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                         Before the
              Federal Communications Commission
                   Washington, D.C. 20554


In the Matter of                  )
                                 )
Core Communications, Inc.,        )
                                 )
      Complainant,                )
                                 )
                v.                )   File No. EB-01-MD-007
                                 )
Verizon  Maryland Inc.,           )
                                 )
       Defendant.                 )
                                 )



                MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


Adopted:  April 18, 2003                Released:  April 23, 
2003

By the Commission:

I.   INTRODUCTION

     1.   In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, we grant in 
substantial part a formal complaint1 that Core 
Communications, Inc. (``Core'') filed against Verizon 
Maryland Inc. (``Verizon'') pursuant to section 208 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (``Communications 
Act'' or ``Act'').2  In particular, based on the record as a 
whole, we grant Core's central claim that Verizon violated 
the parties' interconnection agreement, and thus the 
reasonableness standard of section 251(c)(2)(D) of the Act,3 
by failing to interconnect with Core on just and reasonable 
terms.4  We otherwise dismiss or deny Core's other claims.5



   II.  BACKGROUND

        A.  The Parties

     2.   Core is a facilities-based competitive local 
exchange carrier (``LEC'') providing telecommunications 
services in, among other locations, a region called LATA 
236, which includes Washington, D.C. and parts of the States 
of Maryland and Virginia (the ``Washington Metropolitan 
LATA'').6  Verizon is an incumbent LEC providing 
telecommunications services in, among other locations, the 
Washington Metropolitan LATA.7

        II.A.  Statutory Background

     3.   Section 251(c)(2) of the Act requires incumbent 
LECs to physically link their networks with those of all 
competitive LECs who request such ``interconnection.'' 8  
Interconnection makes possible communication between an 
incumbent LEC's and a competitive LEC's customers.  Because 
incumbent LECs still serve the great majority of subscribers 
in their home territories,9 a competitive LEC cannot 
realistically provide facilities-based services until the 
incumbent LEC interconnects with it.  Prompt 
interconnection, therefore, is essential to attaining the 
pro-competitive goals of the 1996 Act.10  Accordingly, 
section 251(c)(2) requires that incumbent LECs interconnect 
with competitive LECs on ``terms and conditions that are 
just [and] reasonable... in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the [parties' interconnection] agreement... 
.''11  

     4.   Under the statutory scheme of the 1996 Act, the 
terms and conditions for interconnection typically appear in 
interconnection agreements that incumbent LECs and 
competitive LECs either negotiate or arbitrate pursuant to 
section 252.12  The Bell Operating Companies, however, also 
have the option to effectuate interconnection agreements by 
``prepar[ing] and fil[ing] with a State commission a 
statement of the terms and conditions that such company 
generally offers within that State to comply with the 
requirements of section 251 and the regulations thereunder, 
and the standards applicable under [section 252].''13  Such 
statements are referred to as ``Statements of Generally 
Available Terms,'' or ``SGATs.''  A state commission may not 
approve an SGAT unless the SGAT complies with, inter alia, 
section 251 and the regulations thereunder.14

                     C.   Core's Interconnection Request

     5.   During all periods relevant to this proceeding, 
competitive LECs in Maryland seeking to interconnect with 
Verizon could do so pursuant to Verizon's Statement of 
Generally Available Terms and Conditions for Interconnection 
for the State of Maryland (``Maryland SGAT'').15  The 
Maryland SGAT provides, inter alia, that the parties may 
negotiate a schedule for interconnection and that, in the 
absence of such a negotiated schedule, interconnection would 
require not less than 45 days.  The Maryland SGAT does not 
expressly establish a maximum period to complete 
interconnection.16

     6.   In early February 2000, pursuant to sections 
251(c) and 252(f) of the Act, Core requested interconnection 
with Verizon in the Washington Metropolitan LATA under the 
terms of the Maryland SGAT.17  In accordance with the terms 
of the Maryland SGAT, Core and Verizon signed a schedule to 
the SGAT entitled ``Request for Interconnection,'' pursuant 
to which both parties ``agree[d] to be bound by the terms of 
the Statement.''18  Thus, the Maryland SGAT served as the 
parties' interconnection agreement.19  At that time, Core 
had not yet begun to provide service in the Washington 
Metropolitan LATA.  Therefore, interconnecting with Verizon 
was an absolute prerequisite to Core providing any 
facilities-based service in that LATA.20

     7.   According to the record in this proceeding, 
interconnection between Core and Verizon would require three 
steps.  First, Core had to provide Verizon with certain 
information regarding its interconnection request, including 
a forecast of the amount of Verizon network capacity that 
Core expected to utilize.  Next, Verizon had to build an 
``entrance facility'' (i.e., a dedicated fiber optic 
circuit) from Verizon's Damascus, Maryland end office to 
Core's Point of Presence (``POP'') in Damascus, Maryland.  
Finally, Verizon had to establish an interoffice facility to 
carry traffic from its end users to Core's Damascus, 
Maryland POP.21

     8.   By February 28, 2000, Core had fulfilled its 
obligation to provide to Verizon a forecast of the amount of 
Verizon network capacity that Core would require; Core also 
had provided all the other information that Verizon needed 
to begin building the entrance facility.22  Verizon 
completed construction of the entrance facility four months 
later, on June 28, 2000.23

     9.   As previously mentioned, the third and final step 
to complete the Core/Verizon interconnection in the 
Washington Metropolitan LATA was for Verizon to establish an 
interoffice facility on Verizon's network to Core's POP.  
Based on the forecast and other information submitted by 
Core, Verizon determined that it would need two DS-3 
transport circuits and two DS-1 transport circuits to carry 
Core's traffic.24  Towards that end, on June 29, 2000 (the 
day after completing Core's entrance facility), Verizon sent 
Core an Access Service Request form (``ASR'') for the DS-3s.  
Verizon stated on the ASR that the ``D[esired] D[ue] 
D[ate]'' for providing the DS3s was July 14, 2000, a date 
established by Verizon.25  

     10.  Verizon did not provide the DS-3s on July 14, 
2000, however.26  On July 25, 2000, Core telephoned Verizon 
and asked when interconnection would be complete.27  Verizon 
stated that it could not complete interconnection due to an 
interoffice facility issue on Verizon's network, but Verizon 
provided no specific description of the problem and did not 
state when it expected to complete interconnection.28  
Immediately thereafter, Core's counsel sent Verizon's 
counsel a letter asking when interconnection would be 
complete.  Verizon did not respond to Core's letter.29

     11.  Between August 6, 2000 and August 25, 2000, 
Verizon experienced a union work stoppage (i.e., a strike).  
Verizon informed Core and other competitive LECs of the work 
stoppage and that Verizon would not process orders during 
the strike.30

     12.  On August 21, 2000, Core's counsel sent another 
letter to Verizon's counsel asking when interconnection 
would be complete.31  Verizon did not respond to this 
letter, either.32 On about September 11, 2000, Core 
telephoned Verizon, again asking when interconnection would 
be complete.  Verizon stated that interconnection probably 
would not be completed until about November 15, 2000.33

     13.   Verizon completed interconnection with Core on 
November 15, 2000, more than four months after Verizon 
finished the entrance facility (on June 28, 2000), and four 
months after the  July 14, 2000 ``desired due date'' stated 
by Verizon on the ASR.34  Consequently, even though Core had 
provided all information necessary for Verizon to begin 
building the entrance facility by late February 2000,35 Core 
could not provide any facilities-based service in the 
Washington Metropolitan LATA until about nine months later, 
when Verizon finally completed the interconnection on 
November 15, 2000.36
          D.  Verizon's Capacity Exhaust on Key Equipment in 
          the Washington                   Metropolitan 
          LATA37

     14.  It was during discovery in this proceeding that 
Verizon revealed why it had failed to complete its 
interconnection with Core until more than four months after 
building the necessary entrance facility:  two electronic 
digital cross-connect machines -- a K36 3x1 (the ``K36'') 
and a K43 3x3 (the ``K43'')38 -- located in Verizon's 
Southwest Washington, D.C. transport hub (``Washington 
Hub'') ran out of DS3 capacity during the pendency of Core's 
interconnection request.39  Verizon had configured its 
network so that all competitive LEC-bound traffic 
originating in the Washington Metropolitan LATA had to 
travel through a tandem switch located in its Washington 
Hub.40  From that switch, certain competitive LEC traffic 
had to travel through both the K36 and the K43, and, 
ultimately, onto trunks to individual competitive LECs' 
POPs.41

     15.  The consequence of this network configuration was 
that, if and when either the K36 or the K43 ran out of 
capacity, Verizon's ability to transport additional traffic 
of competitive LECs in the Washington Metropolitan LATA 
would be significantly hampered.42  As described below, that 
is precisely what befell Core here:  while Verizon was 
building Core's entrance facility, the K36 and K43 ran out 
of capacity, rendering Verizon unable to complete Core's 
interconnection request and transport any Core traffic in 
the Washington Metropolitan LATA until Verizon solved the 
capacity problem.43

     16.  The K36 and K43 capacity exhaust was the result of 
two Verizon actions.  With respect to the K36, on January 
31, 2000, Verizon placed an order with a third-party vendor 
for equipment to increase the capacity of the K36.44  
Although Verizon forecast that the machine would exhaust in 
May, 2000,45 Verizon set an August 30, 2000 date for the 
equipment to be installed.46  The K36 was exhausted by early 
July,47 well before the equipment was installed.48

     17.  With respect to the K43, by no later than December 
1, 1999, Verizon had forecast that the K43 would exhaust in 
February, 2000.49  On December 22, 1999, Verizon ordered 
equipment to increase the capacity of the K43 from its 
vendor, requesting that some of the equipment be installed 
by February 15, 2000, and that the remaining equipment be 
installed by April 30, 2000.50  The vendor did not even 
begin installing the K43 in February.51  Major portions of 
the machine were at capacity exhaust by about April 1, 
2000,52 and the machine suffered complete exhaust no later 
than late June, 2000.53  On May 8, 2000 the K43 vendor 
informed Verizon that installation would not be complete 
until late October 2000.54  The vendor did not complete 
installation of the equipment ordered for February, 2000 
until August, 2000, and did not complete the rest of the 
order by installing the remainder of the equipment ordered 
(to be installed in April) until October 20, 2000.55  

     18.    The K36 and K43 capacity exhaust conflicted with 
Verizon's internal engineering standards:  Verizon states 
that its engineering objective was ``to add capacity to 
digital cross-connect machines by the time the machine 
reaches 90% utilization.''56  In addition, the capacity 
exhaust had serious consequences for competitive LECs in the 
Washington Metropolitan LATA, including Core.  In 
particular, because the capacity of the K36 and K43 cross-
connect machines had exhausted, Verizon could complete 
neither Core's interconnection request nor numerous other 
competitive LEC requests for transport capacity in the 
Washington Metropolitan LATA.57  By June 23, 2000, Verizon 
had 54 carrier capacity requests in ``hold'' status because 
of the cross-connect exhaust.58  Verizon did not complete 
any of those 54 ``held'' orders until several months later, 
after new equipment was installed.59  Accordingly, Verizon 
did not complete Core's interconnection until November 15, 
2000,60 after the new equipment was installed on about 
October 20, 2000.61  Thus, the record establishes that the 
K36 and K43 were at capacity exhaust for not less than four 
months, from June 23, 2000 (when 54 carrier requests were on 
``hold'') until October 20, 2000 (when the new equipment was 
installed).  Similarly, the record reveals that the capacity 
exhaust caused Core's interconnection to be delayed by four 
months (from about July 14, 2000 -- the ``[D]esired [D]ue 
[D]ate'' in the ASR -- to November 15, 2000). 

     19.  As stated above, between the time that Core 
provided all information necessary to enable Verizon to 
begin building the entrance facility in late February 2000 
and the time that Verizon finally honored Core's request 
nine months later, on November 15, 2000, Core could not 
provide any facilities-based service whatsoever in the 
Washington Metropolitan LATA.62  Meanwhile, throughout that 
period, Verizon's own traffic in the Washington Metropolitan 
LATA continued to flow freely, because Verizon did not route 
its own traffic through the congested Washington Hub, and 
because the portion of Verizon's network that did transport 
Verizon's traffic had capacity sufficient to allow Verizon 
to increase its end-user customer base.63    

III.    DISCUSSION

     20.  Core's central allegation is essentially that 
Verizon violated the Maryland SGAT, and thus the 
reasonableness standard of section 251(c)(2)(D) of the Act, 
by failing to interconnect with Core promptly and by failing 
to notify Core of the likelihood and extent that 
interconnection would be delayed.64  In response, Verizon 
asserts that (i) the Commission lacks jurisdiction over the 
Complaint;65 (ii) the Complaint fails to state a claim;66 
(iii) comity with state commissions warrants dismissal of 
the Complaint;67 and (iv) it interconnected with Core in a 
timely and otherwise just and reasonable manner.68

     21.  As discussed below, we reject all of the reasons 
Verizon asserts that we should dismiss Core's Complaint 
without reaching its merits.  Moreover, we find that Verizon 
violated section 251(c)(2)(D) of the Act and section 
51.305(a)(5) of our rules by failing to provide Core with 
interconnection ``on rates, terms, and conditions that are 
just [and] reasonable, ... in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of [its interconnection] agreement''69 with Core.  
Verizon allowed exhaust in the portion of its network 
through which Core's traffic had to travel, thereby delaying 
interconnection by four months.  Verizon further aggravated 
the delay by repeatedly failing to provide information to 
Core as to the existence and probable duration of the delay.  
Finally, the record reveals that Verizon made little, if 
any, effort to solve the exhaust problem.  Viewing all the 
facts as a whole, we find that Verizon did not provide 
interconnection to Core on just and reasonable terms.

     A.   The Commission Has Jurisdiction Under Section 208.

     22.       Verizon asserts that the Commission lacks 
jurisdiction under section 208 of the Act to adjudicate 
Core's claims alleging a violation of section 251(c)(2) of 
the Act.70  The Commission recently addressed and rejected 
all of the same jurisdictional arguments that Verizon raises 
here.71  Therefore, for the reasons stated in CoreComm v. 
SBC,72 we deny Verizon's jurisdictional defense, and hold 
that we have jurisdiction under section 208 to adjudicate 
Core's claims alleging a violation of section 251(c)(2).

     B.  Core's Complaint States a Claim Under Section 208 
     of the Act.

     23.  Verizon asserts two reasons why Core's Complaint 
fails to state a claim under section 208 of the Act.  First, 
Verizon argues that Core's Complaint really alleges only a 
violation of the Maryland SGAT, not of the Communications 
Act.73  In addition, Verizon argues that the Maryland SGAT 
establishes only a minimum interconnection interval (i.e. 45 
days) and not a maximum, and that therefore, even under the 
Maryland SGAT, no claim lies for taking ``too long'' to 
complete interconnection.74  As this latter issue is more an 
argument about the merits, we discuss it below in evaluating 
the substance of Core's Complaint.  We begin, however, by 
rejecting Verizon's assertion that a violation of the 
Maryland SGAT would not violate the Communications Act.

     24.  As noted above, rather than negotiating its own 
individual agreement with Verizon, Core chose to accept the 
terms of Verizon's Maryland SGAT.  In accordance with the 
terms of the Maryland SGAT, Core and Verizon signed a 
schedule to the SGAT entitled ``Request for 
Interconnection,'' pursuant to which both parties ``agree[d] 
to be bound by the terms of the Statement.''  Thus, the 
Maryland SGAT served as the parties' interconnection 
agreement.75  To the extent that Verizon violated the terms 
of the Maryland SGAT, therefore, it violated the terms of an 
interconnection agreement entered into pursuant to sections 
251 and 252.

     25.  Verizon essentially argues that nothing in the Act 
requires it to comply with the interconnection agreements 
that it enters into pursuant to sections 251 and 252.  
Verizon is incorrect.  Section 251(c)(2) expressly requires 
Verizon to provide interconnection ``on rates, terms, and 
conditions that are just [and] reasonable ..., in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the 
requirements of this section and section 252.'' 76  
Similarly, section 51.305(a)(5) of the Commission's rules 
requires Verizon to provide interconnection ``in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of any agreement.''77  Thus, 
both the Act and the Commission's implementing rules require 
Verizon not only to enter into interconnection agreements, 
but also to comply with their terms.  We find below that 
Verizon failed to comply with its interconnection agreement 
with Core (i.e., the Maryland SGAT) by failing to provide 
interconnection on just and reasonable terms.  This 
violation of the Maryland SGAT constitutes a violation of 
both 47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(D) and 47 C.F.R.  51.305(a)(5).  
Thus, Core's Complaint states a claim pursuant to section 
208 of the Act.

     26.  Verizon argues that Core's Complaint cannot 
possibly state a claim under sections 208 and 251(c)(2) of 
the Act, because ``it is inconceivable that Congress would 
have elaborated a significant role for state commissions in 
the implementation of the 1996 Act while authorizing private 
parties to eliminate that role by filing a complaint with 
the Commission.''78  Verizon's argument is unpersuasive.  
Allowing formal complaints like Core's to proceed will 
hardly ``eliminate'' state commissions' roles in 
implementing the 1996 Act.  State commissions will continue 
to exercise primary authority to arbitrate and approve 
interconnection agreements, and will continue to exercise 
concurrent authority to adjudicate interconnection and 
unbundling disputes arising from interconnection agreements. 
Thus, the state commissions' roles in arbitrating and 
enforcing the requirements of interconnection agreements 
will remain central, as Congress intended. 

     27.  Verizon further argues that allowing Core's 
Complaint to proceed would ``make[] nonsense of the entire 
remedial scheme under section 252 and would deprive 
interconnection agreements of any binding effect - indeed it 
would deprive interconnection agreements of virtually all 
practical significance.''79  Verizon's argument is 
incorrect.  As Verizon acknowledges,80 Core's claim does not 
seek to hold the Maryland SGAT unlawful or to rewrite its 
terms.  Instead, Core's Complaint essentially seeks to 
enforce the SGAT's terms (and, by definition, the Act's 
terms).  Thus, far from vitiating the significance of 
interconnection agreements in the statutory scheme, allowing 
Core's Complaint to proceed actually emphasizes and 
reinforces the crucial status of interconnection agreements 
in implementing the statutory requirements, as well as 
incumbent LECs' statutory obligation to comply with their 
agreements. 81

     28.  Finally, although Verizon does not cite it, we 
note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit recently issued an opinion considering whether, 
under the particular circumstances at issue, an alleged 
breach of an interconnection agreement constituted an 
alleged violation of section 251 of the Act.  In Trinko v. 
Bell Atlantic Corp.,82 a divided panel concluded, over a 
vigorous dissent, ``that in this case it does not.''83  
Trinko does not undermine our conclusion here, however.  
Trinko implies that an incumbent LEC has no obligation under 
the Communications Act to comply with an interconnection 
agreement; thus, an incumbent LEC's obligations would flow 
solely from contract law enforceable only in a court.  In 
the case of interconnection, this conclusion conflicts with 
express statutory language obligating incumbent LECs to 
provide interconnection ``in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the agreement.''  47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(D).84  
In addition, the Second Circuit's conclusion is not 
consistent with the great weight of court and Commission 
authorities holding that state commissions have authority to 
enforce interconnection agreements.85  Trinko does not 
discuss or distinguish those authorities.  Indeed, as the 
dissenting opinion observes, the parties had not raised the 
issue before either the district court or the Second 
Circuit, and thus the Trinko Court did not have the benefit 
of any briefing or factual record.  Finally, the Commission 
was not a party in Trinko, so the Trinko holding is not 
binding.86 

     C.  The Comity Doctrine Does Not Warrant Dismissal of 
the Complaint.  

     29.  Verizon argues that, because the Commission and 
many courts have held that state commissions have authority 
to interpret and enforce interconnection agreements, we 
should decline to adjudicate Core's Complaint out of 
deference to the authority of the Maryland Public Service 
Commission to do so.87  Verizon's argument lacks merit.  
First, the Maryland Commission does not have (and has never 
had) an open proceeding regarding this matter to which we 
could defer.  Moreover, Verizon's argument unduly diminishes 
this Commission's role in enforcing the federal regime, as 
reflected in interconnection agreements.  As discussed 
above,88 Core has stated a claim under the Communications 
Act, and the Commission has jurisdiction to adjudicate that 
claim.  Verizon has not raised any specific circumstances 
present here that make it appropriate to decline to exercise 
our jurisdiction to adjudicate Core's Complaint.  Instead, 
Verizon essentially suggests that we abstain from exercising 
our jurisdiction under section 208 to enforce the Act where 
interconnection agreements are involved.89  This argument 
suffers from several flaws, among them are that it appears 
inconsistent with Congress's decision to deny the Commission 
authority to forbear from section 208; would vitiate the 
Commission as a forum for enforcing federal interconnection 
and unbundling requirements; and, in these particular 
circumstances, would needlessly delay resolution of the 
dispute.90

     30.  In response, Verizon relies upon two orders in 
which the Commission deferred to state commission 
processes.91  Verizon's reliance is misplaced.  In both of 
those orders, the Commission deferred to state commission 
processes because those processes concerned the precise 
matter at issue and were complete or nearly complete.92  
Here, by stark contrast, there is no state commission 
proceeding at all - ongoing or completed - regarding the 
matters at issue here.93  Thus, in sum, Verizon has failed 
to demonstrate that the comity doctrine warrants dismissal 
of Core's Complaint.

     D.  Verizon Violated the Reasonableness Standard of 
     Section 251(c)(2)(D) of the Act. 

          1.  The Maryland SGAT required Verizon to 
     interconnect on rates, terms                         
     and conditions that are just and reasonable.

     31.  Verizon argues that, because the Maryland SGAT 
does not expressly establish a maximum time for providing 
interconnection, no claim can lie for taking too long.94  We 
do not accept Verizon's position that it may take as long as 
it wants to honor an interconnection request. We find that 
Verizon was obligated - pursuant to section 251(c)(2)(D) and 
the terms of the Maryland SGAT - to provide Core with 
interconnection on rates, terms, and conditions that are 
just and reasonable, including within a reasonable period of 
time.

     32.  An SGAT, as defined in the Act, is a Bell 
Operating Company's statement ``of the terms and conditions 
that such company generally offers within [a] state to 
comply with the requirements of section 251 and the 
regulations thereunder ....''95  Moreover, ``[a] State 
commission may not approve such [SGAT] unless such [SGAT] 
complies with ... section 251 and the regulations 
thereunder.''96  Thus, the terms that Verizon offered 
through the Maryland SGAT were, by definition, intended to 
comply with the requirement of section 251(c)(2) to provide 
interconnection ``on rates, terms, and conditions that are 
just [and] reasonable.''97  The Maryland Commission approved 
those terms, and Core accepted them.  Accordingly, although 
the Maryland SGAT does not provide an express deadline for 
fulfilling interconnection requests, the Maryland SGAT does 
require Verizon to provide interconnection on just and 
reasonable terms, including within a just and reasonable 
period of time.98  Here, the totality of the circumstances, 
which include not only a lengthy delay in providing 
interconnection, but also Verizon's refusal to provide any 
timely information about the reason for the delay or its 
likely duration, demonstrate that Verizon failed to provide 
interconnection on just and reasonable terms.

          2.  Verizon failed to interconnect on just and 
     reasonable terms.

     33.  The facts and circumstances of this case, when 
viewed in their totality, establish that Verizon did not 
provide interconnection on just and reasonable terms.  The 
length of delay in providing interconnection, Verizon's 
failure to provide timely information regarding the expected 
duration of the delay, and its failure to explore solutions 
for the delay, taken together constitute a violation of 
section 251(c)(2)(D).   After carefully reviewing the record 
and considering all of the facts and circumstances as a 
whole, we conclude that Core has shown, by a preponderance 
of the evidence,99 that Verizon did not interconnect with 
Core on terms and conditions that are just and reasonable 
and in accordance with the Maryland SGAT.  Specifically, we 
find that Verizon's substantial delay in interconnecting 
with Core, together with Verizon's failure to timely inform 
Core of the delay and its likely duration, and its failure 
to make any significant effort to solve the cause of the 
delay, violated Verizon's statutory obligations.

               a.  Verizon failed to timely inform Core of 
          the likelihood and extent                       
          that interconnection would be delayed.

     34.  When an incumbent LEC promptly informs a 
competitive LEC regarding an anticipated delay in 
interconnection, the requesting competitive LEC can then 
make rational and educated business decisions about how best 
to serve its end user customers.  For example, when a 
requesting carrier learns in advance that interconnection 
will be significantly delayed, it may decide to find a 
different interconnection method or point, to enter the 
market by different means (such as resale), or to divert its 
resources to a different market altogether.  This promotes 
efficient competition and fosters consumer choice.

     35.  In analogous circumstances, the Commission has 
found that incumbent LECs have a duty to provide to 
competitive LECs information indicating the location and 
technical characteristics of the incumbent LEC's network.100  
In so concluding, the Commission reasoned that, ``[w]ithout 
access to such information, competing carriers would be 
unable to make rational network deployment decisions and 
could be forced to make inefficient use of their own and 
incumbent LEC facilities, with anticompetitive effects.''101  
That same reasoning applies to information regarding 
interconnection delays.  Where the incumbent LEC knows that 
a delay in interconnecting will be significant, conveying 
that information promptly to the requesting carrier will 
enable the requesting carrier to ``make rational network 
deployment decisions,'' so that it will not ``be forced to 
make inefficient use of [its] own and incumbent LEC 
facilities, with anticompetitive effects.''102  In sum, 
information regarding the projected time of interconnection 
is very valuable to competitive LECs.  Therefore, the manner 
in which an incumbent LEC conveys such information to a 
requesting competitive LEC is relevant in determining 
whether an incumbent LEC has provided interconnection on 
``terms and conditions that are just [and] reasonable'' 
under section 251(c)(2)(D). 

     36.  We find that Verizon did not timely inform Core of 
the likelihood and extent that interconnection would be 
delayed.  By June 23, 2000, Verizon knew, or should have 
known, that completing Core's interconnection request would 
be significantly delayed.  On that date, Verizon had 54 
requests for capacity on ``hold'' because of lack of 
capacity on the K36 and K43 cross-connect machines.  
Further, Verizon knew, or should have known, that these 54 
requests, as well as Core's, would be on ``hold'' for a 
significant amount of time, because its vendor had informed 
it on May 8, 2000 that the equipment needed to increase the 
capacity of the K43 would not be installed until at least 
October 19, 2000.  Therefore, because Verizon's delay in 
interconnecting with Core was both severe and readily 
apparent, we find that, by at least June 23, 2000, Verizon 
should have informed Core that interconnection would be 
delayed, and provided a reasonable estimate of the extent of 
the delay.  

     37.  Yet Verizon failed to do so.  Although Verizon 
knew or should have known by at least June 23, 2000 that 
interconnection with Core would be severely delayed, Verizon 
sent Core an ASR on June 29, 2000 for DS-3 transport service 
with a ``D[esired] D[ue] D[ate],'' established by Verizon, 
of July 14, 2000.  This ASR was tantamount to a 
representation by Verizon that DS3 service likely would be 
provided on or about July 14.  

     38.  Verizon argues that the ASR's July 14 ``D[esired] 
D[ue] D[ate]'' was not a ``firm order commitment.''103  
Verizon's argument does not succeed.  Although we agree that 
the ASR did not provide an absolute date for provisioning, 
the ASR did, in fact, indicate that Verizon expected to 
provision the DS-3s on or about July 14, and not as much as 
four months later.  Verizon generated the ASR and the 
desired due date,104 and Verizon knew all information 
regarding its network facilities.

     39.   Moreover, the July 14 date in the ASR came and 
went, again without Verizon notifying Core of the 
interconnection problems.  Finally, on July 25, 2000, in a 
phone call initiated by Core, Verizon stated merely that it 
was experiencing an ``interoffice facilities issue'' in 
interconnecting with Core.105  Verizon did not give a sense 
of the seriousness of the problem, and refused to tell Core 
when it expected interconnection to be completed.  Core's 
counsel wrote to Verizon's counsel two days later, and again 
on August 21, 2000, demanding to know when interconnection 
would be complete.  Verizon did not respond to Core's 
letters.  Indeed, it was not until September 11, 2000, 
almost three months after Verizon knew or should have known 
of the severity of the interconnection problem and its 
likely duration, that Verizon informed Core, in response to 
a call initiated by Core, that interconnection would not be 
completed until November 15, 2000.  Thus, the record amply 
demonstrates that Verizon's notice to Core was late and 
insufficient.    

     40.  Verizon argues that it generally does not confirm 
the availability of interoffice facilities for a particular 
requesting carrier until it has completed the carrier's 
entrance facility and issued an ASR.106  Verizon notes that 
it completed Core's entrance facility on June 28, and issued 
the ASR on June 29.  Verizon argues, therefore, that it 
could not have given Core notice of the delay until early 
July.107  The record reveals, however, that Verizon did not 
inform Core of the delay or its probable extent in early 
July.  Verizon did not contact Core soon after issuing the 
ASR, and refused to inform Core during the July 25 telephone 
conversation initiated by Core of the likely duration of the 
interconnection delay.  Moreover, Verizon ignored Core's 
July 27 and August 21 letters asking when interconnection 
would be completed, and refused to provide Core with that 
information until September 11.  In any event, the fact that 
Verizon typically does not confirm the availability of 
interoffice facilities for a particular requesting carrier 
until it has completed the carrier's entrance facility and 
issued an ASR is not sufficient in the specific 
circumstances here.  By at least June 23, 2000, Verizon had 
actual knowledge of all relevant facts:  that Core had 
requested DS3 service, that 54 capacity requests remained on 
hold due to the capacity exhaust, and that the equipment to 
alleviate the capacity exhaust would not be installed until 
late October.  Therefore, by at least June 23, 2000, Verizon 
knew, or should have known, that Core would experience a 
substantial interconnection delay, and should have provided 
notice to Core of that circumstance.  

               b.  Verizon failed to interconnect with Core 
               in a reasonably                         
               expeditious manner. 

     41.  The length of time taken by an incumbent LEC to 
interconnect with a competitive LEC is a relevant factor in 
determining whether the incumbent LEC complied with its duty 
to provide interconnection on terms and conditions ``that 
are just [and] reasonable.''108  As discussed above, an 
incumbent LEC's failure to interconnect expeditiously may 
frustrate accomplishment of Congress's goal of introducing 
facilities-based competition to the local telecommunications 
market. Where interconnection is delayed, a competitive 
LEC's resources may be wasted, and its reputation may suffer 
permanent damage because it does not provide the promised 
service in a timely manner.  Core effectively explains the 
importance of timely interconnection as follows:  ``Core was 
trying to establish the initial interconnection with Verizon 
in order to get into business in [the Washington 
Metropolitan LATA].  This is critical to the success of a 
competitive LEC and time is usually of the essence ... .  
Until the network is up and running, a competitive LEC can't 
exchange traffic with Verizon, can't sell to customers and 
ultimately can't get any revenues.''109

     42.  Core contends that the combined effect of three 
acts or omissions by Verizon unreasonably delayed Core's 
interconnection.  First, Core argues that Verizon failed to 
take adequate steps to ensure that the K43 and K36 would not 
run out of DS-3 capacity well before additional capacity 
could be added.110  Second, Core argues that Verizon should 
have pressed its vendors to expedite installation of the 
cross-connect equipment.111  Third, Core asserts that 
Verizon should have asked its vendors whether smaller, 
alternative equipment could be installed to solve the K43 
and K36 exhaust problem.112  For the following reasons, we 
agree.113 

     43.  First, with respect to Verizon's efforts to ensure 
that the K36 and K43 did not exhaust, the record suggests 
that two Verizon errors caused that exhaust.  Verizon's 
first error concerned the K36.  In January 2000, Verizon 
forecast that the K36 would exhaust in May, 2000.  On 
January 31, 2000, Verizon placed an order for equipment to 
increase the capacity of the K36, but, despite predicting 
that the machine would exhaust in May, set an August 30 date 
for the equipment to be installed.  Not surprisingly, the 
K36 suffered capacity exhaust well before Verizon's August 
30 installation date.  

     44.  Verizon also erred with respect to the K43.  By no 
later than December 1, 1999, Verizon had forecast that the 
K43 would exhaust in February, 2000.  On December 22, 1999 
Verizon ordered equipment to increase the capacity of the 
K43 equipment, requesting that a portion of the equipment 
installation be ``advance completed'' by February 15, 2000, 
and that the remaining equipment be installed by April 30, 
2000.

     45.  Given that Verizon expected the K43 to exhaust in 
February, Verizon's February ``advance complete'' date left 
Verizon and its vendor little room for error or mishap, 
particularly since Verizon placed the order shortly before a 
holiday period (on December 22) and, as Verizon admits, even 
after the equipment was installed, it would have to be 
``turned up'' and tested.114  Moreover, subsequent events 
establish that Verizon had indeed given its K43 vendor too 
little time to complete the job.  The vendor did not begin 
work on the K43 in February, and the machine suffered 
capacity exhaust by June, 2000.  The vendor did not complete 
the ``advance complete'' portion of the order (which Verizon 
requested be completed by February 15) until August 2000,115 
and did not complete the remainder of the order (to be 
completed by April 30) until about October 19, 2000.  In 
sum, with respect to the ``advance complete'' order, Verizon 
gave its K43 vendor two months to complete work that 
required eight months, and, with respect to the remaining 
portion of the order, gave its vendor four months to 
complete work that ultimately required ten months.116 

     46.  The record does not reveal why Verizon ordered the 
K36 equipment to be installed in August when it forecast 
that the machine would exhaust in May.  Similarly, with 
respect to the K43, the record does not reveal whether 
Verizon ordered the equipment too late because Verizon 
misjudged the time it would take its vendor to complete 
installation, or because Verizon did not accurately forecast 
the machine's capacity utilization growth, and therefore did 
not realize until too late that the K43 was near exhaust. 

     47.  In any event, as Verizon acknowledges, Verizon 
must make reasonable efforts to plan for equipment vendor 
installation intervals, and to forecast future capacity 
utilization growth in order to prevent network capacity 
exhaust.117  Moreover, by allowing the K43 and K36 to 
exhaust, Verizon failed to meet its own internal engineering 
objectives.  Verizon further acknowledges that allowing the 
capacity of the K36 and K43 to exhaust significantly 
hindered Verizon's ability to handle additional traffic of 
competitive LECs in the Washington Metropolitan LATA, and 
delayed interconnection with Core for four months.  
Moreover, Verizon is a large, sophisticated, and experienced 
telecommunications provider.  Core's expert expresses 
astonishment at the fact that the K43 and K36 were exhausted 
for four months, stating that the K43 and K36 are ``gigantic 
units with lots of capacity,'' and noting that Verizon 
routinely monitors equipment usage, and forecasts future 
usage.  ``[I]t is nearly inconceivable to me that they could 
have exhausted these facilities without having known it was 
going to happen and without planning to already have the 
next unit installed.''118  Given all these circumstances, 
the fact that Verizon's K36 and K43 were at virtually 
complete exhaust for at least four months, standing alone, 
establishes a prima facie case that Verizon failed to make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the equipment did not 
exhaust.

     48.  Because Core has established a prima facie case 
that Verizon's allowing the capacity of the K43 and K36 to 
exhaust was unreasonable, ``it is incumbent upon [Verizon] 
to respond fully to [Core's] showing, with full legal and 
evidentiary support.''119  Moreover, the cause of the K36 
and K43 capacity exhaust is within Verizon's exclusive 
knowledge.  Therefore, Verizon has the burden to come 
forward with all facts establishing its defense with respect 
to the capacity exhaust.120  Yet Verizon presents little 
evidence to rebut the prima facie showing of 
unreasonableness.  Verizon's sole explanation for its 
mistakes is as follows:  ``The problems Verizon encountered 
in Core's interconnection came in the wake of exploding 
demand for high capacity service.  During 1999 and 2000, 
demand for services requiring high capacity interoffice 
facilities increased tremendously with an unprecedented gain 
of 80% in installed/working high capacity services.''121

     49.  Given the importance of timely interconnection, we 
find Verizon's explanation insufficient.  Verizon's errors 
caused an exhaust problem that lasted - not for days or 
weeks - but for months, four months.  Verizon does not argue 
in its pleadings or briefs that it experienced other 
comparably lengthy exhaust problems during this period of 
increased demand.  Furthermore, although Verizon states that 
there was an ``explosion'' in demand, Verizon does not state 
either that it was unaware of the ``explosion'' or, 
alternatively, that it did not learn of the explosion in 
time to react.  Verizon states that its engineers retrieved 
and reviewed data as to capacity utilization of the K43 and 
K36 ``at least once every two weeks,''122 but does not 
explain why, during those bi-weekly reviews, its engineers 
either did not detect the ``explosion,'' or, having detected 
it, could not make appropriate adjustments.123  Similarly, 
the record establishes that Verizon required Core and other 
interconnecting competitive LECs to provide forecasts of 
their capacity needs,124 yet Verizon does not assert that 
those forecasts did not sufficiently foretell the increase 
in demand. 

     50.  Nor does Verizon's evidence adequately explain its 
failure to plan accurately for vendor installation 
intervals.  Even if demand for facilities was ``exploding,'' 
and, as Verizon also asserts, its vendors were 
``experiencing longer than usual ordering and installation 
intervals,''125 Verizon does not state that it was unaware 
of this problem, and does not assert that it made any 
attempt to adjust its equipment ordering processes to 
reflect the vendor delays.  Moreover, the ``explosion'' in 
demand had begun by at least January 1999;126 therefore, it 
appears that Verizon had some advance warning of, and time 
to adjust for, its vendors' delays.  Verizon regularly 
communicated with its vendors, and routinely ordered 
equipment for its facilities located throughout the 
Northeast.127  Yet, Verizon's ordering interval here proved 
to be far too short:  as discussed, it gave its K43 vendor 
only two months to complete installation of equipment that 
ultimately required eight months.  Finally, we note that 
Verizon does not argue that it has made comparable errors in 
forecasting capacity demand or vendor installation intervals 
regarding the flow of its own traffic.

     51.  In addition, we find that Verizon compounded its 
mistakes by failing to act assertively to resolve the 
capacity problem.  For example, Verizon failed to press its 
vendors to expedite installation of the cross-connect 
equipment, and waited for the cross-connect equipment to be 
installed rather than exploring alternative means of 
interconnecting with Core, such as by obtaining different 
equipment.  As discussed above, the capacity exhaust problem 
had significant ramifications to numerous competitive LECs, 
including Core.  The Washington Hub bottleneck substantially 
stunted the growth of facilities-based competition in the 
Washington Metropolitan LATA.  In other words, the state of 
competition in the Washington Metropolitan LATA had to 
remain constrained until Verizon solved the capacity 
problem.  

     52.  Verizon argues that the affirmative steps 
suggested by Core (i.e., pressing the vendors, exploring 
interconnection alternatives) would likely have proven 
fruitless.128  The record does not permit us to agree with 
Verizon on that score.  In particular, the record contains 
no evidence that Verizon contacted its vendors to obtain 
alternative equipment, but was told that no such equipment 
was available.129  Nor does the record contain evidence that 
Verizon complained to its vendors or otherwise urged them to 
accelerate installation of the equipment Verizon had 
ordered.  For example, there is no evidence that Verizon 
protested when, having forecast that the K43 would exhaust 
by February, and having requested that a portion of the K43 
equipment be installed by February, the K43 ran out of 
capacity in June, and the vendor had not even begun 
installing the equipment.130  Indeed, as explained above, 
Verizon did not notify Core of the problem in a timely 
manner.  In sum, especially given the magnitude of the 
capacity problem, Verizon should have made substantial 
efforts to expedite its resolution.  Verizon's apparent 
passivity was an unreasonable response to Core's dilemma.

                         *    *    *

     53.  In sum, based on what the record reveals about the 
specific circumstances at issue here, we conclude that 
Verizon's acts and omissions, viewed as a whole, violated 
the Maryland SGAT, and thus the reasonableness standard of 
section 251(c)(2)(D) of the Act.  In particular, Core has 
shown, by a preponderance of the evidence that Verizon acted 
unreasonably by taking too long to complete interconnection 
with Core and by failing to promptly notify Core of the 
likelihood and extent of the interconnection delay.  Given 
the substantial magnitude and significant anticompetitive 
repercussions of Verizon's errors, taken together, we cannot 
excuse them as reasonable mistakes.131

     E.  We Dismiss or Deny Core's Other Claims.

     54.  Core alleges that Verizon violated sections 
201(b), 202(a), and 251(c)(2) of the Act.  As discussed 
above, we find that Verizon violated that portion of section 
251(c)(2) which requires that Verizon provide ``just'' and 
``reasonable'' interconnection.  With respect to Core's 
claim that Verizon violated section 202(a) and that portion 
of section 251(c)(2)(D) which prohibits discrimination by 
incumbent LECs in favor of third parties, Core argues that 
Verizon provided more favorable interconnection to two other 
carriers situated similarly to Core than Verizon provided to 
Core.132  In response, Verizon argues that section 202(a) 
does not govern interconnection provided pursuant to section 
251(c),133 and that, in any event, Core has failed to 
provide record evidence of discriminatory treatment.134  We 
agree with Verizon that the record falls far short of 
showing any discriminatory treatment against Core.135  
Accordingly, we deny Core's claim under section 202(a) and 
that portion of section 251(c)(2)(D) which prohibits 
discrimination in favor of third parties.136 

     55.  With respect to Core's remaining claims under 
section 201(b) and the remaining portions of section 
251(c)(2), our ruling under the ``just'' and ``reasonable'' 
standard of section 251(c)(2)(D) will afford Core all of the 
relief to which it would be entitled were we to rule in its 
favor on these remaining claims.  Accordingly, we need not 
address these claims, and dismiss them without prejudice.137

IV.  ORDERING CLAUSES

     56.  ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 
4(i), 4(j), 208, and 251 of the Communications Act of 1934, 
as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 208, and 251, that 
the portion of Core's Count 2138 that alleges violation of 
the ``just'' and ``reasonable'' standard of section 
251(c)(2)(D) of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 
U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(D), IS GRANTED to the extent indicated 
herein. 

     57.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 
4(j), 202, 208, and 251 of the Communications Act of 1934, 
as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 202, 208, and 251, 
that Core's Count 3,139 which alleges that Verizon violated 
section 202(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, 47 U.S.C.  202(a), and those portions of Core's 
Counts 2 and 4,140 which allege that Verizon violated that 
portion of section 251(c)(2)(D) which prohibits 
discrimination by the incumbent LEC in favor of third 
parties, are DENIED.

     58.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 
4(j), 201, 208, and 251 of the Communications Act of 1934, 
as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 201, 208, and 251, 
that the remaining portions of Core's Complaint are 
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 



                                        
                              FEDERAL         COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION



                                                Marlene   H. 
Dortch
                                Secretary                          Appendix
   Timeline with respect to the K43 and K36 Cross-Connect 
                          Machines

1999

December
22nd:  Having forecast that the K43 will exhaust in February 
2000, Verizon orders equipment to increase the capacity of 
the K43, requesting that a portion of the work be completed 
on February 15, 2000 and the remainder on April 30, 2000.

2000

January
31st:  Having forecast that the K36 will exhaust in May 
2000, Verizon orders equipment to increase the capacity of 
the K36, requesting completion by August 30, 2000. 

April
1st:  The last spare K43 OC-12 port is used.

May 
8th:  The vendor for the K43 informs Verizon that 
installation will not be complete until October 20, 2000.

June
29th:  Verizon sends Core an ``Access Service Request'' form 
(``ASR'') for DS-3 transport, stating that the ``D[esired] 
D[ue] D[ate]'' is July 14, 2000.

July
1st:  The last OC-12 port on the K36 suffers DS3 capacity 
exhaust.
14th:  The ``D[esired] D[ue] D[ate]'' on Verizon's ASR 
arrives:  Verizon does not provide the DS-S transport or 
contact Core.
25th:  Core telephones Verizon to ask when interconnection 
will be completed; Verizon does not describe the cause of 
the interconnection delay or state when it expects 
interconnection to be completed.
27th:   Core writes to Verizon, asking when interconnection 
will be completed; Verizon does not respond to Core's 
letter.

August
6th-25th:  Verizon strike.
21st:  Core writes to Verizon and asks when interconnection 
will be completed; Verizon does not respond to Core's 
letter.

September 
11th:  Core telephones Verizon and is informed that 
interconnection will be completed on about November 15, 
2000.October
20th:  Installation of equipment for the K36 and K43 is 
completed.

November 15
Core's interconnection is completed.
        

_________________________

1 Formal  Complaint of Core Communications,  Inc., File No. 
EB-01-MD-007 (filed Mar. 21, 2001) (``Complaint'').

2 47 U.S.C.  208.

3 47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(D).

4 See Part III (D), infra.

5 See Part III (E), infra

6  Joint Statement,  File  No. EB-01-MD-007  (filed May  2, 
2001) (``Joint Statement'')  at 1,  1.   LATAs are ``Local 
Access and  Transport Areas,''  which are  geographic areas 
established by  the AT&T  Consent Decree between  which the 
incumbent Bell  Operating Company  may not  provide service 
except pursuant to  section 271 of the Act.   See, e.g., 47 
U.S.C.     271,   153(3),   153(25);  Newton's   Telecomm 
Dictionary (16th ed.) at 505-506.

7 Joint Statement at 1,  1-2. 

8  47  U.S.C.   251(c)(2).   Section  251(c) provides,  in 
pertinent  part,  that   ``each  incumbent  local  exchange 
carrier  has the  following  duties: ...  (2)  The duty  to 
provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting 
telecommunications carrier, interconnection  with the local 
exchange carrier's  network ... .'' 47  U.S.C.  251(c)(2). 
See,  e.g.,  47  C.F.R.     51.305  (rules  pertaining  to 
interconnection).

9 See  Local Telephone Competition:  Status as of  June 30, 
2002,  Industry  Analysis  and Technology  Div'n,  Wireline 
Competition      Bureau,       Dec.      2002,      http:// 
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/lcom1202.pdf. 

10  See, e.g.,  Preamble, Telecommunications  Act of  1996, 
Pub. L.  No. 104-404,  110 Stat.  56 (1996)  (``1996 Act'') 
(stating  that  the  1996  Act was  designed  ``to  promote 
competition and reduce regulation  in order to secure lower 
prices   and   higher   quality   services   for   American 
telecommunications  consumers   and  encourage   the  rapid 
deployment of new telecommunications technologies.''). 

11   47  U.S.C.     251(c)(2)(D).    Section  251(c)(2)(D) 
provides, in pertinent part,  that each incumbent LEC shall 
provide interconnection  ``on rates, terms,  and conditions 
that are just  [and] reasonable ... in  accordance with the 
terms  and  conditions  of the  [parties'  interconnection] 
agreement and the requirements  of this section and section 
252... .''  47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(D).

12 47 U.S.C.  251-252.

13 47 U.S.C.  252(f)(1).

14 47  U.S.C.   252(f)(2).  The  existence of  an approved 
SGAT does not vitiate a Bell Operating Company's obligation 
to  engage  in  negotiations  for  different  terms,  if  a 
competitive LEC so requests.  47 U.S.C.  252(f)(5).

15 Joint Statement at 1,  1.

16 Answer of Defendant Verizon Maryland, File No. EB-MD-01-
007  (filed Apr.  10, 2001)  (``Answer''), Ex.  1 (Maryland 
SGAT)  at  7   4.4.4;  Joint Statement  at  2,   4.   The 
Maryland SGAT provides, in pertinent part, that Verizon and 
the  requesting  competitive  LEC  ``shall  agree  upon  an 
addendum ... to reflect the schedule ... applicable to each 
new  LATA requested  by [the  requesting competitive  LEC]; 
provided,  however,  that  unless otherwise  agreed  to  by 
[Verizon   and  the   requesting   competitive  LEC],   the 
Interconnection Activation Date in a  new LATA shall not be 
earlier than ...  45 days ... .''  Answer,  Ex. 1 (Maryland 
SGAT) at 7  4.4.4.   According to the record, Core did not 
seek to negotiate a different schedule for interconnection.  
See, e.g., Answer at 4,  5; Joint Statement at 1,  3. 

17 Joint Statement at 1,  3.  Answer, Ex. 1 (Maryland SGAT 
).

18 Answer, Ex. 1 (Maryland SGAT) at Schedule 3.1, ``Request 
for  Interconnection''  (providing  that Core  and  Verizon 
``agree to be bound by the terms of the Statement'').

19 Joint Statement at 1,  3.

20  Complaint at  1;  Complainant's Motion  to Include  the 
Affidavit  of  Douglas A.  Dawson  in  the Record  of  this 
Proceeding, File No. EB-01-MD-007  (filed Nov. 13, 2001) at 
Attachment (Affidavit  of Douglas A. Dawson  dated Nov. 11, 
2001) (``Dawson Aff.'') at 14,   30; Joint Statement at 2, 
 7. 

21 Answer,  Ex. C  (Declaration of  Donald E.  Albert dated 
Apr. 10, 2001)  (``Apr. 10 Albert Dec'n'') at  2-3,  4-6; 
Joint Statement at 2,  5-8.

22  Complaint at  3-4,   6-8; Answer  at 5,   10;  Joint 
Statement at 2,  5-6.

23 Joint Statement at 3,  11.  

24 Apr. 10 Albert Dec'n at 2,  4; Declaration of Donald E. 
Albert, File No. EB-01-MD-007 (filed July 23, 2001) (``July 
23 Albert Dec'n'') at 3,  5.

25  Complaint,  Ex. 2  (ASR  dated  June 29,  2000);  Joint 
Statement  at 3,   12.   An ASR  is a  service order  form 
developed by the  United States telecommunications industry 
used, among  other things, for  ordering access to  a local 
exchange carrier's  network.  Verizon asserts that  it sent 
the  ASR to  Core  (rather  than Core  sending  the ASR  to 
Verizon) because  Core's clients included  internet service 
providers,  so that  only  Verizon  would have  originating 
traffic.  Apr. 10 Albert Dec'n  at 3-4,  8-9; Answer, Ex. 
2 (Access Service Ordering Guidelines) at 3-14.  The record 
does not reveal whether Core's only customers were internet 
service providers.  

26 Joint Statement at 3,  13.

27 Complaint, Ex.  I (Affidavit of Bret  L. Mingo) (``Mingo 
Aff.'') at 2,  6; Joint Statement at 3,  14.

28 Mingo Aff. at 2,  6; Joint Statement at 3,  14.

29 Complaint Ex. 2 (letter dated July 27, 2000 from Michael 
Hazzard, counsel  to Core,  to Steven Hartmann,  counsel to 
Verizon); Joint Statement at 3,  15.  

30 Joint Statement at 3,  18; Answer, Exs. 9-13.

31 Joint  Statement at  3,  17;  Complaint, Ex.  4 (letter 
dated  August 21,  2000  from Michael  Hazzard, counsel  to 
Core, to Steven Hartmann, counsel to Verizon).

32 Joint Statement at 3-4,  17-18.

33 Joint  Statement at  4,  19;  Complaint, Ex.  5 (letter 
dated September  13, 2000 from Michael  Hazzard, counsel to 
Core, to Steven Hartmann,  counsel to Verizon, describing a 
September 11, 2000 conversation between Messrs. Hazzard and 
Hartmann).

34 Joint Statement at 4,  22.

35 Verizon  does not assert  that any acts or  omissions by 
Core after  February 28, 2000 delayed  interconnection with 
Core.  See Apr. 10 Albert Dec'n at 5,  12; Joint Statement 
at 2,   6 and 3,  14; Supplement  to the Joint Statement, 
File No. EB-01-MD-007 (filed May 7, 2001) at 3,  5, 7.

36 Complaint at 3; Joint Statement at 4,  22.

37  A timeline  setting  out relevant  dates regarding  the 
capacity exhaust is attached as an appendix.

38  Digital cross-connect  machines (often  referred to  as 
``DACs'')  connect telecommunications  transport facilities 
that  operate at  different  capacities  or have  different 
technical  characteristics.  They  consist of  ports -  the 
physical  interface  to  which the  transport  facility  is 
connected -  and a matrix,  the internal device  that makes 
connections and multiplexes and de-multiplexes traffic from 
one type of port to another (for example, from a DS-3 to an 
OC-12).  Defendants'  Supplemental Answer  to Interrogatory 
Number 6  and Supplemental  Response to Questions  Posed by 
the Commission During the  July 26, 2001 Status Conference, 
File No.  EB-01-MD-007 (filed  Aug. 10,  2001) (``Verizon's 
Supplemental  Responses'')  at  7.  See  Newton's  Telecomm 
Dictionary  (16th  ed.)   at  231  (defining  cross-connect 
equipment  as  ``distribution   system  equipment  used  to 
terminate and  administer communication  circuits'').  Core 
explains: ``Think  of these boxes  as a huge  collection of 
pre-wired connections.  When a new connection is needed for 
a circuit ... , these boxes allow technicians to choose one 
of  the  pre-wired  connections to  implement  the  circuit 
quickly.   Using a  pre-wired  connection  is quicker  than 
having   a  technician   run  wires   ...  to   create  the 
connections.''   Dawson Aff.  at 7,    15. The  K43 is  an 
Alcatel iMTN  and the K36  is a Tellabs Titan  550.  Dawson 
Aff. at 7,  15.

39  Specifically, Verizon  states,  ``[T]here  was no  DS-3 
channel (capacity)  available through the K36  ... into and 
through the K43... .  That  is, there was no available DS-3 
capacity  on   the  ports   that  already   were  providing 
service... .   In addition, ...  there also were  no unused 
OC-12  ports on  the K36  3x1 machine  and no  unused OC-12 
ports  on the  K43 3x3  machine.''  Verizon's  Supplemental 
Responses at  7-8.  See  Defendant  Verizon Maryland Inc.'s 
Answers   to   Complainant  Core   Communications,   Inc.'s 
Interrogatories,  File  No.  EB-01-MD-007 (filed  June  25, 
2001) (``Verizon's Answers to Interrogatories 1-7'') at 3-4 
(Answer to Interrogatory no. 2); July 23 Albert Dec'n at 4, 
 6-7. 

40 Defendant Verizon Maryland Inc.'s Answers to Complainant 
Core Communications,  Inc.'s Interrogatories, File  No. EB-
01-MD-007  (filed Oct.  26, 2001)  (``Verizon's Answers  to 
Interrogatories 8-13'') at 5-6 (Answer to Interrogatory no. 
10(c)); July 23 Albert Dec'n at 2,  2.  

41   July  23 Albert  Dec'n  at  2-3,   3.   Specifically, 
Verizon's network transported certain competitive LEC-bound 
traffic to the K36, which  multiplexed the signals into DS-
3s and converted them from  electrical to optical, and then 
carried  the traffic,  via OC-12  connections, to  the K43.  
The K43 also  multiplexed the traffic, and  then carried it 
to an OC-48 multiplexer,  from which the traffic ultimately 
was  transported to  the  competitive LEC's  POP.  July  23 
Albert Dec'n  at 2-3,   3.  Verizon describes the  role of 
the K43 and K36 as  follows:  ``After being switched by the 
tandem,  the  Core  bound  call goes  to  trunks  that  are 
connected  to  Verizon's   K36  3x1  digital  cross-connect 
machine. The K36 3x1  cross-connect machine multiplexes the 
trunks into DS-3's and converts the signals from electrical 
to optical.   This cross-connect machine is  then connected 
to  Verizon's K43  3x3  cross-connect  machine using  OC-12 
connections.  The  K43 3x3 is  then connected to  the OC-48 
IOF  fiber  optic  multiplexer using  OC-12  connections.''  
July 23 Albert Dec'n at 4,  6-7.

42  Supplemental  Joint  Statement  at 4,    7;  Verizon's 
Supplemental Responses,  Ex. 9 (Status memo  from Verizon's 
vendor) at 5; Verizon's  Answers to Interrogatory nos. 8-13 
at 3 (Answer to Interrogatory no. 8(f)).

43July 23 Albert Dec'n at 3-4,  6-7; Verizon's Answers to 
Interrogatories 1-7,  at 3-4  (Answer to  Interrogatory no. 
1).

44  Verizon's  Supplemental  Responses,  Ex.  6  (Telephone 
Equipment Order).

45  Verizon's   Supplemental  Responses  at   4,  Verizon's 
Supplemental  Responses,  Ex.   2  (K36  Capacity  Creation 
Request).

46  Verizon's   Supplemental  Responses  at   4;  Verizon's 
Supplemental  Responses,  Exs.  2  (K36  Capacity  Creation 
Request), and 6 (Telephone Equipment Order).

47 Verizon's Supplemental Responses at 6, 7-8. 

48  Verizon's  Answers  to  Interrogatory nos.  8-13  at  7 
(Answer to Interrogatory no. 11(b)).

49 Verizon's  Supplemental Responses,  Ex. 1  (K43 Capacity 
Creation Request).

50 Verizon's  Supplemental Responses, Exs. 1  (K43 Capacity 
Creation Request), 5 (Telephone Equipment Order).

51  Verizon's Supplemental  Responses, Ex.  8 (Status  memo 
from  the  K43 vendor)  at  4;  Verizon's Answers  to  Core 
Interrogatories  8-13 at  7  (Answer  to Interrogatory  no. 
11(c)). 

52 Verizon's Supplemental Responses at 6.

53  Verizon's Supplemental  Responses, Ex.  9 (Status  memo 
from  Verizon's   vendor)  at   5;  Verizon's   Answers  to 
Interrogatories  8-13 at  3  (Answer  to Interrogatory  no. 
8(f)).

54  Verizon's  Supplemental  Responses,  Ex.  5  (Telephone 
Equipment    Order);    Verizon's   Answers    to    Core's 
Interrogatories  8-13 at  7  (Answer  to Interrogatory  no. 
11(c)).

55 Verizon's  Answers to Interrogatories 8-13  at 3 (Answer 
to Interrogatory no. 8(f)),  7 (Answer to Interrogatory no. 
11(c)); July 23  Albert Dec'n at 4,  8.  

56 Verizon's Supplemental Responses at 2.

57 Verizon's  Supplemental Responses at 6;  April 10 Albert 
Dec'n at 6,  15.

58  Verizon's Supplemental  Responses, Ex.  9 (Status  memo 
from Verizon's vendor) at 5; April  10 Albert Dec'n at 6,  
13.   The record  does  not reveal  how  many requests  for 
capacity  in addition  to  Core's were  placed in  ``hold'' 
status after June 23, 2000.  

59 Verizon's  Answers to Interrogatories 8-13  at 3 (answer 
to   Interrogatory   no.  8(f));   Verizon's   Supplemental 
Responses, Ex. 10  at 5.  Although some of  the 54 ``held'' 
orders may have  been completed in September  2000, after a 
portion of  the equipment  for the  K43 was  installed, the 
rest of  the 54 orders  could not be completed  until after 
the  remainder  of the  equipment  was  installed on  about 
October 20, 2000.  Verizon's  Answers to Interrogatories 8-
13  at  3 (answer  to  Interrogatory  no. 8(f));  Verizon's 
Answers to Interrogatories 8-13 at Attachments 1, 2.       

60 Joint Statement at 4,  22.

61 Verizon's  Answers to Interrogatories 8-13  at 3 (Answer 
to Interrogatory no. 8(f)),  7 (Answer to Interrogatory no. 
11(c)); July 23 Albert Dec'n at 4,  8. 

62 Core states  that, as a result of  Verizon's delay, Core 
``was  unable  to  provide   service  to  its  current  and 
prospective customers.'' Complaint at  1.  As Core was only 
seeking  a finding  as to  liability in  this phase  of the 
proceedings, Core's assertion has not been tested. 

63 Letter  dated December 19,  2001 from Sherry  A. Ingram, 
counsel to Verizon, to Commission staff, File No. EB-01-MD-
007  (filed  Dec.  19,  2001)  (``Verizon's  December  2000 
Letter'')  at   1-2.   Specifically,  Verizon   had  direct 
trunking in  the Washington  Metropolitan LATA  between end 
offices  for  its  own  traffic, and  therefore,  used  the 
Washington  Hub for  its own  traffic only  on an  overflow 
basis.  Because  these direct  trunks were operating  at an 
approximately 63%  utilization rate in 2000,  Verizon's own 
existing  traffic, and  its  ability to  add new  dial-tone 
customers,  were  not  affected  by  the  K36/K43  capacity 
exhaust.   Id.   By  ``Verizon's  own  traffic,''  we  mean 
traffic between  Verizon's end-user customers,  and traffic 
from Verizon end-user customers to long-distance carriers.

64  Complaint at 8-9,   22-31.  Core states that it will, 
pursuant  to section  1.722 of  the Commission's  rules, 47 
C.F.R.  1.722,  file  a supplemental complaint for damages 
if successful  in establishing liability.  Complaint  at 9-
10,  33. 

65  Answer at  12,   35;  Answer, Ex.  B (Verizon's  Legal 
Analysis) at  9; Opening  Brief of Verizon  Maryland, Inc., 
File No.  EB-01-MD-007 (filed  Jan. 18,  2002) (``Verizon's 
Opening Br.'')  at 13-14;  Reply Brief of  Verizon Maryland 
Inc.,   File  No.   EB-01-MD-007  (filed   Feb.  8,   2002) 
(``Verizon's Reply Br.'') at 2. 

66  Answer at  12,   36;  Answer, Ex.  B (Verizon's  Legal 
Analysis)  at  4-5;  Verizon's  Opening Br.  at  9-10,  13; 
Verizon's Reply Br. at 2-8. 

67 Verizon's Opening  Br. at 11-12; Verizon's  Reply Br. at 
9-10. 

68 Answer at 2; Answer, Ex. B (Verizon's Legal Analysis) at 
2-3;  Verizon's [Brief  in]  Opposition  to Core's  Initial 
Brief on  Liability, File  No. EB-01-MD-007 (filed  Feb. 1, 
2002) (``Verizon's Opp. Br.'') at 35-43.  

69 47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(D).

70 Answer at  12,  35-36; Answer, Ex.  B (Verizon's Legal 
Analysis) at  9; Verizon's Opening Br.  at 13-14; Verizon's 
Reply Br. at 2.

71   See   CoreComm    Communications,   Inc.   and   Z-Tel 
Communications, Inc.  v. SBC  Communications Inc.,  et al., 
Memorandum Opinion and  Order, -- FCC Rcd --,  File No. EB-
01-MD-017, FCC No. 03-83 (rel. Apr. 17, 2003) at  13-19.  

72 CoreComm v. SBC,  at  13-19.

73

74  Verizon's Opening Br. at 2-3; Verizon's Reply Br. at 2, 
7-9.

  Verizon's Opening Br. at 9-10.

75  47 U.S.C.  252(f); Joint Statement at 1,  3. 

76  47  U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(D).   We note that the  Act also 
requires an  incumbent LEC  to provide unbundled  access to 
network elements.

77  47 C.F.R.  41.305(a)(5) (emphasis added).

78 Verizon's Opening Br. at 13.

79 Verizon's Reply Br. at 8.

80  Answer  at  4,  13;  Verizon's  Opening  Br.  at  9-10; 
Verizon's  Reply Br. at 8-9.

81  Contrary to  Verizon's suggestion  otherwise, Verizon's 
Reply Br.  at 8, nothing  in this order indicates  that the 
Commission would  ignore a valid forum-selection  clause in 
an interconnection agreement.    

82  Trinko v.  Bell Atlantic  Corp., 309  F.3d 89  (2d Cir. 
2002),  (dissenting  opinion  published at  309  F.3d  71), 
Trinko v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,  305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), 
pet. for  cert. granted in  part on other grounds  sub nom. 
Verizon Communications,  Inc. v. Trinko, --  S.Ct. --, 2003 
WL891459 (Mar., 2003).

83 305 F.3d at 104 (emphasis added).

84 See also 47 U.S.C.  251(c)(3), similarly requiring that 
unbundled elements  also be  provided ``in  accordance with 
the terms and conditions of the agreement.''

85  See  BellSouth  Telecomm.,   Inc.  v.  MCIMetro  Access 
Transmission Services, Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 
2003) (en  banc); Global  Naps, Inc. v.  FCC, 291  F.3d 832 
(D.C.  Cir. 2002);  Southwestern Bell  Tel. Co.  v. Connect 
Communications  Corp.,  225  F.3d   942  (8th  Cir.  2000); 
Southwestern Bell  Tel. Co. v.  PUC,  208 F.3d  475, 479-80 
(5th Cir. 2000); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Brooks Fiber 
Comm. Of   Oklahoma, 235  F.3d 493,  497 (10th  Cir, 2000); 
Starpower  Communications,  LLC, Petition  for  Preemption, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 11277 (2000).  See 
also Verizon Maryland,  Inc. v. PUC, 535 U.S.  635, 638 n.2 
(2002),  and Illinois  Bell  Tel. Co.  v. WorldCom  Techs., 
Inc., 179 F.3d  566, 573 (7th Cir.  1999), cert. dismissed, 
535 U.S. 682 (2002) (assuming without discussion that state 
commissions   have  authority   to  construe   and  enforce 
interconnection agreements).

86 This order does not address whether the Commission would 
enforce obligations  in interconnection agreements  that do 
not relate directly to matters  covered by sections 251 and 
252 of the Act.

87 Verizon's Opening  Br. at 11-12; Verizon's  Reply Br. at 
9-10. 

88 See Part III (A)-(B), supra.

89 Verizon's Opening Br. at  11-12; Verizon Reply Br. at 9-
10.

90  Indeed, in  passing the  1996 Act,  Congress considered 
(and then rejected)  a proposal to allow  the Commission to 
forbear  from  section 208.   H.R.  REP.  No. 104-458,  184 
(1996), reprinted in 1996  U.S.C.C.A.N. 1584.  See CoreComm 
v. SBC, -- FCC Rcd --, at n.46.

91 Verizon's  Opening Br.  at 11-12  (citing AT&T   v. Bell 
Atlantic Corp.,  15 FCC  Rcd 17066  (2000), aff'd  sub nom. 
MCIWorldCom  v. FCC,   274 F.3d  542 (D.C.  Cir. 2001)  and 
Global NAPs,  Inc. Petition for Preemption  of Jurisdiction 
of    New   Jersey   Brd.    of    Pub.   Util.   Regarding 
Interconnection  Dispute  with  Bell  Atlantic-New  Jersey, 
Inc., 14 FCC Rcd 12530 (1999)).        

92  In  AT&T   v.   Bell  Atlantic  Corp.,  the  Commission 
dismissed  the  complaint  on comity  grounds  because  the 
complaint asked  the Commission to duplicate  complex rate-
making  proceedings  that  several  state  commissions  had 
already completed  or nearly  completed.  See AT&T  v. Bell 
Atlantic Corp., 15  FCC Rcd at 17071,   12; MCIWorldCom v. 
FCC,  274  F.3d  at  548-49.  In  Global  Naps,  Inc.,  the 
Commission rejected a carrier's  petition for preemption of 
the  authority  of  the  New   Jersey  PUC  to  resolve  an 
interconnection dispute under section  252, because the New 
Jersey PUC  had already completed the  proceeding at issue.  
Global NAPs, Inc., 14 FCC Rcd at 12538-39,  17-18.   

93 As a  result, addressing the merits  of Core's Complaint 
here will  not duplicate any  efforts of the  Maryland PUC.  
In fact,  deferring to  the Maryland  PUC would  only delay 
resolution of the dispute.

94 Answer, Ex. B (Defendant's  Legal Analysis) at 5; Answer 
at 3-4,  5.  

95 47 U.S.C.  251(f)(1) (emphasis added).

96 47 U.S.C.  252(f)(2).

97 47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2).  

98 See  generally, 47 C.F.R.   51.305(a)(5).  Our approach 
here is consistent with general principles of contract law.  
See, e.g.,  Williston on Contracts   30.19 (4th  ed. 1999) 
(Except  where a  contrary  intention  is evident,  ``valid 
applicable laws existing  at the time of the  making of the 
contract  enter into  and form  a part  of the  contract as 
fully  as if  expressly  incorporated  in the  contract''); 
Restatement  2d of  Contracts   204 (where  a contract  is 
silent  with respect  to  a  term that  is  essential to  a 
determination of the parties'  duties, the court may supply 
terms that are ``reasonable  in the circumstances'').  This 
principle applies  with special  force where, as  here, the 
agreement at issue concerns  a subject regulated by federal 
law.  See, e.g., Williston on Contracts  30.20.

99 See, e.g.,  AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 16 
FCC  Rcd  16074,  16079,  n.35  (2001)  (holding  that  the 
``preponderance'' standard applies in complaint proceedings 
brought under section 208).  

100 Implementation  of the Local Competition  Provisions in 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection between 
Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service 
Providers, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 15503, 
  205   (1996)  (``First  Local  Competition   Report  and 
Order''); 47 U.S.C.  51.305(g). 

101 First Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 
15503,  205.

102 First Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 
15503,  205.

103  Answer at  6-7,    12; Verizon's  Opp.  Br. at  9-12.  
Verizon explains  that the instructions for  the ASR state, 
``The actual  due date may  be different from  that desired 
because of  factors such as the  availability of facilities 
and the  quantity, complexity, and impact  on local service 
of the circuit(s) involved.''  Id.

104 Joint Statement at 3,  12.

105 Joint Statement at 3,  14.

106 Verizon's Opp. Br. at 28.

107 Verizon's Opp. Br. at 28.   

108  See,  e.g., 47  C.F.R.    51.305(a)(5) (inquiry  into 
whether  interconnection  is  ``just''  and  ``reasonable'' 
includes ``the time within which the incumbent LEC provides 
such interconnection.'')

109 Dawson Aff. at 14,  30.

110 Initial Brief [of]  Core Communications, Inc., File No. 
EB-01-MD-007 (filed Feb. 1,  2001) (``Core's Initial Br.'') 
at  7-9;  Reply of  Core Communications, Inc.  to Verizon's 
Opposition,  File No.  EB-01-MD-007  (filed  Feb. 8,  2002) 
(``Core's Reply Br.'') at 8-9. 

111 Core's Initial Br. at 8; Core's Reply Br. at 17.

112 Core's Initial Br. at 15-20; Core's Reply Br. at 20-21.    

113 Core also alleges  that Verizon delayed unreasonably in 
building the entrance facility.   Core's Initial Br. at 15-
20; Core's  Reply Br.  at 20-21.  Yet,  Core has  failed to 
provide  probative  evidence  supporting  this  allegation. 
Specifically,  Core's  Complaint  provided no  evidence  to 
support its assertion.  This failure, standing alone, could 
warrant disregard  of Core's allegation.  See  47 C.F.R.  
1.720(c),  1.721   (a)(5),  (a)(11).   In  any   event,  in 
subsequent briefing, Core relied on a single e-mail sent to 
Core  by  Verizon.  Core's  Initial  Br.  at 15-17  (citing 
Answer, Ex. 4 (Verizon e-mail to Core)). Yet this e-mail is 
reasonably  read in  the manner  suggested by  Verizon, see 
Verizon's Opp. Br. at 21, particularly given Core's failure 
to cite  it until final  briefing in this  proceeding.  See 
Complaint  (failing to  cite or  attach Verizon's  e-mail); 
[Core's] Responses to [Verizon's] Interrogatories, File No. 
EB-01-MD-007 (file June 25, 2001) at 1 (failing to cite the 
e-mail or its June 7  date in response to Verizon's request 
that  Core state  the basis  for its  expectation that  the 
entrance  facility  would  be completed  before  June  28).  
Accordingly,  in   determining  whether   Verizon  violated 
section 251(c)(2)(D), we do  not consider Verizon's conduct 
in constructing the entrance facility to have been flawed.

114 Verizon's Answers to  Interrogatories 8-13 at 2 (Answer 
to Interrogatory no. 8(b)).

115 Verizon's Answers to  Interrogatories 8-13 at 3 (Answer 
to interrogatory no. 8(f)).

116  Thus,  Verizon's  assertion  that  the  August  strike 
contributed to the length  of the capacity exhaust, Verizon 
Opp.  Br.  at 26,  is  not  supported  by the  record.   As 
discussed, when ordering equipment to increase the capacity 
of  the   K36,  Verizon  requested  that   installation  be 
completed by  August 30 -  after the Verizon  strike.  With 
respect to  the K43,  Verizon's vendor informed  it, before 
the Verizon  August strike,  that it would  not be  able to 
complete installation until October 2000.

117 Verizon's Supplemental Responses at 2-3.

118  Dawson Aff.  at 8,   17  (stating that  cross-connect 
machines such as the K36  and K43 ``are gigantic units with 
lots  of capacity.   ... For  Verizon  to have  run out  of 
capacity in these  units means there is  something wrong in 
their system.  They ... do routine forecasts and monitoring 
of equipment  usage, and I  have to  say that it  is nearly 
inconceivable to  me that  they could have  exhausted these 
facilities without having known it  was going to happen and 
without   planning   to   already  have   the   next   unit 
installed'').

119 Implementation of the  Telecomm. Act of 1996, Amendment 
of Rules  Governing Procedures  to be Followed  When Formal 
Complaints are  Filed Against  Common Carriers,  Report and 
Order, 12 FCC Rcd 22497,  22617 at  295 (1997) (subsequent 
history omitted).

120 Implementation of the  Telecomm. Act of 1996, Amendment 
of Rules  Governing Procedures  to be Followed  When Formal 
Complaints are  Filed Against  Common Carriers,  Report and 
Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 22615 n.782, 22617,  295.

121 July 23 Albert Dec'n at 5,  10.        

122 Verizon's Supplemental Responses at 5.

123 See April  10 Albert Dec'n at 2,   5; Verizon Opp. Br. 
at 8; Joint Statement at 2,  5-6; Dawson Aff. at 9,  20.  

124 See April  10 Albert Dec'n at 2,   5; Verizon Opp. Br. 
at 8; Joint Statement at 2,  5-6; Dawson Aff. at 9,  20.  

125 Verizon's  Answers to Interrogatories 1-7  at 7 (Answer 
to Interrogatory no. 6).

126 July 23 Albert Dec'n at 5, 10.  

127 Verizon's Supplemental Responses, Exs. 8-10. 

128 Verizon's Opp. Br. at 39-41.

129  For  example,  Core  proposes  two  alternatives  that 
Verizon  could have  considered  that  would have  involved 
Verizon's   obtaining   alternative  equipment,   such   as 
multiplexers  or  smaller cross-connect  machines.   Core's 
Initial  Br. at  20-21.   Verizon  effectively admits  that 
these  alternatives were  technically feasible.   Verizon's 
Opp. Br. at 41.  

130 Verizon has not produced a single written communication 
from Verizon to its vendors urging them to act more quickly 
to  install  the  equipment, despite  Core's  interrogatory 
requesting that it do so.  Nor does Verizon assert that any 
such   documents  ever   existed.   Verizon's   Answers  to 
Interrogatories  8-13 at  5  (Answer  to interrogatory  no. 
10(b)).   Verizon  does  state   that  it  ``held  numerous 
telephone conference  calls with its  digital cross-connect 
vendors...,'' and that it  had weekly conference calls with 
the vendor  for the K43.  Verizon's  Supplemental Responses 
at  8. Yet  these  calls concerned  dozens of  installation 
orders throughout Verizon's territory,  not just the orders 
pertaining  to  the  Washington   Hub  K36  and  K43.   Id.  
Further, Verizon  provides no  evidence that,  during these 
calls,  it pressed  the vendors  to act  more quickly  with 
respect to the K36 and K43; indeed, Verizon states that the 
calls  were   simply  to   ``manage  th[e]   situation  and 
prioritize the jobs.''  Verizon's Supplemental Responses at 
8.

131  The imposition  of liability  here is  limited to  the 
particular facts  presented in this  case.  We do  not hold 
here that  a provisioning  delay of four  months is  per se 
unreasonable.

132 Complaint at 8-9,  29; Core's Initial Br. at 21-23.

133 Verizon Opening Br. at 2-9; Verizon's Reply Br. at 1-7.

134 Verizon Opp. Br. at 32-35.

135  Core  alleges  that Verizon  unlawfully  discriminated 
against  it by  providing more  favorable treatment  to two 
carriers   who   likewise   requested   entrance   facility 
interconnection with Verizon in the Washington Metropolitan 
LATA during this  same period of time.   Core's Initial Br. 
at  21-30.  The  record  indicates,  however, that  Verizon 
actually  took  longer  to   interconnect  with  these  two 
carriers  than  it took  to  interconnect  with Core.   See 
Verizon's  Opp.  Br.  at   35  (citing  Verizon  Answer  to 
Interrogatory No.1 and Attachment).

136  Given  this conclusion,  we  need  not decide  whether 
section 202(a) applies to interconnection provided pursuant 
to section 251(c).

137 Given  this conclusion,  we need not  address Verizon's 
assertion   that  section   201(b)   does   not  apply   to 
interconnection provided  pursuant to section  251(c).  See 
Verizon Opening Br. at 2-9.

138 Complaint at 8.

139 Complaint at 8-9.

140 Complaint at 8, 9.