I am heartened that the Commission has agreed to a package of fair, reasonable, and commercially viable options addressing the financial issues confronted by C block licensees. And I am hopeful that the majority of licensees will find among these options the flexibility to pursue their business plans as they best see fit. I am satisfied that the Commission has done virtually all that it can to provide C block licensees flexibility and relief consistent with and required by our overriding mandate to manage the spectrum in the public interest, and so I join the majority's decision. I write separately, however, to articulate the fundamental principles guiding my decision. Those principles would have led me to support greater relief in the treatment of the down payment credit.

In granting the Commission authority to assign spectrum licenses by auction, Congress directed us to use that authority for the ends of promoting the development and rapid deployment of new technologies and services for the public, facilitating economic opportunity for designated entities and new entrants, and vigorously fostering competition. I take these directives as the lodestar of my decision.

Much has been written about the need to protect the integrity and fundamental fairness of our auctions. With this, I fully agree. But I also believe that when the Commission acted last September, it was generally acknowledged that a significant number of C block licensees, holding licenses covering a majority of the United States, were in financial distress. The financial difficulties of several of the largest licensees cast shadows of doubt across many of the smaller licensees because of the largely interdependent nature of the licenses as building blocks for a nationwide network.

Recognizing the severity of the problem, and its responsibility to assure that this spectrum is used in the public interest, the Commission appropriately decided last year to modify its rules to provide licensees with modest, but tangible, relief. By offering relief through a public notice and comment rulemaking, we have been able to uniformly address the rights of a class of licensees without undermining the integrity of our auctions program.

Some commenters and licensees would have us go further -- to discount and restructure their debt, much as an ordinary commercial lender might. Yet the Commission is not a commercial lender, and we are confronted by competing policies as we negotiate a path as both lender and regulator. In our role as spectrum manager, it is not appropriate for the Commission to assure the success of any class of licensees. C block is an entrepreneurs' block. The truth is that entrepreneurs and small businesses do fail. And they fail at a rate greater than other businesses overall. So it would be inadvisable for the Commission to tie its spectrum management policy to the assured success of any group of licensees; to seek to avoid bankruptcies at all costs; or to become an apologist when such bankruptcies do occur. Fairness to all auctions participants requires that we not adopt measures that would significantly alter the financial obligations that the successful bidders themselves freely assumed at auction. But we can, and should, give them the opportunity to survive and thrive.

Today's decision provides that opportunity by granting licensees significant flexibility to modify their holdings in light of market conditions and business plans. We have upheld the Commission's original decision to provide a variety of options, recognizing that no single option would be appropriate for all. The character of the relief offered is to allow licensees to surrender a certain amount of spectrum in exchange for a proportionate reduction in debt. In addition, we offer further flexibility, so that licensees may adopt different options in different regions (on a MTA basis), as well as combine prepayment and disaggregation.

Inherent in this approach is a focus on whether the licensee chooses to use or relinquish the spectrum it currently holds. Having decided to grant licensees this relief through flexibility, I believe that the use or non-use of the spectrum should remain the central point in structuring the relief options. Such a view is constructive and forward-looking, rather than focusing on whether certain licensees willfully overbid, or inadvertently overbid, or whether they overbid at all. Such past actions of any individual licensees become irrelevant, I believe, in light of our affirmation of the Commission's decision to offer comprehensive relief and flexibility to all licensees.

Centering on whether a licensee intends to use its spectrum to provide service to the public, or whether it plans to return it, my approach would lead to a different treatment of the licensee's 10% down payment on deposit with the Commission. I do not disagree that it is appropriate for some small fee or cost to be associated with the abandonment of spectrum previously bid for, whether surrendered in a 30 MHz or 15 MHz portion. I join the majority's view that 3% of the net bid (equal to 30% of the down payment), which it adopted for most of the options, is appropriate. However, I view this cost as akin to fee for restructuring, much as a commercial bank might impose. It acknowledges the cost of the restructuring, and is in exchange for the benefits of relief from a substantial portion of debt and the creation of an automatic spectrum market (in the case of disaggregation), or the opportunity to hold an unencumbered license (in the case of prepayment). But 3% of the net bid, or 30% of the down payment, also is minimal enough not to act as a disincentive or a penalty for a licensee making a choice which the Commission has otherwise freely offered. I would not view this cost as a "deterrent to speculative bidding," which is a redressed description of a penalty for past behavior.

This cost should be associated only with the abandonment of the spectrum. The licensee would forfeit 30% of the down payment that relates to the spectrum it chooses to return, whether as a whole 30 MHz license (under the pure prepayment option) or 15 MHz piece (under either disaggregation option). Correspondingly, the licensee would retain 100% of the down payment that relates to the spectrum it chooses to keep. Critically, licensees are not penalized to the extent that they choose to go forward with providing service to the public. This approach -- focusing on the use of the spectrum -- is consistent with our spectrum management responsibilities, as expressed in Section 309(j), to promote service to the public, provide opportunity for new entrants, and foster competition.

Basing the fee on the amount of spectrum returned results in varying credits of the down payment. Licensees would receive a 70% credit for a full license returned under the prepayment option, while receiving 85% credit for a license disaggregated, whether then prepaid or continued on installment payments. Some suggest that the lack of parallel treatment is a problem -- that each license should be subject to the same fee, whatever option is chosen. But the size or design of a license is itself arbitrary, as acknowledged by the fact that the Commission has either adopted or proposed spectrum partitioning and disaggregation rules for the majority of commercial mobile radio services. A cost per license would be a cost merely to participate in the choices we offer. That analysis is more characteristic of a bank, less a manager of the spectrum.

Likewise, today's Order suggests that we should provide greater incentives for licensees to select the prepayment option, because it has the effect of removing the Commission from the banking business. I believe this analysis has two flaws. First, any modification to the credit of the 10% down payment will affect a licensee's choice of prepayment marginally, if at all. A decision to prepay will be made on the overall economic costs and benefits to the licensee. Although prepayment may be a good option for some -- particularly those able to obtain down payment credits for the surrender of other licenses -- for others it will not, because it does not account for loss of government financing substantially below their cost of funds in the private market. Because the installment payment plan was offered at the government's cost of funds, a prepayment option discounted to the licensee's higher cost of funds would not be economically neutral to the government. For that reason, and because such a discount would fundamentally change the terms under which these bidders won (and others lost) these licenses, I agree with the decision not to discount the debt. Nonetheless, I believe we must recognize that such a decision affects the overall economic attractiveness of prepayment. A modest tinkering with the credit of the down payment to lessen the credit for disaggregation with resumption of payments, and to increase the credit for disaggregation with prepayment, will not affect that balance.

In addition, for C block the decision for the Commission to serve as a banker is over. That decision was complete with the adoption of service rules. Whether prepayment is a good option for some, we will the remain banker for many. Though I agreed with our decision in the recent Part 1 Report and Order to temporarily suspend the use of installment payments in future rulemaking proceedings, I do not believe we should distinguish the cost of an option based upon whether it minimally reduces our banking role for this service.

Thus, I would offer an 85% credit for any licensee choosing the disaggregation option, whether prepaying or continuing on installment payments. I would not tinker with the calculation of the down payment credit, merely to make disaggregation with installment payments cosmetically equal to standard prepayment, or to make disaggregation with prepayment more attractive than disaggregation with installment payments. It is easier -- and more in the public interest -- simply to ask whether the licensee is choosing to serve the public by making use of the spectrum. Despite these decisional differences, I am pleased that the majority is able to support use of 85% of the down payment for at least one of the disaggregation options.

There is an additional area where I believe we provide important and useful flexibility. This is the modification to allow licensees to apply to the down payment credit either to reduce principal or to apply against accumulated suspension interest. Suspension interest is, in effect, a past debt. It has accumulated because the Commission, by Bureau Order, suspended payments pending resolution of this proceeding. Allowing application of the credits to suspension interest will provide licensees modest relief from the burden of paying both past and current interest simultaneously. At the same time, we do not defer current debt. To take advantage of this option, licensees must be timely on all current interest, making a showing of financial viability.