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If you need the complete document, download the WordPerfect version or Adobe Acrobat version, if available. ***************************************************************** Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al., ) ) Complainants, ) ) File No. E-98-48 v. ) ) Frontier Communications Services, Inc., ) et al., ) ) Defendants, ) ) and ) ) ) Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al., ) File No. E-98-49 ) Complainants, ) ) v. ) ) MCI Telecommunications Corporation, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Adopted: September 23, 1999; Released: September 24, 1999 By the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau: I. INTRODUCTION 1. In this order, we resolve two formal complaints filed by Bell Atlantic-Delaware, et al. (Bell Atlantic or Complainant), one against Frontier Communications Services, Inc., et al. (Frontier) and one against MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI) (collectively Defendants), pursuant to section 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act). Bell Atlantic contends that Defendants violated section 276 of the Act and section 64.1300 of the Commission's rules by refusing to pay payphone compensation for compensable calls that originated on Bell Atlantic payphones. Under section 276 of the Act, and the Commission's implementing rules and orders, interexchange carriers (IXCs) are required to compensate payphone service providers, including local exchange carrier (LEC) payphone service providers, for certain completed intrastate and interstate calls originated from the payphone service providers' payphones. Bell Atlantic seeks an order requiring Defendants to pay payphone compensation to Bell Atlantic for all calls originated on its payphones and carried by Defendants, during the fourth quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998. Bell Atlantic also seeks an order directing Defendants to make future payments for such calls. 2. Defendants each filed an answer arguing that Bell Atlantic is not entitled to payphone compensation for the calls at issue because Bell Atlantic did not adequately certify that it had complied with the compensation eligibility prerequisites set forth in the Payphone Orders. In Defendants' view, certification requires that Bell Atlantic prove to Defendants' satisfaction that Bell Atlantic has met all of the compensation eligibility prerequisites, including the removal of intrastate subsidies from Bell Atlantic's rates. 3. We find Defendants' arguments without merit. The term certification, as set forth in the Order on Reconsideration, does not mandate that a LEC payphone service provider prove to the IXC payor that it has satisfied each compensation eligibility prerequisite. Under the Commission's rules and orders, for purposes of triggering the IXCs' payment obligation, a LEC payphone service provider sufficiently "certifies" its compliance with the prerequisites by attesting authoritatively to an IXC payor that such LEC payphone service provider has satisfied each prerequisite to the receipt of payphone compensation. Moreover, we find this approach to be consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term "to certify." We therefore conclude that Bell Atlantic adequately certified to Defendants that it satisfied the compensation eligibility prerequisites. Accordingly, we order Defendants to pay payphone compensation to Bell Atlantic for all compensable calls routed to them that originated from Bell Atlantic payphones during the fourth quarter of 1997, the first quarter of 1998, and all subsequent calls, as required by the Act and the Commission's rules. II. BACKGROUND A. Statutory Authority 4. In the Payphone Orders, the Commission adopted new rules and policies governing the payphone industry to implement section 276 of the Act. Those rules and policies: (1) establish a plan to ensure fair compensation for "each and every completed intrastate and interstate call using [a] payphone[;]" (2) establish a plan to discontinue intrastate and interstate carrier access charge service elements and payments in effect on such date of enactment, and all intrastate and interstate payphone subsidies from basic exchange services; (3) prescribe nonstructural safeguards for Bell Operating Company (BOC) payphones; (4) permit the BOCs to negotiate with location providers regarding the interLATA carrier presubscribed to their payphones; (5) permit all [payphone service providers] to negotiate with location providers about the intraLATA carriers that are presubscribed to their payphones; and (6) adopt guidelines for use by the states in establishing public interest payphones to be located "where there would otherwise not be a payphone[.]" 5. In the Payphone Orders, consistent with section 276 of the Act, the Commission concluded that all payphone service providers, including LEC payphone service providers, must be compensated for "each and every completed intrastate and interstate call" originated from their payphones. Prior to the Payphone Orders, payphone service providers received no revenue for originating certain calls (e.g., subscriber 800 and other toll-free number calls) and were prohibited from blocking callers from making some of those calls (e.g., access code calls). The Commission concluded in the Payphone Orders that payphone service providers must be compensated for access code, subscriber 800, and other toll-free number calls, whether they are jurisdictionally intrastate or interstate. The Commission further concluded that IXCs, the primary economic beneficiary of such calls, would be responsible for compensating the payphone service providers. 6. The Commission concluded that LEC payphone service providers would be eligible to receive compensation for completed calls originated from their payphones once they had satisfied certain requirements. Specifically, to receive compensation, the Commission required that each LEC "must be able to certify" that it had complied with those prerequisites. In the Payphone Orders, the Commission did not set forth any requirements for the form of such a certification. The Commission subsequently stated in the Second Report and Order, however, that LEC payphone service providers are not required to file such a certification with any state or federal regulatory agency or to obtain a formal certification of compliance from either the Commission or the states to be eligible to receive per-call compensation pursuant to the Payphone Orders. Addressing certification in the Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order, the Common Carrier Bureau (Bureau) stated that, although the Commission does not require a LEC payphone service provider to file a certification with it, nothing in the Payphone Orders prohibits an IXC payor from requesting such a certification from the LECs. In the Bureau Coding Digit Waiver Order, the Bureau further stated that "LECs that have certified to the IXC that they comply with the requirements of the Payphone Orders must receive per-call compensation." B. The Bell Atlantic Complaints. 7. Bell Atlantic provides local exchange and payphone services in the northeast and mid-Atlantic states. Defendants Frontier and MCI are IXCs that provide both interstate and intrastate telephone toll service. Since October 7, 1997, the beginning of per-call compensation, Bell Atlantic has delivered calls from its payphones to Defendants. 8. To obtain compensation for calls that originated from its payphones, beginning in June 1997, Complainant Bell Atlantic including then-NYNEX sent letters to Frontier and MCI stating that the letters "certified" that each of its companies had satisfied the compensation eligibility prerequisites, as set forth in the Payphone Orders. Therefore, Complainant stated, each of its companies was entitled to receive payphone compensation as set forth in the Commission's rules and orders. To supplement its letters, NYNEX provided several compliance matrices listing how it satisfied certain prerequisites including: intrastate subsidy removal; intrastate tariff filings for payphone services; unbundled functions and features; and state-specific tariff information. Similarly, Bell Atlantic provided information in its letters indicating how it satisfied each prerequisite; for example, in responding to each requirement, Bell Atlantic noted the effective date of the tariff, approved date for the tariff or order, and tariff number, where applicable. 9. Defendants Frontier and MCI responded similarly to Complainant's June 1997 letters, each stating that it would not pay compensation until Bell Atlantic proved that the compensation eligibility prerequisites had been satisfied. Specifically, Frontier refused to pay compensation for any calls originated in Bell Atlantic's territory (including former NYNEX territory) until it was provided with specific materials that it contended would demonstrate Bell Atlantic's compliance with the Commission's payphone compensation prerequisites. Similarly, MCI stated that it was not required to pay per-call compensation to Bell Atlantic, because Bell Atlantic had not provided evidence to substantiate the claim that payphone subsidies had been removed from all of Bell Atlantic's intrastate rates. MCI, however, paid compensation in some Bell Atlantic states. Subsequent to the filing of this complaint, Frontier also paid compensation in some Bell Atlantic states. 10. Bell Atlantic issued two subsequent letters in November/December 1997 and again in March 1998 each to Frontier and MCI, again seeking compensation for calls originated from Bell Atlantic's payphones (including those in the former NYNEX territory), and reiterating that it had satisfied all of the Commission's compensation eligibility prerequisites. Additionally, in June 1998, representatives from Bell Atlantic met with representatives from MCI and Frontier (on separate occasions), along with certain Commission staff members, to discuss Defendants' obligations to pay payphone compensation. During these meetings, Commission staff expressed the position that the Payphone Orders clearly mandated that IXCs must compensate a LEC payphone service provider upon receipt of the LEC's certification of eligibility without further inquiry or requirements. Nonetheless, each Defendant stated that it would not compensate Bell Atlantic until Bell Atlantic had proven to each Defendant's satisfaction that it had removed intrastate subsidies from its rates. 11. In July 1998, Bell Atlantic initiated the present action alleging that Defendants' refusal to pay payphone compensation violated section 276 of the Act and the Commission's implementing rules and orders. To facilitate resolution of the issues addressed in the complaint, the Enforcement Division of the Common Carrier Bureau (Division) held a status conference for all parties on August 25, 1998. At that conference, the Division directed the parties to brief two specific issues: (1) what constitutes a "certification" as required by the Commission's Payphone Orders, and has Bell Atlantic complied with this certification requirement; and (2) are there any circumstances under which an interexchange carrier may refuse to pay payphone compensation after receiving a certification from a payphone service provider. III. DISCUSSION A. Introduction. 12. In the Payphone Orders, the Commission set forth prerequisites that LEC payphone service providers must satisfy to be eligible to receive payphone compensation. In doing so, the Commission delineated explicit guidelines that LECs must follow to satisfy each prerequisite, including, in some cases, filing tariffs satisfying the prerequisite. In the Order on Reconsideration, the Commission stated that once these prerequisites had been met, "[t]o receive compensation, a LEC must be able to certify the following" (1) it has an effective cost accounting manual (CAM) filing; (2) it has an effective interstate CCL tariff reflecting a reduction for deregulated payphone costs and reflecting additional multiline subscriber line charge (SLC) revenue; (3) it has effective intrastate tariffs reflecting the removal of charges that recover the costs of payphones and any intrastate [payphone] subsidies; (4) it has deregulated and reclassified or transferred the value of payphone customer premises equipment (CPE) and related costs as required in the Report and Order; (5) it has in effect intrastate tariffs for basic payphone services (for "dumb" and "smart" payphones); and (6) it has in effect intrastate and interstate tariffs for unbundled functionalities associated with those lines. The Commission also required these LECs that are BOCs to "have approved [comparably efficient interconnection (CEI)] plans for basic payphone services and unbundled functionalities prior to receiving compensation." 13. Bell Atlantic contends that it is entitled to receive payphone compensation from Defendants because it "certified" to each defendant that it complied with the Commission's compensation eligibility prerequisites. All parties agree that, in these letters, Bell Atlantic does not attempt to demonstrate to the IXC payor that it complied with each prerequisite. Instead, the letters purport to confirm to the IXC that Bell Atlantic has complied with the compensation eligibility prerequisites set forth by the Commission in the Payphone Orders. Defendants argue that Bell Atlantic's statements that it "certifies" that it has complied with the Commission's prerequisites do not constitute a "certification" as required by the Commission's orders. Instead, Defendants contend that Bell Atlantic must demonstrate to the IXCs that it actually has met the Commission's compensation eligibility prerequisites to constitute a valid certification. Defendants thus contend that Bell Atlantic is not entitled to payphone compensation, because it has not provided the IXCs proof positive that it satisfied the compensation eligibility prerequisites, including the requirement that the LEC remove intrastate payphone subsidies from its intrastate rates. 14. To resolve the complaints before us, we must determine whether Bell Atlantic's letters to Defendants, which state that the LEC has complied with each compensation eligibility prerequisite, constitute a valid certification triggering a payment obligation by Defendants. Specifically, we must determine whether the term "certification," as set forth in the Order on Reconsideration, requires a LEC to demonstrate to the IXC payor that the LEC has complied with each payphone compensation prerequisite. The Commission has not specifically defined the term "certification" in the context of payphone compensation. The courts repeatedly have recognized the authority of agencies to interpret the agency's own rules. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the term "certification" as set forth in the Order on Reconsideration does not require a LEC to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the IXC payor that such LEC has satisfied each compensation eligibility prerequisite. Rather, we find that the term "certification" as set forth in the Order on Reconsideration requires that a LEC be able to attest authoritatively that such LEC indeed has complied with each prerequisite. Therefore, we conclude that Bell Atlantic's letters to Defendants, which attested that Bell Atlantic had complied with each prerequisite, constitute a valid certification such that Defendants were obligated to pay Bell Atlantic payphone compensation. B. A valid certification as set forth in the Order on Reconsideration requires an attestation of compliance not a demonstration of compliance. 15. In the Order on Reconsideration, the Commission stated that to be eligible to receive payphone compensation, a LEC "must be able to certify" that it had satisfied the prerequisites set forth in the Payphone Orders. In requiring that a LEC "must be able to certify," the Commission declined to require LECs to provide a certification to a state or federal regulatory agency, or any other entity. Instead, the Commission simply required that the LEC be able to certify its compliance. The Commission also specifically declined to require LECs to obtain a formal certification from either a state or federal regulatory agency to be eligible for compensation. The Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order, however, permits an IXC payor to request such a certification from the LECs. 16. We conclude that "certification" as set forth in the Order on Reconsideration requires a LEC to attest that it has complied with each compensation eligibility prerequisite. In the Order on Reconsideration, the Commission required a LEC to "be able to certify" that it had satisfied the compensation eligibility prerequisites. The Commission did not set forth any specific requirements for such a certification. Therefore, we find it appropriate to examine the use of the ordinary meaning of the term "to certify" to determine a basis for a certification. Black's Law Dictionary defines "certification" as "the formal assertion in writing of some fact . . . , and to "certify" as "[t]o authenticate or vouch for a thing in writing." Similarly, Webster's Dictionary defines "certify" as "to attest authoritatively" and "to attest as being true or as represented or as meeting a standard." 17. The Commission also has used this common meaning of the term "to certify" in other contexts where it has not identified specific criteria to constitute "certification." For example, the Commission's definition of "certify" in the context of a formal complaint proceeding requires that "[t]he signature of an attorney or party shall be a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, . . . it is well grounded in fact . . . ." Thus, we find that, in this context, the ordinary meaning of the certification signifies an assertion or representation by the certifying party, not, as Defendants assert, a demonstration of proof of the facts being asserted. 18. We also find that there is nothing in the Payphone Orders to suggest other than the ordinary meaning of the term "to certify." We find Defendants' arguments supporting a broader meaning of the term "certify" to be unpersuasive. As previously emphasized, the Commission, in the Order on Reconsideration, stated only that a LEC must be able to certify that it had satisfied each compensation eligibility prerequisite. The Commission did not institute a separate additional requirement that LECs prove in advance to the Commission, IXC, or any other entity that the prerequisites had been met. Nor did the Bureau in subsequent orders require LECs to prove to IXC payors that it had satisfied each compensation eligibility prerequisite to constitute "certification." In the Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order, the Bureau specifically refused AT&T's request to clarify that "a LEC is not eligible for payphone compensation 'until it has provided proof of state action verifying the LEC's compliance with section 276 . . . .'" In response, the Bureau reiterated that the Commission's previous orders required only that a LEC "be able to certify" compliance with the payphone compensation prerequisites. The Bureau stated that the IXCs could request a certification from the LECs. Nothing in this Order, however, suggests that the Commission was creating a new requirement that the IXCs could mandate that LECs provide a factual demonstration of compliance to the IXCs' individual standards before that IXC was obligated to pay compensation directed by the statute and by the Commission's rules. 19. Thus, with regard to Defendants' specific allegation that Bell Atlantic must prove that it has removed intrastate payphone subsidies from its rates prior to being eligible to receive payphone compensation, we find that there is no such requirement, and indeed, directly conflicts with prior Commission and Bureau orders. In the Payphone Orders, when setting forth the specific guidelines for the removal of intrastate subsidies, the Commission did not institute a "proof" requirement. Instead, the Commission stated that, "pursuant to the mandate in Section 276(b)(1)(B), incumbent LECs must remove from their intrastate rates any charges that recover the cost of payphones." The Commission delegated the removal of intrastate payphone subsidies to the states, noting that "states must determine the intrastate rates elements that must be removed to eliminate any intrastate [payphone] subsidies." The Commission thus required LECs to follow procedures outlined by the state and to be able to certify that they have taken the necessary steps to satisfy the procedures. 20. Indeed, the interpretation Defendants ask us to adopt that LECs demonstrate compliance to the IXCs' satisfaction to constitute a certification would place in the hands of the IXC payor the ability to determine when, or even if, it should become obligated to pay compensation mandated by the Act. This interpretation not only would constitute an abdication of the Commission's statutory obligation under section 276 "to ensure that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated for each and every . . . call," but also would conflict with the authority specifically delegated to the Common Carrier Bureau to determine whether a LEC had complied with each prerequisite. Accordingly, we agree with Bell Atlantic that the term "certification" as used in the Payphone Orders, does not, and cannot, require it to prove to each IXC's satisfaction that the LEC has met the Commission's payphone compensation prerequisites. 21. We also find MCI's reliance on Committee to Elect Lyndon LaRouche v. Federal Election Commission to be misplaced. In Committee to Elect LaRouche, the court reviewed a decision of the Federal Election Commission to withhold from Lyndon LaRouche, a 1976 candidate for the Presidential nomination of the United States Labor Party, certification to receive primary matching funds under the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act. The court found that there is a statutory obligation in the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act that the candidate certify his eligibility to the FEC. The court also noted that, pursuant to statute, the FEC must review the submission, determine whether the candidate has satisfied the FEC's eligibility requirements such that the candidate should receive funding, and certify its findings to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment, if appropriate. Therefore, the court held that Petitioner's submission of a notarized statement was insufficient to satisfy his eligibility threshold and stated that the petitioner must provide additional documentation demonstrating that he had met the threshold. This case is simply inapposite to the current dispute. 22. Unlike the statute at issue in Committee to Elect LaRouche, section 276 does not contain any certification requirements. In contrast, in this instance, we are only required to interpret the meaning of Commission orders stating that LECs "must be able to certify" compliance and that IXCs may request such a certification. Absent explicit requirements in the Act or these orders, it is firmly within our discretion to interpret these orders using the common meaning of the term "to certify" as previously described. Nothing in section 276 requires a LEC to certify to any entity that it has satisfied the prerequisites to receiving per-call compensation. Nothing in section 276 requires the state or the Commission to certify to the IXC that such prerequisites have been met. Finally, neither section 276 nor the Commission's orders requires the Commission or any other entity to review a LEC's certification to determine if a LEC is eligible to receive per-call compensation, and if so, how much compensation that LEC should receive. We therefore conclude that neither section 276 nor the Commission's rules and orders authorize the IXC to review a LEC's submission and determine, based on its analysis of whether the prerequisites have been met, whether a LEC should receive per-call compensation. 23. We conclude that Bell Atlantic's certification letters satisfy the Commission's requirement that a LEC "must be able to certify" as set forth in the Order on Reconsideration. In the instant case, Bell Atlantic provided signed letters from its representatives attesting that it satisfied the Commission's prerequisites to certification. For example, in its initial letter seeking compensation, dated June 27, 1997, NYNEX stated that"[t]he NYNEX telephone companies hereby certify that they have met the requirements established by the [Commission] to receive compensation from carriers." NYNEX listed each of its companies and stated that the letter was a certification that each company satisfied the prerequisites. NYNEX further stated that "[a]ccordingly, NYNEX is in full compliance with the applicable requirements as set forth in the Payphone Orders." Similarly, Bell Atlantic, on behalf of its companies, stated "[e]nclosed are Certifications confirming that each of the Bell Atlantic local exchange companies has met all requirements established by the Federal Communications Commission for eligibility to receive payphone compensation . . . ." Bell Atlantic provided a separate certification for each company. 24. As detailed above, to constitute a certification the LEC must assert that it has complied with the compensation eligibility prerequisites. The Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order stated that an IXC could request "a certification for each prerequisite." Accordingly, we find that a satisfactory certification would attest that the LEC had satisfied each compensation eligibility prerequisite. We find that Bell Atlantic's letters of certification clearly meet this standard. 25. In addition to stating that it had complied with each prerequisite, Bell Atlantic's letters listed each requirement separately and stated how it satisfied each prerequisite. For example, Bell Atlantic provided compliance matrices indicating the tariff approval date reflecting intrastate subsidy removal and the approval date of a CEI plan where appropriate. We found above that certification requires an attestation that the LEC has complied with each compensation eligibility prerequisite. Thus, Bell Atlantic not only satisfied its obligation to attest to its compliance, but also provided specific information to the IXC concerning compliance. In light of such thorough filings, Defendants had no basis for refusing to pay compensation. C. Eligibility Disputes 26. Frontier contends that a dispute as to a carrier's eligibility to receive payphone compensation after certification negates an IXC's obligation to pay payphone compensation. In support of its position, Frontier compares its present dispute regarding payphone compensation eligibility to how disputed ANIs are resolved. According to Frontier, a carrier is not required to pay compensation on disputed ANIs until "'a LEC makes a positive identification of an installed payphone.'" 27. We reject Frontier's contention. The Commission established specific procedures to resolve disputed ANIs. In contrast, although the Bureau Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order permits IXC payors to request a certification from the LECs, we have specifically stated that IXCs must pay compensation upon receipt of the LEC's certification. There is no exception to this absolute obligation to pay upon receipt of certification. As noted above, the Payphone Orders delegated to the Bureau the authority to determine whether a LEC had complied with the prerequisites to payphone compensation. IXCs questioning the veracity of a LEC's certification are obligated to challenge the LEC's compliance may initiate a proceeding at the Commission. 28. In the instant matter, neither Frontier nor MCI have availed themselves of this remedy, but instead have undertaken the remedy of self-help by refusing to pay compensation mandated by our rules. As we have stated in other contexts, such self-help remedies are strongly disfavored by the Commission. We emphasize that a LEC's certification letter does not substitute for the LEC's obligation to comply with the requirements as set forth in the Payphone Orders. The Commission consistently has stated that LECs must satisfy the requirements set forth in the Payphone Orders, subject to waivers subsequently granted, to be eligible to receive compensation. Determination of the LEC's compliance, however, is a function solely within the Commission's and state's jurisdiction. As stated above, the Commission specifically delegated to the Common Carrier Bureau the authority to determine whether a LEC has complied with the compensation eligibility prerequisites. D. Damages. 29. We conclude above that Bell Atlantic's letters constitute an adequate certification, such that these letters triggered Defendants' obligation to pay payphone compensation. The Commission bifurcated this proceeding into liability and damages phases. Thus, in accordance with section 1.722(b) of the Commission's rules, the complainant may file a supplemental complaint for damages within sixty days of the release of this order. IV. BELL ATLANTIC'S MOTION TO STRIKE 30. On September 17, 1998, Bell Atlantic filed a motion to strike Frontier's opening brief. Bell Atlantic argues that the Commission Should strike Frontier's brief because the brief ignored the issues that the Commission directed the parties to brief and instead addressed questions that the Commission rejected as issues for briefing. On September 24, 1998, Frontier filed a reply to Bell Atlantic's motion to strike and argued that it directly "addressed the issues identified by Commission staff for briefing. We deny Bell Atlantic's motion to strike. Frontier's brief did address issues set forth by the Commission. To the extent Frontier addressed matters beyond the scope of the issues set forth for this briefing, we did not consider those arguments. V. CONCLUSION AND ORDERING CLAUSES 31. In conclusion, we find that Bell Atlantic's letters to Defendants satisfy the Commission's certification requirement. We also find that Defendant's arguments that Bell Atlantic was required to demonstrate compliance to their satisfaction are without merit for the reasons stated above. Under Defendants' theory, the IXC would be the ultimate judge of whether the LEC payphone service provider had complied with the Commission's rules and orders. This outcome is unacceptable. First, such a construct would allow the IXC to delay paying compensation indefinitely. Second, the statute requires that the Commission "ensure all payphone service providers are fairly compensated for each . . . call" made from a payphone. The Commission has not and cannot delegate this statutory requirement to IXCs. Therefore, we conclude that Bell Atlantic is entitled to receive per-call compensation from Frontier and MCI. 32. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 208, and 276 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 208, and 276, that the instant complaint filed on July 15, 1998, by Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., Bell Atlantic- Maryland, Inc., Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Bell Atlantic- Virginia, Inc. Bell Atlantic-Washington, D.C., Inc., Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., New York Telephone Company and New England Telephone and Telegraph Company against Frontier Communications Services Inc., Frontier Communications International Inc., Frontier Communications of the West Inc., Frontier Communications-North Central Region Inc., Frontier Communications of New England Inc., and Frontier Communications of the Mid Atlantic Inc. IS GRANTED TO THE EXTENT INDICATED HEREIN. 33. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 208, and 276 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 208, and 276, that the instant complaint filed on July 15, 1998, by Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., Bell Atlantic- Maryland, Inc., Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Bell Atlantic- Virginia, Inc. Bell Atlantic-Washington, D.C., Inc., Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., New York Telephone Company and New England Telephone and Telegraph Company against MCI Communications Corporation IS GRANTED TO THE EXTENT INDICATED HEREIN. 34. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bell Atlantic MAY FILE a supplemental complaint for damages within sixty (60) days pursuant to Section 1.722(b)(2) of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R.  1.722(b). 35. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bell Atlantic's motion to strike is DENIED. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Lawrence E. Strickling Chief, Common Carrier Bureau