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                           Before the
                Federal Communications Commission
                     Washington, D.C. 20554


In the Matter of                 )    File No. EB-01-IH-0642
                                )
SBC Communications, Inc.         )    NAL/Acct. No. 20023208001
                                )
Apparent      Liability      for )    FRN Nos. 0004-3051-24
Forfeiture                       )                      0004-3335-
                                )    71
                                                       0005-1937-
                                     01


                        FORFEITURE ORDER 

Adopted:                April               9,               2002                                                     

Released:  April 15, 2002

By the Commission:1

                        I.   INTRODUCTION

In this Forfeiture Order, we find that SBC Communications, Inc. 
(``SBC'') violated an Enforcement Bureau (``Bureau'') order 
requiring SBC to provide sworn verification of the truth and 
accuracy of answers to a letter of inquiry (``LOI'') that the 
Bureau issued pursuant to authority provided by the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (``Act'').2  Based on the 
facts and circumstances before us and after considering SBC's 
response to the Bureau's Notice of Apparent Liability (``NAL'') 
in this matter, we conclude that SBC is liable for a forfeiture 
of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), the amount the Bureau 
proposed in the NAL.

                           II.  FACTS

As described more fully in the NAL,3 on October 1, 2001, the 
Enforcement Bureau sent SBC an LOI directing SBC to provide 
answers to several questions regarding possible discrimination by 
SBC in its provisioning and maintenance of digital subscriber 
line (``DSL'') technology and possible misrepresentations by SBC 
to the Bureau.4  The Bureau further directed SBC to verify the 
veracity of its answers by providing a sworn statement attesting 
to the truth and accuracy of the responses.5  SBC did not object 
to or challenge the Bureau's order in any manner.  Instead, on 
October 22, 2001, SBC submitted a response to the LOI that 
addressed the questions but omitted the requisite sworn 
statement.6  SBC did not identify this omission to the Bureau. 

Soon after receiving SBC's response to the LOI, Enforcement 
Bureau staff discovered the omission and contacted the company to 
determine the reason for the noncompliance and to provide the 
company with an opportunity to correct it.  SBC, however, 
disclosed to Bureau staff that it had intentionally refused to 
provide the sworn statement and that it did not intend to comply 
with that aspect of the Bureau's order.7  The Bureau informed the 
company that SBC was in violation of the order.8  On November 2, 
2001, SBC had still not provided the sworn statement, and the 
Bureau issued the NAL proposing a forfeiture of $100,000 and 
again directing SBC to provide a sworn statement.  As with the 
Bureau's original direction to provide a sworn statement, SBC did 
not request that the Bureau or the Commission stay the portion of 
the NAL directing it again to provide a sworn statement.  On 
November 7, 2001, SBC provided the sworn statement, noting that 
it did so ``under protest.''9  On December 3, 2001, SBC filed its 
response to the NAL.10

                        III.  DISCUSSION

Under section 503(b) of the Act, ``[a]ny person who is determined 
by the Commission to have . . . willfully or repeatedly failed to 
comply with . . . any order issued by the Commission under this 
Act'' shall be liable for a forfeiture penalty.11  In order to 
impose such a forfeiture, the Commission must issue a notice of 
apparent liability, the notice must be received, and the person 
against whom the notice has been issued must have an opportunity 
to show, in writing, why no such forfeiture penalty should be 
imposed.12  The Commission will then issue a forfeiture order if 
it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person has 
violated the relevant order.13   As set forth in detail below, we 
conclude that, based on this standard, SBC is subject to 
forfeiture.

The issue presented here is whether SBC violated the Bureau's 
directive that SBC provide sworn verification of the accuracy and 
truthfulness of its answers to the Commission's written 
inquiries.  SBC argues that the Commission has no authority to 
require it to submit an attestation in the circumstances 
presented here.  But the order at issue here was squarely within 
the Commission's authority and, in any event, parties are 
required to comply with Commission orders even if they believe 
them to be outside the Commission's authority.  Therefore, based 
upon our review of the NAL, of SBC's response thereto, and of the 
record in this matter, we find that SBC willfully violated a 
Commission order.14









     II.A.     Congress Authorized The Commission To Require 
          Regulated Entities To Provide Sworn Statements 
          Verifying The Truth And Accuracy Of Information 
          Submitted During A Commission Investigation. 15

The Commission has statutory authority to require its regulatees 
to attest to the veracity and accuracy of answers to written 
questions that we pose during the course of an investigation into 
potential violations of the Act or Commission rules.  In sections  
4(i), 4(j), 218, 403, and 208 of the Act, Congress afforded us 
with broad authority to investigate regulated entities.16  This 
broad investigative authority in these sections individually and 
collectively encompasses the authority to obtain from carriers 
information supported by attestations to ensure that the 
information is accurate and truthful.

Section 218 of the Act authorizes us to ``obtain from . . . 
carriers . . . full and complete information necessary to enable 
the Commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects 
for which it was created.''17  This provision plainly grants us 
broad investigative power.  SBC's argument that section 218 does 
not speak to the means by which we may obtain information is 
misplaced.18  As we will explain more fully below, in many cases 
information supported by attestation is ``information necessary'' 
to enable us to perform our enforcement function.19  Therefore, 
section 218's broad grant of authority covers our action here.  

Section 403 also gives the Commission broad authority to ``make 
and enforce orders'' relating to the matter under 
investigation.20  Moreover, it gives the Commission the same 
``powers and authority'' in conducting an investigation that it 
would have when investigating a section 208 complaint.21  In this 
regard, section 208 says the Commission can investigate such 
matters ``in such manner and such means as it shall deem 
proper.''22  

The broad authority in sections 4(i) and 4(j) for the Commission 
to ``issue such orders . . . as may be necessary in the execution 
of its functions'' and to ``conduct its proceedings in such 
manner as will best conduce the proper dispatch of business and 
to the ends of justice'' further supports our authority to 
require attestations.23  It is well established that sections 
4(i) and 4(j) afford us broad general authority and power,24 and 
the Bureau's action here falls comfortably within the scope of 
that authority as well.  

We are not persuaded by SBC's argument that sworn verification 
here was not ``necessary'' and thus was outside the scope of our 
authority under section 4(i).25  When the Commission conducts an 
investigation, the subject of the investigation may be the 
exclusive source of information on which the Commission must 
ultimately rely to determine the subject's compliance.  In these 
situations, the willingness of the subject to attest to the truth 
and accuracy of the information can be critical.  This type of 
attestation takes on even greater significance when, as in this 
case, a core question at issue is whether a carrier has engaged 
in misrepresentation to the Commission.26  As we have said in 
another context, we afford greater weight to comments and 
pleadings supported by affidavits or sworn statements than to 
unsupported contrary pleadings.27  Indeed, a party's failure to 
submit such an attestation in the context of an investigation has 
led to a higher forfeiture amount for the underlying substantive 
violation.28  These types of verifications can be necessary to 
the Commission's investigative function,29 and the requirement of 
such verification here falls squarely within the category of acts 
and orders envisioned as necessary under section 4(i).30 

SBC protests that the requirement that it attest to the veracity 
of responses to the Bureau's questions is not a ``question of 
procedure'' that properly falls within section 4(j).31  But this 
requirement is precisely a procedural means by which the 
Commission obtains the substantive response it seeks, i.e., 
answers that bear a unique imprimatur of reliability.  Indeed, 
this type of requirement is a standard and fundamental procedural 
tool in the context of both Commission formal complaint 
proceedings and in civil litigation generally. As noted above, 
section 208 of the Act (which is incorporated here through 
section 403), states that it is the ``duty'' of the Commission to 
investigate ``in such manner and by such means as it shall deem 
proper.''32  Our rules implementing section 208 state that the 
Commission ``may require parties [to a complaint proceeding] to 
submit any additional information it deems appropriate for a 
full, fair, and expeditious resolution of the proceeding, 
including affidavits and exhibits,''33 and they require that 
interrogatories in complaint proceedings ``are to be answered . . 
. in writing under oath or affirmation.''34  Similarly, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that parties must 
provide answers to interrogatories under oath.35  The attestation 
requirement is identical in function and purpose to these other 
requirements.  Thus, section 4(j) also provides authority for the 
Bureau's order. 

In sum, we find that the Bureau was well within its statutory 
authority in requiring SBC to provide a sworn written 
verification of the truth and accuracy of its responses to the 
LOI. In defying that directive, SBC willfully violated a 
Commission order.

     II.B.     The Commission's Subpoena Power Is Not Relevant To 
          This Case.

In section 409 of the Act, Congress afforded the Commission with 
subpoena power to compel ``the attendance and testimony of 
witnesses and the production of all books, papers, schedules of 
charges, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any 
matter under investigation.''36  SBC's primary argument in 
defense of its defiance of the Bureau's order is that the 
Commission may only require carriers to attest to the veracity of 
their LOI responses pursuant to this section 409 subpoena power 
and all of its accompanying statutory and constitutional 
procedures and protections.  Even assuming, arguendo, that 
section 409 provides the exclusive means for the Commission to 
obtain information within the ambit of that section,37 we reject 
SBC's argument simply because section 409 has no relevance to the 
requirement that a carrier attest to the veracity and accuracy of 
its answers to our written inquiries.

By its own terms, section 409 relates only to the ``attendance 
and testimony of witnesses,'' and the production of documentary 
evidence.38  Section 409 is styled ``General Provisions Relating 
to Proceedings - Witnesses and Depositions,'' setting forth the 
limited scope of its applicability.  Section 409 itself 
acknowledges that the Commission has means other than subpoenas 
to obtain information from parties.39  In relevant part, section 
409 governs the use of the Commission's subpoena power to compel 
individuals to appear and testify at hearings or depositions.  
The Bureau did not seek to compel the appearance of witnesses for 
testimony.  The LOI merely sought a ``sworn written response''40 
verifying the truth and accuracy of SBC's answers to the LOI.  As 
noted above, in this respect the LOI followed long-standing 
Commission practice.  We have routinely required affidavits and 
verifications from regulated entities during the course of 
various proceedings without asserting subpoena power.41  Our 
orders requiring regulatees to submit affidavits or to swear to 
the accuracy of responses to our written inquiries do not trigger 
the requirements of section 409.

Consequently, we reject SBC's argument that the specific 
requirements of section 409 supersede the more general provisions 
of sections 218, 403, 4(i) and 4(j).42  Although section 409 may 
be more detailed in its requirements, those requirements simply 
do not apply to the circumstances of this case.43  Rather, 
sections 218, 403, 4(i), and 4(j) control here.44  Therefore, we 
also reject SBC's assertion that the Bureau's failure to comply 
with the procedural requirements of section 409 rendered its 
order invalid.45  Those requirements did not apply to the 
Bureau's action.

     C.SBC's Constitutional Arguments Are Without Merit.

Our federal constitution affords to subjects of administrative 
subpoenas or other administrative orders particular rights of 
access to judicial review.  First, as to administrative 
subpoenas, SBC invokes the right of a subject of such a subpoena 
to judicial review before the subject is obliged to suffer 
penalties for refusing to comply.46  Second, as to other 
administrative orders, SBC refers us to its asserted right to an 
opportunity to raise a good faith challenge to an order before 
being sanctioned.47  We reject each of these arguments because 
they depend on fundamental misconstructions of the relevant facts 
and applicable law in this case.

First, as we concluded above, this case did not involve a 
subpoena, and SBC is incorrect that the Act required the Bureau 
to use a subpoena.48  Therefore, the constitutional protections 
that attach to the enforcement of a subpoena are not applicable 
here.  Even so,  Congress provided a carefully constructed 
protocol for our forfeiture proceedings that allows ample 
opportunity for judicial review before any subject of a 
Commission forfeiture order may suffer any penalties for refusing 
to comply with that order.  The Act explicitly provides that no 
one can be forced to pay a Commission-imposed non-hearing 
forfeiture unless or until the forfeiture order has been 
subjected to federal judicial review in a trial de novo.49  Thus, 
SBC will have access to full-blown judicial review before 
suffering any penalty.50  For this reason, and more fundamentally 
because no subpoena was at issue in this case, we find that the 
Bureau's actions did not violate any constitutional requirements 
related to pre-enforcement judicial review of subpoenas.

Second, we find SBC's argument that the Bureau improperly 
sanctioned a constitutionally protected good faith challenge to 
be misplaced.51  As an initial matter, an NAL is not itself a 
sanction; it is a proposed sanction.  In addition, contrary to 
its assertions, SBC did not raise any type of affirmative 
challenge to the Bureau's sworn statement directive.  Rather, it 
failed even to disclose its noncompliance to the Bureau.  
Moreover, SBC had conducted itself in this manner on two prior 
occasions, and never brought its objection to the Bureau's 
attention.52 

Far from extinguishing SBC's right to challenge the sworn 
statement directive, the Bureau virtually invited such a 
challenge.  Before issuing the NAL in this case, the Bureau 
notified SBC that it had discovered the omission of the sworn 
statement, gave SBC the opportunity to admit and correct its 
noncompliance, and informed SBC that it was in violation of a 
Commission order.53   At that point in time, and even before, SBC 
could have raised a good faith challenge to the order.  As an 
initial matter, SBC could have taken the minimal step of alerting 
the Bureau of its concerns prior to, or simultaneous with, its 
submission of its October 22, 2001 response to the LOI.  In 
addition, at the same time, or at least upon receiving notice 
that it was in violation of the order, SBC could have petitioned 
the Commission or the Bureau for a stay of the portion of the 
October 1, 2001 order that required the sworn statement.54  
Nonetheless, SBC chose not to avail itself of the opportunity to 
raise a genuine good faith challenge to the order.55 

SBC's mere belief that the Bureau's sworn statement directive was 
unlawful cannot excuse its conduct here, and it certainly cannot 
amount to a good faith challenge to the order.  The Act provides 
that ``[a]ll such orders shall continue in force for the period 
of time specified in the order or until the Commission or a court 
of competent jurisdiction issues a superseding order.''56  
Moreover, ``[i]t shall be the duty of every person, its agents 
and employees, and any receiver or trustee thereof, to observe 
and comply with such orders so long as the same shall remain in 
effect.''57  As we have stated very recently, ``a licensee cannot 
ignore a Commission order simply because it believes such order 
to be unlawful.''58

Finally, none of the cases on which SBC bases this argument would 
support a finding that SBC exercised a good faith challenge in 
this case.59  To the contrary, SBC did ```default[] [and] 
contumaciously refuse[] to comply,'' and our process ```provides 
full opportunity for judicial review before any coercive 
sanctions may be imposed.'''60  We reject SBC's argument that the 
Bureau improperly sanctioned a good faith challenge to the LOI.  
The Bureau provided ample due process to SBC.

     D.The Forfeiture Amount Is Lawful and Appropriate.

     22.  Section 503(b)(2)(B) of the Act authorizes the 
Commission to assess a forfeiture of up to $120,000 for each 
violation, or each day of a continuing violation, up to a 
statutory maximum of $1,200,000 for a single act or failure to 
act.61  In determining the appropriate forfeiture amount, we 
consider the factors enumerated in section 503(b)(2)(D) of the 
Act, including ``the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of 
the violation, and, with respect to the violator, the degree of 
culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and 
such other matters as justice may require.''62  
     23.  Section 1.80 of the Commission's rules and the 
Commission's Forfeiture Policy Statement establish a base 
forfeiture amount of $3,000 for failure to file required forms or 
information.63  As noted in the NAL, however, the circumstances 
of this case justify a substantial increase to this base amount 
pursuant to upward adjustment criteria contained in the rules and 
the Forfeiture Policy Statement.64  Specifically, the Bureau 
found that the adjustment was appropriate because the misconduct 
was egregious; the violation was intentional; and the forfeiture 
amount must be high enough to serve a deterrent effect in view of 
SBC's ability to pay.65  

     24.  SBC objects to several aspects of the Bureau's 
reasoning, and it contends that the forfeiture amount proposed in 
the NAL is inappropriate because: (1) SBC did not intentionally 
violate the LOI; (2) SBC's conduct did not impede the Bureau's 
investigation; and (3) SBC and the Bureau still were 
``negotiating'' when the Bureau issued the NAL.66  None of these 
points has merit.

     25.  First, SBC explicitly acknowledged to the Bureau that 
its failure to comply with the LOI was intentional.67  SBC 
admittedly had knowledge of its actions and of the fact that 
those actions violated a Commission order.68  The company cannot 
now credibly argue that its conduct was unintentional.  

     26.  Second, SBC's refusal to attest to the truth and 
accuracy of its responses to the Bureau's written questions did 
impede the Bureau's investigation.  As the Bureau properly noted 
in the NAL, ``SBC's decision not to provide the requisite sworn 
statement here obstructs the Bureau's investigation into 
discrepancies in SBC's various representations to the Commission.  
SBC's conduct strikes at the core of the Bureau's ability to 
perform its function, and rises above the level of a mere 
omission or failure to file.''69 

     27.  Third, SBC and the Bureau were not ``negotiating'' at 
the time the Bureau issued the NAL.  Indeed, Bureau staff had 
made clear to SBC that SBC's obligation to submit a sworn written 
response was not open for negotiation between SBC and the 
Bureau.70  In any event, the Bureau was under no obligation even 
to inform SBC of its noncompliance or to give SBC an opportunity 
to comply.  It did so as a courtesy and was not required to do 
more.71  When a carrier deliberately violates a Commission 
directive, it should not be surprised that the Commission would 
issue an NAL upon discovering the violation.

     28.  For all of the reasons we have discussed above, we find 
that SBC's conduct justified the forfeiture amount that the 
Bureau proposed.  We therefore affirm the $100,000 forfeiture 
amount originally proposed by the Bureau.72   

                   III.      ORDERING CLAUSES

     29.  Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT, pursuant to section 
503(b) of the Act, 73 and section 1.80 of the Commission's 
Rules,74 SBC Communications SHALL FORFEIT to the United States 
Government the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) for 
violating an Enforcement Bureau order to submit a sworn written 
response to a Bureau LOI. 

     30.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that payment shall be made in the 
manner provided for in section 1.80 of the Commission's rules 
within 30 days of release of this order.75  If the forfeiture is 
not paid within the period specified, the case will be referred 
to the Department of Justice for collection pursuant to section 
504(a) of the Act.76 

     31.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order of 
Forfeiture shall be sent by Certified Mail/Return Receipt 
Requested to SBC Communications, c/o Caryn D. Moir, Vice 
President - Federal Regulatory, 1401 I Street, N.W., Suite 1100, 
Washington, D.C. 20005.

                         FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION



                         William F. Caton
                         Acting Secretary

_________________________

1    We note that  the Enforcement Bureau  issued the Notice  of 
Apparent Liability in this  case under its delegated  authority, 
but has  now referred  the matter  to the  Commission given  the 
significance of the challenge to the Commission's authority.  47 
C.F.R.  0.5(c) (``the staff is  at liberty to refer any  matter 
at any stage to the Commission for action, upon concluding  that 
it    involves    matters     warranting    the     Commission's 
consideration'').
2    47 U.S.C.  218, 403, 154(i), 154(j).
3    SBC Communications, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability  for 
Forfeiture, 16 FCC Rcd 19370 (2001) (``NAL'').
4    See Oct.  1, 2001  Letter from  Charles W.  Kelley,  Chief, 
Investigations  and  Hearings   Division,  Enforcement   Bureau, 
Federal Communications  Commission  to Sandra  L.  Wagner,  Vice 
President -  Federal  Regulatory, SBC  Telecommunications,  Inc. 
(``LOI'').
5    Id.
6    See Oct.  22, 2001  Letter from  William A.  Brown,  Senior 
Counsel, SBC Telecommunications, Inc. to Elizabeth H.  Valinoti, 
Attorney,  Investigations  and  Hearings  Division,  Enforcement 
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission (``LOI Response'').  
7    See Dec. 3,  2001 Response of  SBC Communications, Inc.  to 
Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (``NAL  Response''), 
Attachment F, ``Affidavit  of Caryn  D. Moir''  at   6.  As  it 
turns out, this instance was not the first in which SBC violated 
a Bureau  directive to  submit  a sworn  written response  to  a 
Bureau inquiry.   In at  least two other Bureau  investigations, 
both of which involved  possible misrepresentations by SBC,  SBC 
ignored a  Bureau  directive that  the  company submit  a  sworn 
written  response  to  a  Bureau  LOI  without  identifying  the 
omission to the  Bureau and without  offering any explanation  - 
legal or  otherwise -  for its  omission.  Compare  Letter  from 
David  H.  Solomon,  Chief,  Federal  Communications  Commission 
Enforcement Bureau to Sandra L. Wagner, Vice-President,  Federal 
Regulatory, SBC Telecommunications,  Inc., dated  July 26,  2001 
(LOI directing a  ``sworn written response'')  (``July 26,  2001 
LOI'')  with  Letter  from  Reid   M.  Figel,  counsel  to   SBC 
Communications,  Inc.  to  David  H.  Solomon,  Chief,   Federal 
Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau dated Sept. 7, 2001 
(unsworn written response to July 26, 2001 LOI).  Compare Letter 
from Bradford  M. Berry,  Deputy Chief,  Federal  Communications 
Commission  Enforcement  Bureau  to  Sandra  L.  Wagner,   Vice-
President, Federal  Regulatory,  SBC  Telecommunications,  Inc., 
dated  Sept.  14,   2001  (LOI  directing   a  ``sworn   written 
response'') (``Sept. 14,  2001 LOI'') with  Letter from Reid  M. 
Figel, counsel for SBC Communications, Inc., to Trent Harkrader, 
Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau dated Sept. 
19, 2001 (unsworn written response to Sept. 14, 2001 LOI).
8    See NAL Response at 5; see also NAL Response, Attachment F, 
``Affidavit of Caryn D. Moir'' at  6.
9    In response to the NAL's order that SBC ``submit, not later 
than November 7, 2001, a sworn written response to the  Bureau's 
LOI,'' NAL at 5, SBC filed an affidavit signed by an officer  of 
the company attesting that the information submitted in response 
to the Bureau's October  1, 2001 LOI was  ``true and correct  to 
the best of [the officer's] knowledge.''  See ``Verification  to 
Letter of Inquiry,  File No. EB-00-IH-0282''  signed by John  S. 
Habeeb, Director  -  Regulatory,  SBC  Advance  Services,  Inc., 
attached to  Nov.  7,  2001  Letter from  Caryn  D.  Moir,  Vice 
President - Federal Regulatory, SBC Telecommunications, Inc.  to 
Elizabeth H.  Valinoti,  Attorney, Investigations  and  Hearings 
Division, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications  Commission 
(``SBC's Nov. 7, 2001  Letter'').  SBC submitted this  affidavit 
``under protest and without prejudice to its contention that the 
Enforcement Bureau  has  no  authority either  to  compel  sworn 
testimony absent a subpoena or to attach additional costs to SBC 
for seeking review  of a  contested point of  law.''  See  SBC's 
Nov. 7, 2001 Letter at 2.  
10   See NAL Response. 
11   47 U.S.C.  503(b); 47 C.F.R.  1.80(a).
12   47 U.S.C.  503(b); 47 C.F.R.  1.80(f).
13   See, e.g., Tuscola Broadcasting Co., Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 76 FCC 2d 367, 371 (1980) (applying preponderance of  the 
evidence standard in reviewing  Bureau level forfeiture  order).  
Cf. 47 U.S.C.  312(d) (assigning burden of proof in hearings to 
Commission).
14   Under  the  Communications   Act,  a  party   ``willfully'' 
violates the Communications  Act or a  Commission rule or  order 
when it knows it is taking the action in question,  irrespective 
of any intent to violate the Commission's rules.  See 47  U.S.C. 
 312(f); Southern California Broadcasting Co., Licensee,  Radio 
Station KIEV(AM)  Glendale, California,  Memorandum Opinion  and 
Order, 6 FCC Rcd 4387,  4387-88,  5 (1991) (citing  legislative 
history that definition of willful in section 312(f) applies  to 
section 503(b)); Liability of Hale Broadcasting Corp.,  Licensee 
of  Radio  Station  WMTS  Murfreesboro,  Tennessee,   Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 79 FCC 2d 169, 171,  5 (1980).
15   The Commission  has  delegated to  the  Enforcement  Bureau 
broad authority  to serve  as  ``the primary  Commission  entity 
responsible for enforcement of the Communications Act and  other 
communications  statutes,  the  Commission's  rules,  Commission 
orders and Commission authorizations.''  47 C.F.R.   0.111(a), 
0.311.   This   delegated  authority   expressly  includes   the 
authority to ``[i]ssue  or draft orders  taking or  recommending 
appropriate   action    in    response    to    complaints    or 
investigations,'' and to ``issue . . . appropriate interlocutory 
orders and  take  appropriate  action in  the  exercise  of  its 
responsibilities.''   47  C.F.R.    0.111(a)(14).   Where  this 
Forfeiture Order speaks to  Commission authority, therefore,  it 
also applies  to  the  delegated authority  of  the  Enforcement 
Bureau.
16   47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j),  208, 218, 403.   See also  47 
U.S.C. 308(b)  (authority to  investigate radio  licensees  and 
applicants).
17   47 U.S.C.   218.  ``The  Commission may  inquire into  the 
management of the business of all carriers subject to this  Act. 
. . .  The Commission may  obtain from such  carriers, and  from 
persons directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by,  or 
under direct or indirect common control with, such carriers full 
and complete  information necessary  to perform  the duties  and 
carry out the objects for which it was created.''  Id.
18   NAL Response at 18.
19   See infra  10.
20   47 U.S.C.  403.  
          The Commission shall have full authority  and 
          power at any time to institute an inquiry, on 
          its own motion,  in any  case and  as to  any 
          matter or thing concerning which complaint is 
          authorized to  be  made,  to  or  before  the 
          Commission by any provision  of this Act,  or 
          concerning which any question may arise under 
          any  of  the  provisions  of  this  Act,   or 
          relating to  the enforcement  of any  of  the 
          provisions of this Act.  The Commission shall 
          have the same powers and authority to proceed 
          with any inquiry instituted on its own motion 
          as  though  it  had   been  appealed  to   by 
          complaint  or  petition  under  any  of   the 
          provisions of this  Act, including the  power 
          to make and  enforce any order  or orders  in 
          the case, or relating to the matter or  thing 
          concerning  which   the   inquiry   is   had, 
          excepting orders  for the  payment of  money.  
          Id.
21   Id.
22   47 U.S.C.   208(a).   ``If such  carrier or  carriers  [in 
response to a complaint] shall not satisfy the complaint  within 
the time specified or  there shall appear  to be any  reasonable 
ground for investigating said complaint, it shall be the duty of 
the Commission to investigate the matters complained of in  such 
manner and by such means as it shall deem proper.''  Id.
23   ``The Commission may perform any and  all such acts, . .  . 
and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be 
necessary in  the execution  of its  functions.''  47  U.S.C.   
154(i).  ``The Commission  may conduct its  proceedings in  such 
manner as will best conduce  to the proper dispatch of  business 
and to the ends of justice.''  47 U.S.C.  154(j).
24   See, e.g., U.S.  v. Southwestern  Cable Co.,  392 U.S.  157 
(1968).  ``Congress declined to `stereotyp(e) the powers of  the 
Commission to specific details.'''  Id.  at 180 (quoting NBC  v. 
U.S., 319 U.S.  190, 219  (1943)).  ``Thus,  the Commission  has 
been  explicitly   authorized  to   issue  `such   orders,   not 
inconsistent with  this  (Act),  as  may  be  necessary  in  the 
execution of its functions.''' Id.  (citing section 4(i) of  the 
Communications Act,  47  U.S.C.   154(i)).   See  also  FCC  v. 
Schreiber, 381 U.S.  279, 289 (1965)  (section 4(j)  ``delegates 
broad discretion'' to the Commission  to, inter alia, ``make  ad 
hoc   procedural   rulings   in   specific   cases.'');   Mobile 
Communications Corp. of America v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (and cases cited therein).  
25   See NAL Response at 16.
26   See NAL 19371 at  4, 19373 at  10.
27   See Application of Ameritech  Michigan Pursuant to  Section 
271 of the Communications  Act of 1934,  as amended, to  Provide 
In-Region, InterLATA Services in Michigan, CC Docket No. 97-137, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 20543, 20569 (1997).
28   See, e.g.,  Sound Broadcasting  Corp., Notice  of  Apparent 
Liability for  Forfeiture,  7 FCC  Rcd  3378, 3379  (Mass  Media 
Bureau 1992) (noting that a forfeiture in the ``full amount .  . 
. allowed by law'' was to be imposed because the company's reply 
``included only  non-notarized statements  . .  . although  [the 
Mass Media Bureau] had requested notarized affidavits'').
29   The fact that 18 U.S.C.  1001 and 47 C.F.R.  1.17 require 
SBC to  tell the  truth does  not, as  SBC suggests,  render  an 
attestation superfluous.  See NAL Response at 16, 28.  Requiring 
submission of an attestation may  elicit a higher level of  care 
and attention  than  the  level that  answers  unaccompanied  by 
verification may  prompt.   Attestations  can  be  necessary  to 
attain the level of reliability  that we require to enforce  the 
Act and our orders and rules.  Moreover, to the extent that,  as 
SBC  suggests,  the  standards  of  accuracy,  reliability,  and 
accountability elicited  by sections  1001  and 1.17  are  truly 
indistinguishable from  those  the  company must  meet  when  we 
require it to  attest to  the accuracy and  veracity of  written 
responses, the basis for SBC's objection to such an  attestation 
is unclear.
30   Similarly, as we have noted above, information supported by 
sworn verification  may  be  ``necessary'' for  purposes  of  47 
U.S.C.  218.  See supra  7.
31   See  NAL  Response   at  16  (citing   FCC  v.   Pottsville 
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)).
32   47 U.S.C.  208(a).  
33   47 C.F.R.  1.732(g) (emphasis added).
34   47 C.F.R.  1.729(e) (emphasis added).
35   Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 33(b)(1).
36   47 U.S.C.  409(e) (emphasis added).
37   See infra n.46.
38   47 U.S.C.  409. 
39   47 U.S.C.  409(m).
40   LOI at 2, 4.
41   See,  e.g.,  Peninsula  Communications,  Inc.,  Notice   of 
Apparent Liability for  Forfeiture and Order,  16 FCC Rcd  16124 
(2001) (ordering  broadcast licensee  to ``submit  an  affidavit 
informing [the Commission] whether [it] has ceased operating . . 
.  translators  and   whether  it  intends   to  operate   those 
translators at any time in the future absent authorization to do 
so''); see also Brindlee Broadcasting Corp., Memorandum  Opinion 
and Order, 54 FCC 2d 56, 57 (Rev. Bd. 1975) (ordering  president 
of broadcast license applicant to submit ``an explanation . .  . 
under  oath  as  to  how  he  plans  to  fulfill  his  full-time 
commitment  to  [the  license  applicant]  Brindlee''  and   his 
commitments  to  other  organizations  in  which  he  holds   an 
interest).
42   See NAL Response at 14-18.
43   Our conclusion is  perfectly consistent with  the case  law 
SBC cites in its Response to  the NAL.  For example, in AT&T  v. 
FCC, the FCC's use of its broad authority conferred in  sections 
4(i),  4(j),  403  and  numerous  other  sections  of  the   Act 
conflicted  with  ``precise  procedures  and  limitations''   in 
section 205 of  the Act.  AT&T  v. FCC, 487  F.2d 865, 873   (2d 
Cir.  1973).   In  this   case,  however,  the  procedures   and 
limitations of  section  409 simply  do  not apply.   Hence,  no 
conflict exists.
44   We  also  note  that  the  Supreme  Court  has  upheld  the 
Commission's authority  to  utilize  its  general  section  4(i) 
authority even when a more  specialized provision of the Act  is 
at the Commission's disposal.   U.S. v. Southwestern Cable  Co., 
392 U.S at 180 n.46 (noting that the Commission need not ``issue 
prohibitory orders  only under,  and in  conformity with  . .  . 
section [312(b)  of  the  Communications  Act],''  and  that  it 
appropriately may rely  on its  general section  4(i) powers  to 
issue such orders). 
45   NAL Response at 13.  The procedural protections afforded by 
section 409 include payments to witnesses and deponents, aid  to 
the Commission by federal courts in instances of disobedience to 
a  subpoena,   depositions   before   specified,   disinterested 
officers, and caution to deponents  to testify the whole  truth.  
47 U.S.C.   409(e), (f),  (g), (h),  (i), (k).   We note  that 
these procedures are for the protection of not only the  parties 
subject to  subpoenas,  but  also  for  the  protection  of  the 
Commission.  
46   NAL Response at 19-22.
47   NAL Response at 22-25.
48   See supra  13-15.
49   47 U.S.C.  504(a).   If a party chooses not to pay a  non-
hearing forfeiture, the Commission may  refer the matter to  the 
U.S. Department of Justice for collection proceedings, in  which 
case the  party is  entitled to  an entirely  new trial  on  the 
merits in federal court.
50   Even assuming that  the administrative  subpoena cases  SBC 
cites apply  here, none  of  them requires  more than  that  the 
parties have the right to  judicial review of an  administrative 
subpoena before ``suffering penalties for refusing to  comply.''  
See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967), quoted in, 
NAL Response at 19.   Indeed, those cases tend to reinforce  our 
finding here that there is ample opportunity for judicial review 
of the order  at issue,  and that it  is incumbent  upon SBC  to 
invoke those protections.  See,  e.g., Oklahoma Press Publ'g  Co 
v. Walling,  327 U.S.  186, 217  (1946) (rejecting  petitioners' 
argument that  agency  subpoena  power  would  subject  them  to 
impermissible inconvenience, expense, and harrassment  precisely 
because ``they may make appropriate defense surrounded by  every 
safeguard  of   judicial   restraint.'')   (internal   quotation 
omitted).
51   See NAL Response at 22-26.
52   See supra n.7.
53   See supra  3.
54   47 C.F.R.  1.43, 1.44.
55   Moreover, as we discuss above,  see supra  17, even  after 
the issuance of this Forfeiture Order, SBC may choose not to pay 
the forfeiture and  to raise a  challenge to our  findings in  a 
trial de novo  should the  Department of  Justice prosecute  any 
collection action we may refer.  
56   47 U.S.C.  408. 
57   47 U.S.C.  416(c). 
58   See Peninsula Communications,  Inc., Forfeiture Order,  FCC 
02-31 at  5 (rel. Feb. 6, 2002).
59   See NAL Response at 22-26.  In these cases, parties subject 
to various subpoenas or fines actively sought judicial relief to 
stay and/or  enjoin the  relevant order.   See,  e.g.,  Oklahoma 
Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331, 339 (1920) (laundry company 
sued to enjoin Oklahoma Corporation Commission from entertaining 
rate complaints against company, and from enforcement related to 
such complaints); see also, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 441 
(1964) (attorney  filed  suit  seeking  declaratory  ruling  and 
injunctive relief against IRS to invalidate a subpoena demanding 
production of work papers ); see also Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. 
v. U.S., 751 F.2d 332, 333  (10th Cir. 1984) (oil company  filed 
complaint seeking declaratory and  injunctive relief against  an 
investigation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
60   See NAL Response at 23 (quoting Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 
440, 448 n.8,  450 (1964) (emphasis  added)).  Even under  SBC's 
asserted  interpretation  that   section  503(b)   must,  as   a 
constitutional  matter,   permit  good   faith   pre-enforcement 
challenges,   the   Bureau's   actions   were   still   entirely 
appropriate.
61   47 U.S.C.  503(b)(2)(B); see  also 47 C.F.R   1.80(b)(2); 
see also Amendment of Section 1.80(b) of the Commission's Rules, 
Adjustment of Forfeiture Maxima to Reflect Inflation, Order,  15 
FCC Rcd 18221 (2000).
62   47  U.S.C.    503(b)(2)(D);  see  also  The   Commission's 
Forfeiture Policy Statement and Amendment of Section 1.80 of the 
Rules to  Incorporate  the  Forfeiture Guidelines,  12  FCC  Rcd 
17087, 17100  (1997) (``Forfeiture  Policy Statement'');  recon. 
denied 15 FCC Rcd 303 (1999); 47 C.F.R.  1.80(b)(4).
63   47 C.F.R.  1.80; Forfeiture  Policy Statement, 12 FCC  Rcd 
at 17114, Appendix A, Section I.
64   NAL at 19372-73. 
65   47 C.F.R.  1.80; Forfeiture  Policy Statement, 12 FCC  Rcd 
at 17100.
66   See NAL Response at 27-29.
67   See NAL  Response, Attachment  F, ``Affidavit  of Caryn  D. 
Moir'' at  6.
68   Id.  See also supra  3.
69   NAL 19373 at   10.  See  supra  10  and n.30  (discussing 
necessity of attestations to Commission investigations).
70   See NAL Response at 5; see also NAL Response, Attachment F, 
``Affidavit of Caryn D. Moir'' at  6.
71   "The  Commission  is  not  required  to  bargain  with  its 
licensees for the information to  which it is entitled in  order 
properly to carry out  its functions."  See  James A. Kay,  Jr., 
Decision, FCC 01-341 at  40 (rel. Jan. 25, 2002) (quoting Carol 
Music, Inc., 37  FCC 379, 384  (1964))  (acknowledging  licensee 
right to register principled objections to Commission directives 
but noting that objections do not negate licensee obligation  to 
comply with directives).
72   SBC correctly  points  out  that $100,000  is  the  maximum 
forfeiture available at this point in this case, see, e.g.,  NAL 
Response at ii, iv, 27,  28, but the company misunderstands  the 
reason for that limitation.  The  Commission is limited here  to 
imposing a maximum $100,000  forfeiture only because this  Order 
is based on a  Bureau-level NAL in which  the Bureau proposed  a 
forfeiture of  $100,000,  which  is the  cap  on  its  delegated 
authority.  See 47 C.F.R.   0.311.  We note, however, that  had 
the Commission itself issued the  NAL in the first instance,  we 
could have imposed a forfeiture here of up to $120,000 per  day, 
up to a maximum of  $1.2 million for the  more than 10 days  for 
which SBC's violation continued.  See 47 U.S.C.   503(b)(2)(B); 
see also 47 C.F.R   1.80(b)(2); see  also Amendment of  Section 
1.80(b) of  the  Commission's Rules,  Adjustment  of  Forfeiture 
Maxima to Reflect Inflation, Order, 15 FCC Rcd 18221 (2000).  
73   47 U.S.C.  503(b).
74   47 C.F.R.  1.80.
75   Id.
76   47 U.S.C.  504(a).