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If you need the complete document, download the WordPerfect version or Adobe Acrobat version, if available. ***************************************************************** Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of: ) ) Petition for Order to Show Cause ) CSC-379 Against Cox Communications, Inc. ) ) For Violations of the Tier Buy-through ) Provisions of the ) Cable Television Consumer ) Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Adopted: July 16, 1999 Released: July 19, 1999 By the Chief, Cable Services Bureau: I. INTRODUCTION 1. Lynn Putnam, Jerry Williams, and Raphael Levens, ("Petitioners") who purchase cable television service from Cox Communications San Diego ("Cox") have petitioned the Commission pursuant to 47 C.F.R. 76.9, to order Cox to show cause why it should not be found to have violated the tier buy-through prohibition of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("Cable Act") and the Commission's rules promulgated thereunder. Cox has filed an opposition to the Petition and Petitioners have filed a Reply. 2. The tier buy-through prohibition of the 1992 Cable Act generally prohibits cable operators from requiring subscribers to purchase a particular service tier, other than the basic service tier, in order to obtain access to video programming offered on a per-channel or per-program basis. An exception, effective through the year 2002, is made for cable operators that are not technically capable of complying with this requirement. II. LEGAL CONTEXT 3. The tiering of cable television programming services became commonplace in the late 1970s. Tiering involves the packaging and sale of channels of programming for separate or incremental charges. Cable systems that offer their services in tiers historically did so in a cumulative fashion, requiring subscribers to buy through successive intermediate tiers of services in order to subscribe to each higher tiered service or to a service offered on a per channel or per program basis. Cable operators generally control access to premium and pay-per-view services by using either addressable or non-addressable technology. Older systems generally use passive traps (frequency selective filters), nonaddressable set top or nonaddressable set top boxes or descramblers. These technologies require the installation and removal of physical devices (such as traps) at the subscriber's premises in order to add or delete channels or groups of channels. Newer cable systems using addressable technology have the capability to communicate electronically from their headends to those subscribers who have addressable equipment, such as addressable traps or set top boxes. Consequently, cable systems using addressable technology can rapidly make available different levels of cable services from their headends. Many cable systems employ a hybrid of addressable and nonaddressable technology. A. Statutory Language 4. Section 3 of the 1992 Cable Act added Section 623(b)(8) to the Communications Act of 1934, which provides as follows: (8) Buy-through of other tiers prohibited.-- (A) Prohibition.--A cable operator may not require the subscription to any tier other than the basic service tier [as defined in the statute] as a condition of access to video programming offered on a per channel or per program basis. A cable operator may not discriminate between subscribers to the basic service tier and other subscribers with regard to the rates charged for video programming offered on a per channel or per program basis. (B) Exception; limitation.--The prohibition in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a cable system that, by reason of the lack of addressable converter boxes or other technological limitations, does not permit the operator to offer programming on a per channel or per program basis in the same manner required by subparagraph (A). This subparagraph shall not be available to any cable operator after-- (i) the technology utilized by the cable system is modified or improved in a way that eliminates such technological limitation; or (ii) 10 years after the date of enactment of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, subject to subparagraph (C). (C) Waiver.--If, in any proceeding initiated at the request of any cable operator, the Commission determines that compliance with the requirements of subparagraph (A) would require the cable operator to increase its rates, the Commission may, to the extent consistent with the public interest, grant such cable operator a waiver from such requirements for such specified period as the Commission determines reasonable and appropriate. B. The Commission's Rulemakings 5. The Commission adopted an implementing rule that (1) prohibits discrimination between subscribers of the basic service tier and other subscribers with regard to rates charged for video programming offered on a per-channel or per-program basis; (2) forbids any retiering of channels or services intended to frustrate the purpose of the tier buy-through provision; and (3) defines when cable systems are not technically capable of complying with this requirement. 6. The Commission held that there are two kinds of operations to which the tier buy-through requirement may reasonably be applied. First, there are systems that are addressable with respect to all nonbasic services, have the capacity to shut off intermediate tiers, and offer subscribers the basic service plus pay channel option without additional equipment expense. Second, there are certain systems that control access to programming with traps and have the ability to provide the buy-through option by adding, not adding, or removing traps. Under one trap scenario, the buy-through option can be made available by installing positive traps if a scrambling carrier is used or by removing or not installing negative traps if the pay service to which subscription is sought is within the block of frequencies over which basic service is delivered. Thus, for example, if channels 2 through 13 encompass the basic service tier, all channels are distributed in an unscrambled mode, and a pay service is on channel 6, it is possible to deliver basic service plus the pay service by simply not installing or by removing the negative trap that would normally control access to channel 6. The other trap scenario involves a system so configured that the intermediate tier or tiers of service are distributed over a single contiguously located block of channels that may be trapped out in bulk by band pass or band stop filters. Depending to some extent on the number of channels involved and the frequency spectrum they occupy within the cable system, it may be possible with a single block trap to remove the tier (or tiers) of service and so provide subscribers with the option of purchasing the channels that are not deleted by the trap. 7. In order to accommodate these different situations, the Commission defined systems subject to compliance during the 10-year transition period as all systems that have the capacity to offer basic service and all programming distributed on a per channel or per program basis without also providing other intermediate tiers of service either: (1) by controlling subscriber access to nonbasic channels of service through addressable equipment electronically controlled from a central control point or (2) through the installation, noninstallation, or removal of frequency filters (traps) at the premises of subscribers without other alteration in system configuration or design and without causing degradation in the technical quality of service provided. 8. The Commission believed that this approach was consistent with the statutory objective of providing consumers with the option of subscribing to basic and pay service without the need to subscribe to intervening service tiers and without triggering rate increases or requiring premature system upgrading. The Commission recognized that certain system configurations may allow the buy-through option to operate only with respect to certain individual pay or pay-per-view channels and that other channels, trapped or controlled in a different fashion, may be unavailable without intermediate tiers. In order to avoid disparity of treatment between the channels involved, a system is not capable of compliance, and thus subject to the buy-through requirement, unless access to all per channel and per program charge channels can be provided without intermediate tiers. Where access can be provided to some, but not all per channel or per program charge channels without intermediate service tiers, the cable operator may do so on a voluntary basis. 9. The Commission also addressed whether systems that are capable of compliance only with respect to portions of the geographical area they serve must comply with the requirement, i.e., whether compliance is required after only 10 years or whether compliance to the extent possible is required now. The Commission has previously noted that there are likely to be systems that are addressable only in part of the area they serve, either within a franchise area or in some, but not all, of the franchise areas of a technically integrated system. The Commission recognized that this may result, for example, from a staged reconstruction of portions of a system, the integration of two or more previously separate systems, or because of different technical configurations that relate to franchise requirements. With respect to such operations, the Commission reasoned that there is no reason why compliance should not be required as the necessary equipment is put in place and other services are offered using it. 10. After the release of the Tier Buy-through Order, the Commission clarified that the tier buy-through provision of the 1992 Cable Act "only precludes operators from conditioning access to programming offered on a per-channel or per-program basis on purchasing intermediate tiers." Therefore, the provision does not prohibit operators from requiring the purchase of an intermediate tier of cable programming services in order to obtain access to another tier of cable programming services. Moreover, in response to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, the Commission modified Section 76.921 to state that the tier buy-through rule does not apply to cable systems subject to effective competition. III. FACTUAL CONTEXT 11. Petitioners explain that Cox is the fifth largest cable operator in the country, selling cable television service to more than 850,000 subscribers in California alone. They further state that Cox leads other cable operators in building state-of-the-art cable systems, that the operator has repeatedly proclaimed its cable systems are technically advanced, and that at the end of 1996, the operator proclaimed that "100% of its cable television subscribers were served by addressable technology." Petitioners assert that despite these claims, Cox requires each of its customers throughout California to pay an additional $15 to $20 per month for its cable program service tier before it will agree to sell them cable services on a per-channel or per- program basis, such as HBO or pay-per-view movies. Petitioners state that Cox has never applied for, or received a waiver, of the tier buy-through prohibition from the Commission, nor can it reasonably argue that it is excused from compliance with the prohibition because of any technological limitations in its cable system. Petitioners request that the Commission order Cox to cease and desist from violating the tier buy-through prohibition, require Cox to provide information sufficient to demonstrate the geographical areas in which they are capable of complying with Section 623(b)(8) of the Communications Act, and order Cox to forfeit the sum of $25,000 per day, up to and including $250,000, for their continuing violations of the Act. 12. In its opposition, Cox states that the San Diego system it operates has provided cable television service to communities in southern San Diego County since the 1960s, in what currently comprises its "South branch." The South branch currently serves approximately 351,500 subscribers and each of the Petitioners is a customer of the South Branch of the system. In February, 1995, as part of a broader acquisition of Times Mirror, Cox acquired a cable system serving communities in northern San Diego County, now known as its "North branch." The North branch currently serves approximately 141,750 subscribers. Prior to the acquisition of the North branch, the San Diego North and South branches operated as separate, stand-alone systems, with different management, channel line-up configurations, programming and operating philosophies. Since the acquisition, the San Diego system has integrated certain management, administrative and technical operations in the two branches. Cox states that when adding new program services, the San Diego system has worked to minimize disruption and inconvenience to its subscribers by maintaining, to the extent possible, continuity within its two channel line-ups. Cox further states that the North and South branches currently retain separate channel line-ups, they are separated geographically by a distance of approximately 40 miles, and they are served by different teams of field, installation and technical support personnel. 13. Cox states that both the North and South branches offer three tiers of cable service: limited- basic, expanded-basic, and premium (i.e., per channel or per program) service. Cox explains that, like many cable systems, the North and South systems employ a "hybrid" of addressable and nonaddressable technology to provide these services. Cox states that in an addressable system, some or all of the non-basic programming offered by a cable operator is "scrambled" at the system headend before it is transmitted through the cable plant; to view the scrambled signals, customers must rent from the cable operator an addressable set top box for each cable outlet in their homes on which they wish to view non-basic channels. According to Cox, the system's headend electronically commands these addressable decoders to selectively "unscramble" only those signals for which the subscriber has paid. To the extent a system relies upon "nonaddressable technology," it does not scramble programming signals at the cable headend before they are transmitted throughout the system; rather, to control the selection of services received by the individual customers, the cable operator must install passive traps and filters in customer premises to prevent the viewing of unauthorized channels. Cox then states that the San Diego system transmits limited-basic and expanded-basic channels to subscribers' homes via nonaddressable technology. According to Cox, the San Diego system technicians install passive traps and filters in subscriber residences to prevent the viewing of expanded-basic channels by customers who do not order this tier of service. However, the San Diego system uses addressable technology to deliver premium channels. 14. Cox asserts that, notwithstanding Petitioners' unsupported allegations to the contrary, the San Diego system has voluntarily offered subscribers in its South branch the option to purchase per-channel and per-program services, without any intermediate service tiers, since March 1991. Cox states that prior to April 1991, the South branch of the San Diego system offered its customers two levels of service: basic and premium; thus basic subscribers could purchase premium services without the need for purchasing any other tier of service. Cox then explains that in April 1991, the San Diego system decided to unbundle its basic programming into two tiers: a limited-basic tier and an expanded-basic tier; to minimize disruption to its then basic service subscribers, the South branch also concurrently decided to offer its new limited-basic subscribers the option of purchasing premium channels without requiring them to purchase the expanded basic service tier. Cox states that the system used filters to make the premium channels available, but by doing so, two expanded-basic channels would bleed through. Cox asserts that since 1991, the South Branch has continuously offered limited basic customers the option to purchase premium services by reconfiguring its traps and filters as necessary when making minor changes to its channel line-up; however, to minimize signal degradation, each of these historical trap configurations was adjusted to allow for the bleed-through of unauthorized expanded- basic channels. According to Cox, the North branch has not offered its customers the option of purchasing premium and expanded-basic services on an unbundled basis. Cox states that its predecessor, Times-Mirror, never offered this option to its subscribers. 15. Cox states that the San Diego System has experienced very little customer demand for the option of purchasing premium and expanded-basic channels on an unbundled basis. Initially, approximately 100 customers in the South branch opted to subscribe to limited-basic and premium services without purchasing the intermediate programming tier. Cox asserts that approximately 240 limited-basic subscribers in the South branch currently enjoy this combination of services, including the expanded-basic channels they necessarily receive for free. 16. Cox reiterates that all of the Petitioners Lynn Putnam, Jerry Williams, and Raphael Levens reside in communities in southern San Diego County and receive their cable television service from the South branch of the San Diego System. Cox states that Petitioners allege that they requested the San Diego System to provide per-channel and per-program cable services in combination with the most basic level of cable service. Cox further states that Petitioners claim they were told that this combination of services was unavailable, or that it was not technologically feasible for the San Diego System to provide it to them. Cox asserts, however, that Petitioners provide no details (i.e., dates, times, the names of customer service representatives with whom they spoke, etc.) regarding these alleged requests for service. Cox further asserts that only one of the three Petitioners (Williams) has filed a declaration actually affirming that he requested premium services unbundled from expanded-basic tier service. 17. Cox asserts that in December of 1997, counsel for the San Diego System advised Petitioners' counsel that these customers and all subscribers similarly situated in the South County, are eligible to purchase premium channels with Cox Limited Basic service. According to Cox, its counsel expressly invited Petitioners to identify which premium channels they desired to order and offered to arrange for the San Diego System to change their respective service and billing arrangements according to their wishes. Cox states that Petitioners' attorneys declined this unequivocal offer to provide Petitioners with the service combination that is the subject of this Petition, perhaps in an effort to protect Petitioners' status as putative class representatives in the pending litigation. 18. Cox notes that Petitioners are served only by two of the franchises located in what is known as the South Branch of its San Diego system. As such, Cox argues that they lack standing to challenge the practices of other franchises comprising Cox's California cable systems. According to Cox, only "interested persons" may petition the Commission for issuance of an order to show cause against a cable operator. With regard to the buy-through requirements, the Petitioners are "interested persons" only with respect to those franchises providing cable service to them. Cox asserts that it is undisputed that Petitioners receive cable service from only two of the franchises comprising the South branch of the San Diego System La Mesa and the City of San Diego. 19. Cox argues that the trap configurations necessary to comply with the buy-through provision in the North branch cause unacceptable signal degradation. Cox asserts that since its acquisition of the North branch, the San Diego System has not attempted to use trapping technology to offer the sort of unbundled service option provided in the South branch because it would be impracticable to do so. Cox states that in order to abide by the buy-through provision, the San Diego System theoretically would have had to install traps with four filters to unbundle premium and expanded-basic services and block unauthorized channels. Moreover, to ensure compliance with the Commission's actual minimum signal quality standards, the North Branch would have been required to sacrifice seven expanded basic channels in all homes and additional four channels in many homes. According to Cox, this situation has persisted up to the present day. For example, as of October 15, 1997, a trap with six filters was theoretically necessary to unbundle premium and expanded- basic services in the North branch while controlling access to unauthorized channels; however, to offer this combination of unbundled services in accordance with the Commission's signal quality standards, the San Diego system would have had to install this six filter trap configuration in a manner that would allow approximately twenty-three unauthorized expanded basic channels to bleed through. Cox adds that on October 15, 1998, the North branch slightly changed its line-up. Since October 15th, a trap with four filters theoretically would be required to unbundle premium and expanded-basic service in the North branch while preventing access to unauthorized programming; Cox asserts, however, that to comply with minimum signal performance standards on all authorized channels, these four filters would have to be positioned to allow the "bleed through" of fifteen channels of expanded-basic programming. 20. Cox asserts that the introduction of digital service should permit it to easily implement the buy- through rule in both the San Diego North and South branches in 1999. Beginning in early 1999, the system at issue will offer digital cable service to subscribers throughout the San Diego area. Operating in the 550-750 MHz frequency range, Cox states that this new digital cable service will enable subscribers to receive approximately one hundred new channels of programming. All digital channels will be scrambled in this new technology environment, including premium digital channels. Cox states that subscribers to digital service will be required to rent a digital converter box to unscramble programming transmitted on the digital spectrum. Digital channels will be cablecast on frequencies higher than the existing analog channels and will not be affected by existing passive traps and filters. According to Cox, the digital spectrum will support many new services (e.g., HBO 1-8), but will also duplicate traditional analog premium channels. Cox states that the deployment of digital technology will allow subscribers in both its South and North branches to purchase premium services separately from the expanded-basic service tier. Cox further states that subscribers will receive their limited basic-channels via analog technology and their premium channels via digital technology. No additional traps or filters will be employed, and customers subscribing only to the limited-basic or to the limited-basic and intermediate service tiers, will continue to receive their cable television service without the need for any converter boxes. Cox notes that unlike existing analog decoders, the new digital boxes will also facilitate consumer use of electronic equipment features such as picture-in-picture and VCR recording. Cox asserts that the introduction of digital cable service will resolve all of the technical issues presented in this proceeding and moot Petitioners' request to show cause. 21. In reply, Petitioners first discuss the manner by which this matter came before the Commission and why the Commission should investigate Cox's practices throughout California. They explain that the matter were referred to the FCC by the San Diego court after Petitioners filed a lawsuit seeking to establish Cox's violation of California antitrust and consumer protection statutes in its service areas throughout California. Upon Cox's motion, the San Diego court ruled that the Commission had primary jurisdiction for the sole purpose of determining whether Cox was technologically capable of complying with the buy-through prohibition in the service areas addressed by the complaint. As the court stated, "[t]his action shall be suspended and referred to the Federal Communications Commission for its consideration of the alleged violations of the 1992 Cable Act." Petitioners' counter Cox's contention that its cable systems outside San Diego County were excised from the case when the California court referred this matter to the Commission. They argue that the court clearly referred the entire action, not only those aspects that addressed Cox's violations in San Diego, to the Commission; nowhere, either prior to or in its referral order, did the court carve San Diego County out of petitioners' action. Petitioners also argue as the regulatory body with authority over the cable industry, the Commission has an obligation to ensure that cable operators, such as Cox, obey Congress's laws and the Commission's regulations. According to Petitioners, the Commission clearly may, and based on the court's Order and its own regulatory duties must, determine whether Cox has violated the buy- through prohibition in all of its California service areas. 22. The Petitioners also address the standing issue raised by Cox. Petitioners state that they have standing in the California court to challenge Cox's violations in all of its California service areas. As discussed in their court action, Petitioners' claims are based in part on California's Unfair Practices Statute and California Business and Professions Code  17200, which allows citizens to bring suit as "private attorneys general" on behalf of the general public of the State of California. In order to challenge Cox's conduct in the California court, Petitioners argue that they need not have purchased cable services from Cox in any of its service areas, let alone in the particular service areas at issue. The Petitioners also argue that the standing rules for rate- related actions are inapplicable here because the buy-through prohibition is not a rate provision: "[t]he tier buy- through provision is in a stand alone paragraph of Section 623(b) that, unlike many of the other paragraphs of that section, does not deal with rate regulation." Contrary to Cox's arguments, Petitioners conclude they have standing to challenge Cox's violation of the buy-through prohibition in areas outside San Diego County, and the Commission clearly has the power and authority to resolve all of the factual issues referred to it by the San Diego court. 23. Petitioners recognize that Cox claims that it has been capable of complying with the buy- through prohibition in its South branch operations since 1991. Thus, with respect to the South branch, Petitioners state there is nothing for the Commission to decide. Whether that capability was appropriately made available to subscribers is a matter for the San Diego court, not the Commission, to decide. However, Petitioners argue that Cox fails to demonstrate why its North branch is not technologically capable of complying with the buy-through rules. Petitioners assert that Cox provides little or no technological information on its system design or configuration from which its technical capacity can be determined. According to Petitioners, the only excuses that Cox offers are that: (1) customers do not like the set-top analog decoder boxes necessary in fully addressable systems; and (2) customers do not like changes in established channel line-ups. Petitioners argue that neither of these excuses justifies Cox's refusal to comply with the buy-through requirement. 24. Throughout the entire relevant period, Petitioners state that Cox could have used traps, with little difficulty, to comply with the buy-through prohibition. Petitioners discount Cox's argument that the use of traps and filters in the various channel line-ups it has used since 1992 in the North branch, would have diminished the signal quality of channels purchased by subscribers or permit too many unpurchased channels to "bleed through." Petitioners assert that the shortcoming in this argument is that it only considers Cox's existing channel array. Petitioners also assert that Cox fails to provide a technical description of its cable system; without that information, neither the Commission nor petitioners can evaluate Cox's assertions. 25. Petitioners state that Cox provides little or no rationale and no technical support for the North Branch channel array. Petitioners refer to the findings made by their expert witness, Mr. O.D. Page, P.E., who lists over 15 technical details that Cox should be required to provide to the Commission and to Petitioners to allow a reasonable determination of its technical capability. According to Petitioners, their expert was able to design a conceptual channel array that would allow Cox to comply with the buy-through prohibition using only one trap and two filters. The Petitioners state that this technical arrangement is more economical than Cox's current system, eliminates Cox's professed problems of signal degradation and bleed-through, and is consumer friendly; in addition, using this system or one similar to it, only two or three channels would be compromised by bleed-through. Petitioners assert that this proposed retiering could have been implemented at any time in conjunction with any of Cox's channel realignments in the North Branch; the costs would have been minimal and would have entailed merely a reconnection of existing equipment at the headends and use of a single, dual filter trap. 26. Petitioners assert that Cox's only excuse for not undertaking such a realignment is that consumers do not like to have their channels moved. According to Petitioners, this certainly is not a "technical limitation" that excuses noncompliance as prescribed either by the 1992 Cable Act or the Commission's regulations. Petitioners also argue that Cox may not avoid compliance by arguing that reconfiguring its channel line-ups and installing traps and filters will increase its costs. They assert that such arguments are appropriately directed at obtaining a cost-waiver from the Commission, a request that Cox admittedly has not and cannot now make to excuse its past violations. 27. Petitioners also argue that Cox could employ the addressable technology it already possesses to comply with the buy-through prohibition, even though it may be more complicated. Petitioners assert that Cox does not dispute that its cable systems employ addressable technology and the operator acknowledges that its San Diego systems use addressable technology to deliver Pay-Per-Channel and Pay-Per-View services. Petitioners state that Cox never asserts that the hardware used in its cable systems is incapable of sending a fully addressable signal that could comply with the buy-through requirement. Petitioners comment that the Commission has warned cable operators that "deliberate reconfiguration of an addressable system in order to preclude compliance with the buy-through prohibition is an evasion of the prohibition." Petitioners allege that Cox's refusal to implement the addressable capabilities of its system is hardly different. 28. Petitioners claim that Cox's argument regarding the costs of providing decoder boxes now is irrelevant. They note that had the decoder boxes been provided over the seven years since the buy-through prohibition was enacted, as new subscribers and channels came on-line, the costs would not have been prohibitive. Petitioners state that they are not asking that Cox retrofit at this point, especially in light of Cox's upcoming conversion to digital technology. They argue that the question before the Commission is whether, since 1992, Cox had the technology available to comply with Section 623(b)(8). IV. DISCUSSION 29. This case concerns the application of Section 623(b)(8) of the Communications Act and the associated Commission tier buy-through rules to systems owned and operated by Cox Communications. Petitioners request that the Commission investigate Cox's compliance with the rules generally, and in particular, with regard to its California cable systems. Cox urges that petitioners Lynn Putnam, Jerry Williams, and Raphael Levens only have standing to seek Commission relief with respect to the system to which they subscribe. 30. We find that Cox has complied with the Commission's tier buy-through requirements in its Southern San Diego operations where petitioners are subscribers. The operator has shown that, since 1991, it has offered its South branch basic cable subscribers the ability to purchase premium and pay-per-view programming in accordance with the Section 628(b)(8) requirement. In addition, Cox has demonstrated that it will easily be able to comply with the tier buy-through requirement, without the need for traps, once the South branch is fully upgraded to digital. Petitioners appear to concede that, with respect to the South branch operation, there is nothing for the Commission to decide. Thus, as we find that Cox did not violate the Commission's rules in this instance, there is no basis for the imposition of any penalty. 31. We also conclude that there is no basis, relying on the pleading before us, to consider more generally whether Cox, throughout the nation or in its other California operations, has violated the Section 623(b)(8) requirement. Petitioners originally filed their complaint against Cox in California Superior Court, San Diego. Subsequently, in response to a request from Cox, the Commission through its General Counsel, wrote a letter to Cox's Counsel Peter Feinberg, stating that "it is the Federal Communications Commission's position that it has primary jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims to the extent they implicate Section 543(b)(8) [Communications Act Section 623(b)(8)]." In response to this letter, and noting the Commission's expertise in technical matters, the San Diego Superior Court suspended Petitioners' action and referred it to the Commission "for its consideration of the alleged violations of the 1992 Cable Act." The pleadings before us indicate that there is an unresolved dispute between the parties concerning the extent, if at all, to which these Petitioners can challenge in the California court case Cox's alleged violations of the Act's tier buy-through provisions on systems to which these Petitioners do not themselves subscribe. This is a dispute for the California court to resolve if the Petitioners decide to pursue their claims there. 32. Despite the history of this controversy in the state court system, our decision here is controlled by the standing requirements applicable to buy-through complaints lodged with the Commission. Section 76.9 of the Commission's rules provide that: "Upon petition by any interested person, the Commission may: Issue an order requiring a cable television operator to show cause why it should not be directed to cease and desist from violating the Commission's rules." There is nothing before us to suggest that Petitioners are "interested persons" within the meaning of this Section outside of the area where they are subscribers. As such, we will apply the law to the facts insofar as the South branch system is concerned and need not act nor consider Petitioners' request for discovery vis-a-vis the North branch system or other Cox systems in California. This decision to dismiss the petition, however, is without prejudice to any further Commission action which may be appropriate in light of the Petitioners' course of action in the California state court. V. ORDERING CLAUSES 33. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Section 623(b)(8) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C.  543(b)(8)), that the petition filed by Lynn Putnam, Jerry Williams, and Raphael Levens, IS DISMISSED. 34. This action is taken pursuant to authority delegated under Section 0.321 of the Commission's rules. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Deborah A. Lathen Chief, Cable Services Bureau