March 20, 2018

The Honorable Tom Cotton
United States Senate
124 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Cotton:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S. Representative Anna Eshoo, then a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to then-FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressing “grave concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled telecommunications infrastructure companies,” particularly Huawei and ZTE, providing equipment to the U.S. market. In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released the bipartisan report appended to your letter on the U.S. national security issues posed by these companies. And the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 highlights national security concerns stemming from the use of products from Huawei, ZTE, or Kaspersky Lab.

At your suggestion, I have received a briefing on these issues from the Intelligence Community, and I can report that I intend to take proactive steps to help ensure the integrity of the communications supply chain in the United States in the near future.

Further, with respect to the recommendation in the HPSCI report that U.S. government systems should not include Huawei or ZTE equipment, please be advised that the FCC does not purchase or use Huawei or ZTE products or equipment in the conduct of government business, and I do not expect that would change if a major U.S. communications company partnered with Huawei.

I appreciate your interest in this important matter. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo
U.S. House of Representatives
2427 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman LoBiondo:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S. Representative Anna Eshoo, then a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to then-FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressing “grave concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled telecommunications infrastructure companies,” particularly Huawei and ZTE, providing equipment to the U.S. market. In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released the bipartisan report appended to your letter on the U.S. national security issues posed by these companies. And the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 highlights national security concerns stemming from the use of products from Huawei, ZTE, or Kaspersky Lab.

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I appreciate your interest in this important matter. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Angus King  
United States Senate  
133 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator King:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S. Representative Anna Eshoo, then a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to then-FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressing “grave concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled telecommunications infrastructure companies,” particularly Huawei and ZTE, providing equipment to the U.S. market. In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released the bipartisan report appended to your letter on the U.S. national security issues posed by these companies. And the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 highlights national security concerns stemming from the use of products from Huawei, ZTE, or Kaspersky Lab.

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I appreciate your interest in this important matter. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Brad Wenstrup
U.S. House of Representatives
2419 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Wenstrup:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S.
telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United
States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other
Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has
been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S.
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Huawei.

I appreciate your interest in this important matter. Please let me know if I can be of any
further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
The Honorable John Cornyn  
United States Senate  
517 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Cornyn:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S. Representative Anna Eshoo, then a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to then-FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressing "grave concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled telecommunications infrastructure companies," particularly Huawei and ZTE, providing equipment to the U.S. market. In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released the bipartisan report appended to your letter on the U.S. national security issues posed by these companies. And the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 highlights national security concerns stemming from the use of products from Huawei, ZTE, or Kaspersky Lab.

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Susan Collins
United States Senate
413 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Collins:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Roy Blunt  
United States Senate  
260 Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Blunt:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

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I appreciate your interest in this important matter. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Jim Risch
United States Senate
483 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Risch:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S. Representative Anna Eshoo, then a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to then-FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressing “grave concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled telecommunications infrastructure companies,” particularly Huawei and ZTE, providing equipment to the U.S. market. In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released the bipartisan report appended to your letter on the U.S. national security issues posed by these companies. And the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 highlights national security concerns stemming from the use of products from Huawei, ZTE, or Kaspersky Lab.

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Elise Stefanik
U.S. House of Representatives
318 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congresswoman Stefanik:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S. Representative Anna Eshoo, then a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to then-FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressing "grave concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled telecommunications infrastructure companies," particularly Huawei and ZTE, providing equipment to the U.S. market. In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released the bipartisan report appended to your letter on the U.S. national security issues posed by these companies. And the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 highlights national security concerns stemming from the use of products from Huawei, ZTE, or Kaspersky Lab.

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai

March 20, 2018

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
U.S. House of Representatives
2206 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Michael Conaway
U.S. House of Representatives
2430 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Conaway:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S. Representative Anna Eshoo, then a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to then-FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressing “grave concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled telecommunications infrastructure companies,” particularly Huawei and ZTE, providing equipment to the U.S. market. In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released the bipartisan report appended to your letter on the U.S. national security issues posed by these companies. And the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 highlights national security concerns stemming from the use of products from Huawei, ZTE, or Kaspersky Lab.

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I appreciate your interest in this important matter. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
The Honorable Michael R. Turner  
U.S. House of Representatives  
2368 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515  

Dear Congressman Turner:  

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans. Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S. Representative Anna Eshoo, then a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to then-FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressing “grave concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled telecommunications infrastructure companies,” particularly Huawei and ZTE, providing equipment to the U.S. market. In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released the bipartisan report appended to your letter on the U.S. national security issues posed by these companies. And the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 highlights national security concerns stemming from the use of products from Huawei, ZTE, or Kaspersky Lab.  

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Chris Stewart  
U.S. House of Representatives  
323 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Stewart:

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
The Honorable Rick Crawford  
U.S. House of Representatives  
2422 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C.  20515

Dear Congressman Crawford:

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Richard M. Burr
United States Senate
217 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Burr:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable Marco Rubio
United States Senate
284 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Rubio:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks. As you note, this has been a longstanding area of concern in Congress. In November 2010, for example, U.S. Representative Anna Eshoo, then a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to then-FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressing “grave concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled telecommunications infrastructure companies,” particularly Huawei and ZTE, providing equipment to the U.S. market. In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released the bipartisan report appended to your letter on the U.S. national security issues posed by these companies. And the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 highlights national security concerns stemming from the use of products from Huawei, ZTE, or Kaspersky Lab.

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai
March 20, 2018

The Honorable James Lankford  
United States Senate  
316 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Lankford:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

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March 20, 2018

The Honorable Peter T. King
U.S. House of Representatives
339 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman King:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about reports that a major U.S. telecommunications provider was going to begin selling Huawei smartphones in the United States. I understand from published reports that the provider has abandoned those plans.

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At your suggestion, I have received a briefing on these issues from the Intelligence Community, and I can report that I intend to take proactive steps to help ensure the integrity of the communications supply chain in the United States in the near future.

Further, with respect to the recommendation in the HPSCI report that U.S. government systems should not include Huawei or ZTE equipment, please be advised that the FCC does not purchase or use Huawei or ZTE products or equipment in the conduct of government business, and I do not expect that would change if a major U.S. communications company partnered with Huawei.

I appreciate your interest in this important matter. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai