Re:	Petition for Forbearance of the Independent Telephone & Telecommunications Alliance; Regulatory Treatment of LEC Provision of Interexchange Services Originating in the LEC's Local Exchange Area

I support these items to the extent that they provide the relief requested by the Independent Telephone & Telecommunications Alliances (ITTA) petition. I object, however, to the extent that the regulatory relief requested is denied or some lesser regulatory relief is provided. Moreover, I question the overall approach that the Commission has taken to this forbearance petition.

I start with the presumption that the ITTA petition has been "deemed granted" in full because of the Commission's failure either (i) to deny the petition within one year after receiving it, or (ii) to make an explicit finding that a 90 day extension was necessary to meet the statutory requirements. Section 10 of the Communications Act is very clear: "The Commission may extend the initial one-year period by an additional 90 days if the Commission finds that an extension is necessary to meet the requirements of subsection (a)." The statute is thus specific that it is the "Commission" which must grant any extension and must do so upon a finding that the extension is necessary to meet the purposes of section 10(a). I do not believe that the bureau, acting on its own motion and without even prior consultation with the "Commission," can act to extend this statutory time-frame. I do not believe that the 90 day extension can be effectively used by the bureau without even briefing the Commission on the merits of the underlying petition, determining whether or not there are any new or novel questions of fact, law or policy, and receiving some signal from a majority of the "Commission" that an extension of time is warranted under these particular circumstances.

In addition, I disagree with several aspects of the approach that the Commission has taken to this forbearance petition. In several instances, the Commission determines that ITTA has not met the criteria for forbearance to the extent that the petition requests relief beyond that which is granted in a contemporaneous rulemaking proceeding. See e.g., Petition for Forbearance of the Independent Telephone & Telecommunications Alliance, Third Memorandum Opinion and Order in AAD File No. 98-43, at para. 10 (denying relief to the extent that petition "extends beyond the relief granted in the LEC Classification Second Order on Reconsideration.") See also, Petition for Forbearance of the Independent Telephone & Telecommunications Alliance, Sixth Memorandum Opinion and Order in AAD File No. 98-43, at para. 2 ("Although we do not grant forbearance from our rules regarding applications for special permission at this time, we are considering whether, and how, we should modify some of our rules that necessitate applications for special permission as part of our ongoing biennial review rulemaking and expect to make a final decision on the basis of that more complete record in the near future."). I am troubled that the Commission has decided to provide some lesser form of regulatory relief than that which was requested -- doing so in a separate rulemaking where the Commission has more discretion -- and then has used that proceeding as part of the justification for denying full regulatory forbearance as requested. In other words, the Commission has determined that the simplest method of dealing with these petitions is to deny the forbearance relief at issue while at the same time providing lesser relief in a separate rulemaking proceeding. But that is not the process the statute requires. Moreover, under such an approach, the Commission is able to avoid the difficult question of why, when considering the same facts, particular regulatory relief is appropriate and other regulatory relief would contravene the statute. Such distinctions would frequently be difficult to justify as the forbearance criteria focus on general standards -- e.g. "protection of consumers," or "in the public interest." I object to the Commission's attempt to avoid the objective rigor of the section 10 forbearance test by providing regulatory relief in separate proceedings where the Commission has more discretion.

In addition, this approach lends itself to eliminating one set of requirements and at the same time adopting new -- albeit lesser -- regulatory restrictions that would not be justified under section 10 alone. See e.g., Biennial Regulatory review of Accounting and Cost Allocation Requirements, Petition for Forbearance of the Independent Telephone & Telecommunications Alliance, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order in AAD File No. 98-43, at par. 25 (reinterpreting ITTA petition as not asking to forbear from Class A accounting altogether but "[e]ssentially . . . asking us to change our rules, not to forbear from applying the current rules."). While section 10 provides that the Commission may be able to forbear "in whole or in part" from a particular provision or regulation, see section 10(c), it does not provide the Commission with any authority to adopt new regulations or to impose separate conditions in the context of a forbearance petition. Section 10's primary emphasis is on deregulation, and I will not support this provision, or any of the proceedings required by a section 10 petition, being used as an opportunity to authorize new regulatory restrictions or conditions. I fear that this type of expansive reading of the Commission's authority under the Act's forbearance provisions will lead the Commission astray from its clear statutory duties and limitations.

Finally, as I have stated previously, I am concerned that the Commission is placing too high a burden on the parties requesting forbearance relief. I believe that the Section 10 forbearance scheme requires the Commission to justify continued regulation in light of the competitive conditions in the marketplace. The Commission cannot meet their statutory obligations by simply shifting the burden to petitioners to justify forbearance.