WPCy 2HBKX@ Z3|J (TT) S' X #&a\  P6G;/&P#"5@^*7DTT77T^*7*/TTTTTTTTTT//^^^Jxooxf\xx7Axfxx\xo\fxxxxf7/7NT7JTJTJ7TT//T/TTTT7A/TTxTTJP!PZ*7777BD7TTxJxJxJxJxJooJfJfJfJfJ7/7/7/7/xTxTxTxTxTxTxTxTxTxTxJxTxTxTxTxT\TxTxJxJoJoJoJfJfJfJxTxTxxTxTxTxTBT7T777TAxTf/fDxTxTxTxo7oD\A\AN:*KT7JTTTTT.3}}T2T}277JJT77TT7J72t7[[[[^[e*B`^.wRTTn[Cfx`xWlRx[\[ceIfIs`Wx[rriwge*7DTT77T^*7*/TTTTTTTTTT//^^^Jxooxf\xx7Axfxx\xo\fxxxxf7/7NT7JTJTJ7TT//T/TTTT7A/TTxTTJP!PZ7TJTT7\777JJ:T7A7xx*7TTTT!T7.T^7TB[227`K*723T}}}Jxxxxxxoffff7777xxxxxxx^xxxxxx\TJJJJJJoJJJJJ////TTTTTTT[TTTTTTTApple LaserWriter II NTXAPLAIINT.WRSX\  P6G;#`P2[3zKRTimes New Roman (TT)Times New Roman (Bold) (TT)#P#3|a  S' X #&a\  P6G; (&P#Times New Roman (TT)Times New Roman (Bold) (TT)Times New Roman (Italic) (TT)2J=.X &J\  P6Q&P.2N=.X7&N4  pQ&.k(?1%Xr?4  pQ\r>\gFr>\t0\\=!=WxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNBnnBT\>Q\\\\\3;\7;\7>>QQ\??n\\pBnnBmgg>Q\7"yyyy\njc\gnn\2VX K# Zny.C8*,gC\  P6QPgyy>3>j\>\gQgQ>\g3>g3g\ggQF>g\\\QI(I_>0_j>>>0>>>>>>\>g3\\\\\QyQyQyQyQD3D3D3D3g\\\\gggg\\g\\\\pg\\\QQ_QyQyQyQyQ\\\_\gjF3FgF>Fgg__gy3ySy>yIy3ggg\\QQQgFgFgFg_y^y>yjgggggg_yQyQyQgy>ggFy>\0\\=2=WxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNBnnBa\>\\\\\\7>\7>\7>>\\\??n\\pBnnBsgg>\\7"yyyy\nlc\gnn\y.C8*,gC\  P6QP2J=.,/&J\  P6Q&P.2N=.,&N4  pQ&.k(>1%,P>4  pQ]n9x]]?n9xSz+SS8-8WuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN8HH"&H>XHH8HB8>HH^HH>"".2",2,2,"222N2222"&22H22,006"6."""""""""""2H,H,H,H,H,XAB,>,>,>,>,""""H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H,H2H1H2H2H282H,H,H,B,B,B6B,H?>,>,>,>,H2H2H2H6H2H6H2""2"""2F866H2>>(>">">H2;H2H2H2H2XHB"B"B"8&8&8&86>*>>.H2H2H2H2H2H2^HH6>,>,>,H2>"H28&>"H2?22!!WFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN$<<$.2",2222`2 LL2 LL2L"",,2d""I\\>>>\g0>03\\\\\\\\\\33gggQyyrg>Frgygrr>3>T\>jaaj[Rjj28j[jjRjaR[jjjj[X%Xc>0cT>>>0>>>>>>>>\3QQQQQwyQrQrQrQrQ>3>3>3>3\\\\\\\\\\Q\Z\\\g\QQQyQyQycyQtrQrQrQrQ\\\c\c\>3>\>>>\gcc\r3rIr>r>r3\l\\\\y>y>y>gFgFgFgcrMr3rT\\\\\\crQrQrQ\r>\gFr>\t0\\=!=WxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNBnnBT\>Q\\\\\3;\7;\7>>QQ\??n\\pBnnBmgg>Q\7"yyyy\njc\gnn\2MKCK7FKHKJ"i~'^5>g\\>>>\g0>03\\\\\\\\\\>>ggg\yyrF\yrgyy>3>j\>jajja[rr8Irajr[rjRajjjjaI(I_>0_j>>>0>>>>>>\>g3\\\\\QyQyQyQyQD3D3D3D3g\\\\gggg\\g\\\\pg\\\QQ_QyQyQyQyQ\\\_\gjF3FgF>Fgg__gy3ySy>yIy3ggg\\QQQgFgFgFg_y^y>yjgggggg_yQyQyQgy>ggFy>\0\\=2=WxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNBnnBa\>\\\\\\7>\7>\7>>\\\??n\\pBnnBsgg>\\7"yyyy\nlc\gnn\"i~'^+2;II{r222IR&2&)IIIIIIIIII))RRRAjaaj[Rjj28j[jjRjaR[jjjj[2)2CI2AIAIA2II))I)rIIII28)IIjIIAFFO2&OC222&22222222I)jAjAjAjAjA_aA[A[A[A[A2)2)2)2)jIjIjIjIjIjIjIjIjIjIjAjIjHjIjIjIRIjAjAjAaAaAaOaAj\[A[A[A[AjIjIjIjOjIjOjI2)2I222IgROOjI[)[;[2[2[)jIWjIjIjIjIja2a2a2R8R8R8RO[>[)[CjIjIjIjIjIjIjjO[A[A[AjI[2jIR8[2jI\&II11WggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN5XX5CI2AIIIII)/ooI,/ooIo,22AAI22XIIZo5XX5WzzRR2AI{,"aaaaooIoXUOIRXXI"i~'^ %,77\V%%%7>%7777777777>>>0eOIIOD>OO%*ODaOO>OI>DOOgOOD%%37%07070%777V7777%*77O77055;%;3%%%%%%%%%%%7O0O0O0O0O0aHI0D0D0D0D0%%%%O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O0O7O6O7O7O7>7O0O0O0I0I0I;I0OED0D0D0D0O7O7O7O;O7O;O7%%7%%%7M>;;O7DD,D%D%DO7AO7O7O7O7aOI%I%I%>*>*>*>;D.DD3O7O7O7O7O7O7gOO;D0D0D0O7D%O7>*D%O7E77%%WMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN(BB(37%07777j7#TT7!#TT7T!%%007n&&Bn77lCTn(nBB(A\\>>n%07\n!"IIIITTenn7TnB@;7>lBBn7"i~'^5>M\\>>>\}0>03\\\\\\\\\\>>}}}\rryrr>Qygyrr\grrggF3FM\>\\Q\Q3\\33Q3\\\\FF3\QyQQFI3Ic>0cM>>>0>>>>>>\>\3r\r\r\r\r\yyQrQrQrQrQ>3>3>3>3y\\\\\\\\\gQr\\\\gQ\r\r\r\r\yQyQycyQnrQrQrQrQ\\\c\c\>3>\>>>\\ccyQg3gBg>g;g3y\jy\y\\\yrFrFrF\F\F\FccgBg3gM\\\\\\ygcgFgFgF\g>y\\Fg>g\n0\\=(=WddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddNBnnB_\F\\\\\\3;\7;\7>>gg\??n\\pBnnBb\\>g\7"yyyy\njc\}nn\2T@JM@Ph "5@^.=K\\!==\h.=.3\\\\\\\\\\33hhhRzzpf=Gpfzfpp=3=V\=R\R\R=\\33\3\\\\=G3\\\\RX%Xc.====IK=\\RRRRRzzRpRpRpRpR=3=3=3=3\\\\\\\\\\R\\\\\f\\RRzRzRzRpRpRpR\\\\\\I\=\===\G\p3pK\\\z=zKfGfGN@.S\=R\\\\\39\7\7==RR\==\\=R=7t=ddddhdo.Iih3[\\xdCpi_w[dfdmoPpP~j_d~~tqo.=K\\!==\h.=.3\\\\\\\\\\33hhhRzzpf=Gpfzfpp=3=V\=R\R\R=\\33\3\\\\=G3\\\\RX%Xc=\R\\=f===RR@\=G=.=\\\\%\=3\h=\Id77=iS.=79\Rzpppp====hf\RRRRRRzRRRRR3333\\\\\\\d\\\\\\\"5@^.=f\\3==\i.=.3\\\\\\\\\\==iii\zzpG\zpfzz=3=k\=\fRfR=\f3=f3f\ffRG=f\\\RH(H`.====IK=\f\\\\\RzRzRzRzRG3G3G3G3f\\\\ffff\\f\\\\pf\\\RRRzRzRzR\\\\ffIfGfG=Gf\fz3zKff\RRfGfGN@.c\=\\\\\\7<\7\7==\\\==\\=\=7t=ddddido.Iii3[\\xdCpi_w[dfdmoPpP~j_d~~tqo.=f\\3==\i.=.3\\\\\\\\\\==iii\zzpG\zpfzz=3=k\=\fRfR=\f3=f3f\ffRG=f\\\RH(H`=\\\\=f===\\@\=G=.=\\\\(\=7\i=\Id77=ic.=7<\\zzzzGGGGipf\\\\\\RRRRR3333\f\\\\\d\ffff\ff9 xr G;&XxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNHxxH\dDXddddd8@d<@d<DDXXdDdzHxxHvppDXd<"dxtldpxxd"i2a@T` XZ[@]"5@^%1QJJz)11JT%1%)JJJJJJJJJJ11TTTJjbjjbZrr9JrbjrZrjQbjjjjb1)1UJ1JQAQA1JQ)1Q)zQJQQA91QJjJJA: :M%1111:<1JQjJjJjJjJjJjjAbAbAbAbA9)9)9)9)jQrJrJrJrJjQjQjQjQjJjJjQrJrJjJjJZQjJjJjJjAjAjAbAbAbArJrJrrJrJrQrQ:Q9Q919QJrQb)b<jQjQrJjjAjAQ9Q9N3%OJ1JJJJJJ,0nnJ,nnJn,11JJJ11JJ1J1,t1PPPPTPY%:TT(yiIuyJJppp`~PCZjTjL_IjPQPWY@Z@eTpLjPuepe]i[Yrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr%1QJJz)11JT%1%)JJJJJJJJJJ11TTTJjbjjbZrr9JrbjrZrjQbjjjjb1)1UJ1JQAQA1JQ)1Q)zQJQQA91QJjJJA: :Mrrr1JJJJ1Q1rrrr11JJ3J191jrrj%1JJJJ J1n,JT1nJ:P,,1TO%1,0JnnnJjjjjjjjbbbb9999jjrrrrrTrjjjjjZQJJJJJJjAAAAA))))JQJJJJJPJQQQQJQ"U`^.=f\\3==\i.=.3\\\\\\\\\\==iii\zzpG\zpfzz=3=k\=jbjjbZrr9JrbjrZrjQbjjjjbH(H`.====IK=\QjjjjjjzbzbzbzbG9G9G9G9jrrrrjjjjjjjrrjjpZjjjjjjzbzbzbrrrrrrrI:G9G9G9\JrzbzbjjrjjfQfQf>f>>z>z>>>>>>>>>z>>z>N@.c\=\\\\\\7<\7\7==\\\==\\=\=7t=ddddido.Iii3[\\xdCpZjjw_jfQmWpZ~epjuptqo.=f\\3==\i.=.3\\\\\\\\\\==iii\zzpG\zpfzz=3=k\=\fRfR=\f3=f3f\ffRG=f\\\RH(H`=\\\\=f===\\@\=G=.=\\\\(\=7\i=\Id77=ic.=7<\\zzzzGGGGipf\\\\\\RRRRR3333\f\\\\\d\ffff\fy.C8*,gC\  P6QP2J=.,/&J\  P6Q&P.2N=.,&N4  pQ&.k(>1%,P>4  pQ2N=.,&N4  pQ&k(;1%,Wϸ;\  P6QP2J=.,/&J\  P6Q&P"5@^%1%7777777777>>>1eOIIOC=OO%+OCbOO=OI=COOhOOC%%47%17171%777V7777%+77O77155<%%%%,-%77O1O1O1O1O1bII1C1C1C1C1%%%%O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O1O7O7O7O7O7=7O7O1O1I1I1I1C1C1C1O7O7OO7O7O7O7,7%7%%%7+O7CC-O7O7O7bOI%I-=+=+N&27%177777"SS7!TT7S!%%117n%%77ln%1n%!t%<<<<>l[O6Wls[77TTTH_%7777777777>>>1eOIIOC=OO%+OCbOO=OI=COOhOOC%%47%17171%777V7777%+77O77155%T7,OOOOOO=7111111I111117777777<7777777y.C8*,gC\  P6QP 2J=.,/&J\  P6Q&P.2N=.,&N4  pQ&.k(>1%,P>4  pQ2N=.,&N4  pQ&k(;1%,Wϸ;\  P6QP2J=.,/&J\  P6Q&PP,%,J,\  P6QJPI(!,,(\  P6Q,P{,C8*,3C*f9 xQX"5@^!)22SN!!28!2222222222888-\HCCH=7HH!'H=YHH7HC7=HH^HH=!!/2!-2-2-!222N2222!'22H22-006!!!!()!22H-H-H-H-H-YCC-=-=-=-=-!!!!H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H2H-H2H2H2H2H272H2H-H-C-C-C-=-=-=-H2H2HH2H2H2H2(2!2!!!2'H2==)H2H2H2YHC!C)7'7'N#-2!-22222KK2LL2K!!--2d!!22bd!-d!t!77778c71%,P>4  pQ2N=.,&N4  pQ&k(;1%,Wϸ;\  P6QP2J=.,/&J\  P6Q&PP,%,J,\  P6QJPI(!,,(\  P6Q,P {,C8*,3C*f9 xQX0J=.,3V^&J*f9 xQ&Xldpxxdgnn\"i~'^09CSS9S]+9+/SSSSSSSSSS//]]]Ixnnxg]xx9?xgxx]xn]gxxxxg9/9MS9ISISI9SS//S/SSSS9?/SSxSSI S'   S' Federal Communications Commission`~(#bDA971871 ă   yxdddy Պ bOBefore the  S'Federal Communications Commission  S'0Washington, D.C. 20554 \X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:'ԍId. at 3 n.3. F Brooten also argues at the briefing stage that even if the  x7backbilling was reasonable, it still remains to be determined who should bear the burden of Brooten's loss  S" ' xoccasioned by AT&T's conceded error, i.e., "[w]ho pays when a carrier's negligent backbilling causes  S 'damages to its customer?"N } yOZ#'ԍBrooten Reply Brief at 89. N  S ' e 6.` ` As for damages, Brooten maintains that he had already issued bills to his clients prior to  xkreceiving AT&T's April 1996 invoice, which included the delayed billings for some of his November 1995  xkthrough February 1996 calls. Thus, according to Brooten, AT&T's backbilling caused him financial harm  x^because he did not "pass through" AT&T's delayed charges when he billed his clients for this time period. "4N,`(`(88"  xMoreover, Brooten states that he cannot backbill his clients and would not do so as a sound business  S' xMpractice.z} yOh' " ԍBrooten Brief at 3, Complaint at 23. Brooten explains that he cannot rebill his clients, for the late phone  x charges that he received in April 1996, because some of the files have since closed and, in any event, doing so would injure his business reputation and be expensive. Complaint at 24. z Brooten also requested an award for fees and costs. } yO' "& ԍComplaint at 67. Brooten asserted that a party advancing the public interest in addition to a private interest may advocate an award for attorney fees and costs on public interest grounds. Reply at 4.  The record reflects, however, that  S'Brooten declined to further prosecute this request at the briefing stage of this proceeding.h} yO' "p ԍUnder the Commission's rules, briefs must contain the findings of fact and conclusions of law that a party  x is urging the Commission to adopt. 47 C.F.R.  1.732(a). In his brief, Brooten did not address his earlier request  {OH ' x. for costs. See Brooten Brief. AT&T argues that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to award costs. See AT&T Brief  {O ' xk at 7 n.21. Brooten did not reply to AT&T's arguments against awarding costs. See Brooten Reply Brief; see also  yO ' x Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96238, Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996  x@ and Amendment of Rules Governing Procedures to Be Followed When Formal Complaints Are Filed Against  {Ol ' xQ Common Carriers, 11 FCC Rcd 20823, 2084546 (1996) ("Complaintrules NPRM") (noting that Commission is not  {O6' xZ authorized to award costs in formal complaint proceedings) (citing Turner v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1353, 1356 (1975);  {O'Comark Cable Fund III v. Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 100 FCC 2d 1244, 1257 n. 51 (1985)). COMPLAINT NPRM  S`' e W7.` ` Defendant. AT&T concedes that it billed Brooten 150 days after the November 1995  xcalls were placed, and 120, 90, and 60 days after the December 1995, January 1996, and February 1996  S' xcalls were placed, respectively.DB } yO' " ԍAT&T Brief at 5, Answer at 67. Brooten states that the backbilling was up to 160 days, but AT&T argues  x that it was 150 days. The record reflects that the earliest calls billed on the April 1996 invoice were made on  x November 6, 1995. Complaint Exh. 1. The April 1, 1996, "bill close date" was 147 days after November 6, 1995.  x The date Brooten states he received the bill, April 15, 1996, was 161 days after November 6, 1995. Thus, the  x underlying facts are not in dispute. Each party merely used different benchmark dates to measure the billing delay.  {O' x Based on the record before us, we find this difference insignificant and certainly not dispositive.  See, e.g., AmNet  {O' x Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 552 (refers interchangeably to the date a carrier sends its bill and the date a customer receives a bill).  AT&T states that ordinarily it bills Brooten monthly, i.e., within 30 days  xof rendering service; as such, AT&T concedes that its April 1996 bill was late: 120 days for the  xNovember 1995 calls, 90 days for the December 1995 calls, 60 days for the January 1996 calls, and 30  S'days for the February 1996 calls.TN} {O'ԍSee, e.g., AT&T Brief at 5. T  SJ ' e m8.` ` According to AT&T, this late billing resulted from a problem in its billing system that  xarose from a onetime computer programming error. Specifically, AT&T explains that it became aware  xin late November 1995 that the usage information associated with certain customer accounts, including  S ' xthe account for one of Brooten's three locations, was not guided to the appropriate billing account.$$ } {OR#' "  ԍSee, e.g., id. at 2. AT&T states that the group within AT&T responsible for maintaining customer accounts  x became aware of the accountmigration problem because of an unusual increase in the level of unbilled usage that  x was not matched with a particular customer account. Also, CustomNet customers began contacting AT&T to  {O%'express concern that they had not been billed for usage for the previous month. Id. $  xkAT&T then determined that this problem was caused by an error in a computer program it ran in October" ,`(`(88~ "  xt1995 to migrate certain message processing functions for CustomNet customers from one database to  S'another. "} {O@' " ԍSee id. at 2, Answer at 56. AT&T states that it ran this program as part of combining all CustomNet  x message guiding functions into a single database. Because of the programming error, however, AT&T states that affected customers were not billed for the period immediately following the program's execution. AT&T Brief at 2; Response to Interrogatories at 3.   S' e 9.` ` AT&T maintains that it first attempted to identify and bill all unmatched usage through  xa manual, casebycase process, but initiated a project to correct the problem in December 1995 after it  S8' xappeared more pervasive than the individual instances initially identified.g!8} yO 'ԍAT&T Brief at 3; Response to Interrogatories at 36. g After reviewing numerous  xoptions, AT&T states, it concluded that the most cost and timeefficient approach to ensure that all  S' x*affected customers were billed properly was to run a "complex refresh" process."B} {O ' " ԍSee AT&T Brief at 3; Response to Interrogatories at 46. AT&T states that the "complex refresh" process  xk is a computer process that creates the proper "routing guides" for each CustomNet customer whose usage is not  x being routed to the biller. This process generates a "guide record" which provides the information necessary to route  x both current usage and past unmatched/unbilled usage to the correct guiding account, thus enabling that usage to  {O'be billed to the customer during the next billing cycle. Id. at 4.  The refresh program  xwas written and tested in January 1996 and, according to AT&T, implemented during February and March  x1996 in phases to allow for proper testing and quality control. The program was also implemented  xduring times when computers were not running programs necessary to support the daytoday activities  SH ' xDof its billing system.G#XH } yO' " ԍAT&T Brief at 3, Response to Interrogatories at 36. AT&T emphasizes that it refreshed all CustomNet  x accounts so that the guide records for all CustomNet customers who might have been affected by this problem would be updated. AT&T Brief at 3. G As a result of this effort, AT&T states that it was able to match Brooten's unbilled  xusage for November 1995 through February 1996 with his account on the billing system for the affected  xlocation. Accordingly, AT&T states that it included these unbilled charges, totaling $821.07, in its April  S '1996 invoice to Brooten.R$ } yO'ԍAT&T Brief at 4, Answer at 67. R  S ' e  10.` ` AT&T denies that it acted unreasonably in violation of Section 201(b) of the Act or  SX' x7contrary to the Bureau's AmNet clarification. AT&T also avers that Brooten has offered no evidence that  xthe fourmonth delay in billing that he experienced for one of his three CustomNet locations was  S ' xxunreasonable.E% } yOP!'ԍAT&T Brief at 57. E To the contrary, AT&T maintains that the reasonableness of the billing delay is supported  xMby the facts in the record, which demonstrate that: (1) the problem leading up to the late billing was a  xonetime occurrence triggered by a computer error; (2) AT&T addressed the billing problem in a short  xperiod of time during which it developed, tested, and implemented corrections to its billing system; and  Sj' x(3) AT&T promptly thereafter rendered corrected bills to affected customers.<&j6} {O@&'ԍId. < AT&T adds that the"j&,`(`(88"  xreasonableness of its actions is underscored by its obligation under Section 203 of the Act to collect its  S'lawful tariffed charges.}'^} {O@' "l ԍId. at 7 (citing Allnet Communications Service, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Companies, 8 FCC Rcd 5438, 5439  {O ' xQ (1993) ("Allnet"); Referral of Questions from General Communication Incorporated v. Alascom, Inc., 3 FCC Rcd  {O'700, 704 (1988) ("GCI")). }  S' e z 11.` ` AT&T also denies Brooten's allegation that it failed to notify him that his thencurrent  S`' xbills might be incomplete. ("`} yO' "< ԍAT&T argues that because he was not billed at all for one of three locations, it is reasonable to conclude  x^ that Brooten was alerted to the fact that there was a problem with his bill. Moreover, AT&T states that although  x! numerous other customers inquired about their incomplete bills, Brooten did not. AT&T avers that such an inquiry  {OF 'would have mitigated any damages. See AT&T Reply Brief at 4. OTHERS CALLED Alternatively, AT&T avers that failing to notify Brooten was not  xQunreasonable because, even after it was aware of the problem, it still could not identify which CustomNet  S' xcustomers were affected because the unbilled usage was not identified to specific customer accounts.)} {O'ԍId. at 34 & n.1 (citing Answer at 56; AT&T Response to Interrogatories at 46).  xMoreover, AT&T avers that Brooten's followup argument that AT&T still could have warned him by  xnotifying every CustomNet customer that thencurrent invoices might be incomplete does not address  xthe significant expenditure of time and resources that such a notice would have required. AT&T adds that  xBrooten's argument also does not address the confusion that a blanket notice would have generated for  SH 'the vast proportion of CustomNet customers who were not affected by the billing error.<*H j } {OR'ԍId. <  S ' e F 12.` ` Finally, AT&T states that on the numerous occasions when Brooten asked about the  S ' x@delayed charges upon receiving his April 1996 invoice, it advised him that the charges were valid, i.e.,  S ' xnot duplicate billings.>+$ } yOF' " ԍAT&T Initial Brief at 4, Answer at 23 (citing letter dated June 5, 1996, from Lori Wooldridge, AT&T,  {O' x to Kenneth E. Brooten ("Wooldridge Letter") (Complaint, Exh. 2)). AT&T also concedes making statements to  {O' x Brooten about Section 415(a) of the Act. See e.g., AT&T Initial Brief at 78. In paras.  41521 ש415 END31, infra, we consider Brooten's allegation that AT&T's statements misrepresented Section 415(a). > LORI LTR  Nonetheless, AT&T states that it also apologized to Brootenc, } {O2'ԍSee, e.g., Wooldridge Letter at 2. c and issued a total  xgof $427.95 in credits applicable to the latebilled charges as a customer accommodation and to redress  SZ'any inconvenience associated with the tardy billing.-&Zz} {Ot ' " ԍSee AT&T Brief at 4; Answer at 78; see also Wooldridge Letter at 2. The record reflects that after  x Brooten filed the above captioned complaint, the parties also attended several status conferences held by our  {O"' xQ Enforcement Division's staff to consider, inter alia, settlement of the matters in controversy by agreement of the  {O"'parties. See 47 C.F.R.  1.733(a)(4).   S '` ` 2. Decision  S' e  13.` ` We note initially that the Common Carrier Bureau ("Bureau") has previously addressed  S' xthe issue of backbilling in the carriertocarrier context. In AmNet, the Bureau clarified that the twoyear"h-,`(`(88;"  x statute of limitation for recovery actions provided in Section 415(a) of the Act does not establish as a  xmatter of law that backbilling of up to two years is reasonable under Section 201(b). More specifically,  xthe Bureau stated that, depending on the specific circumstances, a "delay of much less than 24 months  xZbetween the rendering of service and the receipt of an initial bill for such service may be an unjust and  S`' xunreasonable practice" and consequently violative of Section 201(b).}.\`} {O' "V ԍAmNet Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 552 ("Section 415(a) establishes a time limit for filing a court action to recover  xD unpaid bills; it does not establish the time limit for sending an initial bill to the customer for services rendered.");  {OZ'see also supra note  415A4 . } In that proceeding, however, the  xcparty seeking a declaratory ruling on the backbilling issue failed to provide evidence that adequately  S' x3established the nature and extent of the alleged backbilling./} {O ' " ԍIn AmNet, the petitioner sought a declaratory ruling, inter alia, that: (1) local exchange carriers (LECs)  xD must abide by their access tariffs, which specified that interexchange carriers (IXCs) would be billed on a prompt  x and current basis; (2) irrespective of these access tariffs, LECs must bill IXCs within 60 days of service; and (3)  {O ' x@ it is unlawful for facilitiesbased IXCs to routinely, i.e., repeatedly, backbill charges for leasing their facilities.  {O 'AmNet Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 55052.  Accordingly, the Bureau determined that  xany fixed limit upon all backbilling should be established in a rulemaking proceeding and that, absent  xga rule, the reasonableness of the amount of time it takes a carrier to render a bill should be evaluated in  x.accordance with the standards for what constitutes an unreasonable practice for purposes of Section 201(b)  Sp' xof the Act.j0p} {O'ԍId. at 551; AmNet Recon, 4 FCC Rcd at 8798. j Under this casebycase approach, we review the record of a given proceeding and determine  SH 'whether the backbilling was unreasonable under the specific circumstances presented.1\H 4 } {O' " ԍIn AmNet, for example, the petitioner averred that Commission intervention was needed because actual and  xo potential competition between LECs and IXCs created anticompetitive incentives for LECs to hamper IXC operations  {O'by engaging in routine backbilling. See, e.g., AmNet Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 55051.   S ' e  14.` ` Turning to the abovecaptioned proceeding, we conclude that AT&T's practices visavis  xBrooten were not unlawful under Section 201(b) of the Act. First, based on the detailed information that  xQit provided, we find credible AT&T's explanation that the backbilling that Brooten experienced arose from  xa onetime computerprogramming error. AT&T addressed the resulting billingsystem problem in a  xMreasonable period of time, during which it developed, tested, and implemented corrections to its billing  x}system, and then billed Brooten for previously unbilled service that was rendered and subscribedto  S ' xQpursuant to tariff.2 X } {O'ԍSee, e.g., Allnet, 8 FCC Rcd at 5439; GCI, 3 FCC Rcd at 704. Next, the record also reflects that AT&T advised Brooten that the backbilled charges  xDwere valid because they: (1) covered service rendered to Brooten; (2) were not duplicative; and (3) were  xdelayed by a computerprogramming error. AT&T also told Brooten that it was authorized to bill these  S' xcharges for up to twoyears under the "statute of limitations" it follows for backbilling, Section 415(a).3} {O#'ԍAT&T's statements about Section 415(a) are also relevant to Brooten's second count, see paras.  41521 ש415 END31, infra.  xMoreover, AT&T also proffered over half of the amount that Brooten claimed as damages, in the form  SB'of account credits, to redress or accommodate any inconvenience associated with the late billing.r4B|} {O^&'ԍSee, e.g., AT&T Brief at 4; Wooldridge Letter at 1. r "4,`(`(88"Ԍ S' e 15.` ` We also conclude that the backbilling in question was reasonable in part because it was  xwithin the scope of AT&T's Section 203 obligation to collect its lawful, tariffed charges. Brooten's  x^contention that this is not so because the charges were unlawful is unavailing because he does not dispute  xthat AT&T rendered the backbilled services; nor does he contend that rates, terms, or conditions of the  S`' xCustomNet tariff were unlawful.5`} yO' " ԍThe Commission previously has stated, moreover, that a customer, even a competitor, is not entitled to the  x self-help measure of withholding payment for tariffed services duly performed but should first pay, under protest,  x. the amount allegedly due and then seek redress if such amount was not proper under the carrier's applicable tariffed  {O ' xk charges and regulations. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp., 62 FCC 2d 703, 705-06 (1976) (Customer may not withhold payment of properly billed tariffed charges for voluntarily ordered services).  In addition, although it is not a separately plead count in the complaint,  xwe also reject any suggestion that AT&T violated Section 203 of the Act when it attempted to settle  S' xBrooten's grievance by proffering credits to his account.-6$z} yO* ' " ԍBrooten's suggestion that AT&T violated Section 203 by proffering its settlement attempt via credits is  {O ' x particularly unpersuasive in view of his refusal to pay the outstanding charges pending anticipated litigation. See,  {O ' x e.g., Wooldridge Letter at 1 ("During our conversation you [Brooten] advised me that if AT&T expects to receive payment on the disputed charge then legal action would need to be taken on AT&T's behalf.").- The "filedrate doctrine" generally bars damage  xawards and thus settlement offers that are based on commonlaw theories that a rate, term, or  S' xcondition contrary to the filed tariff should govern in place of the filed tariff.7f } {O' " ԍSee, e.g., Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 110 S.Ct. 2759, 111 L.Ed.2d 94 (1990).  Section 203 did not,  S' xhowever, bar AT&T from attempting in good faith to settle Brooten's bonafide grievance, which does not  Sr' xarise under a legal theory contraryA8$r } yO' " ԍFor example, when Brooten presented his claim to AT&T's top management, in a letter claiming that  x AT&T's "errors and omissions" would cost him "hundreds of dollars," Brooten also recognized that  BROT LTR he was legally  {Ob' x and ethically responsible for his phone charges. See Answer at 7 (citing letter from Brooten to Robert E. Allen,  {O,'Chairman of the Board of AT&T, dated April 15, 1996 (Answer Exh. B) ("Brooten Letter")). A to the filed tariff. Put differently, Brooten's Section 201(b) claim is  x not barred under the filedrate doctrine because it alleges damages caused by AT&T's delayed billing.  xIt follows thus that AT&T's attempt to settle Brooten's claim was not contrary to the filed tariff or Section  S ' xg203 of the Act.J9$ } yOF' " ԍ As for the balance of the outstanding charges, Brooten reports that AT&T initiated collection efforts against  {O' x him for a portion of the backbilled charges. See Brooten's Statement for the Record, filed on November 19, 1996.  {O' x In response, AT&T states that it will halt this collection activity pending resolution of the instant proceeding. See letter from Ava B. Kleinman, AT&T, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC, dated December 5, 1996. J The Commission's policy, moreover, is to encourage carriers and their customers to  S 'settle disputes over rates and practices outside of the often costly and time consuming complaint process.L:Z } {O !' " ԍSee, e.g., U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. AT&T, 9 FCC Rcd 4801, 4804 (1994) (citing Use of  x Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures in Commission Proceedings and Proceedings in Which the Commission is a Party, 6 FCC Rcd 5669, 5670 (1991)). L  S ' e #16.STRICT LIABLE` ` We also disagree with Brooten's averment that it was per se unreasonable for AT&T to:  x(1) bill him for calls up to 160 days after they were made; or (2) make the computer programming error  S4' xZthat caused the billing problem to occur.x;4} {O''ԍSee, e.g., supra note PER SE14 and accompanying text. x First, Brooten's call for a "per se" determination is contrary"4 L;,`(`(88"  S' x/to AmNet's clarification that backbilling liability does not arise after any fixed number of days, i.e.,  S' xliability is not based on strict liability or negligence per se.<} {OB'ԍSee AmNet Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 551552; AmNet Recon, 4 FCC Rcd at 8798. Moreover, and as stated in AmNet, Section  S' x201(b) lawfulness is determined based on the specific circumstances presented in each case.<=Z} {O'ԍId. < Thus, while  x7these supported factual allegations are relevant to our determination they are not dispositive as to whether  xAT&T's backbilling was unjust and unreasonable under all of the circumstances presented in this case.  xtFor example, the record also contains relevant evidence related to AT&T's efforts to redress Brooten's  xgrievance, as well as detailed information as to the cause, duration, and other circumstances surrounding  S'the backbilling at issue.>} yOx ' " ԍWe note that Brooten's reference to AT&T tariff provisions that guaranteed billing within 120 days do not assist his claim because he did not take service pursuant to these offerings.  S' e 17.` ` Brooten's contention that the existing record is insufficient to assess the reasonableness  St' xvel non of AT&T's actions in identifying and remedying the billing problem is also unavailing.?tD} {OX' " ԍBrooten Reply Brief at 7. Assuming arguendo that Brooten had demonstrated that AT&T took an  x unreasonable amount of time to correct the error (or that AT&T had the burden and failed to prove that the time  x taken was reasonable), this finding would not automatically establish a violation. As described above, we consider  {O' x the specific circumstances presented in toto when ruling on backbilling complaints. We note in this regard Brooten's  {O|'averment that AT&T set out the causes of its delayed billing "in considerable detail." See Brooten Brief at 2 n.4.  To the  xcontrary, the record reflects that AT&T presented, in detail, the nature of its onetime computer  xprogramming error that caused the billing problem at issue, as well as its efforts to correct the problem  x*prospectively and remedy errors in previouslysent bills, including Brooten's. Moreover, information that  S ' xBrooten contends is necessary but not in the record before us is not relevant, probative, or dispositive.@\ } {Op' " ԍSee Complaintrules NPRM, 11 FCC Rcd at 2084243 & n.89 (citing American Message Centers v. FCC,  x 50 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (the court noted the "relatively circumscribed role of discovery in a factpleading  {O'system" under the Commission's formalcomplaint rules). See also 47 C.F.R.  1.720, 1.721.   xFor example, Brooten maintains that the number of subscribers affected by the error is indispensable  xpbecause it would be "patently unreasonable" for AT&T to take several months to remedy the billing  S^' xproblem if only ten subscribers were affected.LA^} yO'ԍBrooten Reply Brief at 7. L We disagree. B^} {O' " ԍMoreover, as noted above, neither strict liability nor negligence per se is the general legal standard for  {Ov 'determining liability for backbilling. See supra paragraph STRICT LIABLE16.  The record reflects that the duration of  xthe billing delay was not correlated to the specific number of subscribers that AT&T ultimately identified  x*as affected by the error. Thus, the amount of time it took AT&T to correct the problem and bill Brooten  x&accurately for his usage is relevant to our determination but the number of subscribers affected is not  S'relevant, probative, or dispositive.CX } yOh%' "I ԍPut differently, even if Brooten demonstrated that only ten customers were affected by the error, it would  x not follow, based on the record before us, that AT&T was unreasonable in not identifying, correcting, and remedying the problem in time to bill Brooten for his unmatched calls before it did so in April 1996.  " *C,`(`(88^"Ԍ S' e ԙ18.` ` We are also not persuaded that AT&T violated Section 201(b) by not warning Brooten  S' xthat his thencurrent bills might be incomplete until it corrected the problem.7D} {O@' " ԍIn reviewing Brooten's allegation, we are assuming arguendo that a fourmonth absence of any charges or  x usage data, for one of three locations would not constitute actual or inquiry notice to a business customer. As such,  xQ we need not resolve AT&T's suggestion that it would be reasonable to conclude that Brooten was alerted to the  xx problem because business customers, such as Brooten, review their invoices in detail to pass through charges to  {Ob' x clients and thus would notice significant abnormalities. See supra note OTHERS CALLED40. We are proceeding this way for administrative convenience and because it is not outcome determinative. 7 The record reflects that  x3the very nature of the problem prevented identification of the affected accounts until the problem was  xcorrected; thus, AT&T could not target notices to affected customers, such as Brooten. Brooten also has  S`' xnot shown that AT&T acted unreasonably by failing to warn him by issuing a blanket notice to all  xCustomNet customers that their bills might be incomplete; we credit AT&T's contention that this  xallegation does not address the significant expenditure of time and resources that such an activity would  xentail as well as the confusion (and perhaps expense) that such notification would generate for the vast  S'proportion of CustomNet customers who were not affected by the billing error.E&D} {O' "y ԍId.  Absent any evidence of unreasonable discrimination, we also decline to "second guess" AT&T's  x business judgement to focus on finding the cause of the problem and correcting its billing system prospectively,  {O6' xk instead of first embarking on a program to identify and to warn all affected customers. See, e.g., Business Choice  {O'Network v. AT&T, 7 FCC Rcd 7702 (Com.Car.Bur. 1992).   Sp' e 19.` ` Brooten's argument that AT&T separately violated Section 201(b) by unreasonably  xtapportioning the injury for its error to him is defective procedurally. Brooten did not raise this claim in  S ' xyeither his complaint or his reply; accordingly, read as a new count it is not properly before us.F 2 } {O' " ԍSee 47 C.F.R.  1.720(a) ("All matters concerning a claim, defense or requested remedy . . . should be pleaded fully and with specificity."). 1.720   S ' xMoreover, if the claim was properly before us, we would have noted that it does not state a prima facie  S 'violationG } {O' "< ԍAlthough Brooten makes this claim assuming, arguendo, that the backbilling was reasonable, this "new" claim is essentially no more than a necessary component of Brooten's claim that the backbilling was unreasonable.  and is in any event, unpersuasive.H } yOX' "I ԍFor example, the claim does not consider the settlement that AT&T proffered to Brooten; it also does not  {O ' x address another relevant issue, according to AT&T. See supra note OTHERS CALLED40. We are not ruling, however, that our  x affirmative Title II jurisdiction over the events alleged by Brooten must be to the exclusion of any tort or other  {O' x7 claim that Brooten may have in a state court; that would be a matter for a state court to decide. See generally 47  {O|'U.S.C.  414; Valenti v. AT&T, 12 FCC Rcd 2611 (1997).   S ' e 20.` ` In summary, we conclude that AT&T's practices visavis Brooten have not been shown  xto be unjust or unreasonable, in violation of Section 201(b) of the Act, as alleged in the abovecaptioned  xcomplaint. Our decision regarding the reasonableness of AT&T's backbilling practices in this particular  xcase should not be construed as establishing a rule of general applicability. Our ruling is limited strictly  xto the facts of this case; in the future, we will continue to consider such matters on a casebycase basis" H,`(`(88t"  S' xpto determine compliance with the just and reasonable requirements of Section 201(b).In } yOh' "R ԍRecently, for example, we found backbilling beyond 120 days violative of Section 201(b) based on the  {O0' x specific record before us. See The People's Network v. AT&T, 12 FCC Rcd __ (1997) [DA 97684 (rel. April 10,  {O' x 1997)] ("TPN"). In TPN, some of the bills were 15 months late and requested a lumpsum payment without  yO' x providing any usage detail; moreover, the defendant provided no specific information regarding its billpreparation  {O' xx procedures that might have shown its reasonableness. See id. at paras. 11, 14, 16. The complainant resalecarrier  x maintained that a fixed 60day limit was necessary to obtaining payment from its customers, and so its business  {O' x customers could pass phone charges through to their clients on a timely basis. Id. at para. 15. In keeping with  {O' x@ AmNet, however, we again declined to establish any fixed limit on backbilling. Id. After noting the particular  xo requirements of the complainant as a resale carrier and its dual status as a customer and competitor of the defendant,  {Oz ' x! we considered record evidence concerning, inter alia, provisions of the defendant's tariff transmittals guaranteeing  {OD ' xI to bill calls within 120 days. See id. at para. 17 (citing AT&T Tariff F.C.C. No. 1, Section 6.4.2.D (effective August 2, 1993)).  We do not  xZforeclose the possibility that backbilling delays of significantly less than 160 days could be found to be  xunjust and unreasonable under the facts of a particular case. Likewise, billing delays exceeding 160 days  S' xymay be reasonable in certain instances. As the Bureau stated in AmNet, "any fixed limit upon all  Sb'backbilling should be established in a Rule Making proceeding."Jb } {O' " ԍAmNet Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 55152. The Commission would consider revisiting the need for rulemaking  {O' x action, sua sponte or in response to petitions for rule making filed under 47 C.F.R.  1.401, should it receive  {O' x indications that backbilling delays are an industrywide concern. See generally TPN at para. 18 n.53. The  xH backbilling at issue in the abovecaptioned proceeding, by contrast, involved a singletime occurrence and does not reflect backbilling problems that are so commonplace that they warrant a rulemaking action at this time.   S'8 B.` ` Misrepresentation of Section 415(a)  S'` ` 1. Contentions of the Parties  Sr' e 21.OSC MOTION415` ` Complainant. 8 Brooten also contends that AT&T violated Section 201(b) of the Act by  xallegedly misrepresenting Section 415(a) of the Act to him as a "statute of limitations" that authorizes  S" ' x@backbilling for up to two years after a call is placed.QK" } {Ov'ԍSee, e.g., Reply at 24. Q Several months after filing the abovecaptioned  xcomplaint, Brooten essentially restated his misrepresentation allegations against AT&T in a separately  S 'captioned motion for an order to show cause ("Showcause Motion").L F} {O' "I ԍSee Motion of Kenneth E. Brooten, Jr. for Order to Show Cause Why AT&T Corp. Should not Cease and  x& Desist from an Unlawful Practice, filed September 9, 1996. Brooten captioned this motion as follows: "In the  x Matter of Enforcement of Section 205 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Against AT&T  {O!' x Corporation." Id. Brooten certified service of this motion on AT&T and AT&T filed an Opposition to Motion for  x  Order to Show Cause on September 24, 1996. Brooten filed a Reply to Opposition on October 3, 1996, which  {O"'AT&T moved to strike on October 11, 1996. See infra para. STRIKE26.  S ' e 22.` ` Brooten alleges that AT&T misrepresented Section 415(a) to him in oral and written  xIresponses to his inquiries about the backbilled charges at issue. Brooten offers copies of letters he  xreceived from and sent to AT&T on this subject and states that AT&T also sent him and his counsel"2 L,`(`(88"  S' xcopies of Section 415 as "asserted evidence of the legitimacy of its claim."iM} {Oh' " ԍSee, e.g., Complaint at 5 & n. 3. According to Brooten, the record establishes that AT&T told Brooten,  x in substance: "You must pay the back billed charges because Section 415(a) of the Act permits us to back bill you  xM for a period of up to two years." Brooten Reply Brief at 2; Brief at 2. During briefing, Brooten claimed for the  {O' x first time that AT&T also sent his counsel a copy of a portion of AT&T Tariff P.S.C. No. 1 (New York). See Brooten Brief at 3 & Exh. 1. iNY TARIFF At the briefing stage of this  xIproceeding, Brooten also argues that AT&T misrepresented to him that Section 415(a) "mandated"  S'payment of the backbilled charges.N^|} {O' " ԍSee, e.g., Brooten Reply Brief at 2 (citing Complaint at 5 n.3; AT&T Response to Interrogatories at 68).  {O ' x See also Wooldridge Letter at 12; Letter dated June 18, 1996, from Michael J. Wilhelm (counsel for Brooten) to  {O` 'AT&T (Complaint Exh. 3) ("Counsel Letter").  MANDATED   S`' e 23.` ` Brooten maintains that Section 415(a) is irrelevant to backbilling and, as such, that  S8' xAT&T's contrary statements to him were "deceptive" attempts to "gain money under false pretenses."SO8} {Oz'ԍSee, e.g., Complaint at 6. S  xBrooten avers that AT&T's practice was unjust and unreasonable in violation of Section 201(b).  xMoreover, according to Brooten, AT&T's conduct was particularly egregious in light of the Bureau's  S' xspecific declarations in AmNet that Section 415 is not a twoyear backbilling "statute of limitations" and  S'does not authorize backbilling for any particular period.P4 } {On'ԍSee id. at 5 & n. 3; Reply Brief at 4 & n. 3 (citing AmNet Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 552).  SJ ' e 24.END BRO 415` ` In his complaint and reply, Brooten did not request any additional or specific relief for  xhimself based on this allegation but opined that it would be consistent with the Commission's public  S ' xinterest mandate "to act sua sponte to cause AT&T to cease and desist misrepresenting to the public that  S ' xSection 415(a) of the Act justifies back billing for up to a twoyear period. . . ."Q } yO:' "J ԍComplaint at 6. Brooten also averred that any decision on this subject was "committed to the  {O'Commission's absolute discretion." Id. at 67. Claiming that AT&T  S ' x7does not deny telling other customers what it told Brooten about Section 415(a),mR } {Ol'ԍSee Reply to Opposition to Showcause Motion at 16. m Brooten's Showcause  xtMotion requests similar Commission action as well as an order requiring AT&T to make reparations to  S\' xall customers that AT&T allegedly deceived.VS\} {O'ԍSee Showcause Motion at 45. V During briefing, Brooten also requested a declaratory  xxruling that it is unlawful for carriers to represent to subscribers that Section 415(a) of the Act requires the  S 'subscriber to pay back billed charges.T D} {O"' " ԍBrooten Reply Brief at 4. Brooten adds that such a ruling would differ from AmNet because  {O#' xo misrepresentation was not raised as an issue in AmNet. Moreover, according to Brooten, the requested ruling would  x not impair a carrier's right to collect backbilled charges but would only mean that the carrier had the burden of  xQ demonstrating that those charges were reasonable under the circumstances and that the carrier could not tell the  x customer that Section 415(a) mandates that the customer pay all back billed charges so long as the back billing  {O&'period does not exceed two years. Id. "  T,`(`(88"Ԍ S' e Aԙ25.` ` Defendant. AT&T does not dispute that, in responding to Brooten's inquiries, it asserted  x}a right to bill and collect the disputed charges and that the "statute of limitations" it follows, Section  S' x*415(a), gives AT&T authority to backbill customers for a period of up to twoyears.+U$} {O' " ԍSee Wooldridge Letter at 12; Counsel Letter at 1; AT&T Response to Interrogatories at 78. AT&T adds  x that notwithstanding Brooten's allegation that it improperly relied upon Section 415(a) to support its general  x statements that it may be entitled to recover charges for up to two years, the specific backbilling at issue related  {Or'back only four months from the thencurrent billing period. See AT&T Brief at 78. + AT&T denies the  xmisrepresentation charge, however, and avers that its statements to Brooten were not inconsistent with the  S`' xBureau's AmNet declaration that Section 415(a) does not establish, as a matter of law, that backbilling is  xreasonable for two years. To the contrary, according to AT&T, Brooten fails to consider that, under  S' x^AmNet, reasonableness is assessed under the particular circumstances of each case. AT&T maintains, as  xsuch, that the context in which it made the statements in question is significant, and includes: (1)  x3Brooten's backbilling was 160 days or less not two years; (2) the billing was in accordance with its  x^Section 203 obligation to collect all lawful, tariffed charges; and (3) AT&T also stated to Brooten its view  xthat the backbilling was valid because it accurately reflected Brooten's unbilled usage and the billing delay  xkarose from a computer error. Moreover, apparently conceding that it sent Brooten and his counsel copies  S$ ' xof Section 415(a), AT&T maintains that "[i]t is incredible for anyone let alone an attorney to claim  xthat the furnishing of a copy of a statutory provision, which speaks for itself, amounts to  S ''misrepresentation' of the statute or the parties' rights under that statute."MV } yO*'ԍAT&T Reply Brief at 6 n.7. MCOPY OF 415  S ' e 26. STRIKE ` ` AT&T also opposes the Showcause Motion, primarily for the same reasons it opposes  S^' xBrooten's misrepresentation allegations in the complaint.dW^D} {OB'ԍSee Opposition to Showcause Motion at 14. d In addition, AT&T avers that we should deny  xthe Showcause Motion because the issues raised are identical and thus already before us in the  xinstant complaint proceeding. According to AT&T, therefore, the Showcause Motion presents no basis  S' xkfor the Commission to apply its scarce resources to a broad factfinding proceeding on the same issues.HX} {O\'ԍSee id. at 46. H  xZAT&T also moves to strike Brooten's Reply to its Opposition to the Showcause Motion, averring that  xreplies to motions are prohibited under Section 1.727(f) of the Commission's rules for formal complaint  Sn' x!proceedings.Ynh } {Ov' " ԍ47 C.F.R.  1.727(f). See AT&T Motion to Strike Complainant's Prohibited Pleading at 12. This motion was unopposed. The Showcause Motion, however, was captioned as a proceeding separate from the above x@captioned complaint proceeding and, as such, AT&T filed its opposition to Showcause Motion under  S' xZSection 1.45 of the rules.xZ } {O"'ԍ47 C.F.R.  1.45. See Opposition to Showcause Motion at 1. x Replies to oppositions are permitted under Section 1.45(b);J[T } yO$'ԍ47 C.F.R.  1.45(b). J we therefore deny AT&T's motion to strike Brooten's reply. "[,`(`(88K"Ԍ S'` ` 2. Decision  S' e 27.` ` In considering Brooten's charge that AT&T's oral and written statements to him about  xSection 415(a) of the Act constitute a violation of Section 201(b), we note that there is no significant  xdispute between the parties as to the literal wording of AT&T's statements to Brooten about Section  S8' x 415(a).w\8} yO' " ԍFor the record, AT&T does not concede sending Brooten a copy of a portion of Tariff P.S.C. No. 1 (New  {Oh' xt York), see generally supra note NY TARIFF77. Also, to the extent it is a new factual allegation, AT&T does not concede  {O2' x representing that Section 415(a) "mandated" payment of the backbilled charges. See generally supra note MANDATED78 and  x accompanying text. We note, moreover, that Brooten did not make this charge in his complaint or his reply and  {O ' x thus it is not properly before us as a separate count. See, e.g., supra note  1.72070 . As discussed below, the record does not support Brooten's averment when read as a permissible legal argument in briefs. w There is also no serious dispute that AT&T sent Brooten and his counsel copies of Section  x415(a) of the Act. Each party, however, offers different interpretations and consequent analyses of  S' xtAT&T's statements, particularly in light of the Bureau's declarations in AmNet that: (1) Section 415(a)  xdoes not authorize backbilling for any particular period because it is a twoyear statute of limitations for  xcollection actions; and (2) backbilling of much less than 24 months may be an unjust and unreasonable  Sr' xtpractice for purposes of Section 201(b).W]rF} {OX'ԍAmNet Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 552. W It is well established that, in a formal complaint proceeding  xunder Section 208, the complainant has the burden of establishing a violation of the Act or of the  S" ' x@Commission's rules or orders.^" } {O' "V ԍSee AT&T v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 5 FCC Rcd 143, 147 (1990); see also Amendment of Rules  x7 Concerning Procedures to be Followed When Formal Complaints are Filed Against Common Carriers, 8 FCC Rcd  {O,' x 2614, 261617 (1993); Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel v. AT&T, 4 FCC Rcd 8130, 8133 (1989), aff'd sub  {O' xg nom. Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel v. FCC, 915 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1310  {O'(1991). See generally 47 C.F.R.  1.7201.7535.  We consider first, therefore, whether the record provides persuasive evidence to support Brooten's interpretations or arguments related to AT&T's statements.  S ' e 28.` ` Brooten urges us to focus on AT&T's statements to Brooten that: (1) Section 415(a)  xxauthorizes backbilling for up to two years; and (2) Section 415(a) is the "statute of limitations" that AT&T  xgfollows for backbilling. Reviewed cursorily and isolated from the balance of the record, we agree that  S2' x*these statements are literally inconsistent with AmNet. AT&T argues correctly, however, that we should  xQconsider all the relevant evidence before us. In addition to the two statements above, the record includes:  xthe specific context in which the statements were made (AT&T was justifying backbilling of 160 days  xԩ much less than two years); other statements that AT&T made to Brooten (AT&T also stated its view  S' xthat the billing was valid, i.e., reasonable, and, moreover, sent him a copy of Section 415); and AT&T's obligation under Section 203 to collect its lawful, tariffed charges.  S' e 29.` ` We conclude, after considering all of the evidence before us, that the record does not  S' xdemonstrate persuasively that AT&T misrepresented Section 415(a) to Brooten, as alleged.r_ } {O&$'ԍSee supra paras.  41521 שEND BRO 41524. r In particular,  xwe give credit to Brooten's statement that AT&T sent him, and subsequently his counsel, copies of Section""_,`(`(881"  x415(a). This established fact, however, appears to render factually improbable Brooten's charge that  S'AT&T misrepresented Section 415(a) to him.{`} {O@'ԍSee, e.g., supra note COPY OF 41586 and accompanying text.{   S' e 030.` ` Based on the same evidence discussed immediately above, Brooten also urges us to find  S`' xthat AT&T misrepresented to him that: (1) Section 415(a) gives AT&T the unrestricted right to backbill  S:' xfor two years; and (2) Section 415(a) requires payment of the backbilled charges.sa:Z} {O4'ԍSee supra note MANDATED78 and accompanying text. s Without implying any  xdisagreement with Brooten's legal conclusion that such statements if made would be erroneous, we  xconclude that the record before us does not establish that AT&T made these statements to Brooten.  xAT&T certainly characterized Section 415(a) in a way calculated to support its collection of the charges  xat issue. We find, however, that AT&T's statements were not as unqualified and broad in nature as  xBrooten suggests and that, in any event, AT&T tempered the effect of its statements by supplying the text  SL 'of Section 415(a) to Brooten.,bXL } yO' " ԍWe caution, however, that less accurate statements to a customer regarding the meaning of a statutory  x provision may not be saved from unreasonableness under Section 201(b) simply by supplying a copy of such provision. ,  S ' e 31. 415 END INCORPORATE` ` Brooten's Showcause Motion offers essentially the same evidence and arguments without  S ' xpresenting any credible evidence beyond Brooten's experiences with AT&T.3c } yO' " ԍWe note that the Showcause Motion, preferably, should have been captioned under the abovecaptioned  {OH' x complaint proceeding. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.  205 (whenever . . . upon a complaint the Commission shall be of the  xk opinion that any practice of any carrier violates the Act the Commission may order the carrier to cease and desist  x& from such violation). The record reflects, however, that Brooten served this motion on AT&T in the manner  {O' x required for motions related to complaint proceedings. See 47 C.F.R.  1.735. Thus, it appears that no party to the complaint was prejudiced by the styling of the motion under a separate caption. 3 More specifically, there  xis no credible evidence before us to support Brooten's general speculation about AT&T misrepresenting  S ' xQSection 415(a) to "its subscribers."d" } {O' " ԍSee, e.g., Brooten Reply Brief at 4; Showcause Motion at 25. Accord GCI, 3 FCC Rcd at 70203  x (Commission held that defendant's proven misrepresentation to complainant was an isolated incident, despite  x complainant's assertion that defendant made similar statements to "a number of customers," because the record presented no evidence that defendant made similar erroneous statements to others).  The record before us contains evidence and arguments concerning  x&the lawfulness of AT&T's representations to Brooten about Section 415(a) and backbilling, which are  S4' xconsidered fully in the abovecaptioned proceeding pursuant to Section 208 of the Act.e4r} yOF!' " ԍSection 208(a) of the Act gives the Commission the authority "to investigate matters complained of in such  yO"'manner and by such means as it shall deem proper." 47 U.S.C.  208(a).  As such, we  x3find no persuasive reason for the Commission to either issue a declaratory ruling or commence a new  xproceeding apart from the abovecaptioned proceeding. Moreover, it does not appear that a ceaseand"e,`(`(88"ԫ xdesist order should be issued on the basis of the separate record created by the Showcause Motion and  S'the responsive pleadings.f$} yO@' "p ԍGenerally, the Commission will issue an order directing the subject to show cause why a ceaseanddesist  {O' xH order should not be issued only if it appears that a ceaseanddesist order should be issued. See 47 C.F.R.  1.91(a);  {O' x see also 47 C.F.R.  1.701. Compare 47 U.S.C.  275(c) (1996). See generally Complaintrules NPRM, 11 FCC Rcd at 2084851.  We therefore deny Brooten's Showcause Motion.Mg$} yO,' " ԍWe are acting on the Showcause Motion in the instant memorandum opinion and order for administrative  {O' x convenience only. See e.g., 47 C.F.R.  1.1 (Commission may on its own motion or petition hold such proceedings  {O' xk as it may deem necessary in connection with investigation). See generally 47 C.F.R.  1.735(a) ("Complaints may . . . be consolidated by the Commission for disposition [for example, if each raises common issues of law or fact]").M  S'D IV. CONCLUSION ă  S8' e z32.` ` We find that Brooten has not made a persuasive showing that AT&T violated Section  x201(b) of the Act, as alleged. We therefore deny Brooten's complaint as well as the separately captioned Showcause Motion.  S'- V. ORDERING CLAUSES ă   SH ' e = 33.` ` ACCORDINGLY IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 4(j), 201205 and 208 of  xIthe Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 201205, 208, and the  xxauthority delegated by Sections 0.91 and 0.291 of the Commission's Rules, 47 C.F.R.  0.91, 0.291, that  xthe abovecaptioned complaint of Kenneth E. Brooten, Jr., against AT&T Corp., filed on June 19, 1996, IS DENIED.  SX' e !34.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brooten's Motion to Accept LateFiled Pleading, filed on August 26, 1996, IS GRANTED.  S' e `"35.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion of Kenneth E. Brooten, Jr. for Order to  xShow Cause Why AT&T Corp. Should not Cease and Desist from an Unlawful Practice, filed on September 9, 1996, IS DENIED.  S@' e `#36.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that AT&T's Motion to Strike Complainant's Prohibited Pleading, filed on October 11, 1996, IS DENIED. ` `  hhCqFEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ` `  hhCqMary Beth Richards ` `  hhCqDeputy Chief, Common Carrier Bureau