| Re: | In the Matter of Applications of SatCom Systems Inc., TMI Communications and Company, L.P. and SatCom Systems Inc., File No. 647-DSE-P/L-98 et al |
I support the Commission's decision today to permit another entrant into the United States satellite communications marketplace. The WTO agreement has created a solid foundation that will allow American companies to compete freely abroad and will create corresponding opportunities for American consumers to purchase the services of new domestic telecommunications providers. I write separately solely to express my continued concern about the role of other government agencies in the Commission's licensing process.(1)
It is clear that the WTO intended for national security concerns to play a role in determining whether certain markets would be opened to competition. The GATS provides for "essential security" exceptions under Articles XIV bis.(2) Similarly, in our DISCO II Order we assured the parties that we would "consider any such legitimate concerns [regarding national security or law enforcement] as we undertake our own independent analyses of whether grant of a particular authorization is in the public interest."(3) I believe the process here went far beyond the process envisioned by the WTO and our prior decisions.
In March 1998, two companies (one American-owned (SatCom) and the other Canadian-owned (TMI)) filed earth station applications to receive the signal of a Canadian satellite (MSAT-1). Comments were due on these applications in May of 1998. Eleven months later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) filed its comments. The FBI then entered into seven months of "negotiations" with the applicants in order to reach a "voluntary" agreement that would place conditions on the licenses. In October 1999, the FBI withdrew its objections and requested that we incorporate the "agreement" into our approval of the license applications.
I. A Muddled Process
I am concerned that the FCC's licensing procedure is being hijacked to achieve other agencies' public policy goals. The FBI's procedural record here is particularly unfortunate.
The Commission may well have been able to approve this application a year ago, but for the last minute epiphany of the FBI that the application raised grave national security issues. Indeed, the FBI filed its comments eleven months late. This is not a minor oversight.(4) The FBI then consumed another seven months negotiating a "voluntary" agreement with the applicants. This effectively created an 18-month freeze on our approval process. This freeze prejudices not only the notice-and-comment process, but also the parties' interest in a full, fair and prompt resolution. Moreover, an applicant's competitors now have an incentive to complicate our licensing process by utilizing other government agencies to slow down our approval. The resulting procedural morass undermines predictability and creates tremendous delays that deny American consumers' competitive service options.
II. Potentially Discriminatory Obligations
These side agreements between the private parties and the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI are also potentially discriminatory. Putting aside the underlying merits of any side agreement, I am troubled by the ad hoc nature of these obligations. To the extent we have jurisdiction and "national security" issues arise, then we should promulgate generally applicable rules to address earth stations accessing non-U.S. licensed space stations. We should utilize the Administrative Procedure Act to develop a comprehensive record on these issues.(5) In fact, at least one rulemaking proceeding could have provided such an opportunity.(6) However, to date no such generally applicable rules have been proposed or adopted by the Commission.
Similarly, if the DOJ or FBI have such concerns, they should utilize their independent authority to address those issues. If they lack such authority, then the Administration should turn to Congress for the appropriate delegation of authority.
As I noted in the AT&T/BT proceeding, our Order here attempts to distance the agency from the conclusions reached and conditions advanced by the DOJ and FBI: "We note that the Agreement reflects a unique situation, and contains certain provisions that, if broadly applied, would have significant consequences for the telecommunications industry. These provisions, if viewed as precedent for other service providers and potential investors, would warrant further inquiry on our part. Therefore, this agreement does not establish precedent for future cases." (7) Once again, the Order does not identify what is "unique" about this "situation," except that it is obvious that the agency does not want to be bound by the findings of DOJ and the FBI. I remain concerned that we are trying to have it both ways - we use our authority to impose these onerous obligations, while distancing ourselves from the outcome.
III. The FCC's Bureau for Third-Party Contract Enforcement?
Finally, as I have discussed elsewhere, this agency is on dangerous ground when it purports to play a role in the enforcement of other agency's regulatory determinations. Here the side agreement calls for the parties to seek judicial enforcement of the agreement or "move for relief from the FCC."(8) As I stated in AT&T/TCI, "we have no jurisdiction to enforce rules not promulgated under the Communications Act. . . and we cannot and should not do the enforcement work of others."(9) The public would be far better served if the Commission were to decline to incorporate the side agreement into our approval order and leave the contract's enforcement to the parties and the courts.(10)
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I urge my fellow Commissioners, the FBI and the Department of Justice to move swiftly to remedy this ad hoc and arduous "process" for national security review by the Administration. To the extent that national security concerns warrant broadly applicable rules, I will readily support efforts to create such regulations. However, we should not continue to develop these rules "as we go along" without any of the procedural and legal protections traditionally afforded parties impacted by rulemakings. The current process does not serve the parties or the American people well.
1 See Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth inAT&T Corp., British Telecommunications, plc, VLT Co. L.L.C., Violet License Co. LLC, and TNV [Bahamas] Limited Applications for Grant of Section 214 Authority, Modification of Authorizations and Assignment of Licenses in Connection with the Proposed Joint Venture Between AT&T Corp. and British Telecommunications, plc, IB Docket No. 98-212, FCC 99-313 (rel. October 29, 1999).
2 It is not clear that general law enforcement issues legitimately rise to the level of "essential security." For the purposes of this Statement, however, I assume that the term subsumes the law enforcement concerns raised by the FBI. Surprisingly, the FBI also invokes the GATS exception for issues related to "any obligations under the U.N. Charter to maintain international peace and security." FBI Reply to Opposition at 7 (filed April 27, 1999). The application of that exception here seems, at best, aggressive.
3 Amendment of the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Service in the United States, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 24094, ¶ 179 (1997)("DISCO II"); Ironically, "we emphasize[d] . . . that we expect national security, law enforcement, foreign policy and trade policy concerns to be raised in very rare circumstances. Contrary to the fears of some commenters, the scope of the concerns that the Executive Branch will raise in the context [of transfers] . . . is narrow and well-defined." Id. at ¶ 180.
4 The FBI asserts that it did not "become aware" of TMI's application "until the fall of 1998." FBI's Reply to Opposition at 3 (filed April 27, 1999). Even after discovery, the Bureau waited another six months to file anything at the Commission. In this regard, the FBI noted Title III's lack of a notice provision for other governmental entities (Section 214 contains such a provision). The distinct lack of such a provision further undercuts any Commission deference to these filings under Title III. Indeed, there appears to be no statutory basis for treating the FBI different than any other party to a Title III application.
5 In this regard, I note that the application has been found to satisfy our requirements under the Communications assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). Order ¶ 61.
6 See Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 to Implement the Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) Memorandum of Understanding and Arrangements and Petition of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to Amend Part 25 of the Commission's Rules to Establish Emissions Limits for Mobile and Portable Earth Stations Operating in the 1610-1660.5 MHz Band, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 99-37 (rel. March 5, 1999).
7 Order at ¶ 57.
8 Appendix A, Agreement at § 11.2.
9 Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, in Re: Applications for Consent to the Transfer and Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorization from Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, CS Docket No. 98-178 (Feb. 18, 1999).
10 Just as in AT&T/BT, I understand that here the incorporation of the side agreement was made an explicit condition of the withdrawal of the government parties' objections. I continue to urge the Commission to work with the other governmental parties to remove such provisions from any future side agreements.