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DRAFT ONHeader A Text = DRAFT and Dateؽ X =8` (#FDRAFTă r  ` (#=D3 1, 43 12pt (Z)(PC-8))T2Dă  ӟ2t"X11CDRAFT OFFTurn Draft Style off@@    HEADERHeader A - AppearanceLETTER LANDLetter Landscape - 11 x 8.5 3'3'Standard'3'3StandardLetter Portrait - 8.5 x 11 ;   LEGAL LANDLegal Landscape - 14 x 8.5f 3'3'Standard'A'AStandardZ K e6VE L"nu;   2ΰ11׮nXvLETTER PORTLetter Portrait - 8.5 x 11L 3'3'Standard3'3'StandardZ K e6VE L"nU9   LEGAL PORTLegal Portrait - 8.5 x 14 3'3'StandardA'A'StandardLetter Portrait - 8.5 x 119   TITLETitle of a DocumentK\ * ăFOOTERFooter A - Appearanced2ndjOBLOCK QUOTESmall, single-spaced, indentedN X HIGHLIGHT 2Large and Bold LargeB*d. HIGHLIGHT 3Large, Italicized and Underscored V -qLETTERHEADLetterhead - date/marginsu H XX  3'3'LetterheadZ K e VE L"n3'3'LetterheadZ K e VE L"nE9    * 3'3'LetterheadZ K e VE L"n3' II"n"Tv3'StandarddZ K e VE L"nU9 Ѓ   2E-88JINVOICE FEETFee Amount for Math Invoice ,, $0$0  MEMORANDUMMemo Page FormatD.   ! M E M O R A N D U M ă r  y<N dddy   INVOICE EXPSEExpense Subtotals for Math Invoice:A ,p, $0$00INVOICE TOTTotals Invoice for Math Macroz 4p, $0$002cXU[[INVOICE HEADRHeading Portion of Math Invoice+C`*   4X 99L$0 **(  ӧ XX NORMALReturn to Normal TypestyleSMALLSmall TypestyleFINEFine Typestyle2)[[[KLARGELarge TypestyleEXTRA LARGEExtra Large TypestyleVERY LARGEVery Large TypestyleENVELOPEStandard Business Envelope with Header+w ,,EnvelopeZ K e VE L"n,,EnvelopeLarge, Italicized and Under;    ,, 88+  `   2X[SMACNormal,.Style 14Swiss 8 Pt Without Margins$$D Co> PfQ  )a [ PfQO Style 12Dutch Italics 11.5$$F )^ `> XifQ  )a [ PfQO Style 11Initial Codes for Advanced IIJ )a [ PfQK  dddn  #  [ X` hp x (#%'b, oT9 ! )^ `> XifQ ` Advanced Legal WordPerfect II Learning Guide   x )^ `> XifQ Advanced Legal WordPerfect II Learning Guide   j-n )^ `> XifQ    Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`6 >Page  jBX )^ `> XifQ    Page ` Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 2lp |Style 3oDutch Roman 11.5 with Margins/Tabs )a [ PfQO  ddn  # c0*b, oT9 !Style 4 PSwiss 8 Point with MarginsDq Co> PfQ  dddd  #  Style 1.5Dutch Roman 11.5 Font4h )a [ PfQO  dddn Style 2Dutch Italic 11.5$ )^ `> XifQ 2-F&Style 5Dutch Bold 18 Point$RH$L T~> pfQ_  )a [ PfQO Style 7Swiss 11.5$$V )ao> PfQ ]  )a [ PfQO Style 6Dutch Roman 14 Point$$N w [ PfQ   )a [ PfQO Style 10oInitial Codes for Advanced U )a [ PfQK  dddn  ##  [[ b, oT9 !b, oT9 !n )^ `> XifQ ` Advanced Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   f )^ `> XifQ Advanced Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   Q" )^ `> XifQ    Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`6 >Page  QN~ )^ `> XifQ    Page ` Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 2_fLkLStyle 8PfInitial Codes for Beginninggi )a [ PfQK  dddn  # X` hp x (#%'b, oT9  [ &e )^ `> XifQ ` Beginning Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   d )^ `> XifQ Beginning Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   jH )^ `> XifQ    Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`6 >Page  j )^ `> XifQ    Page ` Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 Style 9Initial Codes for Intermediate )a [ PfQK  dddn  # X` hp x (#%'b, oT9 Њ [ e )^ `> XifQ ` Intermediate Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   3 )^ `> XifQ Intermediate Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   jf )^ `> XifQ    Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc.`+ >Page  jX )^ `> XifQ    Page ` Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 "S^*8DSS888S^*8*.SSSSSSSSSS..^^^Jxooxf]xx8Axfxx]xo]fxxxxf8.8NS8JSJSJ8SS..S.SSSS8A.SSxSSJP!PZ8*888888888888S.xJxJxJxJxJooJfJfJfJfJ8.8.8.8.xSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxJxSxSxSxSxS]SxJxJoJoJoJoJxSfJfJfJfJxSxSxSxSxSxSxS8S8S888SA8xSf.f8f8f8f.xSxSxSxSxSxo8o8o8]A]A]A]Af8f8f8xSxSxSxSxxSfJfJN:*LS8JSSSSS.4}}S2S}2JJS88SS]]8J2t^^\\^^ee*C^.wR)Ewn\1fy\r\Sxx\r"S^2CRddCCCdq2C28dddddddddd88qqqYzoCNzoozzC8C^dCYdYdYCdd88d8ddddCN8ddddY`(`lC2CC!CCCCCCCCCCd8YYYYYYzYzYzYzYC8C8C8C8ddddddddddYdddddodYYYYYYdzYzYzYzYdddddddCdCdCCCdNCdz8zCzCzCz8dddddCCCoNoNoNoNzCzCzCdddddzYzYNF2[dCYddddd7>d<d<$YYdCCddooCYd<d<+oodCCddddCoto present their views. In particular, the political editorial rule requires that when a licensee  xendorses or opposes a political candidate, the licensee must notify opponents of the candidate  xendorsed (or the candidates opposed) and offer the candidates or their spokesperson an opportunity to respond. The rule provides:    (a) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (1) Endorses or, (2) Opposes a legally  qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the  editorial, transmit to, respectively, (i) The other qualified candidate or candidates for the same office or, (ii) The candidate opposed in the editorial, X` ` (A) Notification of the date and the time of the editorial, ` X` ` (B) A script or tape of the editorial and `  ` pX` ` (C) An offer of reasonable opportunity for the candidate or a spokesman  X -of the candidate to respond over the licensee's facilities.<" Z' yO- xЍ 47 C.F.R. 73.1930(a). The rule further states: "Where such editorials are broadcast on the day of the election  xor within 72 hours prior to the day of the election, the licensee shall comply with the provisions of this paragraph  xsufficiently far in advance of the broadcast to enable the candidate or candidates to have a reasonable opportunity  {O!-to prepare a response and to present it in a timely fashion."  Id. at  73.1930(a)(2)(C). < ` ` `  X-  x  10. Similarly, the personal attack rule provides:    When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public  %importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like  personal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a  reasonable time and in no event later than one week after the attack, transmit to  2the persons or group attacked: (1) Notification of the date, time and identification  of the broadcast; (2) A script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape  is not available) of the attack; and (3) An offer of a reasonable opportunity to  X-respond over the licensee's facilities.OD' yO-Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  73.1920(a). O  X-  There are several exemptions to the personal attack rule's requirements.  yO"-Ѝ Specifically, the rule exempts the following from its requirements:  n  (1) Personal attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) Personal attacks occurring  3during uses by legally qualified candidates; (3) Personal attacks made during broadcasts not  2included in the preceding exemption and made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized  #spokesperson, or those associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their  1authorized spokesperson or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (4) Bona  2fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and onthespot coverage of bona fide news events,  {OX(-including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing programs. Id. at  73.1920(b).",&)&)aa"Ԍ X-  ԙ  x 11. In a 1983 Notice of Proposed Rule Making (1983 Notice), the Commission requested  X- xcomment on the proposal to eliminate both the political editorial and personal attack rules.^ {Od- x,#]\  PCP#Ѝ Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,  {O.- xGen. Docket 83484, RM3739, 48 Fed. Reg. 28295 (June 21, 1983) (Notice). We also requested comment on the  {O-possible repeal of these rules as they apply to cable systems. Notice at  53 n.31. The  X- xjNotice was issued in response to a petition for rulemaking filed by the National Association of  X- x?Broadcasters. yO^-#]\  PCP#Ѝ Petition for Rulemaking filed by the National Association of Broadcasters on August 14, 1980. Comments supporting repeal of the rules were filed for the most part by  X- xZbroadcasters and their representatives.: ~ {O -#]\  PCP#Ѝ In response to the 1983 Notice, comments supporting repeal of the rules were filed by:  x\Telecommunications Division of Adams-Russell Co., Inc. and Satellite Program Network, Inc.; American  xBroadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC); American Legal Foundation (ALF); American Newspaper Publishers  xzAssociation (ANPA); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS); Cosmos Broadcasting Corporation, Cox  xCommunications, Inc., Freedom Communications Inc. and Mid-America Television Company (Joint Broadcasters);  xHenry Geller and Donna Lampert; McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Company, Inc.; National Association of Broadcasters  x(NAB); National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (NBC); National Broadcast Editorial Association (NBEA); National  x<Radio Broadcasters Association (NRBA); Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA), The Evening  x;News Association, Gannett Co., Inc., Gaylord Broadcasting Company and Lee Enterprises, Inc. (Joint Comments of  xRTNDA et. al.); and Tribune Broadcasting Company. An informal comment was filed by National Conference of Editorial Writers. : Comments opposing repeal were filed by various public  X-interest groups.! {O"- x#]\  PCP#Ѝ Comments in opposition to repeal of the rules were filed in response to the 1983 Notice by: Accuracy in  xMedia (AIM); American Legal Foundation (ALF); Media Access Project (MAP) on behalf of the International Union,  x-UAW (MAP/UAW); and Telecommunications Research and Action Center, Black Citizens for a Fair Media and  x<Citizens Communications Center (TRAC). Informal comments were filed by Anti-Defamation League; National Education Association and the Conservative Caucus, Inc.  Xc-  ?x 12. On August 25, 1987, following repeal of the fairness doctrine,"c {O-pX` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:- x#]\  PCP#э  See Section 2(a)(12) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102385, 106 Stat. 1460. and the recent setaside, again without charge, of over 400 MHz of additional  xspectrum to allow each existing full service television broadcaster to convert to digital  XM- xztechnology.M9XMl  yOj- x#]\  PCP#э Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 55 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.  336);  xwFifth Report and Order in MM Docket No. 87268, FCC 97116, 12 FCC Rcd 12810 (1997) (DTV Fifth Report and Order).M Given these considerations, and the record before us, we believe the political  X6-editorial and personal attack rules are justified and continue to serve the public interest.:6  yOs - x.#]\  PCP#э Given our public interest conclusion that the rules should be retained, we need not address UCC/MAP's  xargument that the basic obligations established by the two rules, as well as the fairness doctrine, are statutorily  {O"- xxmandated by the Communications Act.  See 1997 Comments of UCC/MAP at 13 (citing Maier v. FCC, 735 F.2d  {O"- xw220 (7th Cir. 1984)). But see Arkansas AFLCIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1436 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (indicating  {O#- xhthat fairness doctrine is not codified in the Act); Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d  {Oa$- xZ501, 517 (D.C. Cir.), pet. for reh'g en banc denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919  {O+%- x(1987) (TRAC) (indicating that fairness doctrine is not codified in the Act); FCC Rescinds Public Notice Instructing  x;General Counsel With Respect to Fairness Doctrine, FCC 96211 (May 10, 1996) (noting that the fairness doctrine is not codified in the Act).  x " f:,&)&)aa)"ԑ X-B. The Political Editorial Rule  X-    X-   x20. Background. The political editorial rule was adopted by the Commission in order  X- xto expose the public to various viewpoints regarding candidate elections.u; {O6-Ѝ Personal Attacks and Political Editorials, 8 FCC 2d at 722.u When licensees  x-endorse or oppose political candidates, the rule provides a contingent access requirement for the  xunendorsed or opposed candidates, or their spokespersons. The rule is intended to provide  x|citizens with the information necessary to enable them to exercise their vote in a more  xjresponsible and informed manner. In such respects, we believe that this particular rule goes to the very heart of our democratic electoral process.   X -  x21. Commenters supporting retention of the rule argue that the political editorial rule is  x=vital to protect against distortions of the political process that could occur when broadcasters  x[endorse or oppose candidates for public office without affording response time to the affected  X - xcandidates.l< Z yO-Ѝ 1983 Comments of ALF at 89; 1983 Comments of TRAC at 17.l Given the importance of such concerns, these commenters contend that the corresponding burden of compliance on broadcasters is minimal.  X-  x22. Commenters advocating repeal of the political editorial rule argue that the rule's  xrequirements are unduly burdensome. To notify each and every candidate, fringe or otherwise,  Xd- xand afford reply opportunities, they argue, is both time consuming and costly.=d yO-Ѝ 1983 Comments of NAB at 26; 1987 RTNDA Joint Petition at 8; Joint Broadcaster Comments at 11. In  xmulti-candidate races, where arguably the need for editorializing is the greatest, the commenters  X6- x-claim that the administrative burdens of the rule have inhibited broadcasters from editorializing._>6z yOa-Ѝ 1983 Joint Comments of RTNDA et. al. at 55._  xRTNDA argues that the record illustrates the pervasiveness of "licensee selfcensorship generated  xby the burden of having to identify, notify and provide air time to every candidate other than the  X- xone endorsed by the station."U?  yO-Ѝ RTNDA 1987 Joint Petition at 78.U CBS notes that a station that airs a political editorial is "forced  xto offer its air time to major and fringe candidates alike for the presentation of rebuttal  xstatements, regardless of the opportunities it has afforded the principal contenders for the office  X-to express their views in its overall coverage of the election."P@ yO!-Ѝ 1997 Comments of CBS at 89.P  X~-  nx23. With respect to the political editorial rule's alleged chilling effect, the principal  xevidence cited by those advocating repeal is a 1982 survey conducted by RTNDA, NAB, and  xNBEA regarding the editorializing practices of broadcast stations in the United States and  X9- x.submitted as supplemental comments to the Commission's 1983 Notice.tA9*  yO(-Ѝ 1983 Supplemental Comments of NAB, NBEA, and RTNDA at Exhibit 2.t These parties argue"9 A,&)&)aa"  xthat this survey provides evidence that the majority of television and radio stations responding  xin 1982 did not endorse political candidates because of the political editorial rule and that many  X- x<more would make such endorsements but for the rule.B yOK- xЍ RTNDA 1987 Joint Petition at 9; 1983 Supplemental Comments of NAB, NBEA, and RTNDA at 23. The  xsurvey was mailed to 8,810 commercial station licensees, and 43.1 percent of the stations contacted responded. The  xsurvey indicates that while 45 percent of the stations that responded did editorialize, only 3.1 percent endorsed  xpolitical candidates. It further indicates that if the political editorial rule were repealed, 35 percent of the responding stations would endorse political candidates and 7.7 percent would consider making such endorsements Commenters supporting retention of the  xpolitical editorial rule argue that the RTNDA survey is inadequate because it is significantly  X-dated and used a flawed methodology.NCx yO -ԍ 1997 Reply Comments of UCC/MAP at 6.N  Xv-  x24. There are also arguments that may support modification of the rule. The Commission  X_- xnoted in the 1983 Notice, for example, that the rule imposes upon a licensee's own political  xendorsements more stringent requirements than are applied to endorsements by nonlicensee  xsupporters, with the latter subject to less burdensome requirements under the Commission's  X - xZapple doctrine.D  {O- xЍ Notice at  52.  Nicholas Zapple, 23 FCC 2d 707 (1970).  Zapple was a corollary aspect of the Fairness Doctrine but is still enforced by the Commission. The Notice explained that the discriminatory application of more onerous  xrequirements to a licensee's own political endorsements is inconsistent with the belief that  xNlicensee editorializing should be encouraged and is no more subject to abuse than other  X - xcontroversial issue programming.E b  {O-Ѝ Notice at  39 citing Report on Editorializing, 13 FCC at 1252. The Notice consequently sought comment on application of  X -the less burdensome Zapple doctrine to licensee candidate endorsements.QF  {Oi-Ѝ Notice at  53 n.31.Q  X-  ?x25. Discussion. We believe that the political editorial rule continues to serve the public  xinterest by creating a limited right of access to further the important goal of promoting the  Xl- xkvigorous discussion of public issues. The Supreme Court made clear in Red Lion that, "the  xipublic interest standard in broadcasting clearly encompasses the presentation of vigorous debate  X@-of controversial issues of public concern. . . ."G\@  {Ow - xKԍ Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 385. See also  Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F. 3d 957, 975-76 (D.C.  {OA!- xCir. 1996), citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) ("preserv[ation] [of] an uninhibited marketplace of ideas" is proper consideration in imposing public interest obligations on broadcasters).   X-  ?x26. The political editorial rule also serves as an important complement to Congressional  xzpolicies underlying Section 315(a) and Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act. Under  xSection 315(a), a broadcast licensee that permits a candidate to use its station must afford "equal" G,&)&)aa"  X- xopportunities" to the candidate's opponents. H@ yOy-ԍ Section 315(a), 47 U.S.C. 315(a), provides in pertinent part:    If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office  to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for  #that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no  power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provision of this section. No obligation  is hereby imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. The political editorial rule prevents broadcasters  X- x-from evading these equal opportunity responsibilities. In Red Lion, the Supreme Court expressly  X- xxnoted this important connection stating "[w]hen a broadcaster grants time to a political candidate,  xCongress itself requires that equal time be offered to his opponents. It would exceed our  x/competence to hold that the Commission is unauthorized by the statute to employ a similar  xdevice where personal attacks or political editorials are broadcast by a radio or television  Xz- xMstation."KIz {O-ԍ  Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 385. K Absent the political editorial rule, a licensee could run editorials in favor of one  xKcandidate every hour of the broadcast day and never trigger the Section 315(a) equal opportunity responsibility because the candidate never made a "use" of the station.  X -  x27. Similarly, the Commission's Zapple doctrine is patterned on the equal opportunity  X - xrequirements of Section 315(a). The Zapple doctrine applies when candidate supporters, but not  X - xthe candidates themselves, appear on a station.J^ b  {O- xԍ See Nicholas Zapple, 23 FCC 2d 707 (1970). Zapple also does not apply to appearances by candidates'  {O- xsupporters on news programs exempt from Section 315 equal opportunity requirements. See Democratic National  {O-Committee et. al. v. CBS, Inc., 91 FCC 2d 1170 (1982).  In such cases, the Commission requires that  x"quasiequal opportunities" be made available to the supporters of a candidate if supporters of the candidate's opponents have been given or sold time by a station.  X-  _x28. While the Zapple doctrine had its origins in the former fairness doctrine,MK  {O-ԍ Zapple, 23 FCC 2d at 707709.M the  X- x{Commission made clear in its 1972 Fairness Report that the Zapple doctrine "was neither  xtraditional fairness nor traditional equal opportunities" but rather "a particularization of what the  x>public interest calls for in certain political broadcast situations in light of the congressional  X@- xpolicies set forth in Section 315(a)."L@ {O "- xYԍ  See Handling of Public Issues Under Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standard of the Communications  {O"-Act, 36 FCC 2d 40, 49 (1972) (1972 Fairness Report). It noted that in Section 315(a), "Congress has specified  X)- xithat equal opportunities shall be applicable to appearances of legally qualified candidates."VM)v {OP%-ԍ 1972 Fairness Report, 36 FCC 2d at 47.V The  X- xLCommission later explained in the 1974 Fairness Report that the Zapple doctrine was "simply a  xcommon sense application of the statutory scheme" and "was adopted solely because it was" M,&)&)aa"  X- xLanalogous to the situation for which Congress itself had provided for 'equal opportunities.'"JN\ {Oy-Ѝ Handling of Public Issues Under Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standard of the Communications  {OC-Act, 48 FCC 2d 1, 31 (1974) (1974 Fairness Report). (The 1974 Fairness Report appends the 1972 Fairness  {M -Report.)J  X-  x29. We believe the same reasoning applies to licensee endorsements and the political  X- xeditorial rule. Indeed, in many ways Section 315(a), the Zapple doctrine, and the political  xeditorial rule overlap in the purposes they serve and the obligations they trigger; the main  xxdifference is that the first applies to candidate appearances, the second applies to appearances by  Xx- xnonlicensee candidate supporters, and the third applies to licensee candidate supporters. In all  xithree cases, the station is airing appearances whether by a candidate, a nonlicensee or licensee  xԩ that advocate or oppose the election of a particular candidate. These appearances can have a  xsignificant impact on an election given the reach of broadcast stations and the fact that most  X - xAmericans rely on television and radio to obtain news and information regarding elections.*O&  {O- xԍ  See, e.g., Roper Starch Worldwide, America's Watching; Public Attitudes Towards Television at 19 (reporting  {O- xthat 58% of Americans depend on television for news and information on political processes); See also Arkansas  {OO- xEducational Television Commission v. Forbes, ___ U.S. ___ (1998), 1998 WL 244196 at *6 (noting that a majority of the population cites television as its primary source of election information).* In  xthese instances, Congress has seen fit to establish equal opportunity requirements for candidate  xappearances to ensure diverse and robust debate on the airwaves regarding candidate elections.  X - x-And the Commission, exercising its public interest authority, has established the Zapple doctrine  xLand political editorial rule to serve the same purpose and prevent the objectives of Section 315  x>from being circumvented. As the Supreme Court recognized, "[i]n light of the fact that . . . .  xxthe analogous provisions of Section 315 are not preclusive in this area, and [Congress] knowingly  xypreserved the FCC's complementary efforts, we think . . . . the political editorializing regulations  Xh-are a legitimate exercise of Congressionally delegated authority."MPh {O-ԍ Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 38283.M  X:-  x30. We also note that the political editorial rule is consistent with a licensee's statutory  xZobligation under Section 312(a)(7) of the Act to provide reasonable access to political candidates.  xLThe Supreme Court has indicated that the Commission retains the ability to impose reasonable  X- xaccess requirements even after the adoption of Section 312(a)(7) in 1971./QZl  {O - xԍ CBS, Inc. v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 131 (1973) ("Conceivably at some future date, Congress or the Commission  x-ԩ or the broadcasters may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable."). / We believe such  xreasonable access should include affording a candidate the opportunity to respond to a station's  xendorsement of his or her opponent. The political editorial rule ensures that this opportunity is provided.  X-  x31. Because of its close connection to the statutory equal opportunity requirements of  xSection 315(a) and the reasonable access requirements of Section 312(a)(7), the political editorial  x0rule consequently remains critical to the public's paramount right to receive diverse and"T Q,&)&)aa"  xantagonistic viewpoints on issues of public concern. The rule is a vital component of  x/broadcasters' public interest obligations and their unique position as public trustees of the nation's airwaves.  X-  {x32. Broadcasters have argued that the rule has the effect of chilling station editorializing  xand is therefore counterproductive. These parties argue that their 1982 survey proves that many  Xv-more broadcasters would editorialize but for the rule.oRv yO-ԍ See 1983 Supplemental Comments of NAB, NBEA, and RTNDA at Exhibit 2.o  XH-  x 33. Commenters supporting retention of the political editorial rule argue that the RTNDA  X1- xsurvey is dated and used a flawed methodology.PS1X yO: -ԍ 1997 Reply Comments of UCC/MAP at 6. P These parties note that the survey is more than  X - x15 years old and therefore the data relied on is obsolete and untrustworthy.NT  yO-ԍ 1997 Reply Comments of UCC/MAP at 6.N In addition, they  xalso assert that the response rate is low and that the survey instrument does not sufficiently  x=explore other factors, related and unrelated to the rule, that may influence a licensee's decision  X -whether or not to editorialize.U x yO- xYԍ 1997 Reply Comments of UCC/MAP at 6; 1983 Comments of MAP on behalf of International Union, UAW at 2732.  X -  x!34. We share several of these commenters' concerns. The survey purports to present  xevidence that some stations in 1982 might have endorsed political candidates but for the political  xjeditorial rule. However, given that the survey results were obtained over 15 years ago, we find  xthat this survey is too old to serve as conclusive evidence that the rule has a significant chilling  XK-effect on licensee editorializing today.  X-  x"35. In addition, we also question whether the survey instrument and its methodology are  xsufficiently reliable. For example, UCC/MAP notes that the survey instrument itself manifests  xbroadcasters' bias as to the appropriate responses by stating that "NAB is launching a major  xeffort to measure the effect of the FCC's political editorial rule" and that "your response will play  X- xa role in the first step toward full First Amendment rights for broadcasters."V {OB -Ѝ 1983 Comments of MAP on behalf of International Union, UAW at 29. See RTNDA 1987 Joint Petition at 9; 1983 Supplemental Comments of NAB, NBEA, and RTNDA at App. A. This casts the rule  X- xin a pejorative light and encourages a response antipathetic to the rule.wW*  {O#-ԍ 1983 Comments of MAP on behalf of International Union, UAW at 29.w Moreover we find that  x=the statistical analysis of the survey data fails to account for selfselection bias in the data. In  x!particular, licensees who responded may have been more likely to object to the political editorializing rule than the typical licensee.  X7-  x#36. We agree with these commenters that the survey also failed to examine other reasons"7 W,&)&)aa"  xfor licensees choosing not to engage in political editorializing. In particular, we note that while  xthe survey suggests that some broadcasters would engage in political endorsements absent the  xrule, the survey also indicates that others endorsed candidates with the rule in place. These  xresponses raise the unexamined question of why elimination of the rule would have been  xnecessary for some licensees to promote editorializing when it was not the case for others.  xIndeed, the majority of respondents indicated that elimination of the rule would not lead them to engage in political editorializing.  XH-  x$37. Plainly there are other reasons, unrelated to the rule, why licensees do not endorse  xcandidates. A recently published study noted a significant decline in the general level of  X - xtelevision editorializing, not just with respect to candidate endorsements.]XH  {O - xԍ See "TV Editorials Merit Endangered Status", Electronic Media, June 8, 1998 at 3 (a recent study indicates  xthat while more than half of the nation's television stations were editorializing through the 1970s, today less than  {O% - x10 percent of the top50 market television affiliates do so), referencing J. Alumit, S. Carter, R. Sykes, "The Status  xjof Broadcast Television Editorials: A Survey and Discussion," (unpublished) submitted to the Association for  {O- xwEducation in Journalism and Mass Communications, Annual Convention, August 5-8, 1998; see also "The vanishing  {O- xTV editorial", Electronic Media, June 8, 1998 at 12 ("In the last decade and a half, while broadcasters have fully  xreaped the advantages of a strong local voice, they have given up on providing the kind of editorial leadership that attempts to shape and challenge the communities they serve.").] A number of factors  xLhave been attributed to this decline including broadcasters' fears of alienating viewers, station  X - xibudgetary constraints and the low production quality of inhouse editorials.?Y  {Ou- x-#]\  PCP#э Id. Broadcast coverage of the electoral process has come under increasing criticism. See e.g., "A Call for  {O?- xMore TV Time for Campaigns," Washington Post, June 18, 1998, at MD1 ("Given the poor coverage California  x<television stations gave to that state's gubernatorial primary this month, it's clear broadcasters could do much to  {O- ximprove."); "'Bleeders' Sweeping Leaders Off Calif. TV", Washington Post, May 23, 1998 at A1 ("Never before in  xCalifornia have politicians spent so much money on television advertising and received such little time on camera from the news departments of local stations.") ? Thus the presence or absence of the rule may be less significant than other factors.  X -T ă  X -  x%38. Although we find no persuasive evidence of a chilling effect, we are sensitive to  xibroadcasters' concerns about the potential burdens created by the rule and particularly to the fact  xthat the political editorial rule imposes more stringent requirements regarding licensee  Xb- xKendorsements than the Zapple doctrine imposes regarding appearances by candidate supporters.  xUnder the political editorial rule, once they have endorsed or opposed a particular candidate,  X6- xbroadcasters are required to seek out, notify, and provide transcripts to all the opponents of the  xKcandidates endorsed or those opposed, and they must also provide an opportunity to respond to  X - xxall such candidates. By contrast, under Zapple, licensees are under an obligation to furnish reply  X- x/time only to major candidates or major party supporters. The burden is on the candidate's  xZsupporters to request time from the station within seven days. In a footnote, we sought comment  X- xin the 1983 Notice on the manner in which the less rigorous requirements of the Zapple doctrine  X- xmight be applied to licensee editorials.ZV  {O&-Ѝ Notice at  53 n.31. See Nicholas Zapple, 23 FCC 2d 707 (1970).  Two commenters briefly note a preference for  X- xapplication of the Zapple doctrine. Tribune observes that "a licensee's political editorial should"Z,&)&)aa"  X- x\trigger no greater obligations or rights than are activated under the Zapple doctrine when a  X- xbroadcast involves a candidate's supporters."h[ yOd-Ѝ 1983 Comments of Tribune Broadcasting Company at 13.h NBC also notes that Zapple is preferable to the  X- xypolitical editorial rule.E\X yO-ԍ 1983 Comments of NBC at 14.E This meager record should be more fully developed and brought up to date.  X-  |x&39. We would be willing to streamline the rule to more closely parallel Zapple. Under  X|- x\a streamlined rule, the burden would shift to the candidates to request time from the station  xwithin seven days. Licensee political editorials would only trigger an obligation to furnish time  xto major candidates or major party supporters. We believe that this approach would reduce  x<broadcasters' requirements under the current political editorial rule, particularly in multicandidate  X - xraces. A modification of this rule to more closely parallel Zapple would also reconcile the treatment of licensee endorsements with those of political broadcasts sponsored by others.  X -C. The Personal Attack Rule    X -  x'40. Background. The personal attack rule creates a limited right of access to give  xindividuals an opportunity to respond to an attack on their character during the discussion of  X- x<controversial public issues.|] {O-Ѝ Personal Attacks and Political Editorials, 8 FCC 2d at 725 (1967).| In such cases, the Commission has concluded that licensees airing  xjsuch attacks should be required to send the text of the attack to the party attacked and include a specific offer to use their broadcast facilities for responses.  X>-x  X'-  x(41. Commenters supporting retention of the rule note that the rule is crucial because once  xan advocate's credibility is attacked, little credence will be given to his or her views on public  x-issues. By permitting responses to such attacks, they argue, the public is better able to appraise  X- x]the various positions on important public issues.l^z yO -Ѝ 1983 Comments of TRAC at 12; 1983 Comments of MAP at 15.l UCC/MAP note that no responsible  xbroadcaster would prepare or present a documentary or editorial making a personal attack on an  X- x/individual or group without seeking to obtain their views.I_  yOo -ԍ 1997 Comments of UCC/MAP at 16.I Therefore, they argue, the rule  xKreinforces sound journalistic practice and is only needed to address the irresponsible "bad actor"  X- xwho might act in blatant disregard of the public interest in the absence of any regulation.S` yO#-Ѝ 1997 Comments of UCC/MAP at 16.S ALF  x.notes that the personal attack rule helps ensure that the broadcast media will be a marketplace  XX-of ideas rather than a forum for attacks on personal character.NaX*  yO3'-Ѝ 1983 Comments of ALF at 8.N "A a,&)&)aa"Ԍ X-  ?x)42. Commenters urging repeal of the rule argue that the personal attack rule has largely  xproved ineffective and resulted in questionable public benefits. RTNDA argues that the rule is  X- xvague in certain respects, making compliance difficult.Sb yOK-Ѝ RTNDA 1987 Joint Petition at 7.S In such respects, RTNDA argues that  xmany stations, faced with the costs of contesting an alleged violation of the rule, will "opt for  xtimid, safe programming instead of risking the major expense and potential loss of license  X- xxentailed in a personal attack complaint."^cX yO-Ѝ 1983 Joint Comments of RTNDA et. al at 48.^ These commenters also suggest that, in practice, those  x|offered reply time rarely accept. Commenters also argue that the rule is duplicative of  xdefamation law and inconsistent with the constitutional standards governing defamation actions  XH- xLset forth by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan.dH {O - xԍ  See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); 1997 Comments of NAB at 34. 1997; Comments of CBS at 6. They point out, because the  xrule makes no distinction between attacks on public and private figures, it goes beyond existing  X -libel and slander laws.se B yO-Ѝ 1997 Comments of NAB at 34. 1997; Comments of CBS at 6. s  X -  x*43. Discussion. Broadcast licensees have a fundamental public interest obligation to help  xensure that the discussion of public affairs on the public airwaves remains a marketplace of ideas  X - x<and not a platform for attacks on personal character. In upholding the personal attack rule in Red  X - x[Lion, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an  xLuninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than countenance  X- xmonopolization of that market, whether it is by the Government itself or a private licensee."Kf {O-ԍ Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. K  x>The Court went on to say that it was consistent with this First Amendment purpose for the  xCommission "to require a broadcaster to permit answers to personal attacks occurring in the  xcourse of discussing controversial issues . . . . Otherwise, station owners and a few networks  xwould have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate  x<only their own views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those  X- xwith whom they agreed.";gd  {O -ԍ Id. at 392.; Thus, the Court stated that it "cannot say that when a station  xpublishes personal attacks or endorses political candidates, it is a misconstruction of the public  xinterest standard to require the station to offer time for a response rather than to leave the  x[response entirely within the control of the station which has attacked either the candidacies or  X-the men who wish to reply in their own defense.";h  {OB%-ԍ Id. at 385.;  Xm-  x+44. The personal attack rule was based on the public interest standard and was  xestablished in a series of cases in the early 1960s involving personal attacks on candidates and"V h,&)&)aa0"  X- xKelected officials.]i {Oy-ԍ See, e.g., Clayton Mapoles, 23 RR 586 (1962).] The Supreme Court has stated that, "[i]n terms of constitutional principle, and  xas enforced sharing of a scarce resource," the personal attack and political editorial rules "are  xindistinguishable from the equaltime provision of  315." The Court further characterized these  X- xtwo rules as "important complements" of this statutory provision.JjZ {O-ԍ  Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391.J In addition, Section 315(a)  x!expressly provides that compliance with the terms of Section 315 alone does not relieve  xbroadcasters of the "obligation imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest  xKand to afford a reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."  X1-  |x,45. We believe that the personal attack rule strikes a reasonable balance between the  x<editorial control of licensees and the public interest obligation described above. While a licensee  x.is granted complete discretion to broadcast any range and nature of views on issues of public  ximportance, the rule requires that if the reputation of a person or a group is attacked during such  x[a broadcast, the person or group attacked must be given a reasonable opportunity to respond.  x=Like the political editorial rule, the personal attack rule has very limited application and creates  xa targeted and calibrated right of access. The rule comes into play only when an attack is made  xover a licensee's facilities during the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance.  xIn considering whether to apply the rule, the Commission has historically left considerable  xdiscretion to the licensee to decide what issue is involved and whether the issue is controversial  XK- xand of public importance.wkK {O-ԍ See Straus Communications v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1976).w The Commission intervenes only when there is evidence that the  xstation has acted in bad faith. In addition, news programming as well as other matters are  X- x.exempt under the rule.^l~ {OL-ԍ 47 C.F.R.  73.1920 (b). See supra note 28.^ This ensures that a licensee's editorial judgments regarding its news coverage are unhampered.  X-  x-46. It is important, in our view, that the rule provides a targeted right of access on the  xistation on which the attack occurred. Despite commenters' arguments that there are an increasing  xynumber of broadcast outlets in today's communications marketplace, these outlets vary greatly  x/in terms of location, signal reach, audience share and demographics. We agree with those  xparties who point out that once an individual's credibility is attacked, little credence will be given  xto his or her views on public issues. It is therefore critical that the attacked individual be granted  xan opportunity to respond. This opportunity will be more effective if it takes place on the same  xstation airing the attack. In such respects, the rule is tailored to help ensure that the same  x.audience hearing the initial attack is likely to hear the response to that attack. For these same  xreasons, we also disagree with those commenters who assert that the rule does not promote the  xdiscussion of important issues, but merely serves as a means to vindicate personal reputations.  xAn individual's personal character is inextricably linked to the credence an audience will give  xhis or her views on public issues, and in such respects a response to a personal attack is crucial" l,&)&)aa " to the public's ability to reach a reasoned judgment.  X-  x.47. We are also not persuaded by those commenters who argue that attacks on personal  xMreputations can be vindicated through common law defamation actions. The Commission's  xpersonal attack rule is distinct from and serves different purposes than state defamation laws.  xDefamation actions are designed to remedy harms to personal reputations and can take years to  xresolve. In contrast, the personal attack rule is designed to expose the public to a conflicting  xview at the time the issue is being debated. As the commenters supporting the rule persuasively  XH- xLargue,nmH {O -ԍ See 1983 Comments of TRAC at 12; 1983 Comments of MAP at 15. n the rule is not intended to be a remedy for private disputes, but is aimed at permitting  xjthe public to receive a balanced, fair and more complete presentation of controversial issues of  xpublic importance. Moreover, we note that the personal attack rule applies not only to  X -individuals but also to groups, for whom a state defamation claim may not be available.n Z yO- xԍ Defamation claims arising out of defamatory statements about a group are generally only available if the  x,statements can reasonably be construed to be "of and concerning" the individual plaintiff as a member of the group.  {O- xSee, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, 564A (1977) ("One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a group  xor class of persons is subject to liability to an individual member of it if, but only if, (a) the group or class is so  xsmall that the matter can reasonably be understood to refer to the member, or (b) the circumstances of publication  xYreasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular reference to that member."). In contrast, the personal  xattack rule explicitly applies to attacks on groups. 47 C.F.R. 73.1920(a). This difference is consistent with the  xdistinct purposes underlying defamation claims (remedying harm to personal reputations) and the personal attack rule  x(preventing the distortion of debate on important issues through attacks on groups or individuals). The validity of  {O- x-true "group libel" laws is open to substantial doubt. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188  {O-(9th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989).  X -  x/48. We also find that the record contains no persuasive evidence that the precisely  xtargeted access right embodied in the personal attack rule causes licensees to shy away from  xcontroversial issues confronting their communities or otherwise chills their speech. The rule  xremedies a personal attack with more speech, not censorship. As noted above, the Commission  xhas also created significant exemptions from the requirements of the rule, including an exemption for bona fide news coverage.  X4-  x049. The Supreme Court has found that the personal attack rule is not unduly vague  xnoting, "judging the validity of the regulations on their face as they are presented here, we cannot  xconclude that the FCC has been left a free hand to vindicate its own idiosyncratic conception of  X- xthe public interest or of the requirements of free speech."Mo  {O`"-ԍ  Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 39596.M We agree that the rule is sufficiently  xclear and promotes the prompt and inexpensive resolution of disputes between broadcasters and  xmembers of their community. As such, the rule is essentially selfenforcing and the  xCommission's involvement is minimal. As UCC/MAP point out, there have been very few  xpersonal attack rule cases since the RTNDA petitions were filed that have resulted in written"R o,&)&)aa"  X-decisions, and no adverse findings by the Commission since 1987.Rp yOy-ԍ 1997 Reply Comments of UCC/MAP at 1011.R  X-  x150. However, to address broadcasters' concerns that the rule may impose some  X- xunnecessary burdens on licensees, we would be willing to modify this rule to reflect the Zapple  x!requirements. We would therefore be willing to modify the rule to eliminate the existing  xnotification requirements and make the rule requestdriven. In particular, under a modified rule,  xthe requestor the individual or group subject to the personal attack would be required to  xymake the request to the station for response time within a reasonable period of time or the right  xLto reply would be surrendered. The licensee would not be required to take the affirmative step  xof notifying such an individual or group of the personal attack. We note, however, that we have never sought comment on such a proposal and believe it would be important to do so.  X -  x251. We therefore vote to retain the personal attack rule, but would be willing to modify the rule in such a manner.  X -D. The Implications of the Repeal of the Fairness Doctrine  X{-  x352. A number of commenters argue that a prior Commission's decision to repeal the  xfairness doctrine requires this Commission to repeal the political editorial and personal attack  XM- xrules since these two rules have been viewed as corollaries to the fairness doctrine.~qMX {OV-ԍ See Comments of RTNDA, NAB, Paxson, CBS, and Freedom of Expression Foundation.~ We disagree.  X-  x453. The fairness doctrine required broadcast licensees (1) "to provide coverage of vitally  ximportant controversial issues of interest in the community served by the licensees" and (2) "to  X- xprovide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues."r {Ou- xԍ See Report Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 FCC2d 143, 146 (1985).  X- xIn its 1987 decision in Syracuse Peace Council,lsD {O-ԍ 2 FCC Rcd 5043 (1987), recon. denied, 3 FCC Rcd 2035 (1988).l a prior Commission eliminated the fairness  xdoctrine on the grounds that it was contrary to the public interest and First Amendment. The  xCommission believed that the "growth in the number of broadcast outlets reduced any need for  xthe doctrine, that the doctrine often worked to dissuade broadcasters from presenting any  xtreatment of controversial viewpoints, that it put the government in the doubtful position of  xevaluating program content, and that it created an opportunity for incumbents to abuse it for  X;- xpartisan purposes."t; {O%- xԍ Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (summarizing FCC's reasons for  {O&-eliminating doctrine), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld this decision  xKwithout reaching the constitutional issues raised by the Commission. The court instead held that"$2 t,&)&)aa"  x the Commission had been reasonable in concluding, based on the record before it, that the  X-fairness doctrine was contrary to the public interest.3u {Ob-ԍ Id.3  X-  x554. We do not believe that Syracuse Peace Council controls the Commission's resolution  X- x=of this proceeding. Syracuse Peace Council was expressly limited to the fairness doctrine. In  X- xKaddition, subsequent statements and actions by Congress and the Supreme Court,vZ {O- xԍ See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,  {Of -637-38 (1994); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566-67 (1990).  persuade us  xythat broadcasters continue to play a special role in serving the public interest, including a duty  xto abide by the political editorial and personal attack rules. As an initial matter, we note that  XL- x.Syracuse Peace Council expressly declined to rule on a request that it also repeal the political  xeditorial and personal attack rules, stating that "[t]hose issues are beyond the scope" of that  X - xproceeding.<w  yO-ԍ 3 FCC Rcd at 2036.< More generally, these rules are based on the public interest standard, and are not  xdependent on the continued existence of the fairness doctrine. The prior Commission's decision  x to repeal the fairness doctrine did not diminish broadcasters' obligation to serve the public  xinterest. To the contrary, the public interest standard continues to be embodied in the  xCommunications Act, which requires the Commission to issue and renew a broadcaster's license  X - xonly upon a finding that the station has served the public interest.Rx F yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C.  307(a), 309(k)(1)(A).R Moreover, Congress made  xLclear in Section 201 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required the Commission to  x>set aside additional spectrum for existing broadcast television stations to convert to digital  xZtelevision, that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as relieving a television broadcasting  XQ- xstation from its obligation to serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity."yQ {O- xԍ Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56, 108 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.  336(d)). Congress  xalso reaffirmed the public trustee obligation in the Children's Television Act of 1990, noting "[i]t  xis well established that in exchange for 'the free and exclusive use of a valuable part of the  xpublic domain,' a broadcaster can be required to act as a public fiduciary, obligated to serve the  X-needs and interests of its area."z0  {O - xԍ See H. Rep. 385, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1989)(citing Red Lion; Office of Communication of United  {O!- x,Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 FCC 2d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966)). See also Section 25(a) of the Cable Television  xJConsumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102385, 106 Stat. 1460 (directing the FCC to impose  xon providers of direct broadcast satellite service, public interest requirements, including access for political candidates based on a spectrum scarcity rationale.)   X-  0x655. Broadcasters' continued role as public trustees reflects the fact that the frequencies  xLthey use remain a scarce public resource. More citizens still want to broadcast over the public"z,&)&)aa"  X- xairwaves that can be accommodated.{ {Oy- xԍ Originally, radio licenses were issued for 60 days (Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission 1928,  {OC-at 8) and extended to one year (Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission 1929, at 2.) Indeed, the scarcity of these frequencies, and the  xconcomitant barriers to new voices entering the broadcast industry, has been further underlined  x.by the 1996 Act's extension of broadcast license terms to eight years and its elimination of the  X- x<opportunity for competing applicants to challenge an incumbent broadcaster's license renewal.R|&$ {O- xJ#]\  PCP#э#X\  P6G;P# See Sections 203 and 204 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56, 112113  {OZ- x(1996); Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 1720 (1997) (extending broadcast license terms to eight years under the 1996  {O$ - x<Act); Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 18289 (April 25, 1996) (eliminating comparative renewals pursuant to the 1996 Act) (codified at 47 U.S.C.  307(c) and 309(k)(4)).R  xzToday the licensee holds a valuable right to the exclusive use of a frequency which extends  xsignificantly longer than before and which is far less vulnerable to challenge. In addition, the  x1996 Act set aside virtually all remaining vacant UHF and VHF band spectrum to permit each  X_- xexisting full service broadcast television licensee to convert to digital television.}_ yO"-#]\  PCP##]\  PCP#э#X\  P6G;P# Section 201 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56, 10708 (1996). These  xLdevelopments have exacerbated the challenges facing those seeking to become licensees. So xcalled "pirate" broadcasters have recently taken to using the airwaves without a license in large  X - xjnumbers, claiming that they have no reasonable access to licenses.~  {Om-ԍ See, e.g., United States v. Dunifer, No. C 9403542 CW (N.D. Cal. June 16, 1998). Given this, we think it is  X - xa reasonable quid pro quo to expect those who have been awarded these scarce frequencies to  xprovide access to individuals who have been personally attacked or a political candidate whose  xjopponent has been endorsed by a station editorial. A licensee has been "'granted the free and  xexclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise  X -it is burdened by enforceable public obligations.'" 4  {O-#]\  PCP#э#X\  P6G;P# CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (citation omitted).  X{-  1x756. Even Syracuse Peace Council made clear that the repeal of the fairness doctrine  xshould not be interpreted as effectively repealing a broadcaster's obligation to cover issues that  xare responsive to the needs and interests of its community. As the Commission stated, "[i]ssue  X8- x/responsive obligations remain in full force and effect."<8  yO-ԍ 3 FCC Rcd at 2039.< We think the same applies to the  X!- xpolitical editorial and personal attack rules. Although the Syracuse Peace Council Commission  xjasserted that the growth in media outlets would generally ensure some measure of coverage of  xycontroversial issues, that does not mean that the personal attack and political editorial rules do  X- x<not continue to serve important public interest purposes.yZV  {O$- xԍ 2 FCC Rcd at 505152; See 3 FCC Rcd at 203839 ("Having eliminated the chilling effects most directly  x-associated with the second prong of the doctrine, coverage of controversial issues will be forthcoming naturally, without the need for continued enforcement of the first prong."). y The personal attack rule was needed  xk(and upheld by the Supreme Court) when the fairness doctrine ensured some balance in the  xKdiscussion of controversial issues, and continues to be needed even assuming that the growth in"x,&)&)aa"  xmedia outlets provides that coverage. Similarly, the political editorial rule continues to be  xnecessary even assuming that the media marketplace generally ensures some measure of coverage  xof controversial issues, because a particular election might be skewed if the handful of media  x[owners in a community could choose to endorse candidates without providing the candidates'  xopponents a right to respond. This also explains why Section 315(a) continues to be necessary  X- xieven in the wake of the Commission's Syracuse Peace Council decision, because without Section  x315 an election might be skewed if the handful of licensees in a community could choose whose  xcampaign advertisements to accept and reject all others. Thus, notwithstanding the Commission's  x belief eleven years ago that coverage of controversial issues will be forthcoming naturally, Congress has not chosen to repeal or amend Section 315(a).  X -  x857. Moreover, unlike the fairness doctrine, these rules create a specific opportunity in  xcertain circumstances similar to the limited access created by the statutory equal opportunity  xrequirements under Section 315(a) and the reasonable access provisions of Section 312(a)(7) of  xthe Communications Act. These rules thus go beyond the general obligations of the fairness  xKdoctrine by providing an important complement to the requirements of Section 315(a) and Section  x312(a)(7). In doing so, they directly further the robust debate on important public issues that is central to broadcasters' obligation to serve the public interest.  XM-  x958. Nor do we believe the growth in the number of broadcast and other media outlets,  xcited by the prior Commission in eliminating the fairness doctrine, warrants repeal of the political  xeditorial and personal attack rules. First, we do not believe the type of evidence that persuaded  xthe Commission to find that the fairness doctrine had a chilling effect has been presented in this  xproceeding. The evidence submitted regarding the alleged chilling effect of the political editorial  xand personal attack rules has largely been anecdotal and speculative. These attacks on the rules  xkare no more persuasive now than they were in 1969, when the Supreme Court rejected them.  xWe also point out that the rules are tailored to avoid undue burdens and intrusions on licensees'  xeditorial judgments, and we have expressed our willingness to modify the rules further to ensure  xthat this is the case. Thus, for example, the personal attack rule exempts a licensee's news  x\coverage and other matters from its requirements. The fairness doctrine contained no such exemptions or tailoring.  X"-  ?x:59. Second, while there are a greater number of outlets today, many of those outlets are  xirrelevant to the rules at issue. National cable networks, for instance, do not, and realistically  xcannot, endorse candidates for state or local office, or engage in discussion of local issues. So  x-just as Section 315(a) has not been rendered obsolete by the increased number of outlets, neither  xkhas the political editorial rule. Third, these rules authorize a right of access in response to a  xspecific statement that is unlikely to be provided by the general media marketplace. Consider,  X"- xfor example, the personal attack that was at issue in Red Lion -- an attack suggesting that the  X#- xauthor of a book critical of Barry Goldwater was a communist sympathizer.J# {O%-ԍ Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 371.J There is simply  xno reason to think that another broadcaster would happen to provide a response to the view, aired by a competing broadcaster, that a particular author was a Communist sympathizer."U%Z,&)&)aa'$"Ԍ X-  ԙx;60. Fourth, broadcast outlets today vary greatly in terms of location, signal reach, and  xLaudience share and demographics. Given these differences, the limited access afforded by the  x.political editorial and personal attack rules will be most effective if it takes place on the station  xairing the personal attack or candidate endorsement. In this way the individual invoking the rule  x.will be most likely to reach the same audience that heard the initial attack or endorsement. For  xthe same reason Section 315's equal opportunity requirements are imposed on each station airing  xa candidate appearance and have not been rendered obsolete by the growth in the number of media outlets.  X1-  x<61. Fifth, the two rules do not involve the Commission in licensee programming  xdecisions to the extent that the fairness doctrine did. The latter set forth a general obligation of  xxbalanced coverage of controversial issues that required the Commission to make judgments about  x]whether a licensee had presented a sufficient number of "contrasting" viewpoints in the  xprogramming at issue. The political editorial and personal attack rules, however, are basically  xlimited access requirements that are triggered by discrete, identifiable circumstances: a candidate  x/endorsement or a personal attack during the presentation of a controversial issue of public  X- ximportance. As one set of commenters indicated,R yO -ԍ 1997 Reply Comments of UCC/MAP at 1011.R the rules are clear and generally self x^enforcing, greatly minimizing the Commission's involvement in licensee programming  Xb-decisions..~bX yOk- xԍ UCC/MAP, proponents of the rules, state that "since 1987 . . . there have been fewer than a dozen political  xeditorial decisions and personal attack rule cases which actually resulted in written decisions. Of those reported,  xthere have been about three adverse findings as to the political editorial rule, for which the sanctions were in each  xJcase mere admonitions. [UCC/MAP] were unable to locate a single instance of an adverse finding as to the personal attack rule since 1987." 1997 Reply Comments of UCC/MAP at 1011.~  X4-  Ox=62. In the end, our task in this proceeding, just as it was in our review of the fairness  x=doctrine, is "to make predictive and normative judgments" about the benefits and the burdens  x/resulting from the two rules, and ultimately to determine whether the benefits outweigh the  X- xburdens.X {O-ԍ Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 660.X In our judgment this calculus leads us to a different result than the one reached by  xthe prior Commission with respect to the fairness doctrine given the different considerations raised by the political editorial and personal attack rules.  X-E.  First Amendment Issues  Xe-  Nx>63. A number of commenters have argued that the political editorial and personal attack  XN- x.rules are contrary to the First Amendment.N yO%- xԍ 1983 Joint Comments of RTNDA et. al. at 55; 1983 Comments of ALF at 89; 1983 Comments of TRAC at 17. They further assert that spectrum scarcity the  X7- xprimary basis for the Supreme Court's decision upholding the rules in its 1969 Red Lion"7 ,&)&)aa"  X- xBroadcasting Co. v. FCCN˾ {Oy-ԍ Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).N decision is a thing of the past given new allocations of broadcast  x=channels and the development of cable and other outlets. In this regard, they point to dicta in  X- xzSyracuse Peace Council stating that the scarcity rationale is no longer valid and urging the  X- xSupreme Court to reconsider its holdings in Red Lion and League of Women VotersGZ˾ yO-ԍ 468 U.S. 364 (1984).ppG that have  X-granted the government greater leeway in regulating broadcasters under the First Amendment.k|˾ {OE - xԍ Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 505257. The Commission's statements regarding the scarcity  x;rationale were dicta in that they were not necessary to the Commission's decision that, even under the more lenient  {O - xstandard for reviewing broadcast programming regulation set forth in Red Lion, the Fairness Doctrine violated the  xFirst Amendment. In any event, on appeal, the D.C. Circuit expressly avoided any review of either the  xCommission's constitutional holding or its constitutional dicta and upheld the Commission's decision on the narrow  xground that the Commission was reasonable in its conclusion that the fairness doctrine no longer served the public  yO -interest.k  X~-  {x?64. We disagree with these arguments. In Red Lion, the Supreme Court upheld the very  xjrules at issue in this proceeding against a First Amendment challenge. The Court stated that it  xjwas not "inconsistent with the First Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable  xMof conducting its own affairs to require a broadcaster to permit answers to personal attacks  xloccurring in the course of discussing controversial issues, or to require that the political  X - xopponents of those endorsed by the station be given a chance to communicate with the public."J .  {O-ԍ Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392.J  xThe Court also found that "the First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others  xjfrom broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce  xresource which the Government has denied others the right to use. In terms of constitutional  xprinciple, and as enforced sharing of a scarce resource, the personal attack and political editorial  X-rules are indistinguishable from the equal time provision of Section 315. . . ."J  {O -ԍ Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391.J  Xl-  \SYRACUSEx@65. We also take this opportunity to reject the elevenyear old dicta in Syracuse Peace  XW- xCouncil regarding the scarcity rationale and the appropriate First Amendment standard governing  XB- x.broadcasters. We believe that Red Lion and League of Women Voters remain the appropriate  xjconstitutional standard for judicial review of broadcast programming regulation under the First  X- xAmendment. In this regard, we note that three years after the Commission decision in Syracuse  X- xPeace Council, the Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting v. FCCMR  yO$-ԍ 497 U.S. 547, 56667 (1990). M gave no hint that it was  X- xprepared to reconsider the established standard for reviewing broadcast regulation. More  X- xrecently, in Reno v. ACLU the Court noted the special justifications for imposing public interest  x[requirements on broadcasting, including the history of extensive government regulation of the  xmbroadcast medium, the scarcity of available frequencies, and the "invasive nature" of",&)&)aao"  X- xbroadcasting. {Oy- xԍ 117 S.Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997) (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637638 (1994)  {OC-and Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,128 (1989)). Moreover, Congress, whose decisions should be afforded "great weight" in the  X- xjudicial evaluation of First Amendment claims in the broadcasting context,[$ {O-ԍ CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973). [ stated in the  xlegislative history of the Children's Television Act of 1990 its belief that broadcasters may be  x[subject to reasonable public interest programming obligations due to the scarcity of broadcast  X- xifrequencies on the traditional basis that broadcasters are public trustees of the airwaves. {O - xԍ  See S. Rep. No. 227, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1011 (1989)(noting "[t]he Supreme court long has recognized  x;Congress' authority generally to regulate broadcasting 'in the public interest, convenience and necessity' through the  xYvehicle of the Communications Act of 1934 (the "Act") and FCC rules and regulations. In 1969, the Supreme court  xaffirmed that because radio spectrum is not available to all, broadcast licensees have a duty to act as fiduciaries for  {O- - xthe public. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-389 (1969)"); H. Rep. No. 385, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1989)  xy(noting "[i]t is well established that in exchange for 'the free and exclusive use of a valuable part of the public  xKdomain,' a broadcaster can be required to act as a public fiduciary, obligated to serve the needs and interests of its  {O- xYarea." (citing Red Lion; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 FCC 2d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966)). More  xrecently, in Section 201 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress reaffirmed this public  xtrustee relationship and required the Commission to set aside additional spectrum for existing  x<broadcast television stations to convert to digital television noting that "[n]othing in this section  xshall be construed as relieving a television broadcasting station from its obligation to serve the  X1-public interest, convenience, and necessity."1  {On- xԍ Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56, 108 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.  336(d)).  X -  xA66. Red Lion is consequently still good law, and the scarcity rationale remains.  {O-#o\  PCXP##]\  PCP#э#X\  P6G;P# See also 1997 Comments of MAP/UCC at 910. It is  xzstill true that "there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are  X - xfrequencies to allocate." x {O-#o\  PCXP##]\  PCP#э#X\  P6G;P# Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388. Indeed, in 1996 the D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of public  xinterest requirements that have been imposed on direct broadcast satellite services ("DBS"), which  X - xsimilarly use scarce spectrum frequencies, on the basis of Red Lion and the scarcity rationale.  {Od!-#o\  PCXP##]\  PCP#э#X\  P6G;P# Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 97379 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  xiWe also note that alternative rationales have been offered to support a different First Amendment  X}-standard for broadcasters by the courtsl} {O$-#o\  PCXP##]\  PCP#Ѝ#X\  P6G;P# See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 74849 (1978) (upholding broadcast indecency regulation on grounds that broadcasting has "established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and  {O\&-"is uniquely accessible to children"); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400 ("Even where there are gaps in spectrum utilization, the fact remains that existing broadcasters have often attained their present position because of their initial government selection in competition with others before new technological advances opened new"',&)&)!(" opportunities for further uses. Long experience in broadcasting, confirmed habits of listeners and viewers, network affiliation, and other advantages in program procurement give existing broadcasters a substantial advantage over new entrants, even where new entry is technologically possible. These advantages are the fruit of  {O-a preferred position conferred by the Government."); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (A "licensed broadcaster is 'granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he  {Oz-accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable pubic obligations.'") (citation omitted); Time Warner  {OD-Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J., dissenting from denial of petition  {O-for rehearing en banc) (objecting to extending Red Lion's scarcity rationale to justify DBS public interest requirements, but considering the possibility that "DBS regulation could be saved as a condition legitimately attached to a government grant").l and in recent scholarship.(}h  {O0 - x#o\  PCXP##]\  PCP#э#X\  P6G;P# See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (1993); Owen Fiss, The Irony of Free  {O - xSpeech (1996); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children's Television  {O - xProgramming, 45 Duke L.J. 1193 (1996); Charles Logan, Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing  {O -the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1687 (1997)."}X ,&)&)aa"Ԍ X-  lԙxB67. We therefore conclude that the First Amendment standard set forth in Red Lion and  X- xLeague of Women Voters remains the appropriate test for assessing broadcast regulation, and that the political editorial and personal attack rules satisfy this test.  X-" IV. CONCLUSIONTP  Xz-  xC68. As we find above, the political editorial and personal attack rules continue to serve  xthe public interest. We consequently vote to retain the two rules, although, as discussed above,  x_we would be willing to streamline them to lessen the burdens they may impose on  X5-broadcasters.c5X  {O>- xԍ As the Commission pointed out in the Notice and the Mass Media Bureau's 1996 Public Notice, the political  yO- xieditorial and personal attack rules are also applicable to cable systems when they originate programming. See 47  xC.F.R.  76.209. The focus of this proceeding has been on broadcasting, not on cable. We received no comment  xZon these rules in the cable context. The record thus provides an insufficient basis for us to formulate a judgment on this issue. c