WPC  2MBR ZCourierw Roman#|x+x6X@`7X@HP LaserJet 4SiHPLAS4SI.PRSx6X@8;\F WX@|D8D\dDXdXdXDdd88d8ddddDL8ddddX`(`lD4l\DDD4DDDDDDDDd8XXXXXX|X|X|X|XD8D8D8D8ddddddddddXdbdddpdXXXXXlX~|X|X|X|XdddldldD8DdDDDdplld|8|P|D|D|8dvddddDDDpLpLpLpl|T|8|\ddddddl|X|X|Xd|DdpL|Dd~4ddC$CWxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNHxxH\dDXddddd8@d<@d<DDXXdDDxddzHxxHvppDXd<"dxtldpxxdЊHPLAS4SI.PRSXj\  P6G;\F WXP2 #|x*CourierCourier BoldS]MCHPIII.PRSx6X@8;,\,f dtX@Њ2 N:XJCourier 10cpiCourier 10cpi (Bold)CG Times (Scalable)Courier 10cpi (Italic)<?xxx,x6X@`7X@?xxx,x `7X9p?rRBp RRFr RIp R4Mp RPr RTRWpRZ\bvh>nty "m+O6^$(8<><q*"xxxxWWxxxWWkkxxx@ ?! ԍ` ` See NCTA Comments at 18.K Even if a cable operator competes with the OVS operator for subscribers, it will not compete for independent video programming providers. Even as a new entrant, the OVS operator will be dominant as to independent video programming providers, because there are no incumbent alternatives. $>0*((ԌThus, it would be absurd to adopt a rule presuming that OVS  ? carriage rates were reasonable,D? ? ԍ` ` US West Comments at 6.D when the Commission has no reason whatsoever to suppose that this would be true. In the absence of actual, robust competition, the Commission has only one alternative if it does not with to undertake a costofservice analysis of OVS: an objective criterion such as our proposed yardstick " actual carriage of independent video programming providers " provides the only plausible basis for  ? even tentatively concluding that rates are reasonable.@ X ?h ԍ` ` NYNEX approaches this criterion when it invites the Commission "to gauge whether an OVS operator's rates effectively preclude" access by independent video programming providers. NYNEX Comments at 23 (emphasis added). NYNEX, however, fails to draw the logical conclusion that the Commission's rules should incorporate a criterion based on actual results. Id. at 24. Such a realworld test is the Commission's only alternative to the fullscale tariffstyle analysis that the Commission, and the LECs,  ?0 wish to avoid.QA0 ? ԍ` ` NCTA, curiously, seems to suggest that the cable rate regulation model might be used. NCTA Comments at 18. It suffices at this point to note that there is no set of competitive OVS carriage contracts now in place from which a cablelike benchmark could even in principle be extracted.Q   ? ` `  3. OVS rules must require public disclosure of  ?P carriage rates and arrangements. (# In protesting against public disclosure of carriage contracts, the LECs again systematically confuse independent video programming providers' contracts with the OVS operator's contracts for the programming that the OVS operator itself% A0*((  ? selects and provides over the system.B  ?X ԍ` ` See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Comments at 23 (the "minor exception of leased access" is precisely the one case roughly analogous to OVS carriage); USTA Comments at 1213, 16; US West Comments at 7; NYNEX, 13. It is the latter, not the former, that could be compared with existing cable  ?  programming contracts.yC  ?` ԍ` ` Cf. Comments of Viacom, Inc. at 14 (April 1, 1996) ("Viacom Comments") (recognizing that programming contracts are distinct from carriage contracts). It should also be noted that even cable programming contracts are subject to disclosure where this is required by the public interest. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. 76.938.y Some LECs argue that disclosure of carriage contracts could  ?@ cause competitive harm.RD@(  ? ԍ` ` See, e.g., USTA Comments at 16.R Again, such an objection confuses the relevant markets, since the OVS operator has no competitor for carriage contracts. Moreover, there will be no competitive disadvantage as long as all OVS operators are subject to the same requirement.  ?  IV.XOPEN VIDEO SYSTEMS MUST MEET (#  ?h LOCAL COMMUNITY NEEDS AND INTERESTS.MEET COMMUNITY NEEDS    ? ` `  1. OVS Operators Must Meet Locally Established PEG  ? Requirements. (# Bell Atlantic et al. suggest that the Act gives the Commission "great latitude" to keep OVS operators from having to comply with local public, educational, and governmental ("PEG") requirements. This is nothing more than wishful thinking by the LECs. The language of the Act is specific: an OVS operator'sX& D0*(( PEG obligations shall be "no greater or lesser" than those  ? contained in the PEG provision of the Cable Act (Section 611).}E ? ԍ` ` 1996 Act, section 302 (adding new 47 U.S.C. 573(c)(2)(A)) (emphasis added).}  ?  NYNEX, to its credit, seems to admit as much.FX   ? ԍ` ` NYNEX Comments at 17. The issue of how those obligations should be met, id., has been addressed in our initial comments. Thus, as indicated in our initial comments, a "match or negotiate" option should be made available to OVS operators. It must be kept in mind that PEG requirements are  ?` established by localities "to meet critical localism goals."HG` @ ?0 ԍ` ` Cablevision Comments at 21.H These goals were recognized by Congress in the Cable Act. As NCTA points out, "[t]he local franchising authority is the governmental entity best positioned to appreciate community needs and most experienced in the implementation of PEG access  ?0 rules."AH0 ? ԍ` ` NCTA Comments at 34.A   ? ` `  2. An OVS operator's PEG obligations extend to channel capacity, services, facilities, and  ? equipment. (# NYNEX suggests that an OVS operator could be exempted from the full PEG obligations of a competing cable operator by limiting those obligations to channel capacity alone, and not to the facilities, services, and equipment that are crucial to PEG  ? operations.GI`  ?' ԍ` ` NYNEX Comments at 17 n.42.G Such an exemption obviously would defeat the' I0*(( purposes of the statutory provision " to equalize the benefits provided to communities by cable and OVS operators and the burdens such competing operators assume in partial compensation for their use of the public rightsofway. Moreover, it would ignore the fact that the various kinds of PEG support negotiated in cable franchises, such as feeder links upstream to the headend, program production assistance, and video equipment, are essential if a community is to make effective use of PEG channel capacity. But in addition, NYNEX's contention is not supported by the language of the Act. The OVS provision requires an OVS operator to fulfill the obligations of section 611 (47 U.S.C. 531), without restriction. Those obligations include the franchise provisions regarding services, facilities, and equipment for PEG use that are incorporated by way of subsection 611(c), in addition to the channel capacity discussed in subsection 611(a). If Congress had intended the OVS operator to match only the obligations of subsection 611(a), it could have specified that subsection, as it did in the preceding subparagraph with section 623(f). Thus, Congress clearly intended to place the OVS operator on a par with the cable operator as to the entire set of PEG obligations embodied in Section 611, not merely channel capacity under 611(a). If an OVS operator were exempted from other types of PEG obligations, its obligations would be "lesser"#(I0*(( in comparison to those of the cable operator. Such a result is  ? forbidden by subsection (c)(2)(A) of the OVS provision.}J ? ԍ` ` We endorse the reply comments of the Alliance for Community Media on this issue.}   ? ` `  3. Local PEG channels must be available to all  ? subscribers by individual franchise area. (# Bell Atlantic et al. advance in their comments a proposal for "generic PEG" without reference to specific local needs and interests. This proposal has already been refuted in our initial  ? comments.uK  ? ԍ` ` See Bell Atlantic Comments at 27; Comments of NLC et al. at 3941.u Similarly, NYNEX suggests that where there is no cable operator, the Commission should arbitrarily assign "a  ? reasonable amount of capacity" for PEG purposes.BLx ? ԍ` ` NYNEX Comments at 17.B As indicated in our initial comments, however, only the local community can determine what PEG requirements are reasonable for that locality. US West alleges technical problems in connection with the delivery of PEG channels to specific franchise areas within an  ? OVS operator's system.sM ?x ԍ` ` US West Comments at 18. See also Bell Atlantic Comments at 27.s As pointed out in our initial comments,  ?p however, this claim is specious.NXp`  ?`" ԍ` ` NLC et al. comments at 4041. See also Time Warner Comments at 25; Cablevision Comments at 22 (cable operators already meet these requirements). But we welcome the opportunity apparently suggested by US West to "work out) N0*(( solutions on a systembysystem basis in cooperation with local  ? franchising authorities."O  ? ԍ` ` US West Comments at 18. In addition, we endorse the suggestion of Time Warner Cable that the Commission adopt a rule prohibiting "redlining" by OVS operators. Time Warner Comments at 2526.   ? ` `  4. An OVS operator's PEG obligations must develop  ? with those of competing cable operators. (# NYNEX seeks to avoid the obligation to update an OVS operator's PEG requirements to parallel the changing obligations  ?` of competing cable systems.GP`  ? ԍ` ` NYNEX Comments at 17 n.43.G NYNEX suggests no rationale, however, as to why the Commission can or should override the Act in this respect. The statutory requirement that the OVS operator's obligations be "no greater or lesser" than the cable operator's has no time limit. Congress was certainly aware that PEG requirements change over time, given the renewal provisions of the Cable Act. Had Congress wished to enact NYNEX's rule, the statute would read "initially no greater or lesser." Since it does not, the OVS operator's obligation must be a continuing one.   ?8  V.XCABLE OPERATORS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO BECOME OVS OPERATORS, BUT IF THEY ARE, SEPARATE AND PRIOR LOCAL  ? APPROVAL WILL BE NECESSARY. (#   ?   A.` ` A Cable Operator Cannot Be An OVS Operator. CABLE BECOMING OVS(#` Both LECs and cable operators appear generally to believe that the Commission could allow cable operators to become OVS operators. When tested against the statutory, contractual, and *@P0*(( policyrelated issues raised in our initial comments, however,  ? these arguments fail.5Q ? ԍ` ` See Comments of NLC et al. at 4650; Comments of the Electronic Industries Association, Consumer Electronics Manufacturers Association, and Consumer Electronics Retailers Coalition at 69 (April 1, 1996); Comments of Tandy Corporation at 24 (April 1, 1996).5  ?   (1) Statutory language. The OVS provision not only uses different language " a LEC may "provide cable service" over an OVS, but a cable operator, like any other person, may only "provide video programming" " but goes to the trouble of constructing two separate sentences to describe the respective roles of (a) the LEC and (b) everyone else. The only plausible reason for this distinction is that only a LEC, not a cable  ? operator or any other person, may be an OVS operator.IRx ? ԍ` ` As noted in our initial comments at 4748, cable operators were mentioned specifically as video programming providers because of earlier disputes regarding whether cable operators could lease capacity on video dialtone systems. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Comments at 1516.I In fact, the statutory language distinction between LECs, on the one hand, and cable operators and any other person, on the other hand, dooms any suggestion that anyone other than a LEC may be an OVS operator. By stating that LECs may "provide cable service" over an OVS, while cable operators and others may provide only "video programming" over an OVS, Congress recognized that the combination of distribution facilities ownership and providing video programming was "provid[ing] cable service," while providing "video programming" on distribution facilities +( R0*((  ? owned by someone else (the LEC) was not.S  ?X ԍ` ` Thus, "cable service" is also defined to include subscriber interaction to select or use video programming, where such interaction is with the facilities operator, not the ultimate program provider. This construction is confirmed by the fact that Congress had to specifically exempt OVS operators from certain provisions of Title VI. Such an exception would be unnecessary, of course, if owning distribution facilities and providing video programming did not transform an OVS operator into a cable operator fully subject to Title VI, but for the exceptions in the OVS provision. What this means is that only LECs can provide "cable service" " i.e., own the facilities and provide video programming " over an OVS. Cable operators " and any other persons " may not provide "cable service" over an OVS, because they may not own an  ?0 OVS distribution system or be an OVS operator.T 0 ?p ԍ` ` For this reason, Congress uses "video programming" to describe an OVS operator's offering at a point before the LEC has elected whether to use OVS, as in 47 U.S.C. 571(a)(4) and 571(a)(3) (discussing the process of election itself). Similarly, Congress uses "video programming" rather than "cable service" in general descriptions of service that may be provided either by the OVS operator (cable service) or by other parties through the OVS system (as in 47 U.S.C. 573(b)). In effect, the attempts in ACE Comments at 2224, and TCI Comments at 23, to conflate the language in several statutory provisions fail because "video programming" is a broader term than "cable service" (as is briefly acknowledged in ACE Comments at 24 n.44). In any case, the conscious use of differing language in parallel sentences in the eligibility section of the OVS provision is clearly more significant for defining who is eligible to be an OVS operator than is any usage elsewhere.  ?  (2) Contractual issues. A cable operator is contractually bound by its franchise agreement to provide cable service over a cable system. If such a cable operator sought to convert its,T0*(( cable system to an OVS (as distinct from offering the same programming over a competing OVS), it would lose all right to be in the public rightsofway. It would also deprive the local government of its contractual rights under the franchise, creating a takings claim against the Commission if such an action  ? were taken under color of Commission rules.U@ ?( ԍ` ` Comments of NLC et al. at 4950. Viacom points out that "[a] cable operator that chooses to transform its service to OVS should not, of course, be permitted to use that change to abrogate its existing contracts with any of its programmers." Viacom Comments at 7 n.12. Viacom appears to forget that for the same reason a cable operator also cannot, of course, be permitted to abrogate its contract with the local franchising authority.  ?`  (3) Policy rationale. As pointed out in our initial comments, Congress introduced OVS to provide an additional mode through which LECs could enter the video market to compete with established cable operators. This rationale, of course, does not apply at all to cable operators. On the contrary, the conversion of a cable system into an OVS would leave the community still with a single, monopolistic distribution facility, and no new channel capacity, yet deprived of all of the protections afforded  ? by Title VI..V ?@ ԍ` ` It is clear from the comments that cable operators do not contemplate building new OVS systems if they are allowed to choose that option, but rather simply relabelling their existing cable systems as OVS. See, e.g., ACE Comments at 4; Comments of Cox Communications, Inc. at 4 n.4 (April 1, 1996); Comments, Comcast Cable Communications Inc., at 2; Viacom Comments at iv, 7 n.12. The single exception appears to be TCI, which refers to the possibility of a second open video platform. TCI Comments at 24..-V0*((ԌSome cable operators have suggested that they must be  ? allowed to become OVS operators under the First Amendment.nW ? ԍ` ` See, e.g., ACE Comments at 24; Cablevision Comments at 36. n Such a suggestion, however, reflects a fundamental confusion about the opposite case " the LECs' earlier challenges to the former telcocable crossownership ban. The telcocable ban prohibited LECs altogether from selecting programming on their own systems, leaving them no alternative means to transmit their own programming. Cable operators, however, hardly need to be OVS operators to transmit their own programming; they are already able to select essentially all the programming on their own systems. Thus, they would gain no advantage in terms of transmitting their own speech (speech they select) if they had been allowed to become OVS operators. To the contrary, properly construed, OVS would give cable operators less capacity to transmit their own programming. Moreover, as discussed above, the governmental interest in competition provides a rationale for restraining cable operators from being OVS operators that, once again, had no exact parallel in the telcocable cases. If the Commission were to conclude that a cable operator may become an OVS operator at all (with the consent of its contractual partner, the local franchising authority), a cable operator could only be permitted to do so in those telephone service areas where it is also a LEC. This follows from the fact that even traditional LECs may become OVS operators only in their#. W0*((  ? telephone service areas.tX ?X ԍ` ` See 1996 Act, section 302(a) (adding new 47 U.S.C. 573(a)(1)) ("A local exchange carrier may provide cable service to its cable service subscribers in its telephone service area through an open video system") (emphasis added). This limitation in turn flows from the fact that the Act established the four regulatory options for LECs in the course of removing the telcocable restriction and encouraging LECs to enter the video market within their service areas. LECs, of course, always had the option of being cable operators outside their telephone service areas.t It would make no sense for a cable operator to have a wider scope for OVS than the telephone companies for which OVS was designed.   ?x  B.` ` A Cable Operator May Provide Programming Through An OVS, But Only If Consistent With Its Cable Franchise  ? and the Public Interest. (#` The danger of collapsing potential competition into a new consolidated monopoly is reflected in LECs' arguments that they  ? should be able to refuse carriage to local cable operators.qY `  ? ԍ` ` See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Comments at 15; NYNEX Comments at 11.q None of the comments appear to address the concerns raised in our  ? initial comments.MZ  ?  ԍ` ` Comments of NLC et al. at 5152.M  ?  VI.XTHE OVS CERTIFICATION PROCESS MUST (# ENSURE THAT AN OVS COMPLIES WITH LOCAL  ? RIGHTS REGARDING THE PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY. RIGHT-OF-WAY SECTION   ?  A.` ` The Act Neither Preempts, Nor Authorizes the Commission To Preempt, State and Local Authority Over the Public  ?p RightsofWay. (#` Some LECs argue that the OVS provision somehow preempts state and local authority to manage and to receive fair/H Z0*((  ? compensation for the use of their public rightsofway.r[ ?X ԍ` ` See Bell Atlantic Comments at 45, 32; NYNEX Comments at 3032.r These arguments simply represent the highwater mark of the LECs' attempt unilaterally to expand their rights while evading the associated responsibilities. Not only do these arguments lack any support in the statute; in addition, their acceptance in Commission rules would trigger massive Fifth Amendment litigation, delaying the OVS experiment indefinitely for the sake of an essentially frivolous argument.   ?H  B.` ` The Act Does Not Expressly Preempt State and Local  ? RightofWay Authority. (#` Neither Title VI, nor the new OVS provision, makes any reference to preempting any state or local requirement to obtain a franchise or similar authorization to use local public property  ?P not belonging to the federal government.\P  ? ԍ` ` See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 97 S. Ct. 1305 (1977) (Congress must clearly authorize express preemption). Rather, Title VI merely adds a federal law franchising requirement; it does not take any franchising requirement away. The OVS provision simply exempts OVS operators from that federal requirement. The OVS statutory provisions work within federal law alone; they contain no reference to rightofway authority under state or local law. Section 573(c) merely exempts an OVS from parts of Title VI (itself only a federal law requirement), substituting the new federal regulations now under consideration. But exempting OVS from the federal requirement for a local cable`"0x\0*(( franchise in Title VI has no effect whatsoever on any state or local requirement for rightofway authorization. The distinction between the federal law and the parallel state or local law may be illustrated by analogy. There is no question that the Commission has plenary authority over interstate communications by wire under Title II, and over broadcasting under Title III. Yet no one could seriously claim that a Section 214 authorization granted by the Commission, or a Title III broadcast license issued by the Commission, preemptively entitles the holder to install facilities on property that does not belong to it. The OVS provisions are certainly no more preemptive than Title II or III. On the contrary, in the case of OVS, Congress has made clear that its intent is not to preempt local authority with respect to management of the rightsofway. The legislative history of the OVS provision states: XThe conferees intend that an operator of an open video system under this part shall be subject, to the extent permissible under state and local law, to the authority of the local government to manage its public rightsofway in a nondiscriminatory and competitively neutral  ? manner.a] ?@ ԍ` ` H.R. Rep. No. 458, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1996).a  Thus, no express preemption may be alleged.   ?  C.` ` The Act Does Not Impliedly Preempt State and Local  ?! RightofWay Authority. (#` Sensing that Congress did not expressly preempt state and local rightofway authority over OVS, the LECs try to argue that$1X]0*(( preemption is implied. Such implied preemption could occur in only two ways: either by actual conflict between federal and  ?  state or local law,^  ?x ԍ` ` See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 2700 (1984). or by an expression of congressional intent  ? to preempt an entire field of regulation._  ?` ԍ` ` See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1146 (1947). Neither is applicable here.   ? ` `  1. The OVS provision is not inconsistent with state  ?` or local law. (# The LECs present no argument suggesting that it would be impossible for them to comply with both federal and state or local requirements, and thus that an actual conflict exists. Certainly LECs would prefer not to have to comply with both requirements, but that is no basis for preemption. In fact the two levels of law here are complementary, not contradictory. Federal licensing of an entity to provide an interstate communications service is entirely consistent with state or local authorization to use and occupy the public rightsofway. Just as federal OVS licensing does not excuse a LEC from having to obtain office space or purchase equipment for its system, so it does not excuse the LEC from having to lease the public rightsofway it wishes to use. In order for the LECs to have a viable claim of impossibility, the FCC would have to point to a specific local requirement that makes compliance with OVS statutory requirements`"2x_0*((  ? or Commission regulation an impossibility.C` ?X ԍ` ` See Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1218 (1963). Cf. NARUC v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (FCC may preempt state regulation only to the extent it thwarts achievement of valid federal policy).C They have presented  ? no such claim.ax ? ԍ` ` For the same reason, the LECs cannot argue that local authority should be preempted in accordance with the preemption test of Hines v. Davidowitz, which permits preemption of state law that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404 (1941)). Indeed, other than their preference to avoid local requirements, LECs present no evidence that meeting local requirements would stand as an obstacle to OVS. If it did, LECs could always seek solace in the barriertoentry provision in the new Act. (codified at new 47 U.S.C. 253).   ? ` `  2. The OVS provision does not purport to occupy an  ? entire field of regulation. (# NYNEX argues that the OVS provision preempts the field of regulation " in other words, Congress legislated in an area "comprehensively with an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation and has left no room for States to supplement federal  ? law."b  ? ԍ` ` Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 234, 67 S.Ct 1146, 1154 (1947). NYNEX's "preempt the field" argument is misguided. As an initial matter, no such regulatory intent to exclude all state regulation is evident in Section 573. On the contrary, as noted above, the legislative history makes clear that Congress expected state and local governments to retain a role with respect to OVS. P30b0*(( Thus, Congress cannot have intended to "occupy the field" of all OVS regulation. More fundamentally, even if Congress did intend to preempt the field of OVS with respect to service and rate regulation, that says nothing about local governments' property rights. No "preempt the field" precedent of which we are aware has construed the doctrine to sanction a Fifth Amendment taking of property. The "preempt the field" doctrine simply cannot be transformed into a power to appropriate the fields " i.e., to appropriate local streets and rightsofway that do not belong to the federal government.   ? ` `  3. The OVS provision may not be interpreted in such a  ? way as to require a taking. (# For the reasons discussed in our opening comments, the OVS provision specifically cannot be read to preempt state or local  ?p rightofway authority, for constitutional reasons.Wcp ? ԍ` ` See Comments of NLC et al. at 5260.W Since the OVS provision contains no specific intent to carry out a taking and contains no mechanism to award just compensation, it cannot be construed to sanction such a taking.   ?x  D.` ` The LECs Present No Sound Policy Reason Favoring  ?@ Preemption and the Resulting Taking. (#` The sole reason the LECs offer for preempting state and local authority is that such preemption is the only regulatory  ?# benefit an OVS operator would gain.[d#X ?' ԍ` ` See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Comments at 32.[ As noted above, that is#4d0*((  ? not true.ne ?X ԍ` ` See p. #REGULATORY BENEFITS FOR OVS12# supra.n If the LECs believe that Congress should have provided even more incentives, that belief does not authorize the Commission to override the statutory mandate. Even if LECs were correct in suggesting that OVS could not succeed without (in effect) a subsidy in the form of free use of state and local rightsofway, that particular property does not belong to Congress or the Commission to give away. If the LECs are determined to seek a federal subsidy to encourage them to adopt OVS, they should seek it openly from the federal budget, not by unfunded mandate. The LECs' attempt to promote a taking of state and local property under the OVS provision, if successful, would not "forestall future disputes and litigation,"  ? as NYNEX suggests.BfX ? ԍ` ` NYNEX Comments at 31.B Rather, such an attempt would provoke such disputes and litigation " litigation that would unnecessarily delay the opportunity to test OVS in the market, as Congress intended.   ?  VII.XCONCLUSION (# The comments submitted on the NPRM leave unaffected the key conclusions reached in our initial comments. In accordance with those comments, we propose the attached draft OVS rules in@5f0*(( response to the Commission's request for proposed rules to assist Xit in crafting effective OVS regulations. ` `  Respectfully submitted, XX` ` X XTHE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES; THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS; THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES; THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICERS AND ADVISORS; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND; THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; THE CITY OF CHILLICOTHE, OHIO; THE CITY OF DEARBORN, MICHIGAN; THE CITY OF DUBUQUE, IOWA; THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI; THE CITY OF SANTA CLARA, CALIFORNIA; AND THE CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA(# ` `  By ` `  Nicholas P. Miller XX` ` X XTillman L. Lay(# XX` ` X XFrederick E. Ellrod III(# ` `  Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C ` `  1225 19th Street, N.W. ` `  Suite 400 ` `  Washington, D.C. 20036 ` `  (202) 7850600 ` `  Their Attorneys April 11, 1996  VC  WAFS1\44407.1\10425700010X