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Id. (citing 47 U.S.C.  332). CMRS includes all mobile services operated for profit  xthat solicit for subscribers and are interconnected with the public switched network, which is the  X- xtraditional landline telephone service.k X- L Ѝ All of the services reached by the rule adopted by the FCC order under consideration are CMRS services. See 47 U.S.C. 332(d)(1) & (2). PMRS includes all  xwireless services that do not meet the definition for CMRS. 47 U.S.C.  332(d)(3). The OBRA  xamendments also furnished the FCC with the authority to auction licenses for use of the spectrum,  Xb- xsee OBRA  6002(a), 107 Stat.  38792, and required the FCC to issue licenses for personal communications services, 47 U.S.C.  332(c)(1)(D).  X-  { x In the order under review, the FCC extended the rule prohibiting restrictions on resale so  xthat broadband personal communications services ( PCS) and certain widearea specialized  xmobile radio ( SMR) carriers must also allow unrestricted resale of their services; the rule  X - xpreviously applied only to certain cellular providers. See 47 C.F.R. 20.12(b)7 bk X%- L Ѝ The carriers which are subject to  20.12(b), the section at which the new rule and its sunsetting are codified, are providers of Broadband Personal Communications Services[,]...providers of Cellular Telephone Service[,]...providers of Specialized Mobile Radio Services in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands that hold geographic area"(0*0*0*(" licenses and offer realtime, twoway voice service that is interconnected with the public switched network, and incumbent Wide Area SMR licensees. 47 C.F.R.  20.12(a) (1997). Other CMRS include local dispatch service not connected to the public network, nonprivate paging services, airground services, satellite systems for mobile communications and maritime services.7; 47 C.F.R. " 0*0*0*"  xy22.901(e) (former resale rule). SMR are commercially operated private communications systems  X- xthat employ mobile transmitting and/or receiving stations. Chadmoore, 113 F.3d at 237. Such  xsystems were originally used primarily to provide highly localized services, such as the radio  X- xdispatching of police cars and taxicabs. Id.; Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 756  x(6th Cir. 1995). In recent years, however, emerging SMR technologies have enabled licensees  xto offer their customers sophisticated voice and data transmission services over extensive areas  x(e.g., twoway acknowledgment paging, credit card authorization, automatic vehicle location,  Xc- xNremote database access, and voice mail). Id. The FCC has allocated fourteen megahertz  XN- x( MHz) of spectrumDNk X- L Ѝ Generally speaking, spectrum is the range of radio frequencies within which wireless communications providers may operate. To provide complex and technologically sophisticated services to customers, wireless providers need a larger bandwidth of frequencies.D in the 800 MHz band exclusively to SMR systems. Chadmoore, 113 F.3d  x/at 237. Allowing SMR providers to aggregate spectrum has enabled them to produce more  X" - xsophisticated mobile communications services, see Cincinnati Bell, 69 F.3d at 756 & n.1, and  xbecome a viable competitor with cellular technology. As explained below, SMR systems operate  xZby digital technology, which appears to be technologically competitive with cellular technologys analog protocol.   xThe FCC has also designated a range of radio frequencies to be used in providing the new  xbroadband PCS, another wireless communications technology that is expected to compete with  X- xexisting wireless telephone services. See Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 626 (D.C. Cir.  Xn- x/1996); Cincinnati Bell, 69 F.3d at 756. Like mobile satellite services, it is a technology with  xadvantages that will allow it to compete effectively with cellular service providers. Its service  xrelies on digital technology, rather than the analog data technique employed by cellular service  X+- x\providers. See Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1460 (N.D. Ala.  x1997). Most authorities agree that digital technology is an advance in communication and  X- xinformationprocessing services. See, e.g., Western PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning  X- xmAuthority of the City and County of Santa Fe, 957 F. Supp. 1230, 1238 (D.N.M. 1997).  xBroadband PCS is not alone in its reliance on this technology. The previously mentioned SMR  xservices, the original dispatch service, also operates with digital technology and is another  xcategory of service subject to the prohibitions extension and sunsetting. Because those providers  X- xhave been allowed to, as mentioned, aggregate spectrum, see n.3 supra, they are now becoming  xKable to provide services previously impossible which are competitive with cellular and broadband  Xd-PCS systems. See Chadmoore, 113 F.3d at 238.d k X&- L Ѝ Without professing any technological expertise, we offer the following as an aid to our readers. Beyond the difference in digital versus analog techniques, PCS and widearea SMR services operate similarly to cellular service. PCS and SMR operate by transmitting low"(0*0*0*(" power radio signals between mobile, wireless units and fixed antennae mounted on towers,  Xy-buildings and other structures. Sprint, 968 F. Supp. at 1460. h"dd0*0*0*"Ԍ  ^ԙxTo review, there are emerging technologies which will and do provide services to the  xpublic akin to cellular service, i.e., a mobile telephone, but by other technologies. Among the  xlrelevant services on the mobile wireless landscape is cellular, which provides services  X- xcommonly associated with mobile telephone operations. See Cincinnati Bell, 69 F.3d at 756.  xThere is SMR, a digital, wireless service with its origins in dispatch service and also broadband  X-PCS, a service resembling cellular service but accomplished via digital technology.zdk X - L Ѝ There is also mobile satellite service, a technology not at issue in this case, which is a fairly new wireless service that allows subscribers to use their mobile telephones and other  Xv -communications devices via satellite. See Cincinnati Bell, 69 F.3d at 756. Mobile satellite service differs from cellular service in that its satellite rays are not blocked by terrain in the way that cellular services landbased signals are; mobile satellite service users can  X3-communicate via mobile telephone from virtually anywhere in the world. Id.Č  Xa-   xCurrently, as mentioned, two cellular providers hold licenses in each geographic region  x{and compete for wireless communications customers within that region. The new PCS is  x}expected to compete almost immediately with cellular service in providing wireless  X - xcommunications in each geographic region. Id. In extending the rule at issue, the FCC explained  xthat it did not extend the resale requirement to all CMRS providers because (1) it concluded that  xonly cellular, broadband PCS and widearea SMR licensees are likely to compete for twoway  xswitched voice service customers, and (2) because resale is an established practice with most  xother CMRS licensees and competition appears to be vigorous. The rule will sunset five years  x<after the FCC completes licensing the broadband PCS spectrum allocated so far because, the FCC  xexplains, it expects that the availability of numerous facilitybased suppliers of wireless services  X}- xwill make the resale rule unnecessary by that time. The resale rule will then no longer exist for  xany category of wireless service. At that time, carriers may deny their services to entities which  XO-propose to resell the service.  Proceedings Below  X -   xIn July 1994, the FCC issued the notice of inquiry which was the genesis of the current  X- xMlegal action in that it began the underlying FCC proceedings. See Notice of Proposed Rule  x.Making and Notice of Inquiry, Equal Access and Interconnection Obligations Pertaining to  X- xCommercial Mobile Radio Services, 9 F.C.C.R. 5408 (1994) ( First Notice of Inquiry). In April  X- x<1995, the FCC released its Second Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Interconnection and Resale  X- xlObligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 10 F.C.C.R. 10666 (1995)  Xq- x/( Second NPRM). On July 12, 1996, the FCC issued the order before this panel. See First  xReport and Order, Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile  XE- xzRadio Services, 11 F.C.C.R. 18455 (July 12, 1996) ( CMRS Resale Order). In that order, the  x>FCC temporarily extended the resale rule to certain other CMRS licensees in addition to the  xalready subject cellular licensees, so that it now covers broadband PCS and certain SMR  xproviders as well. The FCC declined to impose any resale obligations on narrowband PCS" 0*0*0*"  X- xlicensees, a category of PCS that offers advanced paging and messaging services, see Nicholas  X- xW. Allard, Reinventing Competition, 17 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 473, 482 (1995), or on air xtoground providers. Additionally, the FCC decided to sunset the rule with respect to all CMRS  xlicensees, which includes cellular licensees, five years after the last initial licenses for broadband PCS are awarded.  X-   xIn its order, the FCC explained that it based its decision on the state of competition in the  xmarket for CMRS services. The FCC concluded that under current market conditions,  x[restrictions on resale by cellular, broadband [PCS], and certain [SMR] providers will inhibit the  X5- xdevelopment of competition in these services. CMRS Resale Order at 2. The FCC therefore  X - xdeclared in its rule that these carriers must permit unrestricted resale of service. See 47 C.F.R.  x20.12(b) (codifying requirement as regulation). With respect to the application of the rule to  xjother types of CMRS providers, such as narrowband PCS, the FCC concluded that the markets  xserved by those carriers were already sufficiently competitive so that mandatory resale was not  xneeded. It accordingly declined to adopt the rule with respect to CMRS providers other than cellular, broadband PCS and certain SMR providers.   xThe FCC further concluded that a fiveyear sunset provision was appropriate because  x once broadband PCS licensees have built out their networks and are competing with cellular  XS- xcarriers, market forces will eliminate the need for explicit resale regulation. CMRS Resale Order  xat 2. Reviewing its resale policy, the FCC noted that [t]he common theme underlying the  xbenefits to be obtained from a resale rule is that they are most prominent in markets that have  X- xnot achieved full competition. Id.  at 8. The FCC recognized that such benefits diminish as the  X- xCMRS markets become more competitive. Id. at 9. At that point, the FCC reasoned, the costs  X- xof the resale rule would come to outweigh its benefits and the rule should no longer be imposed.  X- xId. The commencement of the fiveyear sunset period will be triggered by a public notice issued  xzafter the FCC awards the last group of initial licenses for currently allocated broadband PCS  X-spectrum. Id. at 1415.   xThe petitioner Cellnet participated as a commenting party in the proceeding below. It now  x[seeks review and reversal of the FCCs order. Cellnet, a reseller of cellular services, challenges  x>only the sunsetting of the rule. It argues for reversal on the following grounds: (1) that the  x0FCCs decision was arbitrary and capricious in that it departed from its own established  xzobligation for wireless providers to provide service to the public indifferently; (2) that the  xdecision was arbitrary and capricious in that the FCC lacked an adequate basis in the record for  x.its administrative costs justification; (3) that the FCC lacked an adequate basis in the record  xon which to base its predictive judgment that future competition would not justify continued  X!- x>imposition of the rule; and (4) that the agency failed to provide adequate notice of the rule xmaking. The FCC asserts two additional issues: (1) that the petitioner procedurally defaulted the  xnotice issue by not raising it to the FCC in a petition for rehearing; and (2) that the amicus curiae to this appeal exceeded its proper scope of argument.  Xe%-  !JURISDICTION  X (-  N xWe have jurisdiction to review the FCCs final orders pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 402(a) and  x28 U.S.C.  2342(a). Parties who have not been a party to the proceeding below must petition" )0*0*0*'"  X- xthe FCC for reconsideration of an order prior to seeking review in this court. See 47 U.S.C.   X-405(a).  X-(DISCUSSION ă  X-  A. Departure from Established Principles ă  Xx-  Xa-   x Cellnet contends that the FCCs decision to sunset its rule violated its establishment of a  xcommon carriers obligation to serve the public indifferently, and in so doing, represented an  xarbitrary and capricious decision. We may set aside an agencys rule only if it is arbitrary,  X - xycapricious, abusive of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law. Cincinnati Bell Tel.  X -Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing 5 U.S.C.  706(2)(A)).   xCellnet argues that for over twenty years the FCC has consistently applied to  x telecommunications common carriers the basic principle that their services must be offered  x>without regard to the status of the customer and without restrictions on services which are  X- xprivately beneficial and not publicly detrimental. Cellnet relies on a D.C. Circuit decision, Hush X- xaPhone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956), as the source of the articulation  xjof the publics right to unrestricted nondetrimental use of common carrier telecommunications  XU- xservices. It also cites HushaPhone as the basis of the FCCs establishment of its first resale  xpolicy for private line service. The petitioner identifies as the essence of the FCCs justification  x[for its evolving resale policies a customers right to use a selected service without interference  X- xyfrom the carrier selling the service. Cellnet then extrapolates from that principle to the situation  x.at hand, contending that limiting the customers of cellular providers, such as the petitioner, to  xjdealing only with a facilitiesbased carrier despite the benefits a reseller may be able to provide  X-to customers, is in violation of the established principle articulated in HushaPhone.  X-  ]xThe FCC responds that there is no common carrier obligation to allow resale of services.  xIt cites the statutory requirements that carriers are subject to: that they must engage in just and  xreasonable practices and that their practices cannot be unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory.  X\- xSee 47 U.S.C. 201(b) & 202(a). \k X- L Ѝ Subsection (b) of  201, Services and charges, provides that: XxAll charges, practice, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful....The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.  Subsection (a) of  202, Discriminations and preferences, provides that: XxIt shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations,"(0*0*0*(" facilities, or services for or in connection with like communication service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.  It also cites the fact that Congresss 1996 amendments to"\0*0*0*^"  xthe Communications Act created a resale requirement for local exchange carriers and left to the  xZFCCs discretion to decide if any CMRS providers should be defined as local exchange carriers.  xGiven such, the FCC argues, there is no wellestablished requirement that carriers resell their services as outlined by the petitioner.   xThe FCC also responds to Cellnets argument that judicial and FCC precedent applying  xy 201(b) and 202(a) entitles it as a matter of law to use the services of CMRS licensees for any  x[ privately beneficial purpose unless such use is demonstrated to result in public detriment.  x[The FCC asserts that the authorities cited by Cellnet do not support such a narrow view of the  xFCCs discretion under  201 and 202 and that Cellnet exaggerates the reach of the D.C.  X - xCircuits holding in HushaPhone. It characterizes the decision as concerning the reasonableness  xZof a telephone companys restrictions on a subscribers use of a telephone instrument devoted to  X - xa subscribers private use. In the FCCs view of the D.C. Circuits decision in HushaPhone,  xthe courts holding that the tariffed prohibition on foreign attachments was neither just or  xKreasonable under  201(b) does not translate to, as Cellnet argues, a conclusion that subscribers  X - xzare entitled to resell a carriers services. The FCC also contends that HushaPhone did not  xestablish any type of public detriment/private benefit analysis as the universal test for the FCCs  xdetermination of what is just and reasonable under  201(b). The FCC characterizes as  Xh- xmeritless Cellnets contention that the FCCs reliance on HushaPhone in its early resale  xdecisions created a subscribers right to be free from restrictions on resale so long as there was  xno concrete public detriment. Because this contention is meritless, the FCC argues, Cellnets  xidentification of the use of costbenefit analysis as an arbitrary departure from such an  x established subscribers right is also meritless. The FCC points out that it used a costbenefit  xanalysis to eliminate the resale requirement between facilitiesbased cellular providers when it  X- xdetermined that such a limitation on the resale rule was just and reasonable under 201(b). See  X- xCellular Resale NPRM and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 4008. In that same decision, the FCC found  xthat the exception to the general cellular resale rule would not violate  202(a) because it was  x=justified in light of the goal of stimulating interbrand competition and promoting more efficient  X- xuse of the cellular radio spectrum. Id. The FCC acknowledges that it performed a public  xjdetriment analysis as part of its consideration of restrictions on resale in earlier decisions, but  X\-asserts that such is not a required step in its rulemaking.    !xFinally, the FCC contends that its resale policy is not guided by a rigid interpretation of  x[ 201 and 202. Rather than being guided by some absolute right, it is guided by a policy goal  x{of opening up monopoly and duopoly markets to competition. The FCC explains that its  x]determinations in the past that resale restrictions were unlawful have been casebycase  xjdeterminations depending on markets and the particular effects of resale restrictions. The FCC  x.argues that, contrary to Cellnets position, it did not forbear from enforcing  201 and 202; to  xthe contrary, the FCC made clear that its sunsetting did not relieve CMRS providers of any""0*0*0*f!"  x0portion of their statutory obligation under sections 201(b) and 202(a) of the Act, nor ...  X-determine that any resale practice is just and reasonable per se. CMRS Resale Order at 14.   ]xWe agree with the FCC that Cellnets arguments are meritless. We reject the notion that  X- xLthe HushaPhone decision set out a public detriment/private benefit test for FCC action. In  xythat decision, the D.C. Circuit determined that the tariff at issue was neither just nor reasonable  Xz- xunder  201 and 202 because it was an unwarranted interference with a persons use of their  xown telephone. The justness and reasonableness requirements set out in  201 and 202 remain  XN- xthe criteria for FCC action. Thus, the HushaPhone decision neither set forth other, more  X9- xrestrictive principles, nor did it recognize the existence of a customers right to resell services as  x<long as such was not publicly detrimental. Accordingly, we do not regard the order under review  X - xas an arbitrary departure.  See Cellular Resale NPRM and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. at 172022 (deciding  xthat cellular carriers may deny resale capacity to fully operational facilitiesbased competitors on  X - xthe basis that such would not violate the standards of  201(b) and  202(a)), affd sub nom.,  X - xCellnet Communication, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In its order, the FCC  xdetermined that the continuation of the resale rule would no longer be needed to ensure that  x-providers practices were just, reasonable and not unreasonably discriminatory under 201 and  x=202; it determined that the developing competitive market would ensure the reasonableness of  xcarriers practices. We also decline to characterize the FCCs decision as arbitrary, capricious  xzor not in accordance with law in light of Congresss directive to the FCC that it consider the  xcompetitive effect of its regulations and that it must forbear from applying any regulation...  xif the Commission determines that enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary  xto ensure that [carriers practices or regulations] are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or  X-unreasonably discriminatory, 47 U.S.C. 160(a)(1) (1996).8vk Xv- L Ѝ Congress has directed that the FCC  XH-Xx(a)...shall forbear from applying any regulation... to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers  X-or telecommunications services, in any or some of their geographic markets, if the Commission determines that  XxX` ` (1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; ` XxX` ` (2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of consumers; and ` XxX` ` (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the public interest. ` [L. . . Xx(b)In making the determination under subsection (a)(3) of this section, the Commission shall consider whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or regulation will promote competitive market conditions, including the extent to which"(0*0*0*V(" such forbearance will enhance competition among providers of telecommunications services. If the Commission determines that such forbearance will promote competition among providers of telecommunications services, that determination may be the basis for a Commission finding that forbearance is in the public interest.(# 47 U.S.C.  160(a)(b) (1996) (emphasis added)." 0*0*0*7"Ԍ X-ԙx B. Administrative Costs ă   0xCellnet next contends that the FCCs decision to sunset its resale rule was arbitrary and  xcapricious or not in accordance with law in its reliance on administrative costs. As already  xmentioned, we may set aside an agencys rule only if it is arbitrary, capricious, abusive of  X- xdiscretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.k XD - L Ѝ Cellnet cites case law and FCC rulings in support of a standard of review for restrictions on resale which requires that alleged public detriment be direct, substantial and immediate. Such a standard applies to a carrier before the FCC, but such a standard does not govern the FCCs actions. Rather, as mentioned, we review FCC actions to determine if they are arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. Cincinnati Bell, 69 F.3d at 758 (citing 5  xU.S.C.  706(2)(A)). In making our determination, we consider whether the agency has  x=considered the relevant factors involved and whether there has been a clear error in judgment.  XJ- xId. The agency must have articulated a rational connection, i.e., supporting reasons, between its  X5-fact findings and its action. Id.   X -  x The petitioner contends that the FCC relied on administrative costs to make its rule and  xthat such was not supported by adequate evidence or analysis, so that we should reverse the  xFCCs order. In its order, the FCC stated that the rule, like all regulation, necessarily implicates  x=costs, including administrative costs, which should not be imposed unless clearly warranted.  X - x?CMRS Resale Order at 9. Cellnet complains that the FCC did not make clear whether its  xreference to administrative costs was to industry or government administrative costs. It further  xcontends that the FCC received no data and provided no specific evidence or studies regarding  xjthe size of such administrative costs. It additionally complains that the FCC did not show how  xthe general proposition regarding administrative costs was relevant to the issue of access to resale.   xCellnet goes on to argue that even if the consideration of administrative costs was  xappropriate, the FCC failed to explain why the costs of regulation prohibiting restrictions on  xresale are different from the costs involved in the FCCs general obligation to ensure that CMRS  x=subscribers obtain reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates and are free of illegal practices and  xclassifications (under  201 and 202 of the Communications Act). The petitioner contends that  xLthe FCCs rationale is illogical because, in its view, the two activities are indistinguishable, but  xyet, to the FCC, the unknown costs involved in policing the prohibition on resale restrictions were significant and intolerable.   xCellnet also points to a statement by the FCC at an earlier stage in the proceedings that"? [ 0*0*0*l"  x<the extension of the resale requirement to other CMRS providers would involve minimal expense  X- xand technical problems for most of the CMRS licensees subject to the requirement. Second  X- xNPRM, 10 F.C.C.R. at 10708. Cellnet contends that the lack of an explanation accounting for this earlier statement should raise questions.   xThe FCC responds that Cellnets arguments relating to administrative costs are simply  xManother version of its contention that the FCC must demonstrate that resale causes public  xydetriment before it may allow carriers to refuse resale. The FCC explains that it considered the  x!costs of the resale rule relative to the rules diminishing benefits as the market becomes  X5- xcompetitive, CMRS Resale Order at 9, and that evidence in the record supports the FCCs  X - xconclusion that the benefits of the resale rule diminish as competition increases. See, e.g., id. at  x 13 & n.61 (noting that in markets for CMRS other than cellular, broadband PCS, or covered  xZSMR services, competitive conditions render a resale rule an unnecessary burden because the  xjrecord suggests that resale is an established practice, competition appears to be vigorous, and  xthere is no evidence that such providers are unreasonably restricting resale). The FCC asserts  x\that the record also contains evidence supporting the FCCs conclusion that the resale rule  X- xinvolves costs which should not be imposed unless clearly warranted. CMRS Resale Order at  x9. The FCC cites commenting parties statements regarding the negative impacts of such a rule  xjon the availability of service and discouragement of investment in new technology as well as a  xxstudys general conclusion that government regulation of market entry imposes costs on industry and consumers.   xThe FCC concludes that such a basis in the record allowed it to reasonably determine that  x-the benefits available from the resale rules application to cellular licensees and their competitors,  xbroadband PCS licensees and covered SMR providers, when balanced against costs, were  xsufficient to justify extending and retaining the rule for the fiveyear time period; it explained that  xyuntil competitors are able to establish themselves, the justifications for resale remain. The FCC  xalso asserts that it could reasonably conclude that competitive development in the market will  xobviate the need for the rule, as the costs will come to outweigh the benefits of the rule. It  xreasoned that as markets become more competitive, the benefits of a resale rule diminish because  xycarriers have less opportunity to restrict resale. Accordingly, the FCC reasoned, without much in the way of benefits, the rules costs will exceed its benefits.   xThe FCC also addresses Cellnets argument regarding the industryversusagency nature  xof the enforcement costs. It contends that the discussion of costs in the order indicates that the  xFCC was relying on costs to the industry and consumers, and to the extent that its decision also relies on the FCCs own administrative costs, the FCCs decision may take that into account.   xThe FCC also asserts that Cellnet is inaccurate in claiming that the FCC changed its  xkposition without justification between the Second NPRM and the final CMRS Resale Order,  xpointing out that the FCC justified the rule change on the basis that the original rationale for the  xrule had eroded and that the costs of the rule, including administrative costs to the industry, would come to outweigh its benefits.   xCellnets argument on this issue is unavailing. At one point in its order, the FCC  xreferenced the administrative costs that accompany regulation, commenting that resulting"( 0*0*0*'"  xadministrative costs should not be imposed unless clearly warranted. Such reasoning was not  xan arbitrary or capricious basis for the FCCs decision nor was it not in accordance with law.  xThe consideration of administration costs is a natural component to the consideration of  x[competition and the effect of the proposed rule on the relevant markets. In addition, in light of  X- xthe fact that such consideration is mandated by statute, see 47 U.S.C.  160(a)(b), it is certainly  xnot arbitrary, capricious or abusive of the FCCs discretion to have considered such in  xformulating its rule. Finally, the FCC determined, relying on commenting parties statements,  x=a study of governmental regulation of market entry, and observations of other CMRS markets,  xthat there will be no identifiable benefits from a continuation of the resale rule in the face of a  x[competitive market five years hence, and thus any costs are excessive and not justified in light  xof a costbenefit analysis. Such a conclusion is not so arbitrary and capricious as to warrant reversal.  X - C. Predictive Judgment ă  X -  _ x Cellnet contends that the FCC did not have an adequate basis in the record for its  X - xpredictive judgment that CMRS markets will be competitive in five years. As already mentioned,  X- x/we may set aside an agencys rule only if it is arbitrary, capricious, abusive of discretion or  X{- xotherwise not in accordance with law. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 69 F.3d at 758. In making its  xdetermination, we consider whether the agency has considered the relevant factors involved and  XO- xwhether there has been a clear error in judgment. Id. The agency must have articulated a  X:-rational connection, i.e., supporting reasons, between its fact findings and its action. Id.   X-  x The petitioner argues that the FCCs predictive judgment about the state of competition  xamong CMRS providers in five years is fatally flawed. It contends that the FCC did not cite any  xzstatutory authority for its consideration of the state of competition now or in five years as a  xreason for terminating its prohibition of resale restrictions, and that in actuality the statutory scheme is to the contrary.   xThe petitioner also characterizes the FCCs predictive judgment as an illegitimate basis  xfor its order because, while it admits that the FCC has some latitude in making policies based on  xits judgments and predictions, it contends that the FCCs judgment was not based on logic or  xevidence in the record. It points to the fact that the FCCs rules do not assure that the majority  xof the public will have access to PCS service within five years after the issuance of the initial  xlicenses; the FCCs licensing rules require only that PCS licensees with 30 MHz of spectrum  xreach onethird of their service area populations within five years of their licenses issuance, and  x>that PCS licensees with 10 MHz of spectrum must only serve onequarter of the population  X - xwithin five years or failing that, make a showing of substantial service. See 47 C.F.R.  x24.203. Cellnet explains that within five years of the PCS licenses issuance, the FCCs rules  x{do not guarantee that any more than onethird of the population will have access to PCS competitors.   MxCellnet also points to an absence of evidence in the record to support the FCCs prediction  xof competition among PCS providers and cellular providers. In establishing the allocation  xscheme, the petitioner explains, the FCC acknowledged that many PCS licensees, particularly  xkthose with 10 MHz of spectrum, might merely provide niche services or augment services  X(- xcurrently provided by the cellular carriers. See Amendment of the Commissions Rules to"( 0*0*0*'"  X- x{Establish New Personal Communications Services, 9 F.C.C.R. 4957, 5981 (1994). Cellnet  x<accordingly argues that there is no basis for the FCC to assume that the issuance of PCS licenses  xyin any particular geographic area will necessarily result in PCS providers vigorously competing  xwith existing cellular carriers. Cellnet also points out that PCS is still in the early stages of its  x?development and thus there is no track record to predict how markets will develop. The  x<petitioner suggests that the FCCs prediction is revealed to be further flawed by the fact that PCS  xjlicensees will incur billions in capital costs for their licenses and infrastructure, a burden which  xthe FCC has acknowledged may result in disaggregation of spectrum, which would enhance the  xknumber of niche competitors and decrease the number of competitors providing nationwide  X3- xmobile communications services comparable to that of existing cellular providers. See  xxGeographical Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation by Commercial Mobile Radio Service  X - xzLicensees, 11 F.C.C.R. 10187 (1996) (notice of proposed rulemaking). The petitioner asserts  x{that until there is competition, cellular carriers and PCS licensees (as well as other CMRS  x!carriers) have incentives to restrict resale of their service. It further contends that if the  xdevelopment of competition does not eliminate the carriers incentive to prohibit resale, then the  xFCC lacks a basis for sunsetting the resale rule; if, on the other hand, more competition does  xeliminate the carriers incentive to prohibit resale, the retention of the policy will not impose any costs on carriers.   1xThe FCC contends that its determination that by the end of the fiveyear transitional  x=period there will be sufficient facilitiesbased competition in the market for cellularcompetitive  xiservices to render mandatory resale unnecessary is reasonable and thus entitled to our deference.  xIt asserts that its decision rests on a forecast of the direction of public interest which necessarily  x<involves the agencys expertise, and thus complete factual support in the record is not necessary  xor possible. The FCC points out that PCS has been historically regarded as a competitive  xcontender for cellular service and that at the time of its order, it noted that some broadband PCS  x=providers were already competing with cellular carriers where they had begun service and that  xLthey would begin nationwide service in the near future. In addition, the FCC points to the fact  xthat private entities have bid and paid significant sums for PCS licenses and that such providers  xthus have an incentive to establish viable entities. It also points out that in the FCCs report to  xjCongress on the state of competition in the CMRS market, it reported that cellular providers, in  X=- x!anticipation of PCS, were lowering prices and investing in digital technology. See First  X(- x!Competition Report, 10 F.C.C.R. at 885152 & n.34. The FCC goes on to point to recent  X-indicators that its predictions are being borne out.   xThe FCC dismisses the fact that the FCCs rules require PCS licensees to reach only one xthird of the population in their service area within five years. It points out that because many  x\PCS licensees paid significant sums for their license, they have incentives to build out their  X"- xsystems quickly. See Geographic Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation by Commercial  X#- xMobile Radio Services Licensees, 11 F.C.C.R. 10187, 10197 (1996) (noting that many broadband  xZPCS licensees may meet their fiveyear construction obligations early). It also disputes Cellnets  xyimplicit assertion that some of the PCS licensees may only be able to provide niche services. It  xargues that Cellnets claim that there will not be that many PCS licensees in each market does  x=not address the rationale behind the sunset rule, which is the sufficiency of competition in the  xmarket for cellularlike services. The existence of niches will not undermine the FCCs goal of  xcompetition with cellular licensees. The FCC notes that any disaggregation that may occur will") 0*0*0*'"  xencourage competition and that it already noted such in an earlier unrelated report; additionally, disaggregation agreements remain subject to the FCCs review.  X-  xCellnets argument on this issue fails. As the FCCs judgment is a predictive one, it  x.cannot necessarily be proven by the record. It is wellestablished that under the arbitrary and  xcapricious standard of review, an agencys predictive judgments about areas that are within the  Xv- xagencys field of discretion and expertise are entitled to particularly deferential review. Milk  Xa- xIndustry Foundation v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Franklin Savings Assn  XL- xv. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127, 114748 (10th Cir. 1991); Aeronautical  X7- xRadio, Inc. v. FCC, 928 F.2d 428, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Western FuelsIll., Inc. v. Interstate  X" - x Commerce Commn, 878 F.2d 1025, 1030 (7th Cir. 1989). This deference has been explained  xas deriving from the fact that such judgments tend to be infused with policy considerations that  X - xiare not appropriate for close judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.  X - xMv. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1979). While we must be particularly deferential when  xNreviewing such predictive judgments, such judgments are of course not unimpeachable.  X - xLInternational Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  x[An agency must still engage in reasoned decisionmaking, although predictive judgments may  X-often involve dramatic departures from longstanding policy.  Id. at 822.   xThe petitioner has a fundamental misconception as the premise for its challenge. The FCC  xLdid not adopt its resale policy for the purpose of ensuring the availability of resale. It adopted  xthe policy as a means to achieve competition; Cellnet has confused the means and ends the FCC  xhad in mind. The question of whether lifting the resale prohibition would offer the public the  x<benefits of competition implicates the FCCs expertise. The agencys predictive judgment on this  x<point is certainly not arbitrary or capricious given the accepted fact that broadband PCS will offer  xwireless services competitive with cellular services and that five years is the standard buildout  X- x time period for broadband PCS licensees, see 47 C.F.R. 24.203 (requiring PCS licensees to  X- xbuild out networks within five years of being licensed). See, e.g., Western Fuels, 878 F.2d at  x1030 (noting that predictions about price disclosure are within ICCs area of expertise and  X{- xaccordingly giving due deference to its predictive judgment regarding such); Natural Resources  Xf- xDefense Council, 606 F.2d at 1052 (identifying as within the SECs area of expertise the probable  xburden on corporations of complying with proposed rules and the likelihood that a proposed  xdisclosure rule would produce particular corporate policies and noting courts deference for  xagencys deductions in these areas). Because five years is the required buildout time frame, the  xyFCC expects that cellular carriers will not possess sufficient market power at that time to enable  xthem to impose unreasonable restrictions on resale and stifle the competition of resellers. If the  xFCCs predictions about the level of competition do not materialize, then it will of course need  xto reconsider its sunsetting provision in accordance with its continuing obligation to practice  X"- xreasoned decisionmaking. See, e.g., Aeronautical Radio, 928 F.2d at 445 (noting such a  x<possibility of reconsideration in context of declining to set aside a FCC rule based on a predictive  X$-judgment). 74D. Notice  X((-   xThe petitioner contends that the FCC failed to provide adequate notice pursuant to the  xAdministrative Procedure Act which requires a rulemaking notice to include either the terms")0*0*0*'"  X- x[or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. See 5  xU.S.C.  553(b) (1994). Cellnet contends that the Notice of Inquiry and Second NPRM in the  xproceedings below did not adequately inform interested parties, such as the petitioner, that the  xFCC was contemplating the sunset of the resale rule as applied to all cellular providers. We must  xfirst consider the FCCs argument that Cellnet waived its objection to the adequacy of the FCCs  xrule making notice by not raising it to the FCC in a petition for rehearing. We review de novo  Xx- xthe question of a waiver in agency proceedings. See Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990).   ?xThe FCC contends that the petitioner is procedurally barred from raising its assertion of  xerror as to the FCCs notice because  405 of the Communications Act precludes judicial review  X - x\of a claim not previously raised to the FCC. See 47 U.S.C. 405(a). Cellnet responds with a  xSecond Circuit decision which suggests that this court may consider the notice issue if no novel  x/factual issue is raised or if the claim raises a legal issue on which courts have already made  X - x-known their general view to the contrary. See National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 791 F.2d  xz1016, 1021 (2d Cir. 1986). It contends that in this case the agencys views would not aid our  xKresolution of the notice question. It also asserts that the goals of  405 would not be undermined by this courts consideration of the issue despite Cellnets failure to raise the issue to the FCC. xCellnets assertion of error is barred. Section 405(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows.  XxThe filing of a petition for reconsideration shall not be a condition precedent to  Bjudicial review of any ...order...except where the party seeking such review  B...relies on questions of fact or law upon which the Commission ...has been afforded no opportunity to pass.   x47 U.S.C.  405(a). It is wellestablished that issues not presented to an agency may be deemed  X- xwaived on subsequent judicial review. See, e.g., James v. Chater, 96 F.3d 1341, 1342 (10th Cir.  X- x1996); Chipman v. Shalala, 90 F.3d 421, 423 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing cases). Procedural  xobjections under the APA are precisely the sort of issues appropriately raised before the  Xq- xCommission in the first instance. City of Brookings Municipal Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153,  X\- x1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to review petitioners claim that APA notice was inadequate).  xSection 405 dictates that factual and legal issues be presented to the FCC prior to this courts  xjudicial review of issues. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, [t]he very purpose of [section 405]  x0is to afford the Commission the initial opportunity to correct errors in its decision or the  X- xproceeding leading to decision. Action for Childrens Television v. FCC, 906 F.2d 752, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citation and quotation omitted).  X - E. Amicus Curiae  W"<  X#-  0x The FCC contends that the issues raised by the amicus to this case that are beyond the  xscope of Cellnets arguments are not properly before this court. The FCCs contention is based  x[on two grounds. First, it argues that an amicus may not enlarge the scope of the issues before  XJ&- xthis court. Second, it argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider arguments beyond the scope of the issues presented by the parties to the appeal.   ]xThe FCC argues that CONXUS has improperly enlarged the scope of this panels review")0*0*0*'"  X- x[by raising issues beyond those raised by Cellnet. The FCC argues that for CONXUS to obtain  x[review of the issues with which it is concerned, it should have filed its own petition for review,  xLafter satisfying the prerequisites for this courts review. Because CONXUS did not participate  xin the proceedings below nor did it seek reconsideration of the FCCs order, the FCC argues that it is precluded from obtaining judicial review of the issues it raises.   xCellnet has challenged only the sunsetting of the existing resale rule. CONXUS seeks for  X_- xthe resale rule to be extended to narrowband PCS licensees, whereas at present the rule only  XJ- xconcerns, inter alia, wideband PCS licensees. CONXUS argues that it is not expanding the issues  xpresented to this court because it is challenging the same rule that Cellnet challenges and because  X - ` CCellnet also seeks a remand for reconsideration of the rule. While an amicus may offer  X - xassistance in resolving issues properly before a court, it may not raise additional issues or  X - xarguments not raised by the parties. See, e.g., United States v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 84 F.3d  X - x.1, 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 480 (1996); Edison Elec. Inst. v. Occupational Safety and  X - xHealth Admin., 849 F.2d 611, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1988). To the extent that the amicus raises issues  xLor make arguments that exceed those properly raised by the parties, we may not consider such  xissues. Thus, we may not consider the resale rule visavis its impact and factors relating to  X-narrowband PCS. k X- L Ѝ In addition, we are precluded from entertaining any additional issues raised by CONXUS by the statutory provision conferring our jurisdiction. That provision requires as a prerequisite to our review that a petitioner file a petition for reconsideration with the FCC if it was not, as CONXUS was not, a party to the proceedings before the FCC. XxThe filing of a petition for reconsideration shall not be a condition precedent to  Xr-judicial review of [an order] except where the party seeking such review (1)was not a party to the proceedings resulting in such order....   X/-47 U.S.C.  405(a)(1) (emphasis added). As CONXUS did not file a petition for reconsideration with the FCC it may not independently raise issues for our review. CONXUS argues that it is not precluded by this prerequisite because it does not acknowledge that it presents any issues in addition to those of Cellnet; it contends it is functioning solely as a  X-proper amicus. As stated above, to the extent that CONXUS raises the same issues, it is not barred; to the extent that it raises separate issues, it is barred.  XU-  x Because we do not have jurisdiction to consider CONXUSs assertion that the FCC did  xynot act reasonably in declining to impose the resale requirement on narrowband PCS licensees, we do not consider the parties arguments regarding this issue.   X-H% CONCLUSION ă xFor the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petition for review.