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PE37&Ph7jC:, Xj\  P6G;XPi7nC:,4Xn4  pG;XO^T,"hR PE37RPDjN^T,.ÕR_ pi7RD?LC,.b>_ pi7jN^T,.ÕR_ pi7RmYj^,b PE37P DWj^,._ pi7 DFTK,.bI_ pi7 kWj^,._ pi7 GTK, PE37P lYj^,b PE37P n8wC;,Xw PE37XPDo7zC;,.c!Xz_ pi7XpW!@(#, h@\  P6G;hPOA%!,JA PE37JPCY~~vCN~sk~CCCddCYdYCdd88d8ddddJN8ddddYYdYd4dddddCd2$Њ$// R&O, La. PSC, Petn CMRS Rate Reg'n, PR Docket No. 94107, FCC 95191 //$ $/ 300.332 Mobile services /$ $/ 20.13 State petitions for authority to regulate rates /$  Xv-`(#  FCC 95191 ă  XH-2+ Before the X1-TP[ FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONxx  X -Washington, D.C. ăpp dx44` `   X(#Pd  X -X4` <hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: d T-ԍ 47 C.F.R.  20.13.> Moreover, in addition to the evidence, information, and analysis that a state must submit, we determined that a petitioning state also is required to identify and provide a detailed description of the specific existing or proposed rules that it  Y-would continue or establish if we were to grant its petition.i N T-ԍ See CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 1505.i We noted that the standards for  Y-preemption established in Louisiana PSC do not apply to petitions submitted under Section  Y-332 of the Act, nor to Section 20.13 of our Rules. T-ԍ Under Louisiana PSC, the Commission may preempt State regulation of intrastate service when it is not possible to separate the interstate and intrastate components of the asserted Commission  TF!-regulation. Louisiana Pub. Ser. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 n.4 (1986). In construing the  T"-``inseparability doctrine'' recognized by the Supreme Court in Louisiana PSC, Federal courts have held that where interstate services are jurisdictionally ``mixed'' with intrastate services and facilities otherwise regulated by the states, state regulation of the intrastate service that affects interstate service  T$-may be preempted where the state regulation thwarts or impedes a valid Federal policy. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Illinois Bell Tel. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989); National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'ners v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).   NOTE334 In Louisiana PSC the Supreme Court found that Section 2(b) of the Communications Act prohibits the Commission from exercising"V0*((" Federal jurisdiction with respect to ``charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or  Y-regulations for or in connection with intrastate communications services.'' Tb-ԍ Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 373, quoting Communications Act,  2(b), 47 U.S.C.  152(b). Here, Congress has explicitly amended the Communications Act to preempt state and local rate and entry  Y-regulation of commercial mobile radio services without regard to Section 2(b).  X- III. DECISIONAL FRAMEWORK ă  Yv-  Y_-dx6. In order to prevail on the merits, the LPSC must sustain its statutory burden of demonstrating that ``market conditions with respect to [commercial mobile radio] services fail to protect subscribers adequately from unjust and unreasonable rates or rates that are unjustly  Y -or unreasonably discriminatory.''B j T5 -ԍ 47 U.S.C.  332(c)(3).B A question arises as to what showing is necessary to  Y -sustain this burden. Although we addressed this issue in the CMRS Second Report and Order, we revisit it in view of the parties' debate in this record. As explained more fully below, we do not agree that our decision to forbear from regulating interstate CMRS under certain provisions of Title II makes it impossible to grant a state's petition. At the same time, we conclude that a state must do more than merely show that market conditions for cellular  Y-service  TM-ԍ Although the provisions of Section 332(c)(3) of the Act apply to rate or entry regulation in the case of any commercial mobile radio service provider, the LPSC Petition is oriented to the provision of cellular service. have been less than fully competitive in the past. In order to retain regulatory authority, a state must show that, given the rapidly evolving market structure in which mobile services are provided, the conduct and performance of CMRS providers illserve consumer interests by producing rates that are not just and reasonable, or are unreasonably discriminatory.  Y-dx7. Since the Budget Act does not explicitly construe or elaborate on the phrase ``market conditions ... fail to protect subscribers adequately from unjust and unreasonable rates or rates that are unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory,'' we look to the ``design of  Y-the statute as a whole and its object and policy'' to give that phrase meaning.Z T-ԍ See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 157 (1990); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991). We begin that task by reference to other Sections of the Communications Act, such as Section 201, which  Y-also speak of just and reasonable rates.  T$-ԍ See 47 U.S.C.  201; see also 47 U.S.C.  623 (b)(c) (provisions governing reasonableness of cable television rates). We have generally described the measure of reasonableness under these Sections in terms of rates that reflect or emulate competitive"~N 0*(("  Y-market operations.d Ty-ԍ See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, CC Docket No. 87313, 4 FCC  TS-Rcd 2873, 2886 (para. 25), 28892900 (1989); see also Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Rate Regulation, MM Docket Nos. 92266 & 93215, FCC 94286, released Nov. 18, 1994, at paras. 24, 3437, 6479. The more formal description, however, is whether rates fall within a ``zone of reasonableness'' that is bounded at one end by the ``investor interest in maintaining financial integrity and access to capital markets'' and at the other by the ``consumer interest  Y-in being charged nonexploitative rates.''1 T` -ԍ See, e.g., FERC v. Pennzoil Producing, 439 U.S. 508, 517 (1979); AT&T v. FCC, 836 F.2d  T: -1386, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989).1 Regardless of how the test is characterized, it is well established that determinations whether rates fall within this zone are not dictated by  Y-reference to carriers' costs and earnings,>H T-ԍ See FERC v. Pennzoil Producing, 439 U.S. 508, 517 (1979) (the zone of reasonableness is not defined by a ``rigidly . . . costbased determination of rates, much less . . . one that bases each  T8-[carrier's] rates on its own costs.'') (citation omitted); see also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390  T-U.S. 747, 769, 79798, 80005, reh'g denied, Bass v. FPC, 392 U.S. 917 (1968) (upholding ratemaking based upon areawide average costs).  but may take account of noncost considerations such as whether rates further the public interest by tending to increase the supply of the item  Y_-being produced and sold. _N  T^-ԍ See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974), in which the Supreme Court upheld a Federal Power Commission incentive plan that permitted an increase in rates in order to encourage increased production. In doing so, the Court emphasized that it was permissible for the agency to consider noncost factors: ,dMobil's argument assumes that there is only one just and reasonable rate possible for each vintage of gas, and that this rate must be based entirely on some concept of cost plus a  TH-reasonable rate of return. We rejected this argument in Permian Basin and we reject it again here. The Commission explicitly based its additional ``noncost'' incentives on the evidence of a need for increased supplies.!  T-Id. at 316. See also Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 150203 (D.C. Cir), cert.  T-denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984) (acknowledging agency authority to consider noncost factors in establishing just and reasonable rates); Public Service Comm'n of New York v. FERC, 589 F.2d 542, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that agencies have authority to adopt incentivebased regulatory approaches in order to serve the public interest). These principles define basic components of a state's demonstration under Section 332. Specifically, a state must show that market conditions fail to produce rates that fall within a ``zone of reasonableness,'' which is defined by reference to investor and consumer interests viewed in the context of relevant public policy considerations. " 0*((| "Ԍ Y-dx8. We also consider the meaning of the relevant language in the statute in the context of the overarching command of Section 332(c)(3), which is: ``no State ... shall have any  Y-authority to regulate'' CMRS rates.B TK-ԍ 47 U.S.C.  332(c)(3).B As we concluded in the CMRS Second Report and  Y-Order, that provision, as well as the title of Section 332(c)(3) (``State Preemption''), express  Y-an unambiguous congressional intent to foreclose state regulation in the first instance._h T-ԍ CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 1504._ Moreover, OBRA reflects a general preference in favor of reliance on market forces rather than regulation. Section 332(c), for example, empowers the Commission to reduce CMRS  Yc-regulation,Ec  T -ԍ 47 U.S.C.  332(c)(1)(A).E and it places on us the burden of demonstrating that continued regulation will  YL-promote competitive market conditions.EL T-ԍ 47 U.S.C.  332(c)(1)(C).E  Y -dx9. Unlike some of the opponents of the LPSC Petition, we do not view the statutory preference for market forces rather than regulation in absolute terms. If Congress had desired to foreclose state and Federal regulation of CMRS entirely, it could have done so easily. It chose instead to delineate the circumstances in which such regulation might be applied.  Y - Tellingly, it did so in the context of a broad statutory framework with several other principal components. Under the OBRA: (1) substantial amounts of spectrum reserved for Federal  Y-government use are to be identified and transferred to commercial and public safety uses;J T-ԍ OBRA  6001, amending the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act. (2) this and other available spectrum, if allocated to commercial telecommunications uses, are to be licensed ``rapidly'' through the use of competitive bidding systems to promote the development and deployment of new technologies, products, and services, with the goal of  Y8-stimulating economic opportunity and competition;u8  T-ԍ See OBRA  6002(a), amending Section 309 of the Communications Act.u and (3) in contemplation of the deployment of spectrum to commercial wireless services, and to promote regulatory parity, Congress also articulated definitional criteria for determining common carrier status consistently so success in the marketplace will not be determined by regulatory strategies but by technological innovation, service quality, competitionbased pricing decisions, and  Y-responsiveness to consumer needs.d  T#-ԍ See 47 U.S.C.  332(d)(1); CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 1420.  Y-dx 10. Viewing all three components together, the statutory plan is clear. Congress envisioned an economically vibrant and competitive market for CMRS services. It understood" 0*(("  Y-that such a market was still evolving,  Ty-ԍ The Commission's effort to establish new personal communications services (PCS) was initiated in 1989, four years prior to enactment of OBRA, in response to several petitions for rulemaking. During that period we established a formal proceeding to consider PCS issues and adopted major policy decisions that resulted in an allocation to PCS of far more spectrum than is allocated to cellular  T-service. See Notice of Inquiry, GEN Docket No. 90314, 5 FCC Rcd 3995 (1990); Policy Statement and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 6601 (1991); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Tentative Decision, 7 FCC Rcd 5676 (1992); Tentative Decision and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 7794 (1992); Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 7700 (1993); Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 4957(1994); Third Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 6908 (1994). We also made recommendations and participated, on behalf of the United States Government, in international allocations decision making fora that recognized and permitted the use of such spectrum for PCS and  T -other emerging technologies on a global scale. See Report, GEN Docket No. 89554, 6 FCC Rcd 3900 (1992). Congress was well aware of such activities, as witnessed by the fact that the Budget Act  Tu -commanded us to begin granting licenses for such new services no later than May 1994. See OBRA  6002(d)(2)(B). and it provided the resources (e.g., additional  Y-spectrum) and administrative authority (e.g., licensing through competitive bidding) to accelerate that process. Finally, Congress delineated its preference for allowing this emerging market to develop subject to only as much regulation for which the Commission and the  Y-states could demonstrate a clear-cut need. The public interest goal of this Congressional plan is readily discernable. Congress intended to promote rapid deployment of a wireless telecommunications infrastructure. Robust investment is a prerequisite to achieving that  Yc-goal. c> TR-ԍ See CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 1421; see also 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(4)(B), 309(j)(4)(c)(iii); OBRA Conference Report at 483, 49293. Thus, in implementing the statute, we have attempted to facilitate the achievement of this goal by ensuring that regulation creates positive incentives for efficient investment rather than burdening entrepreneurial activities and by establishing a stable, predictable  Y -regulatory environment that facilitates prudent business planning.2!  T-ԍ Id.2  Y -dx 11.ؠ We emphasize the important impact on our decisionmaking of these fundamental elements of the OBRA statutory framework, which have no counterparts in other sections of the Communications Act. They are devoted exclusively to wireless telecommunications services, and to CMRS in particular. Our analysis of ``market conditions'' in the context of Section 332(c)(3) necessarily is governed by that framework.  Yf- dx 12. Section 332(c)(3) must be interpreted in this context; it is an exception to the  YO-general prohibition against state regulation. We conclude that Louisiana or any other state, should not be allowed to continue regulating CMRS overall, or cellular service in particular, merely by demonstrating that the market for cellular service has been less than fully competitive. Such a standard would effectively allow an exception permitting regulation to nullify a general prohibition against it, because it is commonly understood that such"Z!0*((" conditions have in the past adhered in the cellular marketplace. On numerous occasions since the Commission established the twocarrier cellular market structure in 1982, we have  Y-acknowledged that such a structure provided less than optimal competitive opportunities."f TK-ԍ See, e.g., Cellular Communications Systems, 86 FCC 2d 469, 474 (1981), modified on  T%-reconsideration, 89 FCC 2d 58, 7174 (1982), modified on further reconsideration, 90 FCC 2d 571 (1982); Petitions for Rulemaking Concerning Proposed Changes to the Commission's Cellular Resale  T-Policies, 6 FCC Rcd 1719, 1725 & n.67 (1991) (Cellular Resale Order).   Y-Other Federal agencies have taken similar positions.]# Tb -ԍ See Reply Comments of the United States Department of Justice, CC Docket No. 9134, filed June 19, 1991, at 45 (``[T]here is insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that the cellular service market is in fact workably competitive. In each service area there is still a duopoly[.]''); Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission, CC Docket No. 9134, filed July 31, 1991, at 7 (``[T]he staff disagrees with the tentative conclusion that cellular service is produced in a competitively structured market.''), 1012.] One year prior to adoption of the Budget Act, the General Accounting Office (GAO) the investigatory arm of Congress examined the industry and reported that ``[w]hile GAO found no evidence of anticompetitive or collusive behavior in the course of its work, the twocarrier (duopoly) market system that  Y_-the FCC created may provide only limited competition in cellular telephone markets.''$_  T-ԍ United States General Accounting Office, ``Telecommunications: Concerns About Competition in the Cellular Telephone Service Industry,'' GAO/RCED92220 (July 1992) (GAO Report). It strains credulity to assert that Congress was blind to these conditions in 1993 when it broadly  Y1-prohibited state regulation of CMRS.%d1H  T*-ԍ Cf. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988) (Court generally presumes  T-Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to legislation it enacts); accord Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation, 489 U.S. 19 (1990); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959). Thus, we reject a reading of the statute that allows continued rate regulation merely on a showing of duopoly conditions, because it is not  Y -plausible to conclude that Congress adopted a selfdefeating statutory scheme.& t T(-ԍ Cf. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (Court generally presumes Congress legislates with knowledge of basic rules of statutory construction).  Y -dx 13. It also is worth noting that this Agency's recognition of imperfect cellular market conditions has been matched by our commitment to rectify those conditions as quickly as possible by strengthening and expanding cellular competition rather than by resorting to  Y-heavyhanded regulation. '< T/$-ԍ See, e.g., GAO Report at 3 (The ``FCC is relying on the introduction of advanced personal communications services to bring competition to the cellular telephone marketplace.''). The Commission policy of avoiding heavyhanded regulation of the cellular market while it was  T&-developing also has been determined reasonable in court. See Cellnet Communication, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir 1992) (petitions for review of FCC order declining to initiate rate"'&0*(('" regulation of cellular denied because ``the FCC could reasonably conclude, in light of the novelty of the service and the speed of technological change, to wait and see how the market evolved...'').  For example, we have attempted to heighten cellular competition"@'0*((K" at the retail level by prohibiting restrictions on the resale of cellular services, except in narrow circumstances where we determined that restrictions intensify competition between  Y-the two licensees in each local market.V(@@ T-ԍ See Cellular Resale Order, 7 FCC Rcd at 400607. We have recently initiated a review of our resale policies to tailor them to conditions in an emerging wireless telecommunications market that  Tu-has been expanded to include PCS. See Equal Access and Interconnection Obligations Pertaining to  TO -Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 9 FCC Rcd 5408 (1994) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and  T) -Notice of Inquiry), Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 95149, released Apr. 20, 1995.V We also have retooled policies initially tailored to promote competition in the wireline market upon determining that they were unlikely to have  Y-that effect in the unique setting of wireless telecommunications.)H T -ԍ Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises Equipment and Cellular Service, 7 FCC Rcd 4028 (1992). Most especially, we have chosen to address the structural infirmity of the cellular market by vastly expanding the amount of spectrum available for twoway wireless voice communications and other innovative wireless services and technologies.  Y1-dx 14. The framework of our CMRS regulatory policy moderate regulation, symmetrical regulation of all services as appropriate, and a preference for curing market imperfections by lowering entry barriers in order to encourage competition rather than by regulating existing licensees aligns closely with the principal building blocks of OBRA.  Y -Indeed, that statute is in a very real sense a validation of our approach.*  TF-ԍ If Congress had concluded our approach was deficient, or that we should travel in a different policy direction, it is reasonable to conclude that it would have directed us accordingly. As the legislative history of OBRA makes plain, Congress intended those building blocks to establish a  Y -national regulatory policy for CMRS,+ 8  T-ԍ See Conference Report at 48081, incorporating the findings set forth in the Senate Amendment, including the following:  T@- ,d(# ,d,x[B]ecause commercial mobile services require a Federal license and the Federal Government is attempting to promote competition for such services, and because providers of such services do not exercise market power visavis telephone exchange service carriers and State regulation can be a barrier to the development of competition in this market, uniform national policy is necessary and in the public interest. ƀ not a policy that is balkanized statebystate.  Y{-dx15. That intention informs our review of petitions filed by states under Section 332(c)(3). Put simply, Congress intended such petitions to be evaluated in light of a general preference for allowing the policies embodied in OBRA to have an opportunity to work."M +0*(( " With regard to the statutory prohibition on state regulation in Section 332(c)(3) in particular,  Y-the legislative history leaves no room for doubt on this point by providing that:`, Tb-ԍ H.R. Rep. No. 103111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 26162.` ,d,x[i]n reviewing [state] petitions . . . the Commission also should be mindful of the Committee's desire to give the policies embodie[d] in section 332(c) an adequate opportunity to yield the benefits of increased competition and subscriber choice anticipated by the Committee.   YH-dx16. In deference to the states, with whom we have and will continue to share telecommunications jurisdiction under the dual regulatory system of the Communications Act, we have not presumed to establish a rigid blueprint for the demonstration required under Section 332(c)(3). Moreover, unlike many opponents of the petition before us, we do not agree that a state's burden is so great that it is impossible to carry. For example, our decision to forbear from most CMRS regulation is not dispositive of the question whether states may initiate or continue rate regulation of such services. We think it unlikely that Congress would have established two separate statutory procedures one to govern our  Y-forbearance, and another to govern states' petitions~-h T-ԍ See 47 U.S.C.  332(c)(1) (forbearance) and 332(c)(3) (state petitions).~ if it intended our decisions under the former procedure to control automatically the outcomes under both of them. Instead, we conclude that the exemption in Section 332(c)(3) is designed to permit a state to demonstrate that market conditions in that state warrant a departure from national OBRA policies.  Y-dx17. Such a demonstration begins but does not end with a showing of less than fully  Y-competitive market conditions. Almost all markets are imperfectly competitive,.  T-ԍ In general, perfect competition can exist only where goods are homogeneous, and all buyers  T-and sellers have full information and accept price as given (i.e., they do not try to influence price).  Ts-There are also certain necessary conditions regarding cost of production. See D. Carlton & J. Perloff,  TM-Modern Industrial Organization 87 (1995). Under perfect competition, price equals marginal  T%-cost , which is the incremental cost of producing the last unit of a good. Such conditions are theoretical constructs. and such  Y-conditions can produce good results for consumers./  T -ԍ See, e.g., W. Baumol, J. Panzar & R. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of  T`!-Industry Structure 1546 (1982). In particular, as noted previously, Congress was aware of the duopoly cellular structure when it generally proscribed state regulation of CMRS. If a showing of less than perfect competition in the past could justify granting a state petition, regulation might be imposed in a great many circumstances. Nothing on this record convinces us that Congress intended that result. "| ` /0*((|"Ԍ Y-dx18.ؠInstead, we believe that a state must establish the existence of an environment of unjust and unreasonable, or unreasonably discriminatory, rates, given the dynamic and evolving structure in which CMRS is provided. When we implemented the Section 332(c)(3)  Y-state petition process in the CMRS Second Report and Order, we adopted a rule designed to elicit the information needed to make such a showing. Such information permits us to  Y-perform a StructureConductPerformance (``SCP'') analysis,0d T-ԍ Section 20.13(a)(1) requires states to include ``demonstrative evidence'' establishing failed  T-market conditions. See 47 C.F.R.  20.13(a)(1). Section 20.13(a)(2) provides an extensive, detailed list of the types of information that states are encouraged to supply in order to meet this evidentiary  T -burden. See 47 C.F.R.  20.13(a)(2)(vi).  which is a standard paradigm  Yx-of modern industrial organization analysis.1bx T -ԍ See, e.g., F. Scherer & D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic  T -Performance, 47 (3d ed. 1990) (``Scherer and Ross''); D. Carlton & J. Perloff, Modern  T -Industrial Organization, chs. 1, 9 (2d ed. 1994); J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial  T-Organization 13 (1988). This paradigm, as applied to the mobile telecommunications industry, holds that market structure is impacted by basic conditions such as the number of licenses issued by the Commission and the state of technology. Conduct, in  Y3-turn, depends on the structure of the market, e.g., on the number of competitors, the cost structure, and the degree of integration with other wireless providers. Performance, in turn, depends on the conduct of providers and other industry participants with regard to activities such as pricing, interfirm coordination, and technical standards. Such an analysis permits an evaluation of the degree of rivalry within a particular industry structure and allows us to determine whether and how consumer interests are being served by such activity.  Y-dx19.ؠNothing in our rule governing the state petition process suggests that merely showing the existence of a cellular duopoly structure is enough to support a petition. In the first instance, the rule signals our insistence that a petition must be based on demonstrable evidence of anticompetitive activity, or unjust and unreasonable, or unreasonably discriminatory, rates. For example, in order to determine whether an anticompetitive environment presently exists within a state, we requested that a petitioning state produce ``specific allegations of fact,'' to be supported by a sworn affidavit of an individual with personal knowledge thereof, regarding ``anticompetitive or discriminatory practices or  Y-behavior by commercial mobile radio service providers.''H2  T -ԍ 47 C.F.R.  20.13(a)(2)(vi).H We also requested ``[e]vidence, information and analysis demonstrating with particularity instances of systematic unjust and unreasonable rates ... [or a] pattern of such rates, that demonstrates the inability of the commercial mobile radio service marketplace in the state to produce reasonable rates through competitive forces,'' and we indicated that we would consider such evidence ``especially  Yi-probative.''I3i  T&-ԍ 47 C.F.R.  20.13(a)(2)(vii).I"i ^ 30*((]"Ԍ Y-ԙdx20. In order to assess present market conditions so as to predict the future effectiveness of market forces within the state, we requested information on the number and  Y-type of CMRS providers in the state as well as their respective customers,P4 TK-ԍ 47 C.F.R.  20.13(a)(2)(i) and (ii).P and ``an assessment of the extent to which services offered by the commercial mobile radio service providers the state proposes to regulate are substitutable for services offered by other carriers  Y-in the state.''H5h T-ԍ 47 C.F.R.  20.13(a)(2)(iv).H We also requested information and complaint statistics revealing customer  Yv-satisfaction with CMRS providers within the state.J6v T/ -ԍ 47 C.F.R.  20.13(a)(2)(viii).J In addition to this information, and as a further aid in projecting CMRS growth rates and other trends within the state, we also requested information on ``trends'' in each commercial radio provider's rates and customer  Y1-baseR71 T-ԍ 47 C.F.R.  20.13(a)(2)(ii) and (iii).R and on ``opportunities for new providers to enter into the provision of competing  Y -services'' as well as ``an analysis of any barriers to such entry.''G8 H T-ԍ 47 C.F.R.  20.13(a)(2)(v).G In short, although states have the discretion to adduce such evidence in support of continued rate regulation as they  Y -see fit,_9  T-ԍ CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 1504._ the comprehensive list of anticipated documentation in Section 20.13 gives states guidance concerning the evidence of structure, conduct, and performance that we would find persuasive in evaluating their petitions.  Y-dx21. The purposes to which such evidence must be put also are straightforward. For example, with regard to industry structure, while a state seeking to regulate twoway mobile voice services may draw attention to the cellular duopoly, it is incumbent on that state to consider factors that have a direct and substantial impact on that structure. In particular, in evaluating a cellularoriented petition, we will look with disfavor on any petition that fails to consider the immediate and nearterm impact of PCS. Given the general statutory purpose of facilitating PCStype services, it would be difficult to ignore or downplay the importance of fundamental structural changes when considering Section 332(c) petitions.  Y-dx22.ؠWhile PCS is not yet available to the public, it is an accepted antitrust principle that a firm may be considered in competitive analysis if it could enter the market in  Y-question.:f  T$-ԍ See, e.g., McCaw Personal Communications, Inc. v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F.Supp. 1166, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (``the existence of low barriers to entry may rebut a prima facie showing of  T&-illegality, even where the combined market shares of the merged firms is quite high''), citing United  TZ'-States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982- 83 (2d Cir. 1984). See also American Bar"Z'90*(('"  T-Association, I Antitrust Law Developments (Third) 30711 (1992) and cases cited therein.đ Under the case law potential entry must be reasonably prompt, a typical period" h:0*((" being two years from the present in order to expect a significant impact on existing  Y-competitors,; h T-ԍ See FTC v. OwensIllinois, Inc., 681 F.Supp. 27, 37 & n.23 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated on other  T-grounds, 850 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (concerning ``the extensive present and future intermaterial competition in the glass and other packaging industries,'' ``[a]n important, but undisputed, assumption of the economic analysis in this case is that the relevant time frame within which to view elasticity is approximately two years. In other words, conversions by purchasers between types of containers must be feasible within this time frame for demand and supply to be considered elastic''); Department of  T -Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992)(Merger  T -Guidelines), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)  13,104 (Apr. 7, 1992) at 20,57310 (Entry Analysis, Timeliness of Entry: ``In order to deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern, entrants must quickly achieve a significant impact on price in the relevant market. The Agency generally will consider timely only those committed entry alternatives that can be achieved within two  TR-years from initial planning to significant market impact'') (footnote omitted). The Merger Guidelines consider firms to be present competitors if, under certain conditions, they could shift production to a  T-new product within only one year. Id. at 20,5734. and there is little doubt that PCS licensees will enter the market for CMRS in competition with cellular providers within this timeframe. We recently concluded an auction designed to license rapidly two additional competitive providers of wireless twoway voice and data communications in every local market in the country. As shown in the table below, the winning bidders in markets encompassing Louisiana have committed to pay substantial sums for the right to operate wireless systems in that state. Having done so, it is reasonable to conclude they will deploy the facilities necessary to become operational as quickly as possible so as to begin recouping their investment."H ;0*(("  X- X4` <hDp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:v T-ԍ See, e.g., J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 20970 (1988). For example, prices or rates of return in a given year are static factors. Growth and investment are dynamic factors. In addition, a dynamic analysis views price and other static factors at a given point in time in their  Y1-relationship to static factors such as price in the future.<?1j TL -ԍ Id., 239270.< Thus, a rate of return that looks high today may be fair and reasonable when looked at in terms of its impact on future  Y -prices.@  T-ԍ In particular, consumers may be better off facing somewhat higher prices today in exchange for high levels of investment by existing competitors. Furthermore, static factors are, as the name implies, static, or even temporary, whereas the longterm impact of dynamic factors is more important because their effects are cumulative and more permanent. Thus, we believe that evidence concerning dynamic factors is a more persuasive market indicator than evidence concerning static factors. Given the rapidly changing nature of the market in which wireless services are provided and the statutory purposes of OBRA, we conclude that evidence of where a market is going is more relevant than evidence of where it has been.  YK-dx27. No single factor, standing alone, necessarily would tip the balance for or against a particular state petition. The statute allows the states flexibility to make their showings in the best manner they see fit, and it is conceivable that we might find a showing based primarily on one factor to be persuasive. Those demonstrations that are tied most closely to the statutory scheme are, of course, the most determinative. Our decisions in this proceeding and similar proceedings are based on the totality of the evidence.  X-X4  Dp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:E  Tf-ԍ Id. at 23 n.2.> The results of the investigation, the LPSC asserts, will include recommendations as to the type of regulation Louisiana should adopt. After the investigation,  Y -Louisiana states that it may file a petition to initiate additional rate regulation.3F P T-ԍ Id. 3 Pending the outcome of that proceeding, Louisiana requests continued authority to regulate cellular  Y -carriers as it has in the past.<G  TN-ԍ Id. at 4041.< The LPSC states that it intends to keep its current rules in place, but that it cannot now determine what additional or different rules may be required in the future. The LPSC argues in order to avoid rejudging issues it must complete its  Yf-investigation before specifying a different regulatory structure than is in place today.9Hf  T-ԍ Id. at 49.9  X8- V. CASE ON THE MERITS ă  X - dA. Louisiana's Case in Principal Part  Y-dx30. Louisiana asserts that the duopoly structure of the cellular services market results  Y-in rates which may be unjust and unreasonable.@I6  T$-ԍ Id. at 23, 2729.@ The state also contends that cellular services may be priced far above cost, bringing in super normal profits, and carriers may be" I0*(( "  Y-consciously engaging in parallel pricing and/or dividing markets.<J Ty-ԍ Id. at 2829.< Moreover, the LPSC argues, in certain local markets an ``international'' company (BellSouth) is competing against ``a much smaller'' cellular provider (Radiophone) that supports continued regulation ``to  Y-protect it from BellSouth.''FKj T-ԍ Louisiana PSC Reply at 210. F Substantial entry barriers still exist in the cellular market,  Y-according to Louisiana.L  T_ -ԍ Louisiana PSC Petition at 30. In support of this assertion, the Louisiana PSC generally cites to  T7 -the CMRS Second Report and Order. The LPSC also contends that there are no existing substitutes for cellular service, and that new services and technologies such as PCS and wide area Specialized Mobile Radio (``SMR'' ) service are not viable competitors to cellular because their cost and pricing structures differ from cellular's and they are not yet widely available to  YH-consumers.FMH T}-ԍ Louisiana PSC Reply at 1112.F  Y -dx31.ؠThe LPSC contends that it should be allowed to retain regulatory authority until  Y -the market can better produce high quality service at affordable rates.BN $ T-ԍ Louisiana Petition at 30.B Louisiana has been developing a comprehensive telecommunications plan, and it argues that its continued  Y -regulatory authority over CMRS rates is necessary to realize the plan's goals.O  TJ-ԍ Id. at 43. The LPSC also asserts that its regulatory framework is procompetitive. Id. at 3435. In addition, the LPSC states that it must be able to influence market participants in order to achieve the  Y -goal of universal service and allocate the costs of providing such service.9P f  T-ԍ Id. at 46.9  Yy-dx32. Louisiana also asserts that it should be allowed to retain rate regulatory authority in order to assess the level of competition in the Louisiana cellular market and to control  YK-rates as necessary, to compensate for any discovered supracompetitive rates.<QK  T -ԍ Id. at 3839.< The LPSC  Y4-states that it is ``uniquely experienced and positioned to handle''CR4 T"-ԍ Louisiana PCS Reply at 15.C this task and, in particular, that it is more accessible to consumers, in terms of proximity, availability, and  Y-accountability, than the FCC.VSJ T&-ԍ Id. at 1516; Louisiana Petition at 31.V The LPSC notes that this Commission refers complaints it"S0*((' "  Y-receives from cellular subscribers in Louisiana to the LPSC for resolution.bT Ty-ԍ Louisiana PSC Reply at 1516; Louisiana Petition at 910.b Although the LPSC apparently believes the OBRA granted the FCC jurisdiction to address intrastate  Y-CMRS matters,OUh T-ԍ See Louisiana Petition at 9 n.4.O the LPSC claims that ``[a]ny attempt by Congress and the FCC to preempt the authority of the LPSC to regulate the rates charged and services rendered by cellular  Y-providers is a violation of the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.''?V  T_ -ԍ Louisiana Reply at 16.?  Xv- dB. Pleadings of the Parties on Specific Matters  Y_-  XH-d 1. Market Conditions; Competition  Y -dx 33. BellSouth, Century, GTE and McCaw assert that the LPSC failed to meet its burden by failing to show that current market conditions do not adequately protect consumers. BellSouth states that a showing that market conditions ``may'' fail to protect  Y -consumers does not suffice. W  T0-ԍ Comments of BellSouth Corp., on behalf of BellSouth Cellular Corp. and Mobile  T-Communications Corp. of America (collectively, BellSouth), at 2, 46, 1213 & nn.10, 11); accord McCaw Comments at 3, 1115.  Century, McCaw, CTIA and GTE assert that Louisiana provides little or no evidence of the types identified by this Commission as relevant to the statutory showing, and that competition in the CMRS marketplace is likely to increase with  Y-the advent of SMR, PCS, and other services that will act as substitutes for cellular.X T=-ԍ See Century Comments at 78; CTIA Comments at 1824; GTE Comments at 1216, 21 & app. A at 8; McCaw Comments at 3. Century also asserts that the LPSC cannot rely on statements by the FCC and others to meet its burden, and the state fails to provide evidence of unique circumstances in Louisiana that  YK-would warrant a departure from the general preemptive action of the statute.AYKv  Tr-ԍ Century Comments at 78.A  Y-dx!34. Louisiana responds that Congress, the Department of Justice, and this Commission have expressed concern that competitive market conditions do not exist in each state, and this Commission also has determined that significant anticompetitive problems may exist because of the duopoly, and has found that cellular markets are not fully  Y-competitive.qZ  T%-ԍ Louisiana Reply at 34, citing CMRS Second Report and Order.q Louisiana states that the Department of Justice reached similar conclusions as"Z0*(( "  Y-recently as July 1994.[ Ty-ԍ Id. at 45, citing United States v. Western Electric, Memorandum of the United States in Response to Bell Companies' motion for Generic Wireless Waivers, Civ. Action No. 820192 (filed July 25, 1994). It also asserts that the duopoly market conditions alone fail to protect Louisiana subscribers from unjust and unreasonable rates, and that its regulation is warranted  Y-because cellular rates in Louisiana are higher than in similar jurisdictions.:\ T-ԍ Id. at 67.:  X-d 2. Paging and Other CMRS Services  Yv-dx"35. BellSouth notes that the LPSC seeks to regulate all CMRS services, including paging, but it submits no evidence concerning rates, market conditions, or discriminatory conduct by noncellular CMRS providers other than to reference a case involving  Y1-unauthorized solicitations.I]1 T-ԍ BellSouth Comments at 14 & n.12.I AirTouch Paging agrees, and asserts that the paging industry is characterized by relatively low barriers to entry, a variety of frequencies, many facilities Y -based competitors, and healthy price competition.J^ \ T-ԍ AirTouch Paging Comments at 89. J AMSC states that Louisiana petition fails  Y -to make a specific showing as to Mobile Satellite Service.E_  T-ԍ AMSC Comments at 12. E AMSC urges the Commission to preempt state regulation of the MSS ground segment, based on the LPSC's failure to make a contrary showing, and based on past Commission policy of general preemptive action in  Y -similar instances.a`  T-ԍ Id., citing 9 FCC Rcd 1411, para. 41 (1994).a AMTA, describing the high degree of competition among rates of private land mobile systems which have been reclassified as CMRS, opposes any state regulation of  Yy-the entry or rates of such systems.ay>  Th-ԍ AMTA Comments at 1, 67; accord E.F. Johnson Comments (requesting exemption of ``local'' SMR and 220 MHz land mobile systems from state rate regulation). AMTA asserts that the petition is silent regarding intent to include reclassified private services within its regulatory framework, and the state provides no evidence that market conditions in this segment of the CMRS industry do not adequately  Y4-protect subscribers.:b4 T"-ԍ Id. at 57.:  X-d 3. Customer Complaints; Allegations of Anticompetitive or Collusive Conduct  Y-dx#36. BellSouth argues that the customer complaints cited by the Louisiana Commission are largely irrelevant. The carrier contends that the LPSC concedes that it has not determined"Zb0*(( " whether the complaints are evidence of a widespread problem demonstrating current market  Y-failure.Bc Tb-ԍ BellSouth Comments at 19.B In addition, BellSouth claims, the alleged instances of anticompetitive conduct are  Y-similar to interexchange carrier promotions permitted by this Commission.Edh T-ԍ BellSouth Comments at 2223.E In any event, BellSouth asserts, individual cases of possible discriminatory rates or practices can be addressed by this Commission under Sections 201, 202 and 208 of the Communications Act,  Y-47 U.S.C.  201, 202 and 208.Be TF -ԍ BellSouth Comments at 23.B Regarding Louisiana's allegations of impermissible tying arrangements, Century asserts that bundling of cellular service and equipment already has  Y_-been addressed by the FCC.?f_ T -ԍ Century Comments at 2.?  X1-d 4. Effect of State Regulation  Y -dx$37. BellSouth, CTIA and McCaw argue that state regulation results in higher rates.g H T-ԍ BellSouth Comments at 34, 2627, app. at 48 (Affidavit of Economist Dr. R. Rozek); CTIA Comments at 13; McCaw Comments at 2933. The state responds that many parties attribute successes in the CMRS marketplace to ``competition'' and failures to ``regulation.'' In response to arguments that the broadening customer base for cellular service in Louisiana is evidence of procompetitive rates, Louisiana asserts that such broadening may be attributable to nothing other than declining cellular handset costs, rather than any decrease in service rates, and thus is not persuasive evidence of conditions in the cellular service market. Even assuming rates are decreasing,  Yb-Louisiana argues, there is no evidence that the new rates are just and reasonable.>hb  T-ԍ Louisiana Reply at 5.> Louisiana also asserts that BellSouth and McCaw offer no evidence of how regulation has increased rates in Louisiana, and notes that BellSouth does not promise to reduce rates if cellular  Y-service is deregulated.@i`  T. -ԍ Id. at 67 & n.2.@ Indeed, the PSC notes that McCaw's claim that regulation has increased rates in Louisiana is at odds with that company's assertion that its rates have  Y-dropped twenty percent in the past two years.aj  T#-ԍ Id. at 7 n.2, citing McCaw Opposition at 23.a The LPSC states that higher rates may indicate inadequate competition and a need for increased regulation, not any flaw in  Y-regulation.Bk T'-ԍ Louisiana Reply at 7 n.2.B Moreover, the LPSC notes that McCaw's economic consultant in this"Dk0*(( "  Y-proceeding suggests that prices in a regulated environment would be below an efficient level,  Y-not that they would be too high.sl Td-ԍ Id.Ġat 7 n.3, citing Owen Affidavit on behalf of McCaw, at 17.s  X-d 5. Timing  Y-dx%38. BellSouth contends that there is no statutory support for continuing rate regulation  Yx-pending the completion of the Louisiana investigation.Emxj T -ԍ BellSouth Comments at 1516.E BellSouth and McCaw assert that a state may petition to continue rate regulation only to the extent that it actually regulated rates as of June 1, 1993, and argue that the LPSC seeks to continue rate regulations that were not  Y3-in effect on June 1, 1993.\n3  T -ԍ BellSouth Comments at 23; McCaw Comments at 1820.\ Louisiana replies that the petition seeks extension of the state's  Y -existing regulatory authority, not particular regulations.>o  Tw-ԍ Louisiana Reply at 3.>  X - dC. Discussion  d  Y -dx&39. Section 332(c)(3) provides that a state petition shall be granted if it ``demonstrate[s]'' that market conditions for the service at issue fail to protect subscribers adequately from unjust, unreasonable, or unreasonably discriminatory rates. The LPSC has failed to make such a demonstration and, accordingly, we deny its petition.  YM-dx'40.ؠThe question whether CMRS market conditions in Louisiana are such that consumers require regulatory protection can be answered only upon consideration and analysis of tangible evidence concerning the structure, conduct and performance of that market, and the LPSC has not provided such evidence. It has submitted little or no data on CMRS infrastructure investment, earnings, the deployment of new services and technology, or existing service prices or pricing trends. Nor has it presented other information that would support a finding that CMRS licensees are restricting output or otherwise acting in an anticonsumer or anticompetitive manner. Although the LPSC has submitted information on  Y-consumer complaints, it consists essentially of a rough estimate of the number of complaints received last year concerning all commercial mobile radio services, and a laundry list of the  Yg-various practices of which consumers complained.TpgJ Tb#-ԍ See Louisiana Petition at Exhibit 11.T No specific information is provided about those practices, or whether and how they were addressed by the LPSC. This evidence is not adequate to support a conclusion that market conditions fail to protect subscribers adequately from unjust and unreasonable rates or rates that are unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory." p0*((; "Ԍ Y-ԙdx(41. Indeed, it appears the LPSC itself has not made such a finding. Rather, the LPSC essentially asserts that market conditions ``may'' fail to protect subscribers in Louisiana. Although prior to filing its petition the LPSC initiated an proceeding to address that issue  Y-more definitively, the investigation apparently is now being held in abeyance.Gqb T4-ԍ See Letter from B. Almond, Executive Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Deputy Chief, Policy Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Dec. 8, 1994) (attaching minutes of November 9, 1994, open session of the LPSC which described the LPSC's vote to delay its investigation). G The relevant observation is that statements of uncertainty regarding market conditions do not satisfy the statute's requirement that a state ``demonstrate'' that market conditions fail to protect  Yv-subscribers adequately. Accordingly, we deny Louisiana's petition.rv T -ԍ Our decision on the merits of this issue makes it unnecessary to address the question whether Louisiana was exercising rate regulation authority as of June 1, 1993.  YH- dx)42. As a result of our decision, the State of Louisiana is precluded by Section 332(c)(3) from regulating ``the rates charged'' by any CMRS provider. The LPSC's claim that the Tenth Amendment bars that result is neither explained nor supported, so it is not possible to respond to that claim in detail. We do note that the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI  Y -of the Constitution provides Congress with the power to preempt state law;s j T-ԍ See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); see also Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 36869 and cases cited therein. and where, as here, a federal agency acts within the scope of congressionally delegated authority, its actions  Y -have the same effect.t  TS-ԍ Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 369; Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 69899 (1984). Finally, we note that while the LPSC and several parties suggest that  Y -the OBRA has given this Commission jurisdiction over intrastate CMRS,iu \  T-ԍ See Louisiana Petition at 9 n.4; BellSouth Comments at 23.i nothing on this record persuades us that it is necessary to address questions concerning our jurisdiction in order to act on the merits of the LPSC Petition.  XK- 6 VI. REGULATION OF OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS ă  Y4-  Y-dx*43.ؠPrior to the OBRA, Section 332 prohibited the states from imposing ``rate ...  Y-regulation'' upon certain wireless telecommunications carriers.#v  T#-ԍ The statute provided in relevant part that ``[n]o state or local government shall have any authority to impose any rate or entry regulation upon any private land mobile service . . . .'' 47 U.S.C.  332(c)(3) (prior to revisions enacted by OBRA). # This prohibition was"Nv0*(( "  Y-construed broadly to include almost all regulatory activity.w Ty-ԍ See, e.g., Telocator Network of America v. FCC (Millicom), 761 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding Commission's interpretation of Section 332(c)(1), 47 U.S.C.  332(c)(1), in determining  T+-whether preemption provisions of that section apply to a given communications system). See also,  T-e.g., American Teltronix (Station WNHM552), 3 FCC Rcd 5347 (1988)(``Congress did not intend that a private land mobile licensee who, either intentionally or inadvertently, provides service to ineligible users would thereby subject itself to state regulatory authority, including possible sanctions,  T-for operating as a common carrier.''), recon. denied, 5 FCC Rcd 1955, 1956 (1990)(note omitted) (``state entry and rate regulation of a communications service offered by a private land mobile radio system is preempted by statute .... [A]ccompanying legislative history reveals that Congress recognized the Commission's broad discretion to dictate which land mobile systems are to be regulated as private.''). The Commission again stated its view of preemptive authority under that provision when it adopted a Notice of Inquiry respecting Personal Communications Services. Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Establish New Personal Communications Services, Notice of Inquiry, 5 FCC Rcd 3995, 3998 (para. 24 n.19) (1990): ,dIf these services are considered to be, or classified as, radio common carrier telephone exchange services, then the states, under Section 2(b) of the Act, may impose entry and rate regulations upon intrastate operations. If we classify these services as private land mobile, such state regulation would be expressly preempted under Section 332(c)(3).! Postamendment, Section 332(c)(3) now prohibits states from regulating ``the rates charged'' for CMRS, but it expressly reserves to them the authority to regulate the ``other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services.'' Although there is no definition of the term ``the rates charged'' in the statute or its legislative history, there is legislative history regarding the ``other terms and conditions'' language. We believe it is sufficient to allow us to comment in a preliminary manner on what regulatory activities the LPSC is entitled to continue, despite our denial of its Petition.  Y1-dx+44. The House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, reporting the House bill that was incorporated into the amended Section 332, noted that even where state rate regulation is preempted, states may nonetheless regulate other terms and conditions  Y -of commercial mobile radio services. The Committee stated:x  T=-ԍ See H.R. Rep. No. 103111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (``House Report'' ).  ,d,xBy ``terms and conditions,'' the Committee intends to include such matters as customer billing information and practices and billing disputes and other  Y-consumer protection matters; facilities siting issues (e.g., zoning); transfers of control; the bundling of services and equipment; and the requirement that carriers make capacity available on a wholesale basis or such other matters as fall within a state's lawful authority. This list is intended to be illustrative only and not meant to preclude other matters generally understood to fall under ``terms and conditions.''   Y-"Bx0*(( "Ԍ Y-dx,45. Establishing with particularity a demarcation between preempted rate regulation and retained state authority over terms and conditions requires a more fully developed record than is presented here. Thus, we will not expound at any length on this matter. The legislative history largely speaks for itself. It is possible to extrapolate certain findings from the legislative history, however, and we do so here in the interest of minimizing future proceedings directed at this issue.  Y_-dx-46. First, although the LPSC may not prescribe, set, or fix rates in the future because it has lost authority to regulate ``the rates charged'' for CMRS, it does not follow, for example, that its complaint authority under state law is entirely circumscribed. Complaint  Y -proceedings may concern carrier practices, separate and apart from their rates.Py  T -ԍ E.g., Section 208(a) of the Communications Act authorizes complaints by any person  Tm -``complaining of anything done or omitted to be done by any common carrier subject to this Act, in contravention of the provisions thereof.'' 47 U.S.C.  208(a)(emphasis added).P In consequence, it is conceivable that matters might arise under complaint procedures that relate to ``customer billing information and practices and billing disputes and other consumer matters.'' We view the statutory ``other terms and conditions'' language as sufficiently flexible to permit the LPSC to continue to conduct proceedings on complaints concerning such matters, to the extent that state law provides for such proceedings.  Yy-dx.47. Under the same logic, we also conclude that several other aspects of Louisiana's existing regulatory system may fall outside the statutory prohibition on rate regulation. For example, a requirement that licensees identify themselves to the LPSC or whatever other agency the state decides is appropriate does not strike us as rate regulation, so long as nothing more than standard informational filings are involved. Nothing in OBRA indicates that Congress intended to circumscribe a state's traditional authority to monitor commercial activities within its borders. Finally, we note that Louisiana's regulation of the interconnection rates changed by landline telephone companies to CMRS providers appears to involve rate regulation only of the landline companies, not the CMRS providers, and thus does not appear to be circumscribed in any way by Section 332(c)(3).  Y|-dx/48. We expect that, to the extent any interested party seeks reconsideration on this issue, it will specify with particularity the provisions of Louisiana's existing regulation practice at issue.  X - VII. ORDERING CLAUSES#Xj\  P6G;[hXP# #Xj\  P6G;[hXP#у  Y-dx049. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 332(c)(3) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(3), IT IS ORDERED that the Petition on Behalf of the Louisiana Public Service Commission for Authority To Retain Existing Jurisdiction over Commercial Mobile Radio Services Offered Within the State of Louisiana IS DENIED for the reasons set forth above. "#y0*(($ "Ԍ Y-dx150. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 1.4(b), 1.4(b)(2), and 1.106(f) of the Commission's Rules, that any petition for reconsideration of this order SHALL BE FILED within thirty days of the day after the day on which public notice of this action is  Y-given. z T4-ԍ Although we assigned the LPSC Petition a docket number for administrative convenience, this is an adjudicatorytype proceeding, not a rulemaking.  Y- dx44` `    <<hh,FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION dx44` `    <<hh,William F. Caton dx44` `    <<hh,Acting Secretary " @z0*((/ "  X-T  X-&APPENDIX A ĐTP   X-  Parties Filing Comments or Replies  Y-TP AirTouch Paging AMSC Subsidiary Corporation (AMSC) American Mobile Telecommunications Association, Inc. (AMTA) BellSouth Corp., on behalf of BellSouth Cellular Corp. and Mobile Communications Corp. dof America (collectively, BellSouth) Cellular Telecommunications Industry Assoc. (CTIA) Century Cellunet, Inc. (Century) E.F. Johnson Company (E.F. Johnson) GTE Service Corp., on Behalf of GTE Mobilnet Incorporated and Contel Cellular Inc. (GTE) Louisiana Public Service Commission (Louisiana, LPSC) McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. (McCaw) Mercury Cellular Telephone Company and MobileTel, Inc. (Mercury and MobileTel) Mobile Telecommunication Technologies Corp. (MTel) National Cellular Resellers Association (NCRA) Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel) PageMart, Inc. Paging Network, Inc. (PageNet) Personal Communications Industry Association (PCIA) Radiofone, Inc. Rural Cellular Association