAPs for Global NAPs' transport and termination of Verizon-
originated ISP-bound calls in Massachusetts and Virginia from 
July 24, 2000 through March 31, 2001.32

III.  DISCUSSION

          Although we find that paragraph 32 is ambiguous as 
applied to the circumstances at issue here, we conclude that it 
is best read as requiring Verizon to make available for adoption 
in other states the entire Rhode Island Agreement, including 
section 5.7.2.3, or any discrete provision thereof.33  

          Global NAPs focuses on the fact that paragraph 32 
requires Verizon to make available for adoption across state 
lines any ``provisions of an interconnection agreement (including 
an entire agreement) subject to 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) and Paragraph 
39 of these Conditions that was voluntarily negotiated by a Bell 
Atlantic incumbent LEC....''34  In Global NAPs' view, therefore, 
the key question is whether the entire Rhode Island Agreement, 
including section 5.7.2.3, is ``subject to 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)'' 
within the meaning of paragraph 32.  

          Assuming for the moment that Global NAPs asks the right 
question, by focusing on the entire agreement rather than on 
individual provisions thereof, we agree with Global NAPs' answer 
that the Rhode Island Agreement, including section 5.7.2.3, is 
``subject to 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)'' within the meaning of paragraph 
32 (and thus Global NAPs is entitled to opt into it.)  First, 
this interconnection agreement is subject to section 251(c) 
because this is the agreement that Verizon negotiated to comply 
with its obligations under that section.  In other words, this 
agreement incorporates the terms governing the exchange of 
telecommunications traffic in the state of Rhode Island pursuant 
to section 251(c).  This agreement embodies not only many of 
those terms listed in section 251(c), but other provisions that 
the parties found appropriate for inclusion as well.  Moreover, 
section 251(c)(1) states that an incumbent LEC must ``negotiate 
in good faith in accordance with section 252 the particular terms 
and conditions of agreements to fulfill the duties described in 
paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (b) and this 
subsection.''35  No one disputes that the Rhode Island Agreement 
was negotiated pursuant to section 251(c) or subject to the good 
faith provisions of section 251(c).  The fact that the agreement 
included other provisions does not take it out of the ambit of 
section 251(c).36  Accordingly, we find that the entire Rhode 
Island Agreement is ``subject to 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)'' as that 
phrase is used in paragraph 32 of the merger conditions.  Because 
this is a section 251(c) agreement and paragraph 32 permits 
opting into an ``entire'' such agreement, then under Global NAPs' 
approach, the entire Rhode Island Agreement is eligible for 
adoption in Virginia and Massachusetts, and Verizon must offer it 
to requesting carriers to meet its obligations under the Merger 
Order.37

          Verizon, however, poses a different initial question 
than Global NAPs does.  Verizon asserts that the phrase ``subject 
to 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)'' limits the terms it must offer to those 
that are specifically enumerated in section 251(c)(2)-(6) (e.g., 
unbundled access, collocation); thus, according to Verizon, 
because section 251(c) does not specifically address reciprocal 
compensation for ISP-bound traffic, paragraph 32 does not require 
Verizon to offer a provision, such as section 5.7.2.3, that 
concerns such compensation.38  We disagree for two reasons.

           First, Verizon's interpretation of paragraph 32 would 
require us to read the phrase ``subject to 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)'' 
as modifying the term ``provisions'' rather than modifying the 
directly antecedent language ``interconnection agreement 
(including an entire agreement).''  We reject Verizon's 
interpretation.  We believe that the more natural reading of this 
phrase matches the term ``interconnection agreement (including an 
entire agreement)'' with its verb ``that was voluntarily 
negotiated,'' so that the subject and verb agree.  Because the 
phrase ``subject to 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)'' modifies ``agreement,'' 
paragraph 32 allows requesting carriers to opt into an agreement, 
or to any discrete provisions thereof, as long as that agreement 
was subject to section 251(c).  As discussed above in paragraph 
11, the Rhode Island Agreement satisfies this requirement.

          Second, Verizon's interpretation would mean that 
competitors could rarely, if ever, invoke paragraph 32 to opt 
into an ``entire agreement.''  Verizon itself indicated in a 
joint stipulation that its interconnection agreements in the 
former Bell Atlantic territory ``typically contain terms in 
addition to those listed in 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1)-(6).''39  Under 
Verizon's interpretation, requesting carriers would not be 
entitled to opt into ``entire agreements'' if the agreements 
contain any terms not expressly listed in section 251(c).  Thus, 
reading paragraph 32 as Verizon contends would render virtually 
meaningless the phrase ``including an entire agreement.''  We 
decline to construe paragraph 32 in such a cramped manner.

          Verizon also argues that ``even if the merger condition 
were somehow construed (incorrectly) to apply to matters covered 
by section 251(b)(5),'' the Commission's Order on Remand 
establishes that Internet-bound traffic is not covered by section 
251(b)(5).40  Verizon states that because the Commission has 
determined in the Order on Remand that ISP-bound traffic falls 
within section 251(g), such traffic must be excluded from section 
251(b)(5).41  We find Verizon's arguments to be irrelevant to the 
determination in the instant Order.  As discussed above, our 
conclusion that the Rhode Island Agreement, as a whole, is 
subject to section 251(c) does not turn on which statutory 
provision governs reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic.

          Verizon also asserts that construing paragraph 32 in 
the manner sought by Global NAPs would conflict with the Order on 
Remand, because the Commission's determination that ISP-bound 
traffic is covered by section 251(g) of the Act rather than 
section 251(b) demonstrates that ``[p]ayment of inter-carrier 
compensation for Internet-bound traffic is . . . contrary to 
stated Commission policy.''42  We disagree.  The Order on Remand 
governs the exchange of ISP-bound traffic on a prospective basis, 
after its effective date of June 14, 2001.43  Global NAPs' 
complaint, however, asks the Commission to examine Verizon's 
actions from July 24, 2000 to March 31, 2001.44  The Order on 
Remand expressly ``does not alter existing contractual 
obligations, except to the extent the parties are entitled to 
invoke contractual change-of-law provisions.''45  Our decision 
here fully comports with this determination that pre-existing 
contractual obligations between Verizon and Global NAPs remain in 
effect.  As noted above, on November 15, 2000, Verizon and Global 
NAPs entered into an agreement that Global NAPs, as of July 24, 
2000, could opt into any provision of the Rhode Island Agreement 
to which paragraph 32 applied.  Because we find that Global NAPs 
was entitled to opt into the entire agreement, we conclude that 
the parties' November 15, 2000, agreement qualifies as an 
``existing contractual obligation'' that remains unchanged by the 
Order on Remand.46

          We recognize that the interpretation proposed by Global 
NAPs does to some extent render the language ``subject to 47 
U.S.C. § 251(c)'' arguably superfluous, because paragraph 32 also 
refers to section 252(a)(1) to identify the kind of 
interconnection agreements within its scope.  Nevertheless, for 
the reasons explained above, this interpretation makes far more 
sense than the interpretation proffered by Verizon.  Thus, we 
adopt Global NAPs' approach here.

          Finally, we note that paragraph 32 specifically states 
that interconnection terms adopted across state lines must be 
``consistent with the laws and regulatory requirements of the 
state for which the request is made.''47  Thus, we conclude that, 
although the Commission may determine whether an agreement is 
eligible for adoption pursuant to paragraph 32, only the relevant 
state commission may ultimately decide whether particular terms 
of the agreement should be adopted in that state, and if so, what 
those terms mean.

          Because paragraph 32 concerns voluntarily negotiated 
agreements, we expect Verizon and Global NAPs to submit the Rhode 
Island Agreement to the Virginia and Massachusetts commissions 
for approval pursuant to section 252(e)(1) of the Act.48  The 
parties should follow the procedures that the Massachusetts and 
Virginia commissions have established for submitting such 
voluntarily negotiated agreements.49  We also expect that these 
agreements will contain section 5.7.2.3 of the Rhode Island 
Agreement, if Global NAPs chooses to include it.  As specified by 
the Act, each state commission will then determine the 
acceptability of specific provisions under section 252(e)(2).50

          In sum, because paragraph 32 allows for requesting 
carriers to opt into entire agreements across state lines, 
Verizon should have offered the entire Rhode Island Agreement, 
including section 5.7.2.3, to Global NAPs in Virginia and 
Massachusetts to satisfy Verizon's commitments under the Merger 
Order.  Verizon's failure to do so violates section 201(b) of the 
Act.  Accordingly, we grant Count IV of Global NAPs' complaint.

IV.  DAMAGES

          Global NAPs asserts that, if we rule that Verizon 
violated section 201(b) of the Act by refusing to allow Global 
NAPs to adopt in Virginia and Massachusetts section 5.7.2.3 of 
the Rhode Island Agreement, we should award Global NAPs 
$26,871,153.92 in damages.51  This is the amount that Global NAPs 
alleges Verizon would have paid in reciprocal compensation for 
ISP-bound traffic in Virginia and Massachusetts from July 24, 
2000, through March 31, 2001, based on the minutes of traffic 
delivered to Global NAPs and the compensation rate under the 
Rhode Island Agreement during that time period.

          Global NAPs' request for damages is premature.  As 
described above, in accordance with this Order, Global NAPs and 
Verizon must submit interconnection agreements containing section 
5.7.2.3 of the Rhode Island Agreement to the Massachusetts and 
Virginia commissions for approval under section 252(e)(1) of the 
Act.  Only if and when the state commissions approve the 
interconnection agreements, pursuant to section 252(e)(2) of the 
Act, will the issue of Global NAPs' entitlement to damages under 
those agreements be ripe for the appropriate regulatory agency to 
adjudicate.  Accordingly, we deny Global NAPs' claim for damages 
without prejudice.

V.  ORDERING CLAUSES

          Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 
4(i), 4(j), 201(b), and 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201(b), 208, that 
Global NAPs' complaint IS GRANTED IN PART to the extent described 
herein, and in all other respects IS DENIED.

           IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 
4(j), and 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 154(j), 208, that the parties' joint 
request to dismiss Verizon Communications, Inc., as a defendant 
IS GRANTED.

                              FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION



                              William F. Caton
                              Acting Secretary




_________________________

1    See Formal Complaint, File No. EB-01-MD-010 (filed Apr. 27, 
2001) (``Global NAPs Complaint''). Although Global NAPs 
originally named Verizon Communications as a defendant, the 
parties jointly requested that we dismiss Verizon Communications 
as a defendant.  Joint Statement of Stipulated Facts, Disputed 
Facts, and Key Legal Issues, File No. EB-01-MD-010, at 2, ¶ 7 
(filed June 11, 2001) (``Joint Statement'').  We hereby grant 
this request.

2    47 U.S.C. § 208.

3    Id. § 201(b).

4    See Application of GTE Corp., Transferor, and Bell Atlantic 
Corp., Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of Domestic 
and International Sections 214 and 310 Authorizations and 
Application to Transfer Control of a Submarine Cable Landing 
License, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 14032, 
14171-75, ¶¶ 300-05, 14310-11, App. D at ¶ 32 (2000) (``Merger 
Order'').

5    Global NAPs Complaint at 2, ¶ 2; Verizon Answer, File No. 
EB-01-MD-010, at 13, ¶ 28 (filed May 18, 2001) (``Verizon 
Answer'').

6    47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252.

7    Global NAPs Complaint at 2, ¶ 3; Verizon Answer at 13, ¶ 29.

8    Global NAPs Complaint at 2, ¶ 3; Verizon Answer at 13, ¶ 29.

9    See 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)

10   Joint Statement at 1-2, ¶ 2.  Bell Atlantic - Rhode Island 
is the predecessor company of Verizon - Rhode Island, Inc., which 
is now a subsidiary of Defendant Verizon New England, Inc.

11   Id. at 1-2, ¶ 2.  The interconnection agreement reads as 
follows: ``5.7.2.3 The Parties stipulate that they disagree as to 
whether traffic that originates on one Party's network and is 
transmitted to an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") connected to 
the other Party's network ("ISP Traffic") constitutes Local 
Traffic as defined herein, and the charges to be assessed in 
connection with such traffic.  The issue of whether such traffic 
constitutes Local Traffic on which reciprocal compensation must 
be paid pursuant to the 1996 Act is presently before the FCC in 
CCB/CPD 97-30 and may be before a court of competent 
jurisdiction.  The Parties agree that the decision of the FCC in 
that proceeding, or as such court, shall determine whether such 
traffic is Local Traffic (as defined herein) and the charges to 
be assessed in connection with ISP Traffic.  If the FCC or such 
court determines that ISP Traffic is Local Traffic, as defined 
herein, or otherwise determines that ISP Traffic is subject to 
reciprocal compensation, it shall be compensated as Local Traffic 
under this Agreement unless another compensation scheme is 
required under such FCC or court determination.  Until resolution 
of this issue, BA agrees to pay GNAPS Reciprocal Compensation for 
ISP Traffic (without conceding that ISP Traffic constitutes Local 
Traffic or precluding BA's ability to seek appropriate court 
review of this issue) pursuant to the [Rhode Island] commission's 
Order in Case 97-C-1275, dated March 19, 1998, as such Order may 
be modified, changed or reversed.''  Global NAPs Complaint at 
Exhibit 2, at 22 (quoting Interconnection Agreement Under 
Sections 251 and 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
Between Bell Atlantic-Rhode Island and Global NAPs, Inc. (Oct. 1, 
1998).).

12   See Implementation of the Local Competition Provision in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996; Intercarrier Compensation for 
ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 3689 (1999) (``Declaratory Ruling''); see 
also 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5).

13   Declaratory Ruling at 3703, ¶ 21.

14   See Complaint of Global NAPs, Inc., Against Bell Atlantic-
Rhode Island Regarding Reciprocal Compensation, Docket No. 2967, 
Report and Order, R.I. P.U.C. (Nov. 16, 1999) (``RIPUC Order''); 
Joint Statement at 2, ¶ 3.

15   See RIPUC Order at 4-5.

16   See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2000).

17   Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 8.

18   See supra note 4.

19   See Merger Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 14036, ¶ 3-5.

20   Merger Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 14310, App. D at ¶ 32 
(``paragraph 32'').

21   See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Intercarrier Compensation for 
ISP-Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and Report and Order, 16 FCC 
Rcd 9151, 9154-56, ¶¶ 4-6 (2001) (``Order on Remand'').  Section 
251(g) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that ``each local 
exchange carrier, to the extent that it provides wireline 
services, shall provide exchange access, information access, and 
exchange services for such access to interexchange carriers and 
information service providers in accordance with the same equal 
access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and 
obligations (including receipt of compensation) that apply to 
such carrier on [February 7, 1996].''  47 U.S.C. § 251(g).

22   Order on Remand, 16 FCC Rcd at 9155-57, ¶¶ 7-8.

23   Id. at 9189, ¶ 82; see id. at 9186-91, ¶¶ 77-85.  We note 
that, prior to the release of the Order on Remand, on December 
27, 2000, the Commission's Common Carrier Bureau (``CCB'') issued 
a letter stating that the paragraph 32 condition applies to 
reciprocal compensation provisions of interconnection agreements.  
See Letter from Carol Mattey, Common Carrier Bureau, to Michael 
Shor, Swidler Berlin Sheriff Friedman, LLP, 16 FCC Rcd 22 (2000).  
In response to this letter, Verizon asked CCB to clarify its 
position regarding the applicability of the condition to 
intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic.  See Letter from 
Gordon Evans, Verizon Communications, to Dorothy Attwood, Common 
Carrier Bureau, Feb. 20, 2001.  CCB issued a Public Notice on 
March 30, 2001, asking ``whether there are grounds to waive or 
modify the relevant MFN [most favored nation] conditions.''  
Common Carrier Bureau Seeks Comment on Letters Filed by Verizon 
and Birch Regarding Most-Favored Nation Condition of 
SBC/Ameritech and Bell Atlantic/GTE Orders, Public Notice, 16 FCC 
Rcd 6873, 6874 (2001).  As of the release date of this Order, the 
Commission has taken no action regarding the Public Notice.

24   Global NAPs Complaint at Ex. 5.

25   Joint Statement at 2, ¶ 5; see Global NAPs Complaint at Exs. 
3-4 (two letter agreements that both parties signed on 
November 15, 2000).

26   See Global NAPs Complaint at Exs. 6-12 (referring to letters 
and e-mails that the parties exchanged).

27   Joint Statement at 2, ¶¶ 5-6.

28   In its complaint, Global NAPs labels its various assertions 
as ``counts'' that do not make specific allegations of statutory 
or regulatory violations, but instead describe legal arguments.  
Thus, we construe ``Count I,'' ``Count II,'' and ``Count III'' as 
merely parts of the main body of the complaint.  See Global NAPs 
Complaint at 18-20, ¶¶ 42-48 (Count I), 20-40, ¶¶ 49-90 (Count 
II), 40-48, ¶¶ 91-109 (Count III).  We view Count IV as Global 
NAPs' true claim.  See id. at 49, ¶¶ 110-11.  Accordingly, Count 
IV is the only count that we address in this Order.

29   Id. at 50, ¶ 114.

30   Id. at 49-50, ¶ 113.

31   Id. at 50, ¶ 114.

32   Id.

33   We note that paragraph 32 (in a portion not quoted above) 
does create exclusions from the adoptability requirement for 
certain items (e.g., paragraph 32 excludes price- and state-
specific performance measures for interconnection arrangements 
and UNEs).  Any statements in this Order about paragraph 32 
requiring the ``entire'' interconnection agreement to be made 
available for adoption should not be interpreted as overriding 
these exclusions.

34   Merger Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 14310, App. D at ¶ 32 (emphasis 
added).  Paragraph 39 of the Merger Order, which requires Verizon 
to offer unbundled network elements (``UNEs'') in accordance with 
the UNE Remand Order and the Line Sharing Order until a final, 
non-appealable judicial decision to the contrary, has no bearing 
on the issue disputed in this matter.  See id. at 14316, App. D 
at ¶ 39 (``paragraph 39''); see also Implementation of the Local 
Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd 3696 (1999) (``UNE Remand Order''); 
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 
20912 (1999) (``Line Sharing Order'').  Paragraph 39 merely 
leaves in place the requirements contained in certain Commission 
orders implementing section 251(c) of the Act subject to 
appellate review.

35   47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1).

36   In contrast, certain pre-1996 Act interconnection agreements 
are outside the scope of section 251(c).  See Iowa Utilities Bd. 
v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 762-65 (8th Cir. 2000).

37   As our determination rests on the text of paragraph 32 
itself, Verizon's comparisons between the language in the 
SBC/Ameritech Merger Order and the language at issue here are 
inapposite.  See Verizon Answer at 6, ¶ 13; Brief of Defendants 
Verizon New England, Inc., and Verizon Virginia, Inc., File No. 
EB-01-MD-010, at 4-5 (filed July 16, 2001) (``Verizon Brief'') 
(citing Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications, 
Inc., Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of Corporations 
Holding Commission Licenses, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC 
Rcd 14712 (1999) (``SBC/Ameritech Merger Order'')).

38   See Verizon Answer at 4-8, ¶¶ 7-17; Verizon Brief at 1-6; 
Reply Brief of Defendants Verizon New England, Inc., and Verizon 
Virginia, Inc., File No. EB-01-MD-010, at 1-6 (filed Aug. 6, 
2001) (``Verizon Reply'').

39   Joint Stipulation, File No. EB-01-MD-010, at 1 (filed June 
19, 2001).

40   Verizon Answer at 5, ¶ 9; Verizon Brief at 2-3; see also 
Letter from Carol Mattey, Common Carrier Bureau, to Michael Shor, 
Swidler Berlin Sheriff Friedman, LLP, 16 FCC Rcd 22 (2000) 
(stating that section 251(b) is incorporated explicitly into 
section 251(c)).

41   Verizon Answer at 4, ¶ 8; Verizon Brief at 2-3.

42   Verizon Brief at 8; see also Verizon Answer at 2-5, ¶¶ 3-8; 
Verizon Brief at 1-2; Verizon Reply at 2-3.

43   See 68 Fed. Reg. 26800 (2001).

44   See Global NAPs Complaint at 50, ¶ 114.

45   See Order on Remand, 16 FCC Rcd at 9189, ¶ 82.  Verizon 
argues that the Order on Remand ``makes clear that any provision 
dealing with reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic is not and 
has never been subject to section 252(i).''  Verizon Reply at 11.  
We disagree.  The Order on Remand specifically states that ``as 
of the date this Order is published in the Federal Register, 
carriers may no longer invoke section 252(i) to opt into an 
existing interconnection agreement with regard to rates paid for 
the exchange of ISP-bound traffic.''  Order on Remand, 16 FCC Rcd 
at 9189, ¶ 82.  The statement that carriers may ``no longer'' 
invoke section 252(i) ``as of this date'' indicates that, prior 
to this date, such provisions were eligible for opt-in pursuant 
to section 252(i).

46   We do expect, however, that once these agreements expire, 
the Order on Remand will govern the exchange of ISP-bound traffic 
between Global NAPs and Verizon.  See Merger Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 
14172, ¶ 301.

47   Id. at 14310, App. D at ¶ 32.

48   See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(1) (requiring interconnection 
agreements to be submitted to state commissions for approval).

49   Verizon indicated orally to Commission staff and Global NAPs 
that staff at the Virginia commission has stated informally that 
Verizon should not submit agreements opted into from other states 
with the Virginia commission.  In the absence of an official 
state ruling that indicates otherwise, however, we cannot assume 
that the Virginia or Massachusetts commissions will decline to 
carry out their responsibilities set forth in section 252 of the 
Act.

50   See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(2)(A) (listing the grounds upon which 
state commissions reject negotiated interconnection agreements).

51   See Global NAPs Complaint at 49-50, ¶¶ 113-14.