WPC 2a B?Kf Z CG Timesphoenix#C\  P6Q6P#",tB^ f ^;C]ddCCCdCCCCddddddddddCCY~~vCN~sk~CCCddCYdYdYCdd88d8ddddJN8ddddYYdYddddddCddddddddd8YYYYYY~Y~Y~Y~YC8C8C8C8ddddddddddYdddddsdXdXXXddx|X~d~d|XdddddddC8ddddoddd|8|H~d|8|8dtddddHHdlLlLlLkd|H|8~dddddddXXXd~ddkd~ddxCddCCCWxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNdddCYQQddddddFddddFCChhd44ddxxdddvooChdF"dhddCCxCddoddCdYds]xUvdYYCCCCx~oxoY~NYdYC8YooYdYxsdxdd~YYxoxxx~CdxYxxxxCCdddddddxCsdYC\   pxtll\tll@\@\`LHP LaserJet 5LHPLAS5L.PRS5Xw PE37\\y"]eXP2     3|cЊ#Xw PE37|XP#|xCG TimesCourierCourier BoldNew (TT)page numberpage number1#XP\  P6QXP#2%- ?ACG TimesCourierCourier BoldCourier Italicphoenix#C\  P6QP# Before the Phillip A. HogueTim Mollen 2eWvGDefault Paragraph FoDefault Paragraph Font11#XP\  P6QXP##C\  P6QP#footnote textfootnote text footnote referencefootnote reference44#XP\  P6QXP##C\  P6QP#footerfooterX` hp x (#!!X` hp x (#2mQXpage numberpage number11#XP\  P6QXP##C\  P6QP#"i~'K2^18MSS888S8888SSSSSSSSSS88Jxir{icx{8Aui{x`xoYi{xxxl888SS8JSJSJ8SS..S.SSSS>A.SSxSSJJSJSSSSSS8SSSSSSSSS.xJxJxJxJxJorJiJiJiJiJ8.8.8.8.{SxSxSxSxS{S{S{S{SxSxJ{SxSxSxS{S`SxIxSxIqIqIrSrS{dgIiSiSgIxSxSxSxSxS{S{S8.SSSSz]SSuSg/gfootnote text#XP\  P6QXP##footnote reference##XP\  P6QXP##Xx6X@DQX@#э)footnote reference) See, e.g, Computer Reseller News of March 16, 1998: John Sidgmore, president and chief executive of UUNet... has said the company will charge smallersized carriers to peer with the UUNet backbone.#C\  P6QP#> and then to cloak these peering agreements behind confidentiality agreements. #P6X@DQ@# #Xx6X@DQX@# One of WorldComs and MCIs main arguments#footnote reference##XP\  P6QXP#footnote text#XP\  P6QXP##footnote reference##XP\  P6QXP##Xx6X@DQX@#э)footnote reference) WorldComs other argument is that GTE is orchestrating opposition to the merger (see, e.g., Washington Telecom Newswire of March 12, 1998, quoting an MCI spokesperson). This diversionary argument is absurd, as to ICP and numerous other protestants. See infra.#C\  P6QP#ч is that there are low barriers to entry (in the ISP market and, WorldCom implies, in the backbone market). Due to less that fluid IP portability and other factors#footnote reference##XP\  P6QXP#-footnote text#XP\  P6QXP##footnote reference##XP\  P6QXP##Xx6X@DQX@#э)footnote reference) For example, Gordon Cook, author of Cook Report on the Internet, has said that the cost of entering backbone business is already skyrocketing, that the cost of meeting technical requirements bigger companies have set for peering is $500,000 per month and rising. See Communications Daily of March 16, 1998, which also quoted the CEO of Fiber Network Solutions that Sprint is talking about levying fee of up to $50,000 per month (for peering).#C\  P6QP#- demonstrated by other commenters, this is hardly true now and would be less true if this combination were allowed to go forward. At present, ISPs can start up and peer with others; a combined WorldComMCI, however, could and would raise peering prices (which in turn would be passed on to retail consumers), and has indicated it might begin charging for backbone use by the byte. The irony (and need for action) is inescapable: while Congress, the courts and the FCC have been trying to make telephone services more competitive and less concentrated, the infrastructure of most future communications threaten to be irrevocably concentrated by a combined WorldComMCI. ICP believes, as perhaps the Commissioners do, that Congress should address this issue in the interim, however, the FCC must closely scrutinize this proposal, under its existing public interest standard, and should (1) provide the applicants nonpublic material to the protestants, (2) schedule an evidentiary hearing, (3) substantially extend the pleading cycle, and (4) on the current record, deny this proposed combination.  * * * *  ICP filed a timely petition to deny on January 2, 1998. While ICP appreciates that the Bureau has allowed a second round of public comments in this proceeding, the evidentiary record in this docket is nowhere near complete. This cannot legitimately be the last opportunity for public comment. The Department of Justice and the European Union have both initiated more detailed reviews of the proposal. See, e.g., Wilke and Sandberg, Worldcom, MCI Probe is Widened, Wall St. J., March 10, 1998, at A3. Meanwhile, the FCC has yet to release even WorldComs and MCIs initial HartScottRodino filings to any protestant (as WAS done in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX proceeding, 12 FCCC Rcd 19985 (1997), and as should be done here). #P6X@DQ@# #Xx6X@DQX@#We note, and join in, the similar requests of various other commenters / protestants: Telstras March 13 submission, at 2 ( the law requires that an adequate opportunity for public comment be provided after, not before, interested parties are able to inspect all relevant documents including the HSR documents which the FCC obtains in due course from the DOJ) (emphasis in original); Bell Atlantics March 13/16 submission, at 1 ( [t]he commenting parties can be expected to file comprehensive comments only after reviewing the documents the Commission makes available); Rainbow/PUSHs March 13 submission, at 1314 ( the public should be offered a reasonable opportunity to comment on the results of that investigation) (presumably meaning the DOJs, as well as the FCCs, investigation(s)); Simply Internets March 13 submission, at 17 ( unless the necessary information is made available for Commission and public scrutiny, the proposed merger cannot be said to be in the public interest); as well as Simply Internets February 13, 1998, Motion for Immediate Review of NonPublic Materials; etc..  As to the Joint Reply (the Rep.), ICP was flabbergasted by, and hereby formally takes issue with, WorldCom and MCIs statement, in their Rep. at 2728, that [s]ome advocacy groups have, of course, filed petitions opposing the merger. The petitions, however, generally reflect particularized concerns about the effects of the merger, including its effect on the minority community. These issues are important, but... the merger creates no cause for concern. Emphasis added. #P6X@DQ@# #Xx6X@DQX@#WorldCom and MCI have attempted to obscure both the level of consumer opposition to their proposed combination#footnote reference##XP\  P6QXP#footnote text#XP\  P6QXP##footnote reference##XP\  P6QXP##Xx6X@DQX@#э)footnote reference) Beyond the petitions to deny and comments that have been filed with the FCC, the FCC should be aware, inter alia, of the protests filed with the California Public Utilities Commission, and ICPs intervention in opposition to the proposal before the New York State Public Service Commission (see PSC Order of January 26, 1998, granting ICPs motion for intervention in Case 97C1804).#C\  P6QP# (by, inter alia, unilaterally declaring their competitors the primary opponents of the merger), and the public interest issues that the Commission must consider (which extend beyond the strictly competitive analysis of the Department of Justice, for example). #P6X@DQ@# #Xx6X@DQX@#ICP also takes issue with WorldComs and MCIs statement, Rep. at 96, that Internet considerations raise issues beyond the scope of this proceeding. This is a basis WorldCom and MCI proffer for the FCC to refuse to grant a hearing on this unprecedented application, the largest proposed merger not only in telecommunications, but in U.S. history. #P6X@DQ@# #Xx6X@DQX@#As set forth in ICPs January 2, 1998, Petition to Deny, the FCC should and must consider the ways in which this proposed combination would substantially lessen competition in internet as well as long distance markets. #P6X@DQ@# #Xx6X@DQX@#In light of the lack of development of the factual record, particular that part of the record made available to date to the public, the FCC should be aware (and ICP hereby formally enters into the record) that ICP on January 30, 1998, asked WorldCom and MCI to provide certain information in this regard. ICPs request was explicitly made in connection with the New York State Public Service Commission proceeding (Case 97C1804), but is obviously relevant to this FCC proceeding.#footnote reference##XP\  P6QXP#footnote text#XP\  P6QXP##footnote reference##XP\  P6QXP##Xx6X@DQX@#э)footnote reference) Beyond the obvious relevance demonstrated by the questions themselves, the FCCs Bell Atlantic NYNEX Order (full citation in ICPs Jan. 2, 1998, Petition to Deny) explicitly encouraged the consideration of antitrust issues in state regulatory reviews of proposed telecommunications mergers.#C\  P6QP#ѕ Both WorldCom and MCI refused to provide this information. Here are some of ICPs questions (which WorldCom and MCI have refused to answer) ICP asks the Commission to direct WorldCom and MCI to provide this information, to ICP and into the record in this proceeding (as well as providing the other information requested supra):  1.Please describe WorldComs, MCIs and/or the proposed MCI WorldComs plans to preserve and enhance universal service in low or moderate income ( LMI) or predominantly Latino or African American communities in New York State, as this relates to telephone and particularly internet / information technology infrastructure and retail service/access. 2. Please describe WorldComs, MCIs and/or the proposed MCI WorldComs plans and timetables to enter local residential markets in New York State, and internet services therein, particularly in low or moderate income ( LMI) or predominantly Latino or African American communities in New York State. 3.Please describe UUNets policy as to pricing and the disclosure thereof, for backbone peering arrangements / agreements. 4.Please describe current and planned operational and technical standard requirements for UUNet and/or any proposed successor, including but not limited to in the areas of routing protocol architecture, security and packetcounting architecture. 5.Please describe WorldCom, MCIs and/or the proposed MCI WorldComs plans to build switches in LMI or minority communities in New York State. [6].Please describe in detail the basis of (and any plans or timelines for) WorldComs and MCIs statement in their January 15 Opposition to ICPs Motion to Intervene (at 6) that the combination of WorldCom and MCI... will increase... the ability to offer competitive local and toll service to all residential customers...As the strengthened WorldCom/MCI is able to expand the availability of competitive local service to residential customers, the presence of competition will result in lower cost, more efficient service, and more customer choice. Competition will develop for the universal service payments now available only to monopoly LECs and, with that competition, funds available for universal service will be more effective in assuring the availability of universal service for all residential customers. [7].Please provide documents that discuss, analyze, describe or relate to MCIs decision (announced January 22, 1998) to abandon its plans to resell local residential phone service and to focus on providing local business service through its own networks. WorldComs and MCIs outright refusal to provide information responsive to these public interest / antitrust questions, either in response to ICPs January 30, 1998, request, or, essentially, in their January 26, 1998, purported Reply to the FCC, makes the need for an FCC evidentiary hearing in this proceeding all the more clear. On the current record, these applications must be denied.  * * * #P6X@DQ@# #Xx6X@DQX@# For the foregoing reasons, on the current record, WorldComs and MCIs applications, and this proposed combination, should be denied by the Commission. Respectfully submitted, ________________________ Matthew R. Lee, Esq. Executive Director Inner City Press/Community on the Move & Inner City Public Interest Law Project 1919 Washington Avenue Bronx, NY 10457 Phone: 718 7163540 Fax: 718 7163161