WPCG 2J BNLZTimes Roman3|o#o\  PCXP#"S^*8DSS888S^*8*.SSSSSSSSSS..^^^Jxooxf]xx8Axfxx]xo]fxxxxf8.8NS8JSJSJ8SS..S.SSSS8A.SSxSSJP!PZ8*888888888888S.xJxJxJxJxJooJfJfJfJfJ8.8.8.8.xSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxJxSxSxSxSxS]SxJxJoJoJoJoJxSfJfJfJfJxSxSxSxSxSxSxS8S8S888SA8xSf.f8f8f8f.xSxSxSxSxSxo8o8o8]A]A]A]Af8f8f8xSxSxSxSxxSfJfJN:*LS8JSSSSS.4}}S2S}2JJS88SS]]8J2t^^\\^^ee*C^.wR)Ewn\1fy\r\Sxx\rHP LaserJet HP4___2025M_6326_1HPLA4PO0.PRS]\  PChhhh ~P2[;|LX X-#o\  PCXP#"S^2CRddCCCdq2C28dddddddddd88qqqYzoCNzoozzC8C^dCYdYdYCdd88d8ddddCN8ddddY`(`lC2CC!CCCCCCCCCCd8YYYYYYzYzYzYzYC8C8C8C8ddddddddddYdddddodYYYYYYdzYzYzYzYdddddddCdCdCCCdNCdz8zCzCzCz8dddddCCCoNoNoNoNzCzCzCdddddzYzYNF2[dCYddddd7>d<d<$YYdCCddooCYd<d<+oodCCddddCod<d<$YYdCCddooCYtbttYtkYbttttb5,5KP5GPGPG5PP,,P,|PPPP5>,PPtPPGM MW5(555555555555P,tGtGtGtGtGkkGbGbGbGbG5,5,5,5,tPtPtPtPtPtPtPtPtPtPtGtPtPtPtPtPYPtGtGkGkGkGkGtPbGbGbGbGtPtPtPtPtPtPtP5P5P555P>5tPb,b5b5b5b,tPtPtPtPtPtk5k5k5Y>Y>Y>Y>b5b5b5tPtPtPtPttPbGbGN8(HP5GPPPPP,2xxP0zzPx0GGP55PPYY5G0tZZXXZZ``(@Z,rO(B{r{{{iX1btXnXPttXn"S^!)22SN!!!28!2222222222888,\HCCH=8HH!'H=YHH8HC8=HH^HH=!!/2!,2,2,!222N2222!'22H22,006!!!d!!!!!!!!!!2H,H,H,H,H,YCC,=,=,=,=,!!!!H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H,H2H2H2H2H282H,H,C,C,C,C,H2=,=,=,=,H2H2H2H2H2H2H2!2!2!!!2'!H2==!=!=!=H2H2H2H2H2YHC!C!C!8'8'8'8'=!=!=!H2H2H2H2^HH2=,=,N#-2!,22222KK2LL2K,,2d!!22b88d!,dt887788c<%7777777777>>>1eOIIOC=OO%+OCbOO=OI=COOhOOC%%47%17171%777V7777%+77O77155<%%%n%%%%%%%%%%7O1O1O1O1O1bII1C1C1C1C1%%%%O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O1O7O7O7O7O7=7O1O1I1I1I1I1O7C1C1C1C1O7O7O7O7O7O7O7%7%7%%%7+%O7CC%C%C%CO7O7O7O7O7bOI%I%I%=+=+=+=+C%C%C%O7O7O7O7hOO7C1C1N'27%177777"SS7!TT7S!117n%%77l==n%1n!t>><<>>mBBs,>[N6-msTN[TTTH_<1CPtbttYtkYbttttb`(`lC2CC!CCCCCCCCCCP8tttttkzbzbzbzbC5C5C5C5ttttttttttttttttoYttkkkktzbzbzbzbtttttttC5C5C5C5N>tzbzbzbzbzbtttttkkkoYoYoYoYzbzbzbtttttzbzbzYYYzYYYoYzYYYYYYNF2[dCYddddd7>d<d<$YYdCCddooCYoverdue.8"K {O- zԍXSee Letter to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission from Michael B. Fingerhut, General Attorney, Sprint (June 8, 1995).(# Additionally, Sprint contends, the line on which Febrer's 800 service terminated had been  S-  Ldisconnected prior to Sprint's termination of 800PORTFOLIO.|K {O, -ԍXSee id. Sprint states that the line had been disconnected by New York Telephone. See id.(#Ɵ Therefore, Sprint argues, it could not  S-have delivered traffic to Febrer even if he had maintained his subscription to 800PORTFOLIO.FK {O-ԍXSee id.(#F  S-l  S-3III. DISCUSSION ĐlU  SH - A.  Alleged Violations of Sprint's Tariffs  S - 1.` ` Notice and Just CauseV  S -` ` a.  Contentions of the Parties  SX-  9.` `   Febrer contends that Sprint terminated his use of the number 800PORTFOLIO without  S0-  notice to him or just cause for termination and therefore violated its tariffs and its agreement with Febrer.R0K {Op-ԍXSee Complaint at 2.(#R   Febrer relies on Sections 3.17 and 3.23 of Tariff No. 2 to support his claim that Sprint was required to   ?provide him with advance written notification prior to terminating his service and the use of 800 S-  PORTFOLIO.z2 K {O- ԍXSee id. at 3. In pertinent part, Section 3.17 of Sprint's tariff No. 2 states "[b]y giving advance written  notice, subscriber may disconnect service at any time following the one month (30 days) minimum service  requirement . . . . Carrier will have up to 30 days to disconnect . . . . This 30 day period will begin upon  \receipt of written notification from the subscriber." Section 3.23 of Sprint's Tariff No. 2, which governs  800 number service, states "[i]f the 800 service telephone number is not used by callers other than for test  calls to reach the customer or customer's designee within ninety (90) days of activation of the 800 number, US Sprint may, upon written notice, make the number unavailable for the customer's use." (#Ǝ Febrer alleges that he did not receive any written notice from Sprint of its intention to   terminate service or the number 800PORTFOLIO, either within the thirty (30) days specified in Section  Sh-3.17, or the ninety (90) days allegedly required to terminate 800 number service.@ZhtK {O|%- ԍXSee Complaint at 2; Febrer First Response Letter; see also Letter to David Meyers, Staff Attorney, Formal  Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enforcement Division, Common Carrier Bureau from Jay Febrer (June 2, 1995).(#@ "h,o(o(99"Ԍ  S-  C10.` ` Additionally, Febrer contends that Sprint did not have just cause to terminate 800  PORTFOLIO. Febrer argues that his cancelled check dated June 13, 1992, made payable to Sprint,  S-  zsupports his claim that he timely paid for 800 service.ZK {O-  ԍXSee Copy of cancelled check attached to Febrer First Response Letter (submitted in response to Bureau's  request both at status conference and in writing that Febrer provide specific documentation supporting his assertion that he paid for 800 service and was in good financial standing with Sprint).(#Ɖ Febrer further contends that he continued to  S`-receive statements of 800 number service from Sprint even after the number had been disconnected.f`K {O-ԍXSee Febrer First Response Letter.(#f  S-  P11.` `   In its answer to the complaint, Sprint admits that Febrer subscribed to its 800 service, but  S-  zdenies that it disconnected the number without appropriate notice to Febrer and without just cause.K|K yO -ԍXAnswer at 4.(#K   zAdditionally, Sprint contends that Febrer has failed to state a valid cause of action under the Act, and  S-  kmoreover, that Febrer's claims that Sprint violated its tariffs are "based upon a clear misreading of the  Sp-applicable tariff provision."Sp K yO-ԍXOpposition of Sprint at 2.(#S  S -  12.` ` Sprint argues that it provided adequate written notice of its intent to terminate 800 S -  PORTFOLIO, as required by its tariffs.N K yO4-ԍXAnswer at 4, 8.(#N According to Sprint, a carrier must provide written notice thirty  S -  days prior to disconnection, which Sprint in fact provided. Sprint argues that Section 3.23 authorizes   Sprint to terminate a customer's 800 number if that customer does not use the number within the first   ninety days of issuance; it is not a requirement that Sprint provide its 800 number customers with ninety  SX-days notice prior to termination.HX, K {O$-ԍXId. at 7.(#H  S-  o13.` ` Sprint states that it provided Febrer with notice of potential termination by including a   statement on his monthly invoice that his account was past due and that service "may be disconnected"  S-  if "payment is not received within 30 days of invoice date."H K {O-ԍXId. at 8.(#H Sprint further contends that its customer   yservice group attempted to contact the "phone number of record upon which the 800 service was carried,   and heard a recorded announcement that the number had been disconnected and was no longer in  S@-service."J @P K {O0#-ԍXId. at 45.(#J  S-  S-  14.` ` Sprint also argues that it properly disconnected 800PORTFOLIO because payment for  S-  the service was thirty (30) days past due.L!K {OJ'-ԍXSee id. at 8.(#L In support of its position, Sprint relies on Section 3.16 of its"t!,o(o(993"   >tariff, which permits Sprint to "cancel or discontinue service for nonpayment of any sum due to the  S-  carrier for more than 30 days after the rendition of service."H"K {O@-ԍXId. at 8.(#H Sprint states that prior to terminating 800  PORTFOLIO on June 10, 1992, Sprint examined Febrer's payment history, and discovered that Febrer had  S-  Lfailed to pay the basic $15 monthly charge for the months of April and May of 1992.#ZK {O- ԍXId. at 9; Letter to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission from Michael B. Fingerhut, General Attorney, Sprint (June 8, 1995).(# Sprint contends  S`-  that the $45 check submitted by Febrer "confirms" that Febrer's account "was at least two months past  S8-  due at the time Sprint terminated" his service.$8K {O - ԍXSee Letter to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission from Michael B. Fingerhut, General Attorney, Sprint (June 8, 1995).(# Additionally, Sprint argues, Febrer went for periods of  S-nine months, three months, and four months without making any payments.K%K yO -ԍXAnswer at 9.(#K  S- ` ` b. Decision   S-  Sp-  #15.` ` It is well established that in a formal complaint proceeding pursuant to Section 208 of the  SH -  Act, the complainant has the burden of proof.t&H K {O- ԍXSee, e.g., Amendment of Rules Concerning Procedures to be Followed When Formal Complaints are Filed  {OP- Against Common Carriers, 8 FCC Rcd 2614, 261617 (1993); Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel v.  {O- AT&T Communications, 4 FCC Rcd 8130, 8133 (1989), aff'd sub nom. Connecticut Office of Consumer  {O- zCounsel v. FCC, 915 F. 2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991). See generally 47 C.F.R.  1.7201.735.(#t For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Febrer has failed to carry his burden in this case.  S -  16.` ` Under the Commission's general pleading and format requirements, formal complaints  S -  against common carriers must, inter alia, contain a complete statement of facts, that if true, are sufficient  S -  to constitute a violation of the Act or Commission rule or order.u' V K {Ox-ԍXSee 47 C.F.R.  1.720(b), (c), and 1.721(a)(5).(#u The rules provide that facts must be  SZ-  supported by affidavit or other relevant documentation.F(ZK {O-ԍXSee id.(#F The rules also encourage complainants to   describe "fully and clearly the specific act or thing complained of, together with such facts as are  S -  [necessary to give a full understanding of the matter, including relevant legal and documentary support."Q) zK yO$"-ԍX47 C.F.R.  1.721(b).(#Q  S-  Complainants have the right to respond to affirmative defenses raised by defendants in their answers,X* K {O$-ԍXSee 47 C.F.R.  1.726.(#X   and both complainants and defendants may initiate limited selfexecuting discovery to develop information"*,o(o(99"  S-necessary to resolve material questions of fact.X+K {Oh-ԍXSee 47 C.F.R.  1.729.(#X  S-  17.` ` Although Febrer's complaint alleged a violation of the Act,,ZK {O- ԍXFebrer's complaint was filed by an attorney; however, Febrer later proceeded as a pro se complainant. See  {Ot-supra para. 4 & n.8, 9.(# it contained neither a   [complete statement of facts nor documentation sufficient to support the finding of a violation of the Act  S`-  ^or of a Commission rule or order. Nonetheless, because Febrer pursued this action as a pro se  S:-  complainant, the Bureau endeavored to ensure that he had adequate opportunity to provide the necessary   documentation to support his claims. During the April 20, 1995 status conference, and in the April 25,   1995 staff letter, the Bureau explained to each party what information would be needed to support its   claims. Additionally, the Bureau recognized that Febrer may have some difficulty with the English   language, and consequently, granted Febrer's request for a bilingual Commission staff person to assist him during the status conference. Despite these efforts, Febrer has not made the necessary presentation.  S" -  #18.` ` Febrer's principal claim is that Sprint failed to provide advance written notice, as required   by its tariffs, prior to terminating his use of 800PORTFOLIO and that Sprint terminated 800  PORTFOLIO without cause. Febrer seeks to support this claim largely on his own undocumented   assertions that he was in good financial standing with Sprint and that he never received notice of   termination. Febrer cites to Sections 3.17 and 3.23 of Tariff No.2, arguing that notice is required prior   yto termination. It is unclear, however, what Febrer asserts to be sufficient notice for such termination, as each tariff states a different time period.  S-  19.` ` Independent of Febrer's failure to state with specificity the notice to which he claims he   .was entitled prior to disconnection, we find that Febrer has not supported his claim that Sprint failed to   provide him with advance written notification prior to terminating 800PORTFOLIO. Sprint's tariffs   provide that Sprint, by written notice to the subscriber, may terminate service immediately for non SB-  payment of any sum due to it for service "for more than 30 days beyond rendition of the bill."l-BK yO-ԍXTariff No. 2, Section 3.16, Cancellation for Cause.(#l In this   =case, according to Sprint's answer, it appears that Sprint provided written notice to Febrer by stating on  S-  ythe monthly invoice that Febrer's service was subject to disconnection for nonpayment.R.FK {O-ԍXSee supra para. 13.(#R Febrer has not   provided credible evidence to refute Sprint's assertion that it provided notice, such as a copy of the   telephone bills for the time period in question indicating that Sprint did not provide such notice.   Accordingly, we find that Febrer has not met his burden of proof concerning his claim of failure to  SR-  provide notice./XRK yO"- ԍXWe note that at the status conference we requested that Febrer provide specific documentation to support  zhis claim, such as copies of the invoices for the time period prior to disconnection, evidence of payment, or other relevant material to support his claim. Febrer, however, failed to provide any such documentation.(#ƙ Additionally, we agree with Sprint that Febrer misconstrues Section 3.23 of its tariff.   That section specifically states "[i]f the 800 service telephone number is not used by callers . . . within  S-  ninety (90) days of activation of the 800 number," Sprint may remove the number from that customer's" /,o(o(99k"  S-  use.0K yOh-ԍXTariff No. 2, Section 3.23, Assignment and Retention of 800 Service Telephone Numbers.(#Ə That section does not require ninety days notice prior to termination for nonpayment, but instead allows Sprint to terminate the number if it is not used within the first ninety days after installation.  S-  Q20.` ` We also find that Febrer has not made a prima facie showing to support his contention   that Sprint terminated his service and use of 800PORTFOLIO without just cause. According to Section   3.16 of Tariff No. 2, Sprint may discontinue service because of nonpayment of any sum due to Sprint  S-  [after 30 days "beyond the rendition of the bill for such service."l1XK yO -ԍXTariff No. 2, Section 3.16, Cancellation for Cause.(#l During the status conference on April   j20, 1995, the Bureau specifically explained to Febrer that he must provide documentation to support his   claim that he was in good financial standing with Sprint at the time Sprint terminated his use of the  S-  number 800PORTFOLIO.p2K {O -ԍXSee Status Conference Letter supra note 13.(#p Febrer's only documentation to support his claim of payment is a cancelled   check dated June 13, 1992, made payable to Sprint in the amount of fortyfive dollars ($45). Based on   [the evidence in the record, it appears that Febrer tendered this check three days after his 800 service was  S -  terminated.3$ zK {O:- zԍXSeeĠLetter to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission from Michael B.  0Fingerhut, General Attorney, Sprint (June 8, 1995) (stating that Febrer's service was disconnected on  {O- approximately June 10, 1992). See also Febrer First Response Letter (providing a copy of a cancelled check dated June 13, 1992, and arguing that such check illustrated timely payment for service).(# Febrer did not provide other checks evidencing continued payment to Sprint nor invoices   Mstating the amount due. Sprint contends that this $45 check represents payment for three months of   >service at fifteen dollars ($15) per month, at least two months of which were past due. Thus, Sprint   Mcontends, because Febrer's account was over 30 days past due, it had just cause to terminate Febrer's  S -  =service and use of 800PORTFOLIO. Nonpayment is an explicit basis for termination of service under   Tariff No. 2. The check Febrer provided to support his claim that he timely paid for 800 service, tendered   three days after termination of his 800 service, is insufficient evidence to rebut Sprint's claim that Febrer's   yaccount was over 30 days past due at the time he tendered the $45 check. Therefore, we find that Febrer has not sustained the burden of proof as to termination without just cause.  S-  S-2.` ` Number Reassignment  S@-` ` a .   Contentions of the Parties   S-  21.` `   Febrer also alleges that Sprint reassigned 800PORTFOLIO to another customer within   one month after removing the number from his use, and therefore violated the terms of its tariffs and FCC  S-  rules.P4f K yO"-ԍXComplaint at 4. (#P Febrer contends that Sprint's tariffs require it to "age" the disconnected 800 number for six  Sx-  months prior to reassignment,r5x K {O%-ԍXSee id. at 5 (citing NANP Guidelines, Section 4.5).(#r and that the original assignee of that number has three months from the  SP-  [date of disconnection to reconnect the number.L6P K {Ox'-ԍXSee id. at 5.(#L Febrer contends that he was denied the opportunity to"P6,o(o(99"  S-  /reconnect, because the number was reassigned to someone else within one month after termination.7K {Oh- ԍXSee id. at 5; Letter to David Meyers, Staff Attorney, Formal Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enforcement Division, Common Carrier Bureau from Jay Febrer (June 9, 1995).(#   Additionally, Febrer alleges that this reassignment violated his agreement with Sprint, which allegedly  S-  gave him "sole and exclusive use and benefit of the . . . number."H8"K yOr-ԍXComplaint at 2.(#H After disconnection of the number, Febrer contends that he attempted to recover 800PORTFOLIO, but Sprint refused to reissue the number.  S8-  22.` `   Sprint admits that Febrer requested the return of 800PORTFOLIO, but denies that it must   reissue that number to Febrer. Sprint argues that, although "it generally does not reissue the 800 number   of a customer whose service has been disconnected (either voluntarily or involuntarily) for a certain period  S-  Lof time, it will reissue the number within a shorter period if the facts relevant to the particular customer  S-  so warrant, and if the new customer signs a letter agreeing to certain conditions."Q9K yO -ԍXAnswer at 5.(#Q Sprint avers, however,   that under Section 3.23, Tariff No. 2, customers do not have any "ownership interest or proprietary right"  SH -  in the assigned 800 number.H:H BK {O*-ԍXId. at 6.(#H Furthermore, Sprint argues that its tariffs are specifically designed to   =prevent the hoarding of and trafficking in 800 numbers. Therefore, Sprint argues, its tariffs are "just and  S -reasonable" and it is not required to reissue the number.J; K {Ol-ԍXId. at 69.(#J  S -` ` b. Decision  S -  SX-  n23.` ` Febrer alleges that Sprint reassigned the number within three months of disconnection, and  S0-  "therefore violated its tariffs. Febrer, however, has not met his burden of proof with regard to   demonstrating that Sprint reassigned 800PORTFOLIO to a different customer within three months of   =terminating Febrer's use of the number. Therefore, we find that Febrer has not demonstrated that Sprint   violated its tariffs. At the status conference, the Bureau requested Febrer to provide specific   documentation evidencing that Sprint reassigned the number in violation of its tariffs. In response to this  Sh-  zrequest, Febrer reiterated that Sprint gave the number to a different party.^<Zhf K {On- ԍXSee Letter to David Meyers, Staff Attorney, Formal Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enforcement  Division, Common Carrier Bureau from Jay Febrer (June 9, 1995) (written in response to Sprint's letter filed with the Bureau after the status conference).(#^ Febrer, however, did not  S@-  jprovide any information to support this claim, such as a sworn affidavit that he had called the number to   confirm its reassignment, nor did he make any attempts to obtain such information from Sprint through  S-discovery._= K {O$- .ԍXAs previously mentioned, recognizing that Febrer was a pro se complainant, and that Febrer may have some  zdifficultly with the English language, the Bureau endeavored to assist Febrer during the complaint process.  {O%- \See supra paras. 46 (stating that the Commission provided a bilingual staff person to assist Febrer at the  {status conference and that the Bureau specifically informed Febrer what types of documents he should produce to support his claims).(#_" <=,o(o(994"Ԍ S-ԙ B.NANP Guidelines  S-  S- 1.` ` Contentions of the Parties  S-  S`-  C24.` `   Febrer further alleges that Sprint's disconnection of 800PORTFOLIO violated the   .requirements stated in the North American Numbering Plan (NANP), which, he argues, governs Sprint's   j800 number service. Specifically, Febrer cites to Sections 3.6, 3.7, and 4.5 of NANP, alleging that Sprint  S-  unlawfully reassigned the 800PORTFOLIO number without replacing that number in the common  S-  assignment pool;5>K {O( - ԍXSee Bell Communications Research, Inc., TenDigit 800 Service Number Administration Guidelines, North  American Numbering Plan (1987). Febrer provides these guidelines as an attachment to his complaint.  NIn pertinent part, Section 3.6 of the NANP states, "[u]nused 800 Service numbers must be recovered,  returned to the common assignment pool, and made available for reassignment to other potential subscribers/assignees."(#5 that Sprint did not remove the number for just cause and with reasonable notice;?zK yO - ]ԍXComplaint at 4. Section 3.7 states that "an unassigned 800 Service number can be taken away from a subscriber/assignee only with just cause and reasonable notice."(# and  S-that Sprint did not "age" the number after its disconnection.@K yO - ԍXComplaint at 4. Section 4.5 of the NANP guidelines states in pertinent part, "[a] number in the  MDISCONNECT status is an 800 Service number that is disconnected for use by the subscriber/assignee and  .associated 800 service has been terminated. . . . The standard disconnect/aging interval is one year following  the effective date of the 800 Service disconnect. . . . However, if a disconnected 800 Service number is  specifically requested, the minimum amount of time a number must be aged before reassignment is 6 months."(#Ɵ  SH -  25.` `  Sprint disputes that it is liable to Febrer because of alleged violations of the NANP.   Sprint contends that it offers 800 number service through tariffs filed with the Commission and that the   NANP guidelines do not regulate its offering of service. As such, Sprint is not required to "age" 800  S -numbers prior to reassignment.[A J K {O-ԍXSee Answer at 5.(#[  S - 2.` ` Decision  S0-  26.` ` Febrer's contention that Sprint violated the NANP guidelines is without merit. We agree   Lthat Sprint must provide service as specified by its tariffs filed with the Commission, which, as we have  S-  kalready found, it did.ZBK {O\!-ԍXSee supra paras. 1920, 23.(#Z The NANP guidelines are just that guidelines, not enforceable requirements.   Furthermore, pursuant to Section 208 of the Act, the Commission has the authority to review those  S-  complaints brought before us alleging a violation of the Act, our rules, or orders; potential violations of   zthe NANP guidelines are not within our jurisdiction, unless the same requirements have been adopted   yexplicitly by the Commission. As such, we will not examine whether Sprint properly placed the number"@ nB,o(o(99T"  S-in the common assignment pool pursuant to NANP.C K yOh- >ԍXBecause Febrer has failed to establish Sprint's liability, we do not need to entertain his claim for damages.  >Nonetheless, had Febrer demonstrated that Sprint was liable, Febrer would have failed to sustain his claim  \for damages. According to Commission rules, a formal complaint must state what relief the complainant  {O- seeks, including any request for damages. See 47 C.F.R.  1.721(a)(7). Although Febrer requested damages  during the complaint proceeding, Febrer has not met the burden of proof that he sustained past, present, or  future loss as a result of the termination of the use of 800PORTFOLIO. The Commission specifically  requested Febrer at the status conference, and again in writing, to provide specific evidence of his damages.  Febrer responded to this request merely by reiterating that he wanted damages for money spent with regard   to the number and future losses that would be sustained because he could no longer use that number. The  Bureau provided Febrer with an additional opportunity to respond and present a claim for damages; neither  his June 2, 1995 nor his June 9, 1995 letter, however, provides specific instances of expenditures incurred  for the marketing of the number nor support his claim for damages. Accordingly, even if we had found  Sprint liable as Febrer alleges, he has failed to establish that he incurred any damages due to the termination of his use of 800PORTFOLIO. (#  S-  27.` ` We note that although the Commission has not adopted the Bellcore guidelines cited by   yFebrer, the Commission recently adopted rules pertaining to the aging requirements for disconnecting toll  S`-  Lfree numbers.D` K {O- .ԍXSee Toll Free Service Access Codes, Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd 11,162, 11,19193, 11,19799, paras. 4346, 5254 (1997). (# Febrer, however, has not argued that Sprint violated these rules, instead basing his claim   on an alleged violation of NANP guidelines. We emphasize, as noted above, that pursuant to Section 208   of the Act, and our rules pertaining to formal complaints, a complainant must allege a violation of a  S-  specific section of the Act, our rules, or orders upon which relief could be granted.oEK {Od-ԍXSee 47 U.S.C.  208(a); 47 C.F.R.  1.721.(#o Nonetheless, even   if Febrer had alleged a violation of these Commission rules, such rules would not have assisted Febrer's   /claim for several reasons. First, the rule is not applicable to the instant case because Sprint allegedly  Sp-  reassigned the number prior to the effective date of the aging requirements adopted by the Commission.F\pnK yO~- ԍXFebrer initiated this formal complaint with the Commission in January 1994 based on actions that allegedly  {OF- occurred in 1992. See supraĠparas. 3, 24. The Commission, however, did not adopt the aging requirement  {O-rules until 1997. See Toll Free Service Access Codes, 12 FCC Rcd at 11,162.(#ƫ   Second, the rule does not state a minimum period of time that a number must remain in disconnect status;   instead, the rule states a maximum period that a toll free number may remain in disconnect status four  S -  months after disconnection.G K {O* -ԍXSee Toll Free Service Access Codes, 12 FCC Rcd at 11,19193, 11,19799, paras. 4346, 5254.(#ƛ Moreover, even if these rules were applicable in the instant case, we find   [that Febrer did not provide any documentation to support his claim that the number had been reassigned   within a particular amount of time nor did he seek any information to support his claim through discovery.  SX- I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I. 1. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) IV. PROCEDURAL MATTERS  S0-  S-  m28.` `  Sprint's Motion to Dismiss . Sprint filed a motion to dismiss United Telecom, Inc. and   Sprint Corporation as parties to the complaint on the ground that they are not engaged in providing telecommunications services. Febrer did not oppose Sprint's motion to dismiss. " $G,o(o(99"Ԍ S-  ԙ29.` ` We are granting Sprint's motion to dismiss United Telecom, Inc. and Sprint Corporation   yas parties to the complaint. Because Sprint's motion is unopposed and because dismissing the complaint   with respect to these two parties still allows Febrer's complaint to proceed against the proper party to this   yaction (Sprint), we find that the removal of United Telecom, Inc. and Sprint Corporation does not impair resolution of Febrer's complaint.  S-  !30.` `  Febrer's Motion for Summary Judgment . On August 8, 1994, Febrer filed a notice of   Mmotion requesting that the Commission grant summary judgment in his favor because Sprint failed to  S-  answer his complaint.HK yO( - =ԍXAlthough not technically worded as a motion for summary judgment, the Commission considered this notice of motion as a motion for summary judgment.(# Sprint filed an opposition to this motion, with affidavits supporting its position  S-that it never received the Febrer complaint.I K {OX - LԍXSee Affidavit of Jay C. Keithley, Vice President, Law and External Affairs, Sprint (Oct. 27, 1994); Affidavit of Melinda L. Mills, Executive Secretary to Jay C. Keithley, Sprint (Oct. 27, 1994).(#  SH -  _31.` ` Pursuant to Commission rules, the complaint was served on Sprint, requiring Sprint to file  S -  an answer with the Commission by March 21, 1994.J zK yO:- ԍXLetter to Jay C. Keithley, Sprint from Thomas D. Wyatt, Chief, Formal Complaints and Investigations Branch, Common Carrier Bureau (Feb. 18, 1994).(# Subsequently, Febrer through counsel, notified the  S -  Commission that Sprint had not answered the complaint.RKZ K {Oj- >ԍXSee Letter to Thomas D. Wyatt, Chief, Formal Complaints and Investigations Branch, Common Carrier  {Bureau from Febrer's attorney, Howard Hirschfeld (June 8, 1994) (stating that Sprint had "unilaterally decided" not to respond to the complaint).(#R Febrer, through counsel, then filed the instant  S -  motion for summary judgment. After learning that Sprint never received the complaint,L$ K yOd- ԍXThe Commission spoke with Sprint counsel and learned that Sprint had not received the Febrer complaint.  kSprint subsequently verified this information in affidavits submitted in conjunction with its Opposition of  {O- Sprint filed in response to Febrer's motion. See Opposition of Sprint; Affidavit of Jay C. Keithley;  {O-Affidavit of Melinda L. Mills, supra. (# the Commission   forwarded a copy to Sprint on August 6, 1994, which Sprint timely answered thirty (30) days later on   September 6, 1994. Because Sprint did not receive the complaint when initially served, and because   Sprint responded in a timely manner upon receiving the subsequently served complaint, we deny Febrer's motion for summary judgment, and therefore we have ruled on the merits of the complaint.  S- l  S-+ V. CONCLUSION AND ORDERING CLAUSES ĐlU  S-   32.` ` For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Febrer has failed to satisfy his burden of   demonstrating that Sprint's termination of Febrer's use of 800PORTFOLIO occurred without notice or just cause, or that Sprint improperly reassigned 800PORTFOLIO.  S-  33.` ` Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and 208 of the   Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), and 208, and the authority   Ndelegated in Sections 0.91 and 0.291 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R.  0.91, 0.291, that the complaint of Jay Febrer IS DENIED."x L,o(o(99"Ԍ S-  ԙ34.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sprint's Motion to Dismiss United Telecom, Inc. and Sprint Corporation as parties to the complaint IS GRANTED.  S-35.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Febrer's Notice of Motion IS DENIED.   S8-  A36.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the abovecaptioned complaint IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the proceeding IS TERMINATED. ` `  hh,VFEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ` `  hh,V ` `  hh,VA. Richard Metzger, Jr.   ` `  hh,VChief, Common Carrier Bureau