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                                   Before the

                       Federal Communications Commission

                             Washington, D.C. 20554


                                           )                          
                                                                      
                                           )                          
                                                                      
     In the Matter of                      )                          
                                                                      
     Salsgiver Telecom, Inc.,              )                          
                                                                      
     Complainant,                          )                          
                                               File No. EB-06-MD-002  
     v.                                    )                          
                                                                      
     North Pittsburgh Telephone Company,   )                          
                                                                      
     Respondent.                           )                          
                                                                      
                                           )                          
                                                                      
                                           )                          


                          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

   Adopted: May 23, 2007 Released: May 24, 2007

   By the Chief, Enforcement Bureau:

   I. Introduction

    1. In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, we grant a pole attachment
       complaint filed by Salsgiver Telecom, Inc. ("Salsgiver Telecom")
       against North Pittsburgh Telephone Company ("NPTC") pursuant to
       section 224 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended ("the Act")
       and sections 1.1401-1.1418 of the Commission's rules. The Complaint
       alleges that NPTC violated section 224 by denying Salsgiver Telecom
       access to NPTC's poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way for the
       placement of Salsgiver's attachments. Salsgiver Telecom requests that
       the Commission order NPTC, inter alia, to provide Salsgiver Telecom
       with "immediate access to NPTC's poles." For the reasons stated below,
       we grant Salsgiver's Complaint and order NPTC to provide Salsgiver
       immediately with nondiscriminatory access to NPTC's poles.

   II. Factual and regulatory BACKGROUND

    2. Salsgiver Telecom is authorized by Certificate of Public Convenience
       from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission ("PaPUC") to "offer,
       render, furnish or supply telecommunication services as a Competitive
       Access Provider ["CAP"] to the Public in the Commonwealth of
       Pennsylvania." Salsgiver Telecom has filed with the PaPUC a tariff
       under which it offers intrastate wholesale dedicated access service to
       the public as a CAP ("CAP Tariff" or "Tariff"). Salsgiver Telecom
       offers this service to nonresidential users over its own facilities,
       or in combination with the facilities of other companies, on a
       point-to-point basis for the transmission of one-way and two-way
       communications at DS-3 speed (44.736 Mbps), or on a case-by-case
       basis, at another speed. Salsgiver Telecom offers to lease its
       dedicated and private line communications infrastructure under the
       Tariff to enterprise customers for high-bandwidth, secure, voice,
       video, and data networks.

    3. NPTC is an incumbent local exchange carrier providing
       telecommunications within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and thus
       is a "utility" within the meaning of section 224(a)(1) of the Act. As
       a "utility," NPTC must provide "a cable television system or any
       telecommunications carrier" with "nondiscriminatory access to any
       pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it,"
       unless it can show that a denial of access is justified due to
       "insufficient capacity" or "for reasons of safety, reliability and
       generally applicable engineering purposes."

    4. On October12, 2005, Salsgiver Telecom sent a letter to NPTC requesting
       access to NPTC's poles. The letter informed NPTC that Salsgiver
       Telecom had PaPUC approval to provide telecommunication services as a
       CAP to the public in Pennsylvania, and sought immediately to commence
       pole attachment agreement negotiations with NPTC. Following a
       telephone conversation between counsel, Salsgiver Telecom sent NPTC a
       letter on November 11, 2005 attaching a copy of a June 30, 2005 letter
       from the PaPUC provisionally approving Salsgiver Telecom's application
       to provide telecommunications services as a CAP in Pennsylvania. In a
       November 23, 2005 response, NPTC declined Salsgiver Telecom's request
       for access, asserting that under its Tariff, Salsgiver Telecom is
       "merely a lessor of a broadband transmission capacity" and therefore
       is not a "telecommunications carrier" entitled to access NPTC's poles
       under the Act.

    5. On February 7, 2006, Salsgiver Telecom filed the instant Complaint
       alleging that, because Salsgiver Telecom is a "telecommunications
       carrier," NPTC's denial of access to its poles violates section 224 of
       the Act. The Complaint seeks an order requiring NPTC to grant
       Salsgiver Telecom immediate access to NPTC's poles. In its Response to
       the Complaint, NPTC argues that Salsgiver Telecom is not entitled to
       such access under section 224, because Salsgiver Telecom has not
       demonstrated that it is a "telecommunications carrier" planning to
       provide "telecommunications services" over the requested attachments.
       NPTC also sought dismissal of the Complaint as untimely.

    6. The key question presented here is whether Salsgiver Telecom is a
       "telecommunications carrier" with statutory access rights to NPTC's
       poles under section 224(f)(1) of the Act. Answering that question
       requires examination of certain statutory and common law definitions
       described below.

    7. The Act defines "telecommunications carrier," in pertinent part, as
       "any provider of telecommunications services . . .," and specifies
       that "[a] telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common
       carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in
       providing telecommunications services." The term "telecommunications
       service" is defined as "the offering of telecommunications for a fee
       directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be
       effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the
       facilities used." "Telecommunications" is defined as "the
       transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
       information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
       content of the information as sent and received."

    8. In interpreting those statutory definitions, the U.S. Court of Appeals
       for the D.C. Circuit (D.C. Circuit) affirmed the Commission's
       conclusions that (i) the term "telecommunications service" "is
       intended to encompass only telecommunications provided on a common
       carrier basis," and (ii) the term "telecommunications carrier," which
       was added to the Act in 1996, has essentially the same meaning as the
       pre-existing term "common carrier."  Courts construing "common
       carrier" have held, inter alia, that "the primary sine qua non of
       common carrier status is a quasi-public character, which arises out of
       the undertaking to carry for all people indifferently;" and a "second
       prerequisite to common carrier status" is that "`customers transmit
       intelligence of their own design and choosing." Such offering of
       service indiscriminately to the public may be either a wholesale
       offering to other carriers or a retail offering to end users.

   III. discussion

          A. Salsgiver Telecom Has Established a Prima Facie Case That It Is
             a "Telecommunications Carrier" with a Right of Access to NPTC's
             Poles Under Section 224(f)(1) of the Act

    9. In a case such as this challenging a denial of access, section
       1.1409(b) of our rules provides that the complainant bears the burden
       of establishing a prima facie case that the denial of access violates
       section 224(f) of the Act. Once the complainant establishes a prima
       facie case, the defendant utility has the burden of proving that its
       denial was lawful. Therefore, Salsgiver Telecom bears an initial
       burden to establish a prima facie case that it is a
       "telecommunications carrier" with a right of access within the meaning
       of the Act. As discussed below, we conclude that Salsgiver Telecom has
       met that burden by showing that it possesses a valid state
       authorization to provide telecommunications services, and has filed a
       state tariff offering such services to the public.

    1. Salsgiver Telecom has offered proof of its status as a
       "telecommunications carrier" in NPTC's territory by submitting in the
       record (i) its Certificate of Public Convenience to provide
       telecommunications services as a CAP to the public within the
       Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; (ii) the June 30, 2005 Secretarial
       Letter granting Salsgiver Telecom provisional authority to provide
       telecommunications services as a CAP to the public in the Commonwealth
       of Pennsylvania, and (iii) the CAP Tariff it filed with the PaPUC. We
       find that the decisions of the PaPUC authorizing Salsgiver Telecom to
       "offer, render, furnish or supply telecommunications services" to the
       public as a CAP and permitting its Tariff to become effective, reflect
       judgments by an expert regulatory agency that the services set forth
       in Salsgiver's proposed Tariff constitute "telecommunications
       services." Moreover, NPTC has not identified any material differences
       between the meaning of the terms "telecommunications carrier" and
       "telecommunications service" under Pennsylvania law and the
       definitions of those terms in the Act; and we are aware of none.
       Accordingly, Salsgiver Telecom may rely on the PaPUC's authorization
       of its right to provide "telecommunications service" as a CAP,
       together with the PaPUC's acceptance of Salsgiver Telecom's Tariff, to
       establish its prima facie case under section 224(f)(1) of the Act.

   10. In holding that Salsgiver Telecom has established a prima facie case
       that it is a "telecommunications carrier" with pole attachment rights
       under section 224(f) of the Act, our reliance on the PaPUC's actions
       finds support in precedent addressing the prerequisites for the
       analogous process of establishing that an entity is a "cable
       television system" with pole attachment rights under section 224(f).
       In Paragon Cable Television Inc. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit upheld a
       Commission ruling that possession of a valid cable franchise is a
       reasonable precondition for pole attachments. In so holding, the D.C.
       Circuit found that the Commission could apply a "presumption of
       validity" to decisions by the local franchising authority concerning
       the attacher's status as an approved franchisee. Similarly, in Texas
       Util. Elec. Co v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit upheld a Commission ruling
       that section 224 of the Act conferred jurisdiction over those pole
       attachments within the franchise service area defined by the local
       franchise authority. These cases suggest that attachers are entitled
       to rely on decisions by responsible regulatory agencies, such as
       franchise authorities in the case of cable system attachers, and
       public utility commissions in the case of telecommunications carriers,
       in establishing their status as entities entitled to access under
       section 224(f) of the Act.

   11. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Salsgiver Telecom's
       possession of a valid state authorization to provide
       telecommunications service as a CAP, together with its associated
       state tariff filing, constitutes presumptive evidence of its status as
       a "telecommunications carrier" within the meaning of the Act. In our
       view, therefore, Salsgiver Telecom has made a prima facie showing that
       it is a "telecommunications carrier" entitled to nondiscriminatory
       access to NPTC's poles under section 224(f)(1) of the Act.

     A. NPTC Has Failed to Show That Its Denial of Access Was Lawful

   12. Because Salsgiver Telecom has established a prima facie case, the
       burden shifts to NPTC to demonstrate that its denial of access was
       lawful. NPTC argues that it lawfully denied access to Salsgiver
       Telecom because Salsgiver Telecom purportedly does not qualify as a
       "telecommunications carrier" with a right of attachment under section
       224(f). We have examined NPTC's arguments and conclude, for the
       reasons set forth below, that NPTC has failed to show that Salsgiver
       Telecom is not a "telecommunications carrier" under the Act, and thus
       it cannot justify its denial of access on that basis.

      1. Salsgiver's Tariffed Private Line Services Are "Telecommunications
         Services" Under the Act

   13. NPTC suggests that the dedicated (i.e., private line) services that
       Salsgiver Telecom offers to business customers do not qualify as
       "telecommunications services made available to the public," and
       therefore Salsgiver Telecom "may not be deemed a telecommunications
       carrier" with pole access rights under section 224. However, the
       Commission has long regulated as common carrier services the provision
       of "private line" services, which the Commission defines as
       "facilities or network transmission capacity dedicated to the use of
       an individual customer." For example, the Commission's rules contain
       general guidelines and rate structure requirements for the tariffed
       private line services of dominant common carriers. Moreover, the
       Commission has recognized that interstate private line services can
       qualify as interstate telecommunications services for purposes of
       universal service contributions. The Commission thus has recognized
       that private line services may be offered on a common carrier basis,
       and treats private line services offered under tariff as common
       carrier offerings. Accordingly, the fact that Salsgiver Telecom offers
       dedicated or "private line" services, standing alone, provides no
       basis for NPTC's assertion that Salsgiver Telecom is not a
       "telecommunications carrier" with pole attachment rights under section
       224(f)(1) of the Act.

   14. Moreover, Salsgiver Telecom's authorization to provide
       telecommunications services as a CAP on a statewide basis, together
       with its CAP Tariff, establish that Salsgiver Telecom is authorized to
       and does offer to provide its private line CAP services
       indiscriminately and indifferently to the public for a fee in NPTC's
       territory. Indeed, the very term "tariff" means an offering to provide
       service. And the text of Salsgiver Telecom's CAP Tariff reflects that
       the services offered are "telecommunications." For example, the CAP
       Tariff states that it applies to "intrastate services supplied to
       Customers for origination and termination of traffic . . .. The
       services offered under the Tariff are described generally as:
       "wholesale competitive access services," including "the furnishing of
       intrastate interLATA and intraLATA ... services" involving
       "information transmission originating from nonresidential user points
       within ... Pennsylvania."  The Tariff further specifies that
       "Transmission Service is offered via the Company's facilities for the
       transmission of one-way and two-way communications."   These terms
       demonstrate that Salsgiver Telecom is offering to provide to the
       public for a fee intrastate "telecommunications," that is, "the
       transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
       information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
       content of the information as sent and received."

   15. NPTC further suggests that its denial of pole access was lawful
       because Salsgiver Telecom will be offering broadband transmission
       capacity on "dark fiber." According to NPTC, dark fiber offerings are
       not "telecommunications services," and Salsgiver Telecom therefore has
       no right to attach to NPTC's poles for the purpose of providing dark
       fiber. NPTC cites no evidence in the record, however, to support its
       claim that Salsgiver Telecom intends to provide "dark fiber" services
       in NPTC's territory. Such proof would be unavailing, in any event,
       because Salsgiver Telecom has established that it is a
       "telecommunications carrier" based on its offering of "lit" services
       that indisputably qualify as "telecommunications services." Thus,
       regardless of the status of dark fiber service under the Act - an
       issue we need not and do not address here - Salsgiver Telecom is
       entitled to access under section 224 based on its offering of "lit"
       services, and the addition of a dark fiber offering would have no
       impact on its pole attachment rights.

   16. We also reject NPTC's suggestion that Salsgiver Telecom does not
       qualify as a telecommunications carrier because its customers will
       provide and install their own terminal equipment under its CAP Tariff.
       NPTC has not cited -- and we are not aware of --  any authority
       holding that an entity failed to qualify as a common carrier solely
       because its customers were required to provide and install their own
       terminal equipment (i.e., customer premises equipment or "CPE"). In
       fact, contrary to NPTC's position, the Commission's rules expressly
       contemplate that telecommunications carriers may  (but need not)
       separately provide transmission services that connect to
       customer-supplied CPE. Nothing in the Commission's rules or policies
       suggests that such providers of separate transmission services thereby
       lose their status as "telecommunications carriers." NPTC, therefore,
       may not lawfully deny Salsgiver Telecom access to its poles on the
       ground that it is not a "telecommunications carrier" because its
       customers are supplying their own CPE.

   17. In sum, by offering to provide its dedicated (i.e., private line)
       transmission service and point-to-point services via its CAP Tariff,
       Salsgiver Telecom is holding itself out to the public as providing
       those services indifferently and "indiscriminately" for a fee;
       moreover, those services involve communications by wire and
       transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
       information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
       content of the information as sent and received. Thus, Salsgiver
       Telecom's tariffed private line services are clearly
       "telecommunications services" within the meaning of section 153(46) of
       the Act. Based on this record, NPTC has failed to meet its burden of
       proving that Salsgiver Telecom does not qualify as a
       "telecommunications carrier" with pole access rights under section
       224(f)(1) of the Act.

      1. Intrastate Carriers Such as Salsgiver Telecom Have Pole Attachment
         Rights Under Section 224

   18. NPTC argues that, because Salsgiver Telecom's authority to offer CAP
       services is limited to the provision of intrastate service, it is not
       a "telecommunications carrier" eligible for access to NPTC's poles
       under section 224(f)(1). We conclude that, contrary to NPTC's
       assertions, section 224 provides pole attachment rights to intrastate
       carriers such as Salsgiver Telecom.

   19. As previously described, section 224(f)(1) unambiguously states that
       "[a] utility shall provide a cable television system or any
       telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any pole,
       duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it." This
       reference to "any" telecommunications carrier contains no exclusion of
       intrastate carriers. The same is true of the statutory definitions of
       "telecommunications carrier," telecommunications service," and
       "telecommunications." Moreover, section 224(b) grants the Commission
       broad jurisdiction over pole attachment issues, except in states that
       certify that they regulate such issues pursuant to section 224(c); and
       Pennsylvania has not so certified. Further, section 2(b) of the Act
       explicitly recognizes the Commission's jurisdiction in connection with
       intrastate communication service "as provided in sections 223 through
       227 . . . ." In view of this plain statutory language, we conclude
       that Salsgiver Telecom's status as an intrastate carrier provides no
       basis for NPTC's assertion that Salsgiver Telecom is not a
       "telecommunications carrier" with pole access rights under section
       224(f)(1) of the Act.

     A. Salsgiver Telecom's Complaint Should Not be Dismissed as Untimely

   20. NPTC contends that, under section 1.1404(m) of the Commission's pole
       attachment rules, Salsgiver Telecom was required to file the Complaint
       within 30 days after NPTC's Nov. 23, 2005 Letter denying Salsgiver
       Telecom's pole attachment request, i.e., by December 23, 2005. Because
       Salsgiver Telecom did not file the Complaint until February 6, 2006,
       approximately six weeks later, NPTC argues that the Complaint should
       be dismissed as untimely. As explained below, we conclude that the
       30-day time limit in section 1.1404(m) should be waived in this case,
       and thus we decline to dismiss the Complaint as untimely.

   21. Although section 1.1404(m) provides that a complainant shall file a
       pole attachment complaint within 30 days of a denial of access, it
       does not expressly bar the filing of a complaint after the 30 day
       period has run, and the Commission has discretion to waive the 30-day
       requirement in appropriate cases. This is such a case. The record
       reveals that, within 30 days after NPTC's Nov. 23, 2005 denial of its
       pole access request, Salsgiver Telecom contacted Commission staff to
       seek informal assistance in reaching a negotiated resolution of the
       dispute. This effort, although ultimately unsuccessful, was in keeping
       with the Commission's policy of encouraging parties to pursue such
       informal dispute resolution efforts before filing a formal complaint.
       Further, NPTC does not allege that it has suffered any prejudice from
       Salsgiver Telecom filing in February 2006 rather than December 2005;
       nor do we see how NPTC could have been prejudiced, because Salsgiver
       Telecom's pre-complaint correspondence advised NPTC of the very claims
       later asserted in the Complaint. Under these circumstances, we find
       that a short waiver of the 30-day time limit in section 1.1404(m) of
       our rules is warranted in the interest of encouraging parties to
       consider alternatives to formal complaint proceedings. We thus decline
       to dismiss the Complaint as untimely.

     A. Salsgiver Telecom Is Not Entitled to Extraordinary Relief

   22. Salsgiver Telecom argues that we should award "extraordinary relief"
       in the form of unspecified penalties and sanctions, because NPTC
       allegedly is "systematically attempting to preclude entry of
       facilities-based telecommunications competitors in its service area"
       by denying access to its poles. Salsgiver Telecom charges that this
       systematic effort is evidenced by recent denial of access complaints
       against NPTC filed by two other telecommunications carriers in NPTC's
       territory, and by Salsgiver Telecom's cable operator affiliate,
       Salsgiver Communications.

   23. Even if penalties and sanctions could be awarded in a complaint
       proceeding (an issue we do not reach here), Salsgiver Telecom has
       failed to show that extraordinary relief in the form of penalties or
       sanctions is warranted. In particular, Salsgiver Telecom has not shown
       that the arguments NPTC has made in this and the other cases Salsgiver
       Telecom cites are so devoid of merit as to be frivolous. However, now
       that we have provided explicit guidance on the showing a
       telecommunications carrier is required to make regarding its status as
       a "telecommunications carrier" when requesting pole access under
       section 224, we expect NPTC to comply fully and expeditiously with its
       statutory obligation to afford pole access to entities that make such
       a showing.

   IV. Conclusion

   24. For the reasons stated above, we find that (i) Salsgiver Telecom has
       carried its burden to establish a prima facie case demonstrating its
       entitlement to attach to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way
       owned or controlled by NPTC; and (ii) NPTC has failed to carry its
       burden to establish that its denial of access was lawful on the
       alleged ground that Salsgiver Telecom is not a "telecommunications
       carrier" providing "telecommunications services," as those terms are
       defined in the Act. We therefore also conclude that Salsgiver Telecom
       is a "telecommunications carrier" entitled to pole attachments under
       section 224(f) of the Act, and grant the relief requested in the
       Complaint insofar as it requests an order requiring that NPTC promptly
       negotiate in good faith nondiscriminatory rates, terms, and conditions
       of access and attachments and take all actions reasonably necessary to
       accommodate Salsgiver Telecom's access to its poles, as set forth
       herein.

   V. ordering clauseS

   25. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and
       224 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. SS 151,
       154(i), 154(j), and 224, and sections 1.1401-1.1418 of the
       Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. SS 1.1401-1.1418, that the Complaint IS
       GRANTED to the extent set forth herein, and is in all other respects
       DENIED.

   26. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and 224 of
       the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. SS 151, 154(i),
       154(j), and 224, and sections 1.1401-1.1418 of the Commission's Rules,
       47 C.F.R. SS 1.1401-1.1418, that, to the extent that Salsgiver Telecom
       continues to seek access to NPTC's facilities, Salsgiver Telecom and
       NPTC SHALL PROMPTLY NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH nondiscriminatory terms
       and conditions of access and maximum just and reasonable rates for
       pole attachments in accordance with 47 U.S.C. S 224 and the
       Commission's rules.

   27. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and 224 of
       the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. SS 151, 154(i),
       154(j), and 224, and sections 1.1401-1.1418 of the Commission's Rules,
       47 C.F.R. SS 1.1401-1.1418, that, to the extent that Salsgiver Telecom
       continues to seek access to NPTC's facilities, NPTC SHALL: (i)
       immediately commence survey and engineering work on the poles in
       NPTC's service area to which Salsgiver Telecom seeks to attach; (ii)
       grant access to NPTC's poles without a formal agreement in the event
       NPTC fails to complete a just and reasonable pole attachment agreement
       within 60 days from the date of this Order; and (iii) commence
       accepting and processing pole attachment applications and conducting
       any necessary engineering or make-ready arrangements no later than 15
       days from the date of this Order.

   FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

   Kris Anne Monteith

   Chief, Enforcement Bureau

   Complaint of Salsgiver Telecom, Inc., File No. EB-06-MD-002 (filed Feb. 7,
   2006) ("Complaint").

   47 U.S.C. S 224.

   47 C.F.R. SS 1.1401-1418.

   See, e.g., Complaint at 5-7, 9, PP 16, 19, 22-23, 31.

   Complaint at 10, P 34. For ease of reference, "poles" as used herein
   refers to all facilities and properties owned and/or controlled by NPTC
   that are the subject of Salsgiver Telecom's request for access under
   section 224.

   Letter dated September 5, 2006 from J.D. Thomas, counsel to Salsgiver
   Telecom, to Barbara Esbin, Market Disputes Resolution Division,
   Enforcement Bureau ("Salsgiver Telecom Sept. 5, 2006 Letter"), File No.
   EB-06-MD-002, attaching as Exhibit 2: Letter dated March 27, 2006 from
   James J. McNulty, Secretary, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, File
   No. A-311373, Application of Salsgiver Telecom, Inc. to provide
   telecommunication services as a Competitive Access Provider to the Public
   in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("March 27, 2006 Secretarial Letter"),
   and In the Matter of Application of Salsgiver Telecom, Inc. for approval
   to offer, render, furnish, or supply telecommunications services as a
   Competitive Access Provider, to the Public, in the Commonwealth of
   Pennsylvania, Certificate of Public Convenience, adopted Jan. 27, 2006
   ("Certificate of Public Convenience").

   CAP Tariff, Pa. P.U.C. Tariff No. 1, Effective Feb. 14, 2006, attached as
   Exhibit 1 to Salsgiver Telecom Sept. 5, 2006 Letter, "Application of
   Tariff" and "Service Offered," Page 4 of 28. See March 27, 2006
   Secretarial Letter (permitting Salsgiver Telecom's CAP Tariff to become
   effective on Feb. 14, 2006); Complaint at 3-4, PP 9-10. The PaPUC
   provisionally approved Salsgiver Telecom's application to provide
   telecommunications services as a CAP in Pennsylvania on June 30, 2005.
   Complaint, Exhibit 1, Letter dated June 30, 2005 from James J. McNulty,
   Secretary, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, File No. A-311373,
   Application of Salsgiver Telecom, Inc. to provide telecommunication
   services as a Competitive Access Provider to the public in the
   Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("June 30, 2005 Secretarial Letter").
   Subsequently, on February 7, 2006, the PaPUC granted Salsgiver Telecom's
   application to operate as a CAP subject to the conditions and limitations
   set forth in the order, including specified revisions to Salsgiver
   Telecom's proposed CAP Tariff. Response to Complaint filed by NPTC, File
   No. EB-06-MD-002 (filed Mar. 10, 2006) ("Response") at 4, P 10, Exhibit 1,
   Application of Salsgiver Telecom, Inc. for approval to offer, render,
   furnish or supply telecommunication services as a Competitive Access
   Provider to the Public in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Order, Docket
   No. A-311373, Feb. 7, 2006 ("Salsgiver CAP Authorization Order") at 2-6.

   CAP Tariff, "Application of Tariff" and "Service Offered" and Sections
   2.1.1., 3.1, Pages 4, 8 and 25 of 28.

   Complaint at 1-2, P 3; Response at 2, P 3. Section 224(a)(1) of the Act
   defines "utility," in pertinent part, as "a local exchange carrier ... who
   owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole
   or in part, for any wire communications." 47 U.S.C. S 224(a)(1).

   47 U.S.C. S 224(f)(1) (emphasis added). See 47 U.S.C. SS 224(a)(4)
   (defining "pole attachment" as "any attachment by a cable television
   system or provider of telecommunications service to a pole, duct, conduit,
   or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility").

   47 U.S.C. S 224(f)(2).

   Complaint at 4, P 11; Exhibit 4, Letter dated October 12, 2005 from Ralph
   F. Manning, counsel to Salsgiver Telecom, to Kevin J. Albaugh, Vice
   President-Regulatory Affairs ("Salsgiver Telecom Oct. 12, 2005 Letter") at
   1; Response at 4, P 11.

   Complaint at 4, P 12; Salsgiver Telecom Oct. 12, 2005 Letter at 1;
   Complaint, Declaration of Loren Salsgiver, Chief Executive Officer of
   Salsgiver Telecom, at 2-3, PP 7-8; Response at 4, P 12.

   Complaint at 5, P 13; Exhibit 7, Letter dated November 11, 2005 from Ralph
   F. Manning to John Alzamora, counsel to NPTC ("Salsgiver Telecom Nov. 11,
   2005 Letter") at 1, attaching June 30, 2005 Secretarial Letter; Response
   at 5, P 13.

   Complaint at 5, P 14; Exhibit 8, Letter dated November 23, 2005 from John
   Alzamora to Ralph F. Manning ("NPTC Nov. 23, 2005 Letter") at 2; Response
   at 6, P 14.

   Specifically, Salsgiver Telecom seeks an order, inter alia, requiring NPTC
   to: (i) commence immediate good-faith negotiations for a pole attachment
   agreement, with a directive to execute a new pole attachment agreement
   within 30 days of the date of the Order; (ii) accept and process pole
   attachment applications and conduct any necessary engineering or
   make-ready work according to reasonable deadlines; and (iii) grant access
   to NPTC's poles without a formal agreement in the event that NPTC fails to
   timely complete a just and reasonable pole attachment agreement. Complaint
   at 10-11, P 34. Salsgiver Telecom also requests that the Commission impose
   penalties and sanctions, and grant an award of damages pursuant to 47
   U.S.C. SS 206-209, 501, 503(a), (b) and 47 C.F.R. SS 1.1413, 1.80.
   Complaint at 10-11, P 34. We address these requests in Section III.D.,
   infra.

   See, e.g., Response at 6, 12 PP 14, 41, 43-44.

   Although section 224(f)(2) explicitly permits denial of access "where
   there is insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and
   generally applicable engineering purposes," 47 U.S.C. S 224(f)(2), NPTC's
   denial of access does not rest on any of these grounds, but rather solely
   on NPTC's contention that Salsgiver is not a "telecommunications carrier"
   with a right of access under section 224(f)(1).

   47 U.S.C. S 153(44).

   47 U.S.C. S 153(46).

   47 U.S.C. S 153(43).

   Virgin Islands Tel. Co. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 921, 927-30 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
   ("Vitelco") (emphasis added) (affirming AT&T Submarine Sys., Inc.,
   Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 21585 (1998)).

   Vitelco, 198 F.3d at 924-27. See, e.g., Cable & Wireless plc, Memorandum
   Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 8516, 8521-23 at PP 12-17 (1997);
   Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report and Order, 12 FCC
   Rcd 8776, 9177-78 at P 785 (1997) (subsequent history omitted) ("Universal
   Service Order"). The Act defines "common carrier" or "carrier" as "any
   person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign
   communication by wire or radio ... ." 47 U.S.C. S 153(10).

   Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 19
   F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting National Ass'n of Regulatory
   Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (internal
   quotes and footnotes omitted)).  See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 295
   F.3d 1326, 1329 (D.C.Cir.2002); National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs
   v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).

   See, e.g., Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,  Report to
   Congress, 13 FCC Rcd 11,501, 11,556 at P 115 (1998) ("Universal Service
   Report to Congress"); Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 9177-78, P
   785 (holding that "[c]ommon carrier services include services offered to
   other carriers, such as exchange access service, which is offered on a
   common carrier basis, but is offered primarily to other carriers"). See
   generally MTS and WATS Market Structure, Phase I, Third Report and Order,
   93 FCC 2d 241, 246-47, 249-50 PP 13-14, 23 (1983) ("MTS/WATS Market
   Structure Order") (stating that access charges are regulated services and
   include "carrier's carrier" services).

   47 C.F.R. S 1.1409(b).

   Id.

   Salsgiver Telecom Sept. 5, 2006 Letter, Exhibit 2, Certificate of Public
   Convenience and March 27, 2006 Secretarial Letter. See  Response, Exhibit
   1, Salsgiver CAP Authorization Order.

   Complaint, Exhibit 1, June 30, 2005 Secretarial Letter at 1. See Response,
   Exhibit 1, Salsgiver CAP Authorization Order.

   Salsgiver Telecom Sept. 5, 2006 Letter, Exhibit 1, CAP Tariff. See
   Salsgiver Telecom Sept. 5, 2006 Letter, Exhibit 2, March 27, 2006
   Secretarial Letter (permitting Salsgiver Telecom's CAP Tariff to become
   effective on Feb. 14, 2006).

   See Salsgiver Telecom Sept. 5, 2006 Letter, Exhibit 2.

   See Salsgiver Telecom Sept. 5, 2006 Letter, Exhibit 2, March 27, 2006
   Secretarial Letter (permitting Salsgiver Telecom's CAP Tariff to become
   effective on Feb. 14, 2006) and Certificate of Public Convenience, issued
   March 27, 2006. Although Salsgiver Telecom had received only provisional
   authorization to operate as a CAP at the time it filed the Complaint, it
   obtained final authorization from the PaPUC a few weeks later, on March
   27, 2006. See supra at n. 6. The provisional nature of its authorizations
   at the time of filing the Complaint does not change Salsgiver Telecom's
   status as a "telecommunications carrier;" it merely indicates the
   defeasibility of such status had Salsgiver Telecom failed to comply with
   the PaPUC's instructions to file revisions to its proposed CAP Tariff. See
   Letter Ruling dated August 29, 2006 from Barbara Esbin, Market Disputes
   Resolution Division, Enforcement Bureau, to J.D. Thomas, Genevieve D.
   Sapir, and Ralph F. Manning, Counsel to Complainant, and Kenneth E.
   Hardman and John A. Alzamora, Counsel to Respondent, File No.
   EB-06-MD-002, at 2.

   We leave open the possibility that a state may define either
   "telecommunications carrier" or "telecommunications service" under state
   law in a manner so inconsistent with the definitions contained in sections
   153(44) and 153(46) of the Act such that an entity could obtain state
   certification and file state tariffs, yet not meet those federal statutory
   definitions. Similarly, a state might authorize an entity to provide
   telecommunications services only in some, but not all, portions of a state
   such that additional evidence of the entity's status would be required to
   demonstrate a right of attachment in those non-certificated portions of
   the state. Neither situation, however, exists in this case, as far as our
   record shows.

   Paragon Cable Television Inc. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 152, 153-54 (D.C. Cir.
   1987) (holding that the Commission properly refused to address the
   attacher's arguments challenging the legality of the franchise authority's
   decision to revoke the attacher's franchise, noting that it was
   appropriate for the Commission to employ a "presumption of validity with
   respect to the franchising authority's actions vis-`a-vis the franchise").
   See id. at 154 & n.2 (citing Tele-Communications, Inc. v. South Carolina
   Elec. & Gas Co., File No. PA-83-0027 (Com. Car. Bur. Apr. 19, 1985) as
   holding that the utility could not substitute its judgment for the
   franchising authority by removing pole attachments before such time as the
   franchising authority's revocation actually took effect).

   Texas Util. Elec. Co v. FCC, 997 F.2d 925, 934-35 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

   Moreover, NPTC does not argue that it lacks adequate recourse at the state
   level if it believes the PaPUC erred either in approving Salsgiver
   Telecom's application to provide telecommunications services as a CAP, or
   in accepting Salsgiver's CAP Tariff for filing. See generally, Response,
   Exhibit 1, Salsgiver CAP Authorization Order at 2 ("The Company complied
   with notice requirements set forth in our Application form. . . No
   protests were filed. No hearings were held."); 52 Pa. Code S 54.36
   (procedure for protests to applications); 52 Pa. Code S 5.572 (procedures
   for petitions for relief following a final decision).

   After it filed the instant Complaint, Salsgiver Telecom received
   authorization from the PaPUC to provide -- in addition to CAP services --
   certain other telecommunications services. See Complainant's Motion for
   Leave to File Notice and Notice, File No. EB-06-MD-002 (filed June 20,
   2006); Complainant's Erratum, File No. EB-06-MD-002 (filed June 30, 2006).
   We need not and do not rely on that authorization, however, because we
   have an adequate basis to resolve the instant Complaint, and do resolve
   it, on the basis of the PaPUC service authorization Salsgiver Telecom
   possessed at the time it filed the instant Complaint.

   Salsgiver Telecom also claims that it is entitled to pole access on the
   ground that it is a provider of interstate telecommunications services
   pursuant to (i) the Commission's rules forbearing from requiring
   non-dominant interexchange and local exchange carriers to file tariffs,
   and (ii) the Commission's blanket authorization for non-dominant carriers
   to enter interstate markets. Complaint at 3, P 9; Reply of Salsgiver
   Telecom, Inc., File No. EB-06-MD-002 (filed Mar. 30, 2006) ("Reply") at 9,
   14-16. NPTC, however, challenges the adequacy of Salsgiver Telecom's
   factual showing that it is a provider of interstate telecommunications
   services. Response at 13-14, PP 45-48, 49-55. Because we find that
   Salsgiver Telecom is entitled to access NPTC's poles on the basis of its
   intrastate telecommunications service authorizations and service
   offerings, we need not and do not decide whether Salsgiver Telecom has
   submitted sufficient proof of its status as a provider of interstate
   telecommunications services.

   47 C.F.R. S 1.1409(b).

   See, e.g., Response at 6, P 14; 7, P 16; 12, P 43; 13-15, PP 50-54, 57-58.

   See, e.g., Response at 14-15, PP 56-59.

   See, e.g., Investigation of Special Access Tariffs of Local Exchange
   Carriers, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 4712, 4712 at P 2 (1993)
   ("Special Access Tariff Investigation"); MTS and WATS Market Structure
   Order, 93 FCC 2d at 249-50 at PP 20- 23; American Telephone & Telegraph
   Company; Private Line Rate Structure and Volume Discount Practices, Notice
   of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 74 FCC 2d 226 (1979) (investigating
   whether the pricing of AT&T's competitive private line services was
   consistent with 47 U.S.C S 202, which prohibits unjust discrimination by
   common carriers).

   Special Access Tariff Investigation, 8 FCC Rcd at 4712, P 2.

   47 C.F.R. S 61.40 (providing rate structure requirements for the tariffed
   private line services of dominant common carriers); Access Charge Reform,
   Fifth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14221 (1999) (establishing pricing
   flexibility rules for incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC") special
   access - interstate private line - services, including circumstances in
   which ILECs may offer such services on an individually tailored "contract
   tariff' basis), aff'd sub nom. WorldCom v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449 (D.C. Cir.
   2001); see Special Access Tariff Investigation, supra (investigating
   certain issues  related to duration of the Other Common Carrier (OCC) Rate
   Equalization Plan adopted in connection with replacing local private line
   services provisioned under tariff by AT&T prior to the advent of effective
   special access tariffs).

   See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 9175, P 780; 9355-56 at
   Appendix I (stating that private line services qualify as
   "telecommunications" and adopting rules providing for universal service
   contributions by interstate telecommunications carriers); 47 C.F.R. S
   54.706(a) (stating that entities that provide "interstate
   telecommunications" -- including "private line service" -- to the public,
   or to such classes of users as to be effectively available to the public,
   for a fee will be considered "telecommunications carriers" providing
   interstate telecommunications services and must contribute to the
   universal service support mechanisms.).

   In its August 19, 2005 Letter explaining its reasons for denying Salsgiver
   Telecom access to its poles, NPTC cited Salsgiver Telecom's lack of
   certification by the PaPUC as a "CLEC." Complaint, Exhibit 6 at 1;
   Response at 7, P 13; 10, P 17. If NPTC is thereby contending that it may
   deny pole access to Salsgiver Telecom merely because it is certified as a
   "CAP" rather than as a "CLEC," we reject that position. For the reasons
   described above, the "Competitive Access Provider" services listed in the
   CAP Tariff qualify as "telecommunications services" under the Act.
   Moreover, through its CAP Tariff, Salsgiver Telecom holds itself out to
   provide the listed telecommunications services indiscriminately to the
   public, for a fee. Thus, the fact that Salsgiver Telecom is a "CAP" rather
   than a "CLEC" provides no lawful basis under the Act for NPTC to deny
   Salsgiver access to NPTC's poles.

   See, e.g., Integrated Services Digital Networks, First Report, 98 FCC2d
   249, 278, n.77 (1984) ("A tariff for interstate service is a public offer
   to provide service ... ."); Harry Newton, Harry Newton, Newton's Telecom
   Dictionary 888 (22nd ed. 2006) (defining "tariff" in relevant part as a
   "public document [that]details services, equipment and pricing offered by
   the telephone company (a common carrier) to all potential customers")
   (emphasis added).

   See CAP Tariff, "Application of Tariff," Page 4 of 28.

   CAP Tariff, "Service Offered," Page 4 of 28.

   CAP Tariff, Sections 3 "Description of Service" at Section 3.1, Page 25 of
   28. In addition, the Tariff specifies: "Digital channels over the
   Company's network are furnished for full-duplex transmission of digital
   signals ... ." Id. at Section 3.2, Page 25 of 28.

   47 U.S.C. S 153 (43), (46). To the extent that NPTC's characterization of
   Salsgiver's services as "broadband" services is intended to suggest that
   they are information services, we disagree with that suggestion for the
   reasons discussed above. See NPTC Nov. 23, 2005 Letter at 2; Response at
   6, P 14.

   Response at  6, 14-15, PP14, 56-59.

   See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534
   U.S. 327 (2002) (holding, in an analogous context, that the protections of
   section 224 continue to apply to attachments by cable systems, even if the
   attachments are simultaneously used to provide both cable service and a
   non-cable service, such as high-speed Internet access).

   Response at 6, 12, PP 14, 43-44. The Commission's rules define "Terminal
   equipment" as: "[C]ommunications equipment located on the customer's
   premises at the end of a communications link, used to permit the stations
   involved to accomplish the provision of telecommunications or information
   services." 47 C.F.R. S 68.3.

   See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. S 68.100 ("[T]erminal equipment may be directly
   connected to the public switched telephone network, including private line
   services provided over wireline facilities that are owned by providers of
   wireline telecommunications.") (emphasis added); 47 C.F.R. 68.106(a)
   ("Customers connecting terminal equipment or protective circuitry to the
   public switched telephone network shall, upon request of the provider of
   wireline telecommunications, inform the provider of wireline
   telecommunications of the particular line(s) to which such connection is
   made, and any other information required to be placed on the terminal
   equipment ... ."); 47 C.F.R. S 64.702(e) ("Except as otherwise ordered by
   the Commission, the carrier provision of customer premises equipment used
   in conjunction with the interstate telecommunications network may be
   offered in combination with the provision of common carrier communications
   services, except that the customer premises equipment shall not be offered
   on a tariffed basis.") (emphasis added). See generally, Policy and Rules
   Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace/Implementation of
   Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, As Amended/1998 Biennial
   Review - Review of the Customer Premises Equipment and Enhanced Services
   Unbundling Rules in the Interexchange, Exchange Access and Local Exchange
   Markets, Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 7418, 7428, 7437, PP 19, 32 (2001)
   (eliminating requirement that non-dominant carriers unbundle CPE from
   facilities and services).

   47 U.S.C. S 153(46); see id. at S 153(44).

   Response at 13-14, PP 49-55.

   47 U.S.C. S 224(f) (emphasis supplied).

   See 47 U.S.C. SS 153(44), (46), (43).

   Id. at S 224(b) and (c); Complaint at 2, P 6; Response at 2, P 6.  Public
   Notice, States That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole Attachments, 7
   FCC Rcd 1498 (1992).

   See 47 U.S.C. S 152(b).

   In support of its assertion that section 224 affords no pole attachment
   rights to intrastate carriers, NPTC cites the definition of "common
   carrier" in section 153(10) of the Act, which provides, in part, that a
   "`common carrier' or `carrier' means any person engaged as a common
   carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio
   ... ." 47 U.S.C. S 153(10)(emphasis supplied). See Response at 14, P 51.
   We reject any implication that this definition of "common carrier" limits
   the reach of section 224 to "telecommunications carriers" who operate
   interstate. First, as stated above, the definition of "telecommunications
   carrier" (including the related definitions of "telecommunications
   service" and "telecommunications") contains no limitation to providers of
   interstate communications. 47 U.S.C. SS 153(44),(46),(43). Moreover, such
   a restrictive interpretation of the term "telecommunications carrier" as
   used in section 224(f)(1) would eviscerate Congress' intent to open local
   telecommunications markets to competition through the 1996 Act and would
   undermine the Commission's policy of encouraging facilities-based
   competitive entry. See, e.g., Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
   Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the
   Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
   Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
   Capability, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of
   Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978, 16983-84 at PP 1-3 (2003)
   ("Triennial Review Order"), corrected by Triennial Review Order Errata, 18
   FCC Rcd 19020 (2003) (subsequent history omitted).

   See 47 U.S.C. S 1.1404 (m) (providing, in pertinent part: "[i]n a case
   where a cable television system operator or telecommunications carrier
   claims that it has been denied access to a pole, duct, conduit or
   right-of-way despite a request made pursuant to section 47 U.S.C. S
   224(f), the complaint shall be filed within 30 days of such denial.").

   See Response at 10, P 19; NPTC Nov. 23, 2005 Letter.

   See Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of
   1996; Amendment of the Commission's Rules and Policies Governing Pole
   Attachments, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 6777, 6788-89, P 19 (1998)
   (rejecting pole owners' proposal to impose a statute of limitations on
   pole attachment complaints) (subsequent history omitted).

   See 47 C.F.R. S 1.3 ("Any provision of the rules may be waived by the
   Commission on its own motion or on petition if good cause therefor is
   shown.").

   Reply at 19-20; Reply, Declaration of Loren Salsgiver, Chief Executive
   Officer of Salsgiver Telecom, at 2, PP 3, 4.

   See, e.g., Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Amendment
   of Rules Governing Procedures to be Followed When Formal Complaints are
   Filed Against Common Carriers, Order on Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd 5681,
   5697, P 37 (2001) (noting, in the context of formal complaints filed under
   section 208 of the Act, that staff-supervised pre-complaint mediation is
   "highly recommend[ed]," because the "presence of Commission staff in
   mediation and settlement talks has facilitated the achievement of mutually
   agreeable solutions to disputes."); Kansas City Cable Partners v. Kansas
   City Power & Light Co., Order, 14 FCC Rcd 11599, 11602 at P 6 (Cab. Serv.
   Bur. 1999) ("Private negotiation is the preferred method for creating pole
   attachment arrangements and for dispute resolution.") (footnotes omitted).

   Response at 11-12, PP 36-41. Indeed, it appears that section 1.1404(m) was
   promulgated to protect the interest of pole attachers in speedy resolution
   of pole access disputes. See  Implementation of Section 703(e) of the
   Telecommunications Act of 1996; Amendment of the Commission's Rules and
   Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 6777  at
   6788, P 18 (noting the interest of cable operators in the swift resolution
   of pole access disputes). It would thus be incongruous to penalize an
   attacher for promptly seeking alternative dispute resolution before filing
   a formal complaint.

   We further note that, although NPTC's initial denial of Salsgiver
   Telecom's written request for pole access occurred on November 23, 2005,
   NPTC has continued to deny Salsgiver Telecom access to its poles. See
   Supplemental Response of NPTC Regarding Salsgiver Telecom Response to
   Letter Ruling Dated Aug. 29, 2006, File No. EB-06-MD-002 (filed Sept. 14,
   2006) at 1-3. Dismissal of the instant Complaint based on an alleged
   failure to comply with section 1.1404(m) would only serve to delay the
   resolution of this dispute, because Salsgiver Telecom would be free to
   submit another request for access to NPTC, and to file a new complaint,
   once NPTC responded with another denial of access. Such a scenario would
   result in a waste of resources for both the parties and the Commission.

   Complaint at 8-9, PP 29-30 (citing 47 U.S.C. SS 501, 503(a) and (b); 47
   C.F.R. SS 1.1413, 1.80); see id. at 10-11, P 34. Salsgiver Telecom also
   asserted a request for damages, citing SS 206-209 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. SS
   206-209. Complaint at 8-9, P 29. It did not, however, offer proof of any
   alleged damages, nor did it comply with the Commission's rules for
   bringing complaints for damages under sections 206-208 of the Act. See 47
   C.F.R. SS 1.720 - 1.736. As a result of these deficiencies, we are unable
   to assess the merits of Salsgiver Telecom's request for damages and
   therefore deny it.

   Complaint at 7-9, PP 24-30. See Fiber Technologies Networks, L.L.C. v.
   North Pittsburgh Tel. Co., File No. EB-05-MD-014 (Complaint filed July 8,
   2005); DQE Communications Network Servs. v. North Pittsburgh Tel. Co.,
   File No. EB-05-MD-027 (Complaint filed Sept. 16, 2005); Salsgiver
   Communications, Inc. v. North Pittsburgh Tel. Co., File No. EB-06-MD-004
   (Complaint filed Mar. 20, 2006).

   See DQE Communications Network Servs. v. North Pittsburgh Tel. Co.,
   Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 2112 (Enf. Bur. 2007); Fiber
   Technologies Networks, L.L.C. v. North Pittsburgh Tel. Co., Memorandum
   Opinion and Order, 2007 W.L. 580768 (Enf. Bur. 2007).

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                                                              (continued....)

   Federal Communications Commission DA 07-2150

   1

   Federal Communications Commission FCC 00-XXX