WPC 2BJZ Courier3|X>/ >Fx6X@`7X@HP LaserJet 5Sit 5M PCL)HPLAS5SI.PRSx  @\&bYX@26 F ZPK3|X>/ HP LaserJet 5Sit 5M PCL)HPLAS5SI.PRSC\  P6Q\&bYP"i~'^09CSS999S]+9+/SSSSSSSSSS//]]]Ixnnxg]xx9?xgxx]xn]gxxxxg9/9MS9ISISI9SS//S/SSSS9?/SSxSSIP!PZ9+ZM999+999999S9S/xIxIxIxIxIlnIgIgIgIgI9/9/9/9/xSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxIxSxRxSxSxS]SxIxIxInInInZnIxigIgIgIgIxSxSxSxZxSxZxS9/9S999Su]ZZxSg/gCg9g9g/xSbxSxSxSxSxn9n9n9]?]?]?]ZgFg/gMxSxSxSxSxSxSxxZgIgIgIxSg9xS]?g9xSi+SS88WuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN/>/>/>/x]SSSSx]x]x]x]xSxSx]SSxSxSf]xSxSxSxIxIxWxIx{nInInInISSSWS]a?/?]?9?]]WW]n/nKn9nCn/x]xx]x]SSxxIxIxI]?]?]?]WnUn9nax]x]x]x]x]x]xxWnInInIx]n9x]]?n9xSz+SS8-8WuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN;0<v k1=o=>P>Technical[8]Eg%Technical Document Style O g% W4I O g;&/0  . MACNormal<;     X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:<    #:}D4P XP#T I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)T,0*ÍÍ,*Í ., US!!!! ! #:}D4P XP#     X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:<    #:}D4P XP#,0*ÍÍ,*Í ., US!!!! ! #:}D4P XP#Footnote=Íčfootnote tex#>'p #FxX  Pg9CXP#2C?i?@j@A~@Bi{Bheader?Ax 4 <D  #FxX  Pg9CXP# reference@;#FxX  Pg9CXP#itemizeX1A&V 8F ` hp xr#FxX  Pg9CXP#header2BI ` hp x`    #FxX  Pg9CXP# 2HC^DDOtEE FFGheading 3CF` hp x #FxX  Pg9CXP# footer!D!!#d\  PCP#CitatorFormat Secretary's Citator Output FileEW r5-#d6X@`7Ͽ@# XX  X B r5-S  BFormat DownloadFormat Downloaded DocumentFiޛ r5- XX    \ #d6X@`7Ͽ@#2JGrHH5IIrIJ9Ja2AgendaGa1AgendaAgenda ItemsH7D yP ) I. a3AgendaIHeadingChapter HeadingJJ d  ) I. ׃  2MKKLKMdSLNLRight ParRight-Aligned Paragraph NumbersK>a݅@  I.   X(# SubheadingSubheadingL0\ E A.  HIGHLIGHT 1Italics and BoldldeddM+. DRAFT ONHeader A Text = DRAFT and DateN X =8` (#FDRAFTă r  ` (#=D3 1, 43 12pt (Z)(PC-8))T2Dă  ӟ2)ROMP1NQ1OR1PDRAFT OFFTurn Draft Style offO@@    LETTER LANDLetter Landscape - 11 x 8.5P 3'3'Standard'3'3StandardLetter Portrait - 8.5 x 11 ;   LEGAL LANDLegal Landscape - 14 x 8.5Qf 3'3'Standard'A'AStandardZ K e6VE L"nu;   LETTER PORTLetter Portrait - 8.5 x 11RL 3'3'Standard3'3'StandardZ K e6VE L"nU9   2TS1[RTnSUSVd{TLEGAL PORTLegal Portrait - 8.5 x 14S 3'3'StandardA'A'StandardLetter Portrait - 8.5 x 119   TITLETitle of a DocumentTK\ * ăBLOCK QUOTESmall, single-spaced, indentedUN X HIGHLIGHT 2Large and Bold LargeVB*d. 2 ZWjUX{UYEWZ-XHIGHLIGHT 3Large, Italicized and UnderscoredW V -qLETTERHEADLetterhead - date/marginsXu H XX  3'3'LetterheadZ K e VE L"n3'3'LetterheadZ K e VE L"nE9    * 3'3'LetterheadZ K e VE L"n3' II"n"Tv3'StandarddZ K e VE L"nU9 Ѓ   INVOICE FEETFee Amount for Math InvoiceY ,, $0$0  MEMORANDUMMemo Page FormatZD.   ! M E M O R A N D U M ă r  y<N dddy   2^[8>Z\8v[]\^XO^INVOICE EXPSEExpense Subtotals for Math Invoice[:A ,p, $0$00INVOICE TOTTotals Invoice for Math Macro\z 4p, $0$00INVOICE HEADRHeading Portion of Math Invoice]+C`*   4X 99L$0 **(  ӧ XX NORMALReturn to Normal Typestyle^2E`_[^`[4_a[_b[_SMALLSmall Typestyle_FINEFine Typestyle`LARGELarge TypestyleaEXTRA LARGEExtra Large Typestyleb2Mcc[w`d`eXUbfbVERY LARGEVery Large TypestylecENVELOPEStandard Business Envelope with Headerd+w ,,EnvelopeZ K e VE L"n,,EnvelopeLarge, Italicized and Under;    ,, 88+  `   1edfStyle 14Swiss 8 Pt Without Marginsf$$D Co> PfQ  )a [ PfQO 2kgchdilhjjjStyle 12Dutch Italics 11.5g$$F )^ `> XifQ  )a [ PfQO Style 11Initial Codes for Advanced IIhJ )a [ PfQK  dddn  #  [ X` hp x (#%'b, oT9 ! )^ `> XifQ ` Advanced Legal WordPerfect II Learning Guide   x )^ `> XifQ Advanced Legal WordPerfect II Learning Guide   j-n )^ `> XifQ    Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`6 >Page  jBX )^ `> XifQ    Page ` Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 Style 3oDutch Roman 11.5 with Margins/Tabsi )a [ PfQO  ddn  # c0*b, oT9 !Style 4 PSwiss 8 Point with MarginsjDq Co> PfQ  dddd  #  2mk8kl|km@lnlStyle 1.5Dutch Roman 11.5 Fontk4h )a [ PfQO  dddn Style 2Dutch Italic 11.5l$ )^ `> XifQ Style 5Dutch Bold 18 Pointm$RH$L T~> pfQ_  )a [ PfQO Style 7Swiss 11.5n$$V )ao> PfQ ]  )a [ PfQO 2e}ompRnqYsr`xStyle 6Dutch Roman 14 Pointo$$N w [ PfQ   )a [ PfQO Style 10oInitial Codes for Advancedp U )a [ PfQK  dddn  ##  [[ b, oT9 !b, oT9 !n )^ `> XifQ ` Advanced Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   f )^ `> XifQ Advanced Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   Q" )^ `> XifQ    Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`6 >Page  QN~ )^ `> XifQ    Page ` Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 Style 8PfInitial Codes for Beginninggqi )a [ PfQK  dddn  # X` hp x (#%'b, oT9  [ &e )^ `> XifQ ` Beginning Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   d )^ `> XifQ Beginning Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   jH )^ `> XifQ    Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`6 >Page  j )^ `> XifQ    Page ` Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 Style 9Initial Codes for Intermediater )a [ PfQK  dddn  # X` hp x (#%'b, oT9 Њ [ e )^ `> XifQ ` Intermediate Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   3 )^ `> XifQ Intermediate Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   jf )^ `> XifQ    Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc.`+ >Page  jX )^ `> XifQ    Page ` Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 2s}tluev ~UpdateInitial Codes for Update Modules )a [ PfQK  dddn  #  [ X` hp x (#%'b, oT9 !n )^ `> XifQ ` Legal WordPerfect 5.0 Update Class Learning Guide   f )^ `> XifQ Legal WordPerfect 5.0 Update Class Learning Guide   Q" )^ `> XifQ    Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`7 CPage  jN~ )^ `> XifQ    Page ` Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 footnote textftfootnote reference#u MACDocumentv4     X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:<     #:}D4P XP# T I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)T,0*ÍÍ,*Í ., US!!!! ! #:}D4P XP##u\4 PXP#     X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:<     #:}D4P XP# ,0*ÍÍ,*Í ., US!!!! ! #:}D4P XP##:}D4PXP#2,wȐx}yzpara numnumbered indented paragraphsw' Y- 1.(i) 1) 1.#Xw P7[hXP# 1. 1.Ҳa1Paragraph R!1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)D )DDDFrfx$ a2Paragraph R!1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)D )DDDFrfy/` ` ` a3Paragraph R!1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)D )DDDFrfz:` ` `  2{^|}~Ya4Paragraph R!1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)D )DDDFrf{E` ` `  a5Paragraph R!1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)D )DDDFrf|P  ` ` ` hhh a6Paragraph R!1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)D )DDDFrf}[   a7Paragraph R!1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)D )DDDFrf~f  2vJvvva8Paragraph R!1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)D )DDDFrfq heading 4heading 4 heading 5heading 5 heading 6heading 6 2vvvlvheading 7heading 7 heading 8heading 8 Default Paragraph FoDefault Paragraph Font endnote textendnote text 2tr8Vendnote referenceendnote reference toc 1toc 1` hp x (#(#`(#`` hp x (#toc 2toc 2` hp x (#` (#`` (#`` hp x (#toc 3toc 3` hp x (#` (#` (#` hp x (#2vĤvtoc 4toc 4` hp x (# (# (#` hp x (#toc 5toc 5` hp x (#h(#h(#` hp x (#toc 6toc 6` hp x (#(# (# ` hp x (#toc 7toc 7 2 ƫtoc 8toc 8` hp x (#(# (# ` hp x (#toc 9toc 9` hp x (#(#`(#`` hp x (#index 1index 1` hp x (#` (#` (#` hp x (#index 2index 2` hp x (#` (#`` (#`` hp x (#2RvplZRtoa headingtoa heading` hp x (#(#(#` hp x (#captioncaption _Equation Caption_Equation Caption 1, 2, 3,?@65NumbersO@/"=(1*1÷$t ?.E1.2d޵BŶEA, B,t ?@65Uppercase Letters1 ?*1÷$t ?.E .footnote refK&7>footnote referenceGw) "7>NGI "+WXpage numberK&7>page number"Gw* "7>NGI "(YZDefault ParaK&7>Default Paragraph Fontw+ "7>NGI "([(\2͸ùuendnote refeK&7>endnote referenceGw- "7>NGI "+_+`annotation rK&7>annotation referenceGw. "7>NGI "OaOb#Xv P7XP##Xv P7XP#annotation tK&7>annotation textGw/ "7>NGI "2c(d2G2*(K&7>Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7>NGI "8ij@  2۽9Իx%3G3*(K&7>Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7>NGI "Akl@` ` `  ` ` ` 4G4*(K&7>Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7>NGI "Jmn` ` ` @  ` ` ` 5G5*(K&7>Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7>NGI "Sop` ` `  @  6G6*(K&7>Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7>NGI "\qr` ` `  @hhh hhh 2 ̾pe7G7*(K&7>Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7>NGI "est` ` `  hhh@ hhh 8G8*(K&7>Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7>NGI "nuv` ` `  hhh@  9G9*(K&7>Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7>NGI "wwx` ` `  hhh@ppp ppp 10G0*(Q&7tDocument Style Gl0 "7t GI "צGH` ` ` 2|S11G1*(Q&7tTechnical Document Style "7t GI "ק4I$J     12G2*(Q&7tTechnical Document Style "7t GI "ר*KL    13G3*(Q&7tTechnical Document Style "7t GI "ש'MN   14G4*(Q&7tTechnical Document Style "7t GI "ת&OP   23=15G5*(Q&7tTechnical Document Style "7t GI "׫&QR  . 16G6*(Q&7tTechnical Document Style "7t GI "׬&ST  . 17G7*(Q&7tTechnical Document Style "7t GI "׭&UV  . 18G8*(Q&7tTechnical Document Style "7t GI "׮&WX  . 2r!19G9*(Q&7tRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7t GI "ׯ8YZ@  20G:*(Q&7tRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7t GI "װA[\@` ` `  ` ` ` 21G;*(Q&7tRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7t GI "ױJ]^` ` ` @  ` ` ` 22G<*(Q&7tRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7t GI "ײS_`` ` `  @  2Z23G=*(Q&7tRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7t GI "׳\ab` ` `  @hhh hhh 24G>*(Q&7tRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7t GI "״ecd` ` `  hhh@ hhh 25G?*(Q&7tRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7t GI "׵nef` ` `  hhh@  26G@*(Q&7tRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers"7t GI "׶wgh` ` `  hhh@ppp ppp 2527wSg K6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg EJmn` ` @  ` `  28wSg L6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg ESop` `  @  29wSg M6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg E\qr` `  @hh# hhh 30wSg N6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Eest` `  hh#@( hh# 2pu31wSg O6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Enuv` `  hh#(@- ( 32wSg P6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Ewwx` `  hh#(-@pp2 -ppp 33wSg R6w Document Style=(H8g Rܺ*HںwSg E{|` ` ` 34wSg S6w Technical Document Styleg Sܺ*HںwSg E4}$~     2c35wSg T6w Technical Document Styleg Tܺ*HںwSg E*    36wSg U6w Technical Document Styleg Uܺ*HںwSg E'   37wSg V6w Technical Document Styleg Vܺ*HںwSg E&   38wSg W6w Technical Document Styleg Wܺ*HںwSg E&  . 2dCM39wSg X6w Technical Document Styleg Xܺ*HںwSg E&  . 40wSg Y6w Technical Document Styleg Yܺ*HںwSg E&  . 41wSg Z6w Technical Document Styleg Zܺ*HںwSg E&  . 42wSg [6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg E8@   28143wSg \6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg EA@` `  ` ` ` 44wSg ]6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg EJ` ` @  ` `  45wSg ^6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg ES` `  @  46wSg _6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg E\` `  @hh# hhh 2|j)47wSg `6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Ee` `  hh#@( hh# 48wSg a6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg En` `  hh#(@- ( 49wSg b6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Ew` `  hh#(-@pp2 -ppp 50wSg c6w Document Style=(H8g cܺ*HںwSg EF *  ׃  2tR51wSg d6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg EJ` ` @  ` `  52wSg e6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg ES` `  @  53wSg f6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg E\` `  @hh# hhh 54wSg g6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Ee` `  hh#@( hh# 2_np?55wSg h6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg En` `  hh#(@- ( 56wSg i6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Ew` `  hh#(-@pp2 -ppp 57wSg j6w Document Style=(H8g jܺ*HںwSg E` ` ` 58wSg k6w Technical Document Styleg kܺ*HںwSg E4$     2-V59wSg l6w Technical Document Styleg lܺ*HںwSg E*    60wSg m6w Technical Document Styleg mܺ*HںwSg E'   61wSg n6w Technical Document Styleg nܺ*HںwSg E&   62wSg o6w Technical Document Styleg oܺ*HںwSg E&  . 2. 63wSg p6w Technical Document Styleg pܺ*HںwSg E&  . 64wSg q6w Technical Document Styleg qܺ*HںwSg E&  . 65wSg r6w Technical Document Styleg rܺ*HںwSg E&  . 66wSg s6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg E8@   2`L67wSg t6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg EA@` `  ` ` ` 68wSg u6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg EJ` ` @  ` `  69wSg v6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg ES` `  @  70wSg w6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg E\` `  @hh# hhh 2F471wSg x6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Ee` `  hh#@( hh# 72wSg y6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg En` `  hh#(@- ( 73wSg z6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Ew` `  hh#(-@pp2 -ppp 74wSg {6w Document Style=(H8g {ܺ*HںwSg EF *  ׃  2vx qe75wSg |6w Document Style=(H8g |ܺ*HںwSg E*   76wSg }6w Document Style=(H8g }ܺ*HںwSg E0    77wSg ~6w Document Style=(H8g ~ܺ*HںwSg E  . 78wSg 6w Document Style=(H8g ܺ*HںwSg E  2ep p}79wSg 6w Document Style=(H8g ܺ*HںwSg E  80wSg 6w Document Style=(H8g ܺ*HںwSg E` ` ` 81wSg 6w Document Style=(H8g ܺ*HںwSg E` ` ` 82wSg 6w Technical Document Styleg ܺ*HںwSg E4$     2k83wSg 6w Technical Document Styleg ܺ*HںwSg E*    84wSg 6w Technical Document Styleg ܺ*HںwSg E'   85wSg 6w Technical Document Styleg ܺ*HںwSg E&   86wSg 6w Technical Document Styleg ܺ*HںwSg E&  . 2lKU87wSg 6w Technical Document Styleg ܺ*HںwSg E&  . 88wSg 6w Technical Document Styleg ܺ*HںwSg E&  . 89wSg 6w Technical Document Styleg ܺ*HںwSg E&  . 90wSg 6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg E8@   2@991wSg 6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg EA@` `  ` ` ` 92wSg 6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg EJ` ` @  ` `  93wSg 6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg ES` `  @  94wSg 6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg E\` `  @hh# hhh 2r195wSg 6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Ee` `  hh#@( hh# 96wSg 6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg En` `  hh#(@- ( 97wSg 6w Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbersܺ*HںwSg Ew` `  hh#(-@pp2 -ppp 98wSg 6w Default Paragraph Font8g ܺ*HںwSg E;;#x6X@7X@##b6X@C@#2XK"KmKTimes New RomanTimes New Roman BoldTimes New Roman ItalicTimes New Roman Bold Italic"i~'^:DPddDDDdp4D48dddddddddd88pppX|pDL|pp||D8D\dDXdXdXDdd88d8ddddDL8ddddX`(`lD4l\DDD4DDDDDDdDd8XXXXXX|X|X|X|XD8D8D8D8ddddddddddXdbdddpdXXXXXlX~|X|X|X|XdddldldD8DdDDDdplld|8|P|D|D|8dvddddDDDpLpLpLpl|T|8|\ddddddl|X|X|Xd|DdpL|Dd~4ddC$CWxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNHxxH\dDXddddd8@d<@d<DDXXdDDxddxHxxHvppDXd<"dxtldpxxd"i~'^:DpddȨDDDdp4D48ddddddddddDDpppd|Ld|pȐD8DtdDdpXpXDdp8Dp8pdppXLDpdddXP,PhD4htDDD4DDDDDDdDp8dddddȐXXXXXJ8J8J8J8pddddppppddpddddzpdddXXhXXXXXdddhdptL8LpLDLpphhp8ZDP8pppddƐXXXpLpLpLphfDtppppppȐhXXXpDppLDd4ddC6CWxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNHxxHjdDdddddd8HH"&H>XHH8HB8>HH^HH>"".2",2,2,"222N2222"&22H22,006"6."""""""""2"2H,H,H,H,H,XAB,>,>,>,>,""""H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H,H2H1H2H2H282H,H,H,B,B,B6B,H?>,>,>,>,H2H2H2H6H2H6H2""2"""2F866H2>>(>">">H2;H2H2H2H2XHB"B"B"8&8&8&86>*>>.H2H2H2H2H2H2^HH6>,>,>,H2>"H28&>"H2?22!!WFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN$<<$.2",2222`2 LL2 LL2L"",,2d""I\\>>>\g0>03\\\\\\\\\\33gggQyyrg>Frgygrr>3>T\>Q\Q\Q>\\33\3\\\\>F3\\\\QX%Xc>0cT>>>0>>>>>>\>\3QQQQQwyQrQrQrQrQ>3>3>3>3\\\\\\\\\\Q\Z\\\g\QQQyQyQycyQtrQrQrQrQ\\\c\c\>3>\>>>\gcc\r3rIr>r>r3\l\\\\y>y>y>gFgFgFgcrMr3rT\\\\\\crQrQrQ\r>\gFr>\t0\\=!=WxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNBnnBT\>Q\\\\\3;\7;\7>>QQ\??n\\nBnnBmgg>Q\7"yyyy\njc\gnn\y.X80,ɒX\  P6G;Py.\80,>\4  pG;7jC:,ynXj\  P6G;XP7nC:,h#Xj\  P6G;ynXP#   X44  hp x*(08"$&@)+-H024P79X` hVrp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:messages would indicate whether a party is on hold, has joined or has been dropped from the conference call.   GxX3) Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information -- Capability would provide  Gx\a LEA access to all dialing and signaling information available from the subject  Gxwould inform law enforcement of a subject's use of features (such as the use of flash-hook and other feature keys).   GxX4) In-band and out-of-band signaling (notification message) -- A message would  Gxbe sent to a LEA whenever a subject's service sends a tone or other network  Gxrmessage to the subject or associate (e.g., notification that a line is ringing or busy).   GxKX5) Timing information -- Information necessary to correlate call-identifying  Gxinformation with the call content of a communications interception would be sent  Xy4to a LEA.b Zy yO'ԍ Delivery within three seconds of the event producing the callidentifying information is requested, together  {O'with a time stamp indicating the timing of the event within an accuracy of 100 milliseconds. See DoJ/FBI Joint Petition for Expedited Rulemaking, filed March 27, 1998, at 5152.b   GxX6) Surveillance status -- A message that would verify that an interception is still functioning on the appropriate subject would be sent to a LEA.   GxSX7) Continuity check tone (c-tone) -- An electronic signal would alert a LEA if the  X4facility used for delivery of call content interception has failed or QQlost continuity.   GxFX8) Feature status -- A message would affirmatively notify a LEA of any changes in features to which a subject subscribes.   X|4 Gx X9) Dialed digit extraction | yO'ԍ This capability has also been referred to as "postcutthrough dialing and signaling." -- Information sent to a LEA would include those digits dialed by a subject after the initial call setup is completed.   X74 i 6.    The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), Electronic Frontier Foundation  |$(EFF), Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and American Civil Liberties Union  |$p(ACLU) argue that the interim standard is overinclusive because it includes location information  X4 |$and packetmode communications capabilities. Specifically, the interim standard includes a"z 0*%%ZZ"  |$location parameter that would identify the location of a subject's "mobile terminal" whenever this  |$qinformation is reasonably available at the intercept access point and its delivery to law  |$enforcement is legally authorized. Location information would be available to the LEA  |$ irrespective of whether a call content channel (CCC) or a call data channel (CDC) was  X4 |$employed.{ yO'ԍ JSTD025 at  6.4.6, and at  5.4.15.4.8, Tables 1, 5, 6, and 8.{ The interim standard also provides for LEA access to callidentifying information  |$and the interception of wire and electronic telecommunications, regardless of whether the  Xv4 |$telecommunications are carried in circuitmode or in packetmode. vX {O 'ԍ Id. at  3 and 4.5. Section 3 defines circuitmode as "a communication using bidirectional paths switched or connected when the communication is established. The entire communication uses the same path." Section 3 defines packetmode as "a communication where individual packets or virtual circuits of a communication within a physical circuit are switched or routed by the accessing telecommunication system. Each packet may take a different route through the intervening network(s)."  The interim standard further  |$cstates that the "callidentifying information associated with the circuitmode content surveillance  |$Iis provided on the [call data channel]," but does not specifically address whether callidentifying  |$"information, if any, associated with packetmode surveillance must be provided over a call data  X 4channel.2  {O'ԍ Id.2  X 4 i 7.    The Commission released a Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making (Further  X 4 |$NPRM) in this proceeding to address alleged deficiencies in the interim standard. In the Further  X 4 |$NPRM, we stated that we did not intend to reexamine any of the uncontested technical  |$requirements of the interim standard, but would make determinations only regarding whether the  |$y11 disputed capabilities met the assistance capability requirements specified in section 103 of  X4CALEA.O {O'ԍ Further NPRM, at  4445.O  Xh4  XQ4 i 8. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that the provision by carriersQ.  yO0'ԍ Hereinafter, reference to "carriers" includes only wireline, cellular and broadband PCS carriers. to LEAs  |$[of location information and five punch list capabilities is necessary to meet the assistance  |$capability requirements under section 103(a). Those five punch list capabilities are subject |$"initiated conference calls; party hold, join, drop on conference calls; subjectinitiated dialing and  X4 |$+signaling information; and timing information. The Further NPRM also sought comment on  |$whether the dialed digit extraction (postcutthrough digits) capability is necessary to meet the  |$assistance capability requirements under Section 103(a). The Further NPRM also tentatively  |$concluded that three punch list capabilitiessurveillance status, continuity check tone and feature statuswere not assistance capability requirements under Section 103(a)." 0*%%ZZ"Ԍ.  X4 i 9. We emphasized in the Further NPRM that we were directed, pursuant to section  X4 |$107(b) of CALEA, to take into account five factors in our analysis of deficiency petitions brought  X4 |$&to our attention.O {O6'ԍ Further NPRM, at  2930.O Those factors are: (1) meeting the assistance capability requirements of section  |$103 by costeffective methods; (2) protecting the privacy and security of communications not  |$authorized to be intercepted; (3) minimizing the cost of CALEA compliance on residential  Xx4 |$Aratepayers; (4) serving the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new  |$technologies and services to the public; and, (5) providing a reasonable time and conditions for  XJ4CALEA compliance.@JZ yOU 'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1006(b).@  X 4 i  10. We also tentatively concluded in the Further NPRM that, if the additional technical  X 4 |$requirements we proposed were adopted, they could be most efficiently implemented by  |$permitting TIA to modify JSTD025 in accord with our determinations. We stated that although  |$TIA may have to undertake additional work to implement the additional technical requirements  X 4 |$[identified in the Further Notice, it has the experience and resources to develop technical  X 4specifications and implement CALEA's requirements most rapidly.Q  {OH'ԍ Further NPRM, at  132133.Q  X4 i  11. Finally, we sought comment in the Further NPRM on what role, if any, we can  |$or should play in assisting telecommunications carriers other than wireline, cellular, and  XS4broadband PCS to set standards for, or to achieve compliance with, CALEA's requirements.?S| {O'ԍ Id. at  141.?  X' III. DISCUSSION ă  X4  X'    A. General Comments  X' 1. Scope of Proceeding  X4 i = 12. We stated in the Further NPRM that the uncontested technical requirements of the  Xo4 |$interim standard are beyond the scope of this proceeding. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU, challenge this  |$tentative conclusion. They argue that our decision to foreclose comment on "uncontested" issues  |$improperly insulates the interim industry standard from public scrutiny, is inconsistent with the"A0*%%ZZ_"  |$&requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, and undermines the value of our authority over  X4the process that led to the standard.J yOb'ԍ EPIC/EFF/ACLU Comments, at 3334.J  X4 i  13. Discussion. We find no need to reexamine the entire interim standard. CALEA  X4 |$provides that the Commission establish technical requirements or standards upon being petitioned  |$cby a government agency or other person, where industry fails to issue technical requirements or  |$standards or such government agency or person believes the technical requirements or standards  Xa4 |$are deficient.FaX yOj 'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1006(b).F As discussed in the Further NPRM, a draft industry standard was submitted for  |$<balloting in spring 1997 to all interested participants under procedures of the American National  X54 |$Standards Institute.U5 {O 'ԍ Further NPRM, at  12 & n.28.U Subsequently, petitions for rulemaking were filed with the Commission,  X 4 |$ppursuant to section 107(b), contending that the interim standard was deficient; however, none of  |$8these petitions raised any issue pertaining to the interim standard other than those relating to  |$8location information, packetmode communications, and the DoJ/FBI punch list. Further, on  |$'April 20, 1998, our Wireless Telecommunications Bureau and Office of Engineering and  X 4 |$3Technology issued a Public Notice in this proceeding that solicited specific comment on the scope  |$of the assistance capability requirements necessary to satisfy the obligations imposed by  X4 |$CALEA.3z yO'ԍ DA 98762.3 Again, no deficiencies in the interim standard were identified other than with respect  |$Ito location information, packetmode communications, and the punch list. We find that no other  |$Iissues were raised before the Commission regarding the interim standard. Since section 107(b)  |$requires the Commission to resolve specific disputes raised by petition regarding alleged  |$deficiencies in the industry standard, we decline to consider other aspects of that standard not  |$Echallenged in this proceeding. Moreover, by focusing only on those specific technical issues  X 4 |$}properly raised before us, we will achieve greater efficiency and will permit telecommunications  |$manufacturers and carriers to deploy CALEA solutions on a more expedited basis. Accordingly,  |$lwe find that wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers must comply with all uncontested  X4requirements of the interim industry standard by June 30, 2000.I  {O'ԍ See  36, infra. I  X' 2. Definition of "Reasonably Available"  X4  Xk4 i  14. While the Act defines callidentifying information as "dialing or signaling  XT4 |$pinformation that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication  |$generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a"= 0*%%ZZ"  X4 |$telecommunications carrier,"R yOy'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1001(2). R it does not define "reasonably available." The Further NPRM  |$asked for comment on the factors we should use in determining whether callidentifying  X4 |$"information to be provided by a carrier to a LEA is "reasonably available" to the carrier.IX {O'ԍ Further NPRM, at  25.I The  X4 |$interim standard includes a definition of this term which states that callidentifying information  |$is "reasonably available" to a carrier if such information is present at an intercept access point  |$+(IAP) for call processing purposes. The IAP is "a point within a telecommunication system  |$where some of the communications or callidentifying information of an intercept subject's  Xa4equipment, facilities, and services are accessed." There may be one or more IAPs.ra {O 'ԍ See, respectively,  3 and 4.2.2 of JSTD025, at 8 and 14.r  X34 i O15.  Comments. AT&T and Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel) state that they  |$support the definition of reasonably available callidentifying information given in the interim  X 4 |$&standard.~ | {O4'ԍ AT&T Comments, at 34 (citing JSTD025 at  4.2.1); Nextel Comments, at 4. Section 4.2.1 of JSTD {O'025 is titled "Assumptions," and the last paragraph of p. 13 states: "Callidentifying information is reasonably  {O'available if the information is present at an Intercept Access Point (IAP) for call processing purposes. Network protocols (except LAESP) do not need to be modified solely for the purpose of passing callidentifying information. The specific elements of callidentifying information that are reasonably available at an IAP may vary between different technologies and may change as technology evolves." [Note: "LAESP" stands for Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance Protocol.]  AT&T further states that in the Further NPRM we departed from that definition, and  X 4 |$&that if we affirm the proposals set forth therein, we should acknowledge that processing that takes  |$place entirely within terminal equipment or other subscriberowned or maintained equipment is  X 4not reasonably available.=  yO7'ԍ AT&T Comments, at 6.=   X4 i 016.  DoJ/FBI contend that the concept of "reasonable availability" is a technical one that  |$focuses on network design, not a financial one involving carrier balance sheets. Further, DoJ/FBI  |$disagree that callidentifying information should be deemed reasonably available to a carrier only  |$if the information is present at an IAP for call processing purposes. DoJ/FBI contend that the  |$interim standard imposes no requirements regarding where or how IAPs are to be situated within  |$&a network. Instead, according to DoJ/FBI, the interim standard leaves the choice of IAPs entirely  |$to the discretion of individual carriers and manufacturers and permits a carrier to situate IAPs  |$ywithout regard to the impact on the carrier's ability to expeditiously isolate and enable a LEA  |$Ito access callidentifying information. DoJ/FBI maintain that it is untenable to take the position,  X4 |$as reflected in the JSTD025 definition, that there is never any need to modify network  |$protocols, even when the modification would be technically straightforward and would provide" R 0*%%ZZ5"  |$access to callidentifying information without imposing significant burdens on the network.  |$Accordingly, DoJ/FBI propose a modified definition of reasonably available callidentifying information, as follows:  G6!'XCallidentifying information is reasonably available if (1) it is present in an element in the  G6!Scarrier's network that is used to provide the subscriber with the ability to originate,  G6!hterminate, or direct communications and (2) it can be accessed there, or can be delivered  G6!to an IAP located elsewhere, without unreasonably affecting the call processing  XH4capabilities of the network.D!H yO 'ԍ DoJ/FBI Comments, at 2125.D(#  X 4 i z17.  Nextel contends that we should "validate" the JSTD025 definition of reasonably  |$pavailable callidentifying information because the objections of DoJ/FBI to that definition are not  |$wellgrounded. Nextel states that the interim standard requires IAPs to be placed to access call  |$content and callidentifying information, and that the reason the standard requires that call X 4 |$identifying information be present at the IAP for call processing purposes is that Congress  |$narrowly defined such information as dialing and signaling information used for the purposes of  X4routing calls through a carrier's network.G"X yO'ԍ Nextel Reply Comments, at 67.G  Xb4 i v18.  The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) maintains that  |$DoJ's/FBI's contention that a carrier may select IAPs that limit LEA collection of callidentifying  X44 |$information is erroneous. CTIA asserts that a carrier that attempted to implement JSTD025 in  |$such a manner would not be in compliance with publicly available technical requirements. CTIA  |$}argues, however, that there is no need for a carrier to redesign its network to create information  X4for use by a LEA.G# yO'ԍ CTIA Reply Comments, at 2829.G  X4 i B 19.  Numerous parties take issue with the contention of DoJ/FBI that "reasonable  X4 |$availability" is only a technical concept, and others argue that costs should be taken into  |$Vconsideration even for punch list items that are not considered to be callidentifying information.  |$Ameritech Corporation (Ameritech) maintains that Congress used the term "reasonable  Xe4 |$<availability" to include not only technical but also cost and timeliness considerations.I$ex yO!'ԍ Ameritech Reply Comments, at 4. I PrimeCo  |$Personal Communications, L.P. (PrimeCo) argues that DoJ's/FBI's interpretation of this term  |$would effectively nullify Congress's imposition of a reasonableness requirement and would  X 4 |$crequire the redesign of networks and equipment upgrades without regard to cost considerations. "  $0*%%ZZ<"  |$According to PrimeCo, such an interpretation would eviscerate the safe harbor of section 107 by  |$}requiring carriers to provide a particular punch list capability notwithstanding the cost criteria set  X4 |$}forth in section 107(b).F% yOK'ԍ PrimeCo Reply Comments, at 2.F The United States Telephone Association (USTA) agrees, stating that  X4 |$&we cannot adopt a punch list item unless it is shown to meet those cost criteria.C&X yO'ԍ USTA Reply Comments, at 3.C AirTouch states  |$that the cost of any technical solution is necessarily part of a determination as to whether that  X4 |$solution is reasonably available.G' yO& 'ԍ AirTouch Reply Comments, at 9.G AT&T states that section 107(b)(1) provides that if a capability  Xv4cannot be provided in a costeffective manner, that capability need not be provided.C(vx yO 'ԍ AT&T Reply Comments, at 5.C  XH4 i  20. Several parties who argue that the costs of a particular punch list capability are  |$ relevant to a determination of whether that capability is reasonably available to carriers also argue  |$Rthat we must take into account the costs of the core interim standard in our determination of  X 4 |$<whether a punch list item should be required. CTIA contends that these costs will be in excess  X 4 |$[of $4 billion for all carriers.D)  yO'ԍ CTIA Reply Comments, at 12.D On a per switch basis, AT&T states that these costs, even  X 4 |$excluding some that are difficult to quantify, approach almost $500,000.9*  {O'ԍ Id. at 28.9 The Personal  |$hCommunications Industry Association (PCIA) maintains that, based on the lowest switch  |$modification costs in the record, the nationwide cost to local exchange carriers (LECs) of  |$[implementing the interim standard will be $1.73 billion; and, based on AT&T's per switch  Xy4estimates, nationwide costs to wireless carriers will be $639 million.E+y*  yOT'ԍ PCIA Reply Comments, at 67.E  XK4 i 921. Ameritech proposes that if the cost of developing a punch list capability exceeds  X44 |$5% of the interim standard we should deem that capability to be not reasonably available.C,4  yO'ԍ Ameritech Comments, at 3. C  |$Additionally, Ameritech asserts that we must consider the cost of modifying switches placed into  |$service on or before January 1, 1995 in determining capability requirements under section 103  |$because any such switches that have undergone major modifications or significant upgrades must  X4 |$be retrofitted at carriers' expense.F-J  yO$'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1008(d).F Ameritech expresses concern that, given the FBI's proposed" -0*%%ZZ"  |$definition of "major modification or significant upgrade," a substantial portion of the costs of  X4CALEA compliance are designed to become carriers' responsibilities.I. yOb'ԍ Ameritech Reply Comments, at 5. I  X4  X4 i z22. DoJ/FBI argue that the telecommunications industry has agreed to bear the costs  |$of implementing the interim standard; therefore, the only relevant costs are the additional costs  X4 |$that will be added by the punch list.A/X yO'ԍ DoJ/FBI Comments, at 17.A Additionally, DoJ/FBI assert that the features required for  |$a carrier to meet its CALEA assistance capability obligations will be among many features  |$contained in one or more periodic "releases" deployed on the carrier's switches, and that the costs  |$attributable to CALEA are only those that will be added to the costs of this regular release  X14 |$Iprocess.G01 yO 'ԍ DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 14.G Further, according to DoJ/FBI, it is general industry practice for carriers to be given  X 4 |$@discounts of as much as 65% from the manufacturers' quoted prices.91 x {OC'ԍ Id. at 16.9 Moreover, DoJ/FBI assert  |$that even if CTIA's worstcase scenario in industrywide compliance costs to implement the J |$Standard is accepted and all costs are passed on to consumers, the resulting increase in the  X 4average ratepayer's monthly bill would be minimal if costs are spread over five years.92  {O'ԍ Id. at 19.9  X 4 i S23. In response to our request in the Further NPRM,H3  {O'ԍ Further NPRM, at  30.H we received comments from  |$five manufacturers regarding their anticipated revenues from selling software, and in some cases  |$ certain hardware, to wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers to allow those carriers to meet  Xd4 |$the technical requirements of CALEA.4"d.  yOC'ԍ Each manufacturer requested confidential treatment of its individualized revenue data, and such treatment  {O 'was granted by the Commission's Office of Engineering and Technology (OET). See Order, CC Docket No. 97213, DA 99412, released March 2, 1999. Accordingly, in light of OET's ruling, the data were released to the public for comment and considered by the Commission only in aggregated form. Subsequently, the Commission's Office of Engineering  XM4 |$and Technology (OET) issued a Public Notice that solicited comment on these aggregated  X84 |$revenue estimates.x58 {O"'ԍ See Public Notice, CC Docket No. 97213, DA 99863, released May 7, 1999.x These estimates, which would represent costs to the carriers, totalled $916  X!4million for the core JSTD025 and $414 million for the nine punch list items.K6! {O|$'ԍ See Appendix B, infra.K "! <60*%%ZZY"Ԍ X4 i ԙ24. In response to the Public Notice, we received a number of comments concerning  |$the aggregated revenue estimates. CTIA contends that its survey of 21 wireless carriers and six  X4 |$wireless switch manufacturers generally confirms these estimates.W7 {OM'ԍ CTIA Comments to Public Notice, at 3, 7.W AirTouch states that the  X4 |$cestimates provide a floor that the actual total is sure to exceed, and asserts that the Commission  |$"must conclude that the punch list is not costeffective. AirTouch argues that carriers will incur  |$uextensive expenses that will not be paid to telecommunications equipment manufacturers,  |$including inhouse engineering and implementation costs and purchases from thirdparty  Xa4suppliers.Z8aZ {Ol 'ԍ AirTouch Comments to Public Notice, at 24.Z  X34 i 25. GTE and SBC agree with AirTouch that the manufacturers' revenue estimates  |$significantly understate total costs, and each provides its own CALEA compliance cost estimates.  |$GTE states that many of its switches are not manufactured by the five vendors encompassed by  X 4 |$the Public Notice, and further states that it has one of the most central officeintensive networks  |$cin the country, thereby increasing its CALEA compliance costs. According to GTE, its wireline  |$costs of implementing JSTD025 are more than $400 million, which compares with the  X 4 |$Nmanufacturers' wireline revenue estimate of only $569 million.[9  {OH'ԍ GTE Reply Comments to Public Notice, at 56.[ SBC states its CALEA  |$Acompliance cost estimates include not only software, but activation fees, engineering and  |$ginstallation fees, gating hardware costs, and the required advancement of generic upgrades. Based  |$/on these total costs, SBC estimates its wireline JSTD025 compliance costs to be $326 million,  |$and its wireless JSTD025 compliance costs to be $37.2 million. SBC also estimates its wireline  |$/CALEA compliance costs, including the costs associated with the punch list, to be $340 million,  X!4with punch list costs unavailable for its wireless carriers.U:!~ {OP'ԍ SBC Comments to Public Notice, at 13.U   X 4  X4 i 26. DoJ/FBI contend that the manufacturers' revenue estimates have no relevance to  X4 |$the Commission's task under section 107(b) of CALEA.W; {O'ԍ DoJ/FBI Comments to Public Notice, at 1.W DoJ/FBI further contend that these  |$estimates are overstated because they reflect list prices, and additionally do not take into account  |$pthe fact that a substantial portion of costs to carriers will be reimbursed because equipment was  X4 |$Iinstalled or deployed by January 1, 1995. DoJ/FBI also maintain that the estimates may include  |$@revenues that enable carriers to meet CALEA's capacity, rather than capability, requirements; and  Xi4 |$further, may reflect CALEA solutions being incorporated into all remote switches.:<i {O$'ԍ Id. at 68.: DoJ/FBI"i4 <0*%%ZZ"  |$cnote that under section 104(e) of CALEA, eligible capacity costs incurred by a carrier are to be  X4 |$reimbursed by the Government;@= yOb'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1003(b).@ and argue that for many switching platforms, compliance  |$solutions need to be incorporated only into host and standalone switches, and not into remote  X4switches.W>X {O'ԍ DoJ/FBI Comments to Public Notice, at 8.W  X4 i v27. USTA asserts that there is no evidence that any discounts from list prices are  |$available to reduce costs to carriers, and contends that the DoJ/FBI interpretations of the meaning  |$of the terms "equipment, facilities, or services installed or deployed" by January 1, 1995 and  |$"major modifications" to such equipment, facilities, or services would limit reimbursement to  |$carriers. Additionally, USTA maintains that there has been no indication from DoJ/FBI as to  X 4what capacity costs will be eligible for reimbursement.Z?  {O'ԍ USTA Reply Comments to Public Notice, at 2.Z  X 4 i 28.  Discussion. We reiterate that we find no need to reexamine the entire interim  X 4 |$ustandard;H@ | {O'ԍ See  13, supra.H however, in addition to examining the eleven alleged deficiencies, we also will  X 4 |$examine any specific issue regarding that standard raised by the proposals in the Further NPRM,  X 4 |$including the definition of "reasonably available." The interim standard states that callidentifying  |$pinformation is "reasonably available" to a carrier if such information is present at an IAP for call  X}4 |$processing purposes.A} {O<'ԍ See  14 and n.30, supra; and see again  4.2.1 of JSTD025, at 13. The intercept access point is the point in the network where the subscriber's phone line is tapped, usually at the switch. We agree with DoJ/FBI that JSTD025's definition of "reasonably  |$available" is too narrow because the definition would limit "reasonably available callidentifying  XO4 |$information" to callidentifying information used by the IAP switch for call processing. On the  |$other hand, we find DoJ/FBI's proffered definition unnecessarily broad because it would apply  |$to call identifying information located anywhere within a carrier's network, rather than at the IAP  |$<location where the information is being captured for the LEA. Consequently, we do not disturb  |$the interim standard's conclusion that call identifying information is reasonably available if it is  X4 |$located at the IAP. We thus find that if callidentifying information is present at a carrier's IAPBh  {O 'ԍ As mentioned in  14, supra, there may be more than one IAP within a carrier's network.  |$and can be made available without the carrier being unduly burdened with network modifications,  |$that information is reasonably available to that carrier, even if it is not used by the IAP switch  |$Rfor call processing. Under this definition, callidentifying information that is used by the IAP" B0*%%ZZ9"  |$switch for call processing is reasonably available, as well as other callidentifying information carried on the carrier's network that passes the IAP.  X4 i  29. We believe that modifying the definition of "reasonably available" to include call  |$identifying information that is present at an IAP, as opposed to restricting such information to  |$that used only for call processing, serves the important objective of not impeding the development  |$pof new communications services. In addition to network design considerations, our modification  |$'will permit cost and privacy considerations to be considered in determining whether call |$lidentifying information is "reasonably available" to an originating carrier. This modification is  |$<consistent with most commenting parties' contention that the term "reasonably available," as set  |$Rforth in section 103(a)(2) of CALEA, is best interpreted to include cost factors in addition to  |$technical considerations. We believe that this interpretation is consistent with the Act's directive  |$that in taking any action under section 107(b), the Commission must meet the assistance  |$capability requirements of section 103 by costeffective methods and minimize the cost of  |$ECALEA compliance on residential ratepayers, as well protecting the privacy and security of  X 4 |$communications not authorized to be intercepted.@C  yO 'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1006(b).@ Accordingly, we will define callidentifying  |$information to be "reasonably available" to an originating carrier if such information "is present  |$at an IAP and can be made available without the carrier being unduly burdened with network modifications."  X44 i #30. We have reviewed the cost/revenue data submitted in this proceeding. While there  |$ are a wide variety of cost estimates, we find the five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates  |$of $916 million for the core JSTD025 and $414 million for the nine punch list items to be a  |$reasonable guide of the costs to wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers for CALEA  |$Ecompliance. Commenters have noted reasons for believing that the manufacturers' revenue  |$estimates may either understate or overstate costs to carriers. On balance, we find that while  X4 |$/ these estimates indicate that costs to carriers will be significant, and do not represent all carrier  X4 |$costs of implementing CALEA,D&X {O'ԍ As OET noted in its Public Notice, the revenue estimates are for only five manufacturers, and do not  {Of'represent all CALEArelated software and equipment revenues anticipated by these manufacturers. See Public  {O0'Notice, at  4. Nevertheless, relative to other cost/revenue estimates submitted in this proceeding, we find the manufacturers' estimates to be the most detailed and reliable. the additional punch list costs are not so exorbitant as to require  |$us to reject the punch list automatically without considering each item on an individual basis in  |$+relation to CALEA's other statutory factors. We find particularly instructive the cost of the  |$Mpunch list relative to the cost of the core JSTD025 because the latter represents the bulk of costs  |$ to carriers, and carriers through their participation in TIA Subcommittee TR45.2 have agreed  |$to provide the core capabilities of JSTD025. Accordingly, we will evaluate each punch list item individually, including the anticipated cost of each item, as discussed below. " FD0*%%ZZ"Ԍ X4 i Fԙ31. We decline to adopt Ameritech's proposals relating to costs. Its proposal for the  |$Commission to automatically reject any punch list capability whose costs exceed 5% of the  |$interim standard would necessarily be arbitrary and contrary to our directives under CALEA.  |$VAdditionally, while we recognize that some switches placed into service on or before January 1,  |$p1995 may have to be retrofitted at carriers' expense, the commenting parties have not submitted information sufficient for us to quantify the impact of this factor.  X_' 3. Retrofitting Equipment under Interim Standard  XH4  X14 i r32. Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc. (BAM) raises another concern about the interim  |$standard. BAM argues that, in cases in which a carrier deployed equipment after January 1,  |$1995, we should commence a proceeding under section 109(b) of CALEA to decide whether the  |$carrier should be required to bear the costs of retrofitting that equipment to comply with the  X 4 |$pinterim standard.E  yON'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Carriers do not have to pay to retrofit equipment installed on or before January 1, 1995 if it has not been significantly upgraded or otherwise modified since that time. Section 109 of CALEA provides that "[t]he Attorney General may, subject to the availability of appropriations, agree to pay telecommunications carriers for all reasonable costs directly associated with the modifications performed by carriers in connection with equipment, facilities, and services installed or deployed on or before January 1, 1995, to establish the capabilities  {O6'necessary to comply with section 103." 47 U.S.C.  1008(a).  If the Attorney General does not agree to pay all reasonable costs directly related to such modifications, the "equipment, facility, or service [deployed on or before January 1, 1995] shall be considered to be in compliance with the assistance capability requirements of section 103 until the equipment, facility, or service is replaced or significantly upgraded or otherwise undergoes major  yOX'modification." 47 U.S.C.  1008(d).Į BAM contends that we are empowered with broad authority to alleviate the  |$cadverse public policy implications for competition and consumers of requiring carriers to pay for  X 4retrofitting equipment.@F b  yO'ԍ BAM Comments, at 1516.@  Xy4 i  33. Discussion.  We observe that BAM's request that the Commission undertake a  |$yrulemaking proceeding under section 109(b) to decide generally whether telecommunications  |$carriers should be required to bear the costs of retrofitting equipment installed after January 1,  X64 |$<1995 is contrary to the plain language of the Act. Section 109(b) requires us to determine upon  |$receipt of a petition whether compliance by an individual carrier with the assistance capability  |$requirements of section 103 is reasonably achievable with respect to any equipment, facility, or  X4 |$service installed or deployed after January 1, 1995.IG  yO!'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1008(b)(1).I If we receive a petition and determine that  X4 |$compliance by an individual carrier is not reasonably achievable, the Act provides that the  X4 |$Attorney General may agree to pay for any such equipment, facility or service.CH  yO$'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1008(b)(2).C If the Attorney"H0*%%ZZ "  |$General does not agree to pay, that carrier shall be deemed to be in compliance with the  X4 |$assistance capability requirements of section 103.2I {Ob'ԍ Id.2 Accordingly, we decline to adopt BAM's  X4proposal since it is contrary to the plain language of the Act. JZ yO'ԍ We note that in a companion item adopted simultaneously with this order, we provide guidance regarding the factors that we will consider in making determinations under section 109(b) as to whether compliance with CALEA's assistance capability requirements is reasonably achievable for particular carriers, and the showings we  {O5'expect entities filing petitions under section 109(b) to make. See Second Report and Order, CC Docket No. 97213, FCC 99229, adopted August 26, 1999.   X' 4. Compliance Date for Interim Standard  Xv4 i !34. AirTouch Communications, Inc. (AirTouch); BellSouth Corporation, Inc.,  |$9BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., BellSouth Cellular Corp., BellSouth Personal  |$Communications, Inc., and BellSouth Wireless Data, L,P. (BellSouth); and SBC Communications,  X14 |$"Inc. (SBC) question whether the current June 30, 2000 deadline for implementation of the core  |$requirements of the interim standard is achievable. AirTouch states that we should acknowledge  X 4 |$cin this Third R&O that additional extensions may be necessary;BK  yO'ԍ AirTouch Comments, at 31.B BellSouth states that only one  X 4 |$+of its vendors has promised to meet the current deadline;BL  yO;'ԍ BellSouth Comments, at i.B and SBC states that the delivery  |$schedule contemplated by its vendors will not allow for the extensive testing required to ensure  |$Rthat its deployment is in compliance with the interim standard, nor does this schedule allow a  X 4sufficient period for deployment across SBC's entire network.@M ,  yO'ԍ SBC Comments, at 1819.@  X{4 i 9"35. Discussion.  We see no reason at this time to extend, on an industry wide basis,  |$the June 30, 2000 deadline for compliance with CALEA's section 103 capability requirements  |$that are covered by the interim standard. We observe that the deadline specified in the Act was  X84 |$October 25, 1998; NX8  yO'ԍ Section 111(b) of CALEA, 47 U.S.C.  1001(b), specified a compliance deadline four years after the Act's enactment. The Act was enacted on October 25, 1994; accordingly, the original compliance deadline was October 25, 1998.  thus, we have already extended the original deadline by more than 20  X!4months. In our Extension Order, we stated:  G6!X[W]e will require carriers to have installed CALEAcompliant equipment and facilities  G6!4based on the core JSTD025 standard by June 30, 2000. This is a firm deadline. If this"N0*%%ZZ"  G6!0standard is ultimately modified and new capabilities or features are added to the core  G6!Sstandard in the section 107(b) rulemaking, we will consider establishing a separate  X4 G6!deadline for upgrading carrier equipment and facilities to comply with those capabilities  G6!=or features in that proceeding pursuant to our authority under section 107(b)(5). This  G6!approach provides certainty to the telecommunications industry in developing and  G6!installing CALEAcompliant solutions, and recognizes the interests of law enforcement  G6!in providing effective public safety. It also seeks to allow carriers to implement a  G6!CALEAcompliant solution sooner, rather than later, while providing the flexibility to  G6!design modifications to the core JSTD025 standard that can be installed in carrier  G6!4equipment and facilities in subsequent upgrades, if any such modifications are adopted in  X 4the section 107(b) rulemaking proceeding.O  {O 'ԍ Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Docket No. 97213, FCC 98223, released September 11, 1998, at   46 (footnote omitted).(#   X 4 i 9#36. Therefore, carriers and manufacturers have been on notice since the September  X 4 |$1998 Extension Order that we considered June 30, 2000 a "firm" deadline for the section 103  X 4 |$capability requirements covered by the JSTD025.P " {O'ԍ The Extension Order stated that the "core" of JSTD025 excludes both the provision of location  {O]'information and packetmode communications. Id. at n.139. However, in the Further NPRM we proposed to  {O''modify that conclusion to include a location information feature as part of the core of JSTD025. See Further  {O'NPRM, at  46. As discussed in  46, infra, we are herein adopting that proposal and are requiring that a location information feature be deployed by carriers by the June 30, 2000 CALEA compliance deadline, unless  {O'carriers have obtained an extension. With respect to packetmode communications, as discussed in  55, infra,  yOM'we are herein requiring that a packetmode feature be deployed by September 30, 2001. Additionally, as discussed in paragraph 129,  X 4 |$infra, we find the record justifies the establishment of a separate later deadline for the additional  |$capabilities that we are herein mandating for wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers. We  |$palso note that DoJ/FBI is currently negotiating with carriers regarding areas where wiretaps are  Xf4 |$infrequent, and these carriers may be permitted to postpone CALEA compliance in those areas.Qfl  {O'ԍ See letter of June 30, 1999, from Stephen R. Colgate, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, to William E. Kennard, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.  |$Accordingly, we understand that DoJ/FBI and/or the affected carriers may seek an extension  |$[under section 107(c) of CALEA of the June 30, 2000 deadline in conformance with such  X!4 |$Magreements.NRX!  yO 'ԍ We recognize that CALEA also permits carriers to file petitions under section 109(b) of CALEA stating that compliance with the assistance capability requirements of section 103 is not reasonably achievable with respect to any equipment, facilities, or equipment deployed after January 1, 1995.N We therefore will await receipt of such requests before deciding on a new deadline  |$for the affected carriers. We expect that along with such requests, DoJ/FBI will submit a list of  X4 |$the affected carriers and the terms of such extensions so that we may place such information on Public Notice for comment. "R0*%%ZZT"Ԍ X'ԙ B.Particular Capabilities of JSTD025 Opposed by CDT, EFF, EPIC, and ACLU      X'1. Location Information kkkkkkkkkk  X4 i z $37. Background. JSTD025 includes a "location" parameter that would identify the  |$Ilocation of a subject's "mobile terminal" whenever this information is reasonably available at the  |$Nintercept access point and its delivery to law enforcement is legally authorized. Location  |$information would be available to the LEA irrespective of whether a call content channel or a  XJ4call data channel was employed.SJ yO '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э JSTD025 at  6.4.6, and at  5.4.15.4.8, Tables 1, 5, 6, and 8.  X 4 i %38.  The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that location information falls under the  |$definition of callidentifying information set forth in section 102(2) of CALEA because location  X 4 |$_information identifies the origin or destination of a communication.@T X yO'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1001(2).@ Therefore, the Further  X 4 |$NPRM proposed that where location information is reasonably available to a carrier, provision  X 4 |$yof that information to LEAs is necessary to meet the mandates of section 103. The Further  X 4 |$NPRM also proposed that location information necessary to meet section 103 would include only  X4 |$Ethe subject's cell site location at the beginning and termination of a call. Finally, the Further  X4 |$[NPRM tentatively concluded that for a LEA to obtain location information that cannot be  |$determined from the telephone number, the LEA must have an authorization different from the  X[4minimal authorization necessary for use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.OU[ {O'ԍ Further NPRM, at  5257.O  X-4 i m &39. Comments. CDT states that our tentative decision to require carriers to design a  |$Ilocation capability into wireless phones cannot be supported by the plain words of CALEA and,  |$further, directly contradicts the Act's legislative history, which states that location information  X4 |$is not a CALEA mandate.kVz yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э CDT Reply Comments, at iii.k CDT contends that the words "origin" and "destination" have  |$lobvious meanings apart from location, and that interpreting those terms to also mean cell site  |$location violates a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that each word in a statute  |$/should be given a single and unique meaning. Also, CDT contends that the location of wireless  |$/phones is more personally revealing than the location of wireline phones because when a call is  Xw4made on a wireless phone it almost always is made by the individual subscriber.fWw  yO2#'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э CDT Comments, at 512.f "`W0*%%ZZ"Ԍ X4 i   '40. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU generally agree with CDT, arguing that CALEA contains  |$no provisions expressly including location tracking data within the definition of callidentifying  |$information. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU also contend that the interim standard is internally  X4 |$inconsistent because it proposes to require carriers to provide location tracking data at the  |$"beginning and end of calls as part of their duty to provide information regarding the "origin" and  |$A"destination" of particular communications, but the definition of those terms in the interim  Xv4standard does not pertain to physical location.LXXv yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э EPIC, EFF, and ACLU Reply Comments, at 1011. Page 5 of JSTD025 states that "origin is the number of the party initiating a call (e.g., calling party)" and "destination is the number of the party to which a call is being made (e.g., called party)." L %%  XH4 i (41. US West states that the location information capability in the interim standard is  |$<not callidentifying information under section 103(a). US West argues that CALEA's definition  |$lof callidentifying information requires carriers to provide LEAs with telephone numbers, not  |$other characteristics of calls. US West maintains that while a LEA generally is able to derive  |$Na target's physical location from a telephone number for most wireline calls, that ability is  X 4incidental and should not be read as an underlying mandate of CALEA.hY  yOn'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э US West Comments, at 24.h  X 4 i  )42. DoJ/FBI argue that location information is callidentifying and state that,  |$Rirrespective of whether we modify the definition of "reasonable availability" as they propose,  |$there is no need for us to interpret or construe this term differently in connection with location  |$<information than in connection with the other kinds of callidentifying information at issue in this  XK4 |$pproceeding.kZKx yOt'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Comments, at 7476.k DoJ/FBI state that they agree that the interim standard requires only that cell site  |$location at the beginning and end of a call be provided, and maintain that CALEA embodies a  |$compromise regarding location information: When a LEA is proceeding "solely pursuant to the  |$authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices," carriers are not to treat location  |$Iinformation as callidentifying information, but when a LEA has been duly authorized to acquire  |$location information under other electronic surveillance statutes, location information remains part  |$Vof callidentifying information. DoJ/FBI contend that the interim standard is consistent with this  |$intent, while CDT's position is not. DoJ/FBI state that it is not the case, as CDT suggests, that  |$the Commission's reading of "origin" and "destination" gives those terms different meanings for  |$wireless and wireline communications. DoJ/FBI contend that those terms encompass location  |$lboth in the wireless and wireline settings, but that in the case of wireline communications the  |$fixed location of the subscriber's terminal means that the telephone number of the terminal  X74identifies the location of the call, and so no separate location information is required.q[7 yO$'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 6668.q"7[0*%%ZZ8"Ԍ X4 i Kԙ*43. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) argues that any location  |$information that is used and/or is available within a carrier's network for the purpose of providing  |$Ioverall service and/or processing of individual calls should be considered by us to be reasonably  |$Iavailable to the carrier in the case of location of wireless devices. However, NYPD expresses  |$Vconcern about our proposal to adopt cell site location rather than a more precise location for the  |$"subject's mobile terminal. NYPD contends that such a broad definition could limit the scope of  |$existing electronic surveillance authority. For example, NYPD states that in criminal cases where  |$triangulation techniques that allow location to be determined with exactitude have been authorized  |$}by a court, carriers might be reluctant to assist a LEA to determine a more precise location than  X14a cell site.g\1 yO '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э NYPD Comments, at 78. g  X 4 i  +44. Discussion. We find that a subject's cell site location at the beginning and end of  |$a call is callidentifying information under CALEA. The Act states that callidentifying  |$information is "dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination,  |$or termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any  X 4 |$equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier."t] X {O'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1001(2). t We find, contrary to the  |$position of CDT and EPIC/EFF/ACLU, that a subject's cell site location at the beginning and end  |$Aof a call identifies the "origin" or "destination" of a communication and thus is covered by  |$CALEA. With respect to CALEA's express statement that "with regard to information acquired  |$solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section  |$u3127 of title 18, United States Code), . . . callidentifying information shall not include any  |$information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent that the  X4 |$_location may be determined from the telephone number),"L^ yO'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1002(a)(2)(B).L we agree with DoJ/FBI that this  |$provision does not exclude location information from the category of "callidentifying  |$information," but simply imposes upon law enforcement an authorization requirement different  X4from that minimally necessary for use of pen registers and trap and trace devices._z {O'ԍ As we stated in the Further NPRM, we believe that interpreting this provision to exclude location information from the technical requirements for CALEA would render the provision "mere surplusage" and  {O'would thus conflict with the usual rules of statutory construction. See Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465 (1997), 117 S.Ct. 913, 917 (1997) ("legislative enactments should not be construed to render their provisions mere  {O!'surplusage"); Illinois Public Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 562 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (construing  {O!'section 226(e)(2) of Communications Act in manner to avoid "mere surplusage"); Deployment of Wireline  {O"'Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98147, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 98188, released August 7, 1998, at  71 ("when . . . 'charged with understanding the relationship between two different provisions within the same statute, we must analyze the language of each to make sense of the whole'"). "_0*%%ZZ "Ԍ X4 i ԙ ,45. Additionally, we find that location information is reasonably available to cellular  |$/and broadband PCS carriers. We observe that this capability was developed by industry and is  X4 |$Vincluded in the interim standard. Further, as we observed in the Further NPRM, in the wireline  X4 |$yenvironment LEAs have generally been able to obtain location information routinely from the  |$telephone number because the telephone number usually corresponds with location. With the  |$telephone number, location information is available from a LEA's own 911/Enhanced 911 (E911)  |$database or from the telephone company's electronic records, such as the Loop Maintenance  Xa4 |$Operating System (LMOS).`a {O'ԍ See Transmission Systems for Communications, AT&T Bell Laboratories (5th ed. 1982). We also note that the equivalent location information in the  |$wireless (cellular or broadband PCS) environment appears to be the location of the cell sites to  |$Iwhich the mobile terminal or handset is connected at the beginning and at the termination of the  |$"call. Provision of this particular location information does not appear to expand or diminish law  X 4enforcement's surveillance authority under prior law applicable to the wireline environment.    X 4 i -46. We will not, however, mandate a location tracking capability in this proceeding.  |$cWhile NYPD believes that a capability that identifies location more precisely would be useful to  |$pLEAs, we are concerned that such a capability poses difficulties that could undermine individual  |$privacy. We believe that a more generalized capability that will identify only the location of a  |$cell site, and only at the beginning and termination of the call, will give LEAs adequate  |$information. We note, however, that our decision herein does not preclude LEAs from requesting  |$legal authority to acquire more specific location information in particular circumstances.  |$Accordingly, as has been agreed to by both DoJ/FBI and the telecommunications industry, we  |$mandate a location capability that will identify cell site location at the beginning and termination  X4 |$Eof a call. As proposed in the Further NPRM, we require that this capability be deployed by  |$lcarriers by the June 30, 2000 CALEA compliance deadline, unless carriers have obtained an extension.  X4    X'    2.PacketMode  X4 i  .47. Background. JSTD025 provides for LEA access to callidentifying information  |$and the interception of wire and electronic telecommunications, regardless of whether the  XT4 |$telecommunications are carried in circuitmode or in packetmode.8aTZ {O_'ԍ See JSTD025, at  3 and 4.5. Section 3 of JSTD025 defines circuitmode as "a communication using bidirectional paths switched or connected when the communication is established. The entire communication uses the same path." Section 3 defines packetmode as "a communication where individual packets or virtual circuits of a communication within a physical circuit are switched or routed by the accessing telecommunication system. Each packet may take a different route through the intervening network(s)."8 It further states that the  |$V"callidentifying information associated with the circuitmode content surveillance is provided on"= a0*%%ZZ"  |$the [call data channel]," but does not specifically address whether callidentifying information,  X4if any, associated with packetmode surveillance must be provided over a call data channel.2b {Ob'ԍ Id.2  X4 i `/48. The Further NPRM     noted that packet data and packet-switching technology are  |$potentially usable for both information services and telecommunications services, but that such  |$technology is subject to CALEA requirements only to the extent it is used to provide  Xx4 |$/telecommunications services, and not for information services. The Further NPRM also noted  |$that privacy concerns could be implicated if carriers were to give to LEAs packets containing  |$Eboth callidentifying and call content information when only the former was authorized. The  X54 |$Further NPRM tentatively concluded that the record is not sufficiently developed to support any  |$particular technical requirements for packetmode communications, and therefore did not propose  X 4 |$technical requirements for such communications. However, the Further NPRM sought comment  X 4on a wide range of issues to develop a sufficient record.Oc Z(* {O'ԍ Further NPRM, at  6366.O  X 4 i  049. Comments. EFF, EPIC, and ACLU state that our cautious approach regarding  |$8packetmode communications is correct, and that it is critical that we adequately protect the  |$Aprivacy of communications carried on packetmode systems. They state that the interim  X4 |$standard's requirement to deliver the entire packet data stream associated with a given  |$+communication violates the privacy provisions of section 103. Therefore, according to EFF,  XU4 |$/EPIC, and ACLU, until carriers are able to protect the privacy of communications carried over  |$packetmode systems, we should refrain from adopting capability requirements for such  X'4systems.vd'(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э EPIC/EFF/ACLU Reply Comments, at 810.v  X4 i 150. CDT states that carriers using packet technologies have an obligation under  |$#CALEA to protect privacy by distinguishing between call content and callidentifying  |$information, so that a LEA does not intercept the former when it has only the narrower authority  |$for the latter. CDT contends that DoJ/FBI acknowledge that protecting privacy by distinguishing  |$between call content and callidentifying information is technically trivial, but states that DoJ/FBI  |$cbelieve there is no obligation on carriers to protect privacy. CDT states that we should not wait  Xo4 |$luntil packet technologies are more fully deployed to clarify that carriers have an obligation to  XX4protect individual privacy.neX|(* yO"'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э CDT Reply Comments, at iiiii.n "A e0*%%ZZ_"Ԍ X4 i d  251. AT&T supports our tentative conclusion that packetmode technologies may require  |$differing CALEA solutions. AT&T states that it believes that if we defer setting packetmode  |$}communications standards in this proceeding, industry associations will take up the issue on their  X4own.>f(* yO4'ԍ AT&T Comments, at 25.>  X4  X4 i 352. TIA states that the telecommunications network is rapidly evolving toward a  Xv4 |$dpacketbased architecture. TIA cautions that the Commission not stifle the continued  |$cdevelopment of packetmode technologies by imposing a solution that could require the redesign  |$p(or even abandonment) of certain technologies. TIA recommends that we consider establishing  X14a separate packetmode standardsetting effort within it.hg1X(* yO: '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э TIA Comments, at ii, 47.h   X 4 i 453. US West argues that risks to advanced services and the Internet support the deferral  |$of any CALEA requirements on packet networks, at least until CALEA can be implemented  X 4 |$without inhibiting the development of advanced telecommunications services. It further states  |$Nthat because many packetmode communications will avoid the circuitswitched network  |$+altogether, carriers and manufacturers will have to develop and install CALEA solutions for  |$different network elements from those used in circuitswitched networks. Additionally, US West  |$asserts that separating the header from content in packetmode communications is not feasible  |$because packet data is delivered in a layered stack structure, and carriers have neither the ability  XK4 |$Mnor any business reason to monitor packet data streams and then decipher the various protocols.MhK(* yO'ԍ US West Comments, at iii and 2728.M  X4 i   554. DoJ/FBI argue that the interim standard's treatment of packetmode  |$}communications in pen register cases does not conflict with anything in CALEA, and hence that  |$standard is not deficient in this regard. DoJ/FBI state that, as a technical matter, it is perfectly  |$yfeasible for a LEA to employ equipment that distinguishes between a packet's header and its  |$pcommunications payload and makes only the relevant header information available for recording  |$or decoding. DoJ/FBI further state that the statutory distinction between telecommunications  |$carriers and providers of information services does not correspond to any distinction between  |$packetmode and circuitmode communications; therefore, the use of packetmode protocols does  |$pnot turn the transmission of a wire or electronic communication by a telecommunications carrier  XN4into the provision of information services.iNx(* yOw"'#G\  P6G; مP## X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Comments, at 7982. "7i0*%%ZZ_"Ԍ X4 i   655. Discussion.  We find that the approach taken with regard to packetmode  |$8communications in JSTD025 raises significant technical and privacy concerns. Under this  |$standard, LEAs would be provided with both callidentifying information and call content even  X4 |$in cases where a LEA is authorized only to receive callidentifying information (i.e., under a pen  |$_register). We are aware that packetmode technology is rapidly changing, and that different  |$technologies may require differing CALEA solutions for separating callidentifying information  Xz4 |$pfrom call content.j z(* yO'ԍ For example, JSTD025 itself states that a packet data IAP provides access to the following eight packetmode services: Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) usertouser signaling; ISDN Dchannel X.25  {O 'packet services; Short Message Services (SMS) for cellular and broadband PCS (e.g., NAMPS, TIA/EIA41,  {OM 'PCS1900, or GSMbased technologies); wireless packetmode data services (e.g., Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), PCS1900, or GSMbased packetmode services); X.25 services; TCP/IP services; paging (oneway or twoway); and packetmode  yO 'services using traffic channels. JSTD025 at  4.5.2. In addition, we note that there may be other packet technologies warranting discussion. This appears especially so, given that many carriers now provide socalled fast packet services such as frame relay and Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM). We also recognize that we must avoid implementing CALEA requirements  |$8that could impede the development of new technologies. We do not believe that the record  |$/sufficiently addresses packet technologies and the problems that they may present for CALEA  |$purposes. For example, some packet technologies (e.g., frame relay, ATM, X.25) are connection  |$orientedi.e., there are call setup and takedown processes, similar to those used in circuit  |$Mswitched voice networks, whereby addressing information is made available to the carrier separate  |$from and before call content is transmitted. Other packet technologies (e.g., internet protocol  |$Vbased solutions) would not be processed this way. We believe that further efforts can be made  |$to find ways to better protect privacy by providing law enforcement only with the information  |$to which it is lawfully entitled. We note that TIA recommends further study of this matter.  |$Accordingly, we invite TIA to study CALEA solutions for packetmode technology and report  |$cto the Commission in one year on steps that can be taken, including particular amendments to J |$STD025, that will better address privacy concerns. In the interim, we find that packetmode  |$"communications, including callidentifying information and call content, may be delivered to law  X84 |$enforcement under the interim standard.k8(* yO'ԍ We recognize that call identifying information for packet technologies also may be acquired from the carrier's records. Further, we are herein requiring that packetmode  X!4 |$<communications be delivered to LEAs under that standard no later than September 30, 2001.l&! (* {O'ԍ In the Further NPRM, we stated that we would set a separate deadline for compliance with the additional  {O 'technical requirements that we determine CALEA mandates. See Further NPRM, at  133. We note that we are also adopting a September 30, 2001 compliance date for the six punch list items that we are herein mandating.  {O""'See  129, infra.  |$_That date is 15 months after the June 30, 2000 CALEA compliance deadline, and will afford manufacturers that have not yet developed a packetmode capability the time needed to do so.  X4"l0*%%ZZ-"Ԍ X4 i q756. We recognize that the solution we have crafted above is not perfect because a LEA  |$Emay receive both call identifying information and call content under a pen register. We note,  |$Vhowever, that independent legal barriers exist which will protect, to a certain extent, the privacy  |$rights of individuals until a permanent solution is developed. In particular, under this interim  |$larrangement the LEA will be legally prohibited from using any content information in a court  X4 |$proceeding if it has only a pen register or trap and trace authorization.Tm(* {O'ԍ See 18 U.S.C.  2515 and 2518.T We find, therefore, that  Xv4 |$in weighing the factors identified under section 107(b) of CALEAthat is, in particular, (1) to  |$meet the assistance capability requirements of section 103 by cost effective methods, (2) to  |$protect the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted, and (3) to  |$Eencourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public we believe that the  |$above solution provides the most suitable temporary remedy available at this time. We  |$emphasize, however, that we intend this solution to be only an interim one. We recognize that,  |$}in view of the growing importance of packetmode communications, a timely permanent solution  |$Vis essential. Accordingly, we expect that TIA will deliver a report to us no later than September  |$c30, 2000 that will detail a permanent solution, keeping in mind the objectives underlying CALEA  X 4which are described in paragraph 2, supra.  X{' C.DoJ/FBI Punch List  Xd4  XM4 i  857. Section 103(a)(1) of CALEA authorizes telecommunications carriers to provide to  |$LEAs call content information, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization; and  |$section 103(a)(2) of CALEA authorizes telecommunications carriers to provide to LEAs call  X4 |$identifying information, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization._nZ(* yO'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1002(a)(1)(2). _ Call |$Nidentifying information, however, must be provided only if it is reasonably available to the  X4 |$@carrier.[o(* yOu'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1002(a)(2). [ The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that the provision by carriers to LEAs of the  |$content of subjectinitiated conference calls is authorized by section 103(a)(1); and that party  |$hold, join, drop on conference calls, subjectinitiated dialing and signaling information, timing  |$information, and dialed digit extraction constitute callidentifying information under section  |$102(2) of CALEA and therefore must be provided, where reasonably available, under section  Xi4103(a)(2).opiz(* {O!'ԍ Further NPRM, at  7779, 8587, 9194, 104105, and 128.o  X;' 1. Content of subject-initiated conference calls "$ p0*%%ZZ<"Ԍ X4 i  958.  Background. This capability would permit the LEA to monitor the content of  |$'conversations connected via a conference call set up by the facilities under surveillance.  |$Surveillance of all portions of a conference call would continue, even if any party to the call  |$utilized services such as hold, call waiting, or threeway calling. For example, if anyone involved  |$in a conference call were placed on hold, all remaining conversations would continue to be  |$uavailable to the LEA for monitoring. The ability to monitor would continue even after the subject drops off the conference call.  XJ4 i J:59.  The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that the provision to LEAs of the content  |$of subjectinitiated conference calls is a technical requirement that meets the assistance capability  X 4 |$requirements of section 103(a) of CALEA.ss The Further NPRM also sought comment as to how  |$"the Commission should define or interpret section 103's use of the phrase "equipment, facilities,  X 4 |$or services" in the context of subscriberinitiated conference calls.Eq (* {Ok 'ԍ Id. at  7779.E The five manufacturers'  X 4aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $37 million.Mr Z(* {O'ԍ See Public Notice, at 4.M  X 4  X 4 i ;60.  Comments. TIA states that the interim standard already provides LEAs access  |$pto the content of most conference calls. TIA contends that access is not provided in only a few  |$_situations in which the subject's terminal equipment is not connected to the call. TIA further  |$contends that while providing this capability to LEAs is technically feasible, it would require a  |$large redeployment effort by most manufacturers particularly with respect to provisioning a  X<4separate call content channel to monitor the conversations of any parties on hold.@s<(* yO'ԍ TIA Comments, at 2728.@  X4 i \<61.  Bell Atlantic argues that providing the conference calling feature as proposed  |$would give LEAs an expanded capability. Bell Atlantic states that while multiparty calling  |$_services and conference calling have been available for many years, LEAs have not had the  |$ability to monitor all parties to a multiparty conference call after the subject of the surveillance  X4 |$has left the call or has put the call on hold.Ft|(* yO'ԍ Bell Atlantic Comments, at 4.F EPIC, EFF, and ACLU agree that our proposal  X4 |$would permit expanded access to conversations of participants in subjectinitiated conference  X4 |$calls, and they contend that this expansion would be inconsistent with statutory and constitutional  Xm4 |$limitations because it would expand the facilities doctrinePuXm (* yO*#'ԍ The parties argue that courts have traditionally considered "facilities" to be a subscriber's terminal equipment or, with conference bridges, the connection between the subscriber's terminal equipment and the subscriber side port of the carrier's switch. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU Comments, at 2021.P of Title III of the Omnibus Crime"m, u0*%%ZZ"  |$Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as modified by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act  X4 |$of 1986.v (* yOb'ԍ Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), and Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (together codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.  25102522 and in other sections of 18 U.S.C.). These statutory provisions delineate the scope and limitations of federal wiretap surveillance authority. EPIC, EFF, and ACLU state that a LEA with authority to monitor only the subject's  |$facilities should not be permitted to trace conversations on network resources once the subscriber  X4disconnects.Pw(* yO 'ԍ EPIC, EFF, and ACLU Comments, at 2021.P  X4  X4 i =62.  AT&T states that not all conference calls are subscriberbased. It maintains that  |$Iondemand services such as "Meet Me" conference calling, in which the carrier or a third party  |$provider makes a conference bridge available to anyone, are not covered by CALEA because  XH4 |$there is no subscriber.?xH@(* yO9'ԍ AT&T Comments, at 78.? Ameritech agrees, stating that conference bridging services must be  |$_excluded because they are not "equipment, facilities, or services of a subscriber." Ameritech  X 4 |$contends that such services do not permit carriers to know when conference calls will occur and  X 4which telecommunications providers will be used to establish the calls.By (* yO'ԍ Ameritech Comments, at 6.B  X 4 i >63.  DoJ/FBI contend that the proposed conference calling capability is consistent with  |$CALEA. They maintain that when a subscriber's service supports the ability of other participants  |$in a conference call to continue to speak to one another when the subscriber places them on hold  |$or hangs up, the conversations of these other participants constitute "communications" to or from  |$the subscriber's "equipment, facilities, or services," and therefore come within the scope of  |$section 103(a)(1). DoJ/FBI also assert that call hold is similar to call forwarding, which the  |$legislative history of the Act makes clear was one of the principal features that Congress intended  |$to reach when it enacted CALEA. DoJ/FBI state that the facilities of callers who have been  |$placed on hold are supported by the subscriber's conference calling service even if the  X4 |$"communication is no longer routed through the subscriber's switch to his terminal equipment.rz` (* yO'#C\  P6QɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 32, 39.r  |$&DoJ/FBI further argue that commenters' arguments that meetme conference services are outside  |$the scope of a carrier's obligations under section 103 is repudiated by the interim standard.  X4 |$DoJ/FBI state that a party that contracts for meetme conference service is no less a subscriber  |$than a party that arranges for conventional conference calling service. Finally, DoJ/FBI contend  X4 |$that in no case would a LEA need to use more than two call content channels to monitor a" z0*%%ZZ"  |$conference call because DoJ/FBI are not seeking separated delivery of each leg of a held call on  X4a different call content channel.q{(* yOb'#C\  P6QɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 3235.q  X4 i 5?64. Discussion. We find that, under certain circumstances discussed below, the  |$provision of the content of subjectinitiated conference calls is a technical requirement that meets  X4 |$the assistance capability requirements of section 103.g|X(* yO'#C\  P6QɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1006(b).g Under these circumstances, with  |$appropriate lawful authorization, the LEA is entitled to intercept, to the exclusion of any other  |$communications, all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier within a service  XJ4area to or from equipment, facilities, or services of a subscriber.#ufootnote reference#j}Jw yO '#C\  P6QɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1002(a)(1).j  X34  X 4 i m@65. As we stated in the Further NPRM, we recognize that different carriers provide  |$conference calling features in various ways and that not all carriers system architectures are the  X 4 |$&same.)ufootnote reference)#ufootnote reference#p~ xw {O'#C\  P6QɒP#э Further NPRM, at para. 78.p Conference calling features include various types of multiparty calls, such as threeway  |$Vcalling where a bridge is established in the subscribers serving switch, as well as meet me or  |$/conference bridge services where a bridge is established at a remote switch of another carrier.  X 4 |$Some of these services are available as a standard subscriber option from a customers  |$presubscribed carrier, while others are available on a demand basis from multiple carriers. Some  |$systems are designed, for example, to allow a conference call that is initiated by the subject to  |$continue among other parties on the call even after the subject drops off the call, either by putting  |$the call on hold or terminating the connection; other systems do not offer this feature. When a  |$system is designed to allow the conference call to continue, we conclude that carriers must  X!4provide the content of the call under the following circumstances.   X4 i SA66. Clearly, a LEA, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, is entitled  |$to the content of the conference call when the subjects facilities initiate the call and are being  |$used to participate in the call. In this case, an open circuit is maintained between the subjects  |$equipment, facilities and services and the other parties on the call. When the subject puts the  |$conference call on hold, the subjects circuit to the conference call is maintained within the  |$Icarriers network (usually at the subscribers serving switch), thus allowing the subject to rejoin  |$easily the call without having to reinitiate the circuit. In this case, we find that the communication  |$continues to or from the equipment, facility or service of the subscriber, and thus the carrier also  X;4 |$must provide the content of the communication among the other parties to the conference call.  |$8In both cases, however, we conclude that the carrier does not have to provide access to the"$ ~0*%%ZZ<"  |$content of the communication between a participant of the conference call other than the subject  |$and any person with whom that participant speaks on an alternative line; e.g., when A, the  |$subject, is on a conference call with B and C, we conclude that Cs conversations with D on call  |$waiting do not have to be provided by the carrier. We also conclude that the anticipated costs  |$to carriers of adding the conference call capability in these cases is not so exorbitant as to require  |$automatic exclusion of the capability. In percentage terms, based on the manufacturers' aggregate  Xv4 |$yrevenue estimates, these costs would be  4% of the core interim standard and 9% of the total  X_4punch list.r_(* {O'#C\  P6QɒP#э See Appendix B, infra.r )ufootnote reference)  X14 i B67. We reach a different conclusion when the subject terminates his circuit connection  |$to the conference call. In this case, the communication between other participants no longer is  |$to or from the subscriber's equipment, facilities, and services, and may no longer even be "carried  |$Iby the carrier within a service area" to or from the subscriber of the carrier, pursuant to section  X 4 |$V103(a) and (d).#ufootnote reference#&J Zw yO'ԍ Sections 103 (a)(1) and (d) of CALEA, 47 U.S.C.  1002(a)(1) and (d). Section 103(a)(1) requires a carrier to ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services ... are capable of ... expeditiously isolating and  {O 'enabling [lawful interception of] all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier within a service  {O'area to or from equipment, facilities, or services of a subscriber of such carrier ... (italics added). Section 103(d) requires that when a commercial mobile service carrier conducting a lawful interception of wire and  {O|'electronic communications loses access to the content of such communications or callidentifying information  {OF'within the service area ..., information is made available to the government ... identifying the provider of a wire  {O'or electronic communication service that has acquired access to the communications (italics added).& This is especially true with conference bridges located in remote switches of  |$/other carriers. We conclude that it is not reasonable to require the carrier to provide at its IAP  |$the communications of other parties continuing on the conference call after the subject terminates  |$his circuit connection to the call because to do so would not be a costeffective method of  |$implementing the conference call intercept and may not protect the privacy and security of  Xb4 |$ communications not authorized to be intercepted, pursuant to section 107(b).)ufootnote reference)#ufootnote reference#bl w yO/'ԍ We recognize that some multiparty calls may be bridged within the subscribers serving switch, and thus may continue to be within the service area, pursuant to section 103 (a) and (d). Nonetheless, we will not require a carrier to provide the communications of other parties continuing on the call after the subject terminates his connection because to do so may not protect the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted. )ufootnote reference)#ufootnote reference#)-ufootnote reference)#ufootnote reference# We recognize,  |$as DoJ/FBI acknowledge, that if the subject arranges for a "meet me" conference bridge, the  X44 |$VLEA will need a Title III order to cover the communication of the conference bridge.4(* yO"'tfootnote text#C\  P6QɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at n.9 (For Title III purposes, a meetme conference bridge ordinarily will constitute a separate facility from the local switch associated with the subscribers own directory number, and law enforcement therefore will be responsible for obtaining a new Title III order that covers the conference bridge.) Consequently, we do not reach the argument raised by EPIC, EFF and ACLU that implementing the conference call capability as requested by DoJ/FBI would expand Title IIIs facilities doctrine. Under"40*%%ZZ"  |$those circumstances, the carrier that provides the conference bridge should provide an IAP to the  X4LEA.)ufootnote reference)#ufootnote reference#nXw yO'ԍ In some cases, the subjects carrier and the conference bridge carrier may be the same and, indeed, the bridge may be located in the subscribers serving switch. Thus, in some cases the carrier and the LEA may agree to locate one IAP at a point capable of capturing all communications covered by Title III authority. n  X')sufootnote reference)  X'2. Party hold, join, drop on conference callsLL  X4  X4 i S C68. Background. This capability also involves features designed to aid a LEA in the  |$interception of conference calls. This capability would permit the LEA to receive from the  |$"telecommunications carrier messages identifying the parties to a conversation at all times. The  |$party hold message would be provided whenever one or more parties are placed on hold. The  |$party join message would report the addition of a party to an active call or the reactivation of a  |$held call. The party drop message would report when any party to a call is released or disconnects and the call continues with two or more other parties.  X 4 i OD69. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that this capability constitutes call |$identifying information and therefore must be provided by the carrier to the LEA where  X 4 |$Ireasonably available. The Further NPRM noted, however, that LEA access to party hold, join,  X4 |$and drop information would be required only in cases where a carrier's facilities, equipment, or  X4 |$Vservices are involved in providing the service; i.e., where a network signal is generated. To the  Xj4 |$textent that customer premises equipment (CPE) is used to provide this service, the Further NPRM  |$tentatively concluded that party hold, join, and drop information could not be made reasonably  X>4 |$available to the LEA because no network signal would be generated.v>(* {O'#C\  P6QɒP#э Further NPRM, at  8587.v The five manufacturers'  X'4aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $64 million.t'z(* {OR'#C\  P6QɒP#э See Public Notice, at 4.t  X4  X4 i q E70. Comments. AT&T states that currently carriers do not generate party join and drop  |$_messages, and argues that party hold messages are more appropriately classified as subject |$initiated signaling. AT&T contends that whether a party joins or drops from a call has no  |$bearing on the continuity of a call or the communications that may be made during the call, and  |$that a call leg does not constitute either a call or a communication. Finally, AT&T argues that  |$if we sustain our tentative conclusion with respect to this capability, we should simply require  |$uthat industry provide for dynamic reporting of participant changes in a subscriberinitiated  |$conference call because industry may have more efficient or effective ways than party messages  XC4to report joins and drops from the call.gC (* yO%'#C\  P6QɒP#э AT&T Comments, at 810.g"C 0*%%ZZ8"Ԍ X4 i 9ԙ F71. Bell Atlantic argues that if a carrier were to provide information that a party has  |$been added to or disconnected from a call or has been put on hold, that would be a significant  |$Ienhancement to existing or previous wiretapping capabilities, and would be beyond the scope of  |$section 103(a)(5). Bell Atlantic also argues that the words the origin, direction, destination, or  |$ptermination in section 102(2) have physical rather than temporal meanings, that is, they refer to  |$places or locations in the network. Thus, information identifying the termination of a call  Xv4 |$would be the telephone number called, and would not include special information about when one  |$leg of a multiparty calls ends. Finally, Bell Atlantic asserts that party hold, join, or drop  |$information may not be reasonably available to the carrier because conference call capabilities  |$are often provided through equipment that is external to the switch and may even belong to a  X 4service provider unrelated to the carrier.p (* yO '#C\  P6QɒP#э Bell Atlantic Comments, at 811.p  X 4 i F G72. TIA states that, while this item is technically feasible, the provision of party hold,  |$Vjoin, and drop information in the manner sought by the FBI would require considerable software  |$coding to add additional call processing traps and new messages necessary to report the  |$Iinformation. TIA further states that the interim standard already permits LEAs access to party  |$join and drop information, and therefore, the only additional capability LEAs would receive under  |$+this punch list item is hold information. TIA contends, however, that such information is not  |$always detected by the switch and even when it is detected, the switch may not have the specific  XK4identification information requested by the FBI.dKX(* yOT'#C\  P6QɒP#э TIA Comments, at 29.d  X4 i  H73. DoJ/FBI argue that without party hold, join, and drop information, a LEA often  |$would not know who joins or leaves a conference call, whether the subject alternated between  |$legs of the call, or which parties may have heard or said particular communications during the  |$course of the call. They also contend that we should not use the instant proceeding to determine  |$whether such information is reasonably available to particular carriers or platforms, but should  |$frame an appropriate definition of reasonably available and leave the application of that definition  |$@to be worked out by individual carriers and LEAs on a casebycase basis. DoJ/FBI further argue  X|4 |$that the interim standard's Change message|(* yO'#C\  P6QɒP#э The Change message is used to report merging or splitting of connectionoriented call identities. JSTD025, at  6.34. is not a substitute for party join information  Xe4 |$Ebecause: (1) the Change message is triggered by changes in call identities,e@(* yOV"'#C\  P6QɒP#э The Call Identity parameter is used to uniquely identify a particular call, call appearance, or call legs within the context of a single system. JSTD025, at  6.42. rather than by"e!0*%%ZZ~"  X4 |$changes in party identities,(* yOy'#C\  P6QɒP#э The Party Identity parameter identifies a party to a call or call attempt. JSTD025, at  6.47. and therefore will not identify party joins if a manufacturer uses  X4 |$a single call identity to cover multiple legs of a call; (2) the interim standard's Release messageX(* yO'#C\  P6QɒP#э The Release message is used to report that a connectionoriented call has been released. JSTD025, at  6.38.  |$is not a proxy for a party drop message because it does not require a carrier to send the Release  |$message when a single call leg or call appearance is released; and (3) the industry has not  X4 |$suggested that the interim standard provides any message that notifies the LEA of party holds.k(* yO '#C\  P6QɒP#э DoJ/FBI Comments, at 4547.k  X4 |$Additionally, DoJ/FBI contend that commenters who oppose this capability err by treating a  |$}multiparty, multileg call as a single communication because doing so would mean that the LEA  |$in many cases would lack proof of which party participated in a particular conversation and  |$which parties did not. Finally, DoJ/FBI assert that the industry argument that this capability does  |$not exist today confuses the information available to the network and the messages used to  |$encapsulate the information and convey it to the LEA. DoJ/FBI maintain that whether particular  |$information exists in a network is relevant to a carrier's obligations under section 103(a)(2), but  X 4that whether a particular message exists is irrelevant to the carrier's obligations.q @(* yO'#C\  P6QɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 4041.q  X 4  X 4 i 9 I74. Discussion. We find that party hold/join/drop information falls within CALEA's  |$definition of "callidentifying information" because it is "signaling information that identifies the  X4 |$origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated or received" by the  X}4 |$"subject.}(* {O'#C\  P6QɒP#э Section 102(2) of CALEA, 47 U.S.C.  1001(2). Party join information appears to identify the origin of a communication; party drop,  |$}the termination of a communication; and party hold, the temporary origin, temporary termination,  |$or redirection of a communication. This capability also appears to be necessary to enable the  |$LEA to isolate callidentifying and content information because, without it, the LEA would be  |$Vunable to determine who is talking to whom, and, more accurately, to focus on the subject's role  X 4 |$in the conversation. b (* yO'#C\  P6QɒP#э We note that Section 103 specifically requires a telecommunications carrier to: (a) ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable of (2) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to access callidentifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier  (B) in a manner that allows it to be associated with the communication to which it pertains. Further, by isolating the callidentifying information in this manner, the  |$cLEA can screen out third parties who are not privy to the communications involving the subject,  X4thereby furthering privacy considerations.""0*%%ZZ"Ԍ X4 i ԙ J75. We further find that party hold/join/drop information is reasonably available to the  |$4carrier in those cases where the carrier's facilities, equipment or services are involved in  |$providing the service, and that the anticipated costs to carriers of adding this capability are not  |$Iso exorbitant as to require automatic exclusion of the capability. In percentage terms, based on  X4 |$the manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates, these costs would be  7% of the core interim  X4 |$standard and 15% of the total punch list.r(* {O'#C\  P6QɒP#э See Appendix B, infra.r To the extent that CPE is used to provide such  Xv4 |$features, we conclude that party hold/join/drop information is not reasonably available to the LEA  X_4 |$since no network signal would be generated. Thus, we conclude that the provision of party hold,  |$join, and drop information on conference calls, to the extent a network signal is generated, is a  X14technical requirement that meets the assistance capability requirements of section 103.g1Z(* yO< '#C\  P6QɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1006(b).g  X '  X '3. Subject-initiated dialing and signaling informationbb  X 4  X 4 i J K76. Background. This capability would permit the LEA to be informed when a subject  |$using the facilities under surveillance uses services such as call forwarding, call waiting, call hold,  X 4 |$and threeway calling. DoJ/FBI requests this information for each communication initiated by  |$the subject. This capability would require the telecommunications carrier to deliver a message to  |$"the LEA, informing the LEA that the subject has invoked a feature that would place a party on hold, transfer a call, forward a call, or add/remove a party to a call.  X64 i L77. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that this capability fits within the  |$+definition of callidentifying information and therefore must be provided by the carrier to the  X 4 |$LEA where reasonably available.v (* {O'#C\  P6QɒP#э Further NPRM, at  9194.v The Further NPRM requested comment on whether remote  |$_subjectinitiated dialing and signaling should affect this tentative conclusion, and noted that to  |$lthe extent CPE is used to initiate dialing and signaling no information need be provided to the  X4LEA. The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $35 million.t|(* {O'#C\  P6QɒP#э See Public Notice, at 4.t  X4 i  M78. Comments. SBC and USTA state that subject-initiated dialing and signaling  X4 |$Vinformation is not callidentifying and may not be reasonably available.z(* yOC"'#C\  P6QɒP#э SBC Comments, at 13; USTA Comments, at 15.z SBC argues that only  |$if the subscriber action can be detected within a CALEAequipped switch does this feature meet"m#0*%%ZZ"  |$the standard, and it is unknown whether a signal of this nature can be incorporated into the switch  X4by manufacturers at a reasonable cost.g(* yOb'#C\  P6QɒP#э SBC Comments, at 1314.g  X4 i N79.  TIA states that subject-initiated dialing and signaling information has nothing to  |$do with call processing, and that the interim standard generally provides all of the relevant call |$identifying information. TIA contends that the only additional information the LEA would  |$/receive under this punch list item is the identity of the keys pressed by the subject to enable the  |$Rfeature, and most manufacturers would have to make fairly substantial modifications to their  XH4equipment to capture and report such information.gHX(* yOQ '#C\  P6QɒP#э TIA Comments, at 3032.g  X 4 i O80. BellSouth contends that subject-initiated dialing and signaling information would  |$be redundant with the information provided by party join, hold, and drop messages. BellSouth  X 4also states that privacy concerns would be raised by this capability.j (* yO'#C\  P6QɒP#э BellSouth Comments, at 16.j  X 4  X 4 i ` P81. DoJ/FBI contend that industry's arguments that information about a subject's use  |$Rof flash hook, feature keys, and similar activity is not callidentifying are incorrect. DoJ/FBI  |$Iargue that a subject's use of these feature keys changes the connections between the parties to  |$a call, and in so doing changes the "direction" and "destination" (and in some cases "origin" or  |$"termination") of one or more "communication[s] generated or received" by the subject.  |$Moreover, DoJ/FBI argue that any use of feature keys or flash hooks by a subject to control a  |$+call constitutes "direction" of the communication by the subject. DoJ/FBI further argue that  |$BellSouth's suggestion that the information a LEA would derive from a subject's dialing and  |$signaling activity is redundant with the information it would learn from party join, hold, drop  |$"messages is incorrect because dialing and signaling may be either pre or postcutthrough, and  |$may be transmitted either in or outofband. DoJ/FBI states that some of this activity may result  |$lin party joins, holds, or drops, but much of it will not; and that, conversely, there will be many  |$instances in which a change in party connections does not reflect any subjectinitiated dialing and  X4signaling activity.qx(* yO'#C\  P6QɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 4447.q  Xe4 i , Q82. Discussion. We conclude that subject-initiated dialing and signaling information  |$fits within the definition of callidentifying information contained in section 102(2) of CALEA,  |$and that the anticipated costs to carriers of adding this capability are not so exorbitant as to  |$<require automatic exclusion of the capability. In percentage terms, based on the manufacturers'""$0*%%ZZ<"  X4 |$&aggregate revenue estimates, these costs would be  4% of the core interim standard and 8% of the  X4 |$total punch list.r(* {Ob'#C\  P6QɒP#э See Appendix B, infra.r Callforwarding signaling information identifies the direction and destination  |$of a call, and callwaiting signaling information identifies the origin and termination of each  X4 |$communication. We also conclude that access to subject-initiated dialing and signaling  X4 |$information may be necessary in order for the LEA to isolate and correlate callidentifying and  |$Rcall content information. Knowing what features a subject is using will ensure that the LEA  |$receives information "in a manner that allows it to be associated with the communication to  X_4 |$which it pertains."_Z(* yOj '#C\  P6QɒP#э Section 103(a)(2)(B) of CALEA, 47 U.S.C.  1002(a)(2)(B). For example, without knowing that a subject has switched over to a call  |$on call-waiting, the LEA may not be able to associate the call-identifying information with the  |$call content to which it pertains and thus could be more likely to mistake one call for another.  |$Further, we conclude that all inband signals generated by a subject that must be processed at the  |$}IAP (e.g., rotary dial pulse digits, onhook, offhook, and flashes) are reasonably available to the  |$Mcarrier. Dual tone multifrequency (DTMF) signals generated by a subject that must be processed  |$}at the IAP also are reasonably available to the carrier; however, some DTMF signals generated  |$@by the subject are postcutthrough digits and are addressed separately in this order. To the extent  |$}CPE is used to perform any of the functions described here, and no network signal is generated,  |$=that information is not reasonably available to a carrier, and thus, is not required to be  Xy4 |$provided.y(* {O'#C\  P6QɒP#э See sections 103(a)(2) and 103 (b)(1)(A) of CALEA, 47 U.S.C.  1002(a)(2) and 1002(b)(1)(A). Thus, we conclude that the provision of subjectinitiated dialing and signaling  |$information is a technical requirement that meets the assistance capability requirements of section  XK4103.gK|(* yOx'#C\  P6QɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1006(b).g  X44  X4  4. In-band and out-of-band signaling   X4 i  R83. Background. This technical requirement would enable a telecommunications  |$carrier to send a notification message to the LEA when any network message (ringing, busy, call  X4 |$_waiting signal, message light, etc.) is sent to a subject using facilities under surveillance. For  |$example, if someone leaves a voice mail message on the subject's phone, the notification to the  |$lLEA would indicate the type of message notification sent to the subject (such as the phone's  X4 |$message light, audio signal, text message, etc.). For calls the subject   originates, a notification  |$message would also indicate whether the subject ended a call when the line was ringing, busy (a busy line or busy trunk), or before the network could complete the call.  X=4"=% 0*%%ZZl"Ԍ X4 i S84. The Further NPRM stated that certain types of inband and outofband signaling,  |$such as notification that a voice mail message has been received, appear to constitute call |$pidentifying information; whereas other types of inband and outofband signaling may constitute  |$call content information and thus would raise questions as to under what authority they should  X4 |$be provided to the LEA. The Further NPRM therefore sought comment on what types constitute  X4 |$Ma technical requirement necessary to meet the CALEA assistance capability requirements.P(* {O 'ԍ Further NPRM, at  99100.P The  Xz4five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $57 million.MzZ(* {O 'ԍ See Public Notice, at 4.M  XL4 i  T85. Comments. Nextel and PCIA each state that inband and outof band signaling  |$ information is not callidentifying because inband and outofband messages are not used to route  X 4 |$calls, but merely inform the subject as to the status of calls made or received.} (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Nextel Comments, at 13; PCIA Comments, at 29.} Nextel states  |$that what identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of a call are the numbers  X 4dialed, not any subsequent network signal that provided information about the call.g |(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Nextel Comments, at 13.g  X 4 i ,U86. TIA states that certain types of network signaling may constitute callidentifying  |$}information or call content, but most of the broad range of signals sought by the FBI are neither.  |$TIA maintains that there are hundreds of features supported by modern switches that provide  |$some sort of signaling within the scope of the FBI's request, and that in order to report this  |$signaling each of these features would require software modifications, affecting the entire system  |$architecture. TIA asserts that if we require carriers to report any such signals, we should specify  |$which signals are covered and should clarify that carriers can provide notification only of those  X#4 |$signals that are sent to the subject's unit and that are generated by the serving switch.g# (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э TIA Comments, at 3233.g SBC  |$generally agrees with TIA, and also states that to the extent that network signaling can be audibly  |$<detected over the subject's subscriber line, they constitute call content and can be obtained only  X4under a Title III authorization.d(* yO+ '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э SBC Comments, at 14.d  X4 i FV87. Ameritech states that a notification that a voice mail message has been received  X4 |$is not callidentifying information because that type of message is associated with the provision"&, 0*%%ZZ9"  X4 |$3of an information service, which we acknowledge is not part of CALEA.i(* yOy'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Ameritech Comments, at 8.i Nextel and US West,  X4Inc. (US West) agree.X(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Nextel Comments, at 14; US West Comments, at 2021.  X4 i  W88. DoJ/FBI state that, contrary to industry commenters, network signaling constitutes  |$_callidentifying information because without such signaling, a subject will be unaware that an  |$Iincoming call is taking place and the calling party will never reach the subject. DoJ/FBI further  |$pstate that there are many circumstances in which the interim standard's existing messages, such  X_4 |$as the Termination Attempt message,_(* yO 'ԍ The Termination Attempt message is used to report a connectionoriented call termination attempt. JSTD025, at  6.3.10. will not provide the LEA with knowledge of the network  |$}signaling presented to the subject. Additionally, DoJ/FBI state that SBC's argument that audible  |$network signals constitute call content is not legally supported because Title III is designed to  |$protect communications between the parties using a telecommunications network, not signaling  X 4 |$by the network. Finally, DoJ/FBI argue that network notification of waiting voice mail messages  |$Vis covered by section 103 because when a carrier sends a network notification message to alert  |$a subscriber that he has received a voice mail message, the carrier is not acting as an information  X 4service provider.q @(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 4951.q  X '  X4 i  X89. Discussion.  We conclude that some inband and outofband signaling constitutes  |$Rcallidentifying information under section 102(2) of CALEA and that the anticipated costs to  |$carriers of adding this capability are not so exorbitant as to require automatic exclusion of the  |$capability. In percentage terms, based on the manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates, these  |$}costs would be 6% of the interim core standard and 14% of the total punch list. Certain types of  |$signals, such as ringing and busy signals, clearly fall within the scope of callidentifying  |$yinformation because they indicate information about the termination of a call. Other types of  |$signals, however, may simply be used by carriers for supervision or control of certain functions  |$and features of the network and do not trigger any audible or visual message to the subscriber  |$and, thus, would not be callidentifying information. We thus conclude that inband and outof |$band signals that are generated at the IAP toward the subscriber (e.g., call waiting or stutter dial  |$tone) and that are being used for call processing purposes are call identifying information that  |$is reasonably available to the carrier. Other signals that provide call identifying information (e.g.,  |$busy, fast busy, audible ringing tone), although generated elsewhere in the carrier's network, pass  |$through the IAP on their way to the subject even if they are not used for call processing and can  |$be made available without excessive modifications to the network and thus are reasonably  X"4 |$available to the carrier. To the extent CPE is used to perform any of the functions described""'0*%%ZZ<"  |$}here, and no network signal is generated, that information is not reasonably available to a carrier  X4and thus is not required to be provided.  X' 5. Timing information  X4 i  Y90. Background. In those cases where the LEA has obtained authorization to intercept  |$both content and callidentifying information, this capability would require that a  |$telecommunications carrier send call timing information to the LEA so that the LEA could  |$associate the callidentifying information with the actual content of the call. There would be two elements to this capability:  Gx`X1) Each callidentifying message (answer message, party join message, party drop  X 4 Gxmessage, etc.) would be time stamped within a specific amount of time from when  Gxmthe event triggering the message occurred. This timestamp would allow the LEA  X 4 GxFto associate the message with the call content information (i.e., the conversation). DoJ/FBI propose that the time stamp be accurate to within 100 milliseconds.   GxiX2) A carrier would be required to send the callidentifying message to the LEA  Gxmwithin a defined amount of time after the event to permit the LEA to associate the  Gx,number dialed to the conversation. DoJ/FBI propose that the event be defined as  Gxthe time the message is received at the switch's IAP, and that delivery from the  X#4 GxIAP to the LEA's Collection FunctionAX#(* yO'ԍ The Collection Function is responsible for collecting lawfully authorized intercepted communications (i.e., call content) and call-identifying information for a LEA. The Collection Function is the responsibility of the  yO,'LEA. JSTD025, a t  5.3.1.3.A take place within 3 seconds 99% of the time.   X4 i  Z91. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that this capability is callidentifying  |$information and therefore must be provided by the carrier to the LEA where reasonably  X4 |$available.Q(* {OK'ԍ Further NPRM, at  104105.Q The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $20  X4million.Mz(* {O'ԍ See Public Notice, at 4.M  Xm4 i  [92. Comments. Industry commenters argue that timing information is not call |$/identifying and is not required by CALEA. AirTouch states that a time stamp is not part of the  XA4 |$call, does not identify the origin, direction, destination, or termination of the call, and would not"A( 0*%%ZZE"  X4 |$"have been picked up from the call on a traditional pen register or trap and trace interception.i(* yOy'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э AirTouch Comments, at 22.i  X4 |$/Ameritech and AT&T similarly assert that timing information is not callidentifying, and AT&T  X4 |$proposes that any timing requirements be message specific, taking into account the nature of the  X4 |$@event that prompts the message and its relative importance to a LEA to know it.X(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э AirTouch Comments, at 10; AT&T Comments, at 1415. AT&T argues  X4 |$/that any timing requirement should have to be met only 95% of the time.e(* yO= '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э AT&T Comments, at 15.e Finally, Sprint PCS  |$<states that it already provides LEAs with various types of call identifying information within 46  Xv4seconds of the event's occurring.Jvx(* yO 'ԍ Sprint PCS Reply Comments, at 3.J  XH4 i \93. TIA states that it disagrees that timing information is callidentifying, but says that  |$Jit does not oppose a timing provision within the final standard. TIA asserts that while  X 4 |$}manufacturers would prefer to maintain the standard's "expeditious access" requirement, X (* yO'ԍ The CallIdentifying Information Intercept Access Point provides expeditious access to the reasonably available callidentifying information for calls made by an intercept subject or for calls made to an intercept subject. JSTD025, at  4.4.  they  |$Nare willing to replace that provision with a specific amount of time, as long as that time is  |$reasonable and consistent with current system architectures. TIA proposes that such a timing  |$Irequirement apply to the time between detection of the event by the interim standard's Delivery  X 4 |$Function ( (* yO'ԍ The Delivery Function is responsible for delivering intercepted communications and call-identifying  yO_'information to one or more Collection Functions. JSTD025, at  5.3.1.2. and the sending of the callidentifying message from the Delivery Function toward  |$the LEA's Collection Function, and that the message be sent within eight seconds 95% of the  X4time, and with an accuracy near 200 milliseconds.g (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э TIA Comments, at 3537.g  Xb4 i  ]94. DoJ/FBI argue that the interim standard must be modified to incorporate a specific  XK4 |$timing requirement in order to give effect to the general timing provisions of section 103(a)(2).nK(* yO !'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Comments, at 57.n  |$They further argue that the timing requirements they suggest are feasible and constitute a  X4 |$performance standard, not a design standard; and that we are not being asked to prescribe any")0*%%ZZY"  X4 |$specific design by which the timing requirements are to be met.w(* yOy'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 5254.w NYPD agrees with DoJ/FBI  |$Athat the requested 3 second delivery timeframe with 99% probability and 100 millisecond  X4accuracy for the time stamp is needed to ensure timely delivery of callidentifying information.kX(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э NYPD Comments, at 10.k  X4 i v ^95.  Discussion.  We will adopt a timing information requirement as an assistance  X4 |$capability requirement of section 103 of CALEA.@(* yO( 'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1006(b).@ First, we find that time stamping is call Xx4 |$identifying information as defined in section 102(2) of CALEA.mxx(* yO '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1001(2).m This information is needed  |$to distinguish and properly associate the call identifying information with the content of several  |$calls occurring at approximately the same time. In other words, time stamp information is needed  |$uto identify "the origin, direction, destination, or termination" of any given call and, thus, fits  |$cwithin the statutory definition of section 102(2). Second, we find that delivery of callidentifying  |$information, including time stamp information, to the LEA must, pursuant to section 103(a)(2),  |$be provided in such a timely manner to allow that information "to be associated with the  X 4 |$communication to which it pertains."j (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1002(a)(2).j Third, we find that the anticipated costs to carriers of  |$adding this capability are not so exorbitant as to require automatic exclusion of the capability.  |$&In percentage terms, based on the manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimates, these costs would  X4 |$cbe  2% of the core interim standard and 5% of the total punch list.K(* {O'ԍ See Appendix B, infra.K Therefore, we will include  |$ timing parameters for delivery of callidentifying information as a technical requirement necessary to meet the assistance capability requirements of section 103(a).  X64 i _96. Specifically, because we find it to be a reasonable compromise between the  |$DoJ/FBI and TIA proposals, we will adopt the DoJ/FBI proposal that the event be defined as the  |$time the callidentifying information is received at the IAP and TIA's proposal that this  |$cinformation, including a time stamp, be transmitted to the LEA's Collection Function within eight  |$cseconds 95% of the time, and that the time stamp be accurate within 200 milliseconds. We find  |$that TIA's proposal to define the event as the time the callidentifying message is detected by the  |$Delivery Function to be insufficient because in some circumstances this message might not be  |$detected by the Delivery Function until well after it was received at the IAP. However, we find  |$the DoJ/FBI proposal for delivery of the message from the IAP to the LEA's Collection function  |$within 3 seconds 99% of the time with 100 millisecond accuracy to be overly stringent and"g** 0*%%ZZ"  |$possibly excessively costly to carriers given the various network designs used by carriers in  |$Idifferent services applying this requirement. Accordingly, we will require that delivery of a call |$identifying message be transmitted to the LEA's Collection Function within eight seconds of its  X4receipt by the IAP 95% of the time, and with an accuracy within 200 milliseconds.  X'   X'6. Surveillance status  X_4 i 0 `97. Background. This capability would require the telecommunications carrier to send  XJ4 |$information to the LEA to verify that a wiretap has been established and is still functioning  |$correctly. This information could include the date, time, and location of the wiretap;  |$identification of the subscriber whose facilities are under surveillance; and identification of all  |$voice channels that are connected to the subscriber. This information would be transmitted to the LEA when the wiretap is activated, updated or deactivated, as well as periodically.  X 4 i  a98. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that surveillance status messages do not  |$ufall within any provisions of section 103 and therefore should not be required for CALEA  X4 |$compliance. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that such messages could be useful to  X4 |$LEAs, but are not required by the plain language of CALEA.g(* {O'ԍ Further NPRM, at  109110, 114115, and 121122.g The five manufacturers'  Xh4aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $37 million.MhZ(* {Os'ԍ See Public Notice, at 4.M  X:4 i B b99. Comments. Industry commenters agree that this capability is not required by  X%4 |$pCALEA.?X%(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э AT&T Comments, at 10; Ameritech Comments, at 10; AirTouch Comments, at ii; Bell Atlantic Comments, at 5; CTIA Comments, at 33; Nextel Comments, at 15; PCIA Comments, at 18; SBC Comments, at 16; TIA Comments, at 37; US West Comments, at 21.? TIA states that there is no statutory basis for this requirement, and that it would be  |$extremely difficult and costly to implement, particularly for wireless services. TIA contends that  X4 |$a wireless surveillance status requirement would require significant modifications to system  |$architecture to verify electronically that every relevant mobile switch and every other piece of  X4network equipment containing interceptrelated data is operational and properly configured.d (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э TIA Comments, at 38.d   X4  X4 i # c100. DoJ/FBI state that section 103 obligates carriers to take affirmative steps to ensure  |$csurveillance integrity, and that the interim standard excuses carriers from taking any such steps.  |$DoJ/FBI contend that a carrier that does not take any affirmative steps to monitor the integrity  |$of authorized electronic surveillance is not "ensuring" that its equipment, facilities, and services  |$are capable of delivering "all communications" and all reasonably available callidentifying"?+0*%%ZZ_"  |$information that law enforcement is authorized to intercept while protecting the privacy and  X4 |$security of other communications and callidentifying information.k(* yOb'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Comments, at 5760.k DoJ/FBI further argue that  |$TIA's argument that implementing these messages would require fundamental design of wireless  |$_networks assumes that the reporting of surveillance status messages would require a central  |$implementation. According to DoJ/FBI, however, a wireless carrier would be free to transmit  |$surveillance status messages directly from each network element involved in the surveillance, just  Xv4 |$uas each switch will separately transmit callidentifying information and call content to law  X_4 |$enforcement.n_X(* yOh '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 55.n The New Jersey State Police (NJSP) and NYPD agree with DoJ/FBI that a  XH4surveillance status message is necessary.hH(* yO '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э NJSP, at 1; NYPD, at 11.h  X14  X 4 i  d101.  Discussion.  CALEA requires carriers to ensure that authorized wiretaps can be  X 4 |$Vperformed in an expeditious manner, x(* yO.'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Section 103(a) of CALEA, 47 U.S.C.  1002(a). and we believe that a surveillance status message could  |$assist carriers and LEAs in determining the status of such wiretaps. We conclude, however, that  X 4 |$a surveillance status message does not fall within any of the provisions of section 103. We do  |$Enot believe that it is callidentifying information as defined by CALEA, since the information  |$/such a feature would provide would not identify "the origin, direction, destination, or termination  X4 |$of each communication."@(* yOK'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1001(2).@ Nor does a surveillance status message appear to be required under  |$section 103(a)(1), since it is not a wire or electronic communications carried on a carrier's  Xd4 |$Vsystem. Nor are we persuaded by the FBI's interpretation that a surveillance status message is  |$required by CALEA's direction that a carrier "shall ensure" that its system is capable of meeting  |$the section 103(a) requirements. Rather, we note that the Act expressly states: "a  |$ptelecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services . . . are capable  X4 |$of" intercepting communications and allowing LEA access to callidentifying information.Y(* {OQ'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Id.Y We  |$interpret the plain language of the statute to mandate compliance with the capability requirements  X4 |$of section 103(a), but not to require that such capability be proven or verified on a continual  X4 |$basis. E nsuring that a wiretap is operational can be done in either a technical or nontechnical  |$ manner, and section 103(a) does not include "ensurance" itself as a capability. Thus, we conclude  |$that the surveillance status punch list item is not an assistance capability requirement under",* 0*%%ZZ9"  X4 |$}section 103.j(* yOy'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1006(b)(1).j However, we are confident that carriers and LEAs will work together to ensure  |$_that a wiretap is functioning correctly. We also note that there is nothing that would prevent  |$Rcarriers from providing this capability either on a voluntary basis, or with compensation from  X4LEAs."X(* yO'ԍ In this regard, we note that Sprint PCS contends that it conducts tests with LEAs to confirm that a wiretap has been activated and conducts additional manual tests upon request from a LEA. Additionally, Sprint PCS contends that LEAs can verify the functioning of call content channels by reviewing call detail messages.  {O 'See Sprint PCS Ex Parte filing of June 25, 1999, at 16.   X4 7. Continuity check tone  X_4 i ~ e102. Background. This technical requirement would require that, in cases where a LEA  |$has obtained authority to intercept wire or electronic communications, a Ctone or dial tone be  |$placed on the call content channel received by the LEA from the telecommunications carrier until  X 4 |$a user of the facilities under surveillance initiates or receives a call.iX B(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э This feature differs from a surveillance status message because it permits the LEA to know whether the facilities under surveillance have an active call. A surveillance status message permits the LEA to know that the wiretap is operational, whether or not there is an active call.i At that point, the tone  |$would be turned off, indicating to the LEA that the target facilities were in use. This capability  |$would permit correlation between the time a call is initiated and the time the connection is  |$Iestablished. The Ctone would also verify that the connection between the carrier's switch and the LEA is in working order.  X4 i 9f103. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that continuity check tones do not fall  |$Wwithin any provisions of section 103 and therefore should not be required for CALEA  Xf4 |$compliance. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that such tones could be useful to LEAs,  XQ4 |$but are not required by the plain language of CALEA.QQb (* {Od'ԍ Further NPRM, at  114115.Q The five manufacturers' aggregate  X:4revenue estimate for this capability is $3 million.M: (* {O'ԍ See Public Notice, at 4.M  X 4 i B g104. Comments. Industry commenters agree that this capability is not required by  X4 |$CALEA.)X (* yO.#'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э AT&T Comments, at 10; Ameritech Comments, at 10; AirTouch Comments, at ii; Bell Atlantic Comments, at 5; Nextel Comments, at 15; PCIA Comments, at 20; SBC Comments, at 17; TIA Comments, at 38; US West Comments, at 21.) AirTouch states that a carrier's diligent compliance with the industry standard,"-0*%%ZZ"  |$coupled with its observation of routine maintenance and operational standards, will adequately  X4 |$ensure the integrity of wiretap surveillance facilities.i(* yOb'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э AirTouch Comments, at ii.i Bell Atlantic contends that this capability,  |$as well as the surveillance status and feature status capabilities, would give LEAs information  X4 |$they have not previously had and, accordingly, these capabilities should be rejected.mX(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Bell Atlantic Comments, at 5.m PCIA  |$argues that the delivery of an automated continuity check would require carriers to install Ctone  X4generators at the switch.e(* yO& '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э PCIA Comments, at 20.e  X_4 i  h105. DoJ/FBI reiterate the arguments they make with respect to surveillance status  XH4 |$messages, contending that section 103 obligates carriers to take affirmative steps to ensure  X14 |$&surveillance integrity, and that the interim standard excuses carriers from taking any such steps.h1x(* yOZ'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Comments, at 57.h  |$}DoJ/FBI also contend that PCIA's assertion that delivery of an automated continuity check tone  X 4 |$/would require carriers to install Ctone generators at the switch level is incorrect, because a C X 4tone is not the only form of continuity check that would be acceptable to LEAs.n (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 56.n  X 4 i  i106. Discussion. As with the case of surveillance status messages, we believe that  |$continuity tone could assist the LEA in determining the status of a wiretap, but that this technical  |$requirement is not necessary to meet the mandates of section 103(a). Similar to our reasoning  |$regarding surveillance status messages, we do not believe that a continuity tone falls within  |$CALEA's definition of callidentifying information, since the information such a feature would  XM4 |$,provide would not identify "the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each  X64 |$communication."@6(* yO'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1001(2).@ Nor does it appear to be required under section 103(a)(1), since it is not a  |$8wire or electronic communications carried on a carrier's system. Furthermore, as explained  |$above, the plain language of the statute mandates compliance with the capability requirements of  |$section 103(a), but does not require that such capability be proven or verified on a continual  |$Ebasis. Again, ensuring that a wiretap is operational can be done in either a technical or non  |$technical manner, and section 103(a) does not include "ensurance" itself as a capability. Thus,  X4 |$we conclude that the continuity tone punch list item is not an assistance capability requirement  X4 |$under section 103.j( (* yOn$'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1006(b)(1).j As noted in paragraph 101, supra, we are confident that carriers and LEAs". 0*%%ZZ9"  |$will work together to ensure that a wiretap is functioning correctly, and also note that there is  |$nothing that would prevent carriers from providing this capability either on a voluntary basis, or  X4with compensation from LEAs.(* {OK'ԍ We note that Sprint PCS contends that it currently provides continuity tones to LEAs. See Sprint PCS Ex  {O'Parte filing of June 25, 1999, at 17.  X' 8. Feature status  Xv4 i J  j107. Background. This technical requirement would require a carrier to notify the LEA  |$when specific subscriptionbased calling services are added to or deleted from the facilities under  |$Isurveillance, including when the subject modifies capabilities remotely through another phone or  X34 |$through an operator. Examples of such services are call waiting, call hold, threeway calling,  X 4 |$conference calling, and call return.  $(* yO '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э We note that some services, such as call return, are available on either a subscription or percall basis. DoJ/FBI assert, however, that the availability of percall features is irrelevant to their petition and that they do not seek to require carriers to notify a LEA of a subscriber's use of these features. They explain that carriers should simply alert a LEA to the assignment or removal of features that can affect call content or callidentifying information from a line under surveillance. They conclude that, "[a]s a practical matter, law enforcement will know in advance what percall features a particular carrier makes available to its subscribers, and will have collected enough information to predict the . . . likely use of such features, before initiating an intercept, and will  {Oi'be able to order the appropriate number of call content and call data channels based on this information." See DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 74. Also, the carrier would be required to notify the LEA if  |$=the telephone number of the facilities under surveillance was changed or service was  X 4disconnected. (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Joint Petition for Expedited Rulemaking, March 27, 1998, at Appendix 1, 1415.  X 4 i k108. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that feature status messages do not fall  |$Wwithin any provisions of section 103 and therefore should not be required for CALEA  X4 |$compliance. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that such messages could be useful to  X4 |$LEAs, but are not required by the plain language of CALEA.Q (* {O'ԍ Further NPRM, at  121122.Q The five manufacturers'  Xh4aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $40 million.Mh(* {O1 'ԍ See Public Notice, at 4.M "Q/0*%%ZZ*"Ԍ X4 i B l109. Comments. Industry commenters agree that this capability is not required by  X4 |$CALEA.)X(* yOd'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э AT&T Comments, at 17; Ameritech Comments, at 10; AirTouch Comments, at ii; Bell Atlantic Comments, at 5; Nextel Comments, at 15; PCIA Comments, at 21; SBC Comments, at 17; TIA Comments, at 39; US West Comments, at 23.) SBC contends that it is unreasonable to mandate measures that would require the  |$cwholesale redesign of a carrier's network simply to comply with a LEA's preferences regarding  |$Isurveillance. SBC also contends that while it is necessary for changes in the telephone number  |$4of the facilities to be conveyed to a LEA, that need is already being met through existing  X4 |$administrative procedures.d(* yO( '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э SBC Comments, at 17.d US West states that it has provided LEAs with expeditious access  |$to feature status information in the past and will do so in the future. US West also contends that  |$ZLEAs never before had the access that DoJ/FBI now is demanding to carriers' databases, and that  XJ4 |$DoJ/FBI's reasons for seeking this access are unconvincing.kJx(* yOs'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э US West Comments, at 2324.k PCIA maintains that provision of  |$a feature status message by a carrier is not feasible because a carrier may not know which  X 4features a subscriber has implemented at any particular time.e (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э PCIA Comments, at 21.e  X 4 i  m110. DoJ/FBI reiterate the arguments they make with respect to surveillance status  |$messages and continuity check tones, contending that section 103 obligates carriers to take  |$"affirmative steps to ensure surveillance integrity, and that the interim standard excuses carriers  X 4 |$from taking any such steps.h (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Comments, at 57.h DoJ/FBI also contend that PCIA's assertion that carriers may not  |$be able to provide a feature status message because they may not know which features a  |$subscriber has implemented at any particular time is inconsistent with the way carriers' networks  Xd4 |$operate.qd( (* yO='#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 5657.q NYPD agrees with DoJ/FBI that a feature status capability is needed by LEAs, and  |$states that this capability is particularly necessary with respect to call forwarding and when a  X64subject disconnects his service or changes his telephone number.6 (* yO'#&a\  P6G; u&P## X\  P6G;ɒP#э NYPD Comments, at 12.  X4 i \ n111. Discussion. Similar to surveillance status messages and continuity tones, we  |$ubelieve that feature status messages could be useful to a LEA, but that provision of these  |$messages from a carrier to a LEA is not required to meet the mandates of section 103(a). First,  |$we believe it is clear that feature status messages do not constitute callidentifying information  |$since the information such a feature would provide would not identify "the origin, direction,"0H 0*%%ZZ"  X4 |$destination, or termination of each communication."@(* yOy'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1001(2).@ Further, feature status messages do not  X4 |$Wappear to be required under section 103(a)(1) because they are not wire or electronic  |$communications carried on a carrier's system. Rather, they would simply aid a LEA in  |$determining how much capacity is required to implement and maintain effective electronic  |$surveillance of a target facility, information that could be useful in assuring that an interception  |$/is fully effectuated and the intercepted material delivered as authorized. However, as noted by  |$AT&T, the information that would be provided by feature status messages can be provided by  |$other means, such as in response to a subpoena to the carrier. We reiterate that the plain  |$}language of the Act mandates compliance with the assistance capability requirements of section  |$103(a), but does not require carriers to implement any specific quality control capabilities to assist  |$law enforcement. The information sought by DoJ/FBI in a feature status message can be  |$provided in either a technical or nontechnical manner, and section 103(a) does not include  |$"ensurance" itself as a capability. Thus, we conclude that the feature status punch list item is not  X 4 |$ an assistance capability requirement under section 103.j X(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1006(b)(1).j Similar to surveillance status messages  |$and continuity check tones, we are confident that carriers and LEAs will work together to ensure  |$that some form of feature status capability is provided, and also note that there is nothing that  |$would prevent carriers from providing this capability either on a voluntary basis, or with  Xy4compensation from LEAs.>y(* yO'ԍ In this regard, we note that Sprint PCS contends that it currently provides to LEAs handsetinitiated feature codes, and can provide a record if the subject changes features using a Sprint PCS business office. Additionally, Sprint PCS contends that one of its vendors is hopeful that in the future it will be able to provide  {Oj'software "triggers" so that all changes in feature status can be delivered automatically to LEAs. See Sprint PCS  {O4'Ex Parte filing of June 25, 1999, at 13. >  Xb4  XK' 9. Dialed digit extraction  X44  X4 i  o112. Background. This capability would require the telecommunications carrier to  |$provide to the LEA on the call data channel the identity of any digits dialed by the subject after  |$/connecting to another carrier's service (also known as "postcutthrough digits"). One example  |$}of such dialing and signaling would occur when the subject dials an 800 number to access a long  |$distance carrier. After connecting to the long distance carrier through the 800 number, the subject then dials the telephone number that represents the ultimate destination of the call.  X~4 i p113. The Further NPRM tentatively concluded that the identity of post-cut-through  |$qdigits representing all telephone numbers needed to route a call, for example, from the  |$/subscriber's telephone through its LEC, then through IXC and other networks, and ultimately to  X;4 |$the intended party is call-identifying information. The Further NPRM sought comment on";10*%%ZZ8"  |$_whether such callidentifying information is reasonably available to the carrier originating the  X4call.I(* {Ob'ԍ Further NPRM, at  128.I The five manufacturers' aggregate revenue estimate for this capability is $121 million.MZ(* {O'ԍ See Public Notice, at 4.M  X4 i  q114. Comments. EFF, EPIC, and ACLU argue that CALEA does not permit a LEA to  |$obtain postcutthrough digits via a pen register order directed at the initial telecommunications  |$pcarrier because those digits are carried on the initial carrier's call content channel, and therefore  |$must be treated the same as other call content and not revealed to a LEA through a pen register  |$<order served on that carrier. EFF, EPIC, and ACLU maintain that information contained in the  |$call content portion of a transmission does not qualify as callidentifying because it does not  X34 |$identify the "origin, direction, destination or termination" of the initial carrier's  X 4communications.w (* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э EFF, EPIC, and ACLU Comments, at 2628.w  X 4 i vr115. PCIA and TIA each assert that postcutthrough digits are not callidentifying  X 4 |$ information and are not reasonably available to the originating carrier.z |(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э PCIA Comments, at 33; TIA Comments, at 23.z TIA states that a carrier  |$yhas no reason to detect dialed digits that are not used for call routing, and the manufacturers'  X 4 |$cswitch designs do not contemplate their detection since they are meaningless to the switch after  |$pthe call is routed. Further, TIA contends, modifying these fundamental switch designs would be  X{4extraordinarily difficult and expensive.d{ (* yO8'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э TIA Comments, at 23.d  XM4 i s116. PCIA, Ameritech, and BellSouth propose alternative ways for a LEA to obtain  |$postcutthrough dialed digits. PCIA states that, under the interim standard, a LEA would be  X4 |$provided with these digits if it either serves the LEC with a Title III warrant and arranges for the  |$provisioning of a CCC from that carrier, or serves the interexchange carrier (IXC) with a pen  |$register warrant and arranges for the provisioning of a CDC from that carrier. PCIA states that  |$given the availability of these alternatives, we should not expand the interim standard in a manner  X4 |$Ithat conflicts with section 103.h(* yO!'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э PCIA Comments, at 3334.h Ameritech and BellSouth propose another alternative method,  |$which they claim would be less expensive than our proposal that would require carriers to  |$Zredesign touchtone detector architectures and add detector hardware to their switches. Ameritech  |$and BellSouth propose that a LEA obtain a pen register warrant, order a CCC from the  Xg4 |$originating carrier, and install equipment at the LEA's collection facility to extract dual tone"g2, 0*%%ZZ"  |$"multi frequency (DTMF) digits. According to Ameritech and BellSouth, such a practice would  |$8allow carriers to avoid the expense of both developing a digit extraction feature and keeping  X4touchtone registers tied to a monitored call for the duration of that call.(* yOK'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Ameritech Comments, at 1213; BellSouth Comments, at 18.  X4 i 5t117. AirTouch argues that a dialed digit extraction capability would be particularly  |$expensive for wireless carriers to implement. It cites a vendor estimate that each dialed digit  |$<extraction would cost about $1000; thus, a carrier whose switching system has the capability of  X_4 |$lconducting 200 simultaneous wiretaps would have to pay roughly $200,000 an amount that  |$<AirTouch maintains is comparable to the perswitch cost of the software upgrade for the entire  X14punch list.s1X(* yO: '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э AirTouch Comments, at ii and 2627.s  X 4  X 4 i  u118. DoJ/FBI argue that the statutory definition of callidentifying information  |$encompasses all dialing and signaling information that identifies the destination of each  |$communication generated or received by a subscriber regardless of whether the particular carrier  |$ufrom whom the information is being sought uses the information for call routing purposes;  |$accordingly, DoJ/FBI maintain that it is irrelevant whether an originating carrier uses postcut |$through digits to route calls through the network. DoJ/FBI also contend that the argument of  Xy4 |$EFF, EPIC, and ACLU regarding a LEA's lack of authority to obtain call content channel  |$information with only a pen register order is incorrect. DoJ/FBI state that the pen register statute  |$authorizes LEAs to acquire all callidentifying numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted by the  |$<subject using the monitored facilities. Ideally, DoJ/FBI state, carriers would have the capability  |$to automatically distinguish between postcutthrough digits used for call completion and those  |$}used for other purposes, but in the absence of such a capability, the carrier must deliver all post |$cutthrough digits to the LEA. Additionally, DoJ/FBI argue that postcutthrough digits cannot  |$be obtained expeditiously from other carriers, and often will not be available at all; and that for  |$a LEA to provision a CCC to extract postcutthrough tones at the LEA's collection facility  |$would cost LEAs as much as $20 million per year. Moreover, DoJ/FBI argue that delivering the  |$3contents of a subject's postcutthrough communications to a LEA pursuant to a pen register order  |$could pose unnecessary risks to privacy interests because innocent conversations might be heard  Xe4by LEAs in the course of such surveillance.qe(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 5764.q  X74 i  v119.  Discussion.  We find that some digits dialed by a subject after connecting to a  |$carrier other than the originating carrier are call-identifying information. While a subject may  |$dial digits after the initial call setup that are not callidentifying e.g., a bank account number  |$to access his/her bank statement some digits dialed after connecting to an IXC identify the"3x0*%%ZZ"  |$""origin, direction, destination or termination" of the communications. We also find that this call |$identifying information is "reasonably available" to the originating carrier because the digits  |$dialed by a subject after connecting to another carrier are present at an IAP and can be made  |$available by the originating carrier without the carrier being unduly burdened with network  X4modifications.[(* {O'ԍ See  2831, supra.[  Xv4 i w120. Additionally, we note that there appears to be a consensus that LEAs should be  |$permitted to obtain in some fashion digits dialed by the subject after connecting to another  |$ucarrier's service. PCIA, Ameritech, and BellSouth have proposed alternative methods of  |$_extracting such digits, and these methods would minimize the expense to originating carriers.  |$However, each alternative method also raises significant concerns. The first method proposed  |$by PCIA a LEA serving the originating carrier with a Title III warrant and arranging for the  |$yprovisioning of a CCC from that carrier is not feasible unless the LEA can obtain the legal  |$authorization necessary for a Title III warrant. The burden of proof necessary for obtaining a  |$Title III authorization is more stringent than that required for a pen register warrant, and a pen  |$register is all that is required to obtain callidentifying information. We do not believe that  |$CALEA contemplates changing the standard of proof in obtaining a warrant in order to avoid implementing a particular CALEA feature.  XK4 i 5 x121. The second method proposed by PCIA a LEA serving an IXC with a pen  |$}register warrant and arranging for the provisioning of a CDC from that carrier would shift the  |$'cost burden from the originating carrier to the LEA, which would not necessarily be less  |$expensive to the public. Further, this method could be timeconsuming, particularly if a caller  |$pused multiple IXCs to complete a single call, and thus would seem to defeat one of the purposes  |$of CALEA to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance  X4 |$effectively and efficiently in the face of rapid advances in telecommunications technology.Z(* {O'ԍ See again 140 Cong. Rec. H10779 (daily ed. October 7, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hyde).  |$8Finally, this method would shift to the LEA responsibility for ensuring that the interception is  |$<conducted in a way that protects the privacy and security of communications not authorized for  |$interception, and thus would effectively relieve carriers of their obligations under section 103(a)(4) of CALEA.  X74 i By122. The method proposed by Ameritech and BellSouth a LEA obtaining a pen  |$Rregister warrant, ordering a CCC from the originating carrier, and installing equipment at the  |$LEA's collection facility to extract DTMF digits would again shift the cost burden from the  |$originating carrier to the LEA and thus not necessarily effect a cost savings for the public.  |$RAdditionally, this method would jeopardize privacy because the LEA would be using a CCC,  |$and therefore would obtain call content, as well as callidentifying, information under a pen" 40*%%ZZb"  |$register warrant. Thus, to an even greater extent than the second method proposed by PCIA, this  X4 |$method would shift to the LEA responsibility for ensuring that the interception is conducted in  |$a way that protects the privacy and security of communications not authorized for interception, and thus would relieve carriers of their obligations under section 103(a)(4).  X4 i z123. Accordingly, while we are concerned about the costs of a dialed digit extraction  |$capability to originating carriers, as well as the privacy implications of permitting LEAs to access  |$/noncallidentifying digits (such as bank account numbers) with only a pen register warrant, we  |$find that requiring this capability is appropriate. We find that adopting our proposal rather than  |$one of the three alternatives suggested in the comments will best balance the directives of section  |$107(b) of CALEA that the capability requirements of section 103 be met by costeffective  |$methods and that the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted be  |$protected. As with packet switching, the LEA will be required to minimize its search of the CDC  |$for callidentifying information. With respect to costs, we note that the manufacturers' revenue  |$ldata indicate that the cost of a dialed digit extraction capability would exceed the cost of any  |$other punch list capability. In percentage terms, based on the manufacturers' aggregate revenue  X4 |$estimates, this cost would be  13% of the core interim standard and 29% of the total punch list.K(* {O 'ԍ See Appendix B, infra.K  Xy4 |$Based on the manufacturers' wireless revenue estimates, this cost would be  17% of the core  Xb4 |$interim standard and 26% of the total punch list.2bZ(* {Om'ԍ Id.2 However, in balancing these costs against  |$_other statutory requirements, we do not find them to be so exorbitant as to require automatic  |$exclusion of the capability. Further, it is unclear whether any of the alternative methods proposed  |$would be significantly less expensive; rather, they would simply shift the cost burden from  X4 |$Icarriers to LEAs. Thus, we conclude that the provision of dialed digit extraction information by  |$the originating carrier is a technical requirement that meets the assistance capability requirements  X4of section 103.@(* yOu'ԍ 47 U.S.C.  1006(b).@  X4  X' D.  Disposition of JSTD025 Modifications  X4  X|4 i  {124.  Background. In the Further NPRM, we stated that we expected that TIA  |$Subcommittee TR45.2 would modify the interim standard to be consistent with any additional  |$technical requirements we adopt, and that we anticipated that the Subcommittee would complete  X94 |$those modifications within 180 days of release of this Third R&O. We noted that this was an  |$ambitious schedule, but we stated that we believed it to be achievable because the Subcommittee  X 4 |$/has been examining CALEA technical standards issues for several years and the modifications" 5|0*%%ZZ"  |$<to JSTD025 are likely to be relatively limited. Finally, we stated that we would set a separate compliance deadline for those additional technical requirements.  X4 i |125.  Comments. TIA endorses our conclusion that its Subcommittee TR45.2 should  |$Vrevise the interim standard, consistent with the requirements that we adopt. TIA states that the  |$/Subcommittee has the expertise and resources to issue a revised technical standard in the most  |$efficient and expeditious manner, and that it will make every effort to expedite the completion  Xa4 |$of a stable, ballotready revision of the final standard within 180 days.ea(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э TIA Comments, at iii.e TIA contends, however,  XJ4 |$ that 180 days for a balloted and approved standard is not possible.jJX(* yOS '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э TIA Reply Comments, at 10.j TIA also requests  |$dclarification as to whether the revisions to the interim standard should be balloted as a  |$3TIA/American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard, or as another interim standard. TIA  X 4 |$/states that the former procedure would extend the balloting and approval process. Finally, TIA  |$<states that representatives from our Office of Engineering and Technology should participate in  |$ the standard's formulating group, and that members of the privacy and law enforcement  X 4communities are strongly encouraged to participate.g (* yOY'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э TIA Comments, at 1516.g  X4 i   }126.  Several parties submitted comments consistent with those submitted by TIA. US  |$West states that it supports the proposed remand to the TIA Subcommittee, but that the  |$expectation that the Subcommittee will be able to complete its work within 180 days probably  |$<is overly optimistic. US West contends that developing a consensus on the necessary technical  |$standards and having them subsequently approved by ballot, as required under ANSI procedures,  X4 |$could take more than one year.hx(* yOH'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э US West Comments, at ii.h SBC states that it agrees with us about remanding the interim  |$standard to the Subcommittee, but contends that whether the activity of the Subcommittee can  X4 |$be completed within 180 days will depend upon the extent of our modifications.=(* yO'ԍ SBC Comments, at 18.= AT&T states  |$that it may be feasible to complete technical amendments to the interim standard within 180 days,  X4 |$but that procedures for promulgation as a final industry standard will require additional time.>(* yO !'ԍ AT&T Comments, at 23.>  X4 |$cHowever, DoJ/FBI contend that if the Commission is specific about the changes required to the"6( 0*%%ZZ\"  |$interim standard, there is no reason why the Subcommittee cannot produce a ballotready draft  X4within 90 days and a vote on the final standard within an additional 90 days.G(* yOb'ԍ DoJ/FBI Reply Comments, at 74.G  X4 i $~127. TIA argues that implementation of the additional punch list capabilities by  X4 |$_manufacturers and carriers should be at least 36 months after the June 30, 2000 deadline for  X4 |$implementing the capability requirements covered by the interim standard.X(* yO'ԍ TIA Comments, at 1720. BellSouth supports TIA's suggested implementation deadline. BellSouth Comments, at 15. This deadline would  |$provide manufacturers approximately 24 months to design and test new products and provide  |$<carriers approximately 12 months to acquire and test new products in their networks, according  |$to TIA. DoJ/FBI suggest that manufacturers and carriers be required to implement the punch list  X14 |$"capabilities within 18 months of adoption of a revised industry standard.1(* yO'ԍ DoJ/FBI Comments, at 2930. DoJ/FBI support a 180 day period for revising the industry standard; thus, implementation should occur approximately within two years of a decision in this proceeding. DoJ/FBI argue that  |$Athe industry already has begun work on revisions to the standard to include the punch list  X 4 |$capabilities, (* yO'ԍ DoJ/FBI notes the industry began work on an Enhanced Surveillance Services standards document in 1998. DoJ/FBI Comments, at 32. and points to the long delays that already have occurred in implementing CALEA, urging the Commission not to delay further industry compliance.  X 4 i = 128.  Discussion. As proposed, we are remanding the interim standard to Subcommittee  |$TR45.2 of the TIA to make the necessary technical modifications in accord with our findings  |$herein. We believe that those technical requirements can be most efficiently implemented by  |$ppermitting the Subcommittee to make the modifications. LEAs, carriers, and manufacturers are  |$/voting members of the Subcommittee, and the Subcommittee has the experience and resources  |$in place to resolve these issues quickly. Regarding the specific timing requirements, we conclude  |$<that seven months is a reasonable period of time for TIA to complete the necessary changes to  |$JSTD025. We note that only certain punch list items will need to be included in the revised  |$standard, which will reduce the amount of work to be completed, and that the industry already  |$8has begun work in this regard. Accordingly, we will require TIA to complete the necessary  |$lrevisions to the interim standard by March 30, 2000. We find it sufficient for TIA to adopt a  |$revised TIA interim standard and see no need or benefit to consider the revised standard as an  |$pANSI standard. Commission staff will closely monitor the development of the revised standard,  |$but will not participate directly so that we can maintain our impartiality in the event of disputes relative to the revised standard. "g7` 0*%%ZZ"Ԍ X4 i 129. We will require wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers to make the six  |$punch list capabilities available to LEAs by September 30, 2001. We believe that manufacturers,  |$if they have not done so already, will begin working to include the additional capabilities in their  X4 |$products as soon as practicable after adoption of this Third R&O, rather than delay such work  |$until after the June 30, 2000 deadline, as TIA suggests. Relative to implementation of the core  |$interim standard, the September 30, 2001 deadline will provide carriers an additional 15 months  |$to implement these capabilities. We find that this deadline provides sufficient time for the development process to be completed and for carriers to implement these capabilities.  X3' E.Other Technologies and Systems  X 4  X 4 i m  130. Background. In the Further NPRM, we noted that the interim standard applies  |$0only to wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers. CALEA assistance capability  |$requirements for other telecommunications service providers, including paging, specialized mobile  |$radio (SMR), and satellite service providers, are not covered by that standard. Industry  |$associations or standardsetting organizations that represent such service providers that fit within  |$pthe definition of telecommunications carrier under CALEA may establish voluntary standards to  X}4 |$achieve compliance with section 103 by the June 30, 2000 deadline, and take advantage of the  |$safe harbor provision of section 107(a). The absence of an industry standard, however, does not  XO4 |$relieve such carriers from the obligations imposed by section 103.mO(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 47 U.S.C.  1006(a)(3)(B).m In the absence of a publicly  |$Iavailable standard, a carrier will have to work with its vendors to develop an individual CALEA  |$solution, and a carrier is free to choose a solution that is specifically tailored to its particular system and technology.  X4 i  131. Comments. Motorola states that it has been active with respect to technical work  |$involving paging, satellite, SMR, and Enhanced Specialized Mobile Radio (ESMR) systems. It  |$contends that we should defer to and encourage these ongoing efforts by other sectors of the  |$"telecommunications industry to comply with CALEA's obligations. Motorola also recommends  X4 |$ that we clarify that this Third R&O is not a checklist against which other standards will be judged  Xm4 |$in the future because requirements that may be reasonable in the wireline, cellular, or PCS  |$context simply may not apply to other technologies. Finally, Motorola states that we should  |$recognize that despite industry's best efforts, compliance for these other technologies may not be  |$possible by June 30, 2000. Motorola states that we may want to grant a blanket extension for  |$these technologies and postpone their capability compliance until their eventual capacity deadline  X4under the FBI's final notice of capacity.CX(* yO#'ԍ Motorola Comments, at 59.C  X4"80*%%ZZ"Ԍ X4 i \132. American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC) states that, in the absence of  |$petitions to us, we should allow operators of systems that use other technologies to establish, in  |$Econsultation with LEAs, the capability requirements that will apply to their services. AMSC  |$states that only if we are requested to consider the adequacy of technical rules or standards that  X4 |$are adopted for carriers not covered by the interim standard should we become involved.j(* yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э AMSC Comments, at 3.j  X4 |$Similarly, ICO Services Limited (ICO) states that we should not take any action at this time with  Xv4 |$respect to mobile satellite providers, and should allow those providers to work directly with LEAs  X_4 |$}to establish standards.<_X(* yOh 'ԍ ICO Comments, at 3.< AT&T states that, unless a party asks us to intercede in the standards  XH4 |$process, we should have no direct role. Rather, we should announce general capability principles  |$under section 103, leaving industry associations or standard setting bodies to implement the  X 4 |$requirements based on the particular technology.A (* yO'ԍ AT&T Comments, at 2324.A Southern Communications Services, Inc.  |$(Southern) states that we should establish a CALEA safe harbor standard for SMR carriers, but  |$Rthat our role in the standards setting process should be limited absent a deficiency petition or  |$failure of industry to establish standards. Southern further states that our decisions herein should  |$serve only as a general guide for SMR carriers, and that the definition of reasonably available  X 4 |$will differ based on the particular technology employed.I x(* yO'ԍ Southern Reply Comments, at 26.I Finally, PCIA states that it has  |$developed a safe harbor standard for traditional paging providers, whereby such providers will  |$meet the assistance capability requirements through the provision of cloned pagers. However,  |$PCIA contends that NYPD has requested that paging carriers provide specific callidentifying  XK4 |$information that is neither required by section 103 nor by the paging safe harbor standard, and  X44that this request should be rejected.A4(* yO'ԍ PCIA Comments, at 1314.A  X4 i   133. Discussion. Under Section 107 of CALEA, we can establish technical  |$3requirements or standards only after a Government agency or person petitions us to do so because  |$}an industry standard has not been developed or because the petitioner finds that such a standard  |$is deficient. In the absence of a petition, we do not have authority to establish standards and thus  X4 |$Ido not do so herein for telecommunications carriers deploying other technologies. We note that  |$Veach of the requirements we adopt herein with respect to wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS  |$ccarriers is not necessarily appropriate for other technologies. As to the deadline for compliance  Xg4 |$Mfor other technologies, we decline to extend the date. We made clear in the Extension Order that  XR4 |$ythe June 30, 2000 deadline would apply to all telecommunications carriers and should provide"R90*%%ZZ"  X4 |$psufficient time for the development of CALEAcompliant technology.[(* {Oy'ԍ See again Extension Order, at  51.[ Accordingly, while we  |$+will consider any petitions that may be filed to extend that deadline for specific services, we  |$decline to issue a blanket extension herein. Finally, with respect to PCIA's concerns regarding  |$the safe harbor standard it says that it has developed with respect to paging systems, no party has  |$ppetitioned us contending that PCIA's paging standard is deficient. Therefore, there is at present no issue for us to resolve regarding that standard.  Xv4  X_' F. Other Matters  X14 i ~ 134.  Standardized Delivery Interface. DoJ/FBI contend that there is another capability  |$that should be included in the final industry standard; namely, a standardized delivery interface  |$that would limit the number of potential delivery interfaces LEAs would need to accommodate  X 4 |$cfrom the telecommunications industry. DoJ/FBI state that the interim standard does not contain  |$any limitation on the number of protocols that may be used by carriers to deliver call content and  |$callidentifying information. Therefore, according to DoJ/FBI, unless a relatively small number  |$cof standardized protocols are employed, each carrier will be free to employ a different interface  |$protocol, and LEAs could be faced with prohibitive practical and financial burdens in equipping  |$themselves to deal with scores of different protocols. DoJ/FBI state that this capability was part  Xd4 |$of their original punch listdZ {Oo'ԍ See DoJ/FBI "Joint Petition for Expedited Rulemaking," filed March 27, 1998, at 5758. and they have not dropped it from consideration, even though we  XM4 |$stated in the Further NPRM that it had been dropped.IM {O'ԍ See Further NPRM, at n.30.I DoJ/FBI argue that limiting the number  |$of delivery interfaces will ensure that industry meets the assistance capability requirements of  X!4section 103 by costeffective methods.D!~ yOP'ԍ DoJ/FBI Comments, at 7073.D  X4 i 135.   PrimeCo disagrees with DoJ/FBI, stating that we should not limit the number of  |$'delivery interfaces. PrimeCo states that   many new digital standards are currently under  |$4consideration, and contends that the DoJ/FBI proposal contravenes legislativelyimposed  X4parameters by discouraging the development of new services and technologies.H yOm 'ԍ PrimeCo Reply Comments, at 89.H ":0*%%ZZ"Ԍ X4 i ,  136.   Discussion. As Assistant Attorney General Colgate stated in February 1998, "a  X4 |$+single delivery interface is not mandated by CALEA," {Od'ԍ See letter of February 3, 1998 from Stephen R. Colgate, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, to Mr. Tom Barba, Attorney at Law, Steptoe and Johnson, at 3. and we see nothing in the Act that  |$would require that the number of interfaces be limited. We believe, however, that as digital  |$technology evolves, industry will reach agreement on a relatively limited number of delivery  |$interfaces, which should serve to reduce costs to LEAs. Accordingly, we reject the DoJ/FBI proposal to include a standardized delivery interface capability in the final industry standard.  Xa4 i 137.   Employee conduct and recordkeeping requirements. The Further NPRM  |$inadvertently included proposals related to employee conduct and recordkeeping requirements for  X54 |$<telecommunications carriers.g5" {O 'ԍ See Further NPRM, at  161163.g These proposals were carried over from the original Notice of  X 4 |$Proposed Rule Making in this proceeding,  {O'ԍ See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, CC Docket No. 97213, 13 FCC Rcd 3149, 319293 (1998), at  7375. and are not relevant to the issues we address herein.  X 4 |$No comments were filed to the Further NPRM that addressed these proposals. Accordingly, we  X 4 |$Imake no findings regarding them in this decision. We note, however, that these proposals were  X 4addressed in our recent Report and Order in this proceeding.  {O'ԍ See Report and Order, CC Docket No. 97213, FCC 9911, released March 15, 1999, at  9095.  X ' G. Summary of Findings  X4  X4 i 138.  In this Order, we have finalized technical requirements for wireline, cellular, and  |$broadband PCS carriers. Specifically, we are requiring these carriers to implement the  |$/capabilities of the interim standard and six DoJ/FBI punch list items: content of subjectinitiated  |$cconference calls; party hold, join, drop on conference calls; subjectinitiated dialing and signaling  |$information; inband and outofband signaling; timing information; and dialed digit extraction.  |$The core capabilities of the interim standard must be implemented by June 30, 2000, and packetmode communications and the punch list items must be implemented by September 30, 2001.  X'  IV.  PROCEDURAL INFORMATION  X4  X4 A.Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis "s;0*%%ZZ"Ԍ X4 G6!F 139.   As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),YZ {Oy'ԍ See 5 U.S.C.  603. The RFA, see 5 U.S.C.  601 et. seq., has been amended by the Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) (CWAAA). Title II of the CWAAA is the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA).Y an Initial Regulatory  X4 |$Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the Further NPRM.B yO'ԍ 13 FCC Rcd 22632 (1998).B The Commission sought  X4 |$written public comments on the proposals in the Further NPRM, including the IRFA. This Final  X4Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA.F z {O 'ԍ  See 5 U.S.C.  604.F  X4(A)Need for and Purpose of this Action  X|4  Xe4 i   140.   This Third Report and Order responds to the legislative mandate contained in the  |$Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103414, 108 Stat. 4279  |$(1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). The Commission, in  X" 4 |$/compliance with 47 U.S.C.  229, promulgates rules in this Third Report and Order to ensure  |$}the prompt implementation of section 103 of CALEA. In enacting CALEA, Congress sought to  |$/balance three key policies with CALEA: "(1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law  |$@enforcement agencies to carry out properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the face  |$lof increasingly powerful and personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new communications services and technologies."  X4 i ` 141.     The rules adopted in this Third Report and Order implement Congress's goal to  |$/balance the three key policies enumerated above. The objective of the rules is to implement as  |$quickly and effectively as possible the national telecommunications policy for wireline, cellular,  |$and broadband PCS telecommunications carriers to support the lawful electronic surveillance needs of law enforcement agencies.  X4(B)Summary of the Issues Raised by Public Comments Made in Response to the IRFA  X4 i 142.     Summary of Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA). In the Further NPRM,  |$cthe Commission performed an IRFA and asked for comments that specifically addressed issues  X4 |$"raised in the IRFA.   No parties filed comments directly in response to the IRFA. In response to  X4 |$EnonIFRA comments to the Further NPRM, we have modified several of the Commission's  |$proposals, particularly regarding packet switching, conference call content, inband and outofband signaling, and timing information, as discussed above. "I<  0*%%ZZ8"Ԍ X4 G6!l(C)Description and Estimates of the Number of Entities Affected by This Third Report and  V4Order  X4 i 143. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an  X4 |$"estimate of the number of small entities that may be affected by the action taken.j  yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 5 U.S.C.  603(b)(3). j The RFA  |$4generally defines the term "small entity" as having the same meaning as the terms "small  Xx4 |$lbusiness," "small organization," and "small governmental jurisdiction."i xX {O '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Id.  601(6). i In addition, the term  |$l"small business" has the same meaning as the term "small business concern" under the Small  XJ4 |$  Business Act.Y J yO '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 5 U.S.C.  601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of "small business concern" in 15 U.S.C.  632). Pursuant to the RFA, the statutory definition of a small business applies "unless an agency, after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity for public comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register." 5 U.S.C.  601(3).Y A small business concern is one that: (1) is independently owned and  H operated;  |$y(2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established  X 4 |$/by the Small Business Administration (SBA).x   yOg'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C.  632.x A small organization is generally "any notfor X 4 |$profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field."f *  yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 5 U.S.C.  601(4).f  X 4 |$Nationwide, as of 1992, there were approximately 275,801 small organizations.  yOY'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 1992 Economic Census, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table 6 (special tabulation of data under contract to Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration). And finally,  |$"small governmental jurisdiction" generally means "governments of cities, counties, towns,  X 4 |$<townships, villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population of less than 50,000."f  yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 5 U.S.C.  601(5).f  X 4 |$RAs of 1992, there were approximately 85,006 such jurisdictions in the United States.  yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э  U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "1992 Census of Governments." This  |$ number includes 38,978 counties, cities, and towns; of these, 37,566, or 96 percent, have  X{4 |$ppopulations of fewer than 50,000.Z{2 {O^"'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Id.Z The United States Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau)  |$Eestimates that this ratio is approximately accurate for all governmental entities. Thus, of the  |$85,006 governmental entities, we estimate that 81,600 (91 percent) are small entities. Below, we"M=0*%%ZZ"  |$further describe and estimate the number of small business concerns that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order.   X4 i  144. As noted, under the Small Business Act, a "small business concern" is one that:  |$R(1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3)  X4 |$Imeets any additional criteria established by the SBA.L {O'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 15 U.S.C.  632. See, e.g., Brown Transport Truckload, Inc. v. Southern Wipers, Inc., 176 B.R. 82 (N.D.Ga. 1994). The SBA has defined a small business  |$for Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories 4812 (Radiotelephone Communications)  X_4 |$and 4813 (Telephone Communications, Except Radiotelephone) to be small entities when they  XH4 |$have no more than 1,500 employees.hH"L yO '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 13 C.F.R.  121.201.h We first discuss the number of small telecommunications  |$entities falling within these SIC categories, then attempt to refine further those estimates to  |$correspond with the categories of telecommunications companies that are commonly used under our rules.  X 4 i h145. Total Number of Telecommunications Entities Affected.  The Census Bureau reports  |$that, at the end of 1992, there were 3,497 firms engaged in providing telephone services, as  X 4 |$defined therein, for at least one year.2 L {O '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1992 Census of Transportation,  yO'Communications, and Utilities: Establishment and Firm Size, at Firm Size1-123 (1995) ("1992 Census").2 This number contains a variety of different categories  |$ of entities, including local exchange carriers, interexchange carriers, competitive access providers,  |$ cellular carriers, mobile service carriers, operator service providers, pay telephone operators, PCS  |$+providers, covered SMR providers, and resellers. It seems certain that some of those 3,497  |$ctelephone service firms may not qualify as small entities or small incumbent LECs because they  X64 |$are not "independently owned and operated."j6 L yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 15 U.S.C.  632(a)(1).j For example, a PCS provider that is affiliated  |$with an interexchange carrier having more than 1,500 employees would not meet the definition  |$of a small business. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that fewer than 3,497 telephone  |$service firms are small entity telephone service firms or small incumbent LECs that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order.  X4 i \146. The most reliable source of current information regarding the total numbers of  |$}common carrier and related providers nationwide, including the numbers of commercial wireless  X~4 |$_entities, appears to be data the Commission publishes annually in its Carrier Locator report,  Xi4 |$derived from filings made in connection with the Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS).iL {O$'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э FCC, Carrier Locator: Interstate Service Providers, Figure 1 (Jan. 1999) (Carrier Locator). See also 47 C.F.R.  64.601.608. "i> +^'^'ZZ"  X4 |$According to data in the most recent report, there are 3,604 interstate carriers.qL {Oy'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Carrier Locator at Fig. 1.q  X4 |$These include, inter alia, local exchange carriers, wireline carriers and service providers,  X4 |$/interexchange carriers, competitive access providers, operator service providers, pay telephone  |$operators, providers of telephone toll service, providers of telephone exchange service, and resellers.  Xx4 i 147. We have included small incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) in this RFA  Xa4 |$analysis. As noted above, a "small business" under the RFA is one that, inter alia, meets the  XL4 |$pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500  X74 |$8or fewer employees), and "is not dominant in its field of operation."e7ZL yOB '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 5 U.S.C.  601(3).e The SBA's Office of  |$Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field  X 4 |$of operation because any such dominance is not "national" in scope.F L yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Letter from Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, to William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC (May 27, 1999). The Small Business Act contains a definition of "small business concern," which the RFA  {O4'incorporates into its own definition of "small business." See 15 U.S.C.  632(a) (Small Business Act); 5 U.S.C.  601(3) (RFA). SBA regulations interpret "small business concern" to include the concept of dominance on a national basis. 13 C.F.R.  121.102(b). Since 1996, out of an abundance of caution, the Commission has  {O'included small incumbent LECs in its regulatory flexibility analyses. Implementation of the Local Competition  {OX'Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket, 9698, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 16144-45 (1996). We have therefore  |$included small incumbent LECs in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize that this RFA action has no effect on FCC analyses and determinations in other, nonRFA contexts.  X 4 i 148. Wireline Carriers and Service Providers (SIC 4813). The Census Bureau reports  |$that there were 2,321 telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone companies  X4 |$in operation for at least one year at the end of 1992.~ L {O*'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 1992 Census, supra, at Firm Size1-123.~ All but 26 of the 2,321 non |$<radiotelephone companies listed by the Census Bureau were reported to have fewer than 1,000  |$employees. Thus, even if all 26 of those companies had more than 1,500 employees, there would  |$still be 2,295 nonradiotelephone companies that might qualify as small entities or small  |$incumbent LECs. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not independently  |$owned and operated, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of  |$ wireline carriers and service providers that would qualify as small business concerns under SBA's  X4 |$Rdefinition. Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than 2,295 small entity telephone  |$communications companies other than radiotelephone companies that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order. "? +^'^'ZZ"Ԍ X4 i 149. Local Exchange Carriers, Interexchange Carriers, Competitive Access Providers,  X4 |$+and Resellers. Neither the Commission nor SBA has developed a definition of small LECs,  |$interexchange carriers (IXCs), competitive access providers (CAPs), or resellers. The closest  X4 |$applicable definition for these carriertypes under SBA rules is for telephone communications  X4 |$companies other than radiotelephone (wireless) companies.wL yO!'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 13 C.F.R.  121.210, SIC Code 4813.w The most reliable source of  X4 |$information regarding the number of these carriers nationwide of which we are aware appears to  Xz4 |$be the data that we collect annually in connection with the TRS.zXL {O '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э See 47 C.F.R.  64.601 et seq.; Carrier Locator at Fig. 1. According to our most recent  Xc4 |$data, there are 1,410 LECs, 151 IXCs, 129 CAPs, and 351 resellers.*cL {O '#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Carrier Locator at Fig. 1. The total for resellers includes both toll resellers and local resellers. The TRS category for CAPs also includes competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) (total of 129 for both).* Although it seems certain  |$Vthat some of these carriers are not independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500  |$lemployees, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of these  |$carriers that would qualify as small business concerns under SBA's definition. Consequently, we  |$}estimate that there are fewer than 1,410 small entity LECs or small incumbent LECs, 151 IXCs,  |$<129 CAPs, and 351 resellers that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order.  X 4 i 150. Wireless Carriers (SIC 4812). The Census Bureau reports that there were 1,176  |$8radiotelephone (wireless) companies in operation for at least one year at the end of 1992, of  X4 |$Vwhich 1,164 had fewer than 1,000 employees.2DL {Ot'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1992 Census of Transportation,  yO>'Communications, and Utilities: Establishment and Firm Size, at Firm Size1-123 (1995) ("1992 Census").2 Even if all of the remaining 12 companies had  |$more than 1,500 employees, there would still be 1,164 radiotelephone companies that might  |$qualify as small entities if they are independently owned are operated. Although it seems certain  X:4 |$that some of these carriers are not independently owned and operated, we are unable at this time  |$&to estimate with greater precision the number of radiotelephone carriers and service providers that  |$would qualify as small business concerns under SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that  |$there are fewer than 1,164 small entity radiotelephone companies that may be affected by the actions taken in this Third Report and Order.   X4 i =151. Cellular, PCS, SMR and Other Mobile Service Providers. In an effort to further  |$refine our calculation of the number of radiotelephone companies that may be affected by the  |$/actions taken in this Second Report and Order, we consider the data that we collect annually in  |$connection with the TRS for the subcategories Wireless Telephony (which includes PCS, Cellular,  |$and SMR) and Other Mobile Service Providers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has  |$developed a definition of small entities specifically applicable to these broad subcategories, so  |$we will utilize the closest applicable definition under SBA rules, which is for radiotelephone"(@+^'^'ZZ<"  X4 |$communications companies. ZL {Oy'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Id. To the extent that the Commission has adopted definitions for small entities in connection with the auction of particular wireless licenses, we discuss those definitions below.  According to our most recent TRS data, 732 companies reported  |$that they are engaged in the provision of Wireless Telephony services and 23 companies reported  X4 |$that they are engaged in the provision of Other Mobile Services.q!L {Om'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Carrier Locator at Fig. 1.q Although it seems certain that  |$some of these carriers are not independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500  |$employees, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of Wireless  |$Telephony Providers and Other Mobile Service Providers, except as described below, that would  |$qualify as small business concerns under SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that there  |$are fewer than 732 small entity Wireless Telephony Providers and fewer than 23 small entity  |$Other Mobile Service Providers that might be affected by the actions taken in this Second Report and Order.  X 4 i B152.Broadband PCS Licensees. The broadband PCS spectrum is divided into six  |$frequency blocks designated A through F, and the Commission has held auctions for each block.  X 4 |$The Commission defined "small business" for Blocks C and F as an entity that has average gross  X 4 |$revenues of not more than $40 million in the three previous calendar years.l" |L yO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э 47 C.F.R.  24.720(b)(1).l These regulations  |$defining "small business" in the context of broadband PCS auctions have been approved by  X4 |$SBA.# L {OO'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act"Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93253, Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 5532, 558184 (1994). No small businesses within the SBAapproved definition bid successfully for licenses  |$in Blocks A and B. There have been 237 winning bidders that qualified as small entities in the  |$four auctions that have been held for licenses in Blocks C, D, E and F, all of which may be affected by the actions taken in this Second Report and Order.  X4 G6!\ 153. Cellular Licensees. According to the Bureau of the Census, only twelve  |$radiotelephone firms from a total of 1,178 such firms which operated during 1992 had 1,000 or  |$more employees. Therefore, even if all twelve of these firms were cellular telephone companies,  |$nearly all cellular carriers were small businesses under the SBA's definition. In addition, we note  |$Vthat there are 1,758 cellular licenses; however, a cellular licensee may own several licenses. In  |$addition, according to the most recent Carrier Locator data, 732 carriers reported that they were  |$Vengaged in the provision of either cellular service or PCS services, which are placed together in  |$the data. We do not have data specifying the number of these carriers that are not independently  |$+owned and operated or have more than 1,500 employees, and thus are unable at this time to  |$estimate with greater precision the number of cellular service carriers that would qualify as small  |$tbusiness concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than";Af #+^'^'ZZ_"  |$ 732 small cellular service carriers that may be affected by the actions taken in this Second Report and Order.  X4   (D)Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other llCompliance Requirements.  X4 G6!             154. No reporting and recordkeeping requirements are imposed on telecommunications  |$carriers, thus burdens on carriers, including small carriers, are not increased as a result of actions  |$taken herein. Telecommunications carriers, including small carriers, will have to upgrade their  |$/network facilities to provide to law enforcement the assistance capability requirements adopted  |$herein. Although compliance with the technical requirements will impose costs on carriers, the  X 4 |$record was not sufficient to analyze thoroughly the costs to carriers, including small carriers (see  X 4paragraph 30, supra).  X 4  X 4 G6!(E)Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic ..Impact on Small Entities and Significant  V 4Alternatives Considered.  X 4  X4 G6!  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:&H#+^'^'ZZB$"Ԍ X4ԙ  64.2200 Purpose.  |$IPursuant to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No.  |$103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.),  |$this subpart contains rules that require a wireline telecommunications carrier to implement certain  |$capabilities to ensure law enforcement access to authorized communications or call-identifying information.  XH'  64.2201 Scope.  |$The definitions included in this subpart shall be used solely for the purpose of implementing CALEA requirements.  X '  64.2202 Definitions.  X 4 |$Call Identifying Information. Call identifying information means dialing or signaling information  |$that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated  |$vor received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a  |$telecommunications carrier. Call identifying information is "reasonably available" to a carrier if  |$Eit is present at an intercept access point and can be made available without the carrier being unduly burdened with network modifications.  X4 |$/Collection Function. The location where lawfully authorized intercepted communications and callidentifying information is collected by a law enforcement agency (LEA).  X4 |$Content of subject-initiated conference calls. Capability that permits a LEA to monitor the  |$Vcontent of conversations by all parties connected via a conference call when the facilities under surveillance maintain a circuit connection to the call.  Xk4 |$M Dialed digit extraction. Capability that permits a LEA to receive on the call data channel a digits dialed by a subject after a call is connected to another carrier's service for processing and routing.  X?4  X(4 |$mIAP. Intercept access point is a point within a carrier's system where some of the  |$ccommunications or callidentifying information of an intercept subject's equipment, facilities, and services are accessed.  X 4 |$In-band and out-of-band signaling. Capability that permits a LEA to be informed when a  |$network message that provides call identifying information (e.g., ringing, busy, call waiting  X"4 |$signal, message light) is generated or sent by the IAP switch to a subject using the facilities under  |$ysurveillance. Excludes signals generated by customer premises equipment when no network signal is generated. "]%I#+^'^'ZZr#"Ԍ X4 |$MJSTD025. The interim standard developed by the Telecommunications Industry Association and  |$the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions for wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS  |$carriers. This standard defines services and features to support lawfully authorized electronic  |$<surveillance, and specifies interfaces necessary to deliver intercepted communications and callidentifying information to a LEA  X4  Xx4 |$LEA. Law enforcement agency; e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a local police  Xc4department.  X54 |$ZParty hold, join, drop on conference calls "" . Capability that permits a LEA to identify the parties to a conference call conversation at all times.  X 4 |$*Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information. Capability that permits a LEA to be informed  |$when a subject using the facilities under surveillance uses services that provide call identifying  X 4 |$+information, such as call forwarding, call waiting, call hold, and threeway calling. Excludes signals generated by customer premises equipment when no network signal is generated.  X4   X4 |$Timing information. Capability that permits a LEA to associate callidentifying information with  |$the content of a call. A callidentifying message must be sent from the carrier's IAP to the  |$LEA's Collection Function within eight seconds of receipt of that message by the IAP at least  |$95% of the time, and with the call event timestamped to an accuracy of at least 200 milliseconds.  X'  64.2203 Capabilities that must be provided by a wireline telecommunications carrier.  X4  |$(a) Except as provided under paragraph (b), as of June 30, 2000 a cellular telecommunications  X4 |$pcarrier shall provide to a LEA the assistance capability requirements of CALEA, see 47 U.S.C.  |$} 1002. A carrier may satisfy these requirements by complying with publicly available technical  |$requirements or standards adopted by an industry association or standardsetting organization, such as JSTD025.  |$(b) As of September 30, 2001 a cellular telecommunications carrier shall provide to a LEA  |$communications and callidentifying information transported by packetmode communications and the following capabilities:  X4(1) Content of subject-initiated conference calls;  X4(2) Party hold, join, drop on conference calls;  X 4(3) Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information;  X!4(4) In-band and out-of-band signaling;  X"4(5) Timing information;  X#4(6) Dialed digit extraction. "F&J#+^'^'ZZB$"  X4 HX  VII. APPENDIX B: MANUFACTURERS' REVENUE ESTIMATES 5$  yOy'ԍ Includes revenue estimates of Alcatel Network Systems; Lucent Technologies Inc.; Motorola, Inc.; Northern Telecom Inc.; and Siemens Information and Communication Networks. Sums in below table may not add to totals due to rounding. Also, the total punch list figures include $500,000 in estimated wireless revenues that cannot be attributed to any individual punch list capability. The figures in parentheses are revenue estimates for punch list capabilities as percentages of JSTD025 and total punch list, respectively.5 l Y ddx !ddxK%%% Y  L     Capability53  Estimated Total Revenues ($millions)  Estimated Wireless Revenues ($millions) Estimated Wireline Revenues ($millions)L      JSTD025 $916 $348  $569  Z  <  Subjectinitiated conference calls9 < $ 37 (4%, 9%)9 < $ 15 (4%, 6%)9 < $ 22 (4%, 12%)Z Z  <<  Party hold, join, drop messages < $ 64 (7%, 15%) < $ 42 (12%, 18%)  < $ 22 (4%, 12%)Z Z 9  <<  Subjectinitiated dialing and signaling< $ 35 (4%, 8%)< $ 27 (8%, 12%)< $ 8 (1%, 4%)Z Z   <<  Inband and outofband signalingG< $ 57 (6%, 14%)G< $ 30 (9%, 13%)G< $ 27 (5%, 15%)Z q  <_  Timing information_ $ 20 (2%, 5%)_ $ 13 (4%, 6%)_ $ 8 (1%, 4%)q Z G _<  Surveillance status messages< $ 37 (4%, 9%)< $ 24 (7%, 10%)< $ 13 (2%, 7%)Z Z  <c  Continuity check tones_ $ 3 (0.3%, 0.7%)l< $ 3 (0.9%, 1.3%)l<  X4$ 0I%x yO'ԍ Actual figure is about $200,000.I (0%, 0%)Z Z  c<  Feature status messages< $ 40 (4%, 10%)< $ 19 (5%, 8%)< $ 21 (4%, 12%)Z Z l <<  Dialed digit extraction7_ $121 (13%, 29%) < $ 60 (17%, 26%) < $ 60 (11%, 33%)Z    <  Total punch list $414 $234 $180   "K%,N(N(ZZ}"  X4 X    VIII. APPENDIX C: COMMENTING PARTIES k&n yOy'#X\  P6G;ɒP#э Excludes informal comments.k l  X4  Comments to Further NPRM  X4  X4  AirTouch Communications, Inc. American Mobile Satellite Corporation AT&T Corp. Ameritech Corporation Bell Atlantic Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc. BellSouth Corporation, Inc., BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., BellSouth Cellular Corp., BellSouth Personal Communications, Inc., and BellSouth Wireless Data, L,P. Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association Center for Democracy and Technology Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation Drug Enforcement Administration Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and American Civil Liberties Union GTE Service Corporation ICO Services Limited International Association of Police Chiefs Metricom, Inc. New York City Police Department New Jersey State Police Nextel Communications, Inc. Personal Communications Industry Association Pomona (CA) Police Department Rural Cellular Association SBC Communications, Inc. Southern Communications Services, Inc. Telecommunications Industry Association Texas Department of Public Safety United States Cellular Corporation United States Marshals Service United States Telephone Association US West, Inc.  X!4 ""LX&0*%%ZZ "Ԍ X4Reply Comments to Further NPRM AirTouch Communications, Inc. American Mobile Telecommunications Association, Inc. AT&T Corp. Ameritech Corporation Bell Atlantic Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc. BellSouth Corporation, Inc., BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., BellSouth Cellular Corp., BellSouth Personal Communications, Inc., and BellSouth Wireless Data, L,P. Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association Center for Democracy and Technology Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and American Civil Liberties Union MCI WorldCom Inc Motorola, Inc. Moultrie Independent Telephone Company New Jersey State Police New York City Police Department Nextel Communications, Inc. Pennsylvania State Police Personal Communications Industry Association Pomona (CA) Police Department PrimeCo Personal Communications, L.P. SBC Communications, Inc. Southern Communications Services, Inc. Sprint PCS Telecommunications Industry Association Texas Department of Public Safety United States Telephone Association US West, Inc. "h$M&0*%%ZZ""Ԍ X4Comments to May 1999 Public Notice  X4 AirTouch Communications, Inc. Bell Atlantic BellSouth Corporation Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation Omnipoint Communications Services LLC Personal Communications Industry Association PrimeCo Personal Communications, L.P. SBC Communications, Inc. Sprint PCS Texas Advisory Commission on State Emergency Communications and Texas Emergency Communication Districts United States Telephone Association US West, Inc.  Xb4Reply Comments to May 1999 Public Notice  XK4 AirTouch Communications, Inc. BellSouth Corporation Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation GTE Service Corporation MCI WorldCom, Inc. SBC Communications, Inc. United States Telephone Association