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Y-B) I. INTRODUCTION ă  Y- 1. Rochester Telephone Corporation (Rochester) recently reorganized itself in a manner   intended to facilitate local exchange competition in and around Rochester, New York. It now   asks for a waiver of our Part 69 rules to enable it to recover three types of access charges the   >subscriber line charge, the carrier common line charge, and the charge for changing a   presubscribed interexchange carrier in a form it characterizes as better suited to its new   structure and the competitive local marketplace the reorganization is intended to foster. For the reasons stated below, we find the proposed waivers to be in the public interest and grant them.  Y -]+ II. BACKGROUND ă  Y- 2. On February3, 1993, Rochester filed a petition with the New York State Public   Service Commission (NYPSC) proposing an "Open Market Plan" for unbundling network   -services. Rochester proposed to restructure the provision of services to end users and other   carriers in a manner that it expects would permit vigorous competition to develop for local   yexchange services. After substantially modifying its plan, Rochester reached a settlement   Jagreement with the NYPSC staff, the Communications Workers of America, and Time Warner  YU%-  Communications; and on November10, 1994, the NYPSC approved the plan.>U%  T'- v ԍPetition of Rochester Telephone Corp. for Approval of Proposed Restructuring Plan, Opinion and   "Order Approving Joint Stipulation and Agreement, Case 93-C-0103, Opinion No.94-25 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov.10, 1994) (NYPSC Order).> Rochester implemented the plan on January1, 1995.">&+++o'"Ԍ Y- ԙ3. Under its revised Open Market Plan, Rochester Telephone Corporation restructured   \itself into a basic network services company, which retains the Rochester name, and a   xcompetitive company, Frontier Communications of Rochester (Frontier), subject to intrastate  Y-  regulation as a nondominant carrier.80 T4-  [ԍxThe petition, and the comments on that petition and replies, refer to the network services  x company (Rochester) as "R-Net" and to the competitive retail provider (Frontier) as "R-Com." Both  xt"these companies are owned by a holding company, which also owns companies providing longdistance,  x)"wireless, and network systems services, as well as smaller local telephone companies spread throughout the United States. Rochester provides basic network services, such as   interstate access. It also provides, on an unbundled, nondiscriminatory basis, the local loop,   switching, and transport functions that reseller carriers need to provide local exchange telephone   service. It offers these intrastate services as a wholesaler, at discounted prices lower than its  Y_-  standard retail rates._0 T -  ԍxCompare MTS and WATS Market Structure, CC Docket No. 7882, Phase I, Third Report and  T- x Order, 93 FCC 2d 241, 258 (1983) (Access Charge Order); Expanded Interconnection with Local  T- xX Telephone Company Facilities, CCDocket No. 91-141, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed  Tf- xv Rulemaking, 7FCC Rcd 7369, 7403, para. 65 (1992), vacated in part and remanded sub nom. Bell  T@- x AtlanticTel. Cos. v. FCC, 24F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reaffirmed in pertinent part on remand,  T- xW!9FCC Rcd 5154, 5202, para. 111 (1994) (Expanded Interconnection Remand Order), appeal pending (prohibiting distinctions between interstate rates charged to carriers and those charged to end users). Initially, Rochester also continues to provide local exchange telephone   service to most customers as a retailer, and will continue as the default carrier for customers not   selecting other providers. Frontier and other competing local service providers may purchase  Y -  <network services, i.e., local loop, switching, or transport services, from either Rochester or   alternative providers, or they may provide the underlying services over their own network  Y -  Yfacilities. 0 T#- ԍNYPSC Order at 811, 2536 & Appendix (Joint Stipulation and Agreement); Rochester Petition at 16. Thus, competing local service providers, including Frontier, may provide service to   end users in a number of ways: they may buy all network elements from Rochester; they may   buy local loops from Rochester and deploy their own switching and transport networks; or they  Y -may deploy their own local loop facilities and buy Rochester's switching and transport services.I 0 TV-ԍRochester Petition at 9.I  /4. While Frontier has yet to offer more than Centrex, highcapacity private line, and   voice mail services, it and competing local service providers are free to offer all retail telephone   services and attract end user customers away from Rochester's offerings. Ultimately, Rochester   expects Frontier and competing providers to expand their retail operations, leaving Rochester  Y-  + with few direct relationships with end user customers.C0 Tl%-ԍId. at 6, 8.C AT&T has already begun taking out full Y-  page newspaper advertisements to attract local service customers.~>0 T'-ԍSee, e.g., The Rochester Democratic and Chronicle, Jan. 12, 1995 at 9A.~ Rochester also took other   ,actions as part of the plan approved by the NYPSC: it reduced its intrastate rates substantially"+))"   and committed to future reductions; it promised service quality and customer service  Y-  enhancements; it unbundled its network to permit full interconnection with competing networks,   hand offered reciprocal compensation between Rochester and competing local service providers;  Y-and it took steps toward providing local number portability.a0 T4-ԍNYPSC Order at 2023 & Appendix at 4449, 5253.a  Y-w  III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES ă  X`- A.Rochester Petition  Y2- 5. On July 29, 1994, Rochester filed a petition requesting waivers of Part 69 of our   Jrules to harmonize its interstate common line rates with its wimplementation of the revised Open   Market Plan. First, Rochester proposes that, when it provides subscriber lines to Frontier or  Y -  Yother local service providers, it recover the interstate subscriber line charge (SLC), i.e., the flat  Y -  monthly rate element that local telephone companies typically recover directly from end users,  Y -  from the carriers that have a direct relationship with end user customers.G h0 T-ԍ47C.F.R. 69.104.G Rochester argues that   ,it will not have direct relationships with end user customers served by competing local service   providers, and although it could bill these end users directly for the SLC, such a billing   ,arrangement would impose unnecessary costs. Moreover, according to Rochester, such billing   would be confusing to end users who would be faced with two bills for local telephone service  !or charges from two different local telephone companies on the same bill. Instead, Rochester  !Hproposes to bill the SLC to carriers that purchase subscriber lines to resell to end users. These  Y 4 !^carriers, in turn, would recover these costs from their end user customers.L 0 T'ԍRochester Petition at 711.L Rochester also  !proposes to require those reselling subscriber lines to certify that they charge end users no more  !than the applicable federal SLC charge, plus tax surcharges. Rochester also proposes to treat  !the onetime charges for changing an end user's pre-subscribed longdistance carrier in the same  Y4way that it treats the SLC, since those charges also, are typically charged directly to end users.w 0 T' xԍId. at 1113. This proposal would require a waiver of the existing charge for such services as  T' !set forth in Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, CC Docket No. 831145, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 101 FCC 2d 911, 932 (Appendix B, para. 27) (1985).w  Y4 x36. Second, Rochester requests a waiver from the current requirement that it recover the  !Hinterstate carrier common line (CCL) charge on a perminute basis from interexchange carriers  !^(IXCs) that use local exchange companies' (LECs') subscriber lines to originate or terminate  YQ4 !binterstate calls.G Q0 T%'ԍ47C.F.R. 69.105.G Instead, Rochester seeks authority to collect a flatrate charge, which it refers  !to as the Link Common Line charge, in lieu of the perminute CCL charge, from any entity that  !Hbuys Rochester's wholesale subscriber lines but does not use switching provided by Rochester.  !MRochester argues that, because it will be unable to measure the originating or terminating"  +)) "  !!minutes of use (MOU) on lines for which it does not provide the local switching function, it is  !impractical to assess the perminute CCL charge in these circumstances. It proposes to base that  !initial flatrate monthly charge on its average subscriber's CCL payment that is, by  !multiplying the average monthly MOU of its subscribers by its perminute CCL rate. Rochester  !notes that the use of a studyareawide average MOU per line eliminates the possibly  !impractical, and almost certainly contentious, task of tracking individual common lines lost to  !;switching competitors and the volume of interstate access MOUs associated with such common  !lines. Furthermore, it proposes to adjust the perminute CCL charge annually to account for  YH4usage growth, as required by the price cap rules.M H0 T 'ԍRochester Petition at 1314.M  Y 4 x7. Rochester argues that the waivers it requests are in the public interest and satisfy the  ! legal standard for waivers of our rules. According to Rochester, the Open Market Plan's unique  !Qprocompetitive provisions constitute "special circumstances" justifying a waiver. Rochester  !contends that the Commission's existing rules were drafted to address the traditional relationship  !between LECs, IXCs, and end users, and do not contemplate the extensive resale of LEC  !osubscriber lines or the unbundling of subscriber lines from switching functions that Rochester's  !plan makes possible. Rochester asserts that the Open Market Plan will accelerate achievement  !of the Commission's procompetitive goals by: (1)enabling end users to choose among local  !providers; (2)assuring competing local providers access to elements of the existing local  !exchange network on unbundled, nondiscriminatory terms; (3)permitting the local telephone  !company to participate in the newlycompetitive market without obtaining unfair advantages; and  !(4)providing a realworld test of a fullycompetitive local exchange marketplace that should give  Y4 !buseful information to the Commission, state regulators, and companies in the industry.Mh0 T'ԍRochester Petition at 1518.M While  !Rochester states that the waivers it seeks are not essential for it to implement the Open Market  Y4Plan, it contends that the waivers would substantially facilitate its implementation of the plan.W0 T'ԍId. at 9 n.20, 12 n.26, 14 n.30.W  X4 B.Comments  Y|4 x8. AT&T and MCI oppose this waiver. They argue that, instead of granting it, the  !ICommission should use this opportunity to conduct broadbased inquiries to develop a  !framework for addressing the general issue of access reform and telecommunications markets  !in transition from monopoly to competition, possibly in conjunction with other pending  Y 4 !7proceedings.Y 0 T{$'ԍAT&T Comments at 57; MCI Comments at 4.Y MCI asserts that independent proposals and test cases, like that presented by  !Rochester, are not particularly helpful, arguing that ad hoc decisions will only result in  !7unnecessarily repetitious decisionmaking. It further criticizes Rochester's suggestion that its  Y4 !Open Market Plan could become a test for a fully competitive local exchange market.CJ0 T('ԍMCI Comments at 4.C GTE,"+))!"  !!on the other hand, agrees with Rochester that experience gained from the proposed realworld  !test of a fully competitive local exchange marketplace will provide valuable information that may  Y4 !be useful in other parts of the country with similar market conditions.C0 TK'ԍGTE Comments at 3.C GTE and Southwestern  !Bell (SWBT) state that the petition demonstrates the need for the Commission to adopt a more  !flexible access charge structure, as proposed in many other petitions before the Commission.  !GTE and SWBT contend that the current accesscharge structure rules do not permit LECs to  !meet the needs of customers. They agree that the Commission should act as quickly as possible  !to make the necessary fundamental changes to the access charge rules, but they support the  YH4 !waiver request.XHh0 Ta 'ԍId. at 46; SWBT Comments at 13.X Rochester replies to AT&T and MCI that it is not requesting changes in the  Y14Commission rules, only that existing rules be adapted to its new circumstances.F1 0 T 'ԍRochester Reply at 4.F  Y 4 xt9. AT&T and MCI also argue that Rochester has not met the requirements for a waiver.  !In comments filed prior to NYPSC approval of the plan and before Rochester implemented it,  !they assert that Rochester has failed to meet the "good cause" standard for granting a waiver  !|because it has not claimed hardship and that Rochester will proceed with its reorganization with  !or without the waiver. MCI also states that Rochester has not shown how its creation of two  Y4 !new subsidiaries will better serve the public interest.W0 T'ԍAT&T Comments at 4; MCI Comments at 3.W In addition, AT&T and MCI challenge  Yy4 !Rochester's assumption that Frontier will be nondominant.[yJ0 Tt'ԍAT&T Comments at 4 n.6; MCI Comments at 6.[ Sprint and AT&T contend that  !HCommission action on this waiver would be premature before the NYPSC granted Rochester's  !!petition for a reorganization, although Sprint argues that Rochester should be entitled to timely  Y44 !DCommission action once the NYPSC has approved Rochester's reorganization.n40 T'ԍAT&T Comments at 34; Sprint Comments at 2 & attachment at 9.n Rochester  !defends its characterization of Frontier as nondominant, stating that Frontier likely will not even  !offer any jurisdictionally interstate services itself, and, if it does, it will be similar to Rochester's  Y4nondominant long distance affiliate.F 0 T*!'ԍRochester Reply at 6.F  Y4 x 10. If a waiver is to be granted, AT&T is not opposed to Rochester's proposed treatment  !of the charge for changing presubscribed carriers. AT&T argues, however, that rather than  !granting casebycase waivers, the Commission should replace the rate structure of existing SLC  !Uand CCL charges with a more economically rational one. It notes that longaccepted principles  !bof economic efficiency support recovery of the nontrafficsensitive costs of the subscriber line  !Dplant through a nontraffic sensitive charge to the direct costcauser, the subscriber. AT&T  !.notes that it has always supported this policy and now suggests that the Commission implement"7* +))D"  !it by eliminating the CCL charge and recovering any resulting revenue shortfall through an  !Mincrease in the SLC. AT&T predicts that such a restructuring of rates would ensure that  Y4common line cost recovery mechanisms do not distort or undermine local competition.F0 TK'ԍAT&T Comments at 67.F  Y4 xg 11. MCI states that it has no fundamental objection to Rochester's proposal for recovery  !Uof the CCL on a flatrate per subscriber line basis. Still, MCI questions why Rochester cannot  !;secure the relevant MOU data from other carriers. MCI explains that IXCs now supply LECs  !with another type of data that the LECs do not calculate themselves: the percentage of MOU  YH4 !that are interstate traffic (otherwise know as the Percentage of Interstate Usage (PIU)).EHh0 Ta 'ԍMCI Comments at 56.E  !Rochester acknowledges this possibility, but asserts that the reliability of PIU reports is bound  !to become even more suspect (as compared to a flatrated CCL charge) than they already are  Y 4 !Mwith the introduction of additional carriers.H 0 T'ԍRochester Reply at 56.H MCI also argues that, without the ability to  !Dmeasure MOU, Rochester would be unable to compute the growth in MOU per line, which  !|growth figure is needed in the formula for a price cap index. Rochester responds that it would  !3calculate the growth rate based on the growth in the total number of retail and wholesale  ! subscriber lines and the growth in MOU per line on the lines for which it provides switching and  Y4thus is able to measure MOU.0 T' xԍLetter from Michael J. Shortley, III, Senior Attorney, Frontier Corporation to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Jan. 19, 1995.  Yb4Ed III. DISCUSSION ă  Y54 x 12. Under Section 1.3 of our rules, we are authorized to grant waivers "if good cause  Y4 !therefor is shown."C 0 T'ԍ47 C.F.R. 1.3.C As interpreted by the courts, this requires that a petitionerE demonstrate  !that "special circumstances warrant a deviation from the general rule and such a deviation will  Y4 !serve the public interest." 0 Ta ' x_ԍNortheast Cellular Telephone Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1990); WAIT Radio  T;!'v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In this case, we find that, by unbundling subscriber lines from other  !network functions, Rochester creates a situation where there may be no direct relationship  !bbetween Rochester and end users due to the presence of local service resellers from whom end  !users may obtain service. The absence of a direct relationship between a local exchange carrier  !!such as Rochester and end users was not contemplated when the Commission created the rules  !governing the recovery of access charges. We find that the presence of resellers represents the  !kind of special circumstances that justify waivers of our rules for recovery of the SLC,  !presubscription change charge, and CCL charge. We also find that the requested waivers are in the public interest."8< +))7"Ԍ Y4 xԙ 13. Rochester's unbundling plan is an encouraging experiment. Rochester's readiness  !to move towards full local competition and New York State's support for this experiment are  !promising developments in the progress toward full competition in local markets. As AT&T,  !MCI, and Rochester all recognize, there are already a number of pending petitions that raise the  !issue of how the rate structure for access charges should be changed for local  Y4 !xtelecommunications markets in transition to competition.70 T' xuԍSee, e.g., Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee, Petition for Rulemaking, April 15,  !_1994; National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners' Petition for Notice of Inquiry Concerning Access Issues, June 25, 1993.7 We do not believe that we should  !delay efforts by individual carriers to experiment with measures to facilitate competition in local  !markets until we have completed a comprehensive review of our access charge rules. Rather,  !Dwe are firmly committed to the rapid introduction of competition in local exchange markets.  !Competition should produce lower prices, improve services, and yield an innovative and broadly  !accessible communications network. There is no indication that the Rochester plan will in any way impair universal service in the Rochester area.  Y 4 x 14. Contrary to MCI's views, we believe that experimentation in this area may produce  !Duseful data about the effect of alternative rate structures on the development of competition.  !Thus, we support the efforts of individual LECs to begin the transition to full competition in the  !Dlocal exchange. We find that the possibility of fundamental reform in the future not only is  !consistent with, but may be facilitated by, granting a waiver in this instance. Competition  !Mseldom takes one particular form, and the competitive experience that is developed under Rochester's plan will likely provide valuable insights even in markets that develop differently.  Y4 x[15. Similarly, we reject MCI's objections that we not grant this waiver because  !bRochester has not claimed hardship or equity justifications or because Rochester has not shown  !that its corporate reorganization will serve the public interest. Our standards for granting a  Y4 !waiver do not require petitioner to show "hardship" per se,[ b T' xԍWhile MCI relies on Petitions for Waiver of Transport Rate Structure and Pricing Requirements,  !9 FCC Rcd 796, 800 (Com.Car.Bur. 1993), that decision only refers to hardship and inequity as two examples of the special circumstances that could justify a waiver.[ nor do they require Rochester to  !*prove that its corporate reorganization is in the public interest. Approval of local telephone  !corporate reorganizations falls within the province of state authorities, although the Commission  Y4 !reviews reorganizations or aspects thereof that implicate particular federal interests.!l0 T!' xyԍCommission approval is necessary for, inter alia, the transfer of interstate authorizations and for  T"' !waiver of study area boundaries. See, e.g., Applications of Craig McCaw and AT&T For Consent to the  Tf#' !Transfer of Control of McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. and its Subsidiaries, 9 FCC Rcd 5836  T@$' !^(1994) recon. pending; GTE Southwest and Pioneer Telephone Joint Petition for Waiver of the Definition  T%' !of "Study Area" Contained in Part 36, AppendixGlossary of the Commission's Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 7785 (Accounting and Audits Div. 1994).  !Rochester's reorganization has already been implemented and the instant waiver petition does"~N !+))+"  Y4 !not seek our approval for that transaction."0 Ty' xԍThe NYPSC approval of the reorganization renders moot the AT&T and Sprint arguments that Commission action on this petition is premature. Furthermore, we find, below, that Rochester has shown a public interest justification for this waiver.  Y4 x16. We find that Rochester's proposal to recover the SLC from carriers that purchase  !Hand resell its subscriber lines, rather than from the ultimate end user customers, is a reasonable  !xway to recover subscriber line costs when a separate carrier leases lines from Rochester and  !resells service to end users and is in the public interest. Rochester's proposal offers an  !administratively efficient modification that is consistent with our policy of requiring that these  !bcosts be recovered on a per line basis. The only opposition to this proposal is AT&T's general  !opposition to the existing manner of recovering interstate common line costs. We note that even  !if we were to adopt AT&T's suggestion to eliminate the CCL and recover the shortfall via an  !increased SLC, which is beyond the scope of this proceeding, Rochester would still need a  !!mechanism to recover the SLC from carriers reselling Rochester subscriber lines to end users.  !We conclude that it would be in the public interest to permit Rochester to recover these costs  !as it proposes. For similar reasons, we also find that this same treatment is reasonable for  !recovering presubscription change charges. Neither of these changes will have any effect on Rochester's total revenues.  Yb4 x17. Rochester's proposal for recovering its CCL charges from competing local service  !7providers that purchase its subscriber lines, but not its local switching services, also appears  !reasonable. Rochester proposes to charge each such carrier a flatrated CCL charge equal to  !othe total in CCL charges that the carrier would pay if each of the lines it is reselling carried the  !same level of traffic as Rochester averages on its subscriber lines. This procedure appears to  !be an administratively efficient means of recovering common line costs and to avoid the likely  !verification difficulties and controversies associated with relying on MOU levels reported by  !reseller customers. Rochester's proposal also makes it unnecessary to track the volume of  !interstate MOU over common lines connected to switching competitors, which would require  !data that might well be competitively sensitive and costly to ascertain. Moreover, Rochester's  !proposal would recover a greater portion of its common line costs on a flatrate basis, and we  !Hhave consistently found that recovery of nontraffic sensitive costs, such as common line costs,  YN4on a flatrate basis is economically efficient.k#N@0 T? 'ԍSee, e.g., Access Charge Order, 93FCC 2d at 27778.k  Y 4 xR18. Finally, the use of the average MOU per subscriber line makes it unlikely that  !|Rochester will overrecover common line revenues from retail customers that take service from  !bcompeting providers of local switching. We reach this conclusion because the customers likely  !to be the most attractive to competing local service providers that do not use Rochester's local  !switching are those with higher than average MOU per line. For these customers' traffic,  !Rochester would collect a flatrate charge equal to the average in CCL payments per line, rather  !than collecting the aboveaverage payment that it would otherwise have received (the perminute  !CCL charge times the aboveaverage number of interstate minutes on their lines). We therefore"##+))%"  !conclude that Rochester's proposal for recovering CCL charges from competing local service providers would serve the public interest.  Y4 xZ19. We decline, however, to adopt Rochester's proposal to use the growth in subscriber  !lines and the growth in MOU for lines it can measure to calculate the growth rate measure  !required for adjusting the applicable price cap index for its common line basket. This approach  !implicitly assumes, without substantiation, that the growth in MOU for lines Rochester cannot  !measure is the same as the growth on lines it can measure. Rochester offers no justification for  !this assumption. Indeed, Frontier and other local service providers may well seek to attract  !bsubscribers with higherthanaverage rates of growth in MOU on their lines, and may stimulate  !demand through aggressive advertising and related activities. The formula that currently applies  !to the common line price cap basket reduces the price cap index to adjust for half of the growth  !|in MOU per line. If the traffic growth on lines that Rochester cannot measure exceeds the rate  !of growth on the lines that it can measure, then the traffic growth figure used to calculate the  !common line price cap index will be understated, and thus the price cap applicable to  Y 4Rochester's CCL rates will be artificially high.$d 0 T ' x8ԍSee Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, CC Docket No. 87313, Second  T' !Report and Order, 5 FCC Rcd 6786, 679395 (1990) (LEC Price Cap Order); 47 C.F.R. 61.45(c). If  !*the growth variable is understated, the index would not be adjusted down by a sufficiently large amount, and the LEC would be permitted to raise its CCL rates to levels higher than would otherwise be allowed.  Yy4 xE20. Instead, we direct Rochester to calculate the growth in MOU in a manner that  !kreasonably estimates the growth rates of competitive providers of local retail service that use  ! Rochester's subscriber lines. For instance, Rochester might consider proposing use of the traffic  !tgrowth rate of its affiliate, Frontier, as a surrogate for other carriers that use Rochester's  !common lines in connection with other parties' switching service. Thus, Rochester could argue  !gthat Frontier's traffic growth data is comparable to that of other competing firms because  !xFrontier is likely to pursue and secure a customer base comparable to that of its competitors.  !^At the same time, Rochester should be able to place full reliance on data supplied to it by its  !corporate affiliate. We would also consider, in the tariff process, reasonable alternative  !.mechanisms suggested by Rochester. Such a mechanism would make it very likely that, in the  !future, as CCL rates are adjusted under the current price cap formula, the CCL rates (those paid  !both by Rochester's access customers and by local service providers that resell Rochester's  !common lines) and the total CCL revenues received by Rochester would be no greater than they would be in the absence of the Rochester plan.  Y 4 x21. Our decision to permit Rochester to use the average MOU on the lines it can  Y 4 !!measure to calculate the level of the flat-rate CCL charge is consistent with our decision not to  !permit Rochester to use the average rate of MOU growth on the lines it can measure to calculate  !bthe common line price cap index. In the former case, Rochester's proposal is not likely to lead  !^to excessive rates or over-recovery of revenue. In fact, we believe it may be more likely to  !;result in under-recovery. In the latter case, however, under the formula that currently applies  !kto the common line price cap basket, Rochester's proposal may result in CCL rates and total"" $+))$"  !common line revenues that are too high. Accordingly, we require the use of a more accurate surrogate for MOU growth to calculate the common line price cap index.  Y4 x22. These waivers are predicated on the continued existence of the current rules for  !;recovering CCL charges. If we modify these rules such that Rochester need only rely on data  Y4 !to which it has direct access,%0 T' xԍSee, e.g., Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 941, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd 1687 (1994). these waivers would no longer be effective. Instead, the new rules would supersede these waivers.  YH4 xZ23. As the instant petition relates only to federal access charges levied by Rochester, we  !do not address whether Rochester's retail affiliate, Frontier, is a nondominant carrier.  !Moreover, in light of our longstanding prohibition against restrictions on the resale of common  Y 4 !carrier services,A&@ B0 T' xJԍRegulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Services and  T' !Facilities, 60FCC 2d 261 (1976), amended on recon., 62FCC 2d 588 (1977), aff'd sub nom. American  T' !qTel.& Tel. Co.v. FCC, 572F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439U.S. 875 (1978); AT&T  T' !Communications, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture and Order to Show Cause, FCC94-359 (released Jan.4, 1995).A we deny Rochester's proposal to impose a pricing restriction on resellers--  !that is, requiring purchasers of its subscriber lines to impose a federal SLC no more than the SLC charged by Rochester. The charges levied by resellers are not at issue in this proceeding.  Y 4_D IV. ORDERING CLAUSE ă  Yz4 x24. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, that pursuant to Sections 4(i) and 201205 of the  !Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.  154(i) and 201205, and Section 1.3 of the Commission's  !rules, 47 C.F.R. 1.3, Rochester Telephone Corporation's petition for waivers of Sections  !H61.45(c), 61.46(d), 69.104, 69.105, and 69.203 of the Commission's Rules, 47C.F.R. 61.45(c), 61.46(d), 69.104, 69.105, and 69.203, IS GRANTED to the degree noted above. ` `  ,hh]FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ` `  ,hh]William F. Caton ` `  ,hh]Acting SecretaryH" J&+))'"  Y4m  Appendix A: Parties Filing Comments ă  Y4Comments  Y41. American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T)  Yw42.GTE  Y`43.MCI Telecommunications (MCI)  YI44.Southwestern Bell Telephone (SW Bell)  Y245.Sprint Communications (Sprint)  Y 4Reply Comments  Y 41. AT&T  Y 42.Rochester Telephone