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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. 1. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#Xj\  P6G;XP##&a\  P6G;w&P#"5^2CRdd$CCdq2C28dddddddddd88qqqYzoCNzoozzC8C^dCYdYdYCdd88d8ddddCN8ddddY`(`l2CCCCPCddYYYYYYzYzYzYzYC8C8C8C8ddddddddddYdddddoddYYYYzYzYzYdddddPdCdCCCdNdoNNF2ZdCYddddd7>d<d<CCYYdCCddCYCdYzzzzCCCCqodYYYYYYYYYYY8888dddddddnddddddd"5^.=K\\!==\g.=.3\\\\\\\\\\33gggQzzpf=Gpfzfpp=3=V\=Q\Q\Q=\\33\3\\\\=G3\\\\QX%Xc.====I=\\QQQQQzzQpQpQpQpQ=3=3=3=3\\\\\\\\\\Q\\\\\f\\QQzQzQpQpQpQ\\\\\I\=\===\G\fGN@.S\=Q\\\\\39\7\7==QQ\==\\=Q=7N=eegIjg\\j.=K\\!==\g.=.3\\\\\\\\\\33gggQzzpf=Gpfzfpp=3=V\=Q\Q\Q=\\33\3\\\\=G3\\\\QX%Xc=\Q\\=f===QQ@\=G=.=\\\\%\=3\g=\Ie77=jS.=79\Qzpppp====gf\QQQQQQzQQQQQ3333\\\\\\\e\\\\\\\2 "5^.=f\\3==\i.=.3\\\\\\\\\\==iii\zzpG\zpfzz=3=j\=\fQfQ=\f3=f3f\ffQG=f\\\QH(H_.====I=\f\\\\\QzQzQzQzQG3G3G3G3f\\\\ffff\\f\\\\pf\\\QQzQzQzQ\\\ffIfGfG=Gf\\fGN@.c\=\\\\\\7=\7\7==\\\==\\=\=7N=eeiIji\\j.=f\\3==\i.=.3\\\\\\\\\\==iii\zzpG\zpfzz=3=j\=\fQfQ=\f3=f3f\ffQG=f\\\QH(H_=\\\\=f===\\@\=G=.=\\\\(\=7\i=\Ie77=jc.=7=\\zzzzGGGGipf\\\\\\QQQQQ3333\f\\\\\e\ffff\f"5^(1<d<d<CCoodCCddCoCddzzzzzzzzzzCCCCozdddddddYYYYY8888dddddddndddddYd2 '  *#"5^*8FSS$88Sp*8*.SSSSSSSSSS88pppSffoxffxx8Jo]oxfxfS]xff]]A.AFS8SSJSJ.SS..J.xSSSSAA.SJoJJAC.CZ*8888C8SSfSfSfSfSfSooJfJfJfJfJ8.8.8.8.oSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxS]JfSxSxSxS]JxSfSfSfSfSoJoJfJfJfJxSxSxSxSxSCS8S888SJxSoSAN:*WSASSSSSS.4}}S2S}288]]S88SS8]82N8\\pC`pSS`*8FSS$88Sp*8*.SSSSSSSSSS88pppSffoxffxx8Jo]oxfxfS]xff]]A.AFS8SSJSJ.SS..J.xSSSSAA.SJoJJAC.CZv8S]SS8S888]]:S8A8o]*ASSSS.S8.Sp8SC\228`W*824S}}}Sffffffoffff8888xoxxxxxpxxxxx]fSSSSSSSoJJJJJ....SSSSSSS\SSSSSJS"5^2Coddȧ8CCdr2C28ddddddddddCCrrrdzNdzoȐC8CtdCdoYoYCdo8Co8odooYNCodddYO,Oh2CCCCPCdodddddȐYYYYYN8N8N8N8oddddooooddoddddzodddYYYYYdddooPoNoNCNoddȐoNNF2ldCdddddd' +R..y.C8*X?C\  P6QP .7PC2XXP\  P6QXP.2J=.Xw&J\  P6Q&P l2N=.X&N4  pQ&.W!0(Xh0\  P6QhP.I(!X,(\  P6Q,P5PC2X3vFXP*f9 xQXX{,C8*X3FC*f9 xQXl7UC2XXU4  pQX.a$5,!Xɐ5\  P6QP y.C8*X?C\  P6QP . P,%XJ,\  P6QJP0J=.X3U&J*f9 xQ&X"5^.=M\\'==\|.=.3\\\\\\\\\\==|||\ppzpp=Qzfzpp\fppffG3GM\=\\Q\Q3\\33Q3\\\\GG3\QzQQGI2Ic.====I=\\p\p\p\p\p\zzQpQpQpQpQ=3=3=3=3z\\\\\\\\\fQp\\\\fQ\p\p\p\p\zQzQpQpQpQ\\\\\I\=\===\Q\z\GN@.`\G\\\\\\39\7\7==ff\==\\=f=7N=ee|Ij|\\j.=M\\'==\|.=.3\\\\\\\\\\==|||\ppzpp=Qzfzpp\fppffG3GM\=\\Q\Q3\\33Q3\\\\GG3\QzQQGI2Ic=\f\\=\===ff@\=G=zf.G\\\\2\=3\|=\Ie77=j`.=79\\ppppppzpppp====z|fp\\\\\\\zQQQQQ3333\\\\\\\e\\\\\Q\ S' X   2 S'` `   Federal Communications Commission`~(#cDA 991271 ă   yxdddy 2Qb #&a\  P6G;w&P#Before the Federal Communications Commission  S'&2Washington, D.C. 20554 ă In the Matter of:) ) ECHOSTAR COMMUNICATIONS ) CORPORATION) )  S' v.)ppFile No. CSR5138P ) FOX/LIBERTY NETWORKS LLC)  S ')pp FOX SPORTS NET LLC) ) FOX SPORTS DIRECT) ) Program Access Complaint)  S'M ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION \  S'X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:: {OB'ԍId. at 21846. > Section 76.1003(r) of the Commission's rules states:  S' JXAny complaint filed pursuant to this subsection must be filed within one year of the date on which one of the following occurs:   S' e iiX(1)` ` The satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming vendor enters  into a contract with the complainant that the complainant alleges to violate one or more of the rules contained in this subpart; or   Sr' e iiX(2)` ` The satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming vendor offers  Wto sell programming to the complainant pursuant to terms that the complainant alleges to  S" 'violate one or more of the rules . . .B" Z: yO'ԍ47 C.F.R.  76.1003(r).B   S ' e 4.` ` The Order found that pursuant to Section 76.1003(r)(1) of the Commission's rules,  xEchostar had one year from the date of entering into the contract with Liberty Satellite Sports, Inc./Fox  S ' xpSports Direct to file a program access complaint with the Commission.l : yO'#X\  P6G;?P#э47 C.F.R.  76.1003(r)(1).l Thus, EchoStar had until  xJune26, 1997 to file such a complaint. EchoStar did not bring its complaint within that period and was  S4' xDtherefore found to be time barred. The Order found that Fox's subsequent August29, 1997 letter did not  xrevive the limitations period regarding the rates, terms and conditions of the June 26, 1996 contract, nor  S' xcould Fox's August 29, 1997 letter be viewed as a separate offer which triggered the limitations period.Iz: {O'ԍOrder, 13 FCC Rcd at 21849.I  S' xThe Order recognized the public policy of avoiding unnecessary regulatory interference regarding contracts  xentered into by consenting parties, and concluded that once the one year period had elapsed, subsequent  xrenegotiations would not subject such contracts once again to program access review unless the parties  SH' xentered into a new contract.1H : {O'ԍId.1 Because the matter was decided on procedural grounds, the Order did not address the merits of EchoStar's claims regarding violations of the program access rules.  S'"J II. DISCUSSION ă  S'  S' e  5.` ` EchoStar provides five specifications of error relating to the Bureau's Order. EchoStar  S\' x argues that the Bureau's Order: (i) ignored the express language of Section 76.1003(r); (ii) relied on a  x^distinction not relevant to Section 76.1003(r); (iii) disregarded other program access precedent; (iv) relied  xon a previously unmentioned public policy; and (v) failed to apply the "discovery rule" to toll the Section  S' x376.1003(r) limitations period. In addition, EchoStar argues that the Bureau's Order creates the wrong  x*incentives for both allegedly wronged MVPDs and verticallyintegrated programming providers. We find  S' xthat the arguments made by EchoStar in its petition do not warrant reversal of the Bureau's Order. Our conclusions with respect to each of the errors specified by EchoStar are set forth below."r,`(`(88"Ԍ S' e Aԙ6.` ` EchoStar argues the Bureau's decision contravenes the Commission's program access rules  S' xregarding the filing of discrimination complaints.?: yO@'ԍEchoStar Petition at 3.? EchoStar argues that under the express language of  xkSection 76.1003(r)(2), an offer is just as adequate as the execution of a contract for starting the clock for  xDthe program access limitations period. EchoStar contends that the Bureau's finding that a new offer does  xnot restart the clock if there is a contract between the parties at the time the offer is made is contrary to  xMthe clear language of Section 76.1003(r)(2). EchoStar maintains that the Bureau's decision effectively  xxrewrites the rule by adding language to subsection (r)(2) to limit its application to situations in which there  S' x3is no contract between the parties.6X: {O 'ԍId. at 46 EchoStar believes that the Bureau has acted beyond its delegated  xauthority to implement the Commission's rules by introducing exceptions to them. In response, Fox argues  xthat the letter of August 29, 1997 did not start a new one year limitations period or afford an independent  xbasis for jurisdiction because the parties were bound by the RSN Distribution Agreement that had been  SH ' xin effect for fourteen months.<H : yO'ԍFox Opposition at 4.< Fox maintains that allowing correspondence and discussion about existing  xcontracts between the parties to form the basis for program access complaints would render the limitations  S ' x&period meaningless.7 z: {O'ԍId. at 6.7 Further, Fox argues that the Bureau acted within the limits of its jurisdiction by  S 'acting within the plain meaning of the Commission's rules.7 : {O|'ԍId. at 7.7  S ' e W7.` ` We are unpersuaded that the decision in the Order is contrary to the language of Section  x76.1003(r), and affirm our conclusion that EchoStar's program access complaint is barred by the limitations  xZperiod. Looking at the particular language at issue, Section 76.1003(r)(1) establishes a firm period for  S ' xbringing program access claims once the parties have entered into a contract. The Order found that the  x@parties were bound by this limitations period regardless of Fox's subsequent offer. Limited regulatory  xgoversight of the relationship between an MVPD and a vertically integrated programming vendor serves  xthe Congressional intent of prohibiting unfair or anticompetitve actions without undue regulatory disruption  xof the multichannel video programming market. The purposes of Section 628 are: (1) promoting the  x3public interest by increasing competition and diversity in the multichannel video programming market;  x(2) increasing the availability of satellite cable and broadcast programming to persons in rural and other  xareas that are not currently able to receive such programming; and (3) encouraging the development of  S' xcommunications technologies.>: yO !'ԍ47 U.S.C.  548(a).> Section 76.1003(r) furthers these goals by establishing a limited period  xVfor a party aggrieved by conduct alleged to violate the program access provisions to commence an  xZadjudicatory proceeding before the Commission. A party has one year to seek redress for actions that  xentail unfair or anticompetitive practices by a verticallyintegrated program supplier. After that period,  xthe parties should rely on the marketplace to dictate their business relationship. We believe this is consistent with the realities of the marketplace and best achieves the goals of Section 628. ". ,`(`(88"Ԍ S' e Ԋ8.` ` Parties may have numerous reasons for seeking a change of the terms of a programming  xcontract. For instance, a programmer may offer a new channel of programming or technological changes  xin the delivery in programming, or an MVPD may add subscribers and thus seek a different price for  xpprogramming based on the new volume of subscribers. Under EchoStar's interpretation of Section  x76.1003(r), any interaction subsequent to the program vendor entering into a contract with a MVPD could  xlead to a program access complaint regardless of the period of time that has passed since the parties  xentered into a contract. This was not the Commission's intent. Accordingly, the Commission adopted the  xQlimitations period set forth in Section 76.1003(r). EchoStar's interpretation of that provision could thwart  xa programmer's ability to offer new programming, or even suggest a lower price for existing programming.  xAllowing EchoStar's interpretation of Section 76.1003(r) could affect the ability of consumers to receive  xnew programming or services. We do not believe such consequences are consistent with the Congress' purposes in creating Section 628.  S ' e 9.` ` Secondly, EchoStar argues that the Order relied on a distinction not found in the rules.  x}EchoStar believes that the decision attached importance to whether the parties contract amendment  S ' xMdiscussions took place more than one year after the date of the initial contract.{\ ;S {O' x ԍEchoStar reached this conclusion based on a footnote in the Order which noted that "the parties first contract  x amendment discussions took place on August 20, 1997, after the one year limitations period expired." EchoStar  {O'Petition at 5, citing Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 21846 n.61.{ EchoStar argues that  xxthere is no basis in the program access rules for a distinction based on the timing of the offer because any  SZ' xoffer restarts the clock without regard as to when negotiations started.7Z;S {O'ԍId. at 5.7 EchoStar contends that in any  xxevent, the negotiations that formed the basis of its complaint had started less than one year after execution  S 'of the agreement, citing a letter between the parties dated April 9, 1997. ~;S {O('ԍId. at 6 and Attachment 1(Letter from Mr. Glen Gurgiolo to Ms. Jessica Heacock (April 9, 1997)). ` `  S' e  10.` ` Our decision in the Order to dismiss EchoStar's complaint was not based on the timing  S' x"of the parties contract amendment discussions. As stated in the Order, EchoStar's complaint was  xMdismissed because it was not brought within one year following the execution of the RSN Distribution  SF' xAgreement.IF;S {O'ԍOrder, 13 FCC Rcd at 21849.I The Order found that subsequent discussions following the execution of a contract do not  S ' xrevive the limitations period unless the parties enter into a new contract.1 ;S {Ob'ԍId.1 EchoStar's contention that  xrenegotiations started before the limitations period had expired does not bear on this conclusion. Under  xSection 76.1003(r), the limitations period began to run once the parties entered into a contract and was unaffected by their subsequent negotiations.  SX' e ' 11.` ` Third, EchoStar argues that the Bureau's decision is inconsistent with its decision in a prior  S0' x7program access complaint, Turner Vision v. Cable News Network, Inc.04 ;S {O&'ԍTurner Vision v. Cable News Network, Inc., 13 Fcc Rcd 12610 (1998) ("Turner Vision"). EchoStar argues that, in Turner"0 ,`(`(88q"  S' xgVision, the Bureau held that postcontract negotiations are enough to restart the statute of limitations.? ;S yOh'ԍEchoStar Petition at 7.?  xEchoStar maintains that the instant situation presents a more compelling reason to restart the clock because  xthe parties moved beyond discussions after Fox made a written offer, and had the offer been accepted, the  xlimitations period would have restarted under the Commission's rules. In opposition, Fox contends that  Sb' xxthe Bureau's decision is consistent with Turner Vision.<!bX;S yOZ'ԍFox Opposition at 6.< Fox argues that the Turner Vision decision noted  x<that the defendants had agreed to prevent the statute of limitations from tolling because of ongoing  S' xnegotiations, which is dissimilar to the instant situation.U";S {O 'ԍId., citing Turner Vision at 12611 n.6.U Fox maintains that EchoStar was solely  S'responsible for the delay in filing the complaint.<#z;S yO 'ԍFox Opposition at 7.<  S' e q 12.` ` We believe that the facts underlying Turner Vision are distinguishable. In Turner Vision,  xthe parties recognized that their underlying contract was subject to a limitations period. In order to protect  xtheir rights to file a program access complaint, the parties executed agreements expressly tolling the  S& ' xQlimitations period.$& ;S {O'ԍSee Consumer Satellite Services, Inc., et al. Consolidated Reply in CSR Docket No. 4676P at exhibits 7 10. In the present situation, the parties made no similar arrangement. Unlike the situation  S ' xin Turner Vision, the record lacks evidence showing that both parties intended to extend the deadline for filing program access complaints.  S ' e 4 13.` ` One of the reasons cited for dismissing EchoStar's program access complaint was to avoid  S`' xunnecessary regulatory interference regarding contracts entered into by consenting parties.I%`;S {O'ԍOrder, 13 FCC Rcd at 21849.I EchoStar's  x^fourth error specification maintains that the Bureau's narrowing the statute of limitations rules in the name  xof a policy of avoiding interference with private contracts is not a policy determination recognized by the  xCommission. EchoStar argues that the Order implementing the program access rules does not discuss a  S' xCommission policy regarding interference with private contracts.(&. ;S {O' x ԍEchoStar Petition at 9, citing Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Consumer  {OX'Protection and Competition Act of 1992, First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 3359 (1993) ("Program Access Order").( EchoStar contends, that contrary to  S' xZthe position espoused in the Bureau's Order, Congress made the determination to interfere with private  Sr' x^contracts in order to prevent discrimination by cableaffiliated programming vendors.F'r ;S yO!'ԍEchoStar Petition at 10.F EchoStar believes  SJ' xthe determination in the Order to view the limitations period in light of a policy of minimizing interference with private contracts is contrary to that Congressional determination.  S' e  14. ` ` We affirm the conclusion in the Order that public policy requires minimal regulatory  xinterference with private contracts entered into by consenting parties. All limitations periods and statutes  xof limitations are premised upon a recognition that, at some specified point in time, potential defendants"',`(`(88"  S' x3should be able to proceed with their affairs without the looming possibility of liability.Z(;S {Oh'ԍSee Bunker Ramo Corp., 31 FCC 2d 449 (1971).Z By adopting a  xlimitations period for program access complaints, the Commission inherently recognized that, following  xa reasonable period of time in which to raise allegations of discrimination or unfair practices, the parties  xto a programming agreement must operate under the terms thereof or negotiate amendments thereto free of the program access specter.  S' e 15. ` ` We believe that the policy adopted by the Commission is consistent with the  xCongressional policy of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, the  S' xtlegislation that mandated implementation of the program access rules.)Z;S yO 'ԍCable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102385, 106 Stat. 1460. The statement of policy of the  xZAct included a determination by Congress to rely on the marketplace, to the maximum extent possible,  xto achieve the availability of a diversity of views and information through cable television and other video  SH ' xMdistribution media.O*H ;S {O'ԍId. at  2(b), 106 Stat. 1463.O The limitations period provides a limited period of time to contest allegedly unfair  xor discriminatory contracts and is consistent with Congress' policy of reliance on the marketplace to the  S ' xEmaximum extent possible.+ |;S {O' x ԍSee Chambers Development Co., Inc. v. Passaic County Util. Auth., 63 F.3d 582, 589 (3rd Cir. 1995) (discussing sanctity of contracts). For the oneyear limitations period, an exception to reliance on the  xxmarketplace is allowed because of Congress' concern that verticallyintegrated program suppliers have the  S 'incentive and ability to favor their affiliated cable operators over other MVPDs., ;S {O'ԍSee Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 at 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. 1462.  SX' e 16.` ` Finally, EchoStar argues that even if the Bureau's determination that Fox's August 1997  x offer did not restart the statute of limitations was correct, the statute should have been tolled because  xEchoStar was not aware of the discrimination to which it was subject until it received the August 29, 1997  x}letter. EchoStar maintains that prior Commission decisions finding that the "discovery rule," which  xpostpones the beginning of the limitations period until the discovery of the right or wrong or facts on  S' xwhich such knowledge is chargeable in law, is applicable to program access complaints.F-h ;S yO'ԍEchoStar Petition at 15.F EchoStar  xbelieves that the discovery rule has special importance in the program access area where facts needed to  xestablish a discrimination claim are typically in the exclusive possession of the vendor, making discovery  xof a wrong particularly difficult. EchoStar maintains that throughout this litigation, it has requested that  xFox provide it with information necessary to allow it to determine the extent of Fox's discrimination, but  xFox has refused. EchoStar argues that refusing to apply the discovery rule would allow Fox to profit from  S'withholding the very information that would have enabled EchoStar to proceed with its complaint.8. ;S {O8$'ԍId. at 16.8 "x .,`(`(88"Ԍ S' e 17.` ` We are not persuaded that the discovery rule is applicable to the instant proceeding. In  S' xother contexts, the Commission has found that a limitations period is not discretionary.\/;S {O@'ԍBunker Ramo Corp., 31 FCC 2d 449 (1971).\ Its purpose is  xtto protect a potential defendant against "stale and vexatious claims by ending the possibility of litigation  S' xVafter a reasonable period of time has elapsed."v0Z;S {O'ԍId., citing Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Insurance Co., 74 U.S. 386 (1896).v The discovery rule postpones the beginning of the  x"limitations period from the date when the plaintiff is wronged to the date he discovers he has been  S8' xkinjured.q18;S {O 'ԍCada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1990).q The Commission has recognized the discovery rule to toll a limitations period in situations when  S' xkit cannot be clearly determined when the plaintiff's claim accrued.D2D~;S {O. ' xD ԍAccrual is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run. Id.  In Bunker Ramo, Petitioner alleged  x@ that defendant common carrier had deteriorated services and thereafter failed to supply, maintain and restore  x communications circuits and facilities. As a preliminary issue, the Commission addressed whether Petitioner's  xo untimely petition could be entertained. Petitioner argued that because of the difficulty in recognizing precisely when  x injury as a result of the acts became apparent, it was difficult to determine precisely at what time the limitations  x period began to run against petitioner, and accordingly, the period should be tolled. In recognizing the discovery  x rule, the Commission postponed ruling on the limitations period issue until all of the facts could be fully developed  {O'in an evidentiary hearing. See Bunker Ramo Corp., 31 FCC 2d 449 (1971).D EchoStar's situation is distinguishable  xbecause there is no uncertainty regarding when the right to sue accrued. Under Section 76.1003(r)(1), a  xcause of action accrues upon the occurrence of a specific act; EchoStar's execution of the allegedly  xdiscriminatory contract between the parties. Accordingly, the application of the discovery rule is not appropriate in this proceeding.  S ' e 18.` ` Nor do we find merit in EchoStar's claim that the beginning of the limitations period  xshould be postponed by Fox's failure to provide information. In the program access context, the  x;Commission has addressed concerns regarding MVPDs' lack of access to information. The program access  xcomplaint procedures were designed to place the least necessary evidentiary burden on those seeking relief  S ' xunder the program access rules.V3 ;S {O'ԍProgram Access Order, 8 FCC Rcd at 3362.V For discrimination complaints, the Commission allows an MVPD that  xhas been unable to obtain rate information from a program vendor to file a complaint based on information  xand belief of an impermissible rate differential, supported by an affidavit, along with a statement that the  S' xkvendor refused to provide the necessary specific comparative information.:4;S {O'ԍId. at 3417.: The rules provided EchoStar  xIa suitable method to provide evidence in support of its program access complaint regardless of the information supplied by Fox.  Sh' e 19.` ` EchoStar also argues that the Bureau Order creates undesirable policy incentives for both  xverticallyintegrated programmers and MVPDs. While these arguments are not legal specifications of  xerror, we will address them in the interests of fully explicating our rationale in this matter. EchoStar  xkasserts that the Bureau's determination that an offer to renegotiate an existing contract does not restart the  xstatute of limitations eliminates programming vendors' incentive to renegotiate a discriminatory contract"4,`(`(88>"  S' xonce the statute of limitations has expired.@5;S yOh'ԍEchoStar Petition at 12.@ EchoStar maintains that a vendor that has signed a  xdiscriminatory contract does not have any basis to make a nondiscriminatory offer unless there is a commercial advantage to make a new offer.  S`' e d20.` ` We disagree with the claim that the decision eliminates vendor's incentives to renegotiate  x@existing contracts. To the contrary, we believe that a clearly defined limitations period for parties that  xhave entered into a contract encourages unsolicited offers. A statute of limitations requires a party to  xexercise its rights within a reasonable time period. Parties that do not exercise their rights within the  S' x_limitations period forego those rights.h6X;S {O 'ԍ51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions  50 (1970).h After the limitations period has elapsed, the parties may  xrenegotiate the terms of an existing contract without fear that the negotiations could lead to the filing of a program access complaint.  S ' e 21.` ` EchoStar asserts that the Bureau's erroneous decision has the effect of rewarding Fox for  xZits retraction of the offer. EchoStar maintains that if the offer had not been retracted and led to a new  xcontract, the new contract would have restarted the statute and allowed a program access complaint to be  x}brought. EchoStar believes this decision signals to MVPDs who believe their existing contracts are  xdiscriminatory to accept contract offers they know are discriminatory in order to have a cause of action  SX'when the limitations period will not let them bring an action under the existing contract.F7X;S yO'ԍEchoStar Petition at 14.F  S' e 22.` ` We disagree with EchoStar's contention. The Bureau's decision is not intended to reward  xeither party. The decision allows the parties to receive the benefits of the contract they entered subject  xto program access scrutiny for one year. Under EchoStar's view, the Commission must arbitrate program  xaccess disputes between EchoStar and Fox for the entire period that a contract exists between them  xbecause at any time, one of the parties may seek to renegotiate it. As discussed above, such a situation  x<is precisely what the program access limitations period is intended to avoid. EchoStar believes the  xdecision signals to MVPDs to accept discriminatory contract offers in order to have a cause of action when  S' xthe statute of limitations has run on an existing contract.18z;S {O 'ԍId.1 Again, we disagree with EchoStar. If, after  xDthe one year limitations period has expired, a vertically integrated programmer offers new contract terms,  xan MVPD is free to accept or reject those terms in its business judgement. If the MVPD finds the new  xZterms acceptable, it will contract with the programmer. If the terms are unacceptable, the MVPD will  xreject them and continue under the existing contract. We do not believe that MVPDs will generally enter  xinto contracts that they believe to be discriminatory, based on the possibility that the Commission will in  x<the future rule favorably on a program access claim. However, if a MVPD does contract with the  S'vertically integrated programmer, it will have one year from the date of such contract to bring its claim.I9 ;S {O$'ԍOrder, 13 FCC Rcd at 21849.I "` 9,`(`(88"Ԍ S'ԙ(r III. ORDERING CLAUSES Đ\  S' e   23.` ` Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for reconsideration filed by program  xaccess complaint filed by EchoStar Communications Corporation against Fox/Liberty Networks LLC, Fox  S8'Sports Net LLC and Fox Sports Direct IS DENIED.  S' e W24.` ` This action is taken by the Chief, Cable Services Bureau, pursuant to authority delegated  S'by Section 0.321 of the Commission's rules.?:;S yO( 'ԍ 47 C.F.R.  0.321.? ` `  hhCFEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ` `  hhCDeborah A. Lathen ` `  hhCChief, Cable Services Bureau