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Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matters of )
)
AT&T Corp., )
Com- ) EB-01-MD-001
plainant, )
v. )
)
Business Telecom, Inc., )
De- )
fendant. )
)
)
Sprint Communications Company, ) EB-01-MD-002
L.P., )
Com- )
plainant, )
)
v.

Business Telecom, Inc.,
De-
fendant.

ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

Adopted: September 27, 2001 Released: September 27,

2001

By the Commission: Commissioner Martin dissenting and issuing a
separate statement.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this Order on Reconsideration, we dismiss the Joint Petition
for Reconsideration1 of our Memorandum Opinion and Order in AT&T
Corp. and Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Business Telecom,
Inc.2 The Petition was filed by five competitive local exchange
carriers (``CLECs'') and a CLEC trade association, none of which
was a party to the complaint proceedings resolved by the BTI
Order.3 As explained below, we dismiss the Petition because
Petitioners have failed to satisfy the two requirements for non-
parties to seek reconsideration of a Commission order in an
adjudicatory proceeding.4

II. BACKGROUND

In the BTI Order, the Commission partially granted formal
complaints filed by AT&T Corp. (``AT&T'') and Sprint
Communications Company, L.P. (``Sprint'') against Business
Telecom, Inc. (``BTI''), a CLEC, pursuant to section 208 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (``Act'')5 and a primary
jurisdiction referral from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia.6 The Commission held, inter
alia, that BTI's access rates during the relevant period were
unjustly and unreasonably high, in violation of section 201(b) of
the Act.7 Moreover, in order to permit the court to calculate
the damages caused by BTI's violation of section 201(b), the
Commission determined what access rates would have been just and
reasonable during the relevant period.8

None of the parties filed petitions for reconsideration of the
BTI Order. Instead, each of them filed a petition for review of
the BTI Order in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.9

Petitioners argue that they have standing to seek reconsideration
of the BTI Order under section 1.106 of our rules, because (1)
certain interexchange carriers (``IXCs'') have stated to certain
of the Petitioners that the IXCs may attempt to use the BTI Order
as precedent in future complaints concerning the reasonableness
of the Petitioners' access rates;10 and (2) Petitioners had no
reason to believe that the Commission might reach a result in the
BTI Order that was adverse to their economic interests.11

III. DISCUSSION

In order to seek reconsideration of a Commission order in an
adjudicatory proceeding to which it was not a party, a petitioner
must demonstrate that (1) the petitioner's ``interests are
adversely affected'' by the order, and (2) the petitioner has
``good reason why it was not possible for [the petitioner] to
participate in the earlier stages of the proceeding.''12 For the
reasons explained below, we conclude that Petitioners have failed
to demonstrate that they meet either of those requirements.

III.A. Petitioners Have Not Demonstrated That the BTI
Order ``Adversely Affects'' Them Within the Meaning of
Section 405(a) of the Act and Section 1.106 of the
Commission's Rules.

Petitioners allege that the BTI Order ``adversely affects'' them
within the meaning of section 405(a) of the Act and section 1.106
of the Commission's Rules, solely because certain IXCs have
stated that they may attempt to use the BTI Order as precedent in
future complaints concerning the reasonableness of the
Petitioners' access rates.13 We disagree.

Petitioners have not directed us to any Commission or court case
law suggesting that the precedential value of an adjudicatory
order in a section 208 complaint proceeding can ``adversely
affect'' a non-party to the adjudication within the meaning of
section 405(a) of the Act and section 1.106 of the Commission's
rules. Although the Commission has not previously addressed this
issue in a section 208 complaint proceeding, in construing the
phrase ``adversely affected'' in other adjudicatory proceedings,
the Commission has required a far more direct and concrete
interest in the proceeding than that stated by Petitioners.14 In
adjudicatory licensing proceedings, for example, the Commission
has applied the same test that courts employ in determining
whether a person has standing under Article III to appeal a court
order: the person must show (1) a personal injury ``in fact'';
(2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and (3) that it is likely, not merely speculative, that the
requested relief will redress the injury.15 Applying that test
in the Article III standing context, courts have consistently
held that the mere precedential effect of an adjudicatory order
within an agency is not enough to confer standing.16 Indeed, as
the D.C. Circuit has stated, ``we have said before, and we say
again, that the mere precedential effect of [an] agency's
rationale in later adjudications is not an injury sufficient to
confer standing on someone seeking judicial review of the
agency's ruling.''17 In accordance with those decisions, the
Common Carrier Bureau has held that the adverse impact of a
Commission action on a person's litigation strategy in another
Commission proceeding does not meet the ``adversely affected''
test.18 Moreover, to grant non-party requests to reconsider
Commission adjudicatory orders based upon the limited interest
asserted by Petitioners here would open the ``floodgates'' to
non-party participation in adjudicatory proceedings, and thus
effectively convert every adjudicatory proceeding into a
rulemaking proceeding.19 Thus, we conclude that Petitioners have
not shown that the BTI Order adversely affects them within the
meaning of section 405(a) of the Act and section 1.106(b)(1) of
our rules.20

III.B. Petitioners Have Not Shown Good Reason Why They
Failed to Participate Earlier in the Proceeding.

Petitioners did not participate, nor did they seek to
participate, earlier in this proceeding.21 Petitioners allege
that they had ``good reason'' within the meaning of section
1.106(b)(1) of our rules for failing to seek participation
earlier in the proceeding: they had no way to foresee that the
Commission would reach the result that it did.22 Again, we
disagree.

As explained in the BTI Order, ample court and Commission
precedent indicates that the Commission may award damages in a
section 208 complaint proceeding based on the difference between
the rate charged and a just and reasonable rate under section
201(b).23 Consistent with that longstanding authority, the
Commission clearly stated in 1997 that formal complaints filed
pursuant to section 208 of the Act to enforce the ``just and
reasonable'' standard of section 201(b) of the Act could be used
to constrain and discipline CLEC access rates.24 Moreover, the
Commission has on several occasions awarded damages for
violations of section 201(b), even in the absence of specific
rules applicable to the conduct at issue.25 Finally, the court's
referral to the Commission of the IXCs' rate-reasonableness
claims signaled that questions concerning whether and to what
extent the CLECs' access rates caused compensable harm were
hardly ``open-and-shut.''26 Thus, contrary to Petitioners'
assertion otherwise, Petitioners should have known that AT&T and
Sprint might prevail in this proceeding.27 Accordingly, we
conclude that Petitioners have not shown that they had ``good
reason,'' within the meaning of section 1.106(b)(1) of our rules,
to refrain from seeking to participate earlier in this
proceeding.28

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, consistent with our recent decision in
an analogous case,29 we find that Petitioners have failed to show
satisfaction of the two requirements set forth in section 405(a)
of the Act and section 1.106(b)(1) of our rules for a non-party
to a complaint proceeding to seek reconsideration of the order
resolving such proceeding. Each failure, standing alone, is
sufficient to warrant dismissal of the Petition. Consequently,
we dismiss the Petition for lack of standing. 30

V. ORDERING CLAUSE

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 208,
and 405 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
її 154(i), 154(j), 208, and 405, and section 1.106 of the
Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. ї 1.106, that Joint Petitioners'
Petition for Reconsideration IS DISMISSED.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Magalie Roman Salas
Secretary DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER KEVIN J. MARTIN

Re: AT&T Corp. v. Business Telecom, Inc.; Sprint Communications
Company, L.P. v. Business Telecom, Inc., Order on
Reconsideration, File Nos. EB-01-MD-001 & EB-01-MD-002.

I respectfully dissent from this Order. I have concerns
with the original BTI Order's approach to the lawfulness of CLEC
access charges in the past. I also have concerns with the lack
of guidance the Commission has provided on related issues, such
as whether and under what circumstances IXCs could refuse access
services. In my opinion, these issues should have been addressed
in a more comprehensive fashion. At this point, however, my main
concern is that the Commission move quickly to resolve these
uncertainties, which have had a detrimental impact on the
marketplace.

To be fair, this item was not my preferred forum for
addressing these issues. I would rather have considered them in
declaratory rulings responding to the primary jurisdiction
referrals made by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. That court months ago asked us to
weigh in on these issues by July, and we have yet to offer any
response. And, at this point, it is unclear whether we will do
so at all. Accordingly, a reconsideration of the BTI Order may
be our best and only opportunity to address these issues.
Although there are legitimate policy reasons not to allow non-
parties standing here, as the Order makes clear, we plainly have
discretion to hear these non-parties' petitions. Given the
unique circumstances, I would have chosen to do so, or to
reconsider the BTI Order sua sponte.

_________________________

1 Joint Petition for Reconsideration, File Nos. EB-01-MD-001,
002 (filed June 29, 2001) (``Petition'').

2 AT&T Corp. v. Business Telecom, Inc.; Sprint Communications
Company, L.P. v. Business Telecom, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, FCC 01-185, 2001 WL 575527 (rel. May 30, 2001) (``BTI
Order'').

3 The Joint Petitioners are Association for Local
Telecommunications Services, Intermedia Communications, Inc.,
Mpower Communications, Inc., NuVox Communications, Inc., Winstar
Communications, Inc., and XO Communications, Inc. (collectively,
``Petitioners'').

4 See 47 C.F.R. ї 1.106(b)(1). In fact, Petitioners
purported to file their Petition pursuant to the wrong rule, 47
C.F.R. ї 1.429, which applies to rulemaking proceedings, not
adjudications. Petition at 1. This error apparently led to
violations of our service rules. See n.30, infra. Compare 47
C.F.R. ї 1.106(f) (stating that petitions for reconsideration in
adjudications ``shall be served upon parties to the
proceeding'') with 47 C.F.R. ї 1.429(e) (stating that petitions
for reconsideration in rulemakings ``need not be served on
parties to the proceeding''). We note, however, that even in
rulemaking proceedings, the Commission encourages service of
reconsideration petitions on the parties, where, as here, the
number of parties is small. See 47 C.F.R. ї 1.429(e).

5 47 U.S.C. ї 208.

6 Advamtel LLC, et al. v. AT&T Corp., 105 F. Supp.2d 507
(E.D. Va. 2000); Advamtel LLC, et al. v. Sprint Communications
Company, L.P., 105 F. Supp.2d 476 (E.D. Va. 2000).

7 47 U.S.C. ї 201(b). See BTI Order at ІІ 17-50.

8 See BTI Order at ІІ 53-59.

9 AT&T Corp. v. FCC, No. 01-1261 (D.C. Cir. filed Jun. 8,
2001).

10 Petition at 3; Joint Reply to Oppositions to Petition for
Reconsideration, File Nos. EB-01-MD-001, 002 (filed July 19,
2001), at 2, 5-6 (``Reply'').

11 Reply at 5-6.

12 47 C.F.R. ї 1.106(b)(1). See 47 U.S.C. ї 405(a) (stating
that a reconsideration petition may be filed by a non-party who
is ``aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected '' by a
Commission order).

13 Petition at 3 (``[S]everal of the Petitioners were
recipients of threats from the three major interexchange
carriers . . . , who indicated that they intend to use the
precedent established in the [BTI] Order as a sword....'');
Reply at 2 (``The day the [BTI] Order was released, AT&T
contacted one of the Petitioners, and made a thinly veiled
threat to sue for retroactive refunds of its tariffed access
charges.''); Reply 5-6 (``AT&T obviously views the [BTI] Order
as establishing new precedent allowing it to pursue formal
complaints to seek retroactive refunds from any local
carrier.''). To support this assertion, Petitioners submitted
only scant evidentiary support, and did so belatedly. See Reply
at Ex. 1.

14 See, e.g., In the Matter of Edison Cellular Station KNKN
281, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 8 FCC Rcd
2736, 2737 at І 7 (Com. Car. Bur. rel. Apr. 19, 1993)(``Edison
Reconsideration Order'')(``Adversely affected has been
analogized to a direct economic injury.''); In the Matter of
Chris C. Hudgins, Order on Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd 7941 (WTB
PSPWD rel. Apr. 12, 2001) (``Hudgins Reconsideration Order'')
(stating that a non-party petitioner to license renewal ``must
allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that failure to grant the
requested relief would cause the petitioner to suffer a direct
injury''); In the Matter of the Application of City of Compton
Police Department, Order on Reconsideration, 15 FCC Rcd 16563,
16566 at І 8 (WTB PSPWD rel. Apr. 7, 2000) (``Compton
Reconsideration Order'') (same as Hudgins Reconsideration
Order).

15 See In the Matter of Daniel R. Goodman, Receiver; Dr.
Robert Chan, Order on Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd 20547, 20549
at І 4 (1999); Edison Reconsideration Order, 8 FCC Rcd at 2737,
І 7; Hudgins Reconsideration Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 7944, І 8;
Compton Reconsideration Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 16566, І 8. Cf.,
In re the Application of MCI Communications Corp. and Southern
Pacific Telecommunications Company, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 12 FCC Rcd 7790, 7794 at І 11 (1997) (applying Article
III test to determine whether an entity was a ``party-in-
interest'' under section 309(d)(1) of the Act); In the Matter of
Americatel Corporation, Memorandum Opinion, Order, Authorization
and Certificate, 9 FCC Rcd 3993, 3995 at І 9 (1994) (applying
Article III test to determine whether an entity was an
``interested party'' under rule 63.52(c)); In the Matter of the
Applications of Lawrence N. Brandt and Krisar, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd 4082, 4082-83 at ІІ 5-8 (Com. Car.
Bur. Dom. Fac. Div. rel. June 24, 1998)(same as MCI/Southern
Pacific).

16 See Airtouch Paging v. FCC, 234 F.3d 815, 818 (2d Cir.
2000)(``Even if the Commission were to view footnote 700 as
binding in future proceedings, we would have no jurisdiction to
consider the issue unless and until such future proceedings
result in a cognizable injury to Airtouch.''); Sea-Land Service,
Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 137 F.3d 640, 648 (D.C.
Cir. 1998)(``[M]ere precedential effect within an agency is not,
alone, enough to create Article III standing, no matter how
foreseeable the future litigation.''); Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 47
F.3d 1186, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(``a litigant's interest in [an
agency's] legal reasoning and its potential precedential effect
does not by itself confer standing where, as here, it is
uncoupled from any injury in fact caused by the substance of the
[agency's] adjudicatory action.'')(citations and quotation marks
omitted); Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d
671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1994)(same as Shell Oil); Telecommunications
Research and Action Center v. FCC, 917 F.2d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir.
1990)(same as Shell Oil); Shipbuilders Council of America v.
United States, 868 F.2d 452, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1989)(``we know of
no authority recognizing that the mere potential precedential
effect of an agency action affords a bystander to that action a
basis for complaint''); Radiofone, Inc. v. FCC, 759 F.2d 936,
938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (``Radiofone v. FCC'')(separate opinion
of Scalia, J.)(stating that, in order for a non-party to have
standing to challenge an agency's adjudicatory order, its
``injury must still arise from the particular activity which the
agency adjudication approved ... and not from the mere
precedential effect of the agency's rationale in later
adjudications''); American Public Power Association v. FERC,
2000 WL 1946584 (D.C. Cir. 2000)(``Petitioners base their
standing on the potential precedential effect of an agency
action; this by itself does not suffice to confer Article III
standing.'').

17 AFLAC of Columbus v. FCC, 129 F.3d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir.
1997)(citation and quotation marks omitted).

18 Edison Reconsideration Order, 8 FCC Rcd at 2737, І 7.

19 See generally Radiofone. v. FCC, 759 F.2d at 938-39
(observing that an adjudicatory order ``affects'' non-parties
differently than a rulemaking order). Petitioners' reliance on
Shell Oil v. FERC and Sea-Land v. DOT is misplaced. In
Petitioners' view, those cases stand for the proposition that, if
an adjudicatory order increases the prospect of future litigation
for a non-party to the order, the non-party has standing to seek
review of the order. Reply at 5-6. Petitioners' view is
erroneous. The parts of those cases on which Petitioners
mistakenly rely (Sea-Land v. DOT, 137 F.3d at 648; Shell Oil v.
FERC, 47 F.3d at 1202) suggest merely that a party may appeal an
agency's decision to exercise jurisdiction over a matter, even if
the agency ruled in favor of the party on the merits, but only if
the agency's decision will trigger an ```inevitable and
repeating' course of litigation, between the same parties, all
based on a single jurisdictional issue.'' City of Cleveland,
Ohio v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 68 F.3d 1361, 1370
(D.C. Cir. 1995)(emphasis added). Those circumstances do not
exist here. The BTI Order did not decide a jurisdictional issue;
any future litigation would not involve the same parties as in
the BTI proceedings, i.e., BTI; and the Commission has recently
adopted rules that should prevent the onset of any repeating
course of litigation regarding the reasonableness of CLECs'
future access rates. Access Charge Reform, Seventh Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC No. 01-146,
2001 WL 431685 (rel. Apr. 27, 2001)(``CLEC Access Charge
Order'').

20 We note that, although the BTI Order will serve as
precedent in any future case involving the reasonableness of a
CLEC's access rates, any such case will be decided on the
specific facts in that case's record.

21 That is not to say that, had Petitioners attempted to
intervene as a party, they would have been successful. See,
e.g., Teleconnect Co. v. The Bell Company of Pennsylvania,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 5202, 5206 at ІІ 18-20
(Com. Car. Bur. 1991), aff'd on review, 10 FCC Rcd 1626 (1995).
We note that Petitioners failed even to seek leave to file an
amicus brief or supporting memorandum of law. See generally,
Pleading Schedule Established for AT&T Corp. et al. v. Ameritech
Corp., Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd 12057 (Com. Car. Bur. 1998)
(stating that, in a formal complaint proceeding, ``[w]e will ...
consider on a case-by-case basis motions by non-parties wishing
to submit amicus-type filings addressing the legal issues raised
in this proceeding'').

22 Reply at 5-6. Petitioners asserted this argument for this
first time in their Reply. In their initial Petition,
Petitioners made no attempt to satisfy the ``good reason''
requirement. As a result, Petitioners deprived AT&T and Sprint
of an opportunity to respond. This alone might have been
sufficient basis for us to dismiss the Petition for failure to
show satisfaction of the ``good reason'' requirement.
Nevertheless, as described above, we consider Petitioners'
``good reason'' argument on the merits.

23 BTI Order at ІІ 9-12. See Global Naps, Inc. v. FCC, 247
F.3d 252, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Hi-Tech Furnace Systems, Inc. v.
FCC, 224 F.3d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000); CLEC Access Charge
Order, 2001 WL 431685; New Valley Corp. v. Pacific Bell,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5128, 5133 (2000);
Halprin, Temple, Goodman & Sugrue v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 22568, 22573
(1998), recon. denied, 14 FCC Rcd 21092 (1999); Implementation
of Section 402(b)(1)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 2170, 2181-82 (1997); AT&T v.
Telephone Utilities Exchange Carrier Association, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 8405, 8414-15 (1995); ACC Long
Distance Corp. v. New York Tel. Co., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 9 FCC Rcd 1659, 1661-62 (1994); Allnet Communications
Services, Inc. v. U S West, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
8 FCC Rcd 3017, 3021-22 (1993); Communications Satellite
Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd 2643, 2647
(1988); National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd 3679 (1987). See generally MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1407, 1415 (D.C. Cir.
1995).

24 BTI Order at І 24. See Access Charge Reform, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21354, 21472, at І 271 (1996);
Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 15982,
16140, at І 363 (1997); Hyperion Telecommunications, Inc.
Petition for Forbearance, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC
Rcd 8596, 8609, at І 25 (1997).

25 See, e.g., Ascom Communications, Inc. v. Sprint
Communications Company, L.P., 15 FCC Rcd 3223 (2000); Rainbow
Programming Holdings, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., 15
FCC Rcd 11754 (Com. Car. Bur. rel. July 6, 2000); Hi-Rim
Communications, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 13 FCC Rcd
6551 (Com. Car. Bur. rel. Mar. 30, 1998); People's Network, Inc.
v. AT&T Telephone and Telegraph Company, 12 FCC Rcd 21081 (Com.
Car. Bur. rel. Apr. 10, 1997).

26 Indeed, the IXCs' claims that the court referred to the
Commission expressly requested an award of damages based on a
determination of a past reasonable rate. Answer to Second
Amended Complaint and Counterclaims of AT&T Corp., Advamtel, LLC
v. AT&T Corp. et al., Civil Action No. 00-643-A (E.D. Va. filed
Aug. 18, 2000) at pp. 36-37; Counterclaim of Sprint
Communications Company, L.P., Advamtel, LLC v. AT&T Corp., et
al., Civil Action No. 00-643-A (E.D. Va. filed Aug. 18, 2000) at
І 19 and p. 4.

27 Although Petitioners do not explicitly assert that they
lacked awareness of the pendency of this proceeding, we note
that two of the Petitioners are parties to the court litigation
from which this proceeding derives, and were part of the process
that led to the BTI complaint being chosen as the lead complaint
regarding the issues referred by the court. We also note that
Petitioners' counsel represents BTI and all of the other parties
to the court litigation.

28 See generally Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737
F.2d 74, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting ``surprise'' as a basis
for failing to participate earlier); The Seven Hills Television
Company, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd 826, at І 2
(1988) (same); Press Broadcasting Company and Silver King
Broadcasting of Vineland, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3
FCC Rcd 6640, at І 5 (1988) (same).

29 TSR Wireless v. U S West Order, 2001 WL 536914 (2001).

30 Continuing a pattern of service rule violations, see Letter
from Anthony J. DeLaurentis, Attorney, Market Disputes
Resolution Division, Enforcement Bureau, to James F.
Bendernagel, Counsel for AT&T, Jonathan E. Canis, Counsel for
BTI, and Cheryl A. Tritt, Counsel for Sprint, File Nos. EB-01-
MD-001, 002 (Feb. 16, 2001); Response of the FCC to
Petitioners' Emergency Motion for Stay, Mpower Comm. Corp. et al
v. FCC, No. 01-1280 (D.C. Cir. filed Jun. 26, 2001) at 8 n.8,
Petitioners' counsel improperly failed to serve the parties (or
Commission counsel) on the same day that they submitted the
Petition to the Commission, and failed to include a proper proof
of service. See 47 C.F.R. її 1.47(b), (c), (g), 1.106(f),
1.735(f); Letter from Anthony J. DeLaurentis, Attorney, Market
Disputes Resolution Division, Enforcement Bureau, to James F.
Bendernagel, Counsel for AT&T, Jonathan E. Canis, Counsel for
BTI, and Cheryl A. Tritt, Counsel for Sprint, File Nos. EB-01-
MD-001, 002 (Jan. 18, 2001). Because Petitioners submitted the
Petition to the Commission Secretary on the last day for filing
permitted by the Act and our rules, see 47 U.S.C. ї 405(a); 47
C.F.R. ї 1.106 (f), these service rule violations might have
provided another independent basis for dismissing the Petition.
See generally Charter Communications, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 14 FCC Rcd 13511, 13512 (1999). We need not reach that
question, however, because we dismiss the Petition on the other
grounds discussed above.