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F  ` The Commission can and should permit operators to refuse carriage to operators of cable systems in the open video systems service area. In view of Congress intent that open video systems introduce vigorous competition in entertainment and information markets, footnote ref? Xx6X@? с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ #footnote tex# footnote refۍ# footnote ref# Conference Report at 178.? the Commission should presume conclusively that such refusals are reasonable. Otherwise, incumbent cable operators will be able to interfere with the successful operation of competing open video systems.  ` One of the Joint Parties, BellSouth, has direct experience with such interference. The incumbent cable operator in BellSouths video dialtone trial area requested half of the systems analog channels and a substantial number of digital channels. Even though that operator was allocated a smaller number of analog channels, its presence as an enrolled programmer during preparation for the trial has greatly increased the difficulty of creating and maintaining a coalition of enrolled programmers for development of a competitive retail offering. Moreover, its participation has greatly complicated the provision of competitively sensitive, but essential, information to other enrolled programmers.  `   3. Capacity Measurement" Xx6X@@ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PAQ  Í # footnote ref# Notice  1619. "  ` The Notice correctly observes that measuring the capacity of an open video system may not be entirely clear in all cases.  footnote ref Xx6X@B с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PCQ э# footnote ref# Id.  17.  The advent and continuing development of digital technologies make it impossible to prescribe a specific way to measure digital capacity that will be appropriate for all systems. The suggestion that capacity be measured based solely on the systems total bandwidth is contrary to Section 653(b)(1)(B), which refers to channel capacity, activated channel capacity, and number of channels. The Commission should simply adopt the rule required by Section 653(b)(1)(B) without elaboration. Operators will be required to determine how to comply based on the characteristics of their systems. If those determinations are challenged, the Commission should approve any approach that reasonably reflects the technical characteristics of the system.  ` The Commissions tentative conclusion that the capacity of switched digital systems can be presumed to be unlimited is a good working hypothesis, but it must be tempered by a recognition that infinite expansion of such systems may not be economically reasonable or technologically feasible. footnote ref Xx6X@D с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PEQ э# footnote ref# Id.  18.  In any event, there is too much potential for variation among switched digital systems for the Commission to adopt specific rules for the measurement of such capacity.  ` While the Notice correctly reaches the tentative conclusion that PEG channels and mustcarry channels footnote ref Xx6X@F с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PGQ э# footnote ref# For this purpose, mustcarry channels should include all channels eligible for mandatory carriage, even if the broadcasters elect retransmission consent instead. Likewise, any channels that are shared should not be counted in the operators onethird. should not be counted as part of the operators onethird, footnote ref Xx6X@H с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ` hp x (# #footnote tex# footnote refۍ# footnote ref# Notice  19. it incorrectly proposes to deduct those channels from the total prior to calculating the operators onethird. This approach violates Section 653, which unambiguously bases the operators onethird on the activated channel capacity. Title VI defines activated channels as those channels engineered at the head end of a cable system for the provision of services generally available to residential subscribers of the cable system, regardless of whether such services actually are provided, including any channel designated for public, educational, or governmental use .   Xx6X@I с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ` hp x (# #footnote tex# footnote refۍ# footnote ref# 47 U.S.C.  602(1) (Emphasis added). Although this definition is expressed in terms of cable systems, there is no reason to believe that Congress intended any different meaning for open video systems. Section 653 does not authorize the Commission to deduct any activated channels for purposes of calculating the operators onethird. ! Xx6X@J с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ` hp x (# #footnote tex# footnote refۍ# footnote ref# For example, if a system had 300 activated channels and a requirement for 30 PEG, mustcarry, and shared channels, the operator could select programming on at least 100 channels, and 170 would be available for the selection of programming by other video programming providers.   `   4. Minimum/Maximum Capacity Limits" Xx6X@K с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PLQ  Í # footnote ref# Notice  20.   ` Congress intended that open video system operators be restricted to selecting the programming on no less than onethird of the activated channels if demand exceeds capacity. Nothing in the 1996 Act, however, can be interpreted to restrict the open video system operator to onethird of the capacity if demand is insufficient to fill existing or anticipated capacity.  ` In addition, no individual unaffiliated video programming provider should be allowed to select the programming on more channels than the open video system operator and its affiliates. For example, where the open video system operator and only one unaffiliated video programming provider seek carriage, the open video system operator should be restricted to control of the programming on no fewer channels than the unaffiliated video programming provider.  `   5. Analog/Digital Channel Allocation footnote ref# Xx6X@M с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PNQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  21.  ` The absolute necessity of competing effectively against incumbent cable operators demands that open video system operators be permitted to assign programming to analog or digital channels as they deem necessary to provide marketable, competitive programming packages. An operators decisions regarding channel assignment should be considered unjust or unreasonable only if a complainant makes the prima facie discrimination showing set forth above and the operator cannot rebut that showing. Operators must be given flexibility to select their channels from the total base of channels to the extent necessary to provide programming packages that can compete with those offered by incumbent cable operators.  ` To afford the essential business flexibility described in the foregoing paragraphs, the Commissions rules or its interpretation of its rules should, when demand exceeds capacity, permit operators to select programming for any onethird of the activated channels to the extent necessary to compete effectively with incumbent cable operators. Congress did not distinguish between analog and digital channels for this purpose. Neither should the Commission.  `   6. Channel Positioning footnote ref$ Xx6X@O с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PPQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  22.   ` Operators must be permitted to assign channel positions as necessary to meet consumers expectations and facilitate the marketing of competitive packages, as well as to meet channel positioning requirements for mustcarry stations, satisfy the varied requirements of video programming providers, and deal with technological limitations. An operators decisions regarding channel position should be considered unjust or unreasonable only if a complainant makes the prima facie discrimination showing set forth above and the operator cannot rebut that showing.  `   7. Changes In Demand/Capacity footnote ref% Xx6X@Q с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PRQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  2526.   ` Operators must be permitted to handle changes in demand after the initial assignment of a systems capacity in a manner that does not disrupt service. The Commission should not prescribe any specific approach, but should permit operators to accommodate such changes in any reasonable manner. If excess demand materializes, an operator should be given a reasonable period of time to accommodate the demand. For example, if carriage is offered on fixed duration contracts (e.g., 5 years), then a reasonable period of time would be until the next anniversary of those contracts. Otherwise, prospective operators will not be assured of being able to meet customers expectations of reasonably stable programming packages.  ` The Commission should not prescribe specific procedures for the assignment of added or newly available capacity. Such procedures should be left in the first instance to the business judgment of the operator exercised in light of Section 653s prohibition of unreasonable discrimination.  `   8. Marketing Programming Selected By Others footnote ref& Xx6X@S с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PTQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  27.   ` The Commission correctly concludes that Section 653(b)(1)(B) permits operators to market directly to customers any or all of the programming selected by unaffiliated video programming providers. As noted previously, Congress focused on enabling open video systems to compete effectively with incumbent cable operators and accordingly stated its intent not to limit the number of channels of programming an operator may offer to provide to customers. This freedom to market packages of programming including programming selected by others will help to make open video systems competitively viable.  ` B. Rates, Terms and Conditions of Carriage footnote ref' Xx6X@U с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PVQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  2834.   ` That open video systems are not to be regulated as common carrier services means, among other things, that the Commission is precluded from using Title IIlike regulations to enforce the requirement that prices, terms, and conditions for carriage be just and reasonable. Thus, the Commission can neither require the filing of tariffs or the comparable publication of contracts with video programming providers nor promulgate detailed rules governing pricing.  ` The Joint Parties strongly oppose any requirement that they be required to make their contracts public. Such a requirement would amount to a backdoor imposition of Title IIlike public tariff requirements on open video system operators. This tentative conclusion is inconsistent with the 1996 Acts requirement that open video system operators as new entrants be subject to lesser regulatory burdens than incumbent cable operators, and it directly contradicts repeated Commission findings that public rate filings in competitive markets lead to price coordination and are not in the public interest. footnote ref( Xx6X@W с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PXQ э# footnote ref# Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC 96123), Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, CC Docket No. 9661, released March 25, 1996,  34. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 9661, the Commission has tentatively concluded that tariff filings for nondominant interexchange carriers (including AT&T) are not necessary to ensure that charges and practices of those carriers are just, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory. footnote ref) Xx6X@Y с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PZQ э# footnote ref# Id.  28. That notice also restates the Commissions earlier finding that firms lacking market power simply cannot rationally price their services in ways which, or impose terms and conditions which, contravene Sections 201(b) and 202(a) of the Act. footnote ref* Xx6X@[ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ` hp x (# #footnote tex# footnote refۍ# footnote ref# See First Report and Order (FCC 80269), in the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefore, CC Docket No. 79252, 85 FCC2d 1 (1980)  Qpt\Q & J2P]Q 88. Similarly, competitive market forces will operate to ensure reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for carriage on open video systems.  ` Moreover, with the minor exception of leased access, incumbent cable operators have no obligation to disclose their contracts. Also, upon a local exchange carriers deployment of an open video system in an area, the incumbent cable operator will no longer be required to file upper tier programming contracts with the Commission. Even now, those contracts are not publicly disclosed. Under these circumstances, the mere suggestion of a contract disclosure requirement for new market entrants is nothing short of astounding. Such disclosure would serve only to position open video system operators rates as an umbrella for their competitors.  ` No rule is needed in this area beyond the requirement stated in Section 653. The Commission should, however, provide guidance in notes regarding the approach it will take in complaint proceedings. Such notes should indicate that open video system operators will be permitted to place reasonable conditions on video programming providers seeking channels on the system (including, but not limited to, requirements that providers have legal access to programming, meet the systems technical standards, and meet the systems service schedule; requirements regarding scrambling or blocking of obscene or indecent programming; indemnification of the operator for copyright and intellectual property claims as to carried content; deposits; and minimum contract periods). The Commission should make it clear that operators are required to deal only with parties that have contractual access to programming and that operators have no obligation to accommodate a mere request for capacity. Otherwise, capacity on systems could be warehoused and held for speculation by parties that have no prospect of using it to deliver programming. Finally, the notes should establish a preference for voluntarily negotiated arrangements with video programming providers. All such arrangements with unaffiliated parties should be presumed just and reasonable regardless of how they may differ from one another.  `  C. Channel Sharing"+ Xx6X@^ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2P_Q  Í # footnote ref# Notice  3541. "  ` The Commissions conclusion that channel sharing decisions should be left to the discretion of open video system operators is the only correct reading of Section 653. footnote ref , Xx6X@` с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ J2PaQ Í Id.  37.  Operators will require sharing only when doing so makes good business sense from both technical and market perspectives. Thus, the Commission should adopt only a rule that permits channel sharing in the broad terms of the statute. More detailed rules cannot possibly reflect the variety of circumstances in which operators may elect to require channel sharing or the variety of ways in which they may provide subscribers with ready and immediate access to shared channels. The questions raised by the Notice cannot be addressed adequately without reference to the particular facts of particular systems. footnote ref- Xx6X@b с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PcQ э# footnote ref# As previously stated, shared channels should not be counted as channels selected by the operator for purposes of determining whether the operator has selected programming on more than onethird of the activated channel capacity.    ` D. Sports Exclusivity, Network NonDuplication and Syndicated  `   Exclusivity footnote ref!. Xx6X@d с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PeQ  Í # footnote ref# Notice  4246.!  `   ` In general, there is no reason for these rules to be applied to open video systems that cross multiple communities any differently than they are applied to cable systems that cross multiple communities. The primary difference between cable systems and open video systems that these rules should reflect is that multiple parties will be responsible for selection of programming on open video systems. The video programming provider responsible for selecting programming, not the open video system operator, should be held legally responsible for compliance with these rules as to that programming, including the responsibility to indemnify the operator if the video programming providers failure to comply causes loss to the operator. Open video system operators and video programming providers should be permitted to handle the details of such compliance in their contracts.  ` E. Information Provided to Subscribers footnote ref/ Xx6X@f с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PgQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  4751.   ` The Commission should minimize its regulations by adopting a rule that merely restates this requirement as expressed in Section 653, with one exception: The Commission should clarify that this requirement applies only to information provided to all subscribers over the system itself and does not apply to information provided over or in connection with the channels over which the operator, its affiliates, or other video programming providers have exclusive editorial control. Operators should be free to determine how best to comply with this requirement on each system. The potential variety in legitimate approaches to system navigation, menus, the provision of programming information, and other matters related to program selection, to the extent the operator chooses to make them available, makes any other approach unworkable.  ` F.   Applicability of Certain Title VI Provisions footnote ref0 Xx6X@h с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PiQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  5262.   `   1. Public, Educational, And Governmental Access footnote ref1 Xx6X@j с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PkQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  5758.   F Đ ` Section 653(c)(2)(A) gives the Commission great latitude to fashion an approach to PEG access on open video systems that keeps operators free from local franchise regulation as Congress intended. To ensure such freedom, the Commission must affirm that operators are not required to negotiate PEG access or related matters with state or local authorities and must not tie operators duties directly to regulation of individual cable operators. footnote ref2 Xx6X@l с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PmQ э# footnote ref# The Joint Parties do not mean by this proposal or their proposal regarding compliance with mustcarry requirements to suggest that they do not share the cable industrys First Amendment objections to those requirements. Instead, the Commission must prescribe regulations that to the extent possible impose obligations that are no greater or lesser than the obligations of cable operators. In that regard, Section 611 requires only that channel capacity be made available for PEG access. Therefore, the Commissions objective should be to ensure that open video system operators provide PEG access that is comparable to that generally in use in the open video system service area, not to mirror requirements imposed by individual franchising authorities on specific cable operators. Moreover, because open video systems will likely cross multiple franchise boundaries and serve portions of numerous franchise areas, each open video system operator must have the flexibility to determine based on technical considerations and market conditions the manner of meeting PEG access requirements.  ` The Commissions general approach to regulating PEG access should be like that which the Joint Parties have urged for other open video system requirements: Adopt a general rule that requires operators to provide PEG access that overall is comparable to that generally in use in the open video system service area and resolve specific issues in the dispute resolution process.  ` Such an approach would permit operators to satisfy Section 653s PEG access requirement by any reasonable means, including, but not limited to, retransmission of incumbent cable operators PEG feeds or timesharing of channels by PEG entities. It also would permit operators to satisfy PEG access requirements by making capacity available to carry the average amount of PEG programming carried by cable operators in the service area. This approach would give operators a reasonable time to reflect changes in the PEG access provided generally in open video system service areas.  ` Open video system operators should not be required to dedicate entire channels to individual PEG entities. They should be permitted to make PEG access available to qualified users on a firstcomefirstserved basis, by lottery, or any other reasonable mechanism. PEG programmers must be responsible for making their programming feed available for delivery to the open video system headend.  `   2.  Must Carry And Retransmission Consent footnote ref3 Xx6X@n с  ` hp x (# footnote ref J2PoQ  Í # footnote ref# Notice  5960.  XX2PpQ   ` In general, mustcarry and retransmission consent rules should apply to open video systems in the same way they apply to cable systems. In order for open video systems to be competitively viable, the Commission should require broadcasters to offer consent for retransmission of their signals by open video system operators or their affiliates on the same terms and conditions as such signals are made available for retransmission by cable operators.  `   3. Program Access  footnote ref]4 Xx6X@q с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PrQ э# footnote ref# Id.  QptsQ & J2PtQ  61. ]  ` At a minimum, the program access rules for open video system providers should be equivalent to those for the cable industry, so that open video systems have the opportunity to compete with incumbents on a level playing field.  ` G. NonLECs as Open Video System Operators footnote ref$5 Xx6X@u с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PvQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  6366.$ xA  ` As stated previously, it is extremely important, as a test of the reasonableness of the Commissions open video system rules and for the sake of competitive neutrality, to extend to other providers of cable service the option of providing open video systems. The Commission should provide cable operators a genuine opportunity to convert to open video systems and operate them under the same rules as common carriers open video systems. The ambiguity created by Section 653(a)(1)s use of the term cable service with respect to carriers and the term video programming with respect to others can be reasonably resolved in favor of extending the open video system option to all providers of cable service. An interpretation that limits cable operators and others to being video programming providers on open video systems operated by carriers would be inconsistent with the procompetitive intent of Section 653.  `  1.   Bundled packages footnote ref36 Xx6X@w с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PxQ  Í # footnote ref# Id.  QptyQ & J2PzQ 66. 3  ` The Notice correctly acknowledges the value that bundled packages of telephone services, cable services, and data transmission can bring to consumers. There is growing evidence that such packages will result from competition in communications markets. footnote refL7 Xx6X@{ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2P|Q э# footnote ref# For instance, AT&T recently announced that it will begin selling DIRECTV satellite entertainment service and DSS equipment to consumers. AT&T said it will, among other things, offer free payperview movies to customers that sign up for AT&T long distance service and DIRECTV. AT&T Press Release, March 25, 1996. L The Commission should expressly recognize that such packaging is in the public interest, but should not adopt rules. Rather, the Commission should eschew rules and let the market determine the manner and degree of service bundling options offered to customers. Competitive markets require regulatory forbearance.  `   2. Joint Marketing footnote reff8 Xx6X@} с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2P~Q  Í # footnote ref# Notice  QptQ & J2PQ  66 . f  `  The 1996 Act leaves the door wide open for the integrated provision of video programming and telephone services, including the joint marketing of such services. The 1996 Acts treatment of joint marketing of long distance and telephone services demonstrates that Congress was aware of joint marketing issues. footnote ref)9 Xx6X@ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PQ э# footnote ref# 1996 Act  271(e)(1) and 272(g). ) The 1996 Acts total silence on joint marketing of telephone and video programming services sends a strong message to the Commission: Do not interfere with the operation of the market.  ` H. Certification Process footnote ref!: Xx6X@ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PQ  Í # footnote ref# Notice  6770.!   ` The Commissions certification process must be streamlined if the Commission is to approve or disapprove certifications within 10 days, as the 1996 Act mandates. As proposed in the Appendix, the Commission should require only that a certificate provide information comparable to that required in registration certificates for new cable systems footnote refE; Xx6X@ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ #footnote tex# footnote refۍ# footnote ref# See 47 C.F.R.  76.12.E and state that the operator will comply with the Commissions rules. The certification process must not become an opportunity for competitors to delay entry.  ` Any requirement for precertification filings or compliance activity would clearly violate the congressional intent to provide for an expedited process that avoids the pitfalls of the Commissions video dialtone procedures. Further, precertification requirements could create the untenable situation in which an operator and its investors require the business certainty provided by certification before engaging in implementation activity but are required by the Commission to complete significant implementation before qualifying for certification.  ` There is no need for the Commission to take any action regarding cost allocation prior to certification or to impose cost allocation requirements as a condition for certification. The Commission already has rules in place in Part 64 that fully accommodate the joint provision of common carrier and noncommon carrier services. Common carriers must comply with Part 64 before providing video programming services on either an open video system or a cable system. The addition of a cost allocation requirement to the certification process would be redundant.  ` The Commission must state clearly what the effect of certification is. As previously stated, the only substantial incentive for establishing open video systems instead of cable systems is the ability to avoid local franchise negotiations and attendant local regulation. Therefore, the rules must clearly provide that local franchising authorities are not permitted to exercise any authority over establishment or operation of open video systems that would enable them to delay or impede market entry in any manner or otherwise burden the operation of open video systems. By not permitting state or local authorities to require franchises or otherwise regulate open video systems, Congress retained for itself and the Commission exclusive authority to regulate open video systems. The Commission, therefore, should preempt any state or local requirements that would burden or delay the deployment of or discriminate against open video systems. footnote reff< Xx6X@ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref` hp x (# J2PQ э# footnote ref# The need for such preemption to prevent state and local governments from frustrating the intent of Congress with respect to open video systems is comparable to that which justifies the Commissions preemption of local zoning regulation of satellite earth stations. See Report and Order (FCC 9678), IB Docket No. 9559, released March 11, 1996. f  ` I. Dispute Resolution footnote ref!= Xx6X@ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ footnote ref J2PQ  Í # footnote ref# Notice  7172.!  ` The Appendix proposes rules for dispute resolution. These rules are modeled after the Commissions rules for adjudicating disputes relating to program access. footnote refG> Xx6X@ с  ` hp x (#footnote texۂ #footnote tex# footnote refۍ# footnote ref# See 47 C.F.R.  76.1003.G This is the process by which the Commission should resolve specific issues regarding compliance with the rules. The rules should extend presumptions of lawfulness to operators and impose sufficient burdens of proof on complainants to discourage the filing of insubstantial complaints. This can be accomplished by adopting the notes proposed in the Appendix. Conclusion  ` The Commission has asked also how it can in this rulemaking advance Congress goal to encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability. The surest way for the Commission to further that goal is to adopt the flexible, procompetitive rules and the dispute resolution process that these comments have proposed. By making operation of open video systems a genuinely attractive alternative to operation of cable systems, the Commission can encourage the competitive entry and investment that local franchising processes often discourage. p x (#  (Respectfully submitted,  (  (BELL ATLANTIC TELEPHONE COMPANIES  (and BELL ATLANTIC VIDEO SERVICES  (COMPANY p2  ( -By their Attorney:  ( -________________________________  ( -Leslie A. Vial  ( -1320 North Court House Road  ( -Eighth Floor  ( -Arlington, VA 22201  ( -(703) 9742819  (BELLSOUTH CORPORATION and  (BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.  ( -By their Attorneys:  ( -________________________________  ( -Herschel L. Abbott, Jr.  ( -Michael A. Tanner  ( -Suite 4300  ( -675 West Peachtree St., N.E.  ( -Atlanta, GA 30375  ( -(404) 3350764 ((  ((  (GTE SERVICE CORPORATION and its affiliated domestic telephone operating companies and GTE MEDIA VENTURES, INC. (( -By their Attorneys: ((  ((  ((  (( -________________________________ (( -John F. Raposa, HQE03J27 (( -P. O. Box 152092 (( -Irving, TX 750152092 ((  (( -Gail L. Polivy (( -1850 M Street, N.W. (( -Suite 1200 (( -Washington, D.C. 20035 (( -(202) 4635214 ((  ((  ((  ((  ((  ((  ((  ((  ((  ((  (LINCOLN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY (( -By its Attorneys: ((  ((  ((  (( -________________________________ (( -Robert A. Mazer (( -Albert Shuldiner (( -Vinson & Elkins (( -1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. (( -Washington, D.C. 200041008 (( -(202) 6396500 ((  ((  ((  (PACIFIC BELL (( -By its Attorneys: (( - ((  ((  (( -________________________________ (( -Lucille M. Mates (( -Christopher L. Rasmussen (( -Sarah Rubenstein (( -140 New Montgomery Street (( -Room 1522A (( -San Francisco, CA 94105 (( -(415) 5427649 ((  (( -Margaret E. Garber (( -1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. (( -Washington, D.C. 20004 (( -(202) 3836472 ((  ((  ((  ((  ((  (SBC COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and ((  (SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY p2 (( -By their Attorneys: ((  ((  ((  (( -________________________________ (( -James D. Ellis (( -Robert M. Lynch (( -David F. Brown (( -175 E. Houston (( -Room 1254 (( -San Antonio, TX 78205 (( -(210) 3513478 ((  (( -Mary W. Marks (( -One Bell Center (( -Room 3558 (( -St. Louis, MO 63101 (( Date: April 1, 1996   Њ XZ2P pBX` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: