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                           Before the
                FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
                     Washington, D.C.  20554

In the Matter of                )
                                )
AT&T Corporation,               )
                                )
     Complainant,               )
                                )
          v.                    )  File No. E-97-07
                                )
Jefferson Telephone Company,    )
                                )
     Defendant.                    )

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

     Adopted:  August  24, 2001              Released:  August 
31, 2001

By the Commission:

                       I.     INTRODUCTION
                                
1.   In this Memorandum Opinion and Order (``Order''), we deny a 
  formal complaint filed by AT&T Corporation (``AT&T'') against 
  Jefferson Telephone Company (``Jefferson'') pursuant to 
  section 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended 
  (``Act'' or ``Communications Act'').1  AT&T challenges the 
  lawfulness of an access revenue-sharing arrangement that 
  Jefferson entered into with an information provider to which 
  Jefferson terminated traffic.  On the basis of the facts and 
  arguments presented in this record, we conclude that AT&T has 
  failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Jefferson (i) 
  engaged in discrimination prohibited by section 202(a) of the 
  Act,2 or (ii) violated section 201(b) of the Act3 by breaching 
  its duty as a common carrier to serve, in AT&T's words, as an 
  ``objective conduit'' of communications services.  
  Accordingly, we deny AT&T's complaint.4

                       II.     BACKGROUND

2.   At all relevant times, Jefferson was an incumbent local 
  exchange carrier (``LEC'') located in Jefferson, Iowa that 
  served approximately 3,400 access lines.5  Jefferson provided 
  local exchange service to end user customers, and originating 
  and terminating exchange access services to AT&T and other 
  interexchange carriers (``IXCs'').6  During 1994 and 1995, 
  Jefferson charged IXCs access rates specified by the National 
  Exchange Carrier Association (``NECA'') pursuant to a tariff 
  filed at the Commission.7
      
3.   During the period at issue in this dispute, one of 
  Jefferson's end-user customers was an information provider 
  called International Audiotext Network (``IAN'').8  IAN 
  provided its customers a kind of multiple voice bridging 
  service commonly known as ``chat-line'' service.  This service 
  connects incoming calls so that two or more callers can talk 
  with each other simultaneously.9  This differs from 
  traditional conference call service in that callers to the 
  chat line are randomly paired with other callers.  In 
  addition, unlike many chat-line operators, IAN did not impose 
  any charges on callers.  Instead, IAN obtained all of its 
  revenues from Jefferson, as described below.  Thus, callers to 
  IAN paid only their designated IXC for the calls, and paid 
  only the IXC's tariffed, long-distance toll charges.10

4.   During the time period at issue here, a long distance call 
  by an AT&T subscriber to IAN was first routed to the 
  subscriber's local telephone company.  Next, the call was 
  routed to AT&T, which transported the call across AT&T's long 
  distance network.  AT&T then handed the call to Jefferson (the 
  ``terminating access provider'').  As the ``terminating access 
  provider,'' Jefferson routed the call to its end-user 
  customer, IAN.11  Jefferson then billed AT&T for terminating 
  access services at the tariffed rate.12

5.   Towards the end of 1992, Jefferson entered an agreement with 
  IAN whereby Jefferson would make payments to IAN based on the 
  amount of access revenues that Jefferson received for 
  terminating calls to IAN.13  In return, IAN would market and 
  otherwise aid the chat-line operations.14  As mentioned above, 
  the payments that Jefferson paid to IAN based on terminating 
  access revenues constituted IAN's only source of revenue.15  
  On July 31, 1995, the agreement between Jefferson and the chat 
  line ended.16

6.   In December 1996, AT&T filed the instant complaint.17  
  According to AT&T, Jefferson's access revenue-sharing 
  arrangement with IAN violated section 201(b) by contravening 
  the ``basic principle of common carriage'' that a carrier may 
  only serve as an objective conduit of communications service, 
  ``without influenc[ing] or control[ling] . . . the destination 
  of a customer's calls within its authorized service area.''18  
  Such contravention occurred, in AT&T's view, because Jefferson 
  ``acquired a direct interest in promoting the delivery of 
  calls to specific telephone numbers for the provision of a 
  specific communication.''19  AT&T also contends that 
  Jefferson's access revenue-sharing arrangement with IAN 
  discriminated against Jefferson's other end user customers, in 
  violation of section 202(a), because the arrangement ``caused 
  access revenues, which are intended to cover Jefferson's 
  legitimate costs of service and its ability to maintain high 
  quality service in the areas in which it operates, to be 
  directed elsewhere.''20  AT&T requests an order (i) declaring 
  that Jefferson's access revenue-sharing arrangement with IAN 
  was unlawful, and (ii) awarding damages in the amount of the 
  access fees that AT&T paid for calls to IAN, with interest.21 

                III.     DISCUSSION             

A.   AT&T Has Not Demonstrated that the Access Revenue-Sharing 
     Arrangement Between Jefferson and IAN Violated Section 
     201(b) of the Act by Breaching Jefferson's Duty as a Common 
     Carrier.

7.   According to AT&T, there are ``two essential prerequisites'' 
  for common carriage.22  First, a common carrier must ``hold[ ] 
  itself out to serve indifferently with regard to the service 
  in question.''23  Second, a common carrier must ``allow[ ] 
  customers to transmit intelligence of their own design and 
  choosing.''24  AT&T maintains that Jefferson violated the 
  first of these fundamental principles (and, thus, section 
  201(b)) when it entered into the revenue-sharing arrangement 
  with IAN and acquired a direct economic interest in 
  terminating traffic to IAN.25

8.   We agree with AT&T's general description of the fundamentals 
  of common carriage.26  We disagree with AT&T, however, that 
  Jefferson violated the first of those fundamentals when it 
  entered the revenue-sharing agreement with IAN.  

9.   AT&T alleges that Jefferson violated the ``indifference'' 
  requirement of common carriage, because the revenue-sharing 
  arrangement with IAN ``caused Jefferson to have a direct, and 
  greater, economic interest in delivering calls to one set of 
  destination telephone numbers in its service area than to 
  other destination numbers.''27  In AT&T's view, ``it became 
  Jefferson's prerogative, pursuant to the agreement, to 
  transmit calls to IAN as opposed to transmitting calls to 
  other destinations in its territory.''28

10.  AT&T mischaracterizes the ``indifference'' requirement as 
  turning on a carrier's motive for providing service to a 
  particular customer.  This requirement hinges not on such 
  intent, but rather on the carrier's conduct in actually 
  serving customers.  The critical inquiry is whether a carrier 
  makes ad hoc determinations about the provision of service to 
  particular customers.29  Stated another way, ``a carrier will 
  not be a common carrier where its practice is to make 
  individualized decisions in particular cases whether and on 
  what terms to serve.''30  Thus, as Jefferson asserts, the crux 
  of the `indifference' inquiry is the manner in which service 
  is offered to customers, not the carrier's interest in 
  increasing the traffic carried on its network.31  As long as a 
  carrier provides service indifferently and indiscriminately to 
  all who request it, the first prong of the common carriage 
  test is satisfied.

11.  The record does not demonstrate that Jefferson failed to 
  remain appropriately ``indifferent'' as a common carrier, 
  notwithstanding its access revenue-sharing arrangement with 
  IAN.  In particular, the record contains no evidence that 
  Jefferson ever made any individualized decisions in specific 
  cases concerning whether and on what terms to provide 
  interstate access services.  Jefferson provided interstate 
  access service at the same rate to all IXCs who ordered it 
  pursuant to a tariff filed with the Commission.  Moreover, 
  Jefferson provided terminating interstate access service with 
  respect to calls placed to all of the telephone numbers in 
  Jefferson's exchange, not just to those numbers assigned to 
  IAN.  Finally, the record contains no indication that 
  Jefferson ever deliberately routed to IAN an interstate call 
  intended for a different end user.

12.   AT&T points to the fact that the agreement between 
  Jefferson and IAN required IAN to engage in certain marketing 
  practices, and required Jefferson to block certain local calls 
  to IAN.32  These circumstances fall far short of giving 
  Jefferson an unlawful interest in IAN, given that, as stated 
  above, Jefferson provided interstate access services 
  indifferently and indiscriminately to all who requested them.

13.  We note that AT&T relies for support on a 1996 Notice of 
  Proposed Rulemaking and a 1995 advisory letter issued by the 
  Chief of the former Enforcement Division of the Common Carrier 
  Bureau.33  In the 1996 NPRM, the Commission sought comment on 
  whether the practice at issue at here ``could be interpreted 
  as not being just and reasonable under section 201(b).''34  
  The Marlowe Letter opined that an international long distance 
  carrier would violate section 201(b) if it were to share with 
  an information provider the toll revenues collected on calls 
  to the information provider.35  Neither item persuades us 
  here.36  For the reasons set forth above, based on the record 
  in this case, in which AT&T argues that Jefferson's access 
  revenue-sharing arrangement with IAN violated section 201(b) 
  solely because it allegedly breaches common carriage duties, 
  we conclude that AT&T has not met its burden of demonstrating 
  that Jefferson's practice here is unjust and unreasonable.  To 
  the extent the former Enforcement Division's advisory letter 
  is inconsistent with our holding here, we overrule the 
  Division's letter.

14.  For these reasons, we find that AT&T has not demonstrated 
  that Jefferson violated its duty as a common carrier upon 
  entering the revenue-sharing arrangement with IAN.  
  Accordingly, we deny Counts One and Two of the Complaint.37

B.   AT&T Has Not Demonstrated that the Access Revenue-Sharing 
     Arrangement Between Jefferson and IAN Violated Section 
     202(a) of the Act.

15.  AT&T cursorily contends that Jefferson discriminated against 
  its end users, in violation of section 202(a) of the Act,38 by 
  failing to use all of its access revenues to maintain its 
  network.39  AT&T's contention fails to state a discrimination 
  claim under section 202(a), because AT&T fails to allege that 
  Jefferson treated one customer differently from another.40  
  Notably, AT&T fails to allege either that (i) Jefferson 
  offered a better deal to IAN than to other similarly situated 
  end-user customers, or (ii) Jefferson treated one IXC 
  differently than others in its provision of interstate access 
  services.  AT&T simply argues that Jefferson's network as a 
  whole could have been better, had Jefferson not shared 
  revenues with IAN.  Whatever claim this odd argument may 
  state, it is not one under section 202(a).  Thus, we deny 
  Count Three of AT&T's Complaint.41

                       IV.     CONCLUSION
                                
16.  Although we deny AT&T's complaint, we emphasize the 
  narrowness of our holding in this proceeding.  We find simply 
  that, based on the specific facts and arguments presented 
  here, AT&T has failed to demonstrate that Jefferson violated 
  its duty as a common carrier or section 202(a) by entering 
  into an access revenue-sharing agreement with an end-user 
  information provider.  We express no view on whether a 
  different record could have demonstrated that the revenue-
  sharing agreement at issue in this complaint (or other 
  revenue-sharing agreements between LECs and end user 
  customers) ran afoul of sections 201(b), 202(a), or other 
  statutory or regulatory requirements.           

                    V.     ORDERING  CLAUSES

17.  ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 
  4(j), 201, 202, and 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
  amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 201, 202, and 208, 
  that the above-captioned complaint filed by AT&T IS DENIED IN 
  ITS ENTIRETY, and this proceeding is TERMINATED WITH 
  PREJUDICE.

18.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 
  201, 202, and 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
  amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 201, 202, and 208, 
  that Jefferson's Motion to Dismiss (filed February 18, 1997), 
  Jefferson's Motion to Compel (filed May 6, 1997), and AT&T's 
  Motion to Compel (filed May 6, 1997) are DENIED.


                              FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  


                              Magalie Roman Salas
                              Secretary
_________________________

1         47 U.S.C.  208.
2         47 U.S.C.  202(a). 
3         47 U.S.C.  201(b).
4         See generally Hi-Tech Furnace Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 224 
F.3d 781, 787 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming that the burden of 
proof is on the complainant in a proceeding conducted under 47 
U.S.C.  208).
5         AT&T Corp. v. Jefferson Telephone Company, Complaint, 
File No. E-97-07 (filed Dec. 23, 1996) at 2,  4 (``Complaint''); 
AT&T Corp. v. Jefferson Telephone Company, Answer of Jefferson 
Telephone Company, File No. E-97-07 (filed Feb. 18, 1997) at 1,  
4 (``Answer''); AT&T Corp. v. Jefferson Telephone Company, 
Initial Brief of AT&T Corp., File No. E-97-07 (filed Oct. 31, 
1997) at 1 (``AT&T Brief'').  Jefferson claims that it was a 
connecting carrier within the meaning of section 2(b)(2) of the 
Act.  Jefferson Brief at 3-4, citing 47 U.S.C.  152(b)(2).  
Section 2(b)(2) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:  
``[N]othing in the Act shall be construed to apply or to give the 
Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . any carrier engaged 
in interstate or foreign communication solely through physical 
connection with the facilities of another carrier . . . , except 
that sections 201 through 205 of this Act, both inclusive, shall 
. . . apply to [such] carriers . . . .''  47 U.S.C.  152(b)(2).  
Jefferson asserts that it is engaged in interstate communication 
solely through physical connection with other carriers, so 
section 2(b)(2) immunizes it from complaints filed pursuant to 
section 208 of the Act; in Jefferson's view, only sections 201 
through 205 of the Act apply to it, and not section 208.  
Jefferson Brief at 3-4, citing Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico 
Telephone Co., 553 F.2d 701, 704-07 (1st Cir. 1977).  The 
Commission has consistently rejected this interpretation of 
section 2(b)(2) of the Act, and held that section 208 applies 
even to connecting carriers.  See, e.g., Com Services, Inc. v. 
The Murraysville Telephone Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 
FCC 2d 210, 217,  16 (1985); TPI Transmission Services, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico Telephone Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC 
Rcd 2246, 2248 n.19 (Com. Car. Bur. 1989)(both declining to 
follow Comtronics, and relying on Ward v. Northern Ohio Telephone 
Co., 300 F.2d 816, 819-21 (6th Cir. 1962), instead).  
Accordingly, even assuming, arguendo, that Jefferson was a 
``connecting carrier'' under section 2(b)(2) of the Act, we 
reject Jefferson's assertion that it is immune from complaints 
filed pursuant to section 208.
6         Complaint at 2,  4; Answer at 1,  4.
7         Complaint at 2,  5; Answer at 1,  5; AT&T Brief at 1; 
AT&T Corp. v. Jefferson Telephone Company, Initial Brief of 
Jefferson Telephone Company, File No. E-97-07 (filed Oct. 31, 
1997) at 2 (``Jefferson Brief).  The applicable NECA rate for 
terminating access service at that time was between $.06 and $.07 
per minute.  Complaint at 2,  5; Answer at 1,  5.  
8         AT&T Brief at 2, Ex. 2; Jefferson Brief at 1-2.
9         Complaint at 3,  6 n.1; Answer at 1-2.  6; AT&T Brief 
at 3; Jefferson Brief at 2.
10        Complaint at 3,  6; Answer at 2,  6; Jefferson Brief 
at 2; AT&T Brief at 3.   See Jefferson Brief at Exhibit 1, 
Declaration of James L. Daubendiek, at 2-3,  6 (``Daubendiek 
Declaration'') (stating that ``[t]he caller paid the tariffed 
long-distance rates assessed by whichever interexchange carrier 
the caller chose to use.'').
11        See generally Total Telecommunications Services, Inc., 
and Atlas Telephone Company, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, FCC 01-84, 16 FCC Rcd 5726, 5729,  6 (2001).
12        Complaint at 4,  8; AT&T Brief at 4; Jefferson Brief 
at 2; Daubendiek Declaration at 2-3,  6.
13        Complaint at 2-3,  6; Answer at 2,  6; AT&T Brief at 
1-2; Jefferson Brief at 2.  See Daubendiek Declaration at 2,  5.
14        See AT&T Brief at Confidential Exhibit 4, paragraph 2, 
detailing the obligations of IAN pursuant to the agreement 
between Jefferson and IAN.  In a letter dated June 11, 2001, 
Jefferson explicitly granted the Commission permission to discuss 
publicly this section of the agreement.  See AT&T Corp. v. 
Jefferson Telephone Company, Letter from James U. Troup and James 
H. Lister, Counsel for Jefferson Telephone Co., to Warren 
Firschein, Attorney, Enforcement Bureau, FCC, File No. E-97-07 
(dated June 11, 2001).
15        This arrangement stimulated traffic and boosted 
Jefferson's terminating access revenues.  While the arrangement 
was in place, Jefferson terminated as much as 2,000,000 minutes 
per month, whereas after the arrangement ended, Jefferson 
terminated about 130,000 minutes per month.  Complaint at 3-4,  
7; Answer at 2,  7; AT&T Brief at 4; AT&T Brief at Ex. 9, AT&T 
Corp. v. Jefferson Telephone Company, Defendant's Response to 
AT&T Corp.'s First Set of Interrogatories, File No. E-97-07 
(filed Apr. 21, 1997), Response to Interrogatory No. 4.
16        Jefferson Brief at 1; Daubendiek Declaration at 2,  4.
17        Jefferson argues that AT&T's claims are time-barred 
because AT&T knew or should have known of Jefferson's revenue-
sharing arrangement with IAN more than two years prior to the 
filing of the complaint.  AT&T Corp. v. Jefferson Telephone 
Company, Reply Brief of Jefferson Telephone Company, File No. E-
97-07 (filed Nov. 7, 1997) at 3-4 (``Jefferson Reply'').  See 47 
U.S.C.  415(a) (providing that an action to recover charges must 
be initiated within two years from the time the cause of action 
accrues).  In support of its argument, Jefferson relies solely on 
the fact that AT&T appended to its Initial Brief a newspaper 
article from the San Diego Union-Tribune dated November 14, 1994 
that describes the revenue-sharing arrangement.  Jefferson Reply 
at 3.  See AT&T Brief at Ex. 2.  Thus, according to Jefferson, 
``the window of opportunity to file a complaint closed on 
November 14, 1996.''  Jefferson Reply at 3.  We disagree.  Just 
because AT&T submitted the newspaper article in this record does 
not demonstrate that an AT&T representative read the article at 
the time it was published.  Without more, it would be equally 
reasonable to conclude that AT&T first learned of the article in 
the course of prosecuting this case.  Thus, the record does not 
support a conclusion that AT&T's claims are time-barred.
18        Complaint at 4,  10.  See id. at 4-6,  11-16.  AT&T 
asserts this claim in two substantively identical causes of 
action (Counts One and Two), which we consider collectively.  In 
its Initial Brief, AT&T cursorily maintains for the first time 
that the revenue-sharing arrangement between Jefferson and IAN 
also violated section 201(b) by ``evading the requirements'' of 
section 228 of the Act, 47 U.S.C.  228, known as the Telephone 
Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act (``TDDRA'').  AT&T Brief at 
15-17.  AT&T failed to raise this issue in its Complaint, 
however.  Therefore, the record provides an inadequate basis on 
which to assess the merits of this potentially challenging 
argument.  See, e.g., Consumer.Net v. AT&T Corp., Order, 15 FCC 
Rcd 281, 300,  40 n.93 (1999) (declining to consider an argument 
raised for the first time in the briefs); Building Owners and 
Managers Association International v. FCC,  F.3d  , 2001 WL 
754910, n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (declining to address an issue 
raised cursorily in the brief).  Accordingly, we decline to 
address this issue, and restrict our discussion of section 201(b) 
to AT&T's ``common carriage'' claim. 
19        Complaint at 4,  11.  See id. at 4-6,  11-16.
20        Complaint at 7,  20.  See id. at 6-7,  18-21.
21        Complaint at 7-8.
22        AT&T Brief at 7-15.  See Complaint at 4-5,  10-12; 
AT&T Reply at 5-8.
23        AT&T Brief at 7, relying on Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1994); National Ass'n 
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608-09 
(D.C. Cir. 1976); National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
24        AT&T Brief at 7-8, relying on Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d at 1480; NARUC v. FCC, 525 F.2d at 
640-42.
25        Complaint at 4-5,  10-13; AT&T Brief at 7-15; AT&T 
Reply at 5-9; AT&T Corp. v. Jefferson Telephone Company, 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, File No. E-97-07 (filed Mar. 5, 
1997) at 3-4 (``Opposition to Motion to Dismiss'').
26        See Southwestern Bell v. FCC, 19 F.3d at 1480-81 
(stating that, ``[i]f the carrier chooses its clients on an 
individualized basis and determines in each particular case 
`whether and on what terms to serve' and there is no specific 
regulatory compulsion to serve all indifferently, the entry is a 
private carrier for that particular service.'').  See also NARUC 
v. FCC, 525 F.2d at 640-42.
27        AT&T Brief at 5.  See Complaint at 5,  12.
28        AT&T Brief at 9.  See Complaint at 4-5,  10-13; AT&T 
Brief at 7-15; AT&T Reply at 5-9; Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
at 3-4.
29        See Southwestern Bell v. FCC, 19 F.3d at 1480-81; NARUC 
v. FCC, 533 F.2d at 608-09; NARUC v. FCC, 525 F.2d at 641.
30        NARUC v. FCC, 533 F.2d at 608-09.  See NARUC v. FCC, 
525 F.2d at 641 (stating that ``to be a common carrier one must 
hold oneself out indiscriminately to the clientele one is suited 
to serve . . . .'').
31        Jefferson Brief at 7.
32        See note 16, supra.
33        Policies and Rules Governing Interstate Pay-Per-Call 
and Other Information Services Pursuant to the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 11 FCC Rcd 
14738 (1996) (``Pay-Per-Call NPRM''); Ronald J. Marlowe, 10 FCC 
Rcd 10945 (CCB-ED 1995), application for review pending 
(``Marlowe Letter'').
34        Pay-Per-Call NPRM, 11 FCC Rcd at 14752,  41.  See id. 
at 14755-56,  47-48.
35        See Marlowe Letter, 10 FCC Rcd at 10945.
     36   For example, the Marlowe Letter suggested that, 
``[t]hrough payments to an information provider . . . , a carrier 
would abandon objectivity and acquire a direct interest in 
promoting the delivery of calls to a particular number for the 
provision of a particular communication.''  Marlowe Letter, 10 
FCC Rcd at 10945.  As described above, we disagree.  As long as a 
carrier does not make individualized decisions in specific cases 
concerning whether and on what terms to provide service,  a 
carrier does not abandon the requisite ``objectivity'' by sharing 
revenues with an information provider.
37        We note that AT&T explicitly disavowed any claim that 
the terminating access rate charged by Jefferson was unjust and 
unreasonable under section 201(b).  AT&T Brief at 12.  We express 
no view on the reasonableness of Jefferson's rates.
38        Section 202(a) of the Act makes it unlawful ``for any 
common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination 
in charges, practices, . . . facilities, or services . . . or to 
make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to 
any particular person.''  47 U.S.C.  202(a).  
39        Complaint at 6-7,  17-21; AT&T Brief at 17-19.
40        See generally PanAmSat Corp. v. COMSAT Corp., 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 6952, 6965,  34 (1997); 
American Message Centers v. FCC, 50 F.3d 35, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 
Competitive Telecommunications Association v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1058, 
1062 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
41        In light of all of the foregoing rulings, Jefferson's 
Motion to Dismiss, Jefferson's Motion to Compel, and AT&T's 
Motion to Compel are denied as moot.  AT&T Corp. v. Jefferson 
Telephone Company, Motion to Dismiss, File No. E-97-07 (filed 
Feb. 18, 1997) (``Jefferson's Motion to Dismiss''); AT&T Corp. v. 
Jefferson Telephone Company, Motion to Compel, File No. E-97-07 
(filed May 6, 1997) (``Jefferson's Motion to Compel''); AT&T 
Corp. v. Jefferson Telephone Company, Motion to Compel, File No. 
E-97-07 (filed May 6, 1997) (``AT&T's Motion to Compel'').