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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. 1. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)"i~'^09]SS999S]+9+/SSSSSSSSSS99]]]Sxnxxng?Snxgx]nxxxxn9/9aS9S]I]I9S]/9]/]S]]I?9]SxSSIC%CW9+Wa999+999999S9]/xSxSxSxSxSxxInInInInI>/>/>/>/x]SSSSx]x]x]x]xSxSx]SSxSxSf]xSxSxSxIxIxWxIx{nInInInISSSWS]a?/?]?9?]]WW]n/nKn9nCn/x]xx]x]SSxxIxIxI]?]?]?]WnUn9nax]x]x]x]x]x]xxWnInInIx]n9x]]?n9xSz+SS8-8WuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN8HH"&H>XHH8HB8>HH^HH>"".2",2,2,"222N2222"&22H22,006"6."""""""""""2H,H,H,H,H,XAB,>,>,>,>,""""H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H,H2H1H2H2H282H,H,H,B,B,B6B,H?>,>,>,>,H2H2H2H6H2H6H2""2"""2F866H2>>(>">">H2;H2H2H2H2XHB"B"B"8&8&8&86>*>>.H2H2H2H2H2H2^HH6>,>,>,H2>"H28&>"H2?22!!WFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN$<<$.2",2222`2 LL2 LL2L"",,2d""-  on the foreign end." Bottleneck services or facilities are "those that are necessary for the provision of  {O-international services, including intercity or local access facilities on the foreign end." Id. at  116. (#] The Commission also determined that it would continue to consider other public interest factors  X -that may weigh in favor of, or against, granting the application.U  {Oj-ԍXxId. at  6163.(#U  X{-x8.` ` Invertel's affiliation with several Chilean carriers requires us to determine whether any of those affiliated carriers has the requisite market power to require us to engage in an ECO analysis of the Chilean market. We first examine whether any Invertelaffiliated carrier has market power in the international telecommunications market. Chilesat, which has approximately a 25 percent share of Chile's international traffic, is the only carrier affiliated with Invertel participating in that market. As the Commission has previously recognized, the market for international telecommunications services in Chile is highly competitive. In its  X-AmericaTel decision, the Commission noted the growth in the number of long distance providers in Chile and found that ENTELChile, which has the largest market share for international telecommunications service revenues in Chile, lacks market power in the Chilean  X-International Message Telephone Service ("IMTS") market. {O"-ЍXxSee AmericaTel Corporation, 9 FCC Rcd 3993 (1994) ("Transfer of Control Order") (reclassifying AmericaTel as non-dominant for the provision of all services on the U.S.-Chile route).(# Likewise, our  X-Telecommunications Division subsequently found in an examination of NACS that Chilesat" 0*%%ZZ"  X-lacks market power in the Chilean IMTS market.  {Oy-ԍXxSee NACS Communications, Inc., DA 961609, File No. ITC94434 at  8 (released September 27, 1996).(#ƨ Similarly, we find here that Chilesat's 25 percent market share of Chile's international traffic fails to give it market power in Chile's broader international telecommunications market.  X-x9.` ` Second, we assess whether any carrier affiliated with Invertel has market power in Chile's local exchange market. We examine the local exchange market because a U.S. carrier ultimately relies upon a facilitiesbased carrier operating in those markets to reach the Chilean end user. A carrier controlling bottleneck facilities and services in the local exchange market could discriminate in favor of an affiliate competing in the international telecommunications market by offering its affiliate superior technical quality, faster provisioning or preferential rates. Invertel has affiliations with several local exchange carriers: Telesat, Chilesat Telefon1a Rural S.A., and companies affiliated with Invertel through Texcom. We find, however, that none of these carriers has market power in Chile's local exchange market. Noting that  Compa91a de Telecomunicaciones de Chile ("CTC") still controls an overwhelming majority of the local exchange market, our Telecommunications Division found in its examination of NACS that Invertel's affiliate Telesat lacked market power in Chile's local exchange market and did not control any bottleneck services or  Xy-facilities.yZ {O-ЍXxId. (referring to Telef;nica Andina S.A., now known as Telesat).(#ƌ For the same reasons, we conclude here that Chilesat Telefon1a Rural S.A., a new company that has no market share, lacks market power in Chile's local exchange market. We also note that all of the companies affiliated with Invertel through Texcom have market shares  X4-of less of than 10 percent each and control no bottleneck facilities.Z4 yO-ԍxApplication for Transfer of Control at 4.Z Therefore, we conclude that Invertel and the carriers with which it is affiliated lack the requisite market power in both the Chilean international telecommunications market and local exchange market to require an ECO analysis for Section 214 purposes.  X-x 10.` ` We also examine whether any countervailing public interest factors exist that would require denial of MICL's application. Our review of the public interest factors related to MICL's application supports granting its application. The Executive Branch has not raised any national security, law enforcement, foreign policy or trade concerns with this application. No party has raised any other countervailing public interest factors in this proceeding. Moreover, we find that the proposed transfer of control of MICL would serve the public interest under Section 214 of the Act by allowing the provision of additional investment and expertise to MICL, which will help a small U.S. carrier like MICL compete in the increasingly competitive U.S. international telecommunications market. "|0*%%ZZ<"Ԍ X- B.xSection 310(b)(4)  X-x 11.` ` Section 310(b)(4) of the Act establishes a 25 percent benchmark for foreign investment in and ownership of the parent company of a U.S. common carrier, but gives the Commission discretion to allow higher levels of foreign ownership if the Commission  X-determines that such ownership would not be inconsistent with the public interest.R yO-ԍXx47 U.S.C.  310(b)(4).(#R Whenever a foreign entity ultimately owns more than 25 percent of the capital stock of the parent company of an applicant for a common carrier radio license, the Commission must, as  XH-it stated in the Foreign Carrier Entry Order, determine whether the proposed level of foreign  X3-ownership is consistent with the public interest obligations under Section 310(b)(4).g3X {O< -ԍXxForeign Carrier Entry Order at  197.(#g Similar to the Section 214 context discussed above, this determination largely relies on an examination of whether effective competitive opportunities ("ECO") exist in the foreign entity's home market for the radiobased service that is analogous to the service the foreign  X -entity seeks to provide in the U.S. market.M  {Or-ԍxId. at  198.M The Commission identifies the appropriate home  X -market by analyzing where a foreign entity's principal place of business is located.U | {O-ԍxId. at  199208.U  X-x 12.` ` In addition to the ECO analysis, the Commission reaffirmed in the Foreign  X}-Carrier Entry Order that it would continue to look at other public interest factors that it has historically considered germane to determining whether to permit foreign investment under Section 310(b)(4). These factors include the general significance of the proposed entry to the promotion of competition in the U.S. communications market and any national security, law  X#-enforcement, foreign policy, or trade policy concerns raised by the Executive Branch.P# {O-ԍxId. at  216. P  X-x 13.` ` As discussed above, MICL's application requests Commission approval for Chileanowned Invertel to acquire up to a 70.1 percent equity interest in MICL. Because Invertel's proposed foreign ownership level exceeds the 25 percent threshold in Section 310(b)(4), we must determine whether granting MICL's application would be consistent with the public interest. The public interest analysis of this proposed transfer of control proceeds in four steps: (1) determination of the appropriate home market for comparison; (2) determination of the appropriate market segment for comparison; (3) consideration of the factors of the ECO analysis; and (4) analysis of additional public interest factors. "=0*%%ZZ"Ԍ X-Xx 1.` ` Appropriate Home Market (#  X-x 14.` ` In the Foreign Carrier Entry Order, the Commission set forth five factors to consider in identifying the appropriate home market of a foreign entity: (1) the country of its incorporation, organization, or charter; (2) the nationality of its investment principals, officers, and directors; (3) the country in which its world headquarters is located; (4) the country in which the majority of its tangible property, including production, transmission, billing information and control facilities, is located; and (5) the country from which it derives the greatest sales and revenues from its operations. When all five factors indicate the same country, we will presume that country to be the entity's home market, unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrates otherwise. If these five factors yield inconsistent results, however, we will balance them, along with any other information particularly relevant to the  X -case, to determine the appropriate home market under the totality of the circumstances.G  {Og -ԍxId. at  207.G  X -x15.` ` MICL argues that Chile represents Invertel's home market for the following reasons. First, although Invertel is incorporated under the laws of the state of Florida, its parent company, TDC, is a corporation organized under the laws of Chile and owned exclusively by Chilean citizens. Additionally, all of TDC's officers and directors are Chilean citizens. Both TDC's and commonlycontrolled T)lexChile's world headquarters are located in Santiago, Chile. The overwhelming majority of TDC's tangible property is also located in Chile. MICL states that TDC's domestic holdingsT)lexChile, Texcom, Chilesat, Chilepac and Chilesat Telefon1a Rural S.A.constitute approximately 90.5 percent of TDC's direct and  X-indirect property interests and provide 95 percent of TDC's total revenues.ZZ yO-ԍxApplication for Transfer of Control at 9.Z Given these factors, we agree with MICL that Chile represents Invertel's home market for purposes of our ECO analysis.  X-Xx 2.` ` Appropriate Market Segment (#  X~-x16.` ` In undertaking the ECO analysis under Section 310(b)(4), we must compare restrictions on U.S. participation in the home market for the particular radiobased service in which the foreign entity seeks to participate to those restrictions imposed on the foreign entity's participation in the U.S. market for the same service. This servicetoservice comparison requires us to identify the appropriate market segment for use in the comparison. When the services in the United States and the home market do not precisely match, we will" 0*%%ZZ=" use the most closely substitutable radiobased service in the home market, as determined from  X-the customers' perspective.i {Ob-ЍxForeign Carrier Entry Order at  212.i  X-x17.` ` MICL asserts that the Chilean international telecommunications services market represents the relevant market segment for our ECO analysis. We disagree. MICL currently holds licenses for two earth stations that it uses to provide common carrier services on both a resale and facilities basis between the United States and international points. We, therefore, believe that the relevant market segment is more narrow than Chile's entire international telecommunications market. Instead, we conclude that the licensing and operation of earth stations in Chile represents the appropriate market segment for our ECO analysis.  X -x 3.` ` Effective Competitive Opportunities Factors  X -x18.` ` As explained in the Foreign Carrier Entry Order, once we have identified the appropriate market segment within the appropriate home market, we determine whether effective competitive opportunities are available to U.S. companies and investors. The initial  X-focus of an ECO analysis is on de jure restrictions to entry. To the extent they are relevant,  X}-we also consider practical, or de facto, limitations on U.S. participation, including the price, terms and conditions of interconnection, competitive safeguards, and the regulatory framework  XQ-in the relevant market.XQZ {O\-ЍxId. at  213. X  X#-x19.` ` If, after conducting an ECO analysis, we determine that the laws of the relevant home market allow U.S. entities to hold a controlling interest in a provider of the relevant service, then we would be justified in placing no limit on the level of ownership that a foreign  X-entity from that home market can acquire in the U.S. licensee, absent significant de facto barriers. If we determine, however, that the relevant home market places legal limitations on the ability of U.S. entities to acquire and hold a controlling interest in a provider of the relevant service, then we would allow the foreign entity to exceed the 25 percent statutory foreign ownership benchmark only up to the level of ownership available to U.S. entities in  Xm-that foreign market.]m {O -ЍxId. at  214.]  X?-x20.` ` After applying an ECO analysis to MICL's application, we find that Chile has  X(-no de jure or de facto restrictions on licensing and operation of earth stations in Chile by U.S.  X-companies. The Commission previously concluded in its AmericaTel decision that "there are no relevant legal restrictions on the ability of U.S. and other foreign entities to invest in the"~0*%%ZZ<" Chilean international long distance telecommunications marketplace or to obtain licenses to  X-operate as international facilitiesbased long distance carriers."l {Ob-ЍxTransfer of Control Order at  27.l This is demonstrated by the fact that Chile already has substantial foreign investment in, and use of, earth stations to provide international telecommunications services. For example, BellSouth/Chile, a whollyowned subsidiary of BellSouth, has received a concession to provide international telecommunications services using earth stations in competition with Chilean companies such  Xv-as Chilesat.KZvZ yO -X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: