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                           Before the
                Federal Communications Commission
                     Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of                    )
                                   )
Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc.; Bell  )
Atlantic-Maryland, Inc.; Bell       )
Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc.; Bell     )      File No. EB-00-MD-009
Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc.; Bell   )
Atlantic-Virginia, Inc.; Bell       )
Atlantic-Washington, D.C., Inc.;    )
Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc.;  )
New York Telephone Co.; and New     )
England Telephone and Telegraph     )
Co.,                                )
                                   )
          Complainants,             )
                                   )
                                     )
v.

Global NAPs, Inc.,

          Defendant.


                    ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

        Adopted:  April 22, 2002        Released:  April 26, 2002

By the Commission:

                        I.   INTRODUCTION

In this Order on Reconsideration, we deny a petition filed by 
Global NAPs, Inc. (``Global NAPs'')1 seeking reconsideration of 
the Commission's order2 granting a formal complaint brought by 
various Verizon Communications, Inc. companies (collectively, 
``Verizon'')3 against Global NAPs pursuant to section 208 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the ``Act'').4  For the 
reasons discussed below, we conclude that, in the Order:  (1) the 
Commission did not err in ruling that Global NAPs' second tariff 
imposing charges for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic (``Second 
ISP Tariff'') was void ab initio under section 201(b) of the Act5 
because it contradicted the parties' understanding that their 
interconnection agreements alone would govern the payment of 
inter-carrier compensation for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic; 
(2) the Commission did not err in ruling that Global NAPs' Second 
ISP Tariff was void ab initio under section 201(b) because it is 
indeterminate, and (3) the Commission did not violate Global 
NAPs' due process rights by basing its decision, in part, on a 
legal theory not raised by Verizon. 

                         II.  BACKGROUND

This proceeding generally arises out of the same facts and 
disputes that were the subject of the Commission's decision in 
Bell-Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., et al. v. Global NAPs, Inc.,6 
wherein the Commission held, inter alia, that Global NAPs' first 
tariff seeking to impose charges for the delivery of ISP-bound 
traffic (``First ISP Tariff'') was void ab initio under section 
201(b) of the Act.  The parties do not disagree about the 
underlying facts that led to the filing of Verizon's complaint in 
either Global NAPs I or this proceeding.7  Therefore, we 
incorporate by reference the facts described in Global NAPs I and 
the Order. 8  

Certain core facts bear repeating here, however.  In 
Massachusetts and New Jersey, Global NAPs freely entered into 
interconnection agreements with Verizon pursuant to sections 251 
and 252 of the Act,9 knowing full well that it and Verizon 
disagreed about whether the interconnection agreements required 
Verizon to pay reciprocal compensation for Global NAPs' delivery 
of ``ÍSP-bound traffic.''10  Global NAPs immediately and 
vigorously pursued its rights under section 252 of the Act to 
argue to the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and 
Energy (``DTE'') and the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities 
(``BPU'') that its interconnection agreements did, indeed, 
require Verizon to pay reciprocal compensation for the delivery 
of ISP-bound traffic.  Many months thereafter (24 months with 
respect to Massachusetts, seven months with respect to New 
Jersey), Global NAPs filed with the FCC its First ISP Tariff, 
which purported to require Verizon to pay compensation for Global 
NAPs' delivery of ISP-bound traffic, if the applicable 
interconnection agreement did not so require.  Upon complaint by 
Verizon, the Commission ruled, inter alia, that Global NAPs' 
First ISP Tariff was void ab initio under section 201(b) of the 
Act, which ruling was affirmed by the United Stated Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (``D.C. Circuit'').  

After the Commission's release of Global NAPs I, Global NAPs 
filed with the FCC its Second ISP Tariff.  Although worded 
somewhat differently than the First ISP Tariff, it purported to 
accomplish the same result:  require Verizon to pay compensation 
for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic, if the applicable 
interconnection agreement did not so require.

Both the Massachusetts DTE and the New Jersey BPU have held that 
the Global NAPs/Verizon interconnection agreements do not require 
reciprocal compensation for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic.  
Thus, Global NAPs sought to obtain compensation from Verizon 
pursuant to its Second ISP Tariff, whereupon Verizon filed the 
instant complaint challenging the lawfulness of that Tariff.

In the Order, the Commission agreed with Verizon that the 
challenged provisions of Global NAPs' Second ISP Tariff were void 
ab initio under section 201(b) of the Act, for two reasons.  
First, the filing of the Second ISP Tariff conflicts with the 
parties' mutual understanding that their interconnection 
agreements alone would govern whether Global NAPs would receive 
compensation for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic.11  Second, 
Global NAPs' Second ISP Tariff was indeterminate, in violation of 
section 61.2 of our rules,12 which requires that tariffs be clear 
and explicit as to their proper application.13

In its Petition, Global NAPs argues that the Order is flawed in 
several ways.  First, Global NAPs asserts that the Order's 
finding of a mutual understanding not to file a federal tariff 
imposing charges for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic lacks 
record support and violates the Filed Rate Doctrine.14  Second, 
Global NAPs asserts that its Second ISP Tariff is not 
indeterminate.15  Third, Global NAPs contends that the Commission 
lacked authority to declare the Second ISP Tariff void ab 
initio.16  Fourth, Global NAPs maintains that Verizon lacks 
standing to pursue this complaint, because it failed to pay 
Global NAPs' bills.17  Finally, Global NAPs claims that the 
Commission violated its own rules and Global NAPs' due process 
rights by basing its decision, in part, on a legal theory not 
raised by Verizon.18 

The Petition also suggested that Global NAPs should have an 
opportunity to submit evidence and argument regarding whether the 
parties had understood that their interconnection agreements 
alone would govern the issue of compensation for the delivery of 
ISP-bound traffic.19  Commission staff granted Global NAPs that 
opportunity,20 whereupon Global NAPs submitted an affidavit, 
twelve exhibits, and supplemental briefing.21

For the reasons discussed below, we reject all of Global NAPs' 
arguments and deny its petition for reconsideration.  At bottom, 
what the D.C. Circuit said about Global NAPs' First ISP Tariff 
applies equally well to Global NAPs' Second ISP Tariff:  ``That 
GNAPs sought to game the existing rules, and lost, does not mean 
the FCC was arbitrary and capricious in its application of its 
own rules.''22

                      III.      DISCUSSION

     III.A.    The Commission Did Not Err in Concluding That the 
          Parties Understood That Their Interconnection 
          Agreements Alone Would Govern Whether They Were 
          Entitled to Compensation for the Delivery of ISP-bound 
          Traffic.

The only new evidence proffered by Global NAPs in support of its 
Petition relates to the Commission's conclusion that the parties 
understood that their interconnection agreements alone would 
govern whether they were entitled to compensation for the 
delivery of ISP-bound traffic.  Global NAPs argues that this 
conclusion lacks factual support in the record, contradicts the 
interconnection agreements themselves, and violates the Filed 
Tariff Doctrine.23  To support these arguments, Global NAPs 
submitted additional evidence in the form of an affidavit from 
William J. Rooney, Global NAPs' General Counsel and chief 
interconnection agreement negotiator, and correspondence between 
the parties.24  In his affidavit, Mr. Rooney attests that there 
was no separate understanding between the parties about the 
filing of federal tariffs,25 and that in entering into the 
interconnection agreements, he did not understand that Global 
NAPs was waiving any rights.26  Mr. Rooney further opines that 
the integration clause in the interconnection agreements 
precludes the Commission from looking beyond the contract 
language,27 and that such language expressly preserves Global 
NAPs' right to file a federal tariff imposing charges for the 
delivery of ISP-bound traffic.28  Global NAPs maintains, 
therefore, that the Commission erred in concluding that, by 
filing the Second ISP Tariff, Global NAPs acted unreasonably 
under section 201(b), thereby voiding the Tariff ab initio.  For 
the following reasons, we disagree.

First, the Petition does not challenge the validity of the facts 
on which the Order concluded ``that the parties agreed and 
understood that their interconnection agreements alone would 
decide the question of inter-carrier compensation for the 
delivery of ISP-bound traffic.''29  In particular, although 
Global NAPs knew that Verizon interpreted its pre-existing 
interconnection agreements with other carriers in Massachusetts 
and New Jersey as not requiring compensation for the delivery of 
ISP-bound traffic, Global NAPs chose to opt into those agreements 
rather than negotiate different agreements with Verizon.30  In 
other words, rather than reaching its own agreement with Verizon 
on the question of compensation for the delivery of ISP-bound 
traffic, Global NAPs opted into arguably ambiguous preexisting 
interconnection agreements between Verizon and other carriers 
that did not have any language explicitly addressing the ISP-
bound traffic issue.31  Global NAPs then chose, pursuant to 
sections 251 and 252 of the Act, to have the Massachusetts and 
New Jersey commissions decide the issue under the terms of the 
preexisting agreements.  Global NAPs vigorously maintained in 
these state proceedings that (i) the interconnection agreements 
addressed the issue of compensation for the delivery of ISP-bound 
traffic, and (ii) the agreements required compensation for such 
delivery.32  Indeed, Global NAPs continues to maintain this 
position today in its appeals of the Massachusetts and New Jersey 
proceedings.33  Finally, Global NAPS did not file its First ISP 
Tariff until 24 months after opting into the Massachusetts 
agreement and seven months after opting into the New Jersey 
agreement.34  We continue to believe that these uncontested facts 
strongly support the Order's conclusion that the parties 
understood their interconnection agreements to be the exclusive 
source of compensation rights for the delivery of ISP-bound 
traffic.  Thus, these facts also support the Order's holding 
that, ``when the Massachusetts DTE and New Jersey Board of Public 
Utilities found that Global NAPs' interconnection agreements with 
Verizon did not require compensation for such traffic, it was 
unjust and unreasonable for Global NAPs in the particular 
circumstances here to attempt to use this Commission's tariff 
system to impose a separate compensation regime of its own.''35  

Contrary to Global NAPs' contentions, we find that the additional 
evidence it submitted only reinforces the Order's conclusions.  
Indeed, some of this evidence even highlights, in our view, that 
the filing of Global NAPs' Second ISP Tariff was merely a 
continuation of its prior failed effort to ``game'' the system in 
which it voluntarily participated.36   

Before we examine Global NAPs' supplemental evidence in detail, 
we note that our authority to evaluate whether Global NAPs' 
conduct was unjust and unreasonable under section 201(b) is not 
limited to a narrow application of contract law principles.37  
Consequently, our evaluation of the facts and circumstances in 
this case properly entails a broader assessment of the justness 
and reasonableness of Global NAPs' conduct.

Global NAPs points out that the interconnection agreements 
contain ``integration'' clauses, which, according to Global NAPs, 
preclude the Commission from relying on any exogenous 
understanding between the parties regarding the agreements' 
scope.38  We do not believe that the integration clauses restrain 
our section 201(b) analysis in that manner, because the 
interconnection agreements simply do not expressly address the 
propriety of filing a federal tariff for the delivery of ISP-
bound traffic.  Therefore, the understanding found in the Order 
does not conflict with any provision of the Agreements.

Global NAPs further contends that the interconnection agreements 
do, in fact, expressly preserve its right to file a federal 
tariff regarding compensation for the delivery of ISP-bound 
traffic.39  Specifically, Global NAPs contends that, if ISP-bound 
traffic is not ``local'' traffic covered by the reciprocal 
compensation terms of its interconnection agreements, then it is 
a species of switched access traffic, which its interconnection 
agreements ``expressly and unambiguously defer[s] to any 
applicable tariffs.''40  Although read in isolation the 
applicable provisions of the interconnection agreements may seem 
to mean what Global NAPs contends, we cannot conclude that Global 
NAPs' construction of the agreements is tenable and that the 
interconnection agreements are express and unambiguous.  In this 
regard, we note that the relevant language refers to switched 
access traffic, yet the interconnection agreements do not 
expressly identify ISP-bound traffic as a species of switched 
access traffic and the Commission has not expressly identified 
ISP-bound traffic as switched access traffic.  In addition, 
Global NAPs' conduct, as described above41 belies its proferred 
interpretation.  Indeed, had Global NAPs truly believed all along 
that it had a right under the interconnection agreements to file 
a federal tariff charging for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic, 
it surely would have done so immediately, rather than waiting 
many months (and years, in the case of Massachusetts).  Global 
NAPs has shown itself to be an extremely aggressive defender of 
its alleged rights,42 so Global NAPs' tardiness in exercising 
this supposed ``right'' speaks volumes.  Consequently, this 
argument does not alter our interpretation of the facts and 
circumstances in this record and our conclusion.

In addition, according to Global NAPs' own evidence, in executing 
the Massachusetts agreement, Rooney stated in writing: ``I 
understand that my client [Global NAPs] will be treated like all 
other carriers on this issue [reciprocal compensation for the 
delivery of ISP-bound traffic].''43  As far as this record shows, 
no other carrier with which Verizon had a similar interconnection 
agreement has filed a federal tariff charging for the delivery of 
ISP-bound traffic.  Furthermore, the record reflects that Verizon 
has not paid compensation for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic 
to any other carrier in Massachusetts or New Jersey having a 
similar agreement.44  Moreover, Verizon has not requested 
compensation for terminating ISP-bound traffic in the manner 
sought by Global NAPs.45  In sum, Global NAPs expressly agreed 
that it would be treated the same as all other similarly situated 
carriers, and no such carrier received compensation for the 
delivery of ISP-bound traffic or filed a federal tariff seeking 
to obtain such compensation.  Accordingly, we do not believe that 
the interconnection agreements themselves allowed Global NAPs to 
file the Second ISP Tariff.46

Finally, we do not find that the Rooney Affidavit's other 
assertions and conclusions undermine the Order, given all of the 
undisputed facts described above.  Mr. Rooney's affidavit 
generally restates the factual record and provides little, if 
any, new or additional factual evidence from that previously 
introduced.  His affidavit primarily reflects his subjective 
opinions and characterization of the factual record, while 
arguing for the Commission to adopt a different methodology than 
it did in analyzing the facts.47  Thus, we find Mr. Rooney's 
characterization and subjective view of the facts unavailing.48

To summarize, the Petition does not convince us that the 
Commission erred in concluding that the parties understood that 
their interconnection agreements alone would govern the issue of 
compensation for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic. Consequently, 
we reject the Petition's contention that this conclusion failed 
to support the Commission's decision to void the Second ISP 
Tariff ab initio as violative of section 201(b).49 

     III.B.    The Commission Did Not Err in Concluding That the 
          Challenged Tariff Provisions Are Unlawfully 
          Indeterminate.

Under Global NAPs' Second ISP Tariff, a carrier is charged 
whenever it delivers traffic to Global NAPs for further delivery 
to an ISP, unless the originating carrier has already made 
``Alternative Payments.''50  These ``Alternative Payments'' for 
the termination of ISP-bound calls must occur under two 
scenarios:  (1) where the LEC (and presumably Global NAPs) 
``treats'' the ISP-bound traffic as local; or (2) where ``state 
regulators ... direct other payment arrangements ....''51 

The Order concludes that these Tariff provisions are unlawfully 
indeterminate under section 201(b) of the Act and section 61.2 of 
the Commission's rules, because a carrier cannot discern from the 
face of these provisions whether it has incurred any charges 
thereunder.52  In particular, under the ``Alternative Payments'' 
language of the Tariff, a carrier must first determine whether it 
has made any payments to Global NAPs, and, if so, it then must 
attempt to determine whether the payment was for the delivery of 
ISP-bound traffic and whether it occurred pursuant to an 
interconnection agreement, a state-directed payment arrangement, 
or some other scenario.  Thus, it is unlawfully impossible to 
determine, from the face of the Second ISP Tariff, whether the 
Tariff requires payment for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic.

Global NAPS challenges this conclusion, but in doing so offers no 
new arguments or evidence.  Reconsideration is appropriate only 
where the petitioner either shows a material error or omission in 
the original order or raises additional facts not known or 
existing until after the petitioner's last opportunity to present 
such matters.53  The Global NAPs Petition fails to satisfy either 
requirement.  For this reason alone, we deny the Petition's 
arguments regarding the Tariff's ambiguity. 

Moreover, the Order's conclusion that the Second ISP Tariff is 
unlawfully indeterminate is supported by the D.C. Circuit's 
subsequent affirmance of the Commission's conclusion in Global 
NAPs I that Global NAPs' First ISP Tariff was unlawfully 
indeterminate.54  Although different wording is used, we construe 
the relevant language in the Second ISP Tariff to mean 
essentially the same things as the unlawful language in the First 
ISP Tariff:  in order to determine whether the Second ISP Tariff 
requires payment for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic, a carrier 
would have to (1) consult its checkbook, and (2) consult its 
interconnection agreement to determine if payment was made 
pursuant to that agreement, and (3) consult any relevant state 
commission decisions to determine if payment was made pursuant 
thereto.55  In other words, as the D.C. Circuit stated regarding 
the First ISP Tariff, ``[a]ny reasonable construction of the 
tariff's language would require a customer to consult the 
interconnection agreement to determine whether the tariff 
applied.''56  This violates our rule prohibiting fundamental 
facial ambiguity.

The D.C. Circuit's affirmance of Global NAPs I further supports 
the Commission's conclusion invalidating the Second ISP Tariff on 
other grounds not previously noted in the Order.  In Global NAPs 
I, the Commission held, inter alia, that ``any federal tariff 
purporting to govern inter-carrier compensation for ISP-bound 
traffic could be reasonable only if it mirrors any applicable 
terms of the parties' interconnection agreement ....''57  Based 
upon this rationale, the Commission concluded that Global NAPs' 
First ISP Tariff was unjust and unreasonable, inter alia, because 
it purported to require payment for the delivery of ISP-bound 
traffic even when an applicable interconnection agreement 
required no such payment, e.g., a bill and keep arrangement.58  
We find that Global NAPs' Second ISP Tariff suffers from this 
same fatality, because it purports to require compensation for 
the delivery of ISP-bound traffic even when an applicable 
interconnection agreement requires the contrary.59  Consequently, 
we deny Global NAPs' request for reconsideration for this reason, 
as well.

     III.C.    The Commission  Did Not  Err By  Invalidating  the 
          Second ISP Tariff Ab Initio.

Global NAPs argues that the Commission exceeded its authority by 
voiding the Second ISP Tariff ab initio, which also led the 
Commission erroneously (i) to overlook Verizon's lack of standing 
and (ii) to fail to determine a reasonable reciprocal 
compensation rate.60  Global NAPs simply rehashes its prior 
arguments on these issues, and does not raise any new arguments 
or offer any new evidence.  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has 
squarely rejected these very same arguments.61  Thus, we deny 
Global NAPs' request for reconsideration of these issues.  

Global NAPS also argues that the Filed Rate Doctrine precludes us 
from rendering its filing of the Second ISP Tariff unlawful based 
on a pre-existing understanding between the parties.62  In making 
this argument, Global NAPs simply rehashes its prior arguments on 
this issue in support of its Petition, without offering anything 
new to demonstrate a material error or omission in the original 
order. For this reason alone, we deny the Petition's arguments 
regarding the Filed Rate Doctrine.  Moreover, contrary to Global 
NAPs' argument, the Filed Rate Doctrine does not insulate tariffs 
from legal challenges under section 201(b).63   As the Order 
explained, "it is well established that the rates and practices 
carriers seek to shelter pursuant to the Filed Rate Doctrine are 
always subject to an inquiry into their reasonableness."64  
Therefore, for all of the reasons previously stated above and in 
the Order, we reject Global NAPs' Filed Rate Doctrine argument.

     III.D.    The Commission Did Not Violate Global NAPs' Due 
          Process Rights.

Global NAPs argues that the Order violated the Commission's own 
rules and, consequently, Global NAPs' due process rights, because 
``[t]he question whether Global NAPs contracted away its right to 
be paid for ISP-bound calls - under any theory - was never raised 
or briefed by the parties.''65   Global NAPs maintains, in other 
words, that the Commission cannot base its holding in a section 
208 proceeding on a legal theory not specifically advanced by the 
complainant.

Global NAPs' contention lacks merit, for several reasons.  First, 
the D.C. Circuit has squarely held that the Commission can base 
its holding in a section 208 proceeding on a legal theory not 
specifically advanced by the complainant, where the defendant has 
a fair opportunity to address the theory on reconsideration.66  
Here, during the reconsideration phase of this proceeding, 
Commission staff afforded Global NAPs ample opportunity to 
provide evidence and argument regarding the parties' 
understanding of the interconnection agreements' scope; and 
Global NAPs took full advantage of that opportunity. 67  
Moreover, as explained at length in the Global NAPs I Recon 
Order, the Commission has discretion to consider an argument not 
raised by the parties, if such consideration is necessary to 
decide a complaint correctly.68  In any event, Verizon did, in 
fact, raise arguments regarding the scope and effect of the 
interconnection agreements that fairly resemble, if not precisely 
mirror, the arguments on which the Order relies.69  Accordingly, 
we reject the contention that the Order violated Global NAPs' due 
process rights.

                         IV.  CONCLUSION

Having found, and been upheld in our determination, that Global 
NAPs must lose in its first attempt to ``game'' the system in 
which it voluntarily participated, we find that the Petition 
fails to demonstrate why Global NAPs' second attempt should fare 
any better.  Consequently, for all of the reasons stated above 
and in the Order, we deny the Petition.

                      V.   ORDERING CLAUSE

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 
4(j), 201(b), 203(c), 208, and 405 of the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201(b), 
203(c), 208, 405, and section 1.106 of the Commission's rules, 47 
C.F.R. § 1.106, that the Petition for Reconsideration filed by 
Global NAPs, Inc. IS DENIED. 

                         FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION



                         Marlene H. Dortch
                         Secretary
_________________________

1    Petition for  Reconsideration of  Global NAPs,  Inc.,  Bell 
Atlantic-Delaware, et al. v. Global NAPs, Inc., File No.  EB-00-
MD-009 (filed Nov. 27, 2000) (Global NAPs Petition or Petition).  
See 47 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 1.106.

2    Bell  Atlantic-Delaware,  et  al.  v.  Global  NAPs,  Inc., 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 00-383, 2000 WL 1593346  (rel. 
Oct. 26, 2000) (Order). 

3    After  commencement  of  this  proceeding,  Bell   Atlantic 
Corporation changed  its name  to Verizon  Communications,  Inc.  
Thus, the former Bell Atlantic entities named in the caption are 
collectively referred to herein as ``Verizon.''

4    47 U.S.C. § 208.

5    47 U.S.C. § 201(b).

6    Bell-Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., et al. v. Global NAPs,  Inc., 
Memorandum Opinion and  Order, 15 FCC  Rcd 12946 (1999)  (Global 
NAPs I), recon denied, Order on Reconsideration, 15 FCC Rcd 5997 
(2000) (Global NAPs I Recon Order), aff'd sub nom., Global NAPs, 
Inc. v. FCC, 247  F.3d 252 (D.C. Cir.  2001), cert. denied,  122 
S.Ct. 808 (2002).

7    See Global NAPs I Recon Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 5998, ¶ 2  and 
n.6; Order, 2000 WL 1593346 at ¶¶ 2-8.

8    See Global NAPs I, 15 FCC  Rcd at 12947-55; Order, 2000  WL 
1593346 at ¶¶ 2-8.

9    47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52.

10   In this context,  ``ISP-bound traffic''  consists of  calls 
made by customers of  Verizon to customers  of Global NAPs  that 
are Internet Service Providers.

11   Order, 2000 WL 1593346 at ¶¶ 10-21.

12   47 C.F.R. § 61.2.  

13   Order, 2000 WL 1593346 at ¶¶ 22-25.

14   Global NAPs Petition  at 8-17;  Reply Brief  in Support  of 
Petition for Reconsideration, Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al.  v. 
Global NAPs, Inc., File No.  EB-00-MD-009 (filed Dec. 14,  2000) 
(Global NAPs  Reply Brief)  at 1;  Supplemental Reply  Brief  of 
Global NAPs,  Inc., Bell  Atlantic-Delaware,  et al.  v.  Global 
NAPs, Inc., File No. EB-00-MD-009  (filed June 8, 2001)  (Global 
NAPs Supplemental Reply Brief) at 2-3; Supplemental Reply  Brief 
of Global NAPs, Inc., Bell  Atlantic-Delaware, et al. v.  Global 
NAPs, Inc., File No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed Nov. 13, 2001)  (Global 
NAPs Second Supplemental Reply Brief) at 1-3.

15   Global NAPs Petition at 17-19.  See Global NAPs Reply Brief 
at 2, 5-6.

16   Global NAPs Petition at 22-24.  See Global NAPs Reply Brief 
at 2-5.

17   Global NAPs Petition at 19-24.  See Global NAPs Reply Brief 
at 4.

18   Global NAPs Petition at 5-8.   See Global NAPs Reply  Brief 
at 6-9.

19   Global NAPs Petition at 8 and 11 n.14.

20   Letter from William H. Davenport, Attorney, Market Disputes 
Resolution  Division,  Enforcement  Bureau,  to  Christopher  W. 
Savage, Counsel for Global NAPs,  and Lawrence W. Katz,  Counsel 
for Verizon,  Bell Atlantic-Delaware,  Inc.,  et al.  v.  Global 
NAPs, Inc., File  No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed  May 2, 2001);  Letter 
from  Anthony   J.   DeLaurentis,  Attorney,   Market   Disputes 
Resolution  Division,  Enforcement  Bureau,  to  Christopher  W. 
Savage, Counsel for Global NAPs,  and Lawrence W. Katz,  Counsel 
for Verizon,  Bell Atlantic-Delaware,  Inc.,  et al.  v.  Global 
NAPs, Inc., File No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed Sept. 18, 2001); Letter 
from  Anthony   J.   DeLaurentis,  Attorney,   Market   Disputes 
Resolution  Division,  Enforcement  Bureau,  to  Christopher  W. 
Savage, Counsel for Global NAPs,  and Lawrence W. Katz,  Counsel 
for Verizon,  Bell Atlantic-Delaware,  Inc.,  et al.  v.  Global 
NAPs, Inc., File No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed Sept. 19, 2001); Letter 
from  Anthony   J.   DeLaurentis,  Attorney,   Market   Disputes 
Resolution  Division,  Enforcement  Bureau,  to  Christopher  W. 
Savage, Counsel for Global NAPs,  and Lawrence W. Katz,  Counsel 
for Verizon,  Bell Atlantic-Delaware,  Inc.,  et al.  v.  Global 
NAPs, Inc., File No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed Oct. 3, 2001).

21   Supplemental Brief  of Global  NAPs, Inc.,  Bell  Atlantic-
Delaware, et al.  v. Global  NAPs, Inc.,  File No.  EB-00-MD-009 
(filed May. 25, 2001)  (Global NAPS Supplemental Brief);  Global 
NAPs Supplemental  Reply  Brief; Supplemental  Brief  of  Global 
NAPs, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al. v. Global NAPs, Inc., 
File No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed Oct.  5, 2001) (Global NAPs  Second 
Supplemental  Brief);  Global  NAPs  Second  Supplemental  Reply 
Brief.

22   Global NAPs v. FCC, 247 F.3d at 257.

23   See Global NAPs  Petition at  8-17.  See  also Global  NAPs 
Reply Brief at 1, 5; Global NAPs Second Supplemental Brief at 3-
4; Global NAPs Second Supplemental Reply Brief at 1-3.

24   See Global  NAPs  Second  Supplemental  Brief,  Attachment, 
Affidavit of William J.  Rooney (Rooney Affidavit).  The  Rooney 
Affidavit  attaches  12   documents  reflecting   correspondence 
between the parties during the relevant timeframe.

25   See Rooney Affidavit at ¶ 3.

26   Id. at ¶ 13.

27   Rooney Affidavit at ¶ 12.

28   Id. at ¶ 15.  

29   Order, 2000 WL 1593346 at ¶ 12.

30   Order, 2000 WL 1593346 at ¶ 13.

31   Id.

32   Id.

33   See Order, 2000 WL 1593346, at ¶ 13, n.31.

34   Global NAPs sought to enter into interconnection agreements 
in Massachusetts and  New Jersey  in April 1997  and June  1998, 
respectively, but did not file its First ISP Tariff until  April 
1999.  See Global  NAPs I, 15  FCC Rcd at  12947, 12951;  Order, 
2000 WL 1953346 at 4-5.

35   Order, 2000 WL 1593346 at ¶ 14.

36   See, e.g., Global NAPs v. FCC, 247 F.3d at 260.

37   See, e.g., id.  at 258;  Hi-Tech Furnace  Systems, Inc.  v. 
FCC, 224  F.3d 781,  793 (D.C.  Cir. 2000)(although  factors  in 
evaluating  tariff   revisions   may   resemble   contract   law 
principles, ``they are not intended to replicate a contract  law 
analysis''); Cahnman v.  Sprint Corporation, 133  F.3d 484,  488 
(7th Cir.  1998)(FCC uses  the  principle of  reasonableness  to 
determine the validity of a tariff when it is challenged).  

38   See Petition at 9-10.

39   See Petition at 10-13.  

40   See Petition at 10-11.  Specifically, Global NAPs references 
a provision of the Massachusetts' interconnection agreement that 
states: ``All Switched Exchange Access Service and all IntraLATA 
Toll Traffic shall continue to be governed by the terms and 
conditions of the applicable federal and state tariffs,'' 
Massachusetts Agreement at ¶ 5.7.3, and provisions in the New 
Jersey Agreement that state: ``All Switched Exchange Access 
Service and all Toll Traffic shall continue to be governed by the 
terms and conditions of the applicable federal and state 
tariffs,'' New Jersey Agreement at ¶ 5.7.3, and ``Compensation 
for the transport and termination of traffic not specifically 
addressed in this section 5.7 shall be as provided elsewhere in 
this Agreement, or if not so provided, as required by the Tariffs 
of the Party transporting and/or terminating the traffic'' New 
Jersey Agreement at ¶ 5.7.

41   See ¶ 11, supra.

42   See Global NAPs, Inc. Petition to Intervene, In MCI WorldCom 
Technologies, Inc., D.T.E. 97-116 (Mass. D.T.E. filed Mar. 4, 
1999); Complaint of Global NAPs, Inc. against New England 
Telephone and Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic 
Massachusetts, DTE 99-39 (Mass. D.T.E. filed Apr. 16, 1999); 
Pleading Cycle Established for Comments on Global NAPs South, 
Inc. Petition for Preemption of the Jurisdiction of the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Regarding Interconnection 
Dispute with Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Public Notice, DA 99-
900, 14 FCC Rcd 7412 (rel. May 13, 1999); Global NAPs Petition 
for Preemption of the Jurisdiction of the Virginia State 
Corporation Commission Regarding Interconnection Dispute with 
Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 
23318 (1999); Global NAPs Petition for Preemption of the 
Jurisdiction of the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities 
Regarding Interconnection Dispute with Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 12530 (1999); Global 
NAPs Petition for Preemption of the Jurisdiction of the 
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy 
Regarding Interconnection Dispute with New England Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 4943 
(2000); Global NAPs Petition for Preemption of the Jurisdiction 
of the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy 
Regarding Interconnection Dispute with New England Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, Order on Review, 16 FCC Rcd. 4976 (2001); 
Global NAPs, Inc. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., et al., CA No. 
00-CV-10407-RCL (D. Mass. 2000); Global NAPs, Inc. v. New England 
Tel. & Tel. Co., et al., CA No. 00-CV-10502-RCL (D. Mass. 2000); 
Global NAPs, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., Civ. No. 99-
4074 (JAG) (D.N.J. filed Aug. 26, 1999); Petition for Review, 
Global NAPs, Inc. v. FCC, Case No. 01-1192 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 
20, 2001).

43   Global NAPs Second Supplemental Brief, Attachment -  Letter 
dated April 15, 1997 from William J. Rooney, Counsel for  Global 
NAPs to Bruce P. Beausejour, Counsel for Verizon.  Rooney  wrote 
this statement in response to a letter from Verizon that stated, 
in pertinent part: ``Global NAPs would thereafter be treated  in 
the same  manner  with  respect to  the  payment  of  reciprocal 
compensation for traffic that  terminates to Internet  providers 
as will other  carriers having  similar agreements,  and in  the 
same manner as Verizon will request compensation for terminating 
such  traffic   of  other   carriers.''   Global   NAPs   Second 
Supplemental Brief,  Attachment -  Letter dated  April 14,  1997 
from Bruce P.  Beausejour, Counsel  for Verizon,  to William  J. 
Rooney, Counsel for Global NAPs.

44   See Second  Supplemental Brief  of Verizon  Communications, 
Inc., Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al. v. Global NAPs, Inc.,  File 
No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed Oct. 29, 2001), at 12.

45   Id.

46   The New Jersey BPU  apparently shares our  view of the  New 
Jersey interconnection agreement.  In ruling that the  agreement 
did not  require  Verizon  to compensate  Global  NAPs  for  the 
delivery of ISP-bound traffic, the New Jersey BPU remarked  that 
it  expected  Global   NAPs  in  the   future  to  obtain   such 
compensation -  not from  Verizon  via a  federal tariff  -  but 
rather from its  own end-user customers,  including ISPs, via  a 
state tariff  (or  perhaps  contract).  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of   Global  NAPs,   Inc.  for   the  Arbitration   of 
Interconnection   Rates,   Terms,    Conditions   and    Related 
Arrangements with  Bell Atlantic-New  Jersey, Inc.  Pursuant  to 
Section 252(b) of the  Telecommunications Act of 1996,  Decision 
and Order of the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (rel. July 
7, 1999), at 11.  See Formal Complaint, Bell  Atlantic-Delaware, 
et al. v. Global NAPs,  Inc., File No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed  June 
1, 2000) (Verizon Formal Complaint) at Attachment J.

47     Compare Rooney Affidavit at ¶¶ 5-6, 13-15 with Chronology 
of Events, Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al. v. Global NAPs, Inc., 
File No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed Aug. 11, 1999), and Joint Statement 
of Stipulated Facts, and Key Legal Issues Pursuant to Section 
1.732(h) and Joint Statement Pursuant to Section 1.733(7)(b)(2), 
Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al. v. Global NAPs, Inc., File No. EB-
00-MD-009 (filed June 27, 2000) at 1-13.

48   Global NAPs also argues that we should reconsider the Order 
because    its    underlying    policy    preference    favoring 
interconnection agreements as  the context in  which to  address 
compensation  for  ISP-bound   traffic  was   rejected  in   the 
Commission's subsequent  ISP  Remand  Order.   See  Global  NAPs 
Supplemental Brief at 2-4; Global NAPs Supplemental Reply  Brief 
at 1-2; Global  NAPs Second  Supplemental Brief  at 2-3;  Global 
NAPs Second Supplemental Reply Brief at 4-5.  Contrary to Global 
NAPs' contention, however,  the Order  was not  premised upon  a 
policy  preference  that   interconnection  agreements   address 
compensation for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic.  Rather, the 
Order found  that  Global  NAPs'  conduct  in  filing  a  tariff 
contradictory to  its  prior  understanding  that  the  parties' 
interconnection agreements alone  would govern  the question  of 
compensation for ISP-bound traffic was unjust and  unreasonable.  
The Order states that ``[i]t would be unjust and unreasonable to 
allow the issue  of inter-carrier compensation  for delivery  of 
ISP-bound traffic to be subject to one outcome under a carrier's 
interconnection agreements  and another  pursuant to  a  federal 
tariff.'' Order, 2000 WL  1593346 at ¶ 15.   Nothing in the  ISP 
Remand Order alters this conclusion.

49     Global NAPs further argues that the Commission's Order 
erroneously assumes that section 203 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 203, 
does not require or even permit Global NAPs to file a federal 
tariff imposing charges for delivering ISP-bound traffic.  Global 
NAPs Second Supplemental Reply at 4.  This argument misses the 
mark, however, as the Order does not make any determination 
regarding whether section 203 required or permitted Global NAPs 
to file the Second ISP-Tariff.  Rather, the Order simply assumes 
that section 203 allowed Global NAPs to file the Tariff, but 
holds, nevertheless, that the Tariff was void ab initio under 
section 201(b) because it conflicts with the parties' 
understanding with respect to compensation for the delivery of 
ISP-bound traffic.  See Order, 2000 WL 1593346 at 14; see also 
Global NAPs I, 12 FCC Rcd at 12958.  Consequently, Global NAPs' 
argument about section 203 does not alter the Commission's 
conclusions.

50   Second ISP Tariff at 82, Section 7.2, Verizon Formal 
Complaint at Attachment A.

51   Id.

52   Order, 2000 WL 1593346  at ¶¶ 22-25.   Section 61.2 of  the 
Commission's rules provides, in  pertinent part:  ``In order  to 
remove all  doubt as  to their  proper application,  all  tariff 
publications  must  contain   clear  and  explicit   explanatory 
statements regarding the rates  and regulations.''  47 C.F.R.  § 
61.2.

53   See, e.g., WWIZ,  Inc., 37  FCC 685, 686,  aff'd sub  nom., 
Lorrain Journal  Co., v.  FCC, 351  F.2d 824  (D.C. Cir.  1965), 
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966); 47 C.F.R. § 1.106.

54   Global NAPs v. FCC, 247 F.3d at 258.

55   See Order,  2000 WL  1593346, ¶  23 and  n.57 (``Mere  ipse 
dixit statements that  a tariff  is self-contained,  ... do  not 
eliminate  the  references   to  voluntary  and   state-directed 
`arrangements.''').  See also, id. at ¶ 24.

56   Global NAPs v. FCC, 247 F.3d at 258.

57   Global NAPs I, 15 FCC Rcd at 12959, ¶ 23.

58   Id.

59   See Global NAPs I, 15 FCC Rcd 15 12959, ¶ 23.

60   See Global NAPs Petition at 19-24; Global NAPs Reply at  2-
4; Global NAPs  Supplemental Brief  at 4-5;  Global NAPs  Second 
Supplemental Reply Brief at 4-5.

61   Global NAPs v. FCC, 247 F.3d at 259-60.

62   See Global NAPs Petition at 14-17; Global NAPs Reply at  4-
5; Global NAPs Second Supplemental Brief at 3-4.

63   Order, 2000 WL  1593346 at  ¶¶ 19-21.   The only  authority 
cited by Global NAPs merely  holds that claims brought in  court 
pursuant to state  law concerning matters  covered in a  federal 
tariff are  barred  by the  Filed  Rate Doctrine.   Global  NAPs 
Petition at  15, n.17  (citing Fax  Telecommunications, Inc.  v. 
AT&T, 138 F.3d 479  (2nd Cir. 1998)).   That authority does  not 
hold that claims brought at  the Commission pursuant to  section 
201(b) of the Act are so barred.

64   Order, 2000 WL 1593346 at ¶ 20.

65   Global NAPs  Petition at  2; see  id. at  5-8; Global  NAPs 
Reply Brief at 1, 6-9;  Global NAPs Supplemental Reply Brief  at 
2-3; Global NAPs  Second Supplemental  Brief at  3; Global  NAPs 
Second Supplemental Reply Brief at 1-2.

66   Global NAPs v. FCC, 247 F.3d at 257.

67   See note  \* MERGEFORMAT 21, supra. 

68   Global NAPs I Recon Order, 15  FCC Rcd at 5999-6002, ¶¶  6-
12.   The  D.C.  Circuit  did  not  reach  this  aspect  of  the 
Commission's decision.

69   Verizon Formal Complaint  at 6, 10-12,  ¶¶ 10, 17-20.   See 
Complainants Initial Brief, Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc. et  al. 
v. Global NAPs, Inc. File No. EB-00-MD-009 (filed July 28, 2000) 
at 5; Bell Atlantic's Brief  on Non-Cost Issues, Bell  Atlantic-
Delaware, Inc.  et al.  v. Global  NAPs, Inc.  File No.  E-99-22 
(filed Sept. 2,  1998) at  10-12; Bell Atlantic  Reply Brief  on 
Non-Cost Issues, Bell Atlantic-Delaware,  Inc. et al. v.  Global 
NAPs, Inc. File No. E-99-22 (filed Sept. 15, 1999) at 3-7.