DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH
|Re:||Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and Report and Order, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68.|
To some observers, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), in general, and sections 251 and 252 (47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252), in particular, have become unnecessary inconveniences. The poster child for those who proclaim the 1996 Act's failure is reciprocal compensation. It has led to large billings - some paid, some unpaid - among telecommunications carriers. These billings have not shrunk, in large part because the Commission's interpretation of the pick-and-choose provision of the Act (47 U.S.C. § 252(i)) has led to unstable contracts, with perverse incentives for renegotiation.
Reciprocal compensation is an obscure and tedious topic. It is not, however, a topic that Congress overlooked. To the contrary, in describing reciprocal compensation arrangements in sections 251 and 252, Congress went into greater detail than it did for almost any other commercial relationship between carriers covered in the 1996 Act. Among other things, Congress mandated that reciprocal compensation arrangements would be: (1) made by contract; (2) under State supervision; (3) at rates to be negotiated or arbitrated; and (4) would utilize a bill-and-keep plan only on a case-by-case basis under specific statutory conditions. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)(5), 252(a), 252(b), 252(d)(2).
Faced with these statutory mandates, how should the large billings for reciprocal compensation be addressed? Renegotiating contracts would be the simple market solution, only made precarious by our pick-and-choose rules. Another solution would be to seek review of reciprocal compensation agreements by State commissions. Other solutions would be for this Commission to change its pick-and-choose rules or to issue guidelines for State commission decisions (see AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 385 (1999)).
Each of these solutions, of course, would reflect at least a modicum of respect for States, their lawmakers, their regulators, federal law, and the Congress that enacted the 1996 Act. Each would also be consistent with, and respectful of, the prior ruling on reciprocal compensation by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
There is, however, one solution that is not respectful of other governmental institutions. It is a solution that places under exclusive federal jurisdiction broad expanses of telecommunications. It is a solution that does not directly solve the problem at hand. It is a solution that can be reached only through a twisted interpretation of the law and a vitiation of economic reasoning and general common sense. That solution is nationwide price regulation. That is the regrettable solution the Commission has adopted.
The Commission's decision has broad consequences for the future of telecommunications regulation. In holding that essentially all packetized communications fall within federal jurisdiction, the Commission has dramatically diminished the States' role going forward, as such communications are fast becoming the dominant mode. Whatever the merits of this reallocation of authority, it is a reallocation that properly should be made only by Congress. It certainly should not be made, as here, by a self-serving federal agency acting unilaterally.
There is doubtlessly underway a publicity campaign by the proponents of today's action. It will spin nationwide mandatory price regulation as "deregulation." It will spin the abandonment of States and contracts as "good government."
The media might be spun by this campaign. The public might be spun. But it will be far more difficult to convince the courts that the current action is lawful.
A Flawed Order From Flawed Decisionmaking
Today's order is the product of a flawed decisionmaking process that occurs all too frequently in this agency. It goes like this. First, the Commission settles on a desired outcome, based on what it thinks is good "policy" and without giving a thought to whether that outcome is legally supportable. It then slaps together a statutory analysis. The result is an order like this one, inconsistent with the Commission's precedent and fraught with legal difficulties.
In March 2000, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission's conclusion that section 251(b)(5) does not apply to calls made to Internet service providers ("ISPs"). See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 9. The court ruled that, among other things, the Commission had not provided a "satisfactory explanation why LECs that terminate calls to ISPs are not properly seen as 'terminating . . . local telecommunications traffic,' and why such traffic is 'exchange access' rather than 'telephone exchange service.'" Id.
The Commission has taken more than a year to respond to the court's remand decision. My colleagues some time ago decided on their general objective - asserting section 201(b) jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic and permitting incumbent carriers to ramp down the payments that they make to competitive ones. The delay in producing an order is attributable to the difficulty the Commission has had in putting together a legal analysis to support this result, which is at odds with the agency's own precedent as well as the plain language of the statute.
Today, the Commission rules, once again, that section 251(b)(5) does not apply to ISP-bound traffic. In a set of convoluted arguments that sidestep the court's objections to its previous order, the Commission now says that ISP-bound traffic is "information access," which, the Commission asserts, is excluded "from the universe of 'telecommunications' referred to in section 251(b)(5)" (Order ¶¶ 23, 30) - despite the Commission's recent conclusion in another context that "information access" is not a separate category of service exempt from the requirements of section 251. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Order on Remand, 15 FCC Rcd 385, ¶¶ 46-49 (1999) ("Advanced Services Remand Order").
The result will be another round of litigation, and, in all likelihood, this issue will be back at the agency in another couple of years. In the meantime, the uncertainty that has clouded the issue of compensation for ISP-bound traffic for the last five years will continue. The Commission would act far more responsibly if it simply recognized that ISP-bound traffic comes within section 251(b)(5). To be sure, this conclusion would mean that the Commission could not impose on these communications any rule that it makes up, as the agency believes it is permitted to do under section 201(b). Rather, the Commission would be forced to work within the confines of sections 251(b)(5) and 252(d)(2), which, among other things, grant authority to State commissions to decide on "just and reasonable" rates for reciprocal compensation. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2). But the Commission surely could issue "rules to guide the state-commission judgments" regarding reciprocal compensation (Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. at 385) and perhaps could even put in place the same compensation scheme it orders here. At the same time, the confusion that this order will add to the agency's already bewildering precedent on Internet-related issues would be avoided.
The Commission's Previous Order and
the Court's Remand Decision
To see how far the Commission has come in its attempt to assert section 201(b) jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic, let us briefly review the court's decision on the Commission's previous order, which receives little attention in the order released today. In its previous order, issued in February 1999, the Commission focused on the jurisdictional nature of ISP-bound traffic. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Rcd 3689 (1999) ("Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling"). Applying an "end-to-end" analysis, the agency concluded that calls to ISPs do not terminate at the ISP's local server, but instead continue to the "ultimate destination or destinations, specifically at a[n] Internet website that is often located in another state." Id. ¶ 12. Based on this jurisdictional analysis, the Commission ruled that a substantial portion of calls to ISPs are jurisdictionally interstate, and it described ISP-bound traffic as interstate "access service." Id. ¶¶ 17, 18. The Commission reasoned that, since reciprocal compensation is required only for the transport and termination of local traffic, section 251(b)(5)'s obligations did not apply to ISP-bound calls. See id. ¶¶ 7, 26.
1. The Court Asked the Commission Why ISPs Are Not Like Other Local Businesses
The court vacated the Commission's decision. It held that, regardless of the jurisdictional issue, the Commission had not persuasively distinguished ISPs from other businesses that use communications services to provide goods or services to their customers. See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 7. In the court's view, the Commission had failed to explain why "an ISP is not, for purposes of reciprocal compensation, 'simply a communications-intensive business end user selling a product to other consumer and business end-users.'" Id. (citation omitted).
2. The Court Asked the Commission Why Calls Do Not Terminate at ISPs
The court also questioned the Commission's conclusion that a call to an ISP did not "terminate" at the ISP. "[T]he mere fact that the ISP originates further telecommunications does not imply that the original telecommunication does not 'terminate' at the ISP." Id. The court concluded that, "[h]owever sound the end-to-end analysis may be for jurisdictional purposes," the Commission had failed to explain why treating these "linked telecommunications as continuous works for purposes of reciprocal compensation." Id.
3. The Court Asked the Commission How Its Treatment of ISP-Bound Traffic Is Consistent with Its Treatment of Enhanced Service Providers
The court also wondered whether the Commission's treatment of ISP-bound traffic was consistent with the approach it applies to enhanced service providers ("ESPs"), which include ISPs. See id. at 7-8. The Commission has long exempted ESPs from the access charge system, effectively treating them as end-users of local service rather than long-distance carriers. The court observed that this agency, in the Eighth Circuit access charge litigation, had taken the position "that a call to an information service provider is really like a call to a local business that then uses the telephone to order wares to meet the need." Id. at 8. The court rejected as "not very compelling" the Commission's argument that the ESP exemption is consistent with the understanding that ESPs use interstate access services. Id.
4. The Court Asked the Commission Whether ISP-Bound Traffic is "Exchange Access" or "Telephone Exchange Service"
Finally, the court rejected the Commission's suggestion that ISPs are "users of access service." Id. The court noted that the statute creates two statutory categories - "telephone exchange service" and "exchange access" - and observed that on appeal, the Commission had conceded that these categories occupied the field. Id. If the Commission had meant to say that ISPs are users of "exchange access," wrote the court, it had "not provided a satisfactory explanation why this is the case." Id.
The Commission's Latest Order
Today, the Commission fails to answer any of the court's questions. Recognizing that it could not reach the desired result within the framework it used previously, the Commission offers up a completely new analysis, under which it is irrelevant whether ISP-bound traffic is "local" rather than "long-distance" or "telephone exchange service" rather than "exchange access."
In today's order, the Commission concludes that section 251(b)(5) is not limited to local traffic as it had previously maintained, but instead applies to all "telecommunications" traffic except the categories specifically enumerated in section 251(g). See Order ¶¶ 32, 34. The Commission concludes that ISP-bound traffic falls within one of these categories - "information access" - and is therefore exempt from section 251(b)(5). See id. ¶ 42. The agency wraps up with a determination that ISP-bound traffic is interstate, and it thus has jurisdiction under section 201(b) to regulate compensation for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic. See id. ¶¶ 52-65.
The Commission's latest attempt to solve the reciprocal compensation puzzle is no more successful than were its earlier efforts. As discussed below, its determination that ISP-bound traffic is "information access" and, hence, exempt from section 251(b)(5) is inconsistent with still-warm Commission precedent. Moreover, its interpretation of section 251(g) cannot be reconciled with the statute's plain language.
1. Today's decision is a complete reversal of the Commission's recent decision in the Advanced Services Remand Order. In that order, the Commission rejected an argument that xDSL traffic is exempt from the unbundling obligations of section 251(c)(3) as "information access." Among other things, the Commission found meritless the argument that section 251(g) exempts "information access" traffic from other requirements of section 251. Id. ¶ 47. Rather, the Commission explained, "this provision is merely a continuation of the equal access and nondiscrimination provisions of the Consent Decree until superseded by subsequent regulations of the Commission." Id. According to the Commission, section 251(g) "is a transitional enforcement mechanism that obligates the incumbent LECs to continue to abide by equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection requirements of the MFJ." Id. The Commission thus concluded that section 251(g) was not intended to exempt xDSL traffic from section 251's other provisions. See id. ¶¶ 47-49.
In addition, the Commission rejected the contention that "information access" is a statutory category distinct from "telephone exchange service" and "exchange access." See id. ¶ 46. (1) It pointed out that "'information access' is not a defined term under the Act, and is cross-referenced in only two transitional provisions." Id. ¶ 47. It ultimately concluded that nothing in the Act suggests that "information access" is a category of services mutually exclusive with exchange access or telephone exchange service. See id. ¶ 48.
The Commission further determined that ISP-bound traffic is properly classified as "exchange access." See id. ¶ 35. It noted that exchange access refers to "access to telephone exchange services or facilities for the purpose of originating or terminating communications that travel outside an exchange." Id. ¶ 15. Applying this definition, and citing the Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling, the Commission reasoned that the service provided by the local exchange carrier to an ISP is ordinarily exchange access service, "because it enables the ISP to transport the communication initiated by the end-user subscriber located in one exchange to its ultimate destination in another exchange, using both the services of the local exchange carrier and in the typical case the telephone toll service of the telecommunications carrier responsible for the interexchange transport." Id. ¶ 35.
The Advanced Services Remand Order was appealed to the D.C. Circuit. See WorldCom, 2001 WL 395344. The Commission argued to the court in February that the term "information access" is merely "a holdover term from the MFJ, which the 1996 Act supersedes." WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, Brief for Respondents at 50 (D.C. Cir. No. 00-1002). Its brief also emphasized that section 251(g) was "designed simply to establish a transition from the MFJ's equal access and nondiscrimination provisions . . . to the new obligations set out in the statute." Id.
Today, just two months after it made those arguments to the D.C. Circuit, the Commission reverses itself. It now says that section 251(g) exempts certain categories of traffic, including "information access," entirely from the requirements of section 251(b)(5) and that ISP-bound traffic is "information access." See Order ¶¶ 32, 34, 42. The Commission provides nary a word to explain this reversal.
Of course, the Commission's conclusions in the Advanced Services Remand Order that ISP-bound traffic is "exchange access" and that the term "information access" has no relevance under the 1996 Act were themselves reversals of earlier Commission positions. In the Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, (2) the Commission concluded, relying in part on a purported distinction between "exchange access" and "information access," that ISPs "do not use exchange access as it is defined by the Act." Id. ¶ 248. In that order, the Commission was faced with determining the scope of section 272(e)(2), which states that a Bell operating company ["BOC"] "shall not provide any facilities, services, or information regarding its provision of exchange access to [a BOC affiliate] unless such facilities, services, or information are made available to other providers of interLATA services in that market on the same terms and conditions." 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(2). The Commission rejected the argument that BOCs are required to provide exchange access to ISPs, reasoning that ISPs do not use exchange access. See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order ¶ 248. In making that decision, the Commission relied on the language of the statute as well as the MFJ's use of the term "information access." See id. ¶ 248 & n. 621. As the Commission explained, its "conclusion that ISPs do not use exchange access is consistent with the MFJ, which recognized a difference between 'exchange access' and 'information access.'" Id. ¶ 248 n.621.
Thus, in reversing itself yet again, the Commission here follows a time-honored tradition. When it is expedient to say that ISPs use "exchange access" and that there is no such thing as "information access," that is what the Commission says. See Advanced Service Remand Order ¶¶ 46-48. When it is convenient to say that ISPs use the local network like local businesses, then the Commission adopts that approach. See Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 15982, ¶ 345 (1997). And, today, when it helps to write that ISPs use "information access," then that is what the Commission writes. The only conclusion that one can soundly draw from these decisions is that the Commission is willing to make up whatever law it can dream up to suit the situation at hand.
Nevertheless, there is one legal proposition that the Commission has, until now, consistently followed - a fact that is particularly noteworthy given the churn in the Commission's other legal principles. The Commission has consistently held that section 251(g) serves only to "preserve the LECs' existing equal access obligations, originally imposed by the MFJ." Operator Communications, Inc., D/B/A Oncor Communications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 12506, ¶ 2 n.5 (1999). (3) Today's order ignores this precedent and transforms section 251(g) into a categorical exemption for certain traffic from section 251(b)(5). It is this transformation - much more than the shell game played with "information access" and "exchange access" - that is most offensive in today's decision.
2. The Commission's claim that section 251(g) "excludes several enumerated categories of traffic from the universe of 'telecommunications' referred to in section 251(b)(5)" (Order ¶ 23) stretches the meaning of section 251(g) past the breaking point. Among other things, that provision does not even mention "exclud[ing]," "telecommunications," "section 251(b)(5)," or "reciprocal compensation."
Section 251(g), which is entitled, "Continued enforcement of exchange access and interconnection requirements," states in relevant part:
On and after February 8, 1996, each local exchange carrier, to the extent that it provides wireline services, shall provide exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access to interexchange carriers and information service providers in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations (including receipt of compensation) that apply to such carrier on the date immediately preceding February 8, 1996 under any court order, consent decree, or regulation, order, or policy of the Commission, until such restrictions and obligations are explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed by the Commission after February 8, 1996.
47 U.S.C. § 251(g).
As an initial matter, it is plain from reading this language that section 251(g) has absolutely no application to the vast majority of local exchange carriers, including those most affected by today's order. The provision states that "each local exchange carrier . . . shall provide [the enumerated services] . . . in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations . . . that apply to such carrier on the date immediately preceding February 8, 1996." Id. (emphasis added). If a carrier was not providing service on February 7, 1996, no restrictions or obligations applied to "such carrier" on that date, and section 251(g) would appear to have no impact on that carrier. The Commission has thus repeatedly stated that section 251(g) applies to "Bell Operating Companies" and is intended to incorporate aspects of the MFJ. Applications For Consent To The Transfer Of Control Of Licenses And Section 214 Authorizations From Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor To AT&T Corp., Transferee., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 3160, ¶ 53 (1999); see also cases cited supra note 3. Accordingly, by its express terms, section 251(g) says nothing about the obligations of most CLECs serving ISPs, which are the primary focus of the Commission's order.
Moreover, it is inconceivable that section 251(g)'s preservation of pre-1996 Act "equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations" is intended to displace section 251(b)(5)'s explicit compensation scheme for local carriers transporting and terminating each other's traffic. Prior to passage of the 1996 Act, there were no rules governing compensation for such services, whether or not an ISP was involved. It seems unlikely, at best, that Congress intended the absence of a compensation scheme to preempt a provision explicitly providing for such compensation. (4) At the very least, one would think Congress would use language more explicit than that seized upon by the Commission in section 251(g).
Finally, if, as the Commission maintains, section 251(g) "excludes several enumerated categories of traffic from the universe of 'telecommunications' referred to in section 251(b)(5)" (Order ¶ 23), why does section 251(g) not also exclude this traffic from the "universe of 'telecommunications'" referred to in the rest of section 251, or, indeed, in the entire 1996 Act? As noted, section 251(g) nowhere mentions "reciprocal compensation" or even "section 251." In fact, there appears to be no limiting principle. It would thus seem that, under the Commission's interpretation, the traffic referred to in section 251(g) is exempt from far more than reciprocal compensation - a consequence the Commission is sure to regret. See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order 11 FCC Rcd 15499, ¶ 356 (1996) (concluding that "exchange access" provided to IXCs is subject to the unbundling requirements of section 251(c)(3)).
* * *
The end result of today's decision is clear. There will be continued litigation over the status of ISP-bound traffic, prolonging the uncertainty that has plagued this issue for years. At the same time, the Commission will be forced to reverse itself yet again, as soon as it dislikes the implication of treating ISP-bound traffic as "information access" or reading section 251(g) as a categorical exemption from other requirements of the 1996 Act. The Commission could, and should, have avoided these consequences by applying its original analysis in the manner sought by the court.
1 This aspect of the Advanced Services Remand Order was remanded to the Commission by the D.C. Circuit because of its reliance on the vacated Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling. See WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, No. 00-1062, 2001 WL 395344, *5-*6 (D.C. Cir. Apr 20, 2001).
2 Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards Of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996) ("Non-Accounting Safeguards Order").
3 See also, e.g., Application for Review and Petition for Reconsideration or Clarification of Declaratory Ruling Regarding U S West Petitions To Consolidate Latas in Minnesota and Arizona, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14392, ¶ 17 (1999) ("In section 251(g), Congress delegated to the Commission sole authority to administer the 'equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations' that applied under the AT&T Consent Decree."); AT&T Corporation, et al., Complainants, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 21438, ¶ 5 (1998) ("Separately, section 251(g) requires the BOCs, both pre- and post-entry, to treat all interexchange carriers in accordance with their preexisting equal access and nondiscrimination obligations, and thereby neutralize the potential anticompetitive impact they could have on the long distance market until such time as the Commission finds it reasonable to revise or eliminate those obligations.").
4 The case of IXC traffic is thus completely different. There was a compensation scheme in effect for such traffic prior to enactment of the 1996 Act - the access charge regime. Because reciprocal compensation and the access charge regime could not both apply to the same traffic, the Commission could reasonably conclude that the access charge regime should trump the reciprocal compensation provision of section 251(b)(5). See Competitive Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1997). Here, there is no pre-1996 Act compensation scheme to conflict with reciprocal compensation. As the Commission has stated, "the Commission has never applied either the ESP exemption or its rules regarding the joint provision of access to the situation where two carriers collaborate to deliver traffic to an ISP." Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling ¶ 26.