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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of )
) File No. ENF 98-02
Business Discount Plan, Inc. )
) NAL/Acct. No. 916EF0004
Apparent Liability for Forfeiture )
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION
Adopted: December 1, 2000; Released:
December 7, 2000
By the Commission: Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and
issuing a separate statement.
In this Order, we deny in part and grant in part a
Petition for Reconsideration (``Petition'') filed by Business
Discount Plan, Inc. (``BDP''). BDP requests that the Commission
review its July 17, 2000 Order of Forfeiture,1 which imposed a
forfeiture of $2,400,000 against BDP for willful or repeated
violations of sections 201(b)2 and 2583 of the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended (the ``Act''), and our related rules and
orders. In the Forfeiture Order, the Commission found that BDP
had willfully or repeatedly violated section 258 by changing the
preferred interexchange carriers (``PICs'') designated by 30
consumers without their authorization, a practice commonly
referred to as ``slamming.'' Additionally, we determined that
BDP, in effecting these 30 unauthorized PIC changes, had
willfully or repeatedly violated section 201(b) by using unjust
and unreasonable telemarketing practices, such as misrepresenting
the nature of BDP's service offering. In its Petition, BDP asks
the Commission to reduce the amount of the forfeiture assessed
for the section 201(b) and 258 violations.
Between December 1997 and October 1998, the Commission
processed thousands of written consumer complaints alleging
slamming and unreasonable telemarketing practices by BDP.4
Following an investigation of 30 of these complaints, the
Commission issued the BDP NAL,5 which concluded that BDP's
failure to obtain the complainants' authorization prior to
submitting PIC-change requests apparently violated section 258
and the Commission's rules and orders against slamming. Further,
we determined that BDP's use of unjust and unreasonable
telemarketing practices in connection with these unauthorized
conversions apparently violated section 201(b) of the Act.
Accordingly, we found that BDP was apparently liable for a
proposed forfeiture of $40,000 for each of the 30 unauthorized
conversions, and an additional $40,000 for each instance in which
BDP employed unjust and unreasonable telemarketing practices,
resulting in a total forfeiture amount of $2,400,000.6 BDP filed
a response, contesting the Commission's findings of apparent
liability under sections 201(b) and 258, as well as the amount of
the proposed forfeiture. We rejected each of these arguments in
the Forfeiture Order, and determined that the record before us
justified the proposed forfeiture.7
On August 16, 2000, BDP filed the instant Petition for
Reconsideration with the Commission. In its Petition, BDP
reiterates its earlier arguments that the Commission lacks
jurisdiction under section 201(b) over unjust and unreasonable
telemarketing practices, and that the assessed forfeiture is
disproportionate to the alleged offense. BDP further contends
that the Forfeiture Order relies on evidence that fails to meet
the proper standard for assessing forfeitures pursuant to section
503(b) of the Act. As discussed below, we deny in part and grant
in part BDP's Petition.
Reconsideration is appropriate only where the
petitioner either shows a material error or omission in the
original order or raises additional facts not known or existing
until after the petitioner's last opportunity to present such
matters.8 A petition that simply repeats arguments previously
considered and rejected will be denied.9 As set forth below,
review of BDP's petition for reconsideration and the Forfeiture
Order reveals that the Commission has already considered and
rejected many of the arguments contained in BDP's Petition.
A. Section 201(b) Authority
BDP contends that the Commission's Forfeiture Order
``ignores or fails to address'' statutory and other precedents
showing that the Commission lacks jurisdiction under section
201(b) of the Act over fraudulent and deceptive telemarketing and
advertising practices.10 As in its Response to the NAL, BDP
maintains that a line of state preemption cases establishes that
section 201(b) does not provide a cause of action for addressing
the reasonableness of common carriers' deceptive telemarketing
practices.11 BDP also challenges the Commission's reliance on
earlier Commission proceedings in which we exercised our section
201(b) jurisdiction.12 Further, BDP asserts that we were barred
from acting under section 201(b) in this instance because the
Federal Trade Commission (``FTC'') has sole jurisdiction over the
telemarketing and advertising practices of common carriers.13
As an initial matter, the Commission's Forfeiture Order
previously considered and rejected BDP's reliance on state
preemption analyses to support its jurisdictional argument.14
These state preemption cases involved situations in which the
courts held that the Communications Act does not indicate a
``uniquely federal interest'' in common carriers' unfair and
deceptive telemarketing practices, so as to ``preempt'' state
efforts to prevent these practices.15 In the Forfeiture Order,
we stated that even if the Commission lacks a ``uniquely federal
interest'' in preventing slamming and deceptive marketing
practices, BDP presented no evidence or arguments to persuade us
that the Commission therefore lacks authority to declare a
deceptive marketing practice ``unjust and unreasonable'' under
section 201(b) and to issue a forfeiture based on the unlawful
conduct. Hence, we concluded that the Commission need not have a
``uniquely federal interest'' in preventing deceptive marketing
practices in order to exercise its section 201(b) jurisdiction
over ``unjust and unreasonable'' practices by common carriers
``in connection with'' communication service.16 We now
reiterate that even though the states share our interest in
preventing slamming and deceptive marketing practices, we are not
barred from attacking these fraudulent practices with weapons in
our own arsenal - such as section 201(b) of the Communications
Nor do we accept BDP's argument that we erred in
finding support in earlier Commission proceedings that invoked
section 201(b) to address common carriers' unreasonable marketing
practices. We disagree with BDP's claim that these proceedings
are irrelevant because ``[n]either of these decisions hold that
the parties had allegedly engaged in fraudulent practices.''18
To the contrary, the TRAC Decision19 demonstrates that long
before the instant proceeding, the Commission's Common Carrier
Bureau recognized that section 201(b) provided a cause of action
against several common carriers who had engaged in fraudulent
business practices, such as ``failing to convey sufficient
information as to the carriers' identity, rates, practices, and
range of services.''20 And although the Commission stopped short
of finding a section 201(b) violation in the AT&T proceeding,21
it nevertheless cited the statutory provision in admonishing AT&T
about fraudulent credit card marketing practices that had created
significant consumer confusion.22
Likewise, we reject BDP's claim that we could not
exercise our section 201(b) authority in this instance because:
1) Congress did not refer specifically to ``telemarketing
practices'' when it granted the Commission authority over
``unjust and unreasonable practices'' in section 201(b) of the
original Communications Act of 1934; and 2) Congress has not
amended section 201(b) to specifically include ``fraudulent
telemarketing practices.'' Neither of these observations shows
that the Commission lacks authority over fraudulent telemarketing
practices under the ``unjust and unreasonable practices''
standard in section 201(b). Congress gave the Commission broad
authority over unjust and unreasonable practices ``for and in
connection with communication services.''23 In enacting section
201(b), Congress did not enumerate or otherwise limit the
specific practices to which this provision applies. Instead, it
granted us a more general authority to address such practices as
they might arise in a changing telecommunications marketplace.
We also reject BDP's argument that Congress, in
enacting the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act
(``TDDRA''), 24 ``must have recognized that the FCC did not have
authority to regulate telemarketing and advertising under the
Communications Act, because in approving this new public law,
Congress expressly granted authority to the FTC to regulate
communication common carriers' telemarketing and advertising
activities in connection with pay-per-call services.''25 First,
this argument is a logical non sequitur. The grant of authority
to the FTC indicates nothing about the FCC's own authority.
Moreover, the FTC was not directed to regulate the activities of
common carriers; rather, it was directed to regulate those who
advertise and sell services offered on a pay-per-call basis.26
Thus, the FTC's role under the TDDRA is irrelevant to the FCC's
role in regulating common carrier practices.
B. Supporting Evidence for Assessment of a Forfeiture Under
BDP next argues that the Forfeiture Order relies on
``incompetent evidence'' that does not meet the ``proper legal
standard'' for assessing a forfeiture pursuant to section 503(b)
of the Act.27 As explained below, upon further review we have
decided to reduce the amount of the forfeiture to reflect the
fact that some of the inferences drawn from the evidence cannot
fairly be supported.
The Commission's Forfeiture Order was based on numerous
pieces of evidence, including 30 written consumer complaints28
against BDP.29 Of the 30 written complaints in the record, 1530
were filed by consumers who did not recall having had any contact
with BDP prior to discovering unauthorized long distance charges
from BDP on their telephone bills.31 Accordingly, while there is
ample direct evidence in the record showing that BDP slammed
these 15 customers, there is no such direct evidence showing that
BDP deceived these 15 consumers about the nature of its service
offering. In the NAL, the Commission inferred that, ``based on
the clear pattern of deceptive behavior established in the
record, BDP's telemarketers and third-party verifiers deceived
these consumers by misrepresenting BDP's service as a bill
consolidation plan offered by the consumers' local exchange
carriers or preferred interexchange carriers.''32 Upon further
consideration, we agree with BDP that this inference, for 15 of
the complaints, was unwarranted, but is valid for the other 15
complaints. Accordingly, we will reduce the forfeiture amount by
$600,000 (i.e., the $40,000 forfeiture amount for each violation
of section 201(b), for 15 complainants).
We reject, however, BDP's assertion that the Commission
should reduce the amount of the forfeiture because several of the
sworn declarations, filed in support of consumer complaints, are
unreliable in that they rely upon hearsay. 33 Neither the Act
nor the rules speak to the type or quantity of evidence necessary
for assessing a forfeiture. Within constitutional limits, we
believe it is within the Commission's discretion to determine the
kind of evidence needed to support a forfeiture. A review of
the Commission's past forfeiture actions reveals that while the
Commission has based forfeitures on a combination of consumer
complaints and sworn declarations,34 the Commission has also
based forfeitures solely on consumer complaints.35 Hence, the
Commission decides, on a case-by-case basis, whether to obtain
declarations in support of the complaints and whether to include
these declarations as part of the record. In the instant case,
the forfeiture was supported by a body of evidence that included
numerous complaints sufficient to establish a consistent pattern
of abuses, as well as declarations filed in support of these
complaints. While BDP is correct in asserting that a few of the
declarants lacked personal knowledge of what occurred in the
telemarketing calls with BDP, we continue to believe that it was
a reasonable exercise of our discretion to accept such evidence
against the backdrop of the complete record in this proceeding,
which, as a whole, adequately supported the forfeiture. Indeed,
the Commission has stated that while the Federal Rules of
Evidence generally govern Commission hearings, these rules may be
``relaxed if the ends of justice will be better serviced by so
doing.''36 To that end, the Commission has noted that in certain
circumstances, we may consider hearsay as probative evidence ``if
it would serve the interests of justice.''37 We believe that in
the instant proceeding, it serves the interests of justice to
consider the challenged declarations along with the whole body of
evidence, which, as stated above, includes documentary evidence
sufficient to support the assessed forfeiture.
C. Appropriateness of Assessed Forfeiture Amount
BDP seeks a reduction of the forfeiture on the grounds
that the Forfeiture Order did not consider its arguments that: 1)
the proposed forfeiture was out of proportion to the alleged
offense, in contravention of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution;38 and 2) the forfeiture for the section 201(b)
violations was inconsistent with the Commission's Forfeiture
Policy Statement.39 BDP also asserts that the Commission
abused its discretion because it failed to analyze: 1) the
``actual damages'' incurred by each complainant (i.e., ``the
amount BDP refunded the customer plus amounts refunded by the
local exchange carrier which BDP paid''); and 2) the ratio of the
damages to the penalty.40 Finally, BDP claims that it was denied
due process because it was never ``placed on notice'' that it
could be fined separately for fraudulent acts under section
201(b) of the Act.41
BDP's arguments do not justify a reduction of the
forfeiture amount. Contrary to BDP's contention, the Forfeiture
Order considered and rejected BDP's arguments concerning the
amount of the proposed forfeiture.42 First, as we stated in the
Forfeiture Order, the forfeiture is consistent with the
guidelines established in the Forfeiture Policy Statement, and
with our broad discretion under section 503(b) of the Act to
determine forfeiture amounts based on the circumstances of each
individual case.43 As we noted in the Forfeiture Order, we
assessed the standard $40,000 amount established in the
Forfeiture Policy Statement for slamming violations, even though
it would have been within our discretion to assess a forfeiture
higher than the standard amount. Indeed, in other cases
involving similarly egregious slamming activity, we have assessed
double the base forfeiture amount for slamming.44 The amount of
the forfeiture is well within the statutory maximum, and we find
no basis for the assertion that it is unconstitutionally high.
Further, we reiterate that neither the Forfeiture
Policy Statement, nor any other Commission order, barred us from
finding section 201(b) violations based on conduct related to
slamming.45 Contrary to BDP's argument, the fact that the
Commission's guidelines establish a standard forfeiture amount of
$40,000 for ``unauthorized conversions'' does not imply that a
carrier's fraudulent conduct in connection with marketing that
results in slamming constitutes a ``single violation'' that can
only be punished under section 258 of the Act.46 Indeed, the
Forfeiture Policy Statement specifically states that ``any
omission of a specific rule violation [such as section 201(b)] .
. . should not signal that the Commission considers any unlisted
violation as nonexistent or unimportant.''47 Moreover, we note
that case law indicating that deceptive marketing could
constitute a violation of section 201(b) pre-dated the behavior
here.48 For these reasons, we find no merit in BDP's claim that
it was denied due process because it was never ``placed on
notice'' that it could be fined separately for fraudulent acts
under section 201(b) of the Act. We also reject BDP's argument
that the total forfeiture amount (resulting from the dual
violations of sections 201(b) and 258) is excessive, and direct
BDP to the Forfeiture Policy Statement, which seeks to
``guarantee that forfeitures issued against large or highly
profitable entities are not considered merely an affordable cost
of doing business.''49 The Commission specifically cautioned
carriers that ``the forfeiture amount set out in a Notice of
Apparent Liability against them may in many cases be above, or
even well above, the relevant base amount.''50
As to BDP's assertion that we failed to consider all of
the evidence in calculating its forfeiture, including transcripts
of its verification tapes,51 we direct BDP's attention to the
NAL, which addressed the 45 audiotapes submitted by BDP. The
Commission found that the proffered tapes failed to negate the
complainants' assertions that during verification calls, BDP's
verifiers misrepresented the nature of BDP's service offering.52
BDP's subsequent submission of transcripts of some of these same
tapes, in connection with its Response to the NAL, did nothing to
alter our conclusion.53 We also reject BDP's assertion that we
were required to base the forfeiture amount on the ``amount BDP
refunded the customer plus amounts refunded by the local exchange
carrier which BDP paid'' and the ratio of the damages to the
penalty. As noted above, the Commission possesses broad
discretion to assess penalties for slamming and/or section 201(b)
violations on a case-by-case basis, relying upon not only the
damage to consumers, but ``the nature, circumstances, extent and
gravity of the violation and, with respect to the violator, the
degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to
pay, and such other matters as justice may require.''54 Thus,
while BDP may disagree with our conclusions in the Forfeiture
Order, it has failed to demonstrate that further reduction of the
forfeiture amount is warranted.
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, IT IS
ORDERED, pursuant to Section 405 of the Communications Act, as
amended, 47 U.S.C.§ 405, and Section 1.106 of the Commission's
Rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.106, that the Petition for Reconsideration
filed by Business Discount Plan, Inc. IS DENIED IN PART AND
GRANTED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Section 503(b) of
the Act, 47 U.S.C.§ 503(b), and Section 1.80(f)(4) of the
Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. §1.80(f)(4), that Business Discount
Plan, Inc. SHALL FORFEIT to the United States Government the sum
of one million eight hundred thousand dollars ($1,800,000) for
violating Sections 201(b) and 258 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. §§
201(b), 258, as well as the Commission's rules and orders in
effect from December 1997 to December 1998 governing
interexchange carrier conversions.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Magalie Roman Salas
STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CONCURRING IN
PART, DISSENTING IN PART
Re: Business Discount Plan, Inc., Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture, Order on Reconsideration, File No. ENF 98-02,
NAL/Acct. No. 916EF0004 (rel. December 7, 2000).
As I stated in the original Order of Forfeiture, I support
the Commission's decision to impose a substantial fine for
``slamming'' on Business Discount Plan.55 However, I
respectfully dissent from the Commission's imposition of
additional forfeitures based on allegedly misleading advertising
claims under Section 201 (b). As I have described extensively
elsewhere, I believe the Commission should not assert
jurisdiction over carriers' advertising practices because: (1)
the Commission's statutory authority in this area is, at best,
scant; (2) the FCC has not promulgated advertising guidelines
through a transparent or open procedural process; (3) the states
have greater expertise in this area and are fully capable of
resolving these issues; and (4) the Commission's resources are
better spent on regulatory activities squarely within its
statutory authority.56 I continue to believe that the
Commission's forays into the world of advertising regulation are
an unfortunate distraction from the other important (and clearly
statutorily authorized) work of the Commission.
1 Business Discount Plan, Inc., Order of Forfeiture, 15 FCC
Rcd 14461 (2000) (Forfeiture Order).
2 Section 201(b) provides in pertinent part that ``all
charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in
connection with communication service shall be just and
reasonable . . . .'' 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
3 Section 258 provides in pertinent part that ``no
telecommunications carrier shall submit . . . a change in a
subscriber's selection of a provider of telephone exchange
service or telephone toll service except in accordance with such
verification procedures as the Commission shall prescribe.'' 47
U.S.C. § 258.
4 See Common Carrier Scorecard, Federal Communications
Commission, Jan. 1999 edition, at 14.
5 Business Discount Plan, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability
for Forfeiture, 14 FCC Rcd 340 (1998) (BDP NAL).
6 BDP NAL, 14 FCC Rcd at 342.
7 Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 14473.
8 WWIZ, Inc., 37 FCC 685, 686 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Lorain
Journal Co. v. FCC, 351 F2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 967 (1966); 47 C.F.R. § 1.106 (b)(2) (C).
9 Bennett Gilbert Gaines, 8 FCC Rcd 3986, 3987 (Rev. Bd.
10 BDP Petition for Reconsideration (Petition) at 6.
11 Petition at 7-13.
12 Petition at 7-8.
13 Petition at 8-11.
14 Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 14468-69.
15 See, e.g., Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 938 F.Supp. 1158, 1168
16 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
17 We note that the Commission exercised jurisdiction over
slamming under section 201(b) long before Congress enacted
18 Petition at 8.
19 Telecommunications Research and Action Center and Consumer
Action v. Central Corp. et al., 4 FCC Rcd 2157, 2158 (Com.Car.
Bur. 1989)(TRAC Decision).
20 See id.
21 AT&T, 71 RR2d 775 (1992).
22 Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 14469.
23 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
24 Pub. L. No. 102-556, 106 Stat. 4181 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
228 and 15 U.S.C. § 5711 et seq.).
25 Petition at 10-11.
26 See House Report No. 102-430, Feb. 5, 1992 (``Title II [of
TDDRA] directs the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prescribe
rules for any advertisement of services or products procured
through the use of pay-per-call technology.'') 15 U.S.C. §
5711(a). In reporting on a predecessor pay-per-call bill, the
Senate Commerce Committee stated that, ``[t]he term `provider of
pay-per-call service' excludes common carriers that merely
transmit such service or provide billing and collection for such
services . . . . [I]t is not the intention of the Committee to
include telephone companies in the definition of `provider of
pay-per-call service' when a telephone company is serving only as
the carrier of the information service or provider of billing
service and does not control the content of the information
provided.'' S. Rep. No. 102-190 at 27, 102nd Cong. 1st Sess. 137
Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991). The Committee also
commented, ``It is important to note that generally neither the
local telephone company nor the long-distance company provide the
information; the telephone company provides the telephone lines
and billing but has traditionally not had control over the
content.'' S. Rep. No. 102-190 at 3. See also 47 U.S.C. § 228
(i) (limiting the definition of pay-per-call services to those
services that impose a ``charge, greater than, or in addition to,
the charge for transmission of the call.'').
27 Petition at 6-7; 13.
28 To best illustrate BDP's apparent pattern of employing
unjust and unreasonable telemarketing practices and effecting
unauthorized PIC changes, the BDP NAL profiled five complaints
rather than describe the facts of all 30 complaints that were in
the record. See BDP NAL, 14 FCC Rcd at 345.
29 The record also included a letter that BDP sent to consumers
pursuant to a June 1998 legal settlement with AT&T Corp. As part
of the settlement, BDP was required to notify consumers that BDP
is not affiliated with AT&T and that BDP may have left a
different impression with consumers. See BDP NAL, Appendix D.
30 Although the NAL also describes a consumer complaint and
supporting declaration from Mr. Kevin Kennedy, that complaint was
not used to support the forfeiture calculation. Mr. Kennedy was
not slammed by BDP, but instead worked briefly in BDP's customer
service department while on assignment from a temporary agency.
See BDP NAL, 14 FCC Rcd at 355 n.65.
31 See BDP NAL, 14 FCC Rcd at 353 (citing, for example, The Job
Center, Informal Complaint No. IC-98-23919 (July 15, 1998) (in
which complainant alleges that upon reviewing his telephone bill,
he found, to his ``amazement,'' that AT&T was no longer his
company's long distance carrier).
32 See id.
33 Petition at 16-17.
34 See, e.g., Long Distance Services, Inc., Order of
Forfeiture, 13 FCC Rcd 4444 (1998).
35 See, e.g., Amer-I-Net Services Corp., Order of Forfeiture,
15 FCC Rcd 3118 (2000).
36 47 C.F.R. § 1.351; see also WWOR-TV, Inc. et al., 5 FCC Rcd
4113 (Rev. Bd. 1990).
37 See Paul Kelley, 5 FCC Rcd 1955, 1957 n.13 (1990).
38 Petition at 19-21.
39 Id. at 21 (citing Forfeiture Policy Statement and Amendment
of Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate Guidelines, Report
and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 17087(1997), recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd 303
(1999) (Forfeiture Policy Statement)).
40 Petition at 21-22.
41 Petition at 23.
42 See Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 14471.
43 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(D). Section 503(b) requires that the
Commission consider the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity
of the violation, and, with respect to the violator, the degree
of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay,
and other such matters as justice may require.
44 See Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 14471) (citing, for
example, Amer-I-Net Services Corp., Order of Forfeiture, 15 FCC
Rcd 3118 (2000)).
46 Indeed, we stated in the Forfeiture Order that although
BDP's deceptive marketing practices were closely related to its
slamming conduct, the two violations were separate and distinct.
BDP could have slammed the complainants without misrepresenting
the nature of its service offering, it could have misrepresented
its service offering without slamming the complainants. The fact
that it did both militated strongly in favor of assessing an
overall forfeiture amount greater than the standard amount for
slamming. Id. at 14472 n.65.
47 See Forfeiture Policy Statement, 12 FCC Rcd at 17099.
48 See, e.g., AT&T, 71 RR2d 775 (1992); TRAC Decision, 4 FCC
Rcd 2157 (Com.Car. Bur. 1989).
50 See id.
51 Petition at 20 n.17. BDP notes that it submitted
transcripts for 24 of its verification tapes. Id.
52 BDP NAL, 14 FCC Rcd at 358.
53 Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 14472.
54 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(D).
55 See Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth,
Concurring In Part, Dissenting In Part in Business Discount
Plan, Inc., Order of Forfeiture, 15 FCC Rcd 14, 461 (2000); see
also Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-
Roth in Joint FCC/FTC Policy Statement for the Advertising of
Dial-Around and Other Long Distance Services to Consumers, 15
FCC Rcd 8654 (2000).
56 See Harold Furchtgott-Roth and Bryan Tramont, Commission on
the Verge of a Jurisdictional Breakdown, 8 CommLaw Conspectus
219 (Summer 2000).