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Catherine G. O'Sullivan, Attorney, United  {OJ- States Department of Justice, Daniel M. Armstrong,  yO- Associate General Counsel, Federal Communications  {O- =Commission, and David Silberman, Counsel, entered appearances.  {O6-  ppGlenn B. Manishin argued the cause for  {O- intervenors WebCel Communications, Inc., et al., with  {O- " whom Matthew B. Pachman and John D.  {O-  Windhausen, Jr., were on the joint briefs. Frank W.  {O^-Krogh entered an appearance.  {M-  } ppCaressa D. Bennet, Michael R. Bennet,  {O-  Gregory W. Whiteaker and Stephen G. Kraskin were   on the joint briefs for intervenors Rural  {OJ-Telecommunications Group, et al.  {O-  ppBefore: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and  {O-Rogers, Circuit Judges.  {O8 -  ppOpinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge  yO!-Wald.  {O"-  ] ppWald, Circuit Judge: This case involves the  Local Multi-point Distribution Service ("LMDS"), a   new wireless mode of communication that supports   video, voice, and data services. The crux of the  ! dispute concerns the Federal Communication  / Commission's ("FCC") decision to bar incumbent  Llocal telephone companies (known as local exchange   carriers, or "LECs"), including rural local telephone  .companies, from holding LMDS licenses in the sameH(0*0*0**$)**0*0*H  k geographic areas in which they provide telephone  service, for three years from the date of the upcoming  yO-  LMDS auction.ee The FCC's challenged eligibility restriction applies to both local exchange carriers and cable operators. One of the petitioners before us, U S West, Inc., provides both local exchange service and is the nation's third largest cable operator. However, U S West substantially replicates the arguments that the LEC petitioners advance, and relies on no critical distinctions between the situation of LEC and cable service providers.phone market. The LEC and rural LEC petitioners, consisting of various trade associations as well as individual LEC companies, challenge the FCC's eligibility restriction on multiple grounds. In addition, a number of waiver applicants challenge the FCC's previous decision, promulgated while the FCC was devising the current regime, that denied them waivers of the rules that formerly governed use of the spectrum now designated for LMDS. We reject the claims put forth by the LECs, the rural LECs, and the waiver applicants, and accordingly deny their petitions for review. The FCC explains that its Order is   designed to prevent LECs from acquiring LMDS  Llicenses in order to preempt competition in the local   telephone market. The LEC and rural LEC  ypetitioners, consisting of various trade associations as   well as individual LEC companies, challenge the   FCC's eligibility restriction on multiple grounds. In  [addition, a number of waiver applicants challenge the  FCC's previous decision, promulgated while the FCC  \ was devising the current regime, that denied them  waivers of the rules that formerly governed use of the   spectrum now designated for LMDS. We reject the  yclaims put forth by the LECs, the rural LECs, and the  waiver applicants, and accordingly deny their petitions for review.  yO-t I. Background ă  {O-A. The Regulatory Regime Before 1996     In 1970, the FCC adopted a cross-ownership  [rule prohibiting telephone companies from providing  k video programming directly to subscribers in their  > telephone service areas, because of concerns that  telephone companies might monopolize the emerging  {O- [cable industry. See General Tel. Co. v. United States,  > 449 F.2d 846, 85152 (5th Cir. 1971). Congress  {O- eventually codified that rule in 1984. See 47 U.S.C.  {Ov-   533(b), repealed by Telecommunications Act of  1996, Pub. L. No. 104104,  302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56,   124 ("1996 Act"). Over the next two decades,  however, it became apparent that this crossownership  0 prohibition granted cable providers too much   protection. By 1992, "most cable television   subscribers ha[d] no opportunity to select between  jcompeting cable systems," resulting in "undue market  power for the cable operator as compared to that of  consumers and video programmers." Cable Television  =Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102385,  2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460.  {O!-B. The Telecommunications Act of 1996   Congress enacted the Telecommunications   Act of 1996 "to provide for a pro-competitive,   deregulatory national policy framework designed to   accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of   advanced telecommunications and information  technologies and services to all Americans by opening  yO'- all telecommunications markets to competition." H.R."'0*0*0*)"  yO- =Conf. Rep. No. 104458, at 1 (1996) ("Conference  yO-Report"). xP-ԍ The House Report similarly stated that: XThe original rationale for adopting the prohibition of telephone company entry into video services has been satisfied, and given the changes in technology and the evolution of the cable industry, the prohibition is no longer valid. In fact, three governmental bodies, the [FCC], the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division have expressly found that the statute impedes competition in the cable industry.   xP-H.R. Rep. No. 104204, pt. 1, at 5253 (1995).   ppThe 1996 Act eliminates the ban on  {O - / telephone-cable cross-ownership, see 1996 Act    302(b)(1), and authorizes a variety of ways for   telephone companies to deliver video services,   including: (1) via Title III radio-based systems (the  Title that includes LMDS); (2) as a common carrier   under Title II; (3) via a Title IV cable system; and  {O-  (4) through an Open Video System ("OVS"), see id.  651.    ppThe only specific reference in the legislative   history of the 1996 Act to LMDS involves section  > 301(b)(3)(C) of the Act. This section amends 47  {O - ] U.S.C.  543(l)(1), which provides alternative  =definitions of "effective competition," by expanding   the definition of that term to include: "a local  .exchange carrier or its affiliate (or any multichannel  video programming distributor using the facilities of  ] such carrier or its affiliate) [that] offers video  {O6-  programming services directly to subscribers by any  {O- means (other than direct-to-home satellite services) in   the franchise area of an unaffiliated cable operator  which is providing cable service in that franchise area,  ybut only if the video programming services so offered  in that area are comparable to the video programming  yservices provided by the unaffiliated cable operator in   that area." 1996 Act  301(b)(3)(C) (emphasis  \ added). The Conference Report on the 1996 Act   states that " '[b]y any means,' includes any medium  (other than direct-to-home satellite service) for the   delivery of comparable programming, including  l MMDS [Multichannel Multipoint Distribution  k Service], LMDS, an open video system, or a cable system." Conference Report, at 170.   0 ppThe 1996 Act seeks additionally to stimulate  jcompetition in the local telephone market, requiring,  for instance, incumbent local telephone companies to  interconnect with the facilities and equipment of their  {O - Lcompetitors. See 1996 Act  251(c)(2); see also id.  {O!- [ 251(c)(3) (duty to provide "unbundled access"); id.  [ 251(c)(4)(A) (duty "to offer for resale at wholesale  jrates any telecommunications service that the carrier   provides at retail to subscribers who are not  ytelecommunications carriers"). Along the same lines,  ysection 271 of the 1996 Act provides that a Regional  > Bell Operating Company ("RBOC") may provide   long-distance service, but only after that RBOC has  Ldemonstrated that it has met all the requirements for  opening its local telephone market to competition andH(0*0*0**$(VV.,0*0*H  the FCC has found that "the requested authorization  is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and  {O-necessity." Id.  271(d)(3)(C).  {O"-C.XThe FCC's Rulemaking on LMDS   On January 8, 1993, three years before the   passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the  FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that   proposed redesignating the 28 GHz spectrum for  {O- LLMDS. See In the Matters of Rulemaking to Amend   Part 1 and 21 of the Commission's Rules to   Redesignate the 27.529.5 GHz Frequency Band, 8  [F.C.C.R. 557 (released Jan. 8, 1993) ("first NPRM").  jThis first NPRM stated that the FCC did not propose  z to adopt cross-ownership restrictions on acquiring LMDS licenses, explaining that:   XThe evidence before us suggests that the   most likely first use of the 28 GHz band will   be video entertainment programming....   ^ There is no assurance this will be the case,   ? or that even if it is the predominant use, that   $ it will be the most viable use in all   geographic areas. In view of this   | uncertainty, we are inclined not to exclude   any existing video distribution or   telecommunications firm from constructing   1 and operating 28 GHz facilities. We seek    comment on our tentative policy conclusion   that cross-ownership restrictions should not be imposed. X  {O-  Id.  33. The FCC then denied the 971 outstanding  ] requests for waivers of the rules that formerly  ] governed use of the spectrum now tentatively  {O(-  designated for LMDS. See id.  5153. (These   rejected waiver applicants had sought to provide  [point-to-multipoint service on the 28 GHz band, at a  time when only point-to-point service was authorized.  {OJ- See id.) Many of the applicants, including all of the   petitioners in this case who challenge the waiver  ydenials, petitioned the FCC for reconsideration of the  {O!- \ first NPRM. See In the Matter of Rulemaking to   Amend Parts 1, 2, 21, and 25 of the Commission's   Rules to Redesignate the 27.529.5 GHz Frequency   Band, at  385 n.595 (released Mar. 13, 1997)   ("Or-der"). In addition, these waiver applicants  \ concurrently sought review of the FCC's denial of   their waiver requests in this court. This court held   the latter petitions in abeyance pending the completion of the FCC's reconsideration process. "(0*0*0**"Ԍ  ppThe FCC's Third Notice of Proposed  Rulemaking, released in July 1995, solicited "further  ycomment on competitive issues" associated with LEC   acquisition of in-region LMDS licenses. In the  Matter of Rulemaking to Amend Parts 1, 2, 21, and   25 of the Commission's Rules to Redesignate the  =27.529.5 GHz Frequency Band, 11 F.C.C.R. 53, at   l 101 (released July 28, 1995) ("third NPRM").   Specifically, the third NPRM asked a number of questions, including:   XppTo what extent can this [28 GHz band]   m spectrum be used to provide service that is   1 competitive with local telephone service,   particularly the provision of access services   2 to residential and business subscribers?   Would allowing a LEC to acquire LMDS    licenses in its service area eliminate a   _ potential and important new source of   competition in the local exchange market?   1 Given the LECs' current monopoly status   with regard to the provision of local   O exchange service, would LECs be likely to   A acquire LMDS spectrum as a means of   forestalling competitive entry into the local   B exchange market, for example, by   warehousing spectrum or diverting it to less optimal uses?(#p Xpp(#p  {M-Id.   ] ppCongress passed the Telecommunications Act  [of 1996 several months after the release of this third   NPRM. The FCC accordingly sought "specific  0 comment on how our policies towards LMDS  { eligibility would best promote the competitive   objectives of the 1996 Act." In the Matter of   Rulemaking to Amend Parts 1, 2, 21, and 25 of the  M Commission's Rules to Redesignate the 27.529.5   GHz Frequency Band, 11 F.C.C.R. 19005, at  105   (released July 22, 1996) ("fourth NPRM"). The Commission explained its current reasoning this way:   XppIn considering eligibility for LECs and cable    operators within their geographic service   _ areas one must weigh the potential for   ! competition presented by open entry against    the possibility that this spectrum may be    used to forestall rather than promote   competition. Open eligibility may delay or   eliminate an opportunity to increase the   ! number of competitors in the local exchange   3 telephony and multichannel video   ! programming markets. On the other hand, aHh)0*0*0*z+$v)kX0*0*H    bar on eligibility could prevent LECs and   cable operators from using LMDS to   ! compete against each other more effectively   ^ and rapidly or to provide new services not now offered by any firm. X  {O-Id.  125.   The FCC released its Final Order on March  > 13, 1997. This Order placed a three-year ban on   LECs acquiring LMDS licenses within their service  {O-  areas, see Order WW 15799, and denied  =reconsideration of the Commission's earlier denial of  {O, - k the waiver applications, see id. WW 383406. In   explaining its decision to impose this three-year eligibility restriction, the Commission stated that,    B X` ` Based on the record here, standard   economic theory, our experience, an    analogous situation in the cable TV industry,   n and our assessment of competitive and   regulatory developments in the local   telephony and MVPD [Multichannel Video   Programming Distributor] markets, we find   on balance that a policy favoring restricted   | eligibility for a limited time would result in   o the greatest likelihood of increased   competition in the local telephony and    MVPD markets. By restricting in-region   LEC and cable companies, we ensure the   @ entry of a new LMDS operator that could    provide competition in the LEC market, the   MVPD market, or both. An incumbent, on   the other hand, would have a strong   0 incentive to obtain an LMDS license in order    to prevent a new entrant from obtaining the   license and competing directly in the    incumbent's current market. In so doing,   such an incumbent will have forestalled   ! market entry by an entity that could provide    both telephony and MVPD and will have    deprived consumers of an opportunity to   choose between a possible two providers in   @ each market and the lower prices for such   1 services that consumer choice necessarily   implies. Furthermore, either incumbent   O would have no incentive to use the LMDS   spectrum to provide the service in which it   ^ has market power because this could result   in lower prices for the service, and lower   o profits. By temporarily restricting   O incumbents' eligibility to acquire in-region   O LMDS licenses, this policy maximizes the"(0*0*0**"   likelihood of increasing competition in both the LEC and MVPD markets.(#p  {OX-Id.  162.   | ppAlthough rural LECs had asked the FCC to  > exempt them from this eligibility restriction, the   Commission decided against granting such an  yexception. The rural LECs argued that rural residents  would likely be deprived of access to LMDS services   unless the incumbent rural LECs were permitted to  =acquire LMDS licenses in their existing service areas.  {Ob - \ See id.  179. The FCC disagreed. It noted, inter  {O, -  alia, that even incumbent rural LECs would only   provide LMDS service where it was profitable to do   so, and that outsiders should be equally willing to  {O -  acquire and operate licenses in such situations. See  {OP - \ id.  180. The FCC further found it unlikely that   many rural LECs would be subject to the eligibility  {O-  bar, see id., because the restriction only applies to a  LEC if ten percent or more of the population in the  z basic trading area ("BTA") that the desired LMDS  > license covers is also within the LEC's authorized  {O-  telephone service area, see id.  188, and BTAs  l typically encompass geographic areas that are   significantly larger than a rural LEC's service area,  {O^-see id.  180.  yO-S  II. Analysis ă  {O-A.XppThe LEC Petitioners(#p    ppThe LEC petitioners challenge the FCC's  .imposition of the eligibility restriction under section   706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act  ("APA"), which requires this court to "hold unlawful  Land set aside" the FCC's Order to the extent that it is   "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or  z otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C.  706(2)(A).  {O -   Xpp1.XWhether the FCC has Changed its  {M -Policy Without Explanation(# XppX(#   ppThe LECs argue, first, that the FCC's Order  constitutes arbitrary decision making in violation of  ] APA  706(2)(A) because it is an unexplained   departure from prior rules that authorize and  yencourage LECs to offer new wireless communication   services. Along these lines, the LECs note that in   1981 the FCC set aside one cellular service license  per market exclusively for the use of the incumbent  {O(- k LEC. See Final Brief of Petitioners United StatesH(0*0*0**$n)k0*0*H  {O- [Telephone Association, et al., at 1415, citing In the  Matter of an Inquiry into the Use of Bands 825845  yMHz and 870890 MHz for Cellular Communications  [Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 483, 488, 49192 (1981).   Similarly, although the FCC was initially concerned   that LECs might use the Personal Communications   Service ("PCS"), another wireless communications   technology, for anticompetitive ends, it decided in   1993 to include LECs in the bidding on the ground   that LEC participation would promote the rapid   development of the technology and yield a broader  {O-  range of services at a lower price. See id. at 15,  {Od - | citing In the Matter of Amendment of the  { Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal  k Communications Services, 7 F.C.C.R. 5676, 5705  (1992); 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 775152 (1993). The LECs  contend that the FCC's reasons for permitting LECs  .to acquire and use these other wireless services apply   as strongly in the LMDS context and that the FCC  Lhas failed to differentiate its prior decisions from the instant eligibility restriction.    Although the portion of the FCC's Order  [devoted to this issue is relatively brief, we find that it  adequately explains why the FCC reached a different  [conclusion about LEC eligibility in the case of LMDS  M than in the earlier technologies. In balancing the  | advantages and disadvantages"in terms of  / competition and technological development"of  ygranting incumbent LECs unrestricted access to a new   wireless technology, the FCC's Order indicates that  ] there are at least three important factors that differentiate the LMDS situation.    The first factor is the number of licenses  k available per area. In the earlier cases, there were   several licenses available in each market. With  LMDS, in contrast, the Commission found "that the  =temptation for preemptive acquisition is particularly   compelling ... because of the unusually large size of   the LMDS spectrum allocation. A single, large  spectrum block of relatively unused spectrum will be auctioned in each service area." Order  173.   @ The second factor, which is related to the   first, is the unprecedented capacity of an 1,150  megahertz LMDS license, which is the single biggest   license that the FCC has ever issued. As the FCC's Order explains:   _ XLMDS licenses may be used to provide   " service in the local MVPD [Multichannel    Video Programming Distributor] market, the"(0*0*0**"    local telephone market, a broadband data   B market, or a combination of these   " possibilities.... LMDS offers a significant   1 amount of capacity, larger than currently   available wireless services. For instance,   | according to TI [Texas Instruments, Inc.],   the LMDS system they have manufactured   for use in other countries can be used to   serve 16,000 telephone subscribers, in each   LMDS cell with a three-mile radius,   concurrently with about 200 video-on-demand channels....(#p pp....   F$hppXpp... [T]he capacity of an LMDS license is unprecedented.(#p Xpp(#p  {O-  Id.  170, 173. In other words, a single LMDS  Llicense can simultaneously support 16,000 telephone   calls and 200 video channels on demand, a capacity  { that makes the FCC extremely wary about the   possibility that incumbent LECs would devote their  k in-region LMDS licenses only to communications  Lservices that do not compete with the LECs' existing telephone services.   0 ppThe third differential factor is that the FCC's   earlier decisions, none of which purported to  { announce any general policy against eligibility   restrictions on LECs, were made at a time when the  M prospects for generating competition in the local  m telephone market, and for developing new   technologies without maximum participation from  incumbent LECs, were significantly less. The FCC's Order observes:   XppWe recognize that as a result of ongoing    technological changes and passage of the   { 1996 Act, there are other sources of potential    and actual competition to the incumbent   LEC and cable firms in the local telephony   # and local MVPD [Multichannel Video   Programming Distributor] markets. For   A multichannel video distribution, likely   m sources of competition include open video   2 systems (OVS), MMDS [Multichannel   2 Multipoint Distribution Service], DBS   } [Direct Broadcast Satellite], FSS [Fixed   m Satellite Service] program distributors, and   satellite master antenna television systems.   For fixed voice and broadband data services,   the competitive alternatives include newH(0*0*0**$n)AA0*0*H    facilities-based, wireline entrants, such as   interexchange carriers (IXCs), competitive    access providers (CAPs), and cable firms,   ? non-facilities-based entrants utilizing the new   local competition provisions of the 1996 Act,   and a variety of wireless possibilities,   1 including PCS [Personal Communications   @ Service] and cellular service providers. In   many of the foregoing cases, LECs may   @ enter MVPD markets and cable television firms may enter local ex-change markets.  {O` -Id.  163.   In light of the discussion in the FCC's Order   that reviews these three differential factors, we find  [that the Commission has adequately explained why it   came to a different conclusion about LEC eligibility   in the case of LMDS than it reached in earlier cases involving different technologies.  {Oj-   RX2.X` ` The LECs' Claim That the FCC    Order is Not Supported by    Substantial Record Evidence or  {M-Market Analysis` XX` ` `  {OT-    Xa.X` ` The LECs' Challenge to the FCC's    Conclusion That LECs Might     Acquire Exclusive LMDS Licenses    in Order to Preempt Competition in  {Mv-Their Local Telephone Markets` XX` ` `   The LECs' second argument challenges the  \ three propositions that they contend underlie the  FCC's "preemptive acquisition" rationale: (1) that the   LECs exercise monopoly power; (2) that a LEC  could prevent in-region competition from eroding this  monopoly power by acquiring the LMDS license for   its service area; and (3) that an unaffiliated entity  would likely use a LMDS license to compete both in  ythe local telephony market and in the local subscriber video market.   { The LECs contend that the first premise, that   of monopoly power, is factually inaccurate. Here,  z they cite to the existing regulatory scheme that is  jdesigned to counteract the LECs' monopoly position.  They further observe that in one recent proceeding the   FCC itself found that "applicable statutory and  .regulatory safeguards [were] likely to be sufficient to  prevent the BOCs [Bell Operating Companies] from  .improperly allocating costs between their monopoly  ylocal exchange and exchange access services and their"(0*0*0**"  jaffiliates' competitive interLATA services to such an  extent that their interLATA affiliates would be able to  M eliminate other interLATA service providers and   subsequently earn supra-competitive profits by  N charging monopoly prices." In the Matter of   Regulatory Treatment of LEC Provision of   Interexchange Services Originating in the LEC's  \ Local Exchange Area, at  104 (released Apr. 18,  L1997). All that statement demonstrates, however, is  > the FCC's belief that, in the particular context of  / interLATA affiliate services, regulatory controls  =would be able to offset the risk of LECs abusing their  monopoly. The LECs have not shown that the FCC's   conclusion in the present case, that the LECs would   likely resist competing against themselves in the  k telephony market, is unreasonable or that it lacks   substantial evidence in the record. As the FCC's   Order elaborates, the Commission's judgment about  the precise situation at issue in this case rests not only   on economic theory and analysis, but on predictive  comments from the Department of Justice, the Federal   Trade Commission, and several state attorneys   general, three outside economists' conclusions that  jLECs have substantial market power and are likely to  / behave preemptorily, as well as the agency's own  {O- [expertise. See Order  15778. Moreover, the FCC   has found in recent proceedings other than the one   petitioners cite that LECs do currently exercise  monopoly power over the provision of local telephone   service and that eroding that power is in the public  {Or-interest. See id.  163 & n.251.   O ppThe LECs challenge the FCC's second and   third premises for the eligibility restriction"that a   LEC could prevent competition from eroding its  monopoly power by acquiring the LMDS license for   its service area and that an unaffiliated entity would  \ likely use a LMDS license to compete both in the  1 local telephony and local subscriber video  markets"as unduly speculative. With regard to the  second premise, the LECs contest the relevance of an  A analogy that the FCC's Order draws to   anticompetitive behavior that occurred in the cable   industry in the early 1990s when satellite broadcast  service providers emerged as potential competitors to  {O,#-  local cable companies. See id.  16669. In that   situation, incumbent, monopolist local cable  companies "were alleged to have stifled competition   from their non-cable competitors, such as DBS   [Direct Broadcast Satellite] operators, and to have   attempted to suppress the development of DBS   technology as a competitor to cable television  {O(-  service." Id.  166. The LECs point to what theyH(0*0*0**$n)oo0*0*H   regard as controlling distinctions between that case  and the present one, noting particularly that the earlier  case involved different market conditions and that the  { anticompetitive concern in the cable situation  stemmed from the vertical integration between certain   cable operators and programmers, whereas vertical  integration is not a factor in the present case. With  regard to the third premise, the LECs observe that the   FCC has not established that LMDS will be used by  ynon-LEC licensees to compete with the existing local  ytelephone network, pointing to portions of the Order  jthat instead state that "[i]t is expected that many [of  the telecommunications services that may be provided  {O( -  in LMDS] may be offered in the local telephony  ymarket-place as an alternative to the wired telephone  {O -  network." Id.  210 (emphasis added); see also id.    176 ("[W]e do not know at this time whether the   LMDS spectrum is best used for local telephone,  .video, or something else."). The LECs also point to  other means by which competitors can enter the local   exchange market, although the FCC is substantially   less confident that these other technologies will   actually create significant competition in the local  {O-telephone market. See id.  16465.   In considering these claims, we must keep in   mind our standard of review. As both the Supreme  Court and this circuit have made clear, our review of   the FCC's exercise of its predictive judgment is  {O- particularly deferential. In FCC v. National Citizens  {Ox- yCommittee for Broadcasting ("NCCB"), 436 U.S. 775   (1978), another case in which FCC rulemaking that  M established eligibility criteria for communications   licenses was challenged as arbitrary, the Supreme   Court held that the FCC was not required to  z "conclusively establish" the factual validity of the  {O*- jagency's premises. Id. at 796. As the Supreme Court explained,   { Xto the extent that factual determinations were   1 involved in the Commission's decision ...,   n they were primarily of a judgmental or   | predictive nature.... In such circumstances   l complete factual support in the record for the   Commission's judgment or prediction is not   n possible or required; "a forecast of the   direction in which future public interest lies   necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency." X  {O'- Id. at 81314 (quoting FPC v. Transcontinental Gas  {O'- yPipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961)). This circuit"'0*0*0*)"   has similarly noted that our arbitrary or capricious review of the FCC   Xppis a narrow one; we must affirm the   decision if we find that it is not contrary to   # law, that it is supported by substantial   evidence and based upon a consideration of   ? the relevant factors, and if we determine that   the conclusions reached have a rational  {O-  n connection to the facts found. FCC v.  {M-  National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,  {O-  436 U.S. 775, 803, 81415 (1978); NAACP  {Od -   v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 99798 (D.C. Cir.   1982). When, as in this case, "an agency is   obliged to make policy judgments where no   factual certainties exist or where facts alone   do not provide the answer," our role is more   limited; we require only that the agency "so   ? state and go on to identify the considerations  {O-  n it found persuasive." National Ass'n of  {O-  Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d  {Or-  " 1095, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("NARUC")  {O<-  (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).(#p Xpp(#p  {O-AT&T v. FCC, 832 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1987).    ppThese precedents indicate why the LECs'  arguments cannot prevail. Where, as here, the FCC   must make judgments about future market behavior  with respect to a brand-new technology, certainty is   impossible. The Commission must rely (within the  limits of reason and rationality) on its expertise and  M its evaluation of the existing evidence in deciding   whether the risk of harm is large and/or important   enough to merit regulatory action. Our review for  arbitrariness does not demand total assurance on the  @ part of the agency; such a standard would   substantially hobble agencies working in new and   rapidly developing fields. In this light, it is not  M unreasonable for the FCC to have drawn guidance  l from another recent situation in which a local  ] communications monopoly actively set about  suppressing the development of a new technology that  ycould foster competition in its market. Similarly, the  z FCC's prediction that an unaffiliated entity will be  M more likely than a LEC to use a LMDS license to  { compete both in the local telephony and local  \ subscriber video markets is plausibly rooted in the   unprecedented size and capacity of a LMDS license   and in the unprecedented opportunity to foster   competition in the local telephone market that the current window of opportunity may represent.H(0*0*0**$(34 0*0*HԌ {O-   ` ԙb.` ` The LECs' Argument That the FCC    Order Cannot be Justified as a Way    to Afford Opportunities to Small  {MZ-Providers` XX` ` `   1 In paragraph 159 of their Order, the FCC  Commissioners note that: "Our primary goal in the   present proceeding is to encourage efficient   competition in the telephony and MVPD markets.  We have also expressed a corresponding concern with  jproviding opportunities for smaller operators. These   objectives are drawn from the direction given us by  Congress." The rest of the Order continues to place  the smaller operator rationale in a distinctly secondary   status, and the FCC does not highlight it before this court.    In challenging this latter rationale, the LECs  {O-  rely on the reasoning in Cincinnati Bell Telephone  {O- / Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 1995), a Sixth   Circuit case holding that eligibility rules that  z restricted cellular communications providers from   participating in Personal Communications Service  .("PCS") auctions were arbitrary because inadequately  {O- explained, see id. at 756. The Cincinnati Bell opinion  noted that the eligibility restriction at issue there, like   the one in the instant case, permitted incumbent   monopolists to acquire new licenses as long as they   did so outside of their current geographic service  0 areas, and reasoned that the restriction would  therefore do little if anything to stem the accretion of  / communications giants, while disproportionately  [hurting smaller providers who would most likely only   be financially able to offer new communications  {O-services within their existing service area. Id. at 764.   O Considering the FCC's downplaying of the  jsmaller-provider-based rationale before this court and  Lin its Order, we need not tarry on the argument long.   We note, however, that the Sixth Circuit's case   involved a different technology and a different  / market. The Sixth Circuit had before it only the  question of cellular communications provider access  {O!- ! to PCS. Moreover, the Cincinnati Bell court  0 addressed this question in 1995, a year before  Congress passed the 1996 Telecommunications Act,  {O#-  which was intended, inter alia, to make the  development of competition in the telephony market  {O%-  a more realistic possibility. As indicated above (see  k II.A.1.), the FCC's Order adequately differentiates  { LMDS from earlier technologies like PCS, and   present market conditions from those prevailing  jbefore the passage of the 1996 Act. In this light, the"(0*0*0**"  =Sixth Circuit's opinion gives us no reason to question   the reasonableness of the FCC Commissioners'  judgment that restricting the power of incumbent local  telephone company monopolists to acquire the LMDS   license for their existing service area will promote  competition. Certainly, it is reasonable to believe that   many smaller providers who do not currently hold   LEC monopolies will benefit if the FCC's Order   prevents the incumbent LECs monopolists from  k dominating the LMDS market to the exclusion of smaller potential competitors.   ppWe accordingly find that the LECs' challenges to the FCC's Order all fail.  {O -B.XppThe Rural LEC Petitioners(#p   O ppThe FCC's eligibility restriction applies to   rural LECs as well. The rural telephone companies  argue that including them in this restriction violates  47 U.S.C.  309(j)(3)-(4). Section 309(j)(3)(A)-(B)   states that, in designing systems of competitive   bidding, the FCC "shall seek to promote" a series of  {O- objectives, including, inter alia, "(A) the development  =and rapid deployment of new technologies, products,  {O-  and services for the benefit of the public, including  {OV- those residing in rural areas, without administrative   or judicial delays" (emphasis added) and "(B)  promoting economic opportunity and competition and   ensuring that new and innovative technologies are  yreadily accessible to the American people by avoiding  m excessive concentration of licenses and by   disseminating licenses among a wide variety of  {O- japplicants, including small businesses, rural telephone  {O-  companies, and businesses owned by members of   minority groups and women" (emphasis added).   Section 309(j)(4)(D) provides that "[i]n prescribing  regulations pursuant to paragraph (3), the Commission  {O- ] shall ... (D) ensure that small businesses, rural  {O-  telephone companies, and businesses owned by  {OP- members of minority groups and women are given the  l opportunity to participate in the provision of   spectrum-based services, and, for such purposes,  | consider the use of tax certificates, bidding  Lpreferences, and other procedures" (emphasis added).  We agree that these statutory provisions evidence a  particular congressional concern for rural consumers   and rural LECs, but find that the FCC's decision to  ! include rural LECs in its three-year eligibility   restriction on acquisition of an in-region LMDS  ^ license ultimately does not violate section 309(j)(3)-(4). H(0*0*0**$x)``#60*0*HԌ {O-   $ X1.X` ` The Rural LECs' Argument Under  {O-Chevron's First Step` XX` ` `   m The rural LECs argue, first, that the FCC's   inclusion of rural telephone companies in its  eligibility restriction contravenes the plain language of  section 309(j)(3)-(4) and therefore fails under the first  {O|- prong of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources  {OF-  Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This  {O- prong of the two-part Chevron test asks only "whether  Congress has directly spoken to the precise question  yat issue. If the intent of Congress is clear," of course,  "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to  {O2 - ythe unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id.   at 84243. According to the rural LECs, section  j309(j)(4)(D) requires the FCC to "ensure" through its  ! auction rules that LMDS licenses are actually   disseminated to rural telephone companies, and   section 309(j)(3)(B) mandates that rural telephone  companies be "given the opportunity to participate in  the provision of" LMDS. Joint Brief of Intervenors   Rural Telecommunications Group and Independent  Alliance in Support of Petitioner National Telephone  Cooperative Association, at 810 ("Rural LEC Brief").   We cannot see how the plain language or clear  0 meaning of section 309(j) bars the FCC from   imposing the eligibility restriction on rural LECs at issue here.  {O-Xa.X` ` Section 309(j)(3)` XX` ` `   1 First, keep in mind that section 309(j)(3)   grants the FCC the authority to establish eligibility  {O-  restrictions on communications licenses. See 47  .U.S.C.  309(j)(3) ("In identifying classes of licenses  {Oh-  and permits to be issued by competitive bidding, in  [specifying eligibility and other characteristics of such  {O- " licenses and permits, and in designing the   methodologies for use under this subsection, the   Commission shall include safeguards to protect the   public interest in the use of the spectrum and shall  seek to promote the purposes specified in section 151  0 of this title and the following objectives ....")  {O!-  (emphasis added); see also Cincinnati Bell, 69 F.3d  > at 762 ("A plain reading of Section 309(j)(3)(B),  ! which directs the FCC to promote 'economic  opportunity and competition ... by avoiding excessive   concentration of licenses and disseminating licenses   among a wide variety of applicants,' indicates that   Congress clearly conferred authority on the FCC to   place restrictions and limitations on the bidding process."). "( 0*0*0**"Ԍ  ppSecond, section 309(j)(3)(B) does not state   that rural telephone companies must be "given the  opportunity to participate in the provision of" LMDS.   Instead, it requires the FCC to "seek to promote" a  number of objectives, including "promoting economic   opportunity and competition and ensuring that new  and innovative technologies are readily accessible to   the American people by avoiding excessive   concentration of licenses and by disseminating  jlicenses among a wide variety of applicants, including   small businesses, rural telephone companies, and  Lbusinesses owned by members of minority groups and  k women." This provision is subject to a variety of  / reasonable interpretations. Most importantly, it  l articulates a number of potentially conflicting   objectives, Including both the promotion of  competition and the dissemination of licenses to rural  Ltelephone companies. "[O]nly the Commission may   decide how much precedence particular policies will  > be granted when several are implicated in a single  {O- [decision." Mobiletel, Inc. v. FCC, 107 F.3d 888, 895   (D.C. Cir. 1997). In this case, the Commission  determined that allowing incumbent LECs, including  ! incumbent rural LECs, to participate without   restriction in bidding for inregion LMDS licenses  would ultimately inhibit the development and use of  \ the LMDS spectrum, whereas the FCC's eligibility  restriction on rural LECs would "promote economic  =opportunity and competition, and ... avoid excessive   concentration of licenses by disseminating licenses   among a wide variety of applicants." Order  181.   In addition, while section 309(j)(3)(B) calls for the  k wide dissemination of licenses, it lists a number of  / indications of diversity, rather than confining its   concern to rural telephone companies. Moreover,   section 309(j)(3)(B) refers to "new and innovative  \ technologies" as a group, indicating that diversity   within this group might be enough to meet the   statute's requirements even if the licensees for one  technology within this group are less diverse. Finally,  k as we discuss below, the FCC concluded that many  rural LECs would actually to able to acquire inregion LMDS licenses under its Order.  {Ob"-ppb.Section 309(j)(4)(# XppX(#   ppSection 309(j)(4)(D) does not state that the   FCC must "ensure" through its auction rules that  ? licenses for LMDS, which is a spectrum-based   service, are actually disseminated to rural telephone  companies. Instead, it insists only that rural telephone  {O'- companies have "the opportunity to participate in the  provision of spectrum-based services" and accordinglyH( 0*0*0**$~)  Qb0*0*H   instructs the FCC to "consider the use of tax  m certificates, bidding preferences, and other   procedures" (emphasis added). The meaning of  "opportunity" in the context of section 309(j)(4)(D) is  necessarily ambiguous. At the extremes, the term is   capable of supporting a range of interpretations  =extending from the licensee guarantees that the rural  / LECs advocate to a regime in which there are no   guarantees (and perhaps little realistic chance) that  z rural LECs will actually end the day with access to  [LMDS. Under the three-year eligibility restriction in  jissue, a rural LEC does have an "opportunity" to: (a)   acquire LMDS licenses immediately in all areas but  its existing service area; (b) acquire a LMDS license   in its existing service area once three years have   passed; (c) bid immediately for a smaller LMDS  license (150 megahertz instead of 1,150 megahertz) in  its service area; (d) acquire the LMDS license for its   service area as long as the LEC does not provide   telephone service to more than ten percent of the  > population within the basic trading area ("BTA")  l assigned to each LMDS license; (e) acquire an  in-region LMDS license immediately on the condition  l that the LEC divest its overlapping telephone   interests; and (f) seek a waiver of the eligibility   restriction, subsequent to the initial award of LMDS  {OP-  licenses, upon a showing of good cause. See Order   WW 17880, 188, 160. Moreover, section  \ 309(j)(4)(D), like section 309(j)(3)(B), speaks of  "spectrum-based services" as a unit, rather than stating   that rural telephone companies must have access to  {O:- N each spectrum-based service. Finally, section   309(j)(4)(D) does not mandate that the rural LECs   receive preferential treatment in the form of "tax  m certificates, bidding preferences, and other   procedures"; it just instructs the FCC to "consider" that possibility.   In short, we do not believe that the present  z eligibility restriction violates the text or intent of  =section 309(j)(3)(B) or section 309(j)(4)(D) so as to  {O -violate the first prong of the Chevron test.    One of the rural LEC petitioners, the  N National Telephone Cooperative Association  ] ("NTCA"), also makes a brief argument under  {O#-  Chevron's second prong. NTCA contends that the  =FCC abused its discretion by ignoring section 309(j)'s   concern for rural residents and rural LECs, and the  1996 Telecommunications Act's overarching desire to  jfoster competition. This argument is baseless for the  z reasons elaborated elsewhere in this opinion. The  ! FCC's imposition of the three-year eligibility"( 0*0*0**"  z restriction on rural LECs is fully consistent with a  {O-  reasonable interpretation of section 309(j), (see  yII.B.1.), and the Commission has clearly explained its  basis for believing that this eligibility restriction will  {O"-foster competition, see, e.g., Order  162.  {O-  Xpp2.XThe Rural LECs' Argument That   Including Them in the Eligibility   Restriction Was Arbitrary and  {M-Capricious (# XppX(#   @ ppThe rural telephone companies also argue  that the FCC has failed to supply a reasoned basis in   the record for its decision to include the rural LECs  yin the LMDS eligibility restriction. They accordingly  contend that the application of the in-region eligibility  restriction to rural telephone companies is arbitrary  and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to law.  {O-  Rppa.The Claim That the FCC Lacks   Support for its Predictions and That   the Commission's Actions Fail to  {M-Satisfy the FCC's Stated Objectives(# XppX(#   0 ppThe rural telephone companies engage in the  same error that the LECs committed: They assert that  the FCC was required to establish "that limiting rural  {O- / telephone company participation is necessary to   ensure that rural America receives LMDS at   reasonable charges." Rural LEC Brief, at 1314  .(emphasis added). The rural LECs do not locate this  / requirement in any statute, but instead point to a   statement in the FCC's Order that appears in the  introduction to the Commission's explanation of its decision to impose an eligibility restriction:   F$hXppXppOur overall goal in assessing the   need to restrict the opportunity of any class    of service providers to obtain and use   ] spectrum to provide communications services   N has been to determine whether the restriction  {O -  Q is a necessary step in ensuring that   consumers will receive efficient   n communications services at reasonable   P charges. Since we are of the view that    competitive markets are the most direct and   | reliable means for ensuring that consumers   receive the benefits described in the    Communications Act, we have evaluated the   O need for spectrum licensing restrictions in   terms of whether the restrictions are  {O(-  " necessary to promote competition in theH( 0*0*0**$p) ' '0*0*H   l telecommunications marketplace and whether   O these restrictions are otherwise consistent with our obligation to promote the public interest. X   Order  157 (emphasis added). We believe that the   rural LECs have overread this introductory passage,  M which speaks in general terms about "any class of  service providers," any "communications service," and  {O@-  eligibility restrictions as a category. Id. As the   FCC's Order makes clear when it begins its detailed  discussion of the Commissioners' decision to impose  La three-year eligibility restriction on LEC acquisition  .of in-region LMDS licenses, the Commission did not  conclude"or believe that it needed to conclude"that  =imposing the eligibility restriction on rural LECs was  a necessary, unavoidable step if the Commission was   "to ensure that rural America receives LMDS at  \ reasonable charges." Rather, the FCC determined  that: "[t]he [last] element of our inquiry is whether  {O- jeligibility restrictions are the best means of achieving   our goal of increasing competition in the LEC and  {Ol-  MVPD markets. We find that they are" Id.  176  {O6- (emphasis added); see also id.  162 ("[W]e find on  {O- balance that a policy favoring restricted eligibility for  {O-  a limited time would result in the greatest likelihood  of increased competition in the local telephony and MVPD markets.") (emphasis added).   The rural LECs also argue that, even if the   FCC's Order defends its eligibility restriction as the  ["best" approach rather than the "necessary" one, the   FCC cannot rely on economic theory, its evidence  indicating that LECs exercise monopoly power, and   its predictive judgment as to the future behavior of  z markets in deciding to include the incumbent rural   LECs in its eligibility restriction. Instead, the rural  jLECs contend, the FCC had to provide what the rural  telephone companies characterize as "supporting data,"   which would presumably contain more specific and   exact factual information. Rural LEC Brief, at 15.  {OL-  NCCB and AT&T defeat this claim. Both cases  ? recognize that where, as here, the FCC has to   establish eligibility criteria based on how it predicts  the market and regulated entities will react, "complete   factual support in the record for the Commission's  judgment or prediction is not possible or required; 'a   forecast of the direction in which future public  interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on  {O%-  the expert knowledge of the agency.' " NCCB, 436  {OX&- z U.S. at 814 (quoting FPC v. Transcontinental Gas  {O"'- .Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961)). "When, as   in this case, 'an agency is obliged to make policy  Ljudgments where no factual certainties exist or where"( 0*0*0**"  M facts alone do not provide the answer,' our role is  \ more limited; we require only that the agency 'so  state and go on to identify the considerations it found  {OX-  persuasive.' " AT&T, 832 F.2d at 1291 (quoting  {M"-  National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).   ^ ppHere, the FCC acknowledged that absolute  certainty was impossible, but presented its reasoning   clearly, cogently, and based on the agency's best  > understanding of the available information. This  explanation is too lengthy to present completely here,  Lbut the following passage from the Order summarizes many of its essential points:   B XppBased on the record here, standard   economic theory, our experience, an    analogous situation in the cable TV industry,   n and our assessment of competitive and   regulatory developments in the local   telephony and MVPD [Multichannel Video   Programming Distributor] markets, we find   on balance that a policy favoring restricted   | eligibility for a limited time would result in   o the greatest likelihood of increased   competition in the local telephony and    MVPD markets. By restricting inregion   LEC and cable companies, we ensure the   @ entry of a new LMDS operator that could    provide competition in the LEC market, the   MVPD market, or both. An incumbent, on   the other hand, would have a strong   0 incentive to obtain an LMDS license in order    to prevent a new entrant from obtaining the   license and competing directly in the    incumbent's current market. In so doing,   such an incumbent will have forestalled   ! market entry by an entity that could provide    both telephony and MVPD and will have    deprived consumers of an opportunity to   choose between a possible two providers in   @ each market and the lower prices for such   1 services that consumer choice necessarily   implies. Furthermore, either incumbent   O would have no incentive to use the LMDS   spectrum to provide the service in which it   ^ has market power because this could result   in lower prices for the service, and lower   o profits. By temporarily restricting   O incumbents' eligibility to acquire in-region   O LMDS licenses, this policy maximizes the   likelihood of increasing competition in both the LEC and MVPD markets.(#pH( 0*0*0**$|) U U0*0*HԌ   $ ԙX` ` As we have unanimously observed   in recent proceedings, both incumbent LECs   and cable television firms currently possess   substantial market power. An in-region   LMDS license would be valuable to these   ^ firms not only because they could use it as   P other firms would, but also because, by   1 obtaining the license, they could preserve   1 excess profits that an independent LMDS competitor would erode.... X ....    X` ` Our concern regarding LEC and   cable eligibility is educated by the substantial   1 record collected in this proceeding on the   capabilities of LMDS.... LMDS offers a   significant amount of capacity, larger than   currently available wireless services.... [W]e   m believe that the likelihood that LMDS can   increase competition in either the local   A multichannel video or local telephone   ? exchange markets (or both simultaneously) is    high and warrants analysis in order to   determine whether in-region LEC and cable   P TV incumbents should be permitted to acquire and hold initial licenses.    $ X` ` While all bidders in an auction for   LMDS licenses can be expected to base their    bids on their individual assessment of the   0 most efficient use of the spectrum, LECs and   P cable companies assessing the value of   in-region LMDS licenses would have the   additional incentive to protect their market   2 power and preserve a stream of future profits.   Order  16263, 17071. We find that this  explanation is both reasonable and adequate support for the FCC's predictive judgment.  {O -   B b.` ` The Claim That the FCC Failed to  {M!-Consider Record Evidence` XX` ` `   1 The rural LECs next argue that the FCC's  Order failed to address comments in the record from  the rural telephone community that contended that an  in-region eligibility restriction on rural LECs "would  / harm the ability of rural telephone companies to  \ provide LMDS in their service areas." Rural LEC   Brief, at 17. This argument is somewhat odd. One  {O(- would naturally expect that an eligibility restriction on"( 0*0*0**"  > rural LEC acquisition of in-region LMDS licenses   would, by its very nature, "harm""to some  =degree""the ability of rural telephone companies to   provide LMDS in their service areas"; that, in fact,  [is the restriction's purpose. Indeed, no one, including   the FCC, disputes this point, although the FCC has   determined for the reasons elaborated below that  { ultimately the in-region restriction will have a   relatively small impact on the rural LECs' ability to  {O- .participate in the LMDS auction. See Order  179  80. We believe the real question presented here is  > whether the FCC can exercise its judgment that a  Lrestriction on the incumbent rural LECs is merited in  order to counteract the rural LECs' present monopoly   power. Moreover, while the rural LECs assert that   the FCC failed to consider "record evidence," they   point to no evidence in the record. Instead, the  portions of the record that the rural LECs cite simply   assert that the eligibility restriction will harm rural  {O-LECs. See Rural LEC Brief, at 17, citing Joint Appendix, at 66567, 67274, 76566, 77476.   @ ppThe rural LECs go on to cite the Order at  paragraph 179 for the proposition that the FCC has   established a standard whereby "in order for a rural  telephone company to be entitled to an opportunity to   participate in a new service, the rural telephone  {O-  company must first demonstrate that it is the only   entity that can provide the service [in rural areas]."  {O- .Id. Instead, however, paragraph 179 only rejects the  {Ox- rural LECs' contention "that they are the only entities  that can provide service in their service territories." It reads:   qXppCommenters from the rural   telephone community .... reason that unless   # rural telephone companies are able to   participate in the LMDS market, consumers   in rural areas are likely to be deprived of the   benefits of this new service. We agree that   it would be undesirable to impair the   ~ provision of LMDS service to rural    consumers. Although we have decided to   ] impose some short-term restrictions in LECs,   including rural telephone companies, we do   0 not believe that these restrictions, as crafted,   will hinder the introduction of LMDS in   rural areas. Rural LECs have not made the   case that they are the only entities that can provide LMDS in their service territories.(#p Order  179. H( 0*0*0**$l)  0*0*HԌ  ^ The rural LECs have mischaracterized the  yFCC's rationale for its Order and pointed to no record evidence that the Commission failed to consider.  {O -   Xc.X` ` The Claim That the FCC's    CConclusion That the Eligibility    Restriction Will Not Compromise    SRural Telephone Company    ` Participation in LMDS is Arbitrary  {M -and Capricious` XX` ` `  {O-  As we indicated above (see II.B.2.b.), we   have not been able to find (and, for the reasons  { discussed above, would not expect to find) any   statement within the FCC's Order asserting that the  {O - eligibility restriction will have no negative effect on  [rural LEC participation in LMDS. Instead, the FCC's  Order "conclude[s] that the interests of rural telephone  M companies are adequately addressed by the LMDS  Lrules we adopt herein," Order  362, and explains the  various opportunities that remain open to rural LECs.   We evaluate the specific claims that the rural LECs make about that FCC conclusion in this light.  F$h   {O-   X1.X` ` The Claim That the FCC's    $ Conclusion That Rural Telephone    Companies Will Not Trigger the    Eligibility Restriction is Arbitrary  {M-and Capricious` XX` ` X     The rural LECs take issue with the FCC's  =determination that "because rural LECs are generally  ysmall, they are unlikely to have the degree of overlap   with BTAs [basic trading areas] necessary ... to  {O-  trigger our eligibility restriction." Id.  180. This  .statement refers to the fact that the FCC's eligibility   restriction only applies to a LEC if ten percent or   more of the population in the BTA that the desired  0 LMDS license covers is also within the LEC's  {O- > authorized telephone service area. See id.  188.  yThis determination appears in the FCC's Order as one  k of several reasons why the FCC concluded that its  0 restriction on rural LECs will not "hinder the  {O!-  introduction of LMDS in rural areas." Id.  179.  z The rural LECs argue that the FCC's prediction of   relatively modest effects on rural LEC eligibility is  arbitrary and capricious because the application of the  > restriction turns on the overlap between a LMDS  k license's BTA and a LEC's telephone service area,   rather than on the size of a rural LEC. However, it  is not difficult to see a logical connection between the  k FCC's overlap criteria and a rural LEC's size: The   smaller a LEC, the less likely it is to be servicing a"( 0*0*0**"  customer base that constitutes ten percent or more of  the population within a BTA, particularly because the  =BTAs for LMDS licenses, which are quite large, have   no necessary correlation to the boundaries of rural  {O -  telephone companies' service areas. See id. 135, 138, 180.    ppThe rural LECs also claim that the FCC's  determination is arbitrary and capricious because the  [FCC did not "conduct an analysis of the actual degree   of overlap between LMDS license areas and rural  Ltelephone company service areas." Rural LEC Brief,  at 19. The rural telephone companies do not claim to   have the detailed information that such an analysis  covering hundreds of rural LECs would require, or to   have offered to collect it for the FCC; they argue,  ] instead, that the FCC should have secured this  [information during its rulemaking. Given that all the   data needed for an overlap analysis presumably   exists"the boundaries of the BTAs for LMDS   licenses and the current authorized service areas for   rural LECs are both established"the FCC might  " profitably have undertaken such a factual   investigation. However, we do not believe that the   comprehensive factual analysis that the rural LECs  would have liked was actually required of the FCC in   this case. The FCC was entitled to conduct, and did  ? conduct, a general analysis based on informed   conjecture. Specifically, a BTA is typically   constructed around an "urban commercial center,"  { where the population of the BTA will be most   concentrated; BTAs are not designed to follow the   same lines as rural LEC service areas. Order  138.   BTAs also tend to be quite large: The FCC divided  {O-  the fifty states into only 487 BTAs. See id.  135.  M The FCC accordingly drew a reasonable inference   from its general knowledge that "rural LECs are  .generally small," and concluded that rural LECs were   "unlikely" to have the necessary overlap, although  Lsome number of rural LECs will presumably meet the  {OD-overlap requirement's threshold. Id.  180.   ppIn the final analysis, the number of rural  LECs that will or will not fall within the ten percent  z overlap rule was not the determinative issue. The   FCC was operating on the premise that if a LEC  [services a customer base that constitutes more than a  =small percentage of a BTA, then the risk of impeded  [competition in the telephony market is great enough  > to warrant an in-region eligibility bar. The exact  jpercentage of rural LECs covered under a ten percent   overlap rule was not the primary question, and the   precise identification of that percentage through aH( 0*0*0**$v) = = 0*0*H   detailed and expensive study would not likely have   led the FCC to a different conclusion about whether to impose a ten percent overlap rule.  {O -   CX2.X` ` The Claim That the Divestiture    aProvision Does Not Reduce the    Adverse Impact on Rural Telephone  {Mz-Companies` XX` ` X    Under the FCC's Order, a LEC can buy a   LMDS license as long as it divests itself of any   overlapping service areas or interests within ninety  {Ob - k days. See id.  194; see also id.  180. The FCC observed in a footnote that:    X` ` Such flexibility should be   particularly useful for those rural LECs that   ! may have overlapping ownership interests in   m a BTA. Although we anticipate that most    rural LECs would not have sufficient overlap   of their authorized service area with the   LMDS service area to be affected by the   ^ eligibility restrictions we are adopting, the   Q additional flexibility to divest such   } overlapping ownership interests should   1 further ameliorate any potential negative impact on these entities.  {O- Id.  194 n.302. The rural LECs argue that, in fact,   this divestiture provision will be "singularly  yunhelpful" to them "because the areas rural telephone  ycompanies have a desire and ability to serve are those  jwithin and adjacent to their service area." Rural LEC Brief, at 20.   0 We do not believe that this claim renders the   FCC's decision to include rural LECs in its eligibility   restriction arbitrary or capricious. Some"perhaps  even a large"percentage of rural LECs will not find   the divestiture provision in the FCC's Order an  attractive solution to all their "problems." But that  does not mean that the availability of this option does   not increase a rural LEC's flexibility, nor does it  mean that the divestiture provision will not help some  rural LECs. And we see no evidence that the FCC is claiming more for its divestiture provision than that.  {O$-   X3.X` ` The Claim That the FCC's    Conclusion That Geographic    Partitioning Will Ensure the    ` Dissemination of Licenses to Rural    B Telephone Companies is Arbitrary  {M(-and Capricious` "(0*0*0**"ԌXppXX  (#    ppOne of the reasons that the FCC cited in  ysupport of its conclusion that its eligibility restriction   will not impede the introduction of LMDS in rural areas was that   Xppto the extent any LEC is unsuccessful in the   ~ LMDS auction, it will still have the   m opportunity to participate"subject to the   eligibility rules"by either acquiring   O spectrum from an LMDS licensee through   the partitioning and disaggregation rules we   N are adopting, or by contracting (in a way that   does not circumvent any applicable   ! ownership and control requirements and does    not raise competitive concerns) with the   LMDS licensee to provide service in its telephone market area.(#p   Order  180. The rural LECs argue that the FCC's  [partitioning rules are "effectively ... useless" for rural  > LECs because if the customer base of a rural LEC  constitutes more than ten percent of the population in  a BTA, partitioning the BTA will not enable the LEC   to avoid the FCC's ten percent overlap rule. Rural  LEC Brief, at 21. We agree that the partitioning rules   would be more useful to rural LECs seeking to offer  in-region LMDS service if they provided a means to   circumvent the ten percent overlap rule. However,   that is not the purpose of the partitioning rules.  =Rather, the FCC intended for its partitioning rules to  M help rural LECs by making ownership of a LMDS  yservice more affordable. With the assistance of these   rules, a rural LEC seeking to provide LMDS service  [does not have to garner sufficient capital to purchase   and then effectively utilize an entire LMDS license;  =instead, a rural LEC can buy or lease part of a LMDS  {O-  license from its original owner. See Order  141  ? ("We determined that the issue of geographic  k partitioning should be considered to enable LMDS  Llicensees to recoup some of their initial licensing and   construction costs, while providing a method for   entities with specific local concerns or insufficient  capital to purchase rights for the entire service area,  Lto acquire a portion of the geographic area originally  {O*#-  licensed."); id.  145 ("[T]he nature of the LMDS   cell structure makes disaggregation and partitioning   powerful tools for licensees to concentrate on core  \ areas or to deliver services to isolated complexes,   such as rural towns or university campuses, that do  not lie within major market areas. We further believe   that disaggregation and partitioning will provide  opportunities for small businesses seeking to enter theH(0*0*0**$p)ii7?0*0*H  {O- MVPD and local telephony marketplaces."); id.  362  ("[T]he degree of flexibility we will afford in the use  of this spectrum, including provisions for partitioning  =or disaggregating spectrum, should assist in satisfying   the spectrum needs of rural telephone companies at   low cost."). We find the FCC's conclusion, that its  partitioning rules will help rural LECs acquire LMDS  licenses by making smaller, more affordable licenses potentially available, reasonable.   The rural LECs go on to assert that only six  [partitioning deals have thus far been consummated in  / auction-licensed services and argue, citing a trade   periodical, that licensees are reluctant to enter into   partitioning agreements with small and/or rural  entities due to transaction costs and the difficulty of  M earning a profit. We reject this argument on two   grounds. First, the FCC's partitioning rules at issue  yhere govern the implementation of a new technology  in a brand-new market. These are the precise sorts of  circumstances in which the Commission's predictive  {Oj-  judgment demands great deference, see NCCB, 436  {O4- [U.S. at 81314; AT&T, 832 F.2d at 1291, and in this   case the FCC's Order explains the   technologically-based reasons for the Commission's   conclusion that partitioning will be an attractive  [option for LMDS licensees. The Order, for instance,  "observ[es] that continued technological improvements   may reduce the amount of spectrum required to   provide a full range of services." Order  140. The  Order also cites with approval comments in the record  ."contend[ing] that the relatively high cost of LMDS  z construction and the shorter transmission paths it   provides, in addition to the limitation of service to   consumers within reach of cell transmitters, lend   support for the Commission's proposals with regard  {O&- jto geographic partitioning." Id.  143. Second, even  / if rural LECs will encounter difficulties in finding  k parties willing to contract with them for part of a   LMDS license, we do not believe that this would  .make it arbitrary or capricious for the FCC to list its  =partitioning rules as one of the actions it is taking to promote LMDS service in rural areas.  {Oh"-   X3.X` ` The Argument That the Application    Dof the InRegion Eligibility    CRestriction to Rural Telephone    %Companies Hinders the Rapid    CDeployment of LMDS to Rural    America and is Arbitrary and  {M'-Capricious` XX` ` ` "'0*0*0*)"Ԍ {O-  qXppa.XThe Claim That There is No   CEvidence to Support the FCC's   Conclusion That Competitive Forces   ` Will Ensure the Provision of LMDS  {M"-to Rural America(# XppX(#   ppThe rural LECs challenge the FCC's   statement that "we do not believe that these  \ [eligibility] restrictions, as crafted, will hinder the   introduction of LMDS in rural areas.... [I]f it is  =profitable to provide service in rural areas, a licensee  { should be willing to do so, either directly or by  .partitioning the license and allowing another firm to  {O* - M provide service." Id.  17980. The rural LECs  argue that such reliance on the market is "outrageous"  in this context because, historically, rural areas have  not attracted many potential competitors. Rural LEC   Brief, at 25. Although the rural LECs do not assert  M that they will be able to provide LMDS service in  ? rural areas at less expense than other possible  providers, they claim that they have a natural interest   in providing additional communications services in rural areas where they are already operating.    ppWe do not find this argument persuasive.   First, in making a predictive judgment about the  future operation of the brand-new market in LMDS,   the FCC is entitled to a very substantial measure of   deference and is clearly not required to rely on the  {O- history of other markets in other technologies. See  {Ov- NCCB, 436 U.S. at 81314; AT&T, 832 F.2d at 1291.  Second, the rural LECs have not indicated why they  z would be able to provide LMDS in rural markets if   provision of that service would in fact be  unprofitable. They have presented no evidence and   made no argument, for instance, that they would be   able to provide LMDS in rural areas at less expense  jthan potential competitors would incur. In this light,  it seems perfectly sound"indeed   commonsensical"for the FCC to conclude that the   rural LECs can only want increased access to the  [rural LMDS market precisely because they think that  M this market will be profitable (or possibly because they want to protect their telephone monopolies).  {O0#-  $ Xppb.XThe Claim That the FCC Gave No   CConsideration to the Universal   4Service Principles Set Forth in   Sections 309(j)(3)(A) and 254(b)(3)   aWhen It Imposed the Eligibility   pRestriction on Rural Telephone  {M'-Companies(# XppX(#H(0*0*0**$(; ek0*0*HԌ47 U.S.C.  254(b)(3) provides that:   XConsumers in all regions of the Nation,  {OX-  m including low-income consumers and those  {O"-   in rural, insular, and high cost areas, should   have access to telecommunications and   N information services, including interexchange   | services and advanced telecommunications   0 and information services, that are reasonably    comparable to those services provided in    urban areas and that are available at rates   that are reasonably comparable to rates   ^ charged for similar services in urban areas. (emphasis added).   | We believe that the rural LECs err in their   claim that the FCC's Order does not adequately   consider the universal service principles set forth in  .these sections. To be sure, the FCC's Order does not   address this issue by name; its explicit reference to  the universal service goals in the context of providing  {Ol-  LMDS to rural areas is limited to a paragraph. See  [Order  271 & n.403. But the Order does make clear  l that the FCC did consider the substance of the   universal service issue. As a key passage of the  n Order on rural LECs explains, the FCC  .Commissioners "agree[d] that it would be undesirable  > to impair the provision of LMDS service to rural  {O-  customers." Id.  179. The Commissioners   concluded, however, that the Order's eligibility  Lrestriction would not in fact "hinder the introduction   of LMDS in rural areas" for the series of reasons  {O-  discussed throughout this section. Id. In this light,  the rural LECs' argument devolves into a rehashing of  > the contention, rejected above, that the FCC was   arbitrary or capricious in disagreeing with the rural   LECs' claim that the eligibility restriction will leave rural areas without LMDS service.  {O-   Xc.X` ` The Claim That the FCC's     Performance Requirements When    qCoupled With the Eligibility    Restriction Mean That Rural    ` America Will Not Receive LMDS in    &Direct Violation of Section  {M4#-309(j)(4)(B)` XX` ` `   47 U.S.C.  309(j)(4)(B) states that "the Commission shall"   ^ Xinclude performance requirements, such as   n appropriate deadlines and penalties for  {O(-  performance failures, to ensure prompt"(0*0*0**"  {O-  delivery of service to rural areas, to prevent   m stockpiling or warehousing of spectrum by   licensees or permittees, and to promote   investment in and rapid deployment of new technologies and services.(#p (emphasis added). In its Order, the FCC decided to   @ Xppadopt very flexible buildout requirements   _ for LMDS. Specifically, we will require   licensees to provide "substantial service" to    their service area within 10 years. Although   LMDS licensees will have incentives to   _ construct facilities to meet the service   " demands in their licensed service area, we   ~ believe that minimum construction   ] requirements can promote efficient use of the   ! spectrum, encourage the provision of service   P to rural, remote, and insular areas, and prevent the warehousing of spectrum.(#p pp....   | Xpp... [F]or an LMDS licensee that chooses to   offer point-to-multipoint services, a   demonstration of coverage to 20 percent of   the population of its licensed service area at   N the 10year mark would constitute substantial service.(#p Order  266, 270. The Order went on to state that:   aXppWe believe that these build-out   A provisions fulfill our obligations under   Section 309(j)(4)(B). We also believe that   @ the auction and service rules which we are   P adopting for LMDS, together with our   " overall competition and universal service   policies, constitute effective safeguards and    performance requirements for LMDS   licensing. Because a license will be assigned    in the first instance through competitive    bidding, it will be assigned efficiently to a    firm that has shown by its willingness to pay   A market value its willingness to put the   license to its best use. We also believe that    service to rural areas will be promoted by   A our proposal to allow partitioning and disaggregation of LMDS spectrum.(#p  {O'-Id.  271. H'0*0*0*)$v);i0*0*HԌ  ^ The rural LECs argue that these relatively  undemanding performance requirements, together with   the eligibility restriction on rural LECs, will hinder   the delivery of LMDS to rural areas. In their view,  yLMDS licensees offering point-to-multipoint services  \ will meet the requirement that they cover twenty  z percent of the population in their licensed service   areas within ten years by serving urban areas and   avoiding rural ones; once the licensees' build-out  z benchmarks are met, the rural LECs continue, the   licensees will lack any incentive (given the high   transaction and other costs associated with serving  .sparsely populated regions) to negotiate partitioning   agreements with businesses seeking to serve rural  Lareas. This is not an implausible scenario. However,  ? it does not render the Commission's alternate predictive judgment unreasonable.   A The FCC concluded, based on its prior  Lanalogous experience with Wireless Communications   Services ("WCS"), that strict build-out requirements   might discourage the acquisition of LMDS licenses,  \ given the wide variety of services that LMDS can  potentially support and the substantial uncertainties  {O- that presently exist as to the best uses for LMDS. See  {O-  id.  267. In light of this danger, the Commission decided to adopt liberal build-out requirements.   ^ We agree that this decision is a reasonable  interpretation of section 309(j)(4)(B), a provision that  endorses three different, and potentially competing,   goals. First, the FCC's reasoning was clearly in   accord with section 309(j)(4)(B)'s concern that the  agency "promote investment in and rapid deployment   of new technologies and services." 47 U.S.C.   | 309(j)(4)(B). Moreover, if strict build-out  .requirements pose a threat to the rapid development  jof the LMDS spectrum, that danger will also threaten  M section 309(j)(4)(B)'s goal of "ensur[ing] prompt  {O|- =delivery of service to rural areas." Id. As for section  y309(j)(4)(B)'s third goal, "prevent[ing] stockpiling or  Lwarehousing of spectrum by licensees or permittees,"  {O -  id., the FCC Commissioners decided, in their expert  =judgment, that this danger did not loom large enough  to mandate stricter build-out requirements. They also   expressly "reserve[d] the right to review our liberal  construction requirements in the future if we receive  complaints related to Section 309(j)(4)(B), or if our  .own monitoring initiatives or investigations indicate that a reassessment is warranted." Order  272.  {O'-C.XThe Waiver Applicant Petitioners "(0*0*0**"Ԍ  ! ppThe waiver applicant petitioners seek review   of the FCC's decision, released on January 8, 1993,  Lwhile the Commission was devising its current LMDS  k regime, that denied them waivers of the rules that   formerly governed use of the spectrum now  {O- > designated for LMDS. See first NPRM  5153.  The rejected waiver applicants filed petitions with the  ] FCC for reconsideration on February 8, 1993.  Concurrently, the rejected applicants filed petitions for  {O - review with this court. See Brief of Petitioners James  {O-  L. Melcher, et al., at 3; Order  385 n.595. On  l April 15, 1993, this court ordered those latter  jpetitions held in abeyance pending completion of the   FCC proceeding. On March 13, 1997, the FCC   denied the rejected applicants' petitions for  {O - reconsideration. See Order  383406. Many of the   rejected applicants did not then file timely new  { appeals with this court. However, at least two   rejected applicants, Celltel Communications  > Corporation ("Celltel") and CT Communications  Corporation ("CT"), who had dismissed their petitions   for reconsideration that were before the FCC, filed  z timely new petitions for review with this court on  August 11, 1997. This court consolidated these two petitions into the present case on September 8, 1997.  {OX-   ppThe FCC argues that TeleSTAR, Inc. v. FCC,  yO"-  888 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam), and  {O-  Wade v. FCC, 986 F.2d 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per  / curiam), establish that the filing of a petition for  [reconsideration before the FCC makes the challenged  FCC order nonfinal, and therefore nonreviewable by  yO -  this court, as to the petitioning party.ި In addition, the rejected waiver applicants themselves concede that nearly every issue raised in this appeal was not raised before the agency. The   Commission asserts that the rejected waiver   applicants' petitions for review before this court   should accordingly be dismissed as incurably   premature. We agree that the petitions before this   court from large numbers of the rejected waiver  {O- ] applicants raise serious prematurity problems.  {O- M TeleSTAR, Inc. considered the precise question of  ="whether a petition for review, unripe because of the  k pendency of a request for agency reconsideration,   ripens so as to vest this court with jurisdiction once   the agency issues its final decision on  {Op"-  reconsideration." TeleSTAR, Inc., 888 F.2d at 133.   It held "that this court does not have jurisdiction to   consider the prematurely-filed petition for review,  even after the agency rules on the rehearing request.  In order to obtain review of a now-final agency order,  {OZ&-  a new petition for review must be filed." Id. As the court explained: H'0*0*0*)$r)i0*0*HԌ   X` ` While final agency action can ripen   an issue for appellate review, the filing of a   0 challenge to agency action before the agency   has issued its decision on reconsideration is   0 incurably premature. We hold therefore that    when a petition for review is filed before the   O challenged action is final and thus ripe for   review, subsequent action by the agency on   a motion for reconsideration does not ripen   ^ the petition for review or secure appellate   jurisdiction. To cure the defect, the   challenging party must file a new notice of   appeal or petition for review from the now  final agency order. We develop this bright   line test to discourage the filing of petitions   for review until after the agency completes   } the reconsideration process. If a party   determines to seek reconsideration of an   _ agency ruling, it is a pointless waste of   judicial energy for the court to process any   " petition for review before the agency has acted on the request for reconsideration.  {O- k Id. at 134 (citation omitted); see also Wade, 986   F.2d at 1434 ("The danger of wasted judicial effort  .that attends the simultaneous exercise of judicial and   agency jurisdiction arises whether a party seeks  .agency reconsideration before, simultaneous with, or  jafter filing an appeal or petition for judicial review.") (citation omitted).   However, we do reach the merits of the  petitions before this court from Celltel and CT, who have presented petitions that were not premature.  {OZ-  O This court held in Turro v. FCC, 859 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988), that:    4X` ` Our standard for reviewing the    FCC's denial of a request for waiver of an   agency rule is very deferential. As we stated  {O -  ! in WAIT Radio v. FCC, 459 F.2d 1203, 1207   (D.C. Cir.), "An applicant for waiver faces a   high hurdle even at the starting gate. On its   appeal to this court, the burden on [the   " petitioner] is even heavier. It must show   that the Commission's reasons for declining   to grant the waiver were so insubstantial as to render that denial an abuse of discretion."  {O'- Id. at 1499 (citations omitted); see also Orange Park  {O'-  Florida T.V., Inc. v. FCC, 811 F.2d 664, 669 (D.C.  jCir. 1987) ("[I]t is elementary that the judiciary may"(0*0*0**"   disturb a Commission refusal to waive its rules only  {O-  in the event of an abuse of discretion."). In Turro,   the FCC had "concluded that it was preferable to   address the policy concerns raised by Turro in a  rulemaking proceeding and not in the context of an ad  {O-  hoc waiver proceeding." Turro, 859 F.2d at 1500.   The court found that "[t]his decision to proceed by  {O|-rulemaking is entitled to considerable deference." Id.   ppIn this case, the FCC had received hundreds  of waiver requests"971 in total"seeking authority to  provide point-to-multipoint services on the 28 GHz  ! band, rather than the point-to-point services  {O. - then-authorized. See first NPRM  5153. The FCC   also had pending before it three petitions for  [rulemaking, two supporting the designation of the 28   GHz band for point-to-multipoint services, and one  {OP -  opposing such a designation. See id.  113. The  \ Commission denied the waiver requests as a group   and proceeded instead with notice and comment   rulemaking on the use of the spectrum at issue. As  \ the FCC explained, it had concluded, based on the   number of waiver applications and the size of their  yrequests for spectrum space, that granting the waivers  {O- jwould result in a de facto reassignment of the 28 GHz  M band"a band that other parties wanted to use for  {O\- different, incompatible purposes. See id. WW 5153;  .Order  388. Moreover, the Commission found that   the waivers raised common policy questions,   involving both the best use of the 28 GHz band and   the additional rules that would be needed to govern   new uses of that band, questions that would best be  {O-  addressed in a rulemaking proceeding. See Order  389, 40204, 406.   | ppThe FCC's reasoning in this regard was not   only rational, but highly sound. The 971 waiver  applicants were essentially seeking to use the waiver   process as a means of getting the 28 GHz band  / reassigned. Their petitions raised systemic issues   most appropriately considered in a rulemaking   proceeding that offered all interested parties the  z opportunity to comment and gave the agency the   opportunity to proceed in a more thorough and fair  {Op"-  manner. See National Small Shipments Traffic  {O:#- \ Conference, Inc. v. ICC, 725 F.2d 1442, 144748  (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Notice-and-comment procedures ...   are especially suited to determining legislative facts and policy of general, prospective applicability.").   Q ppMoreover, the FCC has adequately  distinguished its earlier decision, in January 1991, to   grant a waiver permitting Hye Crest Management,H(0*0*0**$r)0*0*H  yInc. to provide point-to-multipoint service on the 28   GHz band. When Hye Crest applied for a waiver, it  .was the only such applicant. Its proposal was unique   and untried. The FCC determined that, "under the   circumstances of this proceeding," a formal   rulemaking to consider changing the designation of   the 28 GHz band was "premature" and that a waiver  ] should be granted as the most efficient way to  [introduce point-to-multipoint service into New York  jCity (the area in which Hye Crest sought to operate).  In re Application of Hye Crest Management, Inc., 6  F.C.C.R. 332, at  18 (released Jan. 18, 1991). The   Commission concluded that "grant of the waiver  { request does not establish a precedent that will  =ultimately lead to the de facto reallocation of the 28  GHz band" and stated that it "[did] not anticipate that  .our action today will result in an onslaught of waiver  {OH -  requests." Id.  19. The FCC also observed that  "[s]hould the proposal prove to be a success and the  jpublic benefits anticipated become a reality, a general  investigation into alternate uses of the 28 GHz band  {Oj-  would then be appropriate for consideration." Id.   18. In contrast, by the time that the FCC acted on the   instant waiver applications, a number of  z manufacturers had begun developing equipment to  offer point-to-multipoint services on the 28 GHz band   and the agency had received almost a thousand   requests for waivers to use the band for that  Lpurpose"so many that granting them all would have  {O-  amounted "to a de facto reallocation of the 28 GHz   band." First NPRM  5153. To be sure, some of   those rejected waiver applicants had filed their  .applications for waiver as early as 1991, in the early   days of what was to become a deluge of requests.   But this court has held that the filing of a waiver   application does not create a legal interest that  .restricts the discretion vested in the FCC or compels  k the agency to review the request as if no time had   passed or circumstances changed since the moment  {O~- A the request was filed. See Chadmoore  {OH- z Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 113 F.3d 235, 241  {O - (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Hispanic Info. & Telecomms.  {O - Network v. FCC, 865 F.2d 1289, 129495 (D.C. Cir.  {O!- 1989); Schraier v. Hickel, 419 F.2d 663, 667 (D.C.  Cir. 1969)). By the time the FCC acted in this case,  the circumstances that the FCC had expressly believed  { would not develop when it granted Hye Crest's  .waiver had in fact come to pass, so that the agency's   reasons for granting the earlier waiver no longer applied.  F$h  "(0*0*0**"Ԍ yO- F$h Q  Conclusion ă   ? ppWe accordingly deny the petitions for review from all of the petitioners in this case.