џWPC ћџ2BџџV`џџ№ЖџџZІ3|P'A Roman (TT)аџџ8xCdX›qXx{•2 PЩіQXPўўўўўўўџџџџџўџџўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ"‚џџџџ5џџ…џџеџџџџџџ№џџџџџџ^dC2CCdECCCCCCC7l98l‰99ѕ9:<Document 7aDocument 7a7 ггггDocument 8aDocument 8a8 ггггRight Par 1Right Par 19шоааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааггггааА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааRight Par 2Right Par 2:шоааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ0ААааггггааА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ0XА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааћџ2лF;c><@=ŸB>НDRight Par 3Right Par 3;шоааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааггггааА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааRight Par 4Right Par 4<шоааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ0ААааггггааА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ0XА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааRight Par 5Right Par 5=шоааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааггггааА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааRight Par 6Right Par 6>шоааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ0ААааггггааА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ0XА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааћџ2!L? 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(#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааХХћџ2SKlгQLl?RMxЋRNl#S1515K гггг1616L гггг1717MггУУУ УФФФ Фгг1818N ггггћџ2qUOlСSPl-TQl™TRlU1919O гггг20a20aP гггг21a21aQ гггг22a22aR ггггћџ2_WSxЃUTlVUl‡VVlѓV23a23aSггУУУ УФФФ Фгг24a24aT гггг25a25aU гггг26a26aV ггггћџ2AYWl‘WXl§WYliXZlеX27a27aW гггг2828X гггг2929Y гггг30b30bZ ггггћџ2#[[lsY\lпY]lKZ^lЗZ31b31b[ гггг32b32b\ гггг33b33b] гггг34b34b^ ггггћџ2С^_lU[`lС[a(-\blU^35b35b_ гггг36b36b` гггг37b37baэуХХааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааггггааА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааХХ3838b ггггћџ2Ѓ`clѓ^dl__elЫ_fl7`3939c гггг4040d гггг4141e гггг42a42af ггггћџ2…bglе`hlAail­ajlb43a43ag гггг44a44ah гггг45a45ai гггг46a46aj ггггћџ2gdklЗbll#cmlcnlћc47a47ak гггг48p48pl гггг49p49pm гггг50b50bn ггггћџ2hol™dpleqlqer(нe51b51bo гггг52a52ap 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Фб#&aє\  PŽ6G;ч &P#бƒ In the Matter ofСрЮьRС)ƒ СрЮьRС)ƒ Personal Communications Industry Association's СрЮьRС)ƒ Broadband Personal Communications ServicesСрЮьRС)ƒ Alliance's Petition for Forbearance For BroadbandСрЮьRС)ƒ Personal Communications ServicesСрЮьRС)ƒ СрЮьRС)ƒ СрЮьRС)ƒ Biennial Regulatory Review Љ Elimination СрЮьRС)ƒ or Streamlining of Unnecessary and ObsoleteСрЮьRС)ƒ CMRS RegulationsСрЮьRС)ƒ СрЮьRС)ƒ СрЮьRС)ƒ Forbearance from Applying Provisions of theСрЮьRС)ƒ д …SAД-дCommunications Act to WirelessСрЮьRС)ƒСhСWT Docket No. 98Љ100 Telecommunications CarriersСрЮьRС)ƒ СрЮьRС)ƒ СрЮьRС)ƒ д …SЁД-дFurther Forbearance from СрЮьRС)ƒСhС д …SyД-дTitle II Regulation for Certain Types ofСрЮьRС)ƒСhСGN Docket No. 94Љ33 Commercial Mobile Radio Service ProvidersСрЮьRС)ƒ СрЮьRС)ƒ СрЮьRС)ƒ д …SйД-дGTE Petition for Reconsideration СрЮьRС)ƒСhСMSDЉ92Љ14 д …SБД-дor Waiver of a Declaratory RulingСрЮьRС)ƒСhС СрЮьRС)ƒ д …SД-даадФ дУ УMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AND д …SщД-ддж дNOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING Ф Ф дTьдаадPАд д …S™Д-дааXА` И hРpШ xа (#€%и'0*ˆ,р.813ш5@8˜:№"ˆ,-(-(ZZ%с"дŒТXxТ(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the public д …SиУ-дinterest.ж3#Ъи0€д {O@Д-д УУId.ФФ3жЦ(#Ц СxСи 13.и On June 2, 1997, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau issued a public notice seeking д …S`У-дcomment on the Petition.жI$Z`Z0€д yOZД- Аxhд Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Public Comment On Petition For Forbearance Filed by Broadband д {O"Ѕ- АxвдPersonal Communications Services Alliance of the Personal Communications Industry Association, УУPublic NoticeФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. 7637 (1997).Iж TwentyЉtwo parties filed comments on the Petition and thirteen parties д …S8У-дfiled reply comments.ж‚%€8|0€д {OT Д- АxYд УУSeeФФ Appendix B for a complete list of commenters and shortЉform citations used. Unless otherwise indicated, д {O Ѕ- Аx†дcitations are to comments on the PCIA Petition. УУSee alsoФФ Letter from Pamela J. Riley, AirTouch Communications, д Аx№дto Magalie R. Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, dated March 24, 1998; Response of PCIA to д АxФдStaff Questions Regarding TOCSIA from Jeffrey S. Linder, Counsel, PCIA, to Magalie Salas, Secretary, Federal д {OxЅ- АxLдCommunications Commission, dated April 10, 1998 (PCIA УУEx ParteФФ); Letter from Michael F. Altschul, Vice д АxYдPresident and General Counsel, CTIA, to Daniel Phythyon, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, dated May д {O Ѕ-д1, 1998 (CTIA УУEx ParteФФ).‚ж On May 21, 1998, we extended until June 8, 1998, the date on which the Petition would be deemed granted in the absence of a decision that it failed to meet the standards for д …SшУ-дforbearance under section 10(a).ж­&ьшФ 0€д yOLД- Аx<д Personal Communications Industry Association's Broadband Personal Communications Services Alliance's д {OЅ- АxhдPetition for Forbearance For Broadband Personal Communications Services, УУOrderФФ, FCC 98Љ99 (rel. May 21, 1998). д {OоЅ- АxiдУУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 160(c) (petition for forbearance under section 10(a) shall be deemed granted if not denied within д Аxсдone year after the Commission receives it, unless the Commission extends the oneЉyear period by an additional 90 days upon finding that an extension is necessary to meet the requirements of section 10(a)).­ж On June 5, 1998, we further extended this deadline until June 23, д …SРУ-д1998.ж$'’Рx0€д yOиД- Аx<д Personal Communications Industry Association's Broadband Personal Communications Services Alliance's д {O Ѕ-дPetition for Forbearance For Broadband Personal Communications Services, УУOrderФФ, FCC 98Љ113 (rel. June 5, 1998).$ж д …SpД-даадTьдааддУ УззIV. DISCUSSIONФ Фзз д …SH Д-ддTьдаадPАдУ УззA. Sections 201 and 202Ф Фзз д …Sј Д-дСxСи 14.и УУBackground.ФФ Section 201 of the Act mandates that carriers engaged in the provision of interstate or foreign communication service provide service upon reasonable request, and that all charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for such service be just and reasonable. Section 201 also empowers the Commission to require physical connections with other carriers, to establish through д …SXУ-дroutes, and to determine appropriate charges for such actions.ж=(ШXв0€д yOЪ"Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 201.=ж Section 202 states that it is unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services, or to make or give any undue or unreasonable д …SрУ-дpreference or advantage to any person or class of persons.ж=)Шрb0€д yOт&Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 202.=ж Section 332 of the Act requires that theд"рђ)ˆ,-(-(ZZю№"д Commission treat all CMRS providers as common carriers for purposes of the Communications Act, except to the extent the Commission determines to forbear from applying certain provisions of Title II. Although section 10 forbearance contains no such restriction, it is notable that, for purposes of forbearance under section 332, the Commission "may not specify any provision of section 201, 202, or 208." PCIA requests section 10 forbearance from the application of sections 201 and 202 of the Act to broadband PCS providers on the ground that market forces, including the competitive presence of other CMRS providers, are sufficient to ensure that rates are just, reasonable and not unjustly д …SшУ-дdiscriminatory.ж>*Шш0€д yOPД-д PCIA Petition at 23.>ж PCIA states that forbearance will promote the public interest by enhancing competition, providing consumers with increased choices, driving prices downward, and eliminating д …S˜У-дcompliance costs.ж:+ژX0€д {O Д-д УУIdФФ. at 26.:ж д …SH Д-дСxСи15.и УУDiscussion.ФФ Sections 201 and 202, codifying the bedrock consumer protection obligations of a common carrier, have represented the core concepts of federal common carrier regulation dating back over a hundred years. Although these provisions were enacted in a context in which virtually all telecommunications services were provided by monopolists, they have remained in the law over two decades during which numerous common carriers have provided service on a competitive basis. These sections set out broad standards of conduct, requiring the provision of interstate service upon reasonable request, pursuant to charges and practices which are just and reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory. At bottom, these provisions prohibit unreasonable discrimination by common carriers by guaranteeing consumers the basic ability to obtain telecommunications service on no less favorable terms than other similarly situated customers. The Commission gives the standards meaning by defining practices that run afoul of carriers' obligations, either by rulemaking or by caseЉbyЉcase adjudication. The existence of the broad obligations, however, is what gives the Commission the power to protect consumers by defining forbidden practices and enforcing compliance. Thus, sections 201 and 202 lie at the heart of consumer protection under the Act. Congress recognized the core nature of sections 201 and 202 when it excluded them from the scope of the Commission's forbearance д …S№У-дauthority under section 332(c)(1)(A).жP,Ъ№ъ0€д {OzД-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 332(c)(1)(A).Pж Although section 10 now gives the Commission the authority to forbear from enforcing sections 201 and 202 if certain conditions are satisfied, the history of the д …S У-дforbearance provisions confirms that this would be a particularly momentous step.ж-" |0€д {OМД- Аxxд УУSee alsoФФ УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1461, РР 120 (stating that classification of PCS as д АxУдpresumptively CMRS, thus making it subject to section 201 and 202 and the complaint procedures in section 208, д АxЅдwould contribute to the universal availability of PCS because such regulations place an obligation on PCS licensees to make their services available to the public at nonЉdiscriminatory prices).ж СxСи16.и Sections 201 and 202 are enforced through the formal complaint process established in д …S(У-дsection 208 of the Act.ж=.Ш(f 0€д yO.%Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 208.=ж Under section 208, any aggrieved party may file a petition with the Commission complaining of an alleged violation of these provisions. The carrier that is the subject of the complaint must then either rectify the alleged violation or respond to the complaint. The carrier isд"и і .ˆ,-(-(ZZLс"д relieved of liability for any injury if, within a reasonable period specified by the Commission, the carrier rectifies the injury alleged to have been caused. If the carrier does not satisfy the complaint within the specified time or if there appears to be any reasonable ground for investigating the д …SˆУ-дcomplaint, the Commission shall investigate the alleged violation.жŒ/Zˆ0€д yO№Д- Аxёд 47 U.S.C. РР 208(a). Congress imposed a five month deadline for resolving any section 208 investigation д АxKдinitiated by the Commission, which we believe is indicative of the importance Congress placed on the complaint д {O€Ѕ-дprocess even in a largely deЉregulated regime. УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 208(b)(1). Œж Consumers and carriers are protected by this complaint process. Indeed, when we decided to forbear from applying tariff requirements to CMRS, we relied on sections 201 and 202 and the section 208 complaint process as д …SУ-дimportant safeguards to protect consumers in the event of market failure.ж‰0юъ0€д {Oš Д- Аxд УУSee CMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1478Љ79, РРРР 175Љ176; УУsee also IXC Forbearance OrderФФ, д Аxд11 FCC Rcd. at 20743, 20751, РРРР 21, 38 (citing continued applicability of sections 201 and 202 and complaint д {O, Ѕ- Аxiдprocess in support of forbearance from tariffing interstate, domestic, interexchange services); УУCAP Forbearance д {Oі Ѕ- АxџдOrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 8609, РР 25 (similar discussion in context of provision of interstate exchange access services by providers other than incumbent LECs).‰ж СxСи17.и Consistent with the centrality of sections 201 and 202 to consumer protection, the Commission has never previously refrained from enforcing sections 201 and 202 against common д …SpУ-дcarriers, even when competition exists in a market.жH1Ъp 0€д {OАД-д УУSeeФФ BANM Comments at 18.Hж In those instances where the Commission has reclassified carriers as "nonЉdominant" because they lack market power, and reduced those carriers' д …S У-дregulatory burdens, the Commission has continued to require compliance with sections 201 and 202.жИ2^ 2 0€д {OђД- АxLд УУId.ФФ (citing УУФФPolicy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities д {OМЅ- АxЅдAuthorizations Therefor,УУ First Report and OrderФФ, 85 FCC 2d 1(1980); УУФФMotion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified д {O†Ѕ-дas a NonЉDominant Carrier, УУOrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. 3271 (1995) (УУAT&T Reclassification OrderФФ)).Иж д ‡Sј Д-дFor example, we concluded in the УУAT&T Reclassification OrderФФ that the prohibitions against unjust and unreasonable rates, practices, and discrimination contained in sections 201 and 202 of the Act д …SЊ У-дapply equally to dominant and nonЉdominant carriers.жk3ЪЊ X 0€д {OЂД-д УУAT&T Reclassification OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3282, РР 130.kж We explained that in the absence of section 205 tariff regulation, the substantive obligations imposed under sections 201 and 202, coupled with the complaint and enforcement processes of section 208, would prevent AT&T from engaging in д …S2У-дanticompetitive behavior such as prohibition or unreasonable restriction of resale.ж34Ъ2ъ0€д {OМД-д УУId.ФФ3ж СxСи18.и Based on the record before us, we decline to forbear from enforcing the core common carrier obligations of sections 201 and 202 at this time. The record does not show, as required for forbearance under section 10, that the current market conditions ensure that the charges, practices, classifications and regulations of broadband PCS carriers are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory, that market forces are sufficient to protect consumers from discriminatory charges and practices of broadband PCS providers, and that forbearance is in the public interest. д"Ъ |4ˆ,-(-(ZZс"дŒСxСи19.и The first prong of the section 10 forbearance standard is not satisfied unless enforcement of a statutory provision is shown not to be necessary to ensure that charges, practices, classifications, д …SАУ-дand regulations are just and reasonable, and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory.жC5ША0€д yOД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(1).Cж This standard essentially tracks the central requirements of sections 201 and 202. Thus, in arguing for forbearance from applying sections 201 and 202, PCIA necessarily contends that in order to ensure that broadband PCS providers' charges, practices, classifications, and regulations are just, reasonable, and not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory, we need not require that those charges, practices, classifications, and regulations be just, reasonable, and not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory. д …S˜Д-дСxСи20.и PCIA argues that the broadband PCS market is competitive within the context of the total CMRS market, that broadband PCS providers lack individual market power, and that, therefore, enforcement of sections 201 and 202 is no longer necessary to ensure that rates and practices associated with broadband PCS, or imposed by broadband PCS providers, are just, reasonable, and not д …Sј У-дunjustly discriminatory.жA6Шј X0€д yO№Д-д PCIA Petition at 10Љ26.Aж PCIA relies heavily on the contention that Congress enacted sections 201 and 202 when the communications marketplace was dominated by a few large landline common carriers with substantial market power, and that today's vigorously competitive CMRS market has д …S€ У-дrendered these regulations superfluous.ж7€€ ш0€д {OД- Аxд УУId.ФФ at 19. In support of its contention that CMRS markets are so competitive that sections 201 and 202 are д АxГдno longer necessary, PCIA relies on the Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect д {OšЅ- АxДдto Commercial Mobile Services, УУSecond ReportФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. 11266 (1997) (УУSecond CMRS Competition ReportФФ). д {OdЅ- АxдIn particular, PCIA cites findings in the УУSecond CMRS Competition ReportФФ regarding CMRS market growth, capital д Аxбдinvestment, the existence of multiple CMRS providers in each market area, and the trend of CMRS providers offering д {OіЅ- Аxhдlower prices and new, innovative services. УУSeeФФ PCIA Petition at 9Љ16 (citing УУSecond CMRS Competition ReportФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. 11266). ж PCIA argues that competition in the marketplace can appropriately regulate the provision of wireless telecommunications services by broadband PCS providers and that the present level of competition can supplant sections 201 and 202. СxСи21.и We agree with PCIA that broadband PCS providers are operating in an increasingly competitive environment.зCMRSCOMPETBEGINз Until a few years ago, licensed cellular providers enjoyed duopoly market power, substantially free of direct competition from any other source. As early as 1994, we cited growing CMRS competition as a consideration supporting forbearance from imposing tariff obligations д …S@У-дupon CMRS providers.жЯ8’@0 0€д {O Д- Аxˆд УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1478, РР 175; УУsee generally idФФ. at 1467Љ72, РРРР 135Љ154 (discussing state of competition).Яж Growing competition was also the basis for denying state petitions for д …SУ-дauthority to regulate CMRS rates under section 332(c)(3) of the Act.ж9”Š 0€д {OB#Д- Аxтд УУSee, e.gФФ., УУConnecticut Rate Regulation OrderФФ, 10 FCC Rcd. at 7055Љ59, РРРР 67Љ77УУФФУУФФ;УУ Ohio Rate Regulation д {O $Ѕ-дOrderФФ, 10 FCC Rcd. at 7851Љ52, РРРР 37Љ39.ж Just prior to the filing of д ‡S№Д-дPCIA's Petition, the Commission issued its УУSecond CMRS Competition ReportФФ, in which we д …SЪУ-дacknowledged that the most significant recent entry into CMRS markets has been by PCS providers.жe:ЪЪц0€д {OP'Д-д УУSecond CMRS Competition ReportФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 11269.eж д"Ъ x:ˆ,-(-(ZZ№"д We further observed that the prospective entry of PCS carriers appeared to be accelerating the conversion of some cellular systems from analog to digital technology, a change that would facilitate д …SАУ-дthe offering of a broader array of wireless services by cellular licensees.ж@;ЪА0€д {OД-д УУId.ФФ at 11269Љ70.@ж Most recently, we have д ‡SˆД-дadopted a УУThird CMRS Competition ReportФФ in which we observed that the CMRS marketplace has continued to progress toward competition during the past year, with the result that prices for mobile д …S:У-дtelephony service have been falling and service offerings have become more diverse.жW<Ъ:Z0€д {O4Д-д УУSee Third CMRS Competition Report ФФat 2.Wж СxСи22.и Nonetheless, the competitive development of the industry in which broadband PCS д …SТУ-дproviders operate is not yet complete and continues to require monitoring.жД=’Ть0€д {ON Д- Аxxд УУSee id. ФФat 33Љ35 (discussing factors that have the potential to limit broadband PCS growth and competitive development).Дж У УФ ФУ УФ ФУ УФ ФThe most recent evidence indicates that prices for mobile telephone service have been falling, especially in geographic markets д …SrУ-дwhere broadband PCS has been launched.жA>ЪrF0€д {OXД-д УУSee id.ФФ at 19Љ20.Aж These price declines, however, have been uneven,ж>?Ъrи0€д {OъД-д УУSee id.ФФ at 20.>ж and do not necessarily indicate that prices have reached the levels they would ultimately attain in a competitive marketplace. In general, licensees do not exert any disciplinary effect in their markets until after they announce their intentions to commence operations, identify the services they intend to д …Sв У-дoffer, and begin soliciting business.ж3@(в j 0€д {OмД- АxKд УУSeeФФ УУФФSatellite Business Systems, УУMemorandum Opinion, Order, Authorization and Certification,ФФ 62 FCC 2d д {OІЅ- Аxтд997, 1088Љ1094 (1977), УУaff'd sub nom. United States v. FCCФФ, 652 F.2d 72, 100Љ102 (D.C. Cir. 1980); УУФФGeneral д {OpЅ- АxI дTelephone and Electronics Corporation, УУMemorandum Opinion and Order,ФФ 72 FCC 2d 111, 155Љ158, УУorder on reconФФ., д {O:Ѕ-д72 FCC 2d 516, УУfurther recon. deniedФФ, 84 FCC 2d 18 (1979).3ж While six broadband PCS licenses have now been awarded in most areas, many licensees have yet to begin offering services. Most C, D, E, and F block licensees are not yet in operation, and in some areas, even A or B block licensees have not yet launched д …SZУ-дservices.ж[AЪZZ 0€д {OTД-д УУSee Third CMRS Competition ReportФФ at 32Љ33.[ж Furthermore, even if a licensee is providing service in part of its licensed service area, д …S2У-дthere may be large areas left without competitive service.ж‡B\2ь0€д yOОД- Аxёд The record does not contain a market analysis of competition within particular geographic markets with д {O† Ѕ- Аxрдrespect to any of the requests for forbearance made by PCIA. We also note that the УУThird CMRS Competition Report д {OP!Ѕ-дФФdoes not contain any such analysis. УУSee id.ФФ at 18 n.88.‡ж СxСи23.и Assuming all relevant product and geographic markets become substantially competitive, moreover, carriers may still be able to treat some customers in an unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory manner. Competitive markets increase the number of service options available to consumers, but they do not necessarily protect all consumers from all unfair practices. The market may fail to deter providers from unreasonably denying service to, or discriminating against, customers whom they may view as less desirable. In addition, certain conditions even in competitive CMRSд" Bˆ,-(-(ZZbс"д markets could facilitate discrimination and unfair practices. For example, CMRS systems use a variety of different technologies and operate over different frequency bands, thus requiring handsets with different capabilities to access different systems. The cost of a new handsetЉЉas a component of the cost of switching providersЉЉmay thus act to undermine market discipline. This may be exacerbated by the current lack of number portability. Due to these conditions, providers may, in the absence of sections 201 and 202, have the opportunity and incentive to treat some of their existing customers in an unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory manner, as compared with similarly situated potential new д …SшУ-дcustomers.жHCЪш0€д {OPД-д УУSeeФФ NWRA Comments at 28.Hж д …S˜Д-дСxСи24.и Given the ongoing competitive development of the markets in which broadband PCS providers operate, constraints on market entry imposed by the need for spectrum licenses, and uncertainties regarding the extent to which a competitive market structure can ensure reasonable and nondiscriminatory practices toward all consumers, we are unwilling to assume that current market conditions alone will adequately constrain unjust and unreasonable or unjustly and unreasonably discriminatory rates and practices without specific evidence to that effect. Neither PCIA nor any other д …SЈ Д-дsource has brought such evidence to our attention. У УФ ФWe therefore conclude that the first prong of the section 10 forbearance standard has not been satisfied. СxСи25.и Under the second prong of the section 10 forbearance standard, a party seeking forbearance must show that enforcement of a provision is not necessary for the protection of д …SрУ-дconsumers.жCDШрZ0€д yOкД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(2).Cж PCIA asserts that the variety of competitive alternatives available to consumers, along with the broad range of pricing plans from which they may choose, renders the continued application д …SУ-дof sections 201 and 202 to broadband PCS providers unnecessary for consumers' protection.жAEШъ0€д yOД-д PCIA Petition at 22Љ23.Aж We recognize that consumers in today's market may have a broad choice of calling plans, and that many consumers are able to choose to take service from among several providers. Nonetheless, as we found in connection with the first prong of the section 10 forbearance standard, the record does not show that today's market conditions eliminate all remaining concerns about whether broadband PCS providers' rates and practices are just, reasonable, and nonЉdiscriminatory. For the same reasons, we cannot conclude that sections 201 and 202 are not necessary to protect consumers. СxСи26.и Many of the unjust or unreasonable practices in which carriers could engage could potentially harm consumers. Sections 201 and 202 serve to deter providers that otherwise may arbitrarily refuse service to, or discriminate against, some potential customers. In addition, as noted above, carriers' use of different technologies, the high cost of handsets, and the current lack of number portability combine to create conditions that could facilitate antiЉconsumer practices. By raising the costs of changing providers for many consumers, these factors might permit carriers to harm customers д …S`У-дwho are "locked in" to their provider by failing to offer those customers reasonable deals.ж>FШ`z0€д yOz%Д-д NWRA Comments at 28.>ж Furthermore, carriers could harm consumers by unreasonably failing to offer roaming. Carriers might also prohibit or unreasonably restrict resale of their services, thereby harming consumers by restrictingд" Fˆ,-(-(ZZЂ!с"д д …SУ-дpotential competition by resellers.жwGЪ0€д {OhД-д УУSeeФФ NWRA Comments at 28Љ29; УУsee alsoФФ America One Comments at 2Љ3.wж In the absence of assurance that current market conditions will prevent such carrier practices, we believe that sections 201 and 202, and the complaint process of section 208, constitute a vital safeguard for consumers. СxСи27.и The third prong of the section 10 forbearance standard requires us to forbear only if we д …S8У-дfind that forbearance is consistent with the public interest.жCHШ8Z0€д yO2Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(3).Cж In evaluating whether forbearance is consistent with the public interest, we must consider whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or regulation will promote competitive market conditions, including the extent to which forbearance д …SРУ-дwill enhance competition among providers.жJIЪРъ0€д {OJ Д-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 160(b).Jж In making this assessment, we may consider the benefits a regulation bestows upon the public, along with any potential detrimental effects or costs of enforcing a provision. PCIA argues that forbearance from applying sections 201 and 202 to broadband PCS providers would further the public interest because these sections limit carriers' ability to develop д …S У-дspecialized offerings for particular customers, and impose administrative costs on carriers.жAJШ |0€д yO<Д-д PCIA Petition at 24Љ26.Aж Thus, PCIA contends, sections 201 and 202 retard competition and ultimately harm consumers. д …SЈ Д-дСxСи28.и We reject PCIA's argument for several reasons. First, as already discussed, the first two prongs of the section 10 forbearance standard are not satisfied because the record does not show that present market conditions, in the absence of sections 201 and 202, will protect consumers and ensure that carriers' rates and practices are just, reasonable, and nonЉdiscriminatory.зUNFAIRPRACTICEз Thus, even if we believed forbearance were in the public interest as required under the third prong, we could not forbear from enforcing sections 201 and 202 pursuant to section 10. We also believe that the benefits sections 201 and 202 confer upon the public by protecting consumers and preventing unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory practices are important parts of our public interest analysis. Indeed, we believe that as д …ShУ-дcustomers begin to rely on CMRS as a partial or complete substitute for wireline service,ж[KЪh 0€д {OД-д УУSee Third CMRS Competition ReportФФ at 26Љ28.[ж it becomes increasingly important for us to preserve the basic relationship between carriers and customers enshrined in sections 201 and 202. СxСи29.и Moreover, we are not convinced that any harm caused by sections 201 and 202, to competition or otherwise, outweighs the public interest benefits of these provisions. As discussed above, we are committed to forbearing from enforcing requirements that impede competition, impose unnecessary costs, or obstruct the provision of diverse, high quality services at low prices. Nonetheless, we are not convinced by PCIA's generalized claims that sections 201 and 202 substantially restrict broadband PCS carriers' ability to develop specialized offerings and competitive prices. To the contrary, the principal regulatory impediments to carrier innovation ЉЉ federal and state regulation of rates and state regulation of entry ЉЉ have already been removed as applied to CMRSд"АžKˆ,-(-(ZZ-с"д д …SУ-дproviders by Congressional and Commission action.жšLЪ0€д {OhД-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 332(c)(3); УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1463Љ93, РРРР 124Љ219.šж Rather, sections 201 and 202 give wireless carriers ample discretion to adopt flexible pricing to meet customer needs and marketplace demands. For example, we note that section 202 does not prohibit all different treatment of consumers, only д ‡SˆУ-дУУunreasonableФФ discrimination among consumers.жКM’ˆZ0€д {O‚Д- АxУд УУSee, e.g.,ФФ AT&T Communications, Revisions to Tariff F.C.C. No. 12, УУMemorandum Opinion and OrderФФ, 4 FCC Rcd. 4932 (1989).Кж Furthermore, we disagree that enforcement of sections 201 and 202 puts carriers in the position of speculating about the legal ramifications of offering innovative service packages and prices, and that such speculation chills innovative services д …SУ-дand plans.жїN"Д0€д {Of Д- Аxбд УУSee ФФPCIA Petition at 25; УУsee alsoФФ Sprint/APC Comments at 9 (stating that sections 201 and 202 constrain PCS д АxЅдproviders from offering imaginative and customized terms and conditions); Nextel Comments at 6Љ7 (stating that д Аxядsections 201 and 202 make it difficult for competitive providers to negotiate freely and to tailor terms and conditions of service to the specific needs of particular customers).їж By now, there is a substantial body of precedent that promotional programs, volume д …SъУ-дdiscounts and other arrangements may be reasonable and nonЉdiscriminatory.жOюъž0€д {O(Д- АxУд УУSee ФФBANM comments at 19 (citing Private Line Rate Structure and Volume Discount Practices, УУReport and д {OђЅ- Аx‰дOrderФФ, 97 FCC 2d 923, 947Љ49, РРРР 38Љ42 (1984)); УУseeФФ УУalsoФФ УУФФPetitions for Waiver of Section 64.702 of the д {OМЅ- АxсдCommission's Rules, УУMemorandum Opinion and Order,ФФ 100 FCC 2d 1057, 1106 n.87 (1985) ("Indeed, there is an д Аxiдevolving policy . . . that flexibility in the pricing of private line services such as nondiscriminatory bulk discount offerings is desirable . . .").ж We note no party adduces specific evidence that carriers have been deterred from offering particular plans or have been subject to unwarranted complaints. Also, there has been no effort to show the extent of any д …SrУ-дadministrative costs of compliance.жKPЪrT 0€д {OfД-д УУSee ФФPCIA Petition at 24Љ26.Kж We note again that in order to meet the first prong of the section 10 forbearance test, it must be shown that carriers will comply in any event with the central substantive requirements of sections 201 and 202. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the public interest in forbearance outweighs the benefits of continuing to enforce sections 201 and 202. СxСи30.и Furthermore, we believe forbearance would harm the public interest, and particularly the growth of competition, in other ways. Forbearance from enforcing sections 201 and 202 with regard to broadband PCS carriers alone would create regulatory asymmetry with respect to cellular and other CMRS providers. This asymmetryзSYMз зASYMMETRYзwould distort competition and contradict the intent of Congress that д …S У-дCMRS providers should be treated similarly.ж‡Q~ ц0€д {O Д- Аx№д УУ SeeФФ Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile д {OZ!Ѕ- АxYдServices, УУThird Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. 7988, 7996, РР 13 (1994). We note that PCIA requests in its Petition д АxДдthat the Commission forbear from enforcing sections 201 and 202 solely with regard to broadband PCS providers. д Аx•дPCIA Petition at 18. For the reasons discussed in the text, we conclude that such forbearance is unwarranted without д Аxyдregard to considerations of regulatory symmetry. If we believed the standards for forbearance were otherwise д Аxiдsatisfied, we would consider whether the record supported forbearance for a broader category of CMRS providers. д {OD%Ѕ-дУУSeeФФ para. 73, УУinfraФФ. ‡ж In addition, if we were to forbear from enforcing sections 201 and 202, parties would likely turn to the courts for relief from perceived unjust andд"т,Qˆ,-(-(ZZюс"д д …SУ-дunreasonable carrier practices.жŠR0€д yOhД- АxФд Resort to the courts would probably be required because state regulatory commissions would be limited in д Аx+ дtheir ability to fulfill this function. Section 10(e) of the Act prevents state commissions from enforcing any provision д Аx=дof the Act that the Commission has forborne from applying. 47 U.S.C. РР 160(e). In addition, under section д Аx№д332(c)(3), states cannot regulate the entry of CMRS providers under any circumstances and cannot regulate CMRS д Аxџдrates unless the Commission grants a state's petition upon finding that market conditions fail to protect subscribers д Аx;дadequately from unjust and unreasonable rates or rates that are unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory, or that such д Аxдmarket conditions exist and a service is a replacement for land line telephone exchange service for a substantial д Аx•дportion of the telephone land line exchange service within such state. States may, however, regulate the other terms and conditions of CMRS. 47 U.S.C. РР 332(c)(3). Šж We believe that since the courts lack the Commission's expertise, developed over decades, in evaluating carriers' practices, carriers would face inconsistent court д …SАУ-дdecisions and incur unnecessary costs.ж^SЪА˜0€д {Oш Д-д УУSee ФФBANM Comments at 17Љ18; GTE Comments at 5.^ж This could result in consumers receiving differing levels of service and protection depending upon the jurisdiction in which they live, contrary to the intent of д …S`У-дCongress in amending section 332(c).жlTZ`* 0€д {O*Д- Аxд УУSeeФФ H.R. Rep. No. 103Љ111, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. at 260 (1993) (section 332(c) is intended "[t]o foster the д Аx,дgrowth and development of mobile services that, by their nature, operate without regard to state lines as an integral part of the national telecommunications infrastructure").lж СxСи31.и In sum, we find that the record does not permit us, consistent with the threeЉprong test set out in section 10 of the Act, to forbear from enforcing sections 201 and 202 with respect to broadband PCS providers. First, the record does not show that existing competition in the market in which broadband PCS providers compete has rendered sections 201 and 202 unnecessary to prevent unjust, unreasonable, and unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory practices. Second, the record does not show that sections 201 and 202 are no longer necessary to protect consumers from discriminatory charges and practices by broadband PCS providers. Finally, we do not believe that forbearance from enforcing sections 201 and 202 is consistent with the public interest. The Commission has, pursuant to its authority under section 332(c)(1)(A), forborne from the application of sections 203, 204, 205, 211, 212 and 214 of Title II of the Communications Act to any service classified as CMRS, including д …S€ У-дbroadband PCS.жUЪ€ L 0€д {OlД-д УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1478Љ81, 1485, 1510Љ11, РРРР 173Љ182, 196, 272.ж Sections 201 and 202 continue to provide important safeguards to consumers of broadband PCS against carrier abuse in an area that has already been largely deregulated by the Commission. We therefore find that at this time it is necessary to maintain sections 201 and 202, which enable the Commission to ensure that broadband PCS carriers provide service in a just, reasonable, and nonЉdiscriminatory manner, and to provide all consumers, including other carriers, with a mechanism through which they can seek redress for unreasonable carrier practices. д …ShД-дСxСУ УззB. Resale Rule, 47 C.F.R. РР 20.12(b)Ф Фзз аа д …SД-дСxСи32.и УУBackground.ФФ PCIA has also requested that we forbear from applying the CMRS resale д …S№У-дrule to broadband PCS carriers.жAVШ№о0€д yOn&Д-д PCIA Petition at 27Љ37.Aж On June 12, 1996, the Commission adopted a rule prohibiting certain providers of CMRS from unreasonably restricting the resale of their services during aд"ШnVˆ,-(-(ZZс"д д …SУ-дtransitional period.жxWj 0€д {OhД- Аxiд Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, УУFirst Report and д {O2Ѕ- АxдOrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. 18455 (1996) (УУFirst Report and OrderФФ), УУrecon. pending, appeal pending sub nom. Cellnet д {OќЅ- АxбдCommunications, Inc. v. FCCФФ, No. 96Љ4022 (6th Cir. filed Sept. 19, 1996). The Commission is currently considering д Аxдpetitions for reconsideration or clarification of this order, and these petitions raise many of the same general issues д Аx№дas PCIA does in its petition for forbearance. To the extent that parties raise in their comments in this proceeding д {OVЅ- Аxдissues other than forbearance that are the subject of petitions for reconsideration of the УУFirst Report and OrderФФ, we д {O Ѕ- Аxсдdefer those issues to the reconsideration proceeding, in which a fuller record has been developed. УУSee, e.g., ФФAT&T д АxсдComments at 5Љ6 (urging Commission not to apply the resale rule to bundled packages of services and equipment); д Аx№дGTE Comments at 7 n.10. We also note that while PCIA and others are encouraging us to forbear from enforcing д Аxдthe resale regulation, other parties request that we eliminate the sunset provision and maintain the resale rule in д Аx;дperpetuity.зSUNSETAPPEALз Our decision herein is not meant to prejudge the disposition of issues raised on reconsideration. We are committed to resolving these issues expeditiously.xж Prior to 1996, the Commission applied a similar rule only to providers of cellular д ‡SиУ-дservice.жГX\ињ 0€д {Or Д- Аx№д УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 22.901(e) (1995). The prior rule included an exception permitting a cellular carrier to deny д Аx;дresale capacity to a fully operational facilitiesЉbased competitor, defined as a carrier whose fiveЉyear buildout period д {OЅ-дhad expired. УУId. See generally First Report and OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 18457Љ58, РРРР 4Љ5.Гж УУФФIn the УУFirst Report and OrderФФ, the Commission extended the resale rule to providers of broadband PCS and certain "covered" specialized mobile radio (SMR) services in order to promote д …SŠУ-дcompetition in those services.жtYЪŠ0€д {OHД-д УУFirst Report and OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 18459Љ62, РРРР 7, 10Љ12. tж The Commission found that resale confers important public benefits in less competitive markets, including encouraging competitive pricing; discouraging unjust, unreasonable, and unreasonably discriminatory practices; reducing the need for regulatory intervention and concomitant market distortions; promoting innovation; improving carrier management and marketing; generating increased research and development; and positively affecting the growth of the д …SТУ-дmarket.жФZ"ТА0€д {OД- Аxwд УУId.ФФ at 18461Љ62, РР 10. We note especially that resale in telecommunications markets has helped bring service д Аxдto smaller and underserved markets, as well as providing opportunities for small businesses. In wireless markets, д Аx‡дin particular, resale allows companies that may not have access to spectrum to offer full packages of services and products.Фж Balancing these benefits against the costs of regulation with respect to each class of providers, the Commission concluded that the rule's potential benefits as applied to cellular, broadband д …SrУ-дPCS and covered SMR providers exceeded its potential costs.жP[Ъrš0€д {OЌД-д УУId. ФФat 18464Љ67, РРРР 15Љ20.Pж By contrast, because other CMRS providers did not substantially compete in the mass market for twoЉway switched voice and data services, faced vigorous competition, and operated in markets in which resale was an established practice, the Commission concluded that an express resale requirement was unnecessary for providers д …Sв У-дof these services.жO\Ъв ,0€д {Ož"Д-д УУФФУУId. ФФat 18467Љ68, РР 21.Oж Furthermore, the Commission found that the competitive development of broadband PCS and covered SMR services, as alternatives to cellular, would obviate the need for anд"Њ О\ˆ,-(-(ZZ‰ с"д express CMRS resale requirement, and it therefore provided that the resale rule would sunset five д …SиУ-дyears following the award of the last group of initial broadband PCS licenses.ж ]&и0€д {O@Д- Аx№д УУId. ФФat 18468Љ69, РР 24. УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 20.12(b) ("This paragraph shall cease to be effective five years after д АxLдthe last group of initial licenses for broadband PCS spectrum in the 1850Љ1910 and 1930Љ1990 MHz bands is д {OвЅ- АxYдawarded."). The commencement of the fiveЉyear sunset period will be announced by public notice. УУSee First Report д {OœЅ-дand OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 18469, РР 24. ж д ‡SˆД-дСxСи 33.и Section 20.12(b) of the Commission's rules, which we adopted in the УУFirst Report and д ‡SbД-дOrderФФ, states that "[e]ach carrier subject to this section must permit unrestricted resale of its service" д ‡S<У-дuntil the transition period expires.жL^Ъ<Ж0€д {O’ Д-д УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 20.12(b).Lж We explained in the УУFirst Report and OrderФФ that the rule has two straightforward requirements: (1) no provider may offer like communications services to resellers at less favorable prices, terms, or conditions than are available to other similarly situated customers, absent reasonable justification; and (2) no provider may explicitly ban resale or engage in practices д …SžУ-дthat effectively restrict resale, unless those practices are justified as reasonable.жo_ЪžH0€д {O†Д-д УУФФУУFirst Report and OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 18462Љ63, РР 12.oж It essentially prohibits covered carriers from unreasonably discriminating against resellers. The resale rule does not require providers to structure their operations or offerings in any particular way, such as to promote resale, adopt wholesale/retail business structures, establish a margin for resellers, or guarantee resellers д …Sў У-дa profit.жL`Ъў к0€д {OxД-д УУФФУУId. ФФat 18462, РР 12.Lж д …SЎ Д-дСxСи!34.и УУDiscussion.ФФ PCIA argues that we should not wait until the end of the transition period д ‡S† Д-дestablished in the УУFirst Report and OrderФФ to sunset the CMRS resale rule, but rather should forbear д …S`У-дfrom applying that rule to broadband PCS providers immediately.жGaШ`l 0€д yOlД-д PCIA Petition at 27Љ29.У УФ ФGж Several commenters support PCIA's position, arguing that the Commission should either forbear from enforcing the resale rule or д …SУ-дsignificantly relax the current requirements due to robust competition in CMRS markets.ж}bZќ 0€д {OЌД- Аxд УУSee ФФAT&T Comments at 4Љ5; BANM Comments at 9Љ10; BellSouth Comments at 10Љ11; Nextel Comments д Аxгдat 7; PrimeCo Comments at 3Љ4; SouthEast Comments at 2Љ3; Sprint/APC Comments at 1Љ5; AirTouch Reply д yO>Ѕ-дComments at 3Љ4; BellSouth Reply Comments at 2Љ3; US WEST Reply Comments at 2Љ5УУФФ.}ж We find that the record does not show that the threeЉpronged forbearance test set out in section 10 of the Act д …SРУ-дhas been met.УУФФжPcЪР0€д {O~!Д-д УУФФУУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a).Pж We therefore decline to forbear from enforcing the resale rule with respect to broadband PCS providers at this time. СxСи"35.и The Commission has a long history of encouraging resale and believes it has played an important role in the development of telecommunications markets in the past and may continue to playд" Аcˆ,-(-(ZZbс"д д …SУ-дsuch a role in the future.жdd(0€д {OhД- Аx<д УУSeeФФ Resale and Shared use of Common Carrier Services and Facilities, 60 FCC 2d 261, 263 (1976), УУrecon.ФФ, д {O2Ѕ- Аxhд62 FCC 2d 588 (1977), УУaff'd sub nomФФ. AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), УУcert.deniedФФ, 439 U.S. 875 (1978). УУSee д {OќЅ- АxдalsoФФ Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switched Network services, 83 FCC 2d 167(1980); д {OЦЅ-дУУrecon. deniedФФ, 86 FCC 2d 820 (1981).б#єxў6X@ЩЙ`7ћжbX@#бб#єxў6X@ЩЙ`7ћжbX@#бdж Resellers benefit the marketplace by focusing on residential and smaller business customers, giving them pricing and volume discounts and customer service that д …SАУ-дfacilities-based carriers often make available only to larger customers.жKeЪАИ0€д {OД-д УУSee ФФNWRA comments at 10Љ13.Kж Resellers also exert downward pressure on the rates charged by facilities based providers of CMRS through their ability to purchase wireless service at highЉvolume rates and pass those savings on to residential and small business customers. LowЉvolume consumers benefit from the reseller's lower rates. They also benefit from the reseller's ability to impose market discipline on the facilitiesЉbased provider, which can result in lower prices overall. Moreover, resale expands the opportunities for small businesses to participate in the communications marketplace by focusing on unserved or underserved market segments, such as individual consumers and small businesses in particular ethnic communities, that may not receive д …SpУ-дsufficient marketing attention from underlying CMRS licensees.ж3fЪpJ0€д {OZД-д УУId.ФФ3ж Resellers are able to offer their customers CMRS service packaged with a wide range of other services, including some obtained from other providers, thus enabling resellers to tailor service packages to meet each customer's particular д …Sј У-дmix of needs.ж=gЪј м0€д {OtД-д УУIdФФ. at 10Љ14.=ж Furthermore, resale rules that promote the dissemination of benefits to unserved and underserved communities are directly pertinent to the overarching purpose of serving the needs of "all д …SЈ У-дthe people of the United States," as mandated in section 1 of the Communications Act.ж’hЪЈ n 0€д {OЖД-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C.РР 151, УУsee alsoФФ H.R. Rep. No. 104Љ458, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 104 (1996).’ж СxСи#36.и To some extent, PCIA's arguments for forbearance from enforcing the resale rule simply repeat its arguments with respect to sections 201 and 202; namely, that the criteria in section 10 are met because of the level of competition faced by broadband PCS providers and the growth of д …SИУ-дbroadband PCS service.жKiЪИ 0€д {OXД-д УУSeeФФ PCIA Petition at 29Љ34.Kж We reject these general arguments for the reasons discussed above.жNjЪИ’ 0€д {OъД-д УУSeeФФ Section IV.A, УУsupra.ФФNж Specifically, we have already found that, notwithstanding many promising developments, the competitive development of the market in which broadband PCS providers operate is not yet complete. Moreover, although increased competition brings many benefits to consumers and eliminates the rationale for many regulations, we cannot assume that increased competition alone will protect consumers from unjust or discriminatory practices. Under these circumstances, the evidence does not establish that current market conditions will ensure that providers' practices are just, reasonable, and not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory, and that consumers will not be harmed. д"x$jˆ,-(-(ZZзс"дŒСxСи$37.и In addition to these general contentions, PCIA also makes arguments specifically directed to the current necessity for a resale rule and whether application of that rule to broadband PCS providers serves the public interest. With respect to the first prong of the test, PCIA argues that the resale rule is unnecessary because, given the competitive state of the market, broadband PCS providers have no incentive to engage in unjust or unreasonable resale practices, or to unjustly or unreasonably discriminate against resellers. Indeed, PCIA states, in a competitive environment facilitiesЉbased operators have a natural incentive to promote distribution of their services through the use of д …SшУ-дresellers.ж>kШш0€д yOPД-д PCIA Petition at 31.>ж PCIA asserts that facilitiesЉbased operators are even more likely to rely on resellers where, as is the case with broadband PCS providers, they have extremely high spectrum acquisition and д …S˜У-дoperating costs.ж=lژX0€д {O Д-д УУId.ФФ at 31Љ32.=ж д ‡SH Д-дСxСи%38.и As discussed in the УУFirst Report and OrderФФ, we agree that the operation of competitive market forces removes the opportunity and incentive for carriers to restrict resale in an anticompetitive manner. Thus, the benefits to be obtained through a resale rule generally diminish as markets become д …Sв У-дmore competitive.жm’в ъ0€д {O\Д- АxYд УУFirst Report and Order, ФФ11 FCC Rcd. at 18463, РР 14; УУsee also id.ФФ at 18462, РР 11 ("the benefits to be obtained from a resale rule . . . are most prominent in markets that have not achieved full competition").ж Indeed, this observation underlies the Commission's decision to impose a sunset д …SЊ У-дperiod on the resale rule.жInЪЊ D0€д {OŽД-д УУId.ФФ at 18468Љ69, РР 24.Iж We are not convinced on the present record, however, that existing market conditions impose such discipline on broadband PCS providers, or on other providers subject to the CMRS resale rule.з RESALE з To the contrary, the record contains significant evidence suggesting that despite the д …S2У-дcurrent resale rule, abuses in the form of refusals to offer services for resale still exist.жŠoЪ2ж0€д {OЈД-д УУSee, e.g., ФФNWRA Comments at 19Љ21; One Source Comments at 7Љ9; WorldCom Comments at 12Љ13.Šж For example, WorldCom cites an instance where a carrier's resale program did not include delivery of bills to the д …SтУ-дreseller, thus allegedly impeding any resale agreement.жBpШтh 0€д yOъД-д WorldCom Comments at 13.Bж Touch 1 indicates that it has been presented with reseller rates so complicated that it would be almost impossible to craft a consumer rate plan based on them or to administer such rates in its own billing system, and that such tactics allow facilitiesЉbased carriers to be the first to market promotions and rates to attract the existing base of д …SBУ-дcellular customers.жHqШBј 0€д yOк Д-д Touch 1 Reply Comments at 1Љ2.Hж In addition, two surveys submitted by NWRA and TRA suggest that resellers may be encountering significant difficulties in their negotiations with broadband PCS, cellular and д …SђУ-дSMR carriers.ж rшZђˆ 0€д yO$Д- Аx-д NWRA attached to its comments a survey dated July 1997 that it sent to 91 resellers. Of the 46 wireless д Аxдresellers responding to the survey, 61 percent report that they have been unable to obtain resale arrangements with д Аxxдbroadband PCS carriers within the past year. NWRA Comments at 4, 19, Attachment at 10. Subsequently, TRA д Аxёдsubmitted a survey conducted in January and February 1998 indicating that 88.3% of the respondents that were д Аx—дinterested in reselling PCS had not successfully made arrangements to do so. Letter from Ernest R. Kelly, III,д":'qˆ,-(-(ААq'в"д д {OЅ- АxУдPresident, TRA, to William Kennard, Chairman, FCC, dated Feb. 10, 1998, at 1, Attachment at 3; УУsee alsoФФ Letter д Аx†дfrom Ernest B. Kelly, III, President, TRA, to William Kennard, Chairman, FCC, dated March 24, 1998, Attachment A (March 24, 1998 TRA Letter). ж While we cannot conclude from this record that all of these alleged practices areд"ђъrˆ,-(-(ZZC№"д д …SУ-дunreasonable, these allegations, which have not been effectively refuted,ж9sВъ0€д yOŠД- Аxсд PCIA asserts that the TRA survey results do not preclude the possibility that carriers are not offering resale д АxKдagreements for legitimate reasons contemplated by the resale rule, or that they are simply not offering specially д Аx;дfavorable arrangements for resellers. Letter from Jay Kitchen, President, PCIA, to William E. Kennard, Chairman, д Аx;дFCC, dated March 11, 1998, at 1Љ2. NWRA argues, however, that not offering a resale agreement is tantamount to д {OЊЅ- Аxтдrefusing a request for resale. March 24, 1998 TRA Letter at 1Љ2; УУsee also id.ФФ, Attachment A (addressing PCIA allegations that NWRA survey results are internally inconsistent and statistically do not support TRA's claims).9ж support our conclusion that the resale rule has not been shown unnecessary to ensure that rates and practices are just, reasonable, д …SАУ-дand nonЉdiscriminatory.жMtЪАd 0€д {OД Д-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(1).Mж We note that although the Commission has received few formal complaints д …SˆУ-дabout CMRS providers' failure to permit unrestricted resale of their services,жuˆі 0€д {OД- АxJд УУSee Discount Business Services, Inc. v. Ameritech Mobile Phone Service of ChicagoФФ, File No. WB/ENFЉFЉ97Њд Аx[д010 (filed Mar. 28, 1997) (alleging carrier denied reseller of prepaid service timely access to billing and usage д {OАЅ- Аxсдinformation); УУNational Wireless Resellers Association v. AirTouch CellularФФ, File No. WB/ENFЉFЉ97Љ012 (filed June д {OzЅ- Аxˆд3, 1997) (alleging defendant improperly offers lower rates to resellers that primarily use its services); УУCellexis д {ODЅ- Аx‡дInternational, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic NYNEX Mobile, Inc.ФФ, File Nos. WB/ENFЉFЉ97Љ001, УУet al.ФФ (filed Dec. 20, 1996) д {OЅ- Аx{д(alleging defendants improperly attempted to terminate agreement with switchЉbased reseller); УУCellnet д {OиЅ- АxсдCommunications, Inc. v. New Par, Inc.ФФ, File No. WB/ENFЉFЉENFЉ95Љ010 (filed Feb. 16, 1995) (alleging improper д {OЂЅ- АxNдdenial of agreement with switchЉbased reseller); УУNationwide Cellular Service, Inc. v. Comcast Cellular д {OlЅ-дCommunications, Inc.ФФ, File No. WB/ENFЉFЉENFЉ95Љ011 (filed Feb. 16, 1995) (similar).У УФ Фж we will vigorously д …S`У-дinvestigate any complaints that we receive and take appropriate enforcement action.жіv"`ж0€д {OжД- АxУд УУSeeФФ Letter from Gary P. Schonman, Chief, Compliance and Litigation Branch, Enforcement and Consumer д АxдProtection Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, to Robert S. Foosaner, Vice President and Chief д АxўдRegulatory Officer, Nextel Communications, Inc., File No. WB/ENFЉIЉ98Љ1132 (May 29, 1998) (commencing inquiry under section 308(b) of the Act into possible violations of the resale rule by Nextel).іж д …SД-дСxСи&39.и We also find that PCIA's petition does not satisfy the second prong of the forbearance test. PCIA argues that the resale rule is not necessary to protect consumers because the competitive д …SРУ-дmarketplace will ensure the efficient availability of resale, with its attendant consumer benefits.жAwШРР0€д yO Д-д PCIA Petition at 34Љ36.Aж We reject this contention because, as we have discussed, the record does not show that current market д …SpУ-дconditions can effectively prevent unreasonable resale practices.жJxЪpP0€д {O`"Д-д УУSeeФФ para. 39, УУsupraФФ.Jж In this regard, we emphasize that unrestricted resale promises many benefits to consumers, especially in markets where direct competition among underlying providers remains somewhat limited. With more retail competitors, consumers benefit from alternative choices and higher quality services as carriers vie for customers. As many commenters note, the unrestricted availability of resale helps ensure that consumers will haveд"а тxˆ,-(-(ZZЈ с"д д …SУ-дaccess to favorable rates and innovative service offerings.жTyZ0€д {OhД- Аx†д УУSeeФФ America One Comments at 5Љ10; Cellnet Comments at 5Љ7; CompTel Comments at 1Љ6; MCI Comments д Аx дat 3Љ4; NWRA Comments at 11Љ16; TRA Comments at 2Љ4; WorldCom Comments at 3Љ10; NWRA Reply Comments at 1Љ4; TRA Reply Comments at 6; Touch 1 Reply Comments at 1Љ2.Tж For example, Cellnet argues that wireless resellers' ability to buy in bulk from facilitiesЉbased carriers allows individual consumers to obtain the д …SАУ-дsame rate as a Fortune 500 company.жgzЪАъ0€д {O:Д-д Cellnet Comments at 7; УУsee alsoФФ WorldCom Comments at 8.gж WorldCom argues that resellers compete in areas such as product design, customer support, billing detail, and pricing, thereby providing to consumers a broader д …S`У-дrange of service offerings tailored to the needs of different users.жA{Ш`|0€д yO| Д-д WorldCom Comments at 9.Aж In addition, resale allows providers of other telecommunications services that may not have CMRS licenses to offer bundled packages of services, including CMRS, for the benefit of consumers who prefer "one stop д …SшУ-дshopping."жЄ|’ш 0€д {O”Д- АxЄд УУSeeФФ NWRA Comments at 3; WorldCom Comments at 4, 9, and Attachment A (Affidavit of James Wolfinger) at 2.Єж д …S˜Д-дСxСи'40.и In addition to finding that the first two prongs of the forbearance test are not satisfied, we conclude that the record does not show forbearance from enforcement of the resale rule to be in the public interest. In particular, we find that continued enforcement of the resale rule is important to promote the rapid development of vigorous competition in the market in which broadband PCS д …Sј У-дproviders compete.жф}’ј f 0€д {OўД- АxJд УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 160(b) (directing the Commission to consider whether forbearance will promote competitive market conditions as part of its public interest analysis).фж One of our major reasons for adopting the CMRS resale rule in 1996 was to speed the development of competition in the mass market for twoЉway switched mobile voice services д …SЈ У-дby permitting new entrants to begin offering service to the public before building out their facilities.ж~ЪЈ Р 0€д {OД-д УУSee First Report and OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 18462, РР 10; УУsee also id. ФФat 18470, РР 27.ж This capability, we reasoned, would help new entrants to overcome the advantages enjoyed by two types of earlier entrants. First, all new entrants, including broadband PCS providers, would be competing directly with cellular firms that in many instances had been in the market for a decade or д …SУ-дmore, and therefore enjoyed substantial advantages of incumbency.жFЪR 0€д {OњД-д УУId.ФФ at 18465, РР 17.Fж Second, we observed that even among broadband PCS providers, the earliest licensed entrant in a geographic market might receive its д …SИУ-дlicense and begin operating substantially before its last competitors.жI€ЪИф0€д {O<"Д-д УУId.ФФ at 18465Љ66, РР 18.Iж In this regard, we note that the A and B block licensees in some areas will have a licensing headstart of three years or more over д …ShУ-дsome of their competitors.ж`Xhv0€д yO~%Д- Аxд The earliest broadband PCS licenses were awarded to three holders of pioneer's preferences on December д АxЅд13, 1994, and the remaining A and B block licenses were awarded on June 23, 1995. In some geographic areas, at least one of the remaining licenses still has not been awarded.`ж We continue to believe that resale opportunities will help later entrantsд"h–ˆ,-(-(ZZЏ№"д to overcome their competitors' advantages by entering the market through resale before their facilities д …SиУ-дare built out, and we find nothing in the record to contradict this conclusion.жv‚Ъи0€д {O@Д-д УУSeeФФ WorldCom Comments at 8Љ9 (noting value of resale to new entrants).vж д …SˆД-дСxСи(41.и У УФ ФThe resale rule also promotes competition in ways other than facilitating the early entry of new licensees. In a market that has not achieved sufficient competition, an active resale market can help to replicate many of the features of competition, including spurring innovation and discouraging unreasonably discriminatory practices, by increasing the number of entities offering service at the retail д …SшУ-дlevel.жjƒЪшZ0€д {Oт Д-д УУSee First Report and OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 18462, РР 11.jж In addition, the availability of resale permits more entities to offer packages containing a variety of services including CMRS, thereby increasing competition in the market for multipleЉservice д …S˜У-дpackages.жa„Ъ˜ь0€д {O$ Д-д УУSeeФФ NWRA Comments at 8; WorldCom Comments at 7Љ9.aж Resale may also be used as an entry strategy by small entities that may aspire to offer facilitiesЉbased services in the future. СxСи)42.и In opposition to these procompetitive public interest benefits, PCIA argues that the CMRS д …Sј У-дresale rule harms the public interest by imposing costs of compliance on broadband PCS providers.жA…Шј ~0€д yOД-д PCIA Petition at 36Љ37.Aж д ‡Sа Д-дWhile PCIA makes no attempt to quantify these costs, we did acknowledge in the УУFirst Report and д ‡SЊ Д-дOrder ФФthat, as with all regulation, there are costs associated with resale compliance which should not д …S„ У-дbe imposed unless clearly warranted.жf†Ъ„ 0€д {O2Д-д УУFirst Report and OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 18463, РР 14.fж We concluded, however, that as applied to cellular, broadband д …S\У-дPCS, and covered SMR providers, these costs were outweighed by the benefits of the resale rule.жT‡Ъ\ 0€д {OœД-д УУSee id. ФФat 18464Љ67, РРРР 15Љ20.Tж Nothing in the present record persuades us to reevaluate this conclusion. As we have noted, the resale rule only proscribes policies that restrict resale or discriminate against resellers without reasonable justification, and does not require carriers affirmatively to structure their businesses to promote д …SМУ-дresale.жмˆ’М2 0€д {OŽД- Аx,д УУId.ФФ at 18462, РР 12. УУCompareФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 251(c)(4)(A) (requiring incumbent local exchange carriers to offer services for resale at wholesale rates).мж Moreover, we previously determined to sunset the resale rule five years after we award the д …S”У-дlast group of initial licenses for currently allocated broadband PCS spectrum.жL‰Ъ”Œ 0€д {OР Д-д УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 20.12(b).Lж In light of these limitations, and in the absence of specific evidence to the contrary, we cannot conclude that the administrative costs imposed by the resale rule outweigh the benefits of the rule. In addition, we are not persuaded that the obligation to permit resale significantly discourages facilitiesЉbased carriers from д ‡SєУ-дinnovating in a market that has not achieved sufficient competition.жHŠЪє0€д {OВ%Д-д УУSee ФФPCIA Petition at 34.Hж As we observed in the УУFirst д ‡SЮД-дReport and OrderФФ, the resale rule does not prevent a provider from recovering its costs incurred inд"ЮАŠˆ,-(-(ZZBс"д providing a service, including the costs of developing any underlying technology, or from inserting in д …SиУ-дits sales agreements appropriate, nonЉdiscriminatory terms to protect its interests.жf‹Ъи0€д {O@Д-д УУFirst Report and OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 18472, РР 32.fж Under these circumstances, it is not clear how the rule would operate as a disincentive to innovation. СxСи*43.и Furthermore, even assuming that forbearance from enforcing the resale rule would confer certain public interest benefits, forbearance would also impose costs. If we were to forbear from enforcing the rule only as applied to broadband PCS providers, we would create a regulatory asymmetry between those providers and their cellular and covered SMR competitors. As discussed above, this result could distort the working of market forces, and contradict clear Congressional д …S˜У-дintent.жJŒЪ˜Z0€д {O’ Д-д УУSeeФФ para. 32, УУsupraФФ.Jж If, however, we were to forbear with respect to all CMRS providers, we would further exacerbate the competitive advantage enjoyed by the cellular incumbents. СxСи+44.и In sum, the record does not show that the three statutory conditions for forbearance from enforcement of the resale rule are satisfied. We therefore conclude at this time that we should continue enforcing the resale rule against all covered providers until the scheduled sunset date five д …SЈ У-дyears after we award the last group of initial broadband PCS licenses.жXZЈ ь0€д yO4Д- Аxвд We note that our decision to sunset the resale rule has been challenged both in petitions for reconsideration д {OќЅ- Аxџдand in a judicial appeal. УУSeeФФ n. 87, УУsupraФФ. Nothing in this Order is intended to foreclose our reconsideration of the sunset decision.Xж We recognize, however, that market conditions or other developments may justify termination of the resale rule, as applied to some or all covered providers, before that time. In particular, conditions in some geographic markets may д …S0У-дsupport forbearance at the same time as the rule is still needed in other locations.жšŽЪ00€д {OоД-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a) (Commission may exercise forbearance "in any or some . . . geographic markets").šж In evaluating future petitions, we will consider the state of facilitiesЉbased competition, the extent of resale activity within the relevant market, the immediate prospects for future development of additional facilitiesЊbased competition, the value of service to previously unserved or underserved markets, and other factors relevant to determining whether the requirements of section 10 would be satisfied by the д …ShУ-дgranting of such a petition.жQxh 0€д yOЈД-  /дСxСWhile not exhaustive, we believe consideration of these factors will provide a more comprehensive view д АxJдof conditions within a given geographic market than focusing on a single factor, such as the number of competitors. д АxдIn this sense, we disagree with our dissenting colleagues, Commissioners Powell and FurchtgottЉRoth, that other д Аxhдindicia of market conditions are not needed. We believe it would be an abdication of our responsibility under section д АxГд10 to ignore information indicative of whether the three prongs of the section 10 forbearance standard, including the д Аxwдprongs mandating consideration of consumer protection issues and the public interest, is met for a particular market. Qж In order to resolve such petitions in an expeditious fashion, we will place those petitions promptly on public notice and we will establish expedited pleading cycles. We will make every effort to resolve such petitions substantially in advance of the statutory deadline for forbearance petitions. д"Шрˆ,-(-(ZZс"дŒд …SД-дСxСУ УззХˆХC. International Section 214 AuthorizationsФ Фзз СxСи,45.и ХˆХPCIA asks us to forbear from the international section 214 facilities authorization requirement as it applies to broadband PCS providers. Pursuant to section 214, we require carriers to obtain separate Commission authorizations to provide international telecommunications service, whether by acquiring facilities or by reselling the international services of another carrier. International section 214 authorizations are filed according to section 63.18 of the Commission's rules and processed pursuant to section 63.12. д ‡S˜Д-дСxСи-46.и In the УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, we exercised the authority granted to the Commission under section 332(c) to forbear from applying section 214 requirements to CMRS д …SJ У-дproviders in the domestic context.жnЪJ 0€д {OВ Д-д УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1480Љ81, РР 182.nж We declined at that time to consider forbearing from application д …S" У-дof section 214 to CMRS providers' international services.жe‘Ъ" Z0€д {OД-д УУSeeФФ УУid.ФФ at 1481 n.369; 47 C.F.R. РР 20.15(d).eж Thus, all CMRS providers are currently required to obtain section 214 authorization before providing international service. СxСи.47.и PCIA argues that the section 214 authorization requirement is unnecessary because of the highly competitive market conditions in the wireless industry. According to PCIA, broadband PCS providers offering international message telephone service (IMTS) as facilitiesЉbased carriers lack any incentive to act in an anticompetitive manner because they are new entrants that lack control of д …S У-дbottleneck facilities.жA’Ш ь0€д yO–Д-д PCIA Petition at 52Љ53.Aж For broadband PCS providers offering IMTS through resale, PCIA argues, the case for forbearance is even stronger because the Commission has determined that U.S. international д …SКУ-дresellers pose no anticompetitive concerns.жџ“”К|0€д {OжД- АxKд УУId.ФФ at 53Љ54 (citing Regulation of International Common Carrier Services, УУReport and OrderФФ, 7 FCC Rcd. д {O Ѕ-д7331, 7335, РРРР 31Љ32 (1992) (УУInternational ServicesФФ)).џж Thus, PCIA argues, the section 214 authorization requirement is unnecessary to ensure just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates or to protect consumers. Forbearance would serve the public interest, PCIA claims, by reducing the regulatory delay and costs associated with the application process. The delay while an application is being processed is unnecessary, PCIA argues, because there is little opportunity for broadband PCS providers д …SђУ-дto engage in anticompetitive conduct.жA”Шђи0€д yOjД-д PCIA Petition at 56Љ58.Aж СxСи/48.и For the reasons discussed below, we find that it is necessary to continue to require that international services be provided only pursuant to an authorization that can be conditioned or revoked. We therefore conclude, based on the record generated in this proceeding, that the section 10 forbearance standard for the international section 214 authorization requirement has not been satisfied. As part of our 1998 biennial review, however, we are considering what steps can be taken to minimize regulatory burdens on international carriers, including PCS providers. We believe that at the conclusion of this review, many of PCIA's concerns with the section 214 authorization process will have been addressed.д"Šh ”ˆ,-(-(ZZс"дŒ™СxСи049.и With the conclusion of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Basic Telecommunications Agreement, we expect to see a shift away from monopoly provision of foreign telecommunications services and toward competition and open entry in WTO member countries. Nonetheless, many foreign markets will continue to be served by monopoly or dominant providers of services or facilities that are necessary for the provision of U.S. international service. Even in countries where liberalization is occurring, carriers may continue for some time to possess market power in foreign termination services. Our regulation of international common carrier services has historically focused on ensuring that all U.S. carriers have fair and nondiscriminatory access to foreign termination services д …SРУ-дthat are necessary for the provision of U.S. international service.жl•ЪР0€д {O( Д-д УУSee generallyФФ УУInternational ServicesФФ, 7 FCC Rcd. 7331.lж Applicants for international section 214 authority that are affiliated with foreign carriers present the greatest regulatory concern because the foreign carrier affiliate may have the ability and incentive to discriminate against unaffiliated U.S. carriers in terminating U.S. traffic. However, we also regulate all U.S. carriers' dealings with foreign carriers to ensure that no carrier is able to acquire an anticompetitive advantage along any particular д …Sј У-дU.S. international route.жЙ–^ј Z0€д {OђД- Аxд УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 63.14 (prohibition on agreeing to accept special concessions); Rules and Policies on Foreign д {OМЅ- АxўдParticipation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market, УУReport and Order and Order on ReconsiderationФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. д {O†Ѕ-д23891, 23955Љ65, РРРР 150Љ170 (1997) (УУForeign Participation OrderФФ), УУrecon. pendingФФ.Йж д …SЈ Д-дСxСи150.и The section 214 authorization requirement serves several purposes. It enables the Commission to screen applications for risks to competition and to deny or condition authorizations as appropriate. The review process also includes consultation with Executive Branch agencies on national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade concerns that may be unique to the д …SУ-дprovision of international services.ж—Ъ€0€д {O(Д-д УУSeeФФ УУForeign Participation OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23918Љ21, РРРР 59Љ66.ж The section 214 authorization requirement also helps us monitor competitive conditions along U.S. international routes as well as each carrier's compliance with our rules and policies governing the provision of international services. Authorized carriers are required to file annual reports of their traffic and revenue, and facilitiesЉbased carriers must file annual circuit status reports. We also condition the authorization of every foreignЉaffiliated facilitiesЉbased carrier on its affiliate's having in effect a settlement rate with U.S. carriers that is at or below the Commission's д …SУ-дbenchmark rate.様”0€д {OЪД- Аxд УУSeeФФ International Settlement Rates, УУReport and OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806, 19897Љ912, РРРР 195Љ231 (1997) д {O”Ѕ-д(УУBenchmarks OrderФФ), УУrecon. and appeals pendingФФ.§ж Carriers regulated as dominant along a particular route due to an affiliation with a foreign carrier that has market power are additionally required to file quarterly reports of their traffic д …SШУ-дand revenue,жС™ Шn 0€д yOж!Д- Аx,д Omnipoint asks, in its comments in this proceeding, that we forbear from enforcing the international traffic д Аx–дand revenue reporting requirements of section 43.61 of our rules with respect to CMRS providers. This request is д АxГдnot properly before us in this proceeding. Nevertheless, we anticipate reviewing this and other requirements in future proceedings.Сж circuit status, and provisioning and maintenance of circuits on the affiliated route. So that we can continue to monitor foreign affiliations, we also require carriers to notify the Commissionд" V ™ˆ,-(-(ZZчс"д д …SУ-д(and, in some cases, to seek prior approval) of new affiliations with foreign carriers.жIšЪ0€д {OhД-д УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 63.11.Iж We developed these requirements very recently as narrowly tailored safeguards against the leveraging of foreign д …SАУ-дmarket power to the detriment of U.S. consumers.ж›ЪАZ0€д {OЊД-д УУSeeФФ УУForeign Participation OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23950Љ54, РРРР 143Љ149.ж The section 214 authorization requirement is important to the Commission's efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with its safeguards, and it also serves to inform small carriers of their special obligations as providers of international service. д …SД-дСxСи251.и We have noted that domestic wireless markets are becoming increasingly competitive, д …SшУ-дalthough competition remains limited in some respects.жsœЪшь0€д {Ot Д-д УУSeeФФ УУФФparas. зCMRSCOMPETBEGIN21зУУФФЉ23, УУsupra.ФФsж Nonetheless, we are unable to conclude on this record that forbearance from the section 214 authorization requirement would be consistent with the public interest as required under the section 10 standard. PCIA's petition does not address the leveraging of foreign market power by foreignЉaffiliated carriers except to assert that "as new entrants into the international telecommunication market, broadband PCS providers are without international д …S У-дmarket power and, therefore, lack the ability to engage in unjust or unreasonable practices."ж>Ш ~0€д yO>Д-д PCIA Petition at 54.>ж In its reply comments, PCIA argues that "this hypothetical situation is completely speculative, particularly given the small share of international services attributed to CMRS providers," and that there is no д …SЈ У-дevidence that such a situation exists.жDžШЈ 0€д yOVД-д PCIA Reply Comments at 29.Dж On the contrary, we are concerned that a broadband PCS provider, like any other carrier of international traffic that competes against other international carriers, could acquire an affiliation with a foreign carrier that has market power and that the foreign affiliate would then have the ability and incentive to discriminate against unaffiliated U.S. international carriers on the affiliated route. Indeed, a number of wireless carriers already have relationships with foreign carriers, and we anticipate that, as a result of the recent World Trade Organization agreement to liberalize telecommunications markets, these relationships will become even more common. This is a time of great change in international telecommunications markets, when many markets are characterized by asymmetrical market power that can have anticompetitive effects and harm U.S. consumers. In the absence of a section 214 authorization requirement, we might be unable to monitor foreign affiliations and compliance with our safeguards or to bring enforcement action against a carrier for failure to adhere to our international rules and policies. СxСи352.и We thus continue to have a need to impose certain conditions on all international section 214 authorizations, and in particular cases to impose dominant carrier regulation. We also cannot yet д …SPУ-дrule out the possibility of a need to impose other conditions on particular authorizations.жŸЪPž0€д {OŽ#Д-д УУSeeФФ УУForeign Participation OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23912Љ16, РРРР 51Љ58.ж We therefore must continue to require that international service be provided only pursuant to an authorization that can be conditioned or revoked if necessary to ensure that rates and conditions ofд"0 Ÿˆ,-(-(ZZzс"д д …SУ-дservice are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory and to protect consumers.жH Z0€д {OhД- Аxwд See УУid.ФФ at 24022Љ23, РРРР 293Љ296, for a discussion of the need to investigate allegations that a violation of our д АxЅдrules has occurred and of our authority to enforce our safeguards to prevent harm to competition or consumers in the U.S. market.Hж We may also need to review (in consultation with Executive Branch agencies) any given carrier's international section 214 authorization for national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade concerns. д …S`Д-дСxСи453.и PCIA's argument that forbearance would serve the public interest is unpersuasive in light of the above considerations. The great majority of international section 214 applications are granted through a streamlined process under which the applicant may commence service on the 36th day after public notice of its application. Applications that are opposed or that the Commission deems д …SРУ-дunsuitable for streamlined processing are generally disposed of within 90 days.жIЁЪРъ0€д {OJ Д-д УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 63.12.Iж This delay is not so great a burden as to outweigh the needs described above. д …SH Д-дСxСи554.и For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the record does not show that it would be consistent with the public interest to forbear from the international section 214 authorization requirement. Therefore, the third prong of the forbearance standard is not met. Because the third prong of the standard is not satisfied, we cannot grant the forbearance PCIA seeks, and we need not address the first two prongs. д …SXД-дСxСУ УззХˆХD. International Tariffing RequirementsззФ Ф СxСи655.иХˆХ PCIA next asks us to forbear from imposing on broadband PCS carriers the requirement д ‡SрД-дof filing tariffs for their international services. In the УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, we exercised our forbearance authority under section 332(c) to forbear from requiring or permitting tariffs for д …S’У-дinterstate service offered directly by CMRS providers to their customers.жuЂЪ’|0€д {OЎД-д УУSeeФФ УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1480, РР 179.uж We did not address the tariffing obligations as they apply to international services. СxСи756.и We conclude, based on this record, that the section 10 standard is met for forbearance from the international tariffing requirement for CMRS providers that offer international service directly to their customers for international routes where they are not affiliated with any carrier that terminates U.S. international traffic and collects settlement payments from U.S. carriers. Thus, we will forbear from the mandatory tariffing requirement and adopt permissive detariffing of international services to д …SRУ-дunaffiliated pointsжwЃКR0€д {O"Д- Аxгд We use the term УУaffiliated routeФФ or УУaffiliated pointФФ in this order to refer to an authorized CMRS carrier's д Аxjдprovision of international service to a destination where a carrier that is affiliated with the authorized carrier д {O’#Ѕ- Аxдterminates U.S. international traffic and collects settlement payments from U.S. carriers. УУUnaffiliated routeФФ or д {O\$Ѕ- Аx†дУУunaffiliated pointФФ refers to an authorized carrier's provision of service to an international destination where it has no д {O&%Ѕ- Аxџдsuch affiliated foreign carrier. The existence of an affiliation is determined by the definition of УУaffiliationФФ found in д {O№%Ѕ-дSection 63.18(h)(1)(i) of the Commission's rules. УУSeeФФ УУФФn.172, УУinfraФФ.wж for CMRS providers. д"* Ѓˆ,-(-(ZZ{с"дŒСxСи857.и Under the first criterion for forbearance under section 10, we must determine that mandatory tariff filing requirements are unnecessary to ensure that charges, practices, classifications, or д …SАУ-дregulations are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory.жCЄША0€д yOД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(1).Cж In the domestic context, we have determined that tariffing is not necessary to ensure reasonable rates for д ‡S`У-дcarriers that lack market power.жКЅ’`X0€д {OXД- АxДд УУSee CAP Forbearance OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 8608, РР 23; УУIXC Forbearance OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. at 20742Њ47, РРРР 21Љ28.Кж In the УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, we found that competition in the CMRS market for domestic services will lead to reasonable rates and that enforcement of the д …SУ-дtariffing requirement is therefore not necessary.жvІЪВ0€д {Od Д-д УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1478Љ79, РРРР 174Љ175.vж In the absence of an affiliation with a foreign carrier, the same considerations apply in the CMRS market for international services. The CMRS market is sufficiently competitive that there is no reason to regulate any CMRS carrier as dominant on an international route for any reason other than an affiliation with a foreign carrier. Therefore, we conclude that tariffs are not necessary to ensure that unaffiliated CMRS providers' charges, practices, classifications, or regulations for international services are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory. СxСи958.и Under the second statutory criterion for forbearance, we must determine that mandatory tariff filing requirements for CMRS providers serving unaffiliated international routes are unnecessary д …S‚ У-дto protect consumers.жCЇШ‚ D0€д yOfД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(2).Cж As explained above, tariffs are not necessary to ensure that rates are just and reasonable. Therefore, tariffs are also not necessary to protect consumers. Accordingly, the second д …S2У-дcriterion is met.жqЈЪ2д0€д {OІД-д УУCf.ФФ УУCAP Forbearance OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 8609Љ10, РР 26.qж СxСи:59.и Under the third criterion, we must determine that permissive detariffing of CMRS д …SКУ-дproviders serving unaffiliated international routes is consistent with the public interest.жCЉШКf 0€д yOРД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(3).Cж Permissive detariffing reduces transaction costs for service providers and reduces administrative burdens on service providers and the Commission. Thus, carriers that choose not to file tariffs would not need to undertake the time and expense of preparing and filing tariffs, and the Commission would not incur the administrative burden of reviewing them. Section 10(b) requires the Commission, in determining whether forbearance would be consistent with the public interest, to consider whether forbearance д …SЪУ-дwould promote competitive market conditions.ж@ЊШЪі 0€д yO`#Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(b).@ж We believe that permissive detariffing would enable carriers to avoid impediments that mandatory tariffing might impose on a carrier's ability to introduce services because of the time and expense of preparing and filing tariffs. Thus, detariffing should lower the cost of entry into the international services market by CMRS providers. Further, as Omnipointд"R† Њˆ,-(-(ZZЧс"д д …SУ-дargues,жNЋЪ0€д {OhД-д УУSeeФФ Omnipoint Comments at 2Љ4.Nж permissive detariffing would facilitate the provision of international service by CMRS providers by not requiring that they disclose their prices to competitors and would enable carriers that offer international services directly to their customers to enjoy the benefits of our earlier decision to prohibit tariffs for domestic CMRS services. These considerations outweigh any public interest benefit of requiring CMRS providers to file tariffs for the provision of international service on unaffiliated routes. Accordingly, зMANDDETARIFзwe conclude that permissive detariffing, in contrast to mandatory tariffing, would be consistent with the public interest by reducing administrative burdens on carriers and on the Commission, promoting competitive market conditions, facilitating provision of new service offerings, and promoting market entry. Thus, permissive detariffing will also further the goal of the 1996 Act to "promote competition and reduce regulation . . . to secure lower prices and higher quality service for American telecommunication consumers and encourage the rapid development of new д …SH У-дtelecommunications technologies."жЌШH Z0€д yOB Д-д Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, S. Conf. Rep. No. 104Љ230, at 1 (1996).ж СxСи;60.и We are unable to find, however, that it would be consistent with the public interest to adopt permissive detariffing for CMRS providers serving international routes where the carrier is д …SЈ У-дaffiliatedж­. Ј ъ0€д {O2Д- Аxсд For the purposes of our regulation of international telecommunications in Part 63 of our rules, УУaffiliationФФ is д АxУдdefined to include (1) a greater than 25 percent ownership of capital stock, or controlling interest at any level, by д Аxбдthe carrier, or by any entity that directly or indirectly controls or is controlled by it, or that is under direct or indirect д Аx;дcommon control with it, in a foreign carrier or in any entity that directly or indirectly controls a foreign carrier; or д Аx д(2) a greater than 25 percent ownership of capital stock, or controlling interest at any level, in the carrier by a foreign д АxГдcarrier, or by any entity that directly or indirectly controls or is controlled by a foreign carrier, or that is under direct д Аxдor indirect common control with a foreign carrier; or by two or more foreign carriers investing in the carrier in the д Аxwдsame manner in circumstances where the foreign carriers are parties to, or the beneficiaries of, a contractual relation д Аxжд(e.g., a joint venture or market alliance) affecting the provision or marketing of basic international д АxKдtelecommunications services in the United States. A U.S. carrier also is considered to be affiliated with a foreign д АxJдcarrier where the foreign carrier controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with a second foreign carrier д {OЬЅ- АxЕдthat is affiliated with that U.S. carrier under this definition. УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 63.18(h)(1)(i)з AFFILDEF з; УУsee alsoФФ 47 C.F.R. д {O–Ѕ-дРР 63.18(h)(1)(ii) (defining УУforeign carrierФФ).ж with a foreign carrier that terminates U.S. international traffic. Currently, our ability to detect and deter certain kinds of anticompetitive pricing practices on affiliated routes depends on the availability of tariffed rates on those routes. When an international carrier serves an affiliated route, the carrier and its affiliate may have the ability and incentive to engage in anticompetitive pricing д ‡SД-дbehavior that can harm competition and consumers in the U.S. market. In our УУBenchmarks OrderФФ, we д …SтУ-дfound that there is a danger of anticompetitive price squeeze behaviorжРЎ~тр0€д {Ob!Д- Аx†д A УУprice squeezeФФ refers to a particular, wellЉdefined strategy of predation that would involve the foreign carrier д АxKдsetting "high" (aboveЉcost) international settlement rates while its U.S. affiliate offers "low" prices for domestic д Аxдinternational message telephone service ("IMTS") in competition with other carriers. Because the foreign carrier's д АxГдinternational termination services are a necessary input for providing IMTS, the foreign carrier can create a situation д Аxядwhere the relationship between its "high" international settlement rates and its affiliate's "low" prices for IMTS forces д {OL%Ѕ- Аx,дcompeting carriers either to lose money or to lose customers even if they are more efficient than the affiliate. УУSeeФФ д {O&Ѕ-дУУBenchmarks OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19901, РР 208.Рж by U.S. facilitiesЉbased carriers on affiliated routes and adopted a trigger to determine when market distortion has occurred asд"К&Ўˆ,-(-(ZZБс"д a result of a carrier's provision of international service on an affiliated route. We established a rebuttable presumption that a U.S. facilitiesЉbased international carrier has engaged in anticompetitive price squeeze behavior when any of the carrier's tariffed collection rates on an affiliated route is less д …SˆУ-дthan the carrier's average variable costs on that route.ж'Џ”ˆ0€д {O№Д- АxZд УУSeeФФ УУid.ФФ at 19908, РР 224. For purposes of that brightЉline test, we defined a carrier's average variable costs д {OКЅ-дon a route as its net settlement rate plus any originating access charges. УУSeeФФ УУid.ФФ'ж If tariffs were not available, we would need to rely on another mechanism for detecting, as well as deterring, price squeezes by facilitiesЉbased д …S8У-дcarriers on affiliated routes.жeАZ8$0€д {OќД- Аxрд УУSeeФФ УУForeign Participation OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 24000, РР 244 ("To the extent that a foreignЉaffiliated carrier д Аxiдhas the ability to engage in a predatory price squeeze, we find that the existence of a tariff filing requirement . . . will serve to deter such behavior.").eж When we examined the potential for price squeeze behavior by д ‡SД-дaffiliated switched resellers in the УУForeign Participation OrderФФ, we did not find the same danger of anticompetitive price squeeze behavior as in the case of affiliated facilitiesЉbased carriers. We stated nonetheless that we would monitor the switched resale market carefully for evidence of anticompetitive д …SšУ-дbehavior.жQБЪšF0€д {O€Д-д УУSeeФФ УУid.ФФ at 23986, РР 214.Qж The record in this proceeding does not address the extent to which other sources of pricing information are sufficiently available to permit the Commission and interested parties to detect price squeeze behavior by foreignЉaffiliated carriers in a timely manner. Nevertheless, we anticipate examining this and other issues in a subsequent proceeding. We will also continue to review our rules as market conditions change in the international context to ensure that our regulations are no more burdensome than necessary. СxСи<61.и Price squeeze behavior on affiliated routes can have anticompetitive effects that are inconsistent with competitive market conditions, and our enforcement of our rules and policies against such behavior currently depends on the availability of tariffed rates on affiliated routes. We therefore conclude that the third prong of the forbearance standard, that forbearance would be consistent with the public interest, is not met for any CMRS provider providing international service to a destination market in which it is affiliated with a foreign carrier that terminates U.S. international traffic and collects settlement payments from U.S. carriers. Because the third prong of the forbearance standard is not satisfied for affiliated routes, we cannot forbear in those circumstances, and we need not address the first two prongs. СxСи=62.и We next address our decision to forbear from applying the international tariffing requirement on unaffiliated routes to all CMRS providers despite the fact that PCIA's petition seeks forbearance only for broadband PCS providers. No party in this proceeding argues that broadband PCS providers should be treated differently from other CMRS providers as a matter of sound policy. д …SRУ-дMany commenters argue that forbearance is warranted for all CMRS providers,жВZRи0€д {OЪ"Д- АxZд УУSee, e.g.ФФ, AMTA Comments at 5; CTIA Comments at 2Љ3; Nextel Comments at 4; RTG Comments at 5. д Аx–дPCIA acknowledges these comments and supports extending forbearance to all CMRS providers to the extent the Commission finds that the section 10 forbearance standard is satisfied. PCIA Reply Comments at 3Љ4.ж and several argueд"Rњ Вˆ,-(-(ZZ‹№"д д …SУ-дthat forbearance is appropriate for broadband PCS only if it applies to all CMRS providers.жQГ\0€д {OhД- Аx†д УУSeeФФУУФФ AMTA Reply Comments at 2 (stating that all parties that addressed the appropriate scope of forbearance д {O2Ѕ- АxТдagreed that any forbearance should apply to the entire CMRS industry); УУe.g.ФФ, AT&T Wireless Comments at 1Љ2; RTG Comments at 5.Qж We agree that the same considerations apply to all CMRS providers, regardless of whether they are broadband PCS licensees. We have previously described the need to regulate all CMRS providers д …SˆУ-дsimilarly.жќД’ˆь0€д {OД- АxKд УУSeeФФ УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1418, РР 13 (finding that Congress intended to ensure that similar mobile services would be subject to consistent regulatory treatment).ќж Forbearance from a tariffing requirement for broadband PCS licensees but not for other CMRS licensees would disturb this regulatory neutrality by giving broadband PCS licensees an unfair and unwarranted advantage over their competitors. д …SшД-дСxСи>63.и If we could not extend forbearance to all CMRS providers, we would not be able to grant the forbearance that PCIA seeks, because we would not find that the public interest would be served by granting forbearance that would create a disparity in regulatory treatment among like CMRS services. Because we find that the same considerations apply to all CMRS providers regardless of whether they are broadband PCS providers, further notice and comment on extending forbearance to д …S У-дall CMRS providers is unnecessary.ж>ЕZ F0€д {OД- Аxвд УУSeeФФ 5 U.S.C. РР 553(b)(B) (providing that noticeЉandЉcomment procedures are not required "when an agency д Аxрдfor good cause finds that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest").>ж To the extent that we grant forbearance here, the issues have been fully explored in the record of this proceeding. Were we to seek additional comment on extending permissive forbearance to other CMRS providers, we believe no issues would be raised that could not have been raised in the comments on PCIA's petition. Therefore, we find that the forbearance we adopt here should be applied equally to all CMRS providers. СxСи?64.и We conclude that we should not adopt complete detariffing, i.e., prohibiting the filing of tariffs, in this proceeding. Although we continue to believe, as we have discussed at length д …SрУ-дelsewhere,жиЖ’рh 0€д {OшД- Аxд УУSeeФФ УУCAP Forbearance OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 8607Љ08, РР 22; УУsee alsoФФ УУIXC Forbearance OrderФФ, УУФФ11 FCC Rcd. at 20760Љ68, РРРР 52Љ66.иж that there are usually added benefits to complete detariffing, PCIA's petition did not д …SИУ-дrequest complete detariffing and there is no discussion of that option in this record.жМЗьИТ 0€д {OД- Аxд УУCf.ФФ УУCAP Forbearance OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 8607Љ08, РР 22 (finding that the option of complete detariffing д Аx–дwas not available because the petitions had not requested complete detariffing and notice of a proposed change to д Аx•дcomplete detariffing had not been given). Only when complete detariffing has not been available have we found that д {Ot!Ѕ- АxТдpermissive detariffing would serve the public interest. УУSeeФФ УУid.ФФ at 8611Љ12, РРРР 30Љ33. We anticipate seeking comment on the possibility of complete detariffing of international services in the near future.Мж Because we conclude that we must continue to require tariffs on affiliated routes, there could be complications to adopting complete detariffing on unaffiliated routes that are not present in the domestic context. For example, a carrier whose affiliation status changes or becomes uncertain might have difficulty timely amending or canceling its tariff. We conclude that it would be imprudent to prohibit the filing of tariffs on unaffiliated routes while continuing to require tariffs on affiliated routes without any discussion in the record of the consequences of such a policy. We therefore have confined ourд"Ш vЗˆ,-(-(ZZс"д analysis under the forbearance standard to consideration of the options discussed in the record Р"Р continuing to require tariffs (mandatory tariffing) or forbearing from requiring tariffs (permissive detariffing) Р"Р and have concluded that permissive detariffing would better serve the public interest than mandatory tariffing for CMRS providers serving unaffiliated routes. As discussed above, permissive detariffing would reduce administrative burdens on carriers and on the Commission, promote competitive market conditions, facilitate provision of new service offerings, and promote д …SУ-дmarket entry.жчИ’0€д {OxД- АxЄд УУCf.ФФ УУid.ФФ at 8610Љ12, РРРР 27Љ32 (finding that permissive detariffing for competitive access providers better serves the public interest than mandatory tariffing).чж СxСи@65.и We therefore grant PCIA's request for forbearance from the international tariffing requirement to the extent described above. As a result, a CMRS carrier offering international service д …SpУ-дdirectly to its customersж Йp"0€д yO2 Д- Аx‡д We are not detariffing the international services of CMRS companies that offer international service on a stand-alone basis, i.e., international service used by customers other than with a mobile radio telephone. ж need not file tariffs for its service to international points where it is not affiliated with a carrier that terminates U.S. international traffic. We amend section 20.15(d) of our rules to provide for this exception to our international tariff filing requirement. If the CMRS carrier acquires an affiliation with a foreign carrier that collects settlement payments from U.S. carriers, it must file a tariff in order to continue to provide service to any market where the foreign carrier terminates U.S. international traffic. We note that, when any authorized international carrier, including a CMRS provider with international section 214 authority, acquires an affiliation with a foreign carrier, it must notify the Commission as required by section 63.11 of the Commission's rules. д …SД-дСxСУ УззE. Section 226: Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement ActззФ Ф д …SИД-дСxСиA66.и УУBackgroundФФ. In 1990, Congress passed and the President signed TOCSIA to "protect consumers who make interstate operator service calls from pay telephones, hotels, and other public д …ShУ-дlocations against unreasonably high rates and anticompetitive practices."жuКЪhz0€д {O‚Д-д S. Rep. No. 101Љ439 at 1 (1990), УУreprinted inФФ 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1577.uж TOCSIA regulates two classes of telecommunications service providers: (1) "aggregators," which are defined as persons or entities that make telephones available to the public or to transient users of their facilities for interstate д …S№У-дtelephone calls using a provider of operator services,ж]ЛШ№ 0€д yOœД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(a)(2); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.708(b).]ж and зDEFINE OSP/AGGз(2) "providers of operator services" (OSPs), which are defined as common carriers that provide operator services, or any other persons д …S У-дdetermined by the Commission to be providing operator services.ж]МШ œ0€д yOм!Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(a)(9); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.708(i).]ж "Operator services" have been defined as any interstate telecommunications service initiated from an aggregator location that includes, as a component, any automatic or live assistance to a consumer to arrange for billing or completion, or both, of an interstate telephone call through a method other than: (1) automatic completion withд"(!, Мˆ,-(-(ZZŠс"д billing to the telephone from which the call originated; or (2) completion through an access code used д …SиУ-дby the consumer, with billing to an account previously established with the carrier by the consumer.жHНXи0€д yO@Д- Аx<д УУФФ47 U.S.C. РР 226(a)(7); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.708(g). An access code is a sequence of numbers that, when dialed, д Аx-дconnect the caller to the provider of operator services associated with that sequence. 47 U.S.C. РР 226(a)(1); 47 C.F.R. РР 708(a).Hж д …SˆД-дСxСиB67.и TOCSIA and our regulations impose several requirements upon aggregators. Aggregators must post the following information on or near the telephone instrument, in plain view of consumers: д …S8У-д(a) the name, address, and tollЉfree telephone number of the OSP presubscribed to the telephone;ж#О"8ш0€д yOР Д- Аx—д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1)(A)(i); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(b)(1). A "presubscribed OSP" is the OSP to which the д Аxтдconsumer is connected when the consumer places a call using a public telephone without dialing an access code. д {OP Ѕ- АxсдУУSee ФФ47 U.S.C. РР 226(a)(8); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.708(h). In the landline context, aggregators contract with an OSP and д yO Ѕ-дoften receive a commission from the OSP for the arrangement.У У Ф ФУУФФ#ж (b) a written disclosure that rates for service are available on request, and that consumers have a right to obtain access to the OSP of their choice and may contact their preferred OSP for information on д …SРУ-дaccessing its service using that telephone;жgПШРв0€д yO2Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1)(A)(ii); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(b)(2).gж (c) in the case of a pay telephone, the local coin rate for д …S˜У-дthe pay telephone location;жFРؘb 0€д yOšД-д 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(b)(3).Fж and (d) the name and address of the Enforcement Division of the д …SpУ-дCommon Carrier Bureau of the Commission.жpСШpђ 0€д yOД-д УУФФ47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1)(A)(iii); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(b)(4). pж УУФФAggregators must also ensure that each of their telephones presubscribed to an OSP allows consumers to use "800," "900" or "10XXX" access codes д …S У-дto reach the OSP of their choice,ж™ТЪ ‚ 0€д {OBД-д This is also known as "dial around" access. УУSee ФФ47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1)(B); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(b). ™ж and ensure that consumers are not charged higher rates for calls д …Sј У-дplaced using these access codes.жiУШј 0€д yOЌД-д УУФФ47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1)(C); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.705(b). iж д …SЈ Д-дСxСиC68.и TOCSIA and our regulations also impose a number of requirements upon OSPs. OSPs must identify themselves, audibly and distinctly, to the consumer at the beginning of each telephone д …SXУ-дcall and before the consumer incurs any charge for the call.жcФШXЄ0€д yOœД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(A); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(a)(1).cж They must also disclose immediately to the consumer, upon request and at no charge to the consumer, a quotation of their rates or charges for the call, the methods by which such rates or charges will be collected, and the method by which д …SрУ-дcomplaints concerning such rates, charges, or collection practices will be resolved.жlХШр40€д yOД#Д-д УУФФ47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(C); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(a)(3). lж OSPs must also д …SИУ-дpermit the consumer to terminate a telephone call at no charge before the call is connected;жcЦШИФ0€д yO&Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(B); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(a)(2).cж not billд"И"TЦˆ,-(-(ZZќ№"д д …SУ-дfor unanswered telephone calls;жgЧШ0€д yOhД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(FЉG); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.705(a)(1Љ2).gж not д …SиУ-дengage in "call splashing"жтШ иX0€д yOаД- Аxвд "Call splashing" means the transfer of a telephone call from one OSP to another in such a manner that the д АxZдsubsequent OSP is unable or unwilling to determine the location or the origination of the call and because of such д yO`Ѕ- Аx<дinability or unwillingness, is prevented from billing the call on the basis of such location. УУФФ47 U.S.C. РР 226(a)(3); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.708(c). тж unless the consumer requests to be transferred to another OSP after being informed, prior to such a transfer, and prior to incurring any charges, that the rates for the call may not reflect the rates from the actual originating location of the call; and not bill for a call that does not д …S`У-дreflect the location of the origination of the call.жjЩШ`@0€д yO@ Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(HЉI); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.705(a)(3Љ4). jж The Commission recently added an additional requirement: OSPs must now audibly disclose to consumers how to obtain the price of a call before it д …SУ-дis connected.жЪЪа0€д {O€Д-д 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(a)(4); УУsee Billed Party Preference OrderФФ, 13 FCC Rcd. 6122.ж д …SРД-дСxСиD69.и The regulatory scheme of TOCSIA also affirmatively charges OSPs with overseeing aggregator compliance with both the statute's posting requirement and its prohibitions on restricting д …SpУ-дconsumers' access to the OSP of their choice.жЫШpb 0€д yOrД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(DЉE); 47 C.F.R. РРРР 64.703(e), 64.704(b), 64.705(a)(5).ж Finally, TOCSIA requires OSPs to file informational д …SH У-дtariffs with the Commission,жJЬЪH ђ 0€д {OкД-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 226(h).Jж the Commission requires OSPs to regularly publish and make available at no cost to inquiring customers written materials that describe any recent changes in operator д …Sј У-дservices and in the choices available to consumers in that market,жsЭЪј „ 0€д {OД-дУ У Ф Ф47 C.F.R. РР 64.707. УУSee also ФФ47 U.S.C. РР 226(d)(3)(B).sж and the Commission requires OSPs and aggregators to ensure immediate connection of emergency telephone calls to the appropriate emergency service of the reported location of the emergency, if known, and, if not known, of the д …S€ У-дoriginating location of the call.жmЮЪ€ 0€д {O6Д-д 47 C.F.R. РР 64.706. УУSee alsoФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 226(d)(3)(A).mж СxСиE70.и The Commission has previously considered the issue of TOCSIA's application to wireless service. In 1993, the Common Carrier Bureau denied a Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed by GTE that sought a ruling that TOCSIA did not apply to certain activities of GTE's mobile affiliates. The Common Carrier Bureau held that TOCSIA required the Commission to regulate as an aggregator any entity that makes telephones available to the public or transient users of its premises, and to regulate as an OSP any entity that provides interstate telecommunications service initiated from an aggregator location that includes automatic or live assistance to arrange for billing or call completion. The Common Carrier Bureau found that certain GTE affiliates provided services which made them д …S№У-дaggregators and that commercial airЉtoЉground carriers provided services which made them OSPs.жdЯЪ№Ј0€д {O8'Д-д УУGTE Declaratory RulingФФ, 8 FCC Rcd. at 6176, РР 31.dж д"№#:Яˆ,-(-(ZZR№"д GTE subsequently requested reconsideration or waiver of this decision, arguing that it could not be д …SиУ-дreconciled with the language, legislative history, and purposes of TOCSIA or sound public policy.жgаЪи0€д {O@Д-д УУФФУУSee generally ФФУУGTE Reconsideration PetitionФФ.gж We resolve this pending matter below. д ‡S`Д-дСxСиF71.и In the УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, adopted in 1994, the Commission concluded, based on the record before it at that time, that forbearance from TOCSIA was not warranted for д ‡SУ-дCMRS providers in general.жkбЪZ0€д {O Д-д УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1490, РР 211.kж However, in the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ issued later that year, the Commission sought comment on whether there were particular classes of CMRS providers that warranted forbearance from certain regulations. We primarily sought comment on how to define small businesses in CMRS markets and whether certain regulatory provisions were much more of a burden д ‡StУ-дto small carriers than to large carriers.жfвЪtь0€д {OД-д УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 2169, РР 23.fж Although we are now terminating the УУFurther Forbearance д ‡SN Д-дNPRM,ФФ УУФФwe incorporate the comments received in that proceeding that relate to TOCSIA into the record д ‡S( Д-дof this proceeding. Since we are resolving GTE's УУReconsideration Petition ФФwith this Order, we also д ‡S Д-дincorporate the record of both the УУGTE Declaratory RulingФФ and the УУGTE Reconsideration PetitionФФ into this proceeding. д …SŒ Д-дСxСиG72.и УУФФУУDiscussionФФ. The requirements of TOCSIA and our implementing regulations apply only д …SdУ-дto entities functioning as aggregators or OSPs.жrгЪd~0€д {O‚Д-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 226(a)(2),(a)(9); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.708(b),(i).rж Thus, only a small subset of CMRS activities is affected by TOCSIA. For example, the Common Carrier Bureau has previously held that TOCSIA д …SУ-дapplies to commercial airЉtoЉground telephone service and GTE's Railfone service.ж™дЪ0€д {OФД-д УУGTE Declaratory RulingФФ, 8 FCC Rcd. 6171. We affirm this holding below. УУSeeФФ para. 89, УУinfra.ФФ™ж Other examples of affected services referenced in the record include phones leased with rental cars, mobile phone д …SФУ-дbooths at special events, and mobile phones rented by hotels and shopping malls.жnеZФЂ0€д {OД- АxJд УУSeeФФ Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, "Colorado Dreamin'" (Nov. 9, 1997); Charleston Gazette and Daily д Аx•дMail, "Offerings Range From Tires to Tuna" (Oct. 28, 1997); Minneapolis Star Tribune, "Surfing on the Edge; Music Festival Draws People and Dollars by the Thousands" (May 25, 1997).nж д …StД-дСxСиH73.и У УФ ФAlthough PCIA requests that we forbear from applying the requirements of TOCSIA to д …SLУ-дbroadband PCS providers only,ж>жШLФ 0€д yOА!Д-д PCIA Petition at 43.>ж we believe that we should consider the merits of forbearance from д …S$Д-дTOCSIA in relation to all CMRS servicesУ УФ Ф. One of our primary missions since the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 has been to establish regulatory symmetryз SYMMETRY з among similar д …SдУ-дCMRS services.жJзЪдT 0€д {OШ%Д-д УУSeeФФ para. 30, УУsupra.ФФJж Broadband PCS providers compete with cellular radiotelephone and SMR providers to provide commercial mobile telephone service, and we see no reason to treat licensees in theseд"Ќ$цзˆ,-(-(ZZс"д services differently with respect to the requirements of TOCSIA. Moreover, it is likely that other д …SиД-дcategories of CMRS licensees will compete with broadband PCS in the future. У УФ ФIn light of our goal of regulatory symmetry, we believe that any decisions we make with respect to forbearance from д …SˆД-дTOCSIA should apply to all CMRS providersУ УФ Ф. We note also that commenters in both this and earlier д …S`У-дproceedings have argued for forbearance from TOCSIA for CMRS providers generally.жйи”`0€д {OШД- Аxд УУSee, e.g.ФФ, BANM Comments on УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 8; GTE Comments on УУFurther Forbearance д {O’Ѕ-дNPRMФФ at 6; CTIA Comments at 6.йж More specifically, several commenters argue that failure to extend relief to all CMRS providers would put д …SУ-дcertain service providers at a competitive disadvantage.жйZ$0€д {Oд Д- АxХд УУSee, e.g.,ФФ AT&T Comments at 1Љ2; BANM Comments at 2; BellSouth Comments at 3Љ9; CONXUS д АxZдComments at 3 (arguing that broadband and narrowband PCS should be treated similarly); PrimeCo Comments at 2Љ3.ж Under these circumstances, we find that further notice and comment on extending forbearance to all providers and aggregators of CMRS would д …SРУ-дbe unnecessary.жLкЪРF0€д {OІД-д УУSeeФФ 5 U.S.C. РР 553(b)(B).Lж We therefore will apply our decision to forbear from certain requirements of TOCSIA to all providers and aggregators of CMRS. д …SH Д-дСxСиI74.и The provisions of TOCSIA ensure that transientзTRANSIENTSз users of public telephones enjoy the same benefits they would have if they were using private telephones. Thus, for example, subscribers to wireline telecommunications services have the ability to presubscribe to the interexchange carrier of д …Sа У-дtheir choice,жГлра и0€д yOHД- Аxiд Presubscription is the process by which each customer selects one or more primary interexchange carriers д {OЅ- Аxёд(IXCs) from among several available carriers for the customer's phone line(s). УУSeeФФ Investigation of Access and д {OкЅ- АxhдDivestiture Related Tariffs, УУMemorandum Opinion and OrderФФ, 101 FCC 2d 911, 928, Appendix B, РР 4 (1985) (УУLEC д {OЄЅ- АxрдEqual Access OrderФФ); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, д {OnЅ- Аx,дУУSecond Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. 19392, 19418Љ20, РРРР 46Љ50 (1996) д {O8Ѕ- Аx,дrev'd in part УУsub nomФФ. People of the State of California v. FCC, 124 F.3d 934 (1997). Thus, when a customer dials д Аxд"1," the customer accesses only the relevant primary IXC's services. An end user can also access other IXCs by д {OЪЅ- АxЅдdialing either a five or seven-digit access code. УУLEC Equal Access OrderФФ, 101 FCC 2d at 911, РР 1; Administration д {O”Ѕ- Аxўдof the North American Numbering PlanУУФФ Carrier Identification Codes, УУOrder on Reconsideration, Order on Application д {O^Ѕ-дfor Review, and Second Further Notice of Proposed RulemakingФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. 17876 (1997).Гж and TOCSIA ensures that they can access this or any other carrier of their choice when using a pay phone. Subscribers to mobile telephone service do not, however, require all of the same legal protections as wireline subscribers. As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress amended the Communications Act by adding section 332(c)(8), which exempts CMRS from the д …S0У-дobligation of providing equal access to common carriers for the provision of telephone toll services.жCмШ0€0€д yOP!Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 332(c)(8).Cж The Commission then determined that it no longer had the authority to require CMRS providers to offer equal access to common carriers for the provision of telephone toll services. The Commission further found that, although it was authorized in certain circumstances to prescribe regulations to ensure subscribers unblocked access to the telephone toll services of their choice, no demonstratedд"%мˆ,-(-(ZZЁс"д д …SУ-дneed for such regulation existed at that time.жён”0€д {OhД- Аx;д УУSeeФФ Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, УУOrderФФ, 11 FCC д {O2Ѕ-дRcd. 12456 (1996) (УУCMRS Equal Access OrderФФ).ёж Thus, both Congress and the Commission have previously decided that certain legal protections needed by users of wireline phones in both private and public contexts are not necessary or appropriate for CMRS subscribers. We believe that these decisions reflect not only an effort on the part of Congress and the Commission to ensure that unwarranted regulatory burdens are not imposed on CMRS, but also a recognition that there may be differences between wireline telephone service and CMRS that justify differences in their regulatory treatment, including differences in treatment when functioning as OSPs. д …SРД-дСxСиJ75.и As explained more fully below, we will forbear from applying to CMRS providers those provisions of TOCSIA that impose requirements that are identical or similar to requirements that Congress or the Commission have previously found unnecessary. Thus, we will forbear from enforcing the provisions of TOCSIA related to unblocked access against CMRS aggregators and OSPs, and we will forbear from requiring CMRS OSPs to file informational tariffs. As we discuss below, the threeЉpronged test under section 10 is satisfied as to these provisions. Although the current factual record is insufficient to support forbearance from other provisions of TOCSIA, we explore in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the possibility of further forbearance from TOCSIA and propose to modify our rules in a manner tailored to the mobile phone environment. д ‡S0Д-дСxСиK76.и УУUnblocked Access.ФФ TOCSIA and its implementing rules contain several provisions based on the premise that consumers should be allowed access to the OSP of their choice. Aggregators are required to ensure that their telephones presubscribed to a particular OSP allow consumers to use 800 д …SКУ-дand 950 access codes to reach their preferred OSP.ж`оШК$0€д yO~Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1)(B); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.704(a).`ж Aggregators also must not charge consumers more for using an access code than the amount the aggregator charges for calls placed using the д …SjУ-дpresubscribed OSP,ж`пШjД0€д yOОД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1)(C); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.705(b).`ж and they must post a written disclosure that consumers have a right to obtain access to the interstate common carrier of their choice and may contact their preferred interstate д …SУ-дcommon carrier for information on accessing that carrier's service using that telephone.жgрШD0€д yOўД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1)(A)(ii); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(b)(2).gж OSPs must ensure, by contract or tariff, that aggregators allow consumers to use 800 and 950 access codes to reach the OSP of their choice and must withhold payment of any compensation due to aggregators if д …SЂУ-дthe OSP reasonably believes that the aggregator is blocking such access.жbсШЂд0€д yO!Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(DЉE); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.704(b).bж СxСиL77.и We believe that we should forbear from enforcing these provisions with respect to CMRS. In order to do so, the first prong of the section 10 forbearance test requires that we find that enforcement of these provisions is not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations of CMRS providers acting as OSPs are just and reasonable and are not unjustly orд"к&d сˆ,-(-(ZZLс"д д …SУ-дunreasonably discriminatory.жCтШ0€д yOhД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(1).Cж Discussing the requirements of TOCSIA in general, PCIA asserts that the most persuasive support for such a finding is the "complete lack of complaints" about mobile д …SАУ-дpublic phone services, which have been offered since before TOCSIA was enacted.жHуШАX0€д yOЈД-д PCIA Petition at 43. УУФФ Hж According to PCIA, there is also no evidence that blocking or discriminatory charges have been a problem in the д …S`У-дmobile context.ж=фЪ`ш0€д {OшД-д УУIdФФ. at 44Љ45.=ж We believe that the absence of complaints filed with the Commission about access blocking or discriminatory charges for access by CMRS aggregators, standing alone, may not be enough to support forbearance, particularly since the public mobile phone industry is relatively young. Nonetheless, nothing in the record contradicts PCIA's assertion that blocking of access is not a problem in this context. We note that the principal purpose of TOCSIA, as suggested by its name, is to protect consumers. This function is addressed under the second prong of the forbearance test. In this context, in the absence of some evidence suggesting that without the unblocked access rules CMRS aggregators would engage in unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory practices, we conclude that the first prong of the forbearance test is satisfied. СxСиM78.и The second prong of the section 10 forbearance test requires that we find that д …SЈ У-дenforcement of the provisions at issue is not necessary for the protection of consumers.жCхШЈ z0€д yOТД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(2).Cж УУФФPCIA contends that requiring CMRS providers to comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements of TOCSIA is not necessary to protect consumers because none of the abuses that led to the enactment of д …S0У-дTOCSIA, including call blocking, have occurred in the mobile context.ждц0 0€д yOкД- Аx<д PCIA Petition at 38, 40, 45. "Call blocking" occurs when an aggregator does not allow consumers to use 800, 900, or 10XXX numbers to access alternative OSPs.дж With respect to the obligation of OSPs to ensure that aggregators comply with the unblocking requirement of TOCSIA and its prohibition against charging higher rates for using access codes to reach a preferred OSP, PCIA states that, because of the resale obligation, CMRS providers may not know that their services are д …SУ-дbeing resold for mobile public phone purposes and therefore have no contract with the aggregator.жOчЪb 0€д {O’Д-д PCIA УУEx ParteФФ, Attachment at 2.Oж Finally, PCIA asserts that the TOCSIA unblocking requirements have been superseded by the д …S@У-дlimitation that section 332(c)(8) places on the Commission's ability to order unblocking.ж>шШ@є 0€д yOд Д-д PCIA Petition at 46.>ж СxСиN79.и We do not have a factual record that would support a finding that CMRS providers are unable to comply with the requirement that they ensure aggregators' compliance with unblocking because they do not have contracts with aggregators. However, we do believe that it would be inconsistent with section 332(c)(8) to fail to forbear from enforcing the unblocking requirements in question here. As discussed above, under section 332(c)(8), CMRS providers are not required to provide equal access to common carriers for the provision of telephone toll services. Section 332(c)(8)д"('„ шˆ,-(-(ZZЈс"д authorizes the Commission to prescribe regulations that afford consumers unblocked access to the provider of telephone toll services of their choice if the Commission determines that consumers are denied access to the provider of their choice and finds that such denial is contrary to the public д …SˆУ-дinterest, convenience, and necessity.жCщШˆ0€д yO№Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 332(c)(8).Cж We believe that this provision reflects a determination on the part of Congress that equal access and unblocking regulations are generally unnecessary to protect consumers of CMRS. Moreover in the absence of any evidence that consumers of CMRS have been denied access to their provider of choice, we have not employed our authority under section 332(c)(8) to prescribe unblocking regulations with respect to ordinary subscribers. In light of these circumstances, we see no need to provide transient users of CMRS with consumer protections that neither Congress nor the Commission has provided for ordinary subscribers. In sum, we conclude that enforcement of the equal access and unblocking provisions of TOCSIA is unnecessary for the protection of consumers. СxСиO80.и The third prong of the section 10 forbearance test requires that we find that forbearance д …Sа У-дfrom applying the provisions in question is consistent with the public interest.жCъШа X0€д yOШД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a)(3).Cж In determining whether forbearing from certain regulations meets the public interest prong of the section 10 test, we attempt to balance the costs carriers must incur to comply with regulations and the effects of these д …SXУ-дcosts upon competition with the benefits that these regulations bestow on the public.жJыЪXш0€д {OрД-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 160(b).Jж As we discussed under the second prong, section 332(c)(8) exempts CMRS providers from providing equal access to common carriers for the provision of telephone toll services and unblocked access to the provider of telephone toll services of the subscriber's choice through the use of a carrier identification д …SИУ-дcode.ж…ьЪИz0€д {OвД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 332(c)(8). УУSee alsoФФ УУCMRS Equal Access OrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. 12456.…ж Congress enacted section 332(c)(8) in part because it felt that the imposition of equal access д …SУ-дrequirements on wireless services would inflate the cost of service.ж`эШ 0€д yO<Д-д H.R. Rep. No. 204(I), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). `ж As discussed above, the Commission has endeavored, consistent with its statutory mandate, to avoid imposing unnecessary regulations on CMRS and to allow competition to produce benefits for the consumer. We believe that this approach to forbearance promotes competitive market conditions and enhances competition among CMRS providers. In light of Congressional concerns that equal and unblocked access requirements would increase the cost of service, and the fact that we have no evidence that such requirements would produce any identifiable benefits, we conclude that forbearanceз DISIXC з from the unblocking provisions of TOCSIA with respect to CMRS is consistent with the public interest. д ‡S(Д-дСxСиP81.и УУInformational Tariffs.ФФ Under TOCSIA, OSPs are required to file tariffs specifying rates, terms, and conditions, and including commissions, surcharges, any fees which are collected from consumers, and reasonable estimates of the amount of traffic priced at each rate, with respect to calls д …SВУ-дfor which operator services are provided.жFюШВœ0€д yOю&Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(h)(1)(A).Fж We have considered forbearing from this requirement inд"В(, юˆ,-(-(ZZ-№"д д ‡SД-дthe past and have declined to do so. In the УУCMRS Second Report and Order,ФФ we decided not to forbear from enforcing the section 226 tariff requirement for CMRS, even though we forbore from requiring other tariff filings under section 203, because the required filings are less detailed than those д ‡SŠУ-дrequired pursuant to section 203.жkяЪŠ0€д {OђД-д УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1490, РР 211.kж More recently, in the УУBilled Party Preference Order,ФФ we again indicated that we were not prepared to conclude that Section 226 informational tariffs are no longer д …S<У-дnecessary as applied to all OSPs to protect consumers.жu№Ъ<Z0€д {O6Д-д УУФФУУBilled Party Preference OrderФФ, 13 FCC Rcd. at 6146Љ47, РР 43.uж д …SьД-дСxСиQ82.и Having further considered this issue, we now believe that we should forbear from applying the informational tariff requirement to CMRS OSPs. The first prong of section 10 requires us to find that enforcement of the tariff filing requirement is not necessary to ensure that the charges and practices of OSPs are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory. The rates and related surcharges or fees in OSPs' informational tariffs may be changed without prior д …S$ У-дnotice to consumers or to this Commission.ж=ёЪ$ ь0€д {OАД-д УУSeeФФ УУidФФ.=ж Moreover, we are encouraged by the fact that the CMRS marketplace is becoming increasingly competitive and will continue to promote rates and practices that are just and reasonable. When we decided to forbear from enforcing section 203 with respect to CMRS, we found that even though the cellular services marketplace was not fully competitive, there was sufficient competition to justify forbearance from tariffing requirements, and we д …S\У-дnoted in particular that the strength of competition would increase in the near future.жsђЪ\~0€д {OzД-д УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1479, РР 177. УУФФsж We believe that the same can be said today of the public CMRS marketplace. In addition to cellular providers, broadband PCS and SMR providers are entering the market and promise to increase competition in the near future. In light of this growing competition and our earlier findings regarding the usefulness of detariffing as a spur to competition, as well as the continued applicability of sections 201 and 202, we do not believe that it is necessary for CMRS providers to file informational tariffs. In the event isolated abuses do occur, they can be dealt with under sections 201 and 202 through our complaint procedures. We therefore conclude that the tariff filings required under section 226 are not necessary to ensure just and reasonable rates and practices. СxСиR83.и The second prong of section 10 requires us to find that enforcement of the section 226 tariff filing requirement is not necessary for the protection of consumers. For the same reasons stated under the first prong, we believe that the tariff requirement is not necessary to protect consumers. We note also that there is no record evidence that indicates a need for these informational tariffs to protect consumers. СxСиS84.и Under the third prong of section 10, we must find that forbearance from applying the section 226 tariffing requirement is consistent with the public interest. With respect to this prong of the section 10 test, PCIA claims that forbearance from TOCSIA is in the public interest because the statute undermines the benefits derived from detariffing CMRS providers. PCIA states that the Commission forbore from requiring tariffs from broadband PCS providers because tariffs could impede providers' flexibility, remove incentives for price discounting and the introduction of new offerings,д" )ђˆ,-(-(ZZЂ!с"д д …SУ-дand generally limit competition.жpѓЪ0€д {OhД-д PCIA Petition at 47 (citing УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФУУФФ).pж According to PCIA, forbearance from the requirement to file informational tariffs is necessary to realize the proЉcompetitive benefits the Commission intended to д ‡SАУ-дachieve in the УУCMRS Second Report and Order.ФФж=єЪАZ0€д {OЊД-д УУId.ФФ at 47Љ48.=ж д …SbД-дСxСиT85.и We agree with PCIA with respect to these arguments. When we decided to forbear from applying section 203 to CMRS, we reasoned that tariffing imposes administrative costs and can be a д …SУ-дbarrier to competition.жnѕЪь0€д {Ož Д-д УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1478Љ79, РР 175.nж We indicated our belief that tariff filings can remove carriers' ability to make rapid, efficient responses to changes in demand and cost, as well as remove incentives for the introduction of new offerings, impede and remove incentives for competitive price discounting, and impose costs on carriers that attempt to make new offerings. Finally, we said that forbearance would д …SrУ-дfoster competition, which would expand the consumer benefits of a competitive marketplace.жFіЪr~0€д {OД-д УУId.ФФ at 1479, РР 177.Fж Indeed, we found that even permissive tariff filings for CMRS providers entailed too great a risk of fostering anticompetitive practices, and might allow service providers to use their tariffs to avoid д …Sњ У-дreducing their rates.жOїЪњ 0€д {OЊД-д УУФФУУId.ФФ at 1479Љ80, РР 178.Oж We therefore instituted mandatory detariffing for CMRS.ж3јЪњ Ђ0€д {O<Д-д УУ IdФФ.3ж Even though the tariff filing requirements of section 226 are less burdensome and therefore less costly than the requirements of section 203, we nonetheless agree with PCIA that enforcement of the section 226 requirements is inconsistent with our decision to require detariffing for CMRS. We also believe that the cost of filing informational tariffs is not outweighed by any benefits these tariffs might produce, and we conclude that forbearance from enforcing this filing requirement is consistent with the public interest. Consistent with our previous mandatory detariffing decision for CMRS, we therefoз NPRMCALL зre forbid CMRS OSPs from filing informational tariffs under section 226, and we require CMRS OSPs with д …SКД-дtariffs currently on file to cancel those tariffs within 90 days of publication of this УУФФMemorandum д …S’У-дOpinion and Order in the Federal Register.жуљ"’4 0€д yOfД- Аxтд Our decision to institute mandatory detariffing for CMRS OSPs is not inconsistent with our adoption of д Аxсдpermissive detariffing for CMRS international services on unaffiliated routes. Unlike in the international context, д {OіЅ- Аxдthere is no reason to believe that requiring the withdrawal of OSP tariffs could lead to complications. УУSeeФФ para. 64, д {MР Ѕ-дУУsupra.ФФуж д ‡SBД-дСxСиU86.и УУOther Requirements.ФФ PCIA claims in its Petition that other OSP requirements of TOCSIA are irrelevant to CMRS, unduly burdensome, or impossible for broadband PCS providers to meet. Thus, for example, PCIA states that the requirement that OSPs disclose their rates immediately to the д …SЬУ-дconsumer is irrelevant in the CMRS з OSPREQ зcontext because charges are determined by the aggregator.ж>њШЬ0€д yOŠ&Д-д PCIA Petition at 48.>ж PCIA also asserts that other requirements would be very costly, and produce little benefit, becauseд"Є*Ўњˆ,-(-(ZZс"д CMRS providers cannot generally distinguish calls from public mobile phones from calls placed by д …SиУ-дsubscribers using their own phones.жhћЪи0€д {O@Д-д PCIA УУEx Parte ФФat 4Љ6; see also CTIA УУEx ParteФФ at 2.hж However, neither PCIA nor any of the commenters has supplied sufficient specific factual material in support of these claims.зDISCLOSUREз Thus, we believe that we do not have an adequate record at this time to forbear from any of the OSP provisions of TOCSIA other than those already discussed. We similarly lack a record to forbear from enforcing any additional aggregator disclosure provisions, which may provide important information to consumers. As we have stated previously, one of our major goals with respect to CMRS is to refrain from imposing any unnecessary regulations, in the belief that robust competition will produce benefits for the consumer, and we will therefore consider forbearing from other provisions of TOCSIA. We therefore solicit factual information through the Notice of Proposed Rule Making that will provide us with a basis for deciding whether we may forbear under section 10 from enforcement of the remaining provisions of TOCSIA. д ‡Sј Д-дСxСиV87.и УУGTE Petition for Reconsideration. ФФWith respect to its petition for reconsideration, GTE contends that Congress did not intend TOCSIA to apply to mobile telecommunications service д ‡SЊ У-дproviders.жЯќ’Њ Z0€д {OЄД- АxYд УУGTE Reconsideration ФФУУPetition ФФat 9Љ11. This argument is also raised by PCIA and Nextel. УУSeeФФ PCIA Petition at 40; Nextel Comments at 8.Яж We disagree. As the Common Carrier Bureau stated in the УУGTE Declaratory RulingФФ, we believe that the statutory language and legislative history indicate that Congress intended TOCSIA to apply to all phones made available to the public in situations where the consumer, not the telephone д …S4У-дprovider, pays for the cost of the call, regardless of whether the phone is a mobile phone or not.жђ§&4Д0€д {OˆД- Аx<д УУGTE Declaratory RulingФФ, 8 FCC Rcd. at 6174 ("The telephones provided by the GTE subsidiaries are not д {ORЅ- Аxбдcourtesy telephones because the consumer, not the telephone provider, pays for the cost of the call."). УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. д {OЅ- Аx\дРР 64.708(b); 47 U.S.C. РР 226(2); S. Rep. No. 439, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 2, 5 (1990), УУreprinted inФФ 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1577, 1579, 1582.ђж д ‡S Д-дFurthermore, although numerous commenters on the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ contend that the "captive customer" problem Congress passed TOCSIA to remedy is uniquely a landline telephone д …SОУ-дservice problem,ж ў”ОЂ0€д {OД-  !дСxСУУФФDial Page Comments onУУ Further Forbearance NPRMФФ at 7Љ8; УУФФBellSouth Reply Comments onУУ Further д {OЪЅ-дForbearance NPRMФФ at 4; УУФФNextel Reply Comments on УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 7Љ8. ж we believe that, as AT&T correctly noted, customers who need to place a call from a public telephone located on an airplane or a train are as "captive," if not more "captive," than д …SnУ-дcustomers making a landline OSP call from a hotel or hospital.жўџ$nў 0€д {O Д-  ЇдСxСУУФФAT&T Reply Comments onУУ Further Forbearance NPRMФФ at 12Љ13. In addition to being unable to walk to д Аxiдcompetitor's telephone while on an airplane or a train, airline passengers are also forbidden to even turn on their д {Ož!Ѕ- АxKдpersonal cellular phones while airborne. УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР22.925 (cellular telephones on board an aircraft must be turned off when the aircraft leaves the ground).ўж We believe that Congress imposed TOCSIA's aggregator regulations to protect "captive" customers, and therefore these provisions should apply to commercial airЉground telephone service and Railfone service. д …SіД-дУ УФ ФСxС СxСиW88.и Upon review of the record, we find GTE offers no new facts or legal arguments in support of its position that TOCSIA does not apply to the actions of certain of its mobile affiliates,д"І+ъџˆ,-(-(ZZчс"д other than to allege that the decision failed to consider the policy and practical implications of classifying cellular carriers as OSPs in the Railfone and rental cellular phone contexts. Upon consideration of the entire record, we find no reason to overturn the Common Carrier Bureau's д ‡SˆД-дdecision. We therefore affirm the decision in the УУGTE Declaratory RulingФФ that TOCSIA applies to the д ‡SbД-дactions of certain GTE affiliates, and deny the УУGTE Reconsideration Petition. ФФHowever, our order today provides relief from certain of the provisions of TOCSIA for CMRS providers and will grant GTE some of the relief it sought in its petition. We also note that we are exploring other issues concerning TOCSIA's application to mobile service in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. д …StД-даадЫy дУ УззV. NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING Ф Фзз дTьдаадPАд д …S$ Д-дУ УззA. Application of TOCSIA to CMRS Aggregators and OSPsФ Фзз СxСиX89.и In the Memorandum Opinion and Order, we determined that, except for the provisions relating to unblocked access and the filing of informational tariffs, the present record is inadequate to support forbearance from applying the provisions of TOCSIA and our implementing regulations to CMRS OSPs and aggregators. PCIA has, however, made several arguments that could, if adequately д …S4У-дsupported, may establish grounds for forbearing from enforcing some or all of those provisions.жRЪ40€д {OœД-д УУSee generally ФФPCIA УУEx ParteФФ.Rж Consistent with the deregulatory intent of the 1996 Act, and with the more specific forbearance directive of section 10 and biennial review requirement of section 11, we believe that PCIA's arguments merit further inquiry. Accordingly, in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking we ask questions designed to elicit specific information relevant to determining whether, and in what respects, we should forbear from applying additional provisions of TOCSIA to CMRS providers and aggregators, continue applying these provisions to those parties, or modify or eliminate our rules implementing TOCSIA to address the different circumstances faced by CMRS providers. СxСиY90.и As discussed above, a principal function of TOCSIA is to ensure that transient users of publicly available telephones and telecommunications services enjoy the same consumer protection as д …S|У-дsubscribers to the equivalent services.жJЪ|Z0€д {OvД-д УУSeeФФ para. УУ73, supra.ФФJж We will consider this attribute of the statute prominently in deciding whether to forbear from applying any portion of TOCSIA, or eliminate or modify any of our implementing regulations, with respect to CMRS providers and aggregators. Thus, for purposes of the section 10(a) forbearance analysis, the maintenance of equivalent protection for all CMRS users will be relevant to determining whether continued enforcement of a provision is unnecessary to ensure that carriers' practices are just, reasonable, and not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; whether the provision is unnecessary for the protection of consumers; and whether forbearance is consistent with д …SdУ-дthe public interest.жPЪdь0€д {O№#Д-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 160(a).УУФФPж We will also consider the protection of consumers who obtain CMRS through aggregators, as compared with other CMRS consumers, as a principal factor in determining whether to make any changes to our forbearance regulations outside of section 10, including in determining whether a regulation is no longer necessary in the public interest as the result of meaningful economicд"ь ,~ˆ,-(-(ZZt"с"д д …SУ-дcompetition between providers of service under section 11.жkш0€д yOhД- Аx,д We note that to the extent our regulations implementing TOCSIA are not required by the statutory text, we д Аx№дneed not satisfy the section 10 forbearance standard in order to exempt a class of providers from those regulations д Аx;дor modify the regulations applicable to certain providers, if such a change is warranted by the language and purposes д Аxдof TOCSIA. Commenters may, however, frame their comments regarding any of our TOCSIA regulations in terms of the section 10, section 11, or section 332(c) criteria.kж We encourage commenters to focus their remarks on the context of equivalent protection for all consumers of CMRS. д …SˆД-дСxСиZ91.и CMRS networks and service offerings differ from those of wireline service providers in several respects. These differences may include, among other things, differences in equipment inherent in the nature of mobile service; differences in prevailing rate structures such as larger local calling areas for CMRS, roaming charges, and charges for incoming calls; differences in the governing regulatory regimes; and differences in the relationships between OSPs and aggregators and between OSPs and end users. In addition to possibly supporting forbearance from applying some provisions of TOCSIA to CMRS providers and aggregators, these differences may mean that different regulations implementing TOCSIA are appropriate in the CMRS context. Accordingly, in this Notice we propose to consider applying modified TOCSIA regulations to CMRS providers and aggregators as well as eliminating the application of certain regulations and statutory provisions. Our adoption of any appropriate modifications to the regulations implementing the statute should promote the public interest both by relieving CMRS providers and aggregators of regulatory burdens that are illЉsuited to the CMRS context and by providing consumers with targeted measures for their protection. СxСи[92.и In the Memorandum Opinion and Order above, we forbear from enforcing certain д …S0У-дprovisions of TOCSIA against all providers and aggregators of CMRS.жJЪ0x0€д {OHД-д УУSeeФФ para. 74, УУsupra.ФФJж We determined to extend forbearance to all CMRS, even though PCIA requested forbearance only as to providers of broadband PCS, because providers holding different categories of licenses within CMRS compete with each other and there did not appear to be any compelling reasons for distinguishing among them. Under these circumstances, we concluded that maintaining regulatory symmetry would promote the public interest д …ShУ-дby avoiding distortion of competition in the markets for CMRS.ж3Ъh 0€д {OД-д УУId.ФФ3ж For the same reasons, we tentatively conclude that any decision to forbear arising out of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking will apply to providers and aggregators of all services classified as CMRS. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion. СxСи\93.и Before addressing the provisions of TOCSIA and our implementing rules individually, we also seek comment on a few matters that underlie our consideration of many of these provisions. PCIA argues that many of the provisions of TOCSIA are unduly burdensome as applied to broadband PCS providers because these providers may not be able to distinguish users that obtain service through д …SУ-дan aggregator from other users of their services.ж~Ъœ0€д {O<%Д-д УУSeeФФ PCIA Petition at 44; PCIA УУEx ParteФФ at 4Љ5; CTIA УУEx ParteФФ at 2.~ж We seek comment as to whether all broadband PCS providers, and other CMRS providers, are in fact currently unable to identify calls that are placed or received through aggregators. If some aggregator calls can in fact be identified, we request specificд"А-. ˆ,-(-(ZZс"д information as to what factors, including the type of CMRS involved, technical attributes of the underlying provider's network, or the type of aggregator arrangement, permit such identification. We also seek clarification as to whether calls made through aggregators cannot be distinguished from all д ‡SˆУ-дother CMRS calls, or only from certain types of calls (УУe.g.ФФ, roaming calls).жъ’ˆ0€д {O№Д- Аxсд УУSeeФФ PCIA Petition at 46; PCIA УУEx ParteФФ at 4Љ6 (stating that application of section 64.703(a) to broadband PCS effectively requires providers to brand all roamer calls).ъж To the extent that some aggregator calls cannot be identified, we further seek comment regarding whether it would be feasible for providers to introduce the capability to identify these calls and, if so, at what cost. СxСи]94.и We also seek comment on the different contexts in which CMRS is now or could in the future be offered through aggregators. The record includes evidence of a variety of different transient uses of mobile telephone service, including airЉtoЉground telephone service on commercial airlines, the leasing of phones along with rental cars, mobile phone booths at special events, and the rental of д …SJ У-дphones by hotels and shopping malls.жMЪJ "0€д {O Д-д УУSeeФФ n.211, УУsupra.ФФУУФФMж У УФ ФWe seek further information on the distinguishing characteristics of each of these arrangements, and on any other contexts in which CMRS is aggregated. In particular, when addressing particular provisions of TOCSIA, commenters should consider whether the statutory provisions and our regulations have different impacts depending on the type of aggregator arrangement in question. Commenters should also consider the potential future evolution of CMRS aggregation. In particular, we seek comment regarding how proposed billing schemes under which the calling party pays for airtime might affect the arrangements between CMRS providers and aggregators д …S2У-дand the impact of TOCSIA and our implementing rules.жй ’2Д0€д {O†Д- Аxд УУSeeФФ Calling Party Pays Service Option in the Commercial Mobile Radio Services, УУNotice of InquiryФФ, 12 FCC д yOPЅ-дRcd. 17693 (1997). У УФ Фйж д …SтД-дСxСи^95.и УУAggregator Disclosure and OSP Oversight of Aggregators.ФФ Even before the enactment of TOCSIA, we proposed rules "that pertain to a subject that is vital to the operation of an open and д …S’У-дcompetitive operator services marketplace: customer information and notification."жч ”’0€д {O@Д- Аxд Policies and Rules Concerning Operator Service Providers, УУNotice of Proposed Rule MakingФФ, 5 FCC Rcd. д {O Ѕ-д4630, 4631Љ32, РР 14 (1990) (УУTOCSIA NPRM)ФФ.чж After TOCSIA was enacted, we adopted rules requiring aggregators to post "on or near the telephone instrument, in plain view of consumers" information designed to aid consumers. This information includes (1) the name, address, and tollЉfree telephone number of the provider of operator services; (2) a written disclosure that the rates for all operatorЉassisted calls are available on request, and that consumers have a right to obtain access to the interstate common carrier of their choice and may contact their preferred interstate common carrier for information on accessing that carrier's service using that telephone; (3) for pay telephones, the local coin rate for the pay telephone location; and (4) the name and address of д …SRУ-дthe Commission's Common Carrier Bureau enforcement division.ж™ "ZRj 0€д {O\$Д- Аxxд 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(b). УУSee alsoФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1) (requiring posting of items 1, 2, and 4 above). We д АxГдnote that section 226(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires aggregators to post the name and address of the Common Carrier Bureau's д Аxkдenforcement division. We tentatively conclude that, for purposes of public wireless phones, the Wireless д Аx‡дTelecommunications Bureau's enforcement division should be substituted. We believe we have authority to makeд"Ж& ˆ,-(-(ААс&в"д д Аxвдthis substitution pursuant to our forbearance power and our authority under section 4(i) of the Act to perform any д {OXЅ- АxЅдand all acts as may be necessary in the execution of our functions. УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 154(i). We seek comment on this tentative conclusion.™ж We require all aggregators toд"R.ъ ˆ,-(-(ZZš№"д д …SУ-дcomply with this posting requirement, including aggregators in nonЉequal access areas.жю ”ъ0€д {OŠД- АxДд УУSeeФФ Policies and Rules Concerning Operator Service Providers, УУReport and OrderФФ, 6 FCC Rcd. 2744, 2759, д {OTЅ-дРР 36 (1991) (УУTOCSIA Implementing OrderФФ).юж Responsibility for enforcement of the aggregator posting requirement is, in part, placed upon the OSP used by the aggregator. The OSP is obligated to ensure, by contract or tariff, that each aggregator for which such provider is the presubscribed provider of operator services is in compliance with the д …S`У-дposting requirements.ж` Ш`F0€д yOF Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(D); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(e).`ж д …SД-дСxСи_96.и We have declined in most respects to forbear from enforcing these provisions with respect to CMRS at this time because of the vital information that disclosure provides to consumers of public telecommunications services, and because there is no record evidence that these requirements impose д …S˜У-дan undue burden on aggregators.ж\˜ж0€д {OД- Аxд УУSeeФФ para. 86,УУ supraФФ. We are, however, forbearing from enforcing the disclosure requirements relating to the д Аxдright to access the interstate common carrier of the consumer's choice, consistent with our decision that CMRS д {O Ѕ-дaggregators need not offer consumers that choice. УУSeeФФ paras. 76Љ80, УУsupraФФ.ж For the same reasons, we tentatively conclude that we should continue in the future to require some form of disclosure by CMRS aggregators similar to that mandated by section 226(b)(1)(D) of the Act. In particular, we believe customers of CMRS aggregators will benefit from access to the same information that is available to direct customers of CMRS providers, including the identity of and how to contact the underlying service provider, how to obtain information about rates, and how to lodge complaints about service. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion. In particular, we are interested in any unusual burdens that the disclosure requirement generally might impose on aggregators. For example, if certain aggregators are prone to frequently changing their underlying service provider, might it be costly for them to continuously update the disclosure information? Are there circumstances where an aggregator might not know the identity of its underlying service provider? If so, how do these conditions differ from those encountered by wireline aggregators? We also welcome comment on the benefits of disclosure to consumers. СxСи`97.и Although we tentatively conclude that we should retain some form of disclosure requirement for CMRS aggregators, we recognize that the appropriate form of disclosure may be different in the CMRS and wireline contexts. In particular, we note that wireless public phones are not always attached to a particular stationary geographic location, and, indeed, may not be attached to anything at all. This fact could impede compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirement that д …S У-дaggregators post information "on or near the telephone instrument."жaШ њ 0€д yO:$Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(c)(1)(A); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(b).aж Due to the increasing diminution in size of CMRS telephone devices, it may be impossible to post all of the required information, in a legible fashion, on the telephone instrument itself. We also recognize that because certain mobile public phones are not fixed to a particular location, it may not be possible to postд"(/Š ˆ,-(-(ZZ{с"д notices in every place where a consumer can initiate a call. We therefore tentatively conclude that we should forbear from requiring CMRS aggregators to post disclosure information "on or near the telephone instrument," and instead should permit some or all CMRS aggregators to use some other reasonable means of disclosure. For example, we might permit CMRS aggregators to provide the д ‡S`Д-дrequired information to the consumer at the point of establishing a contractual relationship, УУe.gФФ., at the д …S:У-дcar rental counter or concierge desk.ж№$:0€д yOЂД- Аxiд We note that before TOCSIA was enacted, we proposed to afford aggregators the option of meeting their д Аxxдdisclosure obligations by giving printed documentation to the customer in person. We provided as examples that д {O2Ѕ- Аx№дa customer at a hotel or a patient at a hospital could be given the required information while checking in. УУTOCSIA д {OќЅ-дNPRMФФ, 5 FCC Rcd. at 4632, РР 17.№ж We seek comment regarding this tentative conclusion and how it should be implemented. For example, we seek comment on whether the point of establishing a contractual relationship is an appropriate alternative time for disclosure, or whether this point may be nonexistent or difficult to identify under some circumstances. We also seek comment as to the means д ‡SšД-дby which disclosure should be effected at the time the relationship is established; УУe.g.ФФ, by posting information in the aggregator's office or by handing a leaflet to the customer. Commenters should also consider alternatives to disclosure at the time of contracting, such as placing information in the glove compartment of a rental car. In addition, we are interested in whether alternative means of disclosure should be available to all CMRS aggregators, or only to aggregators that will have difficulty complying with the literal statutory requirement. СxСиa98.и We also seek comment on whether certain disclosures should be required of CMRS aggregators in addition to those mandated under section 226(c) of the Act and section 64.703(b) of our rules. Specifically, CMRS providers typically impose a number of charges on end users that are not commonly encountered in the wireline context, including roaming charges, charges for airtime, and charges for incoming calls. We believe that CMRS subscribers are typically aware of these charges, but that transient users of CMRS may not be. We therefore seek comment on whether CMRS aggregators should be required to disclose the existence of these or other charges. If so, we further seek comment regarding the precise nature of the required disclosure. For example, should the aggregator provide information regarding the boundaries of the home calling area? Alternatively, д ‡SД-дwhere the CMRS device provides notice that a customer will incur roaming charges (УУe.gФФ., a light on the device is illuminated), should this fact be disclosed? Should the aggregator be required to disclose д …SЮУ-дthe phenomenon of "call capture?"жfFЮД0€д yO"Д- Аx<д "Call capture" or "capture of subscriber traffic" occurs when a mobile radio user is unable to initiate a call д АxJдthrough a carrier's system from a location within that system's service area, because the control channel signal from д Аxсдan adjacent system is stronger at that location. Capture occurs because CMRS devices are designed to seek service, д Аx;дwhen initiating a call, from the system with the strongest control channel signal on the preferred channel block. In д Аxhдsuch a situation, the user's radio automatically registers in and initiates calls through the adjacent system, potentially д {O !Ѕ- Аx=дtriggering roaming charges. УУSee ФФAmendment of Part 22 of the Commission's Rules to Provide for Filing and д {Oд!Ѕ- АxУдProcessing of Applications for Unserved Areas in the Cellular Service and to Modify Other Cellular Rules, УУFurther д {Ož"Ѕ-дMemorandum Opinion and Order on ReconsiderationФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. 2109, 2124 n.81 (1997).У УФ Фfж We welcome comment on these and other relevant questions. СxСиb99.и Section 64.703(b)(3) of our rules requires that in the case of a pay telephone, an д …SVУ-дaggregator must disclose the local coin rate for the location.жŠЪVТ 0€д {OИ&Д-д УУ See ФФ47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(b)(3). We note that this requirement is not imposed by statute.Šж We seek comment on whether thisд"V0T ˆ,-(-(ZZ|№"д requirement is appropriately applied to CMRS aggregators. In particular, we request information regarding whether coinЉoperated CMRS phones exist. If not, should we forbear from applying this disclosure requirement, or should we retain it to apply to coinЉoperated applications that may be developed in the future? If coinЉoperated phones do currently exist, is there any reason aggregators should not be required to disclose the coin rate? For example, are rate structures too complicated to be conveniently posted? If so, is there any compromise proposal that could effectively protect consumers without unduly burdening aggregators? Commenters should specifically address any relevant differences between CMRS and wireline coinЉoperated phones. СxСиc100.и We also tentatively conclude that we should retain the requirement that CMRS OSPs д …SpУ-дensure by contract or tariff that aggregators will comply with the disclosure requirements.жjЪp0€д {Oи Д-д УУSee ФФ47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(D); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(e).jж Congress believed that OSP oversight is important to ensuring aggregator compliance with TOCSIA, and we д …S У-дagree with Congress' judgment.жО’ Z0€д {OД- АxJд УУSeeФФ S. Rep. No. 439, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 13 (1990). УУSee also TOCSIA Implementing OrderФФ, 6 FCC Rcd. at 2747Љ48, РР 4.Ож We also are not convinced on the present record that OSP oversight is unduly burdensome. PCIA argues, however, that compliance with the oversight requirement is problematic for CMRS OSPs because, unlike wireline OSPs, they typically do not have contracts with д …SЈ У-дaggregators, and indeed may not know who aggregators of their services are.ж†ЪЈ Д0€д {OќД-д See PCIA Petition at 46Љ49; Sprint/APC Comments at 15; PCIA УУEx ParteФФ, Attachment at 2.†ж We seek comment regarding the prevalence of contractual arrangements between CMRS aggregators and OSPs, and how this compares with the wireline context. To the extent such contracts do not exist, we seek comment on the costs and benefits of requiring CMRS aggregators and OSPs to enter into contracts. We also seek comment on practical alternatives to contractual provisions as a means of effecting OSP oversight, and on whether OSPs that do not have contracts with their aggregators, or do not know who their aggregators are, should be exempt from the oversight requirement. In addition, we welcome comments on the benefits of oversight by CMRS OSPs. д …S@Д-дСxСиd101.и УУOSP Identification, Disclosure, and Termination at No ChargeФФ. TOCSIA requires that every OSP audibly and distinctly identify itself to every person who uses its operator services before any charge is incurred by the consumer, permit the consumer to terminate the telephone call at no charge before the call is connected, and disclose to the consumer upon request, at no charge, a quotation of its rates or charges for the call, the methods by which such rates or charges will be collected, and the methods by which complaints concerning such rates, charges, or collection practices д …SPУ-дwill be resolved.жHШPF0€д yO6!Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(AЉC).Hж Our regulations reiterate these requirements, and in addition we require that the д …S(У-дOSP disclose audibly to the customer how to obtain the price of a call before the call is connected.жCШ(ж0€д yOž#Д-д 47 C.F.R. РР 64.703(a).Cж д"1f ˆ,-(-(ZZkс"дŒСxСиe102.и In the Memorandum Opinion and Order, we have concluded that on the present record, д …SиУ-дthe criteria for forbearance from applying these requirements to CMRS OSPs are not satisfied.жJЪи0€д {O@Д-д УУSeeФФ para. 86, УУsupraФФ.Jж We seek additional comment on this issue. In particular, we seek comment on PCIA's arguments in favor of forbearance. First, PCIA and commenters supporting its position argue that the OSP disclosure and call termination requirements are unnecessary to protect consumers because CMRS providers' rates and practices are reasonable, competitive market forces motivate CMRS providers to offer services at reasonable rates, and CMRS providers generally disclose rate information as a matter of sound д …SшУ-дbusiness practice.жgPшZ0€д {Oт Д- Аx: д УУSeeФФ PCIA Petition at 43Љ45; AT&T Comments at 7Љ8; GTE Comments УУФФat 10; Sprint/APC Comments УУФФat 13Љ15; д {OЌ Ѕ- АxwдУУФФALLTEL Comments on the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 3; Bell Atlantic Comments on the УУFurther Forbearance д {Ov Ѕ- АxЄдNPRMФФ at 9; CTIA Comments on the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 7; GTE Comments on the УУFurther Forbearance д {O@ Ѕ- АxдNPRMФФ at 6Љ8; InЉFlight Comments on the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 5; McCaw Comments on the УУFurther д {O Ѕ- АxсдForbearance NPRMФФ at 5Љ6; Nextel Comments on the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 15; SBMS Comments on the д {Oд Ѕ- АxядУУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 11Љ16; AMTA Reply Comments on the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 4Љ5; BellSouth д {OžЅ- АxYдReply Comments on the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 3Љ4; McCaw Reply Comments on the УУFurther Forbearance д {OhЅ-дNPRMФФ at 5; PCIA УУEx ParteФФ at 1Љ2, Attachment at 1.gж We have already found, based on the existing record, that current market conditions may not ensure that CMRS providers will refrain from unjust, unreasonable, or д …S˜У-дunreasonably discriminatory practices.ж—ژr 0€д {OЊД-д УУSeeФФ paras. 19Љ24, УУsupraФФ (discussing decision not to forbear from enforcing sections 201 and 202).—ж We seek comment as to whether this analysis is any different when CMRS providers are acting as OSPs. We also seek comment on the disclosure practices of CMRS OSPs, and in particular whether they make relevant information available to consumers on each call and inform consumers before each call how to obtain such information. In addition, assuming providers typically do act reasonably and disclose their rates and practices, we seek comment on whether these circumstances are sufficient grounds for forbearing from regulation. For example, even if CMRS providers' rates and practices are reasonable, consumers may have an independent interest in knowing what those rates and practices are before they incur charges. Similarly, even if most CMRS providers disclose their rates and practices as a matter of business practice, regulation may be important to ensure disclosure by all providers. We seek comment on these theories. We also seek comment on whether continuing to apply disclosure requirements to CMRS OSPs on each call is д …SрУ-дconsistent with our decision to forbear from requiring these providers to file informational tariffs.жJЪр 0€д {O„Д-д УУSeeФФ para. 85, УУsupra.ФФJж СxСиf103.и Second, PCIA argues that enforcement of these requirements is not in the public interest because compliance with these requirements is unduly costly and burdensome for CMRS OSPs. In particular, PCIA contends that broadband PCS providers have no way of distinguishing a rental phone from a private phone, and therefore must make the required announcements, at a minimum, at the д …S№У-дbeginning of all roamer calls that are not billed to the originating number.жnЪ№– 0€д {O&$Д-д PCIA Petition at 46; PCIA УУEx ParteФФ at 4Љ6 and Attachment at 1.nж PCIA also states that the financial costs of complying with the OSP identification and disclosure requirements are substantial, arguing in particular that compliance with the new requirement to audibly disclose how to obtain the price of a call would entail replacement or modification of network equipment, design and installationд"x2(ˆ,-(-(ZZШс"д of new switch software, the development and maintenance of databases, and the hiring and training of д …SиУ-дnew personnel.ж|Ъи0€д {O@Д-д УУSeeФФ PCIA Petition at 47; PCIA УУEx ParteФФ at 3 and Attachment at 1.УУФФ|ж We seek comment on these arguments, including specific information regarding the д …SАУ-дcosts of compliance for CMRS OSPs.жЄ|АZ0€д yOЊД- Аxсд GTE and McCaw both provided estimates of how potentially expensive the original imposition of TOCSIA д Аx,дwould be for CMRS providers. PCIA cited both GTE's 1993 $20 million estimate of the cost of compliance for the д АxYдcellular industry and McCaw's 1994 extrapolation of this estimate to $100 million cost of compliance for the entire д {OЅ- АxJдCMRS industry, without providing new figures. УУФФPCIA PetitionУУ ФФat 47 (citing УУФФУУGTE Reconsideration PetitionФФ at 17 and д {OЬЅ- Аx-дУУФФMcCaw Comments УУФФon theУУ Further Forbearance NPRM ФФat 5). These figures, however, are several years old, and д Аx—дpresumably many of the costs at issue have already been incurred. We seek current information regarding the compliance costs presently faced by the CMRS industry.Єж To the extent that CMRS providers cannot distinguish calls made through aggregators from other calls, we further seek information regarding the costs of making the required identification and disclosures on a larger universe of calls. СxСиg104.и Finally, PCIA argues that the OSP disclosure requirements are ill suited to CMRS operator services because, unlike in the wireline context, CMRS OSPs typically have no direct relationship with the end user and do not set the end user's rates. Rather, according to PCIA, the aggregator sets the customer's rates and bills the customer directly. Therefore, PCIA argues, information regarding the OSP's rates is of little value to the consumer, and OSPs do not have д …SH У-дsufficient information to accurately disclose the rate that may be charged to any end user.жmЪH ž0€д {O†Д-д УУSeeФФ PCIA УУEx ParteФФ at 2Љ3, 4, and Attachment at 1.УУФФmж We seek comment on the billing practices that prevail in CMRS aggregator contexts, and on the variations that may exist in these practices. In particular, we seek information on whether, and under what circumstances, end users are billed by aggregators, OSPs, or both. To the extent that end users pay charges only to aggregators, we seek comment on whether aggregators set those fees independently or simply pass on the fees charged to them by OSPs. We also seek information on any fees or charges assessed by aggregators on top of the OSP's charges. In light of existing practices, we seek comment on whether, and under what circumstances, aggregators or OSPs are better situated to provide meaningful rate and billing information to end users. In addition, we seek comment on how CMRS aggregator arrangements compare with those in the wireline context, and how any differences affect the rules that may be appropriate to protect consumers. д …ShД-дСxСиh105.и УУBilling for Unanswered CallsФФ. TOCSIA and our regulations forbid OSPs from billing for unanswered telephone calls in areas where equal access is available, and from knowingly billing for д …SУ-дunanswered telephone calls in areas where equal access is not available.жg Ш0 0€д yOш Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(FЉG); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.705(a)(1Љ2).gж PCIA asserts that this provision is unnecessary as applied to CMRS providers because standard industry practice is to begin accruing air time charges only when the call is connected, and there is no evidence that billing for д …S У-дunanswered calls has been a problem in the mobile telecommunications industry.жQ!Ъ Р 0€д {O%Д-д PCIA УУEx ParteФФ, Attachment at 1Љ2.Qж We seek comment about CMRS industry practices with respect to billing for unanswered calls and any variations in those practices. In particular, we seek information regarding what constitutes billable airtime and whetherд"P3R !ˆ,-(-(ZZЉс"д CMRS providers calculate airtime differently for customers who obtain service through aggregators д …SиУ-дthan for other users of their networks.ж}"ъи0€д yO@Д- Аxвд We note that in another proceeding, a cellular service provider has asked us to declare that "call initiation" д {OЅ- АxЄдin the CMRS context occurs when the customer activates the phone to place or receive a call. УУSeeФФ Southwestern Bell д Аx№дMobile Systems, Inc. Petition for a Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Just and Reasonable Nature of, and State Law д АxЕдChallenges to, Rates Charged by CMRS Providers When Charging for Incoming Calls and Charging for Calls in WholeЉMinute Increments at 3, 11Љ12 (filed Nov. 12, 1997).}ж Commenters should further address the cost of implementing and complying with this provision for CMRS calls made through aggregators. To the extent that CMRS providers cannot distinguish between public and other users of the network, commenters should address the costs of forgoing billing for unanswered calls for a larger set of users. д …SД-дСxСиi106.и УУCall SplashingФФ. Both TOCSIA and the implementing regulations forbid OSPs from engaging in "call splashing" or billing for a call that does not reflect the originating location of the call д …SРУ-дwithout the consumer's informed consent.жP#шРz0€д yOк Д- Аx№д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(b)(1)(HЉI); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.705(a)(3Љ4). "Call splashing" means the transfer of a telephone д Аxдcall from one provider of operator services to another such provider in such a manner that the subsequent provider д Аx[дis unable or unwilling to determine the location of the origination of the call and, because of such inability or д АxKдunwillingness, is prevented from billing the call on the basis of such location. 47 U.S.C. РР 226(a)(3); 47 C.F.R. РР 64.708(c). Pж PCIA argues that this prohibition is unnecessary as applied to CMRS OSPs because these providers have not engaged in call splashing to the detriment of д …SpУ-дconsumers, as evidenced by the lack of consumer complaints about the practice.ж $”p* 0€д {O:Д- Аxџд PCIA Petition at 43; УУsee also, e.g.ФФ, CTIA Comments on УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 7; GTE Comments д {OЅ-дon УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 6; InЉFlight Comments on УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ at 5.УУФФ ж In particular, PCIA argues that because most mobile service providers charge distanceЉinsensitive toll rates, call splashing д …S У-дby CMRS providers would not harm consumers or unfairly benefit carriers.жv%Ъ † 0€д {OFД-д УУSeeФФ PCIA Petition at 45; PCIA УУEx ParteФФ at 2 and Attachment at 3.vж PCIA observes that the point of call origination has little meaning in the mobile context since callers frequently change д …Sа У-дlocation during the course of a communication.жO&Ъа 0€д {OˆД-д PCIA УУEx ParteФФ, Attachment at 3.Oж PCIA further argues that broadband PCS providers cannot feasibly target users of aggregated services for call splashing because they have no way of д …S€ У-дdistinguishing a rental phone from a private phone.ж>'Ш€ Њ0€д yOЪД-д PCIA Petition at 46.>ж СxС СxСиj107.и As discussed above, the present record is insufficient to support forbearance based on д …SУ-дPCIA's arguments.жJ(Ъ:0€д {Oт"Д-д УУSeeФФ para. 86, УУsupra.ФФJж We therefore seek further comment on PCIA's arguments and on the costs and benefits of applying the call splashing prohibition to CMRS. In particular, we seek comment on whether CMRS OSPs have any history of call splashing to the detriment of consumers, and on whether situations exist or could arise where CMRS OSPs could have an incentive to engage in call splashing that would harm consumers. In this regard, we request comment on the prevalence of distanceЉinsensitive billing in CMRS markets, how this billing practice affects CMRS OSPs' incentivesд"@4Ь(ˆ,-(-(ZZс"д to engage in call splashing and the potential for call splashing to harm consumers, and how these conditions compare with the situation in wireline services. In addition, we seek information on the costs to CMRS OSPs of complying with the call splashing prohibition for calls made through aggregators and, to the extent that CMRS providers cannot distinguish between customers of aggregators and other users, the costs of complying with this prohibition on other calls as well. д …SД-дСxСиk108.и УУOSP Publication of Changes in ServicesФФ. Under TOCSIA, the Commission is required to establish a policy for requiring providers of operator services to make public information about recent д …SРУ-дchanges in operator services available to consumers.жF)ШР0€д yO( Д-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(d)(3)(B).Fж Pursuant to that directive, we have required OSPs to regularly publish and make available at no cost to inquiring consumers written materials that describe any recent changes in operator services and in the choices available to consumers in that д …SH У-дmarket.ж@*ШH X0€д yO@ Д-д 47 C.F.R. РР 64.707.@ж PCIA argues that CMRS providers have no basis for issuing such reports because they are д …S У-дonly incidentally and involuntarily OSPs.жO+Ъ ш0€д {OЈД-д PCIA УУEx ParteФФ, Attachment at 3.Oж We seek comment on the costs and benefits of requiring CMRS OSPs to publish regular reports of their changes in service in light of the nature of the services provided, the level of abuses, and carriers' customary disclosure practices. We are also interested in how this costЉbenefit analysis compares with the analysis for wireline OSPs. Commenters should particularly consider whether the benefit of these reports to consumers may vary for different CMRS aggregator arrangements, and therefore whether it may make sense to modify or forbear from enforcing the rule only for certain types of arrangements. д …SрД-дСxСиl109.и УУRouting of Emergency CallsФФ. TOCSIA requires the Commission to establish minimum д …SИУ-дstandards for OSPs and aggregators to use in the routing of emergency telephone calls.жF,ШИz0€д yOвД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226(d)(3)(A).Fж Under our rules implementing this provision, OSPs and aggregators are required to ensure immediate connection of emergency telephone calls to the appropriate emergency service of the reported location of the д …S@У-дemergency, if known, and if not known, of the originating location of the call.ж@-Ш@ 0€д yOъД-д 47 C.F.R. РР 64.706.@ж More recently, the Commission has promulgated requirements specifically governing the routing and handling of emergency 911 calls by cellular, broadband PCS, and SMR licensees that offer real-time, twoЉway switched voice service that is interconnected with the public switched network and utilize an in-network switching facility which enables the provider to reuse frequencies and accomplish seamless д …SxУ-дhand-offs of subscriber calls.жх.(xš0€д {OВ"Д-даа 47 C.F.R. РР 20.18; УУsee ФФRevision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 д {O|#Ѕ-дEmergency Calling Systems, УУReport and Order and Further Notice of Proposed RulemakingФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. д {OF$Ѕ-д18676 (1996) (УУE911 OrderФФ)УУФФ; УУMemorandum Opinion and Order, ФФ12 FCC Rcd. 22665 (1997) (УУE911 д {O%Ѕ-дReconsiderationФФ), УУfurther recon. pendingФФ.хж These requirements include: д"P5Š .ˆ,-(-(ZZИс"дŒТXxТРР covered carriers must process and transmit to the designated Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) all 911 calls made from wireless mobile handsets, including calls initiated by roamers; Ца Ц ТXxТРР during Phase I of implementation and deployment, covered carriers must provide the telephone number of the originator of a 911 call and the location of the cell site or base station receiving a 911 call from any mobile handset accessing their system to the designated PSAP through the use of Automatic Number Identification (ANI) and д …SРУ-дPseudoЉANI.ж‰/ъР0€д yO( Д- Аx†д "PseudoЉANI" means a number, consisting of the same number of digits as ANI, that is not a North American д Аx;дNumbering Plan telephone directory number and may be used in place of an ANI to convey a special meaning. The д Аxёдspecific meaning assigned to the pseudoЉANI is determined by agreements, as necessary, between the telephone д Аxjдsystem originating the call, intermediate telephone systems handling and routing the call, and the destination д {OH Ѕ-дtelephone system. УУE911 ReconsiderationФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 22715, РР 103.‰ж These capabilities will allow the PSAP attendant to contact the caller if the 911 call is disconnected;Ца Ц ТXxТРР during Phase II of implementation and deployment, covered carriers must achieve the capability to identify the latitude and longitude of a mobile unit making a 911 call within a radius of no more than 125 meters, using Root Mean Square methodology (which equates to a success rate of approximately 67 percent to 75 percent).Ца Ц СxСиm110.и PCIA asserts that CMRS aggregators' and OSPs' obligations with respect to emergency д …SXУ-дservices are spelled out in the Commission's E911 rules, which supersede section 64.706.жO0ЪXz0€д {OrД-д PCIA УУEx ParteФФ, Attachment at 3.Oж The record, however, is almost totally devoid of comments addressing the emergency call routing д …SД-дobligation. У УФ ФWe seek comment as to whether section 64.706 is appropriately applied to CMRS aggregators and OSPs, in light of our E911 rules. Commenters should specifically address the costs and benefits of applying section 64.706 in the CMRS context. In addition to addressing the impact of section 20.18, commenters should consider whether section 64.706 remains necessary and appropriate as applied to any CMRS aggregators and OSPs that are not covered by the E911 rule, or whether those providers that are not covered by the E911 rule should be excluded from any emergency call д …SУ-дrouting obligation because they are incapable of handling emergency calls.жг1’ 0€д {OФД- Аxџд УУSee E911 Order, ФФ11 FCC Rcd. at 18716Љ18, РРРР 80Љ83; УУE911 ReconsiderationФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 22700Љ05, РРРР д yOŽЅ-д70Љ83.У УФ Фгж д …SШД-дСxСУ УззB. Forbearance From Other Statutory and Regulatory Provisions.Ф Фзз д ‡SxД-дСxСиn111.и In the УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, the Commission classified all mobile radio services as either commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) or private mobile radio service (PMRS). The statutory definition of CMRS is "any mobile service . . . that is provided for profit and makes interconnected service available (A) to the public or (B) to such classes of eligible users as to be д ‡SкУ-дeffectively available to a substantial portion of the public."жN2Ъкf 0€д {Oр&Д-д УУSeeФФ 47 U.S.C. РР 332(d)(1). Nж In the УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ,д"к6ј 2ˆ,-(-(ZZ.№"д we concluded that CMRS includes the following former private radio services: SMR licensees that provide interconnected service, private carrier paging, and all for-profit interconnected services offered by business radio service and 220-222 MHz band licensees (we excepted, however, private paging systems that service the licensee's internal communications needs but do not offer for-profit service to д …S`У-дthird-party customers).ж~3Ъ`0€д {OШД-д УУSeeФФ УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1448Љ54, РРРР 82Љ99.~ж We concluded that CMRS also includes the following common carrier services: cellular service, all air-ground services, common carrier paging, all mobile telephone services and resellers of such services, offshore radio service, public coast stations and providers of mobile д …SшУ-дsatellite service directly to end users.жП4ьшZ0€д {Oт Д- Аx;д УУId. ФФat 1454Љ58, РРРР 100Љ109; УУsee ФФ47 C.F.R. РР 20.9. At the time of adoption of this regulation, we determined д Аxhдthat we would treat as CMRS for-profit subsidiary communications services transmitted on subcarriers within the FM д Аxџдbaseband signal that provide interconnected service, but we would use our discretion to determine whether we would д Аxдtreat the provision of space segment capacity to other than end users by satellite licensees and other entities as д {O Ѕ-дcommon carriage. УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1457Љ58, РРРР 108Љ109.Пж We also decided to treat both broadband and narrowband PCS as CMRS on a presumptive basis, but to allow PCS systems to be treated as PMRS if a carrier makes д ‡S˜У-дa showing sufficient to overcome this presumption.жK5ژ0€д {OFД-д УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 20.9(b).Kж In the УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, we determined to forbear from applying sections 203, 204, 205, 211, 212 and 214 of Title II of the д …SJ У-дCommunications Act to any service classified as CMRS.жv6ЪJ  0€д {OŠД-д УУCMRS Second Report and OrdeФФr, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1475Љ90, РРРР 164Љ213.vж While we determined УУФФto continue enforcing the remaining sections of Title II with respect to CMRS providers, we announced that we would undertake a rulemaking proceeding to evaluate the possibility of additional regulatory relief from Title II for smaller entities that had complained of the disproportionate burden the current д ‡SЊ У-дregulations imposed upon them.жЋ7ЪЊ 2 0€д {O|Д-д УУФФУУId.ФФ at 1419, 1511, 1515, РРРР 17, 272, 285. УУSee alsoФФ Separate Statement of Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett.Ћж We subsequently issued the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ to initiate that rulemaking. д ‡S4Д-дСxСиo112.и The Commission received numerous comments and reply comments on the УУFurther д ‡SД-дForbearance NPRMФФ, but the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 made sweeping changes which not only affected all consumers and telecommunications service providers, but also greatly expanded the Commission's forbearance authority. Section 332(c) authorizes the Commission to д …S˜У-дforbear from applying most provisions of Title II to any CMRS "service or person."жC8ؘФ 0€д yOќД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 332(c)(1).Cж Under our section 10 authority, by contrast, we may forbear from applying almost any regulation or provision of the Act to any "telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services, in any or some of their geographic д …SјУ-дmarkets."жF9ШјT 0€д yOь$Д-д УУФФ47 U.S.C. РР 160(a).Fж The 1996 Act also added section 11, which directs us biennially to review all of our telecommunications regulations and repeal or modify any regulations that we determine are no longer necessary in the public interest as the result of meaningful economic competition between providers ofд"Ј7ф9ˆ,-(-(ZZс"д д …SУ-дservice.ж=:Ш0€д yOhД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 161.=ж Because these legal changes and changes in the telecommunications marketplace have made д ‡SиД-дportions of the record in the УУFurther Forbearance NPRM ФФstale, we terminate УУФФthat proceeding УУФФand seek new comments regarding forbearance from applying any regulation or provision of the Act to wireless telecommunications carriers licensed by the Commission. Such carriers include telecommunications carriers licensed under Part 21 (domestic public fixed radio services), Part 22 (public mobile radio д …S:У-дservices), Part 24 (personal communications services), Part 90 (private land mobile radio services),жQ;X:X0€д yO2Д- Аxyд Although Part 90 governs "private land mobile radio services," certain SMR, paging, and other service д Аxxдproviders regulated under Part 90 have been classified as CMRS providers, and therefore fall within the definition of "telecommunications carrier" under the Act.Qж д …SУ-дand Part 101 (fixed microwave services)ж <x0€д yO* Д- АxJд Part 101 governs both common carrier and private fixed pointЉtoЉpoint microwave services. However, only common carrier microwave licensees are telecommunications carriers eligible for forbearance under this Notice. ж of our rules.ж†=Zа0€д yO‚Д- Аxд However, licensees governed by these rule parts who do not meet the definition of "telecommunications д {OJЅ- АxKдcarrier" (УУe.g., ФФpublic safety and private microwave licensees) are beyond the scope of our section 10 forbearance д yOЅ-дauthority, and therefore are not subject to thУУФФis Notice.†ж д ‡SТД-дСxСиp113.и We believe the goals we identified in the УУCMRS Second Report and Order ФФmirror those set for us by Congress in the 1996 Act: reduce the regulatory burden upon, and foster vigorous and д …StУ-дfair competition among, telecommunications providers.жm>Ъtђ 0€д {OД-д УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1418Љ19, РР 16.mж We are continually striving to meet those goals. For example, our decision to forbear from applying tariffing requirements in sections 203, 204, д …S$ У-дand 205 to CMRS providers significantly reduced the filing burdens placed upon such providers.ж?Ъ$ „ 0€д {OHД-д УУSee id.ФФ at 1475Љ81, РРРР 165Љ82; H.R.Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. at 259-60 (1993).ж Continuing this trend, we recently granted the FCBA's forbearance petition and that portion of PCIA's д ‡Sд Д-дpetition relating to УУpro forma ФФtransfers and assignments, subject to several exceptions, eliminating the requirement that telecommunications carriers licensed by the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau д ‡S† Д-дobtain prior Commission approval before consummating УУpro formaФФ transactions, УУi.e.ФФ, transactions that д …S`У-дdo not constitute a substantial change of control.жX@Ъ`0€д {OД-д УУFCBA OrderФФ, 13 FCC Rcd. at 6299, РР 9.Xж As we have stated in other proceedings, however, the decision to forbear from enforcing statutes or regulations is not a simple decision, and must be based upon a record that contains more than broad, unsupported allegations of why the statutory д …SшУ-дcriteria are met.жA^шЈ0€д {O0"Д- Аxд УУSeeФФ Bell Operating Companies Petitions for Forbearance from the Application of Section 272 of the д {Oњ"Ѕ- АxдCommunications Act of 1934, As Amended, to Certain Activities, УУMemorandum Opinion and OrderФФ, 13 FCC Rcd. д {OФ#Ѕ-д2627 (Comm. Carr. Bur. 1998). УУSee alsoФФ УУCAP Forbearance OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. 8596.ж СxС СxСиq114.и Section 332(c) and section 10 differ in scope, yet set forth similar threeЉpronged tests д ‡SpД-дthat must be met in order for us to exercise our forbearance authority. Since we issued the УУFurther д ‡SJД-дForbearance NPRMФФ prior to the passage of section 10, we seek comment as to whether the differencesд"J8ЮAˆ,-(-(ZZс"д in language between section 332(c) and section 10 necessitate a departure from the criteria we д ‡SиД-дenunciated in the УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ as a test for whether we would use our authority to forbear. These criteria are: (1) how the relevant statutory forbearance test and in particular the cost/benefit analysis we associate with the last prong of the test apply to the provision sought to be forborne from, (2) how forbearance from applying the provision would enhance future CMRS competition, (3) how Congressional intent underlying the provision would be affected, (4) how forbearance for particular types of CMRS providers would comport with regulatory symmetry and (5) whether there are other factors or alternatives we should consider in classifying CMRS for further д …SТУ-дforbearance purposes.жeBЪТ0€д {O* Д-д УУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 2165, РР 8.eж We further ask, since our authority under section 332(c) was limited to deregulation of commercial mobile services, whether we should extend any forbearance pursuant to д ‡SrД-дsection 10 to wireless carriers other than those classified as CMRS, УУe.g.ФФ, wireless competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), in order to promote their role in providing competition in the local exchange market. СxСиr115.и If commenters seek forbearance from particular statutory provisions or regulations, we ask them to primarily focus their analysis on whether forbearance is warranted under the three-pronged test of either section 332 or section 10. In connection with the third prong of the test, the public interest standard, commenters should show whether the costs incurred by carriers to comply with particular provisions outweigh the benefits to the public to be gained in applying them, as well as whether forbearance from particular statutory provisions would enhance future competition from a diversity of entities and thus tend to justify a finding that forbearance served the public interest. It would also be useful for commenting parties to consider and comment upon: (i) the original purpose of the particular rule in question; (ii) the means by which the rule was meant to further that purpose; (iii) the state of competition in the relevant market at the time the rule was promulgated; (iv) the current state of competition as compared to that which existed at the time of the rule's adoption; (v) how any changes in competitive market conditions between the time the rule was promulgated and the present might obviate, remedy, or otherwise eliminate the concerns that originally motivated the д …SЬУ-дadoption of the rule; and (vi) the ultimate effect forbearance may have on consumers.жёC’ЬZ0€д {OЦД- Аx-дУУ See ФФ1998 Biennial Review ЉЉ Broadcast Ownership Rules, MM Docket No. 98-35, УУNotice of InquiryФФ, FCC 98Љ37 (rel. March 13, 1998) (Statement of Comm'r Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth).ёж СxСиs116.и We also seek comment on whether there exist, within CMRS and other wireless telecommunications markets, types of providers for which application of a particular statutory or regulatory provision will either pose undue costs or yield no benefits to the public. For example, if the costs of regulation are fixed, smaller providers could be more likely than other types of providers д …SмД-дto be burdened by the costs of regulation. We believe УУФФtwo factors of the public interest test that we д …SДУ-дhave proposed to apply under section 332(c) can serve to guide our determinations in this area.жoDЪДД0€д {O#Д-д УУSee ФФУУFurther Forbearance NPRMФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 2165, РР 8.oж The first is whether differential costs of compliance with particular laws or regulations make forbearance appropriate for particular types of providers. The second is whether the public interest benefits from application of particular provisions vary among the different types of providers. д" 9FDˆ,-(-(ZZ“!с"дŒСxСиt117.и In addition, we ask interested parties to comment on how forbearance for particular types д …SиУ-дof providers would comport with the goal of regulatory symmetry,жХE’и0€д {O@Д- АxZд УУSeeФФ H.R.Rep. No. 111, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. at 259-60 (1993); УУCMRS Second Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1417-22, РРРР 13Љ29.Хж bearing in mind that our д …SАУ-дforbearance authority permits different regulation of different providers.жЮFА"0€д yOrД- Аx№д Section 10 explicitly grants us this authority; the Congressional intent underlying section 332(c) would also permit such application of its provisions.Юж Specifically, we seek comment on whether limiting forbearance to only some CMRS or other wireless telecommunications д ‡S`Д-дcarriers would undermine regulatory symmetry and the regulatory scheme established in the УУCMRS д ‡S:Д-дSecond Report and OrderФФ. д …SьД-дСxСиu118.и Finally, we ask interested parties to suggest any other factors or alternatives that we should consider when evaluating forbearance petitions affecting telecommunications services or providers licensed or regulated by the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau. аа д …SL Д-даадЧдУ УззVI. CONCLUSIONФ ФзздTьдаадPАд д …Sќ Д-дааСxСиv119.и We find, based on the record before us, that the section 10 forbearance standard is not satisfied for sections 201 and 202 of the Act and 47 C.F.R. РР 20.12(b) (the resale rule) with respect to broadband PCS and other CMRS providers, and deny PCIA's request to forbear from requiring broadband PCS providers to comply with these provisions. We also find that the section 10 forbearance standard is not satisfied with respect to the requirement that broadband PCS and other CMRS providers obtain section 214 authorization for providing international services. Forbearance is, however, warranted from the requirement that these carriers file tariffs for their international services, except on affiliated routes, and we find that this forbearance should be extended to all CMRS providers. Forbearance is also warranted from the provisions of TOCSIA that require CMRS aggregators to provide unblocked access and related provisions, as well as the requirement that CMRS OSPs file informational tariffs. We find, however, that the factual record is insufficient to support forbearance from enforcement of the other provisions of TOCSIA at this time, and we solicit further information in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that we hope will provide a basis for determining whether to forbear from applying other provisions of TOCSIA in the future. СxСиw120.и We also find that GTE has failed to raise any new facts or legal arguments in support of its contention that TOCSIA does not apply to certain activities of its mobile affiliates, and therefore we deny its Petition for Reconsideration. д ‡SД-дСxСиx121.и We also dismiss the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking entitled УУFurther Forbearance from д ‡SоД-дTitle II Regulation for Certain Types of Commercial Mobile Radio Service ProvidersФФ because the record no longer reflects our expanded forbearance authority. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking we issue today seeks comment regarding additional forbearance from regulation in wireless telecommunications markets. д …S Д-даадџTдУ УззVII. ORDERING CLAUSESФ Фзз дTьдаадPАдд"№ :zFˆ,-(-(ZZe"с"дŒСxСиy122.и Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 10, 11 and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. РРРР 151, 154(i), 160, 161 and 332, the outstanding portions of the Petition for Forbearance filed by the Broadband Personal Communications Services Alliance of the Personal Communications Industry Association on May 22, 1997, ARE GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART to the extent discussed above. СxСиz123.и IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 226 and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. РРРР 151, 154(i), 226 and 332, the Petition for Reconsideration or Waiver filed by GTE on September 27, 1993, IS DENIED. СxСи{124.и IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i) and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. РРРР 151, 154(i) and 332, the rulemaking proceeding captioned Further Forbearance from Title II Regulation for Certain Types of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, GN Docket No. 94Љ33, IS TERMINATED. СxСи|125.и IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 10, 11, 303(g), 303(r) and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. РРРР 151, 154(i), 160, 161, 303(g), 303(r) and 332, a NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING is hereby ADOPTED. СxСи}126.и IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to applicable procedures set forth in Sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's Rules, 47 C.F.R. РРРР 1.415 and 1.419, interested parties may file д …SИД-дcomments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on or before У УAugust 3, 1998Ф Ф, and reply comments д …SД-дon or before У УAugust 18, 1998Ф Ф. Comments and reply comments should be filed in WT Docket No. 98Њ100. To file formally in this proceeding, you must file an original plus four copies of all comments, reply comments, and supporting comments. For each Commissioner to receive a personal copy of your comments, you must file an original plus nine copies. Send comments and reply comments to Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Washington D.C. 20554. Comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center (Room 239), 1919 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. For further information contact Jeffrey Steinberg at 202Љ418Љ0620 or Kim Parker at 202Љ418Љ7240. СxСи~127.и IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, Parts 20 and 64 of the Commission's Rules ARE AMENDED as specified in Appendix C, effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. д ‡SАД-дСxСи128.и This is a permitЉbutЉdisclose notice and comment rulemaking proceeding. УУEx parteФФ presentations are permitted except during the Sunshine Agenda period, provided they are disclosed as д ‡SbД-дprovided in the Commission's rules. УУSee generallyФФ 47 C.F.R. РРРР 1.1202, 1.203, and 1.206(a). д"<;Fˆ,-(-(ZZ… с"д д'ц$ЏBи€1.и'д СxСи€129.и As required by Section 603 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. РР 603, the Commission has prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the expected impact on small entities of the proposals suggested in this document. The IRFA is set forth in Appendix A. Written public comments are requested on the IRFA. These comments must be filed in accordance with the same filing deadlines as comments on the rest of the Notice, but they must have a separate and distinct heading designating them as responses to the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. The Commission's Office of Public Affairs, Reference Operations Division, shall send a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rule Making, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. ааpџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџuџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааСxССuu;СFEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION СxССuu;СMagalie Roman Salas СxССuu;СSecretaryд"0<Fˆ,-(-(ZZвс"д д …SД-дВСрГь,СУ УAPPENDIX AФ Фƒ аа д …SАД-дСxССрs ьЛСУ УINITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSISФ Фƒ д …S`У-дСxСAs required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),жxGZ`0…д {OШД- АxЇд УУSee ФФ5 U.S.C. РР 603. The RFA, УУsee ФФ5 U.S.C. РРРР 601 УУet seqФФ., has been amended by the Contract With д АxвдAmerica Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104Љ121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) (CWAAA). Title II of CWAAA is the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA).xж the Commission has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible impact on small entities of the rules д …SД-дproposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (УУФФNotice) in WT Docket No. 98ЉXX. Written public comments are requested on the IRFA. Comments on the IRFA must have a separate and distinct heading designating them as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments д …S˜Д-дon theУУФФ Notice. The Commission will send a copy of theУУФФ Notice, including this IRFA, to the Chief д …SpД-дCounsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. In addition, theУУФФ Notice and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register. A. Need for, and objectives of, the proposed rules: д …SЈ Д-дСxС In thisУУФФ Notice, the Commission proposes to consider forbearing from applying provisions of section 226 of the Communications Act (Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act or д …SXУ-дTOCSIA)жCHШXъ0…д yOтД-д 47 U.S.C. РР 226.УУФФCж to Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) providers and aggregators of CMRS, as well as modifying its rules applying TOCSIA to those entities. Specifically, the Commission proposes to: (1) continue to require some form of disclosure to consumers by CMRS aggregators similar to that mandated by section 226(b)(1)(D) of the Act, although the precise nature of the disclosure may be modified; (2) forbear from requiring CMRS aggregators to post disclosure information "on or near the telephone instrument," and instead permit all or some CMRS aggregators to use some other reasonable means of disclosure; and (3) continue to require CMRS providers of operator service (OSPs) to ensure д …S@У-дby contract or tariff that aggregators will comply with the disclosure requirements.ж I’@z0…д yOZД- Аxџд Definitions of aggregator and OSP can be found at 47 U.S.C. РР 226(a)(2) and (9), 47 C.F.R. РР 64.708(b) and д {O"Ѕ-д(i), and para. 66 of the Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, УУsupraФФ. ж СxСIn addition, the Commission requests comment on whether it should forbear from applying other provisions of TOCSIA in the CMRS context or whether these requirements should be modified as applied to CMRS aggregators and OSPs. These provisions include requirements that OSPs identify themselves to consumers, disclose certain information, and permit termination of calls before connection at no charge upon request; that OSPs refrain from billing for unanswered calls in areas where equal access is available and refrain from knowingly billing for unanswered calls in areas where equal access is unavailable; that OSPs avoid certain call transfer and billing practices known as "call splashing"; that OSPs make publicly available information about recent changes in their operator services; and that OSPs and aggregators ensure immediate connection of emergency telephone calls. д …SˆД-дThe Commission's objective is to formulate rules that are responsive to the differences between CMRS and fixed services provided through aggregators, that avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on CMRSд"`=дIˆ,-(-(ZZбс"д OSPs and aggregators, and that provide consumers who obtain CMRS through aggregators with protections comparable to those enjoyed by other consumers of CMRS. д …SАД-д СxСThe Notice also seeks comment on forbearance from applying other provisions of the Act to all wireless telecommunications carriers licensed by the Commission, including telecommunications carriers licensed under Part 21 (domestic public fixed radio services), Part 22 (public mobile radio services), Part 24 (personal communications services), Part 90 (private land mobile radio services), and Part 101 (fixed microwave services) of our rules. The Commission's objective is to reduce regulatory burdens upon providers of wireless telecommunications services where consistent with the public interest, and thus to foster vigorous and fair competition among these providers. B. Legal basis: СxСThe proposed action is authorized under sections 1, 4(i), 10, 11 and 332(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. РРРР 151, 154(i), 160, 161 and 332(c). C. Description and estimate of the number of small entities to which rules will apply: СxСThe RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the д …SУ-дnumber of small entities that will be affected by our rules.жXJШ0…д yOpД-дСxС5 U.S.C. РРРР 603(b)(3), 604(a)(3).Xж The RFA generally defines the term "small entity" as having the same meaning as the terms "small business," "small organization," and д …SИУ-д"small governmental jurisdiction."жFKШИX0…д yOАД-дСxС5 U.S.C. РР 601(6).Fж A small organization is generally "any notЉforЉprofit enterprise д …SУ-дwhich is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field."жFLШш0…д yOД-дСxС5 U.S.C. РР 601(4).Fж Nationwide, there are д …ShУ-д275,801 small organizations.жтMhx0…д yO€Д-  дСxС1992 Economic Census, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table 6 (special tabulation of data under contract to Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration).тж "Small governmental jurisdiction" generally means "governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population of д …SУ-дless than 50,000."жFNШа0…д yOˆД-дСxС5 U.S.C. РР 601(5).Fж As of 1992, there were 85,006 such jurisdictions in the United States.жOШ` 0…д yO Д-дСxСU.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "1992 Census of Governments."ж СxСIn addition, the term "small business" has the same meaning as the term "small business д …S У-дconcern" under Section 3 of the Small Business Act.жЄPШ № 0…д yO0$Д-дСxС5 U.S.C. РР 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of "small business concern" in 15 U.S.C. РР 632).Єж Under the Small Business Act, a "small д …SxД-дbusiness concern" is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in itsд"x>€ Pˆ,-(-(ZZзс"д д …SД-дfield of operation; and (3) meets any additional criteria established by the Small Business д …SиУ-дAdministration (SBA).жDQШи0…д yO@Д-дСxС15 U.S.C. РР 632.Dж СxСThe Notice could result in rule changes that, if adopted, would affect all small businesses that are aggregators or providers of CMRS operator services as well as all small business that are wireless telecommunications carriers. To assist the Commission in analyzing the total number of affected small entities, commenters are requested to provide estimates of the number of small entities that may be affected by any rule changes resulting from the Notice. The Commission estimates the following number of small entities may be affected by the proposed rule changes: д …SpД-дУ УСxСCellular Radiotelephone ServiceФ Ф. The Commission has not developed a definition of small entities applicable to cellular licensees. Therefore, the applicable definition of small entity is the definition under the SBA rules applicable to radiotelephone companies. This definition provides that a д …Sј У-дsmall entity is a radiotelephone company employing no more than 1,500 persons.ж|RШј X0…д yO№Д-дСxС13 C.F.R. РР 121.201, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code 4812.|ж The size data provided by the SBA does not enable us to make a meaningful estimate of the number of cellular providers which are small entities because it combines all radiotelephone companies with 1,000 or д …S€ У-дmore employees.ж3SX€ ш0…д yOД-  .дСxСU.S. Small Business Administration 1992 Economic Census Employment Report, Bureau of the Census, U.S. д АxдDepartment of Commerce (radiotelephone communications industry data adopted by the SBA Office of Advocacy) (SIC Code 4812). 3ж The 1992 Census of Transportation, Communications, and Utilities, conducted by the Bureau of the Census, is the most recent information available. This document shows that only twelve radiotelephone firms out of a total of 1,178 such firms which operated during 1992 had 1,000 д …SУ-дor more employees.жHTX0…д yOАД-  КдСxСU.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992 Census of Transportation, д АxДдCommunications, and Utilities, UC92ЉSЉ1, Subject Series, Establishment and Firm Size, Table 5, Employment Size of Firms: 1992, SIC Code 4812 (issued May 1995). Hж Therefore, even if all twelve of these firms were cellular telephone companies, д …SрД-дnearly all cellular carriers were small businesses under the SBA's definition. The Commission assumes, for purposes of this IRFA, that all of the current cellular licensees are small entities, as that term is defined by the SBA. In addition, the Commission notes that there are 1,758 cellular licenses; however, a cellular licensee may own several licenses. The most reliable source of information regarding the number of cellular service providers nationwide appears to be data the Commission д ‡SД-дpublishes annually in its УУTelecommunications Industry RevenueФФ report, regarding the Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS). The report places cellular licensees and Personal Communications Service (PCS) licensees in one group. According to the data released in November д …SЂУ-д1997, there are 804 companies reporting that they engage in cellular or PCS service.жзUЂ( 0…д yOj#Д-  ѓдСxСFCC, Telecommunications Industry Revenue: TRS Fund Worksheet Data, Figure 2 (Number of Carriers Paying Into the TRS Fund by Type of Carrier) (Nov. 1997).зж It seems certain that some of these carriers are not independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees; however, the Commission is unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of cellular service carriers qualifying as small business concerns under the SBA's definition.д"*?€ Uˆ,-(-(ZZŠс"д For purposes of this IRFA, the Commission estimates that there are fewer than 804 small cellular service carriers. д …SˆД-дСxСУ УBroadband PCS. Ф ФУУФФThe broadband PCS spectrum is divided into six frequency blocks designated A through F. The Commission has defined "small entity" in the auctions for Blocks C and F as a firm that had average gross revenues of less than $40 million in the three previous calendar д …SУ-дyears.жWVЪ0…д {OxД-дСxСУУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РР 24.720(b)(1).Wж This definition of "small entity" in the context of broadband PCS auctions has been approved д …SшУ-дby the SBA.жW”шZ0…д {Oт Д-  ђдСxСУУSeeФФ Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act ЉЉ Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. д {OЌ Ѕ-д93Љ253, УУFifth Report and OrderФФ, 9 FCC Rcd. 5532, 5581Љ84 (1994).ж The Commission has auctioned broadband PCS licenses in blocks A through F. Of the qualified bidders in the C and F block auctions, all were entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs was defined for these auctions as entities, together with affiliates, having gross revenues of less than $125 million and total assets of less than $500 million at the time the FCC Form 175 application was filed. Ninety bidders, including C block reauction winners, won 493 C block licenses and 88 bidders won 491 F block licenses. For purposes of this IRFA, the Commission assumes that all of the 90 C block broadband PCS licensees and 88 F block broadband PCS licensees, a total of 178 licensees, are small entities. д …S€ Д-дУУФФСxСУ УNarrowband PCS. Ф ФУУФФThe Commission has auctioned nationwide and regional licenses for narrowband PCS. There are 11 nationwide and 30 regional licensees for narrowband PCS. The Commission does not have sufficient information to determine whether any of these licensees are small businesses within the SBA-approved definition for radiotelephone companies. At present, there have been no auctions held for the major trading area (MTA) and basic trading area (BTA) narrowband PCS licenses. The Commission anticipates a total of 561 MTA licenses and 2,958 BTA licenses will be awarded in the auctions. Given that nearly all radiotelephone companies have no more than 1,500 д …ShД-дemployees, and that no reliable estimate of the number of prospective MTA and BTA narrowband licensees can be made, the Commission assumes, for purposes of this IRFA, that all of the licenses will be awarded to small entities, as that term is defined by the SBA. д …SШД-дСxСУ У220 MHz Radio Services.Ф Ф Commercial licenses in the 220Љ222 MHz band are divided into д …S У-дtwo categories.ж XД Ж0…д yOіД- Аxˆд Some channels in the 220Љ222 MHz band are reserved for Public Safety and Emergency Medical Radio д АxџдServices. Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules To Provide for the Use of the 220Љ222 MHz Band by д {O†Ѕ- Аxwдthe Private Land Mobile Radio Service, УУThird Report and Order; Fifth Notice of Proposed RulemakingФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. д Аxyд10943, 10972Љ79, РРРР 59Љ72 (1997). In addition, qualified entities may obtain secondary licenses to use these д {O!Ѕ- АxJдfrequencies for fixed geophysical telemetry operations. УУId.ФФ at 11009Љ12, РРРР 140Љ146. These licensees would not be affected by any rules adopted pursuant to this Notice. ж Phase I licensees are licensees granted initial authorizations from among д …SxУ-дapplications filed on or before May 24, 1991.жCYШx2 0…д yOJ$Д-д 47 C.F.R. РР 90.701(b).Cж The Commission has not adopted a definition of small business specific to Phase I 220 MHz licensees. Accordingly, the Commission will use the SBA д ‡S(Д-дdefinition applicable to radiotelephone companies, УУi.e.ФФ, an entity employing no more than 1,500 persons. Approximately 1,515 nonЉnationwide Phase I licenses and four nationwide Phase I licensesд"@Т Yˆ,-(-(ZZ\с"д д …SД-дhave been awarded. The Commission estimates that almost all of the holders of these licenses are small entities under the SBA definition. СxСPhase II licensees are licensees granted initial authorizations from among applications filed д …S`У-дafter May 24, 1991.жCZШ`0…д yOШД-д 47 C.F.R. РР 90.701(c).Cж The Commission has adopted a twoЉtiered definition of small businesses in the д …S8Д-дcontext of auctioning Phase II licenses in the 220Љ222 MHz band. A small business is defined as either (1) an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenue for the three preceding years of not more than $3 million; or (2) an entity that, together with affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenue for the three preceding years of not д …S˜У-дmore than $15 million.жD[ؘX0…д yO Д-д 47 C.F.R. РР 90.1021(b).Dж This definition of small business has been approved by the SBA.жj\ؘш0…д yO Д-д Letter from A. Alvarez, SBA, to D. Phythyon, FCC (Jan. 6, 1998).jж There have not been any auctions to date of 220 MHz licenses, and it is therefore impossible accurately to д …SH Д-дpredict how many eventual licensees out of the auctions process will be small entities.У УФ Ф Based on its experience with auctions of SMR licenses in the 900 MHz band, however, the Commission estimates that for the 908 auctionable licenses in the 220 MHz band, there will be approximately 120 applicants, of which approximately 92 will be small entities within either prong of the definition approved by the д …SЈ У-дSBA.жu]ЪЈ x0…д {OРД-д УУSee 220 MHz Third Report and OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. at 11096, Appendix A.uж д …SXД-дСxСУ УPaging. Ф ФУУФФУ УФ ФThe Commission has proposed a two-tier definition of small businesses in the context of auctioning geographic area paging licenses in the Common Carrier Paging and exclusive Private Carrier Paging services. Under the proposal, a small business will be defined as either (1) an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues for the three preceding years of not more than $3 million; or (2) an entity that, together with affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues for the three preceding calendar years of not more than $15 million. Since the SBA has not yet approved this definition for paging services, the д ‡S@Д-дCommission will utilize the SBA definition applicable to radiotelephone companies, УУi.e., ФФan entity employing no more than 1,500 persons. At present, there are approximately 24,000 Private Paging д ‡SђД-дlicenses and 74,000 Common Carrier Paging licenses. According to УУTelecommunications Industry д ‡SЬД-дRevenueФФ data, there were 172 "paging and other mobile" carriers reporting that they engage in these д …SІУ-дservices.жз^І 0…д yOP Д-  ѓдСxСFCC, Telecommunications Industry Revenue: TRS Fund Worksheet Data, Figure 2 (Number of Carriers Paying Into the TRS Fund by Type of Carrier) (Nov. 1997).зж Consequently, the Commission estimates that there are fewer than 172 small paging carriers. The Commission estimates that the majority of private and common carrier paging providers would qualify as small entities under the SBA definition. д …SД-дСxСУ УAir-Ground Radiotelephone Service.Ф Ф The Commission has not adopted a definition of small д …SоУ-дbusiness specific to the Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service.жŸ_Шоb 0…д yOр&Д-дСxСAirЉGround radiotelephone service is defined in section 22.99 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. РР 22.99.Ÿж Accordingly, the Commission will useд"оAђ _ˆ,-(-(ZZ=№"д д ‡SД-дthe SBA definition applicable to radiotelephone companies,УУ i.eФФ., an entity employing no more than 1,500 persons. There are approximately 100 licensees in the Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service, and the Commission estimates that almost all of them qualify as small entities under the SBA definition. д …SbД-дСxСУ УSpecialized Mobile Radio (SMR).Ф Ф The Commission awards bidding credits in auctions for geographic area 800 MHz and 900 MHz SMR licenses to firms that had revenues of no more than $15 million in each of the three previous calendar years. This regulation defining "small entity" in the context of 800 MHz and 900 MHz SMR has been approved by the SBA. The Commission does not know how many firms provide 800 MHz or 900 MHz geographic area SMR service pursuant to extended implementation authorizations, nor how many of these providers have annual revenues of no more than $15 million. One firm has over $15 million in revenues. The Commission assumes for purposes of this IRFA that all of the remaining existing extended implementation authorizations are held by small entities, as that term is defined by the SBA. The Commission has held auctions for geographic area licenses in the 900 MHz SMR band, and recently completed an auction for geographic area 800 MHz SMR licenses. There were 60 winning bidders who qualified as small entities in the 900 MHz auction. There were 10 winning bidders who qualified as small entities in the 800 MHz auction. д …S2Д-дСxСУ УOffshore Radiotelephone Service.Ф Ф This service operates on several ultra high frequency (UHF) TV broadcast channels that are not used for TV broadcasting in the coastal area of the states bordering the Gulf of Mexico. At present, there are approximately 55 licensees in this service. The Commission is unable at this time to estimate the number of licensees that would qualify as small entities under the SBA definition for radiotelephone communications. The Commission assumes, for purposes of this IRFA, that all of the 55 licensees are small entities, as that term is defined by the д …SBД-дSBA. д …SђД-дСxСУ УGeneral Wireless Communications Service.Ф Ф This service was created by the Commission on д …SЪУ-дJuly 31, 1995жн`”Ъ0…д {O2Д-  kдСxСУУSeeФФ Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Federal Government Use, УУSecond Report and д {OќЅ-дOrderФФ, 11 FCC Rcd. 624 (1995).нж by transferring 25 MHz of spectrum in the 4660Љ4685 MHz band from the federal government to private sector use. The Commission is unable at this time to estimate the number of д …SzД-дlicensees that would qualify as small entities under the SBA definition for radiotelephone communications. д …SД-дСxСУ УCommon Carrier Fixed Microwave Services.Ф Ф Microwave services include common carrier д …SкУ-дfixed,жƒaЪк$0…д {Ož Д-дСxС47 C.F.R. РРРР 101 УУet seqФФ. (formerly Part 21 of the Commission's rules).ƒж private operationalЉfixed,жjbъкЖ0…д yO0"Д-  ^дСxСPersons eligible under Parts 80 and 90 of the Commission's rules can use private operational fixed д {Oј"Ѕ- Аx—дmicrowave services. УУSeeФФ 47 C.F.R. РРРР 80.1 УУet seq.ФФ; 47 C.F.R. РРРР 90.1 УУet seqФФ. Stations in this service are called д АxдoperationalЉfixed to distinguish them from common carrier and public fixed stations. Only the licensee may use an д АxiдoperationalЉfixed station, and only for communications related to the licensee's commercial, industrial, or safety operations.jж and broadcast auxiliary radio services.ж'cДкh 0…д {OД-  ‰дСxСAuxiliary Microwave Service is governed by Part 74 of Title 47 of the Commission's rules. УУ SeeФФ 47 C.F.R. д {OZЅ- АxiдРРРР 74.1 УУet seqФФ. Available to licensees of broadcast stations and to broadcast and cable network entities, broadcast д Аxдauxiliary microwave stations are used for relaying broadcast television signals from the studio to the transmitter, or д Аxсдbetween two points, such as a main studio and an auxiliary studio. The broadcast auxiliary microwave services also д Аx[дinclude mobile TV pickups which relay signals from a remote location back to the studio. This service is not д yO|Ѕ-дincluded within the scope of this Notice.УУФФ'ж Of these, only operatorsд"кBDcˆ,-(-(ZZ№"д in the common carrier fixed microwave service are telecommunications carriers that could be affected by the adoption of rules pursuant to this Notice. At present, there are 22,015 common carrier fixed microwave licensees. The Commission has not yet defined a small business with respect to microwave services. For purposes of this IRFA, the Commission will utilize the SBA definition applicable to д ‡S`Д-дradiotelephone companies, УУi.eФФ., an entity employing no more than 1,500 persons. The Commission д …S:Д-дestimates that for purposes of this IRFA all of the common carrier fixed microwave licensees would qualify as small entities under the SBA definition for radiotelephone communications. д …SТД-дСxСУ УRural Radiotelephone Service. Ф ФThe Commission has not adopted a definition of small entity д …SšУ-дspecific to the Rural Radiotelephone Service.жšdШšD0…д yO~Д-дСxСRural Radiotelephone Service is defined in section 22.99 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. РР 22.99.šж A significant subset of the Rural Radiotelephone д …SrУ-дService is the Basic Exchange Telephone Radio Systems (BETRS).жeШrд0…д yOцД-дСxСBETRS is defined in sections 22.757 and 22.729 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. РРРР 22.757, 22.729.ж The Commission will use the д ‡SJ Д-дSBA definition applicable to radiotelephone companies; УУi.e.ФФ, an entity employing no more than 1,500 persons. There are approximately 1,000 licensees in the Rural Radiotelephone Service, and the Commission estimates that almost all of them qualify as small entities under the SBA definition. д …SЌ Д-дСxСУ УMarine Coast Service. Ф ФThe Commission has not adopted a definition of small business specific to the marine coast service. The Commission will use the SBA definition applicable to д ‡S\Д-дradiotelephone companies; УУi.e.ФФ, an entity employing no more than 1,500 persons. There are approximately 10,500 licensees in the marine coast service, and the Commission estimates that almost all of them qualify as small under the SBA definition. д …SОД-дСxСУ УWireless Communications Services (WCS). Ф ФWCS is a wireless service which can be used for fixed, mobile, radiolocation, and digital audio broadcasting satellite uses. The Commission will д ‡SnД-дuse the SBA definition applicable to radiotelephone companies, УУi.e.ФФ, an entity employing no more than д …SHУ-д1,500 persons, while it seeks SBA approval of a more refined definition.ж9f$Hd 0…д yOLД-  фдСxСThe Commission defined "small business" for the WCS auction as an entity with average gross revenues д Аxhдof $40 million or less in the three preceding years and "very small business" as an entity with average gross revenues д {Oм Ѕ- Аxwдof $15 million or less in the three preceding years. УУSee ФФAmendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish Part 27, д {OІ!Ѕ-дthe Wireless Communications Service ("WCS"), УУReport and OrderФФ, 12 FCC Rcd. 10785 (1997).9ж The Commission auctioned geographic area licenses in the WCS service. Based upon the information obtained in the auctions process, the Commission concludes that eight WCS licensees are small entities. СxСIn addition to the above estimates, new licensees in the wireless radio services will be affected by these rules, if adopted. CMRS aggregators will also be affected by these rules, if adopted. The Commission does not have any basis for estimating the number of CMRS aggregators that may beд"XCP fˆ,-(-(ZZ‹с"д small entities. To assist the Commission in analyzing the numbers of potentially affected small entities, commenters are requested to provide information regarding how many small business entities may be affected by the proposed rules. D. Description of reporting, record keeping and other compliance requirements: СxСThe Notice proposes no additional reporting, recordkeeping or other compliance measures and seeks to minimize such burdens for CMRS aggregators and OSPs. As noted, we propose to forbear from requiring CMRS aggregators to post disclosure information "on or near the telephone instrument," and instead permit all or some CMRS aggregators to use some other reasonable means of disclosure. E. Steps taken to minimize the significant economic impact on small entities, and significant alternatives considered: СxСThe Notice proposes to reduce the administrative burdens and cost of compliance with TOCSIA and the Commission's implementing regulations for CMRS aggregators and OSPs generally. This reduction of burden will economically benefit small entities within these categories. In addition, the Commission seeks comment on ways of reducing regulatory burdens by forbearing from applying any provisions of the Communications Act to wireless telecommunications carriers, including those carriers that are small business entities. We specifically request comment on whether forbearance from applying any statutory provision is appropriate with respect to smaller CMRS providers. F. Federal rules which overlap, duplicate, or conflict with these proposed rules: СxСNone. д"№Dfˆ,-(-(ZZкс"д д …SД-даад*šдУ УAPPENDIX BФ Ф дTьд д …SАД-дд—Ч дУ УLIST OF COMMENTERS AND SHORTЉFORM NAMES USEDФ Ф дTьд д …S`Д-ддёсдУ УУУComments on the PCIA PetitionФ ФФФ дTьдаадPАд America One Communications, Inc. (America One) American Mobile Telecommunications Association, Inc. (AMTA) AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (AT&T) Bell Atlantic NYNEX Mobile, Inc. (Bell Atlantic NYNEX) BellSouth Corporation (BellSouth) Cellnet of Ohio, Inc. (Cellnet) Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) Competitive Telecommunications Association (CompTel) CONXUS Communications, Inc. (CONXUS) General Wireless, Inc. (GWI) GTE Service Corporation (GTE) KCI Communications Corp. d/b/a/ One Source (One Source) MCI Communications Corporation (MCI) National Wireless Resellers Association (NWRA) Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel) Omnipoint Communications, Inc. (Omnipoint) PrimeCo Personal Communications, L.P. (PrimeCo) Rural Telecommunications Group (RTG) д …SД-дSouthEast Telephone, Ltd. (SouthEast) Sprint PCS and American Personal Communications (Sprint/APC) Telecommunications Resellers Association (TRA) WorldCom, Inc. (WorldCom) д …SPД-дУ УСрн ьнСУУReply Comments on the PCIA PetitionФ ФФФƒ AirTouch Communications, Inc. (AirTouch) American Mobile Telecommunications Association, Inc. (AMTA) AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (AT&T) BellSouth Corporation (BellSouth) Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) National Wireless Resellers Association (NWRA) Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel) Northcoast Communications, LLC (Northcoast) Personal Communications Industry Association (PCIA) д …S˜"Д-дPrimeCo Personal Communications, L.P. (PrimeCo) Telecommunications Resellers Association (TRA) Touch 1 Wireless (Touch 1) д …S %Д-дUS WEST, Inc. (US WEST)У УФ Фд" %Efˆ,-(-(ZZЌ&с"д д …SД-даад֘ дУ УФ ФУ УФ ФУ УУУComments on the Further Forbearance NPRMФ ФФФ дTьдаадPАд Alltel Service Corporation (Alltel) American Mobile Telecommunications Association, Inc. (AMTA) Applied Technology Group, Inc. (Applied) AT&T Corporation (AT&T) Bell Atlantic Mobile Systems, Inc. (BANM) BellSouth Corporation (BellSouth) Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) Dial Page, Inc. (Dial Page) E.F. Johnson Company (E.F. Johnson) Geotek Communications, Inc. (Geotek) Grand Broadcasting Corporation (Grand Broadcasting) GTE Service Corporation (GTE) InЉFlight Phone Corp. (InЉFlight) McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. (McCaw) National Association of Business and Educational Radio, Inc. (NABER) Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel) NYNEX Corporation (NYNEX) OneComm Corporation (OneComm) Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell (PacBell) SEA, Inc. (SEA) Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. (SBC) The Southern Company (Southern) United States Sugar Corporation (US Sugar) Utilities Telecommunications Council (UTC) Waterway Communications System, Inc. (Watercom) WJC Maritel Corporation (WJC) д …SPД-дУ УСр• ьГСУУReply Comments on the Further Forbearance NPRMФ ФФФƒ American Mobile Telecommunications Association, Inc. (AMTA) AMSC Subsidiary Corporation (AMSC) AT&T Corporation (AT&T) BellSouth Corporation (BellSouth) Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) GTE Service Corporation (GTE) InЉFlight Phone Corp. (InЉFlight) McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. (McCaw) Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel) NYNEX Corporation (NYNEX) Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell (PacBell) Radiofone, Inc. (Radiofone) Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. (SBC) Sprint Corporation (Sprint)д"а&Ffˆ,-(-(ZZn(с"дŒUS WEST, Inc. (US WEST) д …SиД-дUnited States Telephone Association (USTA) Waterway Communications System, Inc. (Watercom)д"АGfˆ,-(-(ZZТс"д д …SД-даад+ГдУ УAPPENDIX CФ Ф дTьд д …SАД-дд(€дУ УFINAL RULESФ Ф дTьд дTьдаадPАд Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 20 and 64, is amended as follows: Part 20 Љ COMMERCIAL MOBILE RADIO SERVICES и1.и The authority citation for Part 20 is amended to read as follows: AUTHORITY: Secs. 4, 10, 251-254, 303, and 332, 48 Stat. 1066, 1082, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 154, 160, 251-254, 303, and 332 unless otherwise noted. и2.и Section 20.15 is amended by revising paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as follows: д …S€ Д-дУ УРР 20.15 Requirements under Title II of the Communications ActФ Ф ***** СxС(c) Commercial mobile radio service providers shall not file tariffs for interstate service to their customers, interstate access service, or interstate operator service. Sections 1.771Љ1.773 and part 61 of this chapter are not applicable to interstate services provided by commercial mobile radio service providers. Commercial mobile radio service providers shall cancel tariffs for interstate service to their customers, interstate access service, and interstate operator service. СxС(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify the Commission's rules and policies on the provision of international service under Part 63 of this chapter, except that a commercial mobile radio service provider is not required to file tariffs for its provision of international service to markets where it does not have an affiliation with a foreign carrier that collects settlement payments from U.S. д ‡SPД-дcarriers. For purposes of this paragraph, УУaffiliationФФ is defined in РР 63.18(h)(1)(i) of this chapter. ***** вŒ 1. 1. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. 1. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)Œв Part 64 Љ MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS и1.и The authority citation for Part 64 is amended to read as follows: AUTHORITY: Sec. 4, 48 Stat. 1066, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 154, unless otherwise noted. Interpret or apply secs. 10, 201, 218, 226, 228, 332, 48 Stat. 1070, as amended, 1077; 47 U.S.C. 10, 201, 218, 226, 228, 332, unless otherwise noted. и2.и Section 64.703 is amended by deleting the word "A" at the beginning of paragraph (b)(2) and inserting in its place the phrase "Except for CMRS aggregators, a". и3.и Section 64.704 is amended by adding a new paragraph (e) to read as follows:д"в&Hfˆ,-(-(ZZn(с"дŒд …SД-д™У УРР 64.704 Call blocking prohibited.Ф Ф ***** СxС(e) The requirements of this section shall not apply to CMRS aggregators and providers of CMRS operator services. и4.и Section 64.705 is amended by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as follows: д …S˜Д-дУ УРР 64.705 Restrictions on charges related to the provision of operator services.Ф Ф ***** СxС(c) The requirements of paragraphs (a)(5) and (b) of this section shall not apply to CMRS aggregators and providers of CMRS operator services. и5.и Section 64.708 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (d) through (h) as (f) through (j), redesignating paragraph (i) as paragraph (l) and adding paragraphs (d), (e) and (k) to read as follows: д …SД-дУ УРР 64.708 Definitions.Ф Ф ***** д ‡ShД-дСxС(d) УУCMRS aggregatorФФ means an aggregator that, in the ordinary course of its operations, makes telephones available to the public or to transient users of its premises for interstate telephone calls using a provider of CMRS operator services; д ‡SЪД-дСxС(e) УУCMRS operator servicesФФ means operator services provided by means of a commercial mobile radio service as defined in section 20.3 of this chapter; ***** д ‡SД-дСxС(k) УУProvider of CMRS operator servicesФФ means a provider of operator services that provides CMRS operator services; ***** д …SfД-дСxСл#footnote reference#лггУУллФФ