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                            Before the
                Federal Communications Commission
                      Washington, D.C. 20554


In the Matter of                   )
                              )
Telecommunications Services             )         CS Docket No. 95-184
Inside Wiring                      )
                              )
Customer Premises Equipment             )
                              )
                              )
In the Matter of                   )
                              )
Implementation of the Cable             )    
Television Consumer Protection          )         MM Docket No. 92-260
and Competition Act of 1992:            )
                              )
Cable Home Wiring                  )



              FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING


Adopted:  August 27, 1997                         Released:  August 28, 1997

By the Commission: 

Comment Date:  September 25, 1997
Reply Comment Date:  October 2, 1997

                        Table of Contents
                                                    Paragraph No.

I.   Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
II.  Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
III. Further Notice on Cable Inside Wiring in Multiple Dwelling Unit Buildings10
     A.   Comments in Response to Inside Wiring Notice . . . . 10
     B.   The Competitive Landscape. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     C.   Disposition of Home Run Wiring . . . . . . . . . . . 32
                         1.   Building-by-Building Disposition of Home Run Wiring35
          2.   Unit-by-Unit Disposition of Home Run Wiring . . 39
          3.   Ownership of Home Run Wiring. . . . . . . . . . 44
          4.   Impact on Incumbent Video Service Providers . . 46
          5.   Application of Procedural Framework . . . . . . 48
          6.   Statutory Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
          7.   Constitutional Arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . 70
     D.   Disposition of Cable Home Wiring . . . . . . . . . . 73
          1.   Building-by-Building Disposition of Home Wiring 75
          2.   Unit-by-Unit Disposition of Home Wiring . . . . 79
     E.   Alternatives to Procedural Framework . . . . . . . . 83
IV.  Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis . . . . . . . 87
V.   Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis. . . . . . . . .108
VI.  Procedural Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .110
VII. Ordering Clauses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113

               Appendix A:    Parties that Filed Comments and Reply Comments regarding the Issues
          Discussed in this Further Notice
               Appendix B:    Time Line Summary of Building-by-Building Wiring Disposition Procedures
Appendix C:    Time Line Summary of the Unit-by-Unit Wiring Disposition Procedures
Appendix D:    Proposed Rules


I.   INTRODUCTION

     1.   This Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("Further Notice") sets forth specific proposals
for addressing certain issues raised in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CS Docket No. 95-184 ("Inside
Wiring Notice") and the First Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
MM Docket 92-260 ("Cable Home Wiring Further Notice") regarding potential changes in our telephone
and cable inside wiring rules in light of the evolving telecommunications marketplace.  The issues raised in
this Further Notice are intended to supplement the issues already discussed in the Inside Wiring Notice and
the Cable Home Wiring Further Notice.

     2.   As described below, we believe that our inside wiring rules could more effectively promote
competition and consumer choice, but believe that the record would benefit from additional comment on our
specific proposals.  We stress that the Commission intends to act quickly on these proposals.  The proposals
herein are set forth in great detail and generally are limited to a single issue:  the disposition of cable inside
wiring in multiple dwelling unit buildings ("MDUs") upon termination of service.  In addition, our proposals
herein are similar to a proposal first made by the Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association
("ICTA") in its initial comments in this proceeding, described more fully by ICTA in an ex parte letter to
the Commission, and discussed by interested parties in ex parte letters.  Accordingly, and in light of the
extensive comments and ex parte meetings and comments received in response to the Inside Wiring Notice
and the Cable Home Wiring Further Notice, we have set shorter deadlines than usual for interested parties
to file comments and reply comments.  We ask parties to refrain from filing comments that are repetitive of
their comments filed in response to the Inside Wiring Notice and the Cable Home Wiring Further Notice. 
All such comments will be considered as part of the record filed in response to this Further Notice to the
extent they remain relevant.

     3.   The extensive record in this proceeding reflects a range of issues beyond those raised in this
Further Notice, including, among other things:  (1) the competitive impact of exclusive service contracts;
(2) the ability of alternative telecommunications carriers to obtain access to telephone inside wiring; (3) the
feasibility of multiple entities providing service simultaneously over a single wire; and (4) the applicability
of our cable signal leakage rules to other multichannel video programming distributors ("MVPDs").  We
intend to address those issues in subsequent action in this docket.

     4.   In this Further Notice, we tentatively conclude that we should adopt new procedural
mechanisms that will provide certainty regarding use of the "home run" wiring in MDUs (which runs from
the point at which the wiring becomes dedicated to serving an individual subscriber to the demarcation point)
upon termination of service.  We also propose to apply our rules regarding the disposition of cable inside
wiring to all MVPDs using broadband wiring.  In addition, we propose to modify our cable home wiring
rules so that they will operate in harmony with these proposed procedures for home run wiring. 


II.  BACKGROUND

     5.   Section 16(d) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
(the "1992 Cable Act"), codified at Section 624(i) of the Communications Act, requires the Commission
to "prescribe rules concerning the disposition, after a subscriber to a cable system terminates service, of any
cable installed by the cable operator within the premises of such subscriber."  In February 1993, the
Commission issued a Report and Order implementing Section 624(i) (the "Cable Wiring Order").  The
Cable Wiring Order provided that when a subscriber voluntarily terminates cable service, the operator is
required, if it proposes to remove the wiring, to inform the subscriber:  (1) that he or she may purchase the
wire; and (2) what the per-foot charge is.  If the subscriber declined to purchase the home wiring, the
operator was required to remove it within 30 days or make no subsequent attempt to remove it or to restrict
its use.  These rules were designed to advance Section 624(i)'s goals of avoiding the disruption of having
the wiring removed and permitting subscribers to use the wiring with an alternative video service provider.

     6.   We further provided that the subscriber may purchase the cable home wiring inside his or
her premises up to the demarcation point.  As in the telephone context, a demarcation point generally is the
point at which a service provider's system wiring ends and the customer-controlled wiring begins.  From the
customer's point of view, this point is significant because it defines the wiring that he or she may own or
control.  For purposes of competition, the demarcation point is significant because it defines the point where
an alternative service provider may attach its wiring to the customer's wiring in order to provide service.  

     7.   For MDUs with non-"loop-through" wiring, the cable demarcation point was set at (or
about) 12 inches outside of where the cable wire enters the subscriber's individual dwelling unit.  Generally,
in a non-loop-through configuration, each subscriber in an MDU has a dedicated line (often called a "home
run") running to his or her premises from a common "feeder line" or "riser cable" that serves as the source
of video programming signals for the entire MDU.  The riser cable typically runs vertically in a multi-story
building (e.g., up a stairwell) and connects to the dedicated home run wiring at a "tap" or "multi-tap," which
extracts portions of the signal strength from the riser and distributes individual signals to subscribers. 
Depending on the size of the building, the taps are usually located in a security box (often called a "lockbox")
or utility closet located on each floor, or at a single point in the basement.  Each time the riser cable
encounters a tap its signal strength decreases.  In addition, the strength of a signal diminishes as the signal
passes through the coaxial cable.  As a result, cable wiring often requires periodic amplification within an
MDU to maintain picture quality.  Amplifiers are installed at periodic intervals along the riser based upon
the number of taps and the length of coaxial cable within the MDU.  Non-cable video service providers
typically employ a similar inside wiring scheme, except that many of them (e.g., multichannel multipoint
distribution services ("MMDS"), satellite master antenna services ("SMATV") and direct broadcast satellite
("DBS") providers) use wireless technologies to deliver their signal to an antenna on the roof of an MDU,
and then run their riser cable down from the roof to the taps and dedicated home run wires. 

     8.   In January 1996, the Commission issued the Cable Home Wiring Further Notice and the
Inside Wiring Notice.  In the Cable Home Wiring Further Notice, among other things, the Commission
clarified that, during the initial telephone call in which a subscriber voluntarily terminates cable service, if
the operator owns and intends to remove the home wiring, it must inform the subscriber:  (1) that the cable
operator owns the home wiring; (2) that it intends to remove the home wiring; (3) that the subscriber has a
right to purchase the home wiring; and (4) what the per-foot replacement cost and total charge for the wiring
would be, including the replacement cost for any passive splitters attached to the wiring on the subscriber's
side of the demarcation point.  Where an operator fails to adhere to these procedures, it is deemed to have
relinquished immediately any and all ownership interests in the home wiring, and thus, is not entitled to
compensation for the wiring and may make no subsequent attempt to remove it or restrict its use.  If the
cable operator informs the subscriber of his or her rights and the subscriber agrees to purchase the wiring,
constructive ownership over the home wiring will transfer immediately to the subscriber, who may authorize
a competing service provider to connect with and use the home wiring.  If, on the other hand, the subscriber
declines to purchase the home wiring, the operator has seven business days to remove the wiring or make
no subsequent attempt to remove it or restrict its use.

     9.   In the Inside Wiring Notice, we sought comment on "whether and how our wiring rules can
be structured to promote competition both in the markets for multichannel video programming delivery and
in the market for telephony and advanced telecommunications services."  In particular, we requested
comment on whether and where the Commission should establish a common demarcation point for wireline
communications networks, whether we should continue to establish demarcation points based on the services
provided over facilities (i.e., telephony or cable), or whether we should create demarcation points based upon
the nature of the facilities ultimately used to deliver the service (i.e., narrowband termination facilities or
broadband termination facilities).  We noted that we "recognize that numerous other factors may affect the
proper location of the cable network's demarcation point, as well as one's control over cable inside wiring
and cable service generally."  We also sought comment on the "legal and practical impediments faced by
telecommunications service providers in gaining access to subscribers."


     III. FURTHER NOTICE ON CABLE INSIDE WIRING IN MULTIPLE DWELLING UNIT
     BUILDINGS

     A.   Comments in Response to Inside Wiring Notice

     10.  The main purpose of this Further Notice is to solicit comment on a procedural framework
for the disposition of cable home run wiring in MDUs.  This home run wiring has already been the subject
of substantial debate in this proceeding.  In the Inside Wiring Notice, we sought comment on, among other
things, moving the cable demarcation point to encompass the cable home run wiring within our cable home
wiring rules.  Since the comments received regarding the cable demarcation point are relevant to
understanding the proposed procedural framework on which we seek additional comment, we will
summarize those comments briefly.

     11.  Many commenters argue that the current cable demarcation point in MDUs (at or about 12
inches outside of where the cable wire enters the subscriber's individual dwelling unit) is anticompetitive. 
These commenters assert that, as a physical matter, the cable wiring at the demarcation point is often
embedded in brick, plaster, or cinder blocks, or encased in conduits or moldings, particularly in older
MDUs.  These commenters state that, as a practical matter, a large majority of property owners refuse to
allow installation of a second set of cable wires in their buildings due to the risk of property damage, space
limitations and aesthetic concerns.  Alternative MVPDs contend that property owners routinely insist that
a competitor to the incumbent cable operator may only provide service to the consumers residing in the
MDU if the competitor uses the existing wiring within the building.  These commenters assert that, given
the growing number of MDU residents, this is a significant nationwide problem.

     12.  Alternative providers make several different proposals.  Most commenters urge the
Commission to establish a new cable demarcation point at the point at which the wiring becomes solely
dedicated to an individual subscriber -- e.g., at the lockbox, where the riser cable connects to each unit's
dedicated home run wiring.  Other proposals include:  (1) placing the cable demarcation point at the
minimum point of entry, as it typically is located in the telephone context; (2) moving the cable
demarcation point to a location near the entry to the building, such as a basement, telephone vault or
frameroom; and (3) placing the cable demarcation point within the MDU's common areas where existing
wiring is first readily accessible to competitors. 

     13.  Alternative service providers argue that moving the cable demarcation point to the point
where the wiring becomes dedicated to an individual unit will promote competition in the video marketplace. 
They assert that adopting their proposal would allow an alternative service provider, upon termination of the
incumbent provider's service by a subscriber, to attach its network quickly and easily to the wiring solely
dedicated to the individual subscriber's use.  They also argue that this new demarcation point would permit
a second entrant to provide service without disrupting hallway walls or ceilings, or installing additional
hallway molding in order to conceal a second set of home run wiring.  These commenters contend that this
would greatly increase property owners' willingness to allow them to enter the building and compete, thereby
fostering competition and enhancing consumer choice.

     14.  Some commenters that advocate moving the cable demarcation point to the "solely
dedicated" point, as described above, urge the Commission to deem the MDU property owner the
"subscriber" for purposes of Section 624(i) and to allow the property owner to purchase the home run wiring
upon termination of the cable service.  These commenters argue that to permit a tenant to purchase the
wiring would constitute an impermissible taking of the property owner's property, would be beyond the
Commission's authority under Section 624(i), and would not be sound policy since only the MDU owner
has a long term interest in the property and the services available to the MDU.

     15.  As an alternative to moving the cable demarcation point, ICTA proposes that the
Commission adopt a procedural mechanism that it argues would accomplish many of the same objectives. 
ICTA's proposal would apply to MDUs where the entire building converts to the service of a new provider
and where the MDU owner does not already own the wiring in the building by operation of law or pursuant
to private contractual arrangements.  Under ICTA's proposal, an MDU owner would provide written notice
of the conversion to the incumbent provider at least 90 days prior to the date of the conversion.  Within 30
days of the receipt of notice, the incumbent video provider in turn would give written notice to the owner
that it has elected one of the following three options:  (1) removal of the inside wiring, except the wiring
within each individual unit and that portion extending twelve inches outside thereof, which either the tenant
(under the Commission's existing rules) or the owner (under ICTA's proposal) will have purchased;
(2) abandonment of such inside wiring without disabling it; or (3) sale of such inside wiring to the owner
or the new provider.

     16.  If the incumbent chooses to sell the wiring, it would then have 30 days to negotiate the sale
with the MDU owner or new provider.  If the parties are unable to agree to terms for the sale, the incumbent
must choose between the other two options (i.e., removal or abandonment) and disconnect its feeder lines
(without disabling the wiring) at the end of the failed negotiation period or complete the removal of the
wiring within 30 days from that date.  ICTA states that its model would only work if the Commission
establishes an enforcement mechanism to ensure that the incumbent provider adheres to its initial election,
acts within the specified time frames and abides by whatever terms may be negotiated for a sale of the
wiring.  ICTA's proposal does not specify the form such an enforcement mechanism would take.  

     17.  ICTA also stated that a modified version of its proposal could apply in those situations where
there are two providers serving an MDU and a tenant intends to switch from its current provider to the other
provider, such as might arise in an access state or where an MDU owner has determined that there should
be two providers.  In that instance, ICTA proposes that the tenant would notify the other provider of its
intent to receive that provider's service, either orally or in writing.  Within seven days of that notice, the other
provider would notify the tenant's current provider of the request.  The current provider then would have
seven days in which to negotiate a sale, with the tenant or owner, of that portion of the inside wiring
dedicated to that tenant's unit, excluding the cable home wiring which either the tenant will already have
purchased pursuant to the Commission's existing cable home wiring rules under Section 624(i) or the owner
will have purchased as empowered under the ICTA model.  ICTA proposed that, if the providers are unable
to reach agreement on the terms of the sale, the current provider must either formally abandon and
disconnect this wiring (without disabling) at the end of the failed negotiation period, or remove the wiring
within seven days.  The current provider would be required to notify the other provider in writing of which
election it has chosen.

     18.  Cable operators generally argue that the Commission should not modify the current cable
demarcation point in MDUs.  Some cable operators argue that the alternative service providers have failed
to support their assertions that the current cable demarcation point is often inaccessible and that the cost of
installing additional home run wiring is prohibitive.  Cable operators contend that they often are the second
entrant into an MDU, and that in such circumstances they install their own inside wiring, including home
runs.  In addition, some cable operators assert that alternative service providers typically assuage concerns
of landlords through compensation for access to the MDU, which they claim cable operators may be
precluded by law from doing.  Alternatively, Charter/Comcast urges the Commission to move the
demarcation point for broadband services inside the customer's premises, such as to the wall plate.

     19.  Cable operators argue that moving the cable demarcation point would restrict their ability
to compete to provide telephony and other telecommunications services, such as Internet access, if a
subscriber chose a competitor's video services.  They assert that consumers would benefit from additional
broadband wires to their premises, since they could then have the flexibility of receiving different services
from different providers, rather than simply choosing among service providers.  Cable operators argue that
they should be permitted to maintain control over their wire in order to compete to provide such services,
rather than have to relinquish their wire to a competitor and be forced to re-wire in the future.

     20.  Cable operators also argue that allowing competitors to take over the cable operators'
existing plant would undercut their incentives to upgrade and deploy end-to-end broadband networks.  Cox
states that it is not surprising that telephone companies and other alternative service providers favor a rule
that allows them to take over the cable operator's plant, since this allows them to reduce costs while also
protecting them from competition from cable operators in the provision of telephony, video and data
services.  Some cable commenters contend that moving the cable demarcation point would slow network
upgrades in areas with a high concentration of MDUs and disadvantage those subscribers residing in MDUs
vis-a-vis subscribers residing in single family homes.

     21.  The end result of moving the cable demarcation point in MDUs, according to cable
operators, would be a "one-wire world" in which the MDU owner or manager would become the
"gatekeeper" with the power to determine which services and service providers have access to subscribers. 
Some cable commenters believe that the premises owner will generally promote its own interests at the
expense of subscribers residing in the building.  These parties believe that, rather than enhancing property
owners' power to control access to MDUs, the property owners' power should be minimized, in order to
promote competition and enhance consumer choice.

     22.  In reply, GTE disputes the claim that moving the demarcation point necessarily "would lead
to a one-wire world and would discourage the offering of new services."  GTE states that, if a building
owner wants to allow service providers to duplicate the wiring that exists in its structure, there is nothing in
the current rules preventing this.  Similarly, ICTA argues that moving the demarcation point would not
discourage investment because a cable operator may protect itself by obtaining a property owner's agreement
guaranteeing the operator access to the property for a period of time sufficient for the operator to recoup its
investment in the wiring and make a reasonable profit.

     23.  Alternative service providers also dispute the cable industry's argument that moving the
cable demarcation point would impair cable operators' ability to offer additional services because the
operator will no longer control the existing home run wiring.  WCA asserts that this is a consumer decision
and that MDU subscribers will do what all consumers do when choosing among providers -- i.e., evaluate
the options and determine which one will provide the highest quality service at the lowest price.  WCA
believes it would be anti-competitive for the cable operator to hold a subscriber hostage to the operator's
video programming service only because the cable operator may offer telephony or other services in the
future.  In addition, ICTA argues that the cable industry should not be able to use its competitive advantage
with respect to video programming, which results from its control over inside wiring, to inhibit competition
in other markets as well.

     24.  Finally, some commenters contest cable operators' arguments that property owners will
function as anti-competitive gatekeepers if the cable demarcation point is changed.  First, these parties state
that the cable industry's arguments ignore property owners' incentives to act in tenants' best interests if the
owners want to avoid vacancies in their buildings.  These parties add that the cable industry ignores the
"thousands of times" landlords seek to act in the best interests of their tenants but are "hamstrung" by cable
operators' assertions of ownership over wiring, even after the cable operator's service has been terminated. 
Second, some commenters argue that the issue is not whether there will be or should be a gatekeeper to an
MDU, but whether the property owner or the cable operator would make a better gatekeeper.  Ameritech,
for instance, believes that given cable operators' incentives to preclude competition as compared with
property owners' incentives to maintain and attract tenants, the property owners are the better candidates to
act in the tenants' interests. 

          B.   The Competitive Landscape

     25.  The evidence in this proceeding leads us to conclude that more is needed to foster the ability
of subscribers who live in MDUs to choose among competing service providers.  Based on the record
evidence, we believe that one of the primary competitive problems in MDUs is the difficulty for some
service providers to obtain access to the property for the purpose of running additional home run wires to
subscribers' units.  The record indicates that MDU property owners often object to the installation of multiple
home run wires in the hallways of their properties, for reasons including aesthetics, space limitations, the
avoidance of disruption and inconvenience, and the potential for property damage.  According to ICTA,
"[v]irtually all property owners refuse to allow installation of a second set of separate cable wires . . . 
[because] . . . [p]ost-wiring a building generally negatively impacts the appearance of the property because
[the wiring] cannot be hidden without tampering with the structure of the building."

     26.  We believe that property owners' resistance to the installation of multiple sets of home run
wiring in their buildings may deny MDU residents the ability to choose among competing service providers,
thereby contravening the purposes of the Communications Act, and particularly Section 624(i), which was
intended to promote consumer choice and competition by permitting subscribers to avoid the disruption of
having their home wiring removed upon voluntary termination and to subsequently utilize that wiring for
an alternative service.  We believe that the impact is substantial.  As of 1990, there were almost 31.5
million MDUs in the United States, comprising approximately 28% of the nationwide housing market. 
Moreover, the trend between 1980 and 1990 indicates that the number of MDUs is growing at a much faster
rate than the number of single family dwellings.  Data also shows that MDUs make up between 32% and
84% of the housing market in cities with the greatest numbers of households receiving cable service.

     27.  Although some cable operators argue that the current demarcation rules should be
maintained in order to encourage property owners to permit the installation of multiple sets of wires, the
record does not demonstrate that the current cable home wiring rules, having been in place for four years,
provide adequate incentives for MDU property owners to permit the installation of multiple home run wires. 
Time Warner submitted information seeking to support the proposition that competition within MDUs is
steadily growing in Manhattan.  Time Warner states that in 1992, prior to adoption of the current
demarcation rules, only 17 MDUs received services from both Liberty (a SMATV operator) and Time
Warner (a cable operator), and that this number grew to 57 in 1993, to 91 in 1994, to 120 in 1995, and finally
to 143 buildings in 1996.  

     28.  We believe that the presence of multiple wires in 143 buildings in Manhattan does not
demonstrate that our rules provide adequate incentives to MDU owners to permit multiple home run wires
in their buildings.  While Time Warner's letter did not state the total number of MDUs in Manhattan, it
appears that 143 MDUs represent only a small fraction of the total.  Moreover, while Time Warner alleges
an overall increase in the number of buildings with at least two providers, the number of new buildings being
served by both providers has declined each successive year since 1993 -- i.e., from 40 new buildings between
1992 and 1993, to 34 between 1993 and 1994, to 29 between 1994 and 1995, to only 23 new competitive
buildings between 1995 and 1996. 

     29.  In addition, the 143 MDUs served by both Time Warner and Liberty may also stem from
unique circumstances.  First, as Time Warner itself has argued in our cable home wiring docket, Liberty may
have enjoyed certain advantages over other alternative service providers in gaining access to MDUs. 
Similarly, Time Warner's ability to install wiring in Manhattan MDUs already served by Liberty may result
in part from Time Warner's mandatory access rights under New York state law.  Under New York law, an
MDU owner cannot deny Time Warner access to its property in order to serve the MDU's residents.  Liberty,
and other non-cable video service providers do not enjoy such mandatory access rights in New York. 
Nationally, fewer than 20 states have enacted some form of mandatory access statute (most of which appear
to benefit only the franchised cable operator).  Notably, Time Warner cites only one example of two-wire
competition in the states in which it operates without the benefit of mandatory access statutes.  Time
Warner's evidence of two-wire competition in MDUs outside of Manhattan consists of "approximately a
dozen" apartment complexes in Harrisonburg, Virginia, which are served by both Time Warner Cable and
a wireless cable provider.  Time Warner Cable operates 18 systems in California, 17 systems in Louisiana,
57 systems in North Carolina, 28 systems in South Carolina and 45 systems in Texas, none of which have
state mandatory cable access laws, and yet Time Warner cites no examples of two-wire competition in these
states.

     30.  An ex parte submission from Cablevision, another cable operator, appears to support our
belief.  Cablevision lists 353 MDUs in its service areas in which two broadband wires have been installed. 
Of these 353 MDUs, Cablevision was the second entrant in 338 (over 95% of the cases).  Thus, non-cable
MVPDs have overbuilt Cablevision in only 15 MDUs in the same areas in which Cablevision has overbuilt
non-cable video service providers 338 times.  Cablevision states that its installation of second wires in these
MDUs is part of its franchise obligation to serve all residences where there is a request for service.  We note,
however, that Cablevision's examples of MDU overbuilds are all from New York, Connecticut,
Massachusetts and New Jersey, all of which have cable mandatory access statutes.  Cablevision has cited
no instances of overbuilds in the states in which it operates without mandatory access statutes, such as
Alabama (25 systems), Kentucky (17 systems), Missouri (40 systems) and North Carolina (17 systems). 
Based on the foregoing, we believe that the presence of multiple wires in the MDUs cited by Cablevision
is substantially due to the existence of state mandatory access statutes and not to a desire for multi-wire
competition on the part of property owners.  Accordingly, we find that the record does not demonstrate that
our current rules are adequate to promote competition and consumer choice in MDUs by encouraging
property owners to install multiple home run wires.

     31.  We believe that disagreement over ownership and control of the home run wire substantially
tempers competition.  The record indicates that, where the property owner or subscriber seeks another video
service provider, instead of responding to competition through varied and improved service offerings, the
incumbent provider often invokes its alleged ownership interest in the home run wiring.  Incumbents invoke
written agreements providing for continued service, perpetual contracts entered into by the incumbent and
previous owner, easements emanating from the incumbent's installation of the wiring, assertions that the
wiring has not become a fixture and remains the personal property of the incumbent, or that the incumbent's
investment in the wiring has not been recouped, and oral understandings regarding the ownership and
continued provision of services.  Written agreements are frequently unclear, often having been
consummated in an era of an accepted monopoly, and state and local law as to their meaning is vague. 
Invoking any of these reasons, incumbents often refuse to sell the home run wiring to the new provider or
to cooperate in any transition.  The property owner or subscriber is frequently left with an unclear
understanding of why another provider cannot commence service.  The litigation alternative, an option rarely
conducive to generating competition, while typically not pursued by the property owner or subscriber, can
be employed aggressively by the incumbent.  The result is to chill the competitive environment.   

          C.   Disposition of Home Run Wiring

     32.  We propose to establish procedures for building-by-building disposition of the home run
wiring (where the MDU owner decides to convert the entire building to a new video service provider) and
for unit-by-unit disposition of the home run wiring (where an MDU owner is willing to permit two or more
video service providers to compete for subscribers on a unit-by-unit basis) where the MDU owner wants the
alternative provider to be able to use the existing home run wiring.  We believe that these procedural
mechanisms will not create or destroy any property rights, but will promote competition and consumer
choice by bringing order and certainty to the disposition of the MDU home run wiring upon termination of
service.  

     33.  In today's marketplace, alternative video service providers have no timely and reliable way
of ascertaining whether they will be able to use the existing home run wiring upon a change in service.  As
explained above, MDU owners are similarly unsure of their legal rights.  Because of this uncertainty, an
MDU owner seeking to change providers may be confronted with choosing among:  (1) allowing the
alternative provider to install duplicative home run wiring before it knows whether the incumbent will
abandon the existing home run wiring when it leaves; (2) waiting to see what the incumbent does with the
home run wiring when it leaves the building, risking a potential disruption in service to its residents;
(3) staying with the incumbent provider; or (4) allowing the alternative provider to use the home run wiring
and risking litigation.  The proposed procedures are intended to provide all parties sufficient notice and
certainty of whether and how the existing home run wiring will be made available to the alternative video
service provider so that a change in service can occur efficiently.  We tentatively conclude that establishing
rules governing the disposition of the MDU home run wiring will represent a substantial step toward
increased competition in the MDU video programming service marketplace.

     34.  We propose that the procedural mechanisms described below would apply only where the
incumbent provider no longer has an enforceable legal right to remain on the premises against the will of the
MDU owner.  In other words, these procedures would not apply where the incumbent provider has a
contractual, statutory or common law right to maintain its home run wiring on the property.  In the building-
by-building context, the procedures below would not apply where the incumbent provider has a legally
enforceable right to maintain its home run wiring on the premises against the MDU owner's wishes and
prevent any third party from using the wiring; in the unit-by-unit context, the procedures below would not
apply where the incumbent provider has a legally enforceable right to keep a particular home run wire
dedicated to a particular unit (not including the wiring on the subscriber's side of the demarcation point) on
the premises against the property owner's wishes.  We are not proposing to preempt an incumbent's ability
to rely upon any rights it may have under state law.  We seek comment on the impact of this condition on
the efficacy of our proposal, and how any adverse effects should be addressed.  In particular, we seek
comment on whether the Commission can and should create any presumptions or other mechanisms
regarding the relative rights of the parties if the incumbent's right to maintain its home run wiring on the
premises is disputed.  For example, we seek comment on a presumption that the incumbent does not possess
an enforceable legal right to maintain its home wiring on the premises (and therefore that our proposed
procedures would apply), unless the incumbent can adduce a clear contractual or statutory right to remain. 
 
          1.   Building-by-Building Disposition of Home Run Wiring

     35.  We seek comment on the following proposal:  where the incumbent service provider owns
the home run wiring in an MDU and does not (or will not at the conclusion of the notice period) have a
legally enforceable right to remain on the premises, and the MDU owner wants to be able to use the existing
home run wiring for service from another provider, the MDU owner may give the incumbent service
provider a minimum of 90 days' notice that the provider's access to the entire building will be terminated. 
The incumbent provider would then have 30 days to notify the MDU owner in writing of its election to do
one of the following for all the home run wiring inside the MDU:  (1) to remove the wiring and restore the
MDU to its prior condition by the end of the 90-day notice period; (2) to abandon and not disable the wiring
at the end of the 90-day notice period; or (3) to sell the wiring to the MDU owner.  If the incumbent
provider elects to remove or abandon the wiring, and it intends to terminate service before the end of the 90-
day notice period, the incumbent provider would be required to notify the MDU owner at the time of this
election of the date on which it intends to terminate service.  If the MDU owner refuses to purchase the home
run wiring, the alternative video service provider may purchase it.

     36.  We are concerned that an incumbent provider may initially elect to remove its home run
wiring and then decide to abandon it.  Such conduct could put the alternative service provider to the
unnecessary burden and expense of installing a second set of home run wires when the incumbent has no
intention of removing the existing wiring.  We seek comment on whether to adopt penalties for incumbent
providers that elect to remove their home run wiring and then fail to do so.  

     37.  Where the incumbent provider elects to sell the home run wiring, our preference is to let the
parties negotiate the price of the wiring.  We seek comment on whether market forces would provide
adequate incentives for the parties to reach a reasonable price.  If market forces are insufficient, we seek
comment on how a reasonable price should be established.  For instance, we seek comment on whether:  (1)
the Commission should establish broad guidelines within which negotiations would occur (e.g., a reasonable
price should be more than a nominal amount but should not include the incumbent provider's lost opportunity
costs); (2) the price should be left to negotiations between the parties but the Commission should establish
a default price if the parties cannot reach an agreement; or (3) the Commission should establish a general
rule or formula for determining a reasonable price.  If parties believe that the Commission should establish
guidelines, a default price, a general rule or formula, we seek comment on the type of guidelines, default
price, general rule or formula that should be established.

     38.  We propose that, if the parties negotiate a price, they would have 30 days from the date of
election to negotiate a price for the home run wiring.  The parties could also negotiate to purchase additional
wiring (e.g., riser cables) at their option.  If the parties are unable to agree on a price, the incumbent would
be required to elect one of the other two options (i.e., abandonment or removal) and notify the MDU owner
at the time of this election if and when it intends to terminate service before the end of the 90-day notice
period.  If the incumbent service provider elects to abandon its wiring at this point, the abandonment would
become effective at the end of the 90-day notice period or upon service termination, whichever occurs first. 
Similarly, if the incumbent elects to remove its wiring and restore the building to its prior condition, it would
have to do so by the end of the 90-day notice period.  If the incumbent failed to comply with any of the
deadlines established herein, it would be deemed to have elected to abandon its home run wiring at the end
of the 90-day notice period.

          2.   Unit-by-Unit Disposition of Home Run Wiring

     39.  We also seek comment on the following proposal for unit-by-unit disposition of home run
wiring.  Where the incumbent video service provider owns the home run wiring in an MDU and does not (or
will not at the conclusion of the notice period) have a legally enforceable right to maintain its home run
wiring on the premises, the MDU owner may permit multiple service providers to compete head-to-head
in the building for the right to use the individual home run wires dedicated to each unit.  We propose that,
where an MDU owner wishes to permit such head-to-head competition, the MDU owner must provide at
least 60 days' notice to the incumbent provider of the owner's intention to invoke the following procedure. 
The incumbent service provider would then have 30 days to provide the MDU owner with a written election
as to whether, for all of the incumbent's home run wires dedicated to individual subscribers who may later
choose the alternative provider's service, it will:  (1) remove the wiring and restore the MDU to its prior
condition; (2) abandon the wiring without disabling it; or (3) sell the wiring to the MDU owner.  In other
words, the incumbent service provider would be required to make a single election for how it will handle the
disposition of individual home run wires whenever a subscriber wishes to switch video service providers;
that election would then be implemented each time an individual subscriber switches service providers.  The
alternative service provider would be required to make a similar election within this same 30-day period for
any home run wiring that the alternative provider subsequently owns (i.e., after the alternative provider has
purchased the wiring from the current incumbent provider) and that is solely dedicated to a subscriber who
switches back from the alternative provider to the incumbent.  We also tentatively conclude that it would
streamline and expedite the process to permit the alternative service provider or the MDU owner to act as
the subscriber's agent in providing notice of a subscriber's desire to change services.  We tentatively
conclude that unauthorized changes in service (i.e., "slamming") are unlikely to occur in this context; if
slamming does occur, however, we would propose to take additional steps to protect consumers, such as
requiring proof of agency.    

     40.  As with the proposed building-by-building procedures, we would prefer to let the parties
negotiate for the sale of the home run wiring, and we seek comment on whether market forces will produce
a reasonable price.  If market forces are not adequate, we seek comment on the appropriate mechanism for
establishing a reasonable price for the home run wiring.  We propose that, if one or both of the video service
providers elects to negotiate for the sale of the home run wiring, the parties have 30 days from the date of
such election to reach an agreement.  During this 30-day negotiation period, the incumbent, the MDU owner
and/or the new provider could also work out arrangements for an up-front lump sum payment in lieu of a
unit-by-unit payment.  An up-front lump sum payment would permit either service provider to use the home
run wiring to provide service to a subscriber without the administrative burden of paying separately for each
home run wire every time a subscriber changes providers.  We also propose that, if the parties cannot agree
on a price, the incumbent provider would be required to elect one of the other two options (i.e., abandonment
or removal).  If the incumbent fails to comply with any of the deadlines established herein, we propose to
treat the home run wiring as abandoned and permit the alternative provider to use the home run wiring
immediately to provide service. 

     41.  We propose that, after completion of this initial process, a provider's election would be
carried out if and when the provider is notified either orally or in writing that a subscriber wishes to
terminate service and that an alternative service provider intends to use the existing home run wire to provide
service to that particular subscriber.  At that point, a provider that has elected to remove its home run wiring
would have seven days to do so and to restore the building to its prior condition.  We tentatively conclude
that seven days is adequate for removal because we believe that, unlike in the building-by-building context,
the provider would only be required to remove a single home run wire.  If the current service provider has
elected to abandon or sell the wiring, the abandonment or sale would become effective seven days from the
date it receives a request for service termination or upon actual service termination, whichever occurs first. 
We would propose that, if the incumbent provider intends to terminate service prior to the end of the seven-
day period, the incumbent would be required to inform the subscriber or the subscriber's agent (whichever
is notifying the incumbent that the subscriber wishes to terminate service) at the time of the request for
service termination of the date on which service will be terminated.  In addition, we would propose to require
the incumbent provider to disconnect the home run wiring from its lockbox and to leave it accessible for the
new provider by the end of the seven-day period or within 24 hours of actual service termination, whichever
occurs first.  

     42.  We base the above procedures on the assumption that the alternative service provider will
have an incentive to ensure that the incumbent is notified that the alternative service provider intends to use
the existing home run wire to provide service.  To the extent this assumption is inaccurate, we seek comment
on how the incumbent's election regarding the home run wiring in the unit-by-unit context should be
triggered efficiently and so as to minimize disruption of service.  If the subscriber's service is simply
terminated without any indication that a competing service provider wishes to use the home run wiring, the
incumbent service provider would not be required to carry out its election to sell, remove or abandon the
home run wiring.  This might occur, for instance, where an MDU tenant is moving out of the building.  In
such cases, we do not believe that it would be appropriate to require the incumbent to sell, remove or
abandon the home run wiring when it might have every reasonable expectation that the next tenant will
request its service.  We would propose, however, that the incumbent provider would be required to carry out
its election with regard to the home run wiring if and when it receives notice from a subsequent tenant (either
directly or through an alternative provider) that the tenant wishes to use the home run wiring to receive a
competing service.  

     43.  Moreover, even where the incumbent receives a request for service termination but does not
receive notice that an alternative provider wishes to use the home run wiring, we would still propose to
require the incumbent to follow the procedures set forth in our cable home wiring rules -- e.g., to offer to sell
to the subscriber any cable home wiring that the incumbent provider otherwise intends to remove.  First, the
required notice in the unit-by-unit context may be effected in two stages (i.e., the subscriber may call to
terminate service and the alternative provider may separately notify the incumbent that it wishes to use the
home run wiring).  In order for the home run wiring and the home wiring to be disposed of in a coordinated
manner, we therefore believe that our cable home wiring rules must apply upon any termination of service. 
In addition, we believe that subscribers should have the right to purchase their home wiring to protect
themselves from unnecessary disruption associated with removal of home wiring, regardless of whether they
intend to subscribe to an alternative service.  

          3.   Ownership of Home Run Wiring

     44.  In both the building-by-building and unit-by-unit approaches, we propose to give the MDU
owner the initial option to negotiate for ownership and control of the home run wiring because the property
owner is responsible for the common areas of a building, including safety and security concerns, compliance
with building and electrical codes, maintaining the aesthetics of the building and balancing the concerns of
all of the residents.  Moreover, vesting ownership of the home run wiring in the MDU owner, as opposed
to the alternative service provider, will reduce future transaction costs since the above procedures will not
need to be repeated if service is subsequently switched again.  Nevertheless, we recognize that some MDU
owners may not want to own the home run wiring in their buildings; we propose that in such cases the
alternative service provider should be permitted to purchase the wiring.

     45.  We do not believe that individual subscribers would be disadvantaged by having the MDU
owner own the home run wiring.  If a subscriber has the ability to choose between multiple service providers
in the unit-by-unit context, the MDU owner has already concluded that it is willing to permit multiple service
providers on the premises in order to compete for subscribers.  Given that the MDU owner would have
voluntarily opened its building to multiple competitors, we do not believe that the MDU owner would deny
a resident the ability to use the home run wiring for the resident's provider of choice.  Furthermore, we
believe that, if the alternative service provider purchases the home run wiring, that provider would not be
able to act as a bottleneck and the individual subscriber would continue to be protected because, as described
herein, the alternative service provider would also be subject to these same procedures if and when the
alternative provider's service is terminated.

                         4.   Impact on Incumbent Video Service Providers

     46.  We tentatively conclude that cable operators' argument that the loss of their home run wiring
eliminates their ability to provide other telecommunications services is misplaced.  Cable operators' ability
to compete in the telephony market should be largely unaffected.  The procedures proposed herein apply
where the incumbent has no legally enforceable right to remain on the premises and the MDU owner and/or
the individual subscriber has selected another provider's package -- notwithstanding the incumbent's other
telecommunications services.  Given MDU owners' resistance to the installation of multiple home run wires,
we tentatively conclude that affording consumers a choice among various packages offered by multiple
service providers is better than the current situation, in which MDU residents often have no choice at all. 
Under our proposal, MDU owners would remain free to implement the type of multiple-wire model
advocated by the cable industry by requiring all service providers to install their own home run wires.

     47.  Cable operators also complain that property owners often act as "gatekeepers" in selecting
a service provider and pursue their own interests rather than the interests of their residents.  While we
acknowledge how these circumstances can exist, we tentatively conclude that where the real estate market
is competitive it will discourage MDU owners from ignoring their residents' interests.  In addition, the
rules we propose do not grant MDU owners any additional rights, but simply establish a procedural
mechanism for MDU owners to enforce rights they already have.  Moreover, in the unit-by-unit context, the
MDU owner would be expanding its residents' choices, not restricting them.

                         5.   Application of Procedural Framework

     48.  In both the building-by-building and unit-by-unit contexts, one of our goals is to promote
competition and consumer choice by minimizing any potential disruption in service to a subscriber switching
video service providers.  To that end, we have proposed certain rules herein designed to give the subscriber
reasonable notice if and when his or her service will be terminated prior to the end of the applicable notice
period.  In addition, we would propose to adopt a general rule requiring the parties to cooperate to ensure
as seamless a transition as possible.  We seek comment on whether it is necessary to promulgate such a rule,
or whether a provider's desire to win the subscriber back will compel the provider to cooperate during the
transition period.

     49.  We also propose that the above procedural mechanisms would apply regardless of the
identity of the incumbent video service provider involved.  While initially this incumbent would commonly
be a cable operator, it could also be a SMATV provider, an MMDS provider, a DBS provider or others.

                         6.   Statutory Authority

               a.   Background

     50.  Throughout the record of this proceeding, commenters have presented widely disparate
views on the Commission's authority to address a range of proposals regarding inside wiring.  Most of these
comments are directed at the Commission's authority to move the cable demarcation point in MDUs.  We
therefore only briefly summarize them here.

     51.  In general, cable operators argue that Congress expressed its preference for two-wire,
facilities-based competition in the 1996 Act, and that any Commission rule that forces a cable operator to
relinquish ownership or control over the home run portion of its network is inconsistent with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act").  In addition, cable operators argue that Section 652
of the Communications Act, which generally promotes facilities-based competition by prohibiting a local
exchange carrier ("LEC") from purchasing a cable company within its service area and a cable operator from
purchasing a LEC within its franchise area, contains a "Joint Use" Provision that strengthens their claim that
Congress intended that they retain control over the home run wiring.  Cable operators contend that the
plain language of Section 652 clearly permits a LEC to use a portion of the cable operator's facilities from
the last multi-user terminal to the subscriber's premises, but only with the operator's consent, and only for
a short period of time.  Finally, cable operators contend that the Commission's authority under Section
624(i), which directs the Commission to "prescribe rules concerning the disposition, after a subscriber to a
cable system terminates service, of any cable installed by the cable operator within the premises of such
subscriber," is limited to wiring within the apartment of an MDU subscriber. 

     52.  In response, some commenters challenge the cable operators' implication that facilities-based
competition requires alternative providers to install redundant and unnecessary cables all the way to
subscribers' individual dwelling units, including "every last item down to the nail and the staple."  In
addition, alternative service providers argue that the cable operators misinterpret the Joint Use Provision as
limiting the Commission's authority to relocate the cable demarcation point in MDUs.  Bartholdi states
that Congress intended the Joint Use Provision to:  (1) apply only to those cable facilities that are located
between the street and the home; and (2) allow telephone companies to share use of such facilities without
violating the prohibition against joint ventures contained in Section 652 of the 1996 Act.  Moreover,
alternative service providers state that the Joint Use Provision merely describes the circumstances in which
a telephone company may share a cable operator's wire, whereas Section 624(i) addresses the disposition of
the wiring after a cable operator's service has been terminated. 

     53.  Finally, several commenters assert that the Commission's authority to regulate cable inside
wiring is not limited by Congress' enactment of the 1992 Cable Act, including Section 624(i).  Section
624(i) mandates the Commission to establish rules for the disposition of "cable installed . . . within the
premises of such subscriber."  These commenters note that "premises" is not defined in the
Communications Act and urge the Commission to define the term to encompass wiring that is solely
dedicated to an individual dwelling unit.  Such a definition, they argue, would further the goals of the 1992
Cable Act, which include fostering competition in the monopolistic cable marketplace. 

               b.   Discussion

     54.  We believe that the Commission has authority under Sections 4(i) and 303(r) of the
Communications Act to establish procedures for the disposition of MDU home run wiring upon termination
of service.  Section 4(i) permits the Commission to "perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution of
its functions."  The Commission may properly take action under Section 4(i) even if such action is not
expressly authorized by the Communications Act, as long as the action is not expressly prohibited by the Act
and is necessary to the effective performance of the Commission's functions.  We propose to invoke Section
4(i) here because the law does not expressly prohibit the Commission from adopting procedures regarding
the disposition of home run wiring and because affording the widest range of competitive opportunities is
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Communications Act. 

     55.  Section 4(i) has been held to justify various Commission regulations that were not within
explicit grants of authority.  In these cases, the courts found that the Commission's regulations were not
inconsistent with the Communications Act because they did not contravene an express prohibition or
requirement of the Act, and were reasonably "necessary and proper" for the execution of the agency's
enumerated powers.  Most recently, in Mobile Communications Corp. v. FCC, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged the Commission's authority under Section 4(i)
to regulate even where the Communications Act does not explicitly authorize such action.  In that case, the
D.C. Circuit held that the Commission had authority under 4(i) to require Mtel, which held a pioneer's
preference, to pay for a narrowband personal communications service ("PCS") license, despite the fact that
the Act did not specifically authorize the Commission to charge a price for a license granted to a pioneer's
preference holder.  The court denied Mtel's argument that the Commission's action was inconsistent with
the Communications Act and therefore not within the Commission's Section 4(i) power.  Mtel argued that
Congress' explicit grant of authority to the Commission to collect certain fees and to conduct auctions for
specified types of licenses denied the Commission authority to impose other fees.  The court found Mtel's
reliance on the expressio unius maxim -- that the expression of one is the exclusion of other -- misplaced. 
According to the court, "[t]he maxim 'has little force in the administrative setting,' where we defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute unless Congress has "'directly spoken to the precise question at issue.'" 
The court also denied Mtel's argument that, in the absence of an affirmative statutory mandate to support the
payment requirement, the Commission's action was not "necessary in the execution of [the Commission's]
functions," as required by Section 4(i).

     56.  Applying these principles here, we conclude that the Commission is authorized under
Section 4(i) to establish procedures regarding the disposition of MDU home run wiring upon termination
of service.  First, establishing rules regarding the disposition of the home run wiring upon termination is
necessary to the execution of the Commission's functions.  As noted above, Section 624(i) directs the
Commission to prescribe rules regarding the disposition of wiring within a subscriber's premises in order to
promote consumer choice and competition by permitting subscribers to avoid the disruption of having their
home wiring removed upon voluntary termination and to subsequently utilize that wiring for an alternative
service.  We believe that, under our current rules, we cannot fully meet those objectives in the MDU context
because, as described above, MDU owners often will not permit multiple home run wires to be installed in
their buildings.  In order to promote consumer choice and competition, we therefore propose to prescribe
additional rules regarding the disposition of the existing home run wiring upon termination of service.  

     57.  Further, we propose to premise our decision to establish procedures regarding the disposition
of home run wiring in MDUs on the Communications Act's fundamental purpose of "regulating interstate
and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all
people of the United States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communications service . . . ."  Moreover, we propose to premise our decision on the pervasive regulatory
structure Congress established regarding cable communications, the goal of which is to replicate or
encourage competitive conditions.  Section 601 of the Communications Act states that one of the purposes
of Title VI is to promote competition in cable communications.  Due to the lack of competitive alternatives
in multichannel video programming services, Congress has authorized the Commission to ensure that basic
cable services, including equipment, are available at reasonable rates, to ensure that cable programming
service rates are not unreasonable, and to establish standards whereby cable operators fulfill customer
service requirements.

     58.  We believe that establishing procedures regarding the disposition of MDU home run wiring
will assist the Commission in discharging its statutory obligations under Section 623(b) and its overall
responsibility to pursue Congress' preference for competition stated in the 1992 Cable Act.  Section 623(b)
of the Communications Act requires the Commission to prescribe rules to ensure that rates for basic cable
service are "reasonable" and that such regulations "shall include standards to establish, on the basis of actual
cost, the price or rate for . . . installation and lease of equipment used by subscribers . . . ."  The regulations
authorized by Section 623(b) cover "equipment used by subscribers to receive the basic cable service tier,
including . . .  equipment as is required to access programming . . . ."  The term "equipment" under Section
623(b) includes cable inside wiring.  This extensive authority seeks to foster enhanced services to the
subscriber at reasonable prices.

     59.  We believe that establishing the above procedures regarding the disposition of MDU home
run wiring is necessary to fulfill Section 623(b)'s mandate of reasonable basic cable rates.  We believe that
these procedures will provide advance certainty for property owners, alternative video service providers and
subscribers regarding the disposition of the home run wiring when the existing service is terminated, thereby
alleviating current circumstances that deter the property owner from considering alternative service providers
and fostering competition among service providers.  We believe that such competitive choice will exert a
restraining influence on rates as service providers compete for the opportunity to serve the entire building
or individual subscribers.

     60.  Moreover, in the 1992 Cable Act, Congress specifically embraced a "[p]reference for
competition" over regulation in setting rates for cable services.  Fostering competition among service
providers through the adoption of rules regarding the disposition of MDU home run wiring is a fundamental
means to ensure that cable service rates remain "reasonable."  The legislative history of Section 623(b) states
that Congress agreed that "[r]ather than requiring the Commission to adopt a formula to establish the price
for equipment, the Commission is given the authority to choose the best method of accomplishing the goals
of this legislation."  We therefore find that it is within our scope of authority under the 1992 Cable Act to
establish procedural mechanisms that encourage reasonable rates through a competitive environment rather
than a regulatory one. 

     61.  Finally, we believe that our proposed approach would help to fulfill Congress' mandate in
the 1996 Act to "provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to
accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies
and services to all Americans."  We believe that adoption of the above procedural mechanisms would
enhance competition, fostering the deployment of innovative technologies and expanded services.    

     62.  We believe that the above provisions authorize the Commission not only to establish
regulations duplicating the behavior of a competitive market, but to take actions that prompt the evolution
of a true competitive environment.  Based on the record before us, we find that failing to establish such
procedures would continue existing barriers to competitive choice for individuals residing in MDUs. 
Individuals residing in MDUs often are currently limited to receiving service from only one provider. 
Although we recognize that subscriber choice would be enhanced by the use of multiple wires, we do not
believe that requiring MDU owners to permit multiple wires is a viable option at this point in time.  We
believe that the inability of the MDU owner to use the existing home run wiring deters consideration of
alternative providers, and that providing certainty with regard to the disposition of the MDU home run wiring
provides a reasonable means of increasing choice and promoting competition. 

     63.  We also conclude that, in accordance with the second part of Section 4(i), the procedural
mechanisms we are proposing are not inconsistent with any provision of the law.  Nothing in the language
of Section 624(i) prohibits the Commission from adopting rules concerning wiring outside the subscriber's
premises.  This is not a circumstance where the general canon of statutory construction, the "specific
governs the general," applies.  The courts have found this canon applicable only where there "is an
'inescapable conflict' between the specific provision and the general provision."  Section 624(i) does not
expressly prohibit the Commission from adopting rules affecting home run wiring.  Thus, we tentatively
conclude that there is no "inescapable conflict" between Section 624(i) and the procedures discussed
below.  To the contrary, as described above, we believe that the rules we are proposing will further
promote Section 624(i)'s underlying purpose of promoting consumer choice and competition by permitting
subscribers to use their existing home wiring to receive an alternative video programming service.  Finally,
as the Mtel court found, the expressio unius maxim -- that the expression of one is the exclusion of other --
"'has little force in the administrative setting,' where we defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute unless
Congress has "'directly spoken to the precise question at issue.'"  Indeed, the Mtel court stated:  "[W]e
think the nature of Congress's auction authorization more supports than undermines the Commission's
decision here."   

     64.  While the legislative history of Section 624(i) indicates that Congress was concerned about
the potential for theft of service and signal leakage, we believe that the rules we are proposing would
not have an adverse impact on those concerns.  First, we do not believe that the procedural mechanisms we
are proposing will increase the frequency of service theft; a provider's control over its network security is
unaffected by our rules.  Our proposed rules do not give the MDU owner, the alternative service provider
or the subscriber access to the incumbent's riser cable or lockbox.  Second, our proposed rules would not
affect the service provider's signal leakage responsibilities.  It would remain the duty of the provider to
protect against signal leakage while it is providing service, regardless of who owns the home run wiring in
the building.

     65.  We also think that cable operator reliance on the "Joint Use" provision of the 1996 Act
(codified at Section 652(d)(2) of the Communications Act) as evidence of Congress' intent that cable
operators retain ownership and control of the home run wiring is misplaced.  Section 652(d)(2) provides
generally that a LEC may obtain permission from the cable operator to use that part of the transmission
facilities extending from the last multi-user terminal to the premises of the end user, and that such use must
be reasonably limited in scope and duration.  Cable operators assert that this provision invests them with
ownership and control of all cable wiring outside the subscriber demarcation point, including the home run
wiring, even after a subscriber terminates service, as Congress otherwise would not have established rules
allowing cable operators to set the terms and conditions for a LEC's use of the facilities.  

     66.  We disagree.  Notably, Section 652(d)(2) is entitled "Joint Use," indicating Congress' intent
for the provision to govern only the joint use of the facilities by a cable operator and a local exchange carrier. 
It is an exception to the general prohibition in Section 652(c) on joint ventures or partnerships between cable
operators and LECs that serve the same market area.  We believe that Section 652(d)(2) does not constrain
our authority to establish procedures governing the disposition of the home run wiring because the provision
only addresses use of the wiring while the cable operator continues to own or use the facilities.  Here, the
procedural mechanisms would not apply until the cable operator has no legally enforceable right to remain
on the premises and the MDU owner and/or subscriber terminates the operator's service.

     67.  Additionally, we believe that had Congress intended the "Joint Use" provision to govern
cable wiring, it would have placed the provision in Section 624, which sets forth the existing wiring
provisions, rather than in Section 652, which concerns telephone company-cable television cross-ownership
restrictions.  We also agree with alternative video service providers that Congress would have enumerated
additional types of potential users of cable operators' wiring, other than telephone companies, if it had
intended this provision to cover uses of the wiring other than the limited situation of wiring being shared
between a LEC and a cable operator.

     68.  We believe that we have authority to apply all our cable inside wiring rules to all MVPDs,
and not just to cable operators.  Section 303(r) of the Communications Act authorizes the Commission, as
required by public convenience, interest, or necessity, to promulgate rules and restrictions, not inconsistent
with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act.  We believe that applying these rules
to over-the-air video service providers would be in the public interest.  The same competitive concerns
described above exist regardless of whether a cable operator or some other video service provider initially
installed a subscriber's or an MDU's inside wiring.  In addition, we believe that applying our cable home
wiring rules to MVPDs that are radio licensees would not be inconsistent with Section 624(i) and would
further its purposes, since subscribers could use their existing inside wiring to receive an alternative service. 
Further, for similar reasons to those discussed above in proposing procedures for disposition of the home
run wiring in MDUs for cable operators, such procedures would not be inconsistent with Section 624(i) if
applied to MVPDs that are radio licensees.  

     69.  In addition, we tentatively conclude that we have the authority under Sections 201 to 205
of the Communications Act to extend our cable inside wiring rules to common carriers engaged in the
transmission of video programming.  We tentatively conclude that Section 4(i) also invests the
Commission with authority to expand our rules in this manner with regard to MVPDs that are neither radio
licensees nor common carriers.  Again, we tentatively conclude that the same competitive concerns are
present regardless of the type of service provider that initially installs the broadband inside wiring.  In
addition, we tentatively conclude that such an extension of our rules is necessary in the execution of our
functions and is not inconsistent with the Communications Act, as described above.  To promote parity
among broadband competitors and to fulfill the directives of the 1992 Cable Act and the 1996 Act, we
propose to apply our cable inside wiring rules to all MVPDs.

          7.   Constitutional Arguments

               a.   Background

     70.  As with the statutory authority issue, most commenters raised constitutional arguments in
the context of a proposal to move the cable demarcation point.  Generally, cable operators contend that
moving the cable demarcation point would constitute a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments
to the U.S. Constitution.  According to Cox and other cable operators, because the Communications Act
limits the Commission's authority over cable wiring to wiring "within the premises of the subscriber," the
Commission may not effectuate a taking of the home run wiring.  In addition, cable operators assert that
"simply adopting a 'just compensation' formula is not the answer here."  NCTA argues that the
Commission cannot provide for adequate compensation to a cable operator for the "lost opportunity costs
resulting from this unlawful seizure."  Paying the cable operator for the "replacement cost" of the wiring
would not compensate the operator for its lost opportunity to compete in the provision of telecommunications
services, and would contradict the policy of fostering facilities-based competition.

     71.  Alternative service providers state that the Commission has already rejected the cable
operators' takings argument with respect to the wiring within the individual subscriber's unit, and that moving
the demarcation point farther from the individual dwelling unit is irrelevant to any further takings analysis. 
Alternative service providers also state that relocating the demarcation point would not be an impermissible
taking because the cable operator always has the right and opportunity to remove the wiring before it is
forfeited and the cable operator would be compensated for its wiring.  Alternative service providers also
dispute the cable operators' claim that "just compensation" must include lost opportunity costs, arguing that
any lost opportunities arise from the subscriber's decision to terminate the cable operator's service, not as
a matter of law.  In addition, these parties state that cable operators typically installed the wiring many
years earlier, and have more than fully recouped their investment. 
               b.   Discussion

     72.  We tentatively conclude that the procedural mechanisms we have proposed do not constitute
an impermissible "taking" under the Fifth Amendment.  First, there is no forced taking of the incumbent's
physical property, since the incumbent has a reasonable opportunity to remove, abandon, or sell the wiring. 
If the incumbent fails to act within the reasonable periods set forth and its wiring is deemed abandoned, it
is the operator's failure to act, not the Commission's rule, that would extinguish the cable operator's rights. 
The Fifth Amendment cannot be construed to allow a service provider with no contractual or other legal right
to remain on a person's property to leave its wiring on the property indefinitely and prohibit the property
owner from using it.  In addition, there can be no taking of the incumbent's access rights because the
procedures expressly apply only where the incumbent does not have a contractual, statutory or other legal
right to maintain its wiring on the premises.  We seek comment on these tentative conclusions.

     D.   Disposition of Cable Home Wiring

     73.  We believe that fostering competitive choice in MDUs requires the coordinated disposition
of two segments of cable wiring:  (1) the home run wiring from the point where the wiring becomes devoted
to an individual unit to the cable demarcation point; and (2) the cable home wiring from the demarcation
point to the subscriber's television set or other customer premises equipment.  Without clear and predictable
rules for the disposition of each of these segments, an alternative provider's ability to convince an MDU
owner or individual subscriber to switch services could be significantly compromised.  The procedural
framework proposed above addressed the disposition of MDU home run wiring.  Here, we set forth a specific
proposal on how to address certain issues regarding the disposition of MDU cable home wiring.  We believe
that these rules will promote competition and consumer choice by providing a comprehensive and workable
framework for the disposition of MDU cable wiring.
 
     74.  As in the context of home run wiring, we propose that these home wiring procedural
mechanisms apply regardless of the identity of the incumbent video service provider involved.  While
initially this incumbent would commonly be a cable operator, it could also be a SMATV provider, an MMDS
provider, a DBS provider or others.  We tentatively conclude that we have the same authority to apply these
home wiring rules to other video service providers described in Section III.C.6. above.  We request comment
on this proposal.
          1.   Building-by-Building Disposition of Home Wiring

     75.  In the Cable Home Wiring Further Notice, we requested comment on, among other issues,
whether, in order to promote the goals of Section 624(i) and our rules thereunder, the subscriber (on a non-
loop-through wiring configuration) or the building owner (with a loop-through wiring configuration) should
be given the opportunity to purchase the cable home wiring when the MDU owner terminates cable service
for the entire building.  For the most part, alternative service providers support having the cable home
wiring procedures apply where the building owner terminates service on behalf of the entire building. 
Some commenters believe that when the building owner terminates service the individual subscriber should
be given the opportunity to purchase the home wiring; others believe only the building owner should have
that right.  GTE asserts that cable "subscriber" should be defined as the one that contracts or arranges for
service.  Bell Atlantic contends that the building owner may be acting as the subscriber's authorized agent
if the subscriber agrees in its lease agreement that the landlord may terminate service.  Building Owners,
et al., oppose applying the Commission's rules under Section 624(i) when service for the entire building is
terminated, allegedly because much of the building wiring is not cable home wiring and because a landlord
is not a "subscriber" under the Commission's rules.

     76.  We tentatively conclude that, if the MDU owner has the legal right, either by law or by
contract, to terminate the subscriber's cable service, the owner terminating service for the entire building is
effectively voluntarily terminating service on the subscribers' behalf.  We therefore tentatively conclude
that our home wiring rules would be triggered when an MDU owner terminates service for the entire
building.  We tentatively conclude that providing the cable operator a single point of contact (i.e., the MDU
owner) would further the statutory purposes of minimizing disruption and facilitating the transfer of service
to a competing video service provider.  Because we believe that it would be impractical and inefficient for
the incumbent provider to deal with each individual subscriber regarding the disposition of his or her cable
home wiring when the entire MDU is switching providers, we propose to deem the MDU owner to be acting
as the terminating "subscriber" for purposes of the disposition of the cable home wiring within the individual
dwelling unit where the cable home wiring is not already owned by a resident.  We request comment on this
proposal.  Similarly, with regard to bulk service contracts, we tentatively conclude that it is logical for the
landlord to be deemed the subscriber, and thus for the landlord to have the right to purchase the wiring as
provided in our general rules.  We tentatively conclude, however, that this rule should not override a bulk
service contract that specifically provides for the disposition of the wiring upon termination of the contract. 


     77.  We propose that, when an MDU owner provides an incumbent provider with its minimum
of 90 days notice that the incumbent provider's access to the entire building will be terminated and that the
MDU owner seeks to use the home run wiring for another service, the incumbent provider must, in
accordance with our current home wiring rules, (1) offer to sell to the MDU owner any home wiring within
the individual dwelling units which the incumbent provider owns and intends to remove, and (2) provide the
MDU owner with the total per-foot replacement cost of such home wiring.  As with the home run wiring,
if the MDU owner declines to purchase the cable home wiring not already owned by a resident, the
alternative service provider could elect to purchase it upon service termination under our rules.  

     78.  We propose to require that the MDU owner decide whether it or the alternative provider will
purchase the cable home wiring and so notify the incumbent provider no later than 30 days before the
termination of access to the building will become effective.  We propose to modify our current home wiring
rules to allow the incumbent provider 30 days, rather than the current seven, to remove all of the cable home
wiring for the entire building.  We believe this is appropriate given the amount of home wiring that may need
to be removed from an entire building.  We propose that, if the MDU owner and the alternative service
provider decline to purchase the home wiring, the incumbent provider would not be permitted to remove the
home wiring until the date of actual service termination, i.e., likely 90 days after the building owner notified
the incumbent that its access to the entire building will be terminated.  Under these circumstances, we would
propose that if the incumbent provider fails to remove the home wiring within 30 days of actual service
termination, it could make no subsequent attempt to remove the wiring or restrict its use.  We request
comment on this proposal.

          2.   Unit-by-Unit Disposition of Home Wiring

     79.  In the unit-by-unit context, we propose to continue to apply our rules permitting terminating
subscribers (or their agents) to purchase the cable home wiring up to a point approximately 12 inches outside
their individual units.  We continue to believe that this is consistent with the purposes of Section 624(i)
to promote consumer choice and competition by permitting subscribers to avoid the disruption of having
their home wiring removed upon voluntary termination and to subsequently utilize that wiring for an
alternative service.  We do, however, propose to modify our rules in two ways.  First, as discussed below,
we propose to permit the MDU owner or the alternative service provider to purchase the cable home wiring
within each unit if the subscriber declines, provided that the building owner timely notifies the incumbent
provider that it or the alternative provider wants to purchase the home wiring whenever a subscriber declines. 
Second, we propose to change the time in which an incumbent provider must remove the home wiring or
make no further effort to use it or restrict its use from seven business days to seven calendar days after the
individual subscriber terminates service.  We believe that this minor change is sufficient time for removal
of a single unit's cable home wiring, and will avoid customer confusion by having the time permitted for the
provider to remove the home wiring within the individual unit run concurrently with the time permitted for
the provider to remove, sell or abandon the home run wiring outside the unit.

     80.  In the Cable Home Wiring Further Notice, we requested comment on whether the premises
owner should have the right to purchase the cable home wiring when a subscriber who voluntarily terminates
cable service does not own the premises and elects not to purchase the wiring.  Alternative service
providers contend that the premises owner should have the right to purchase the cable home wiring when
the individual subscriber declines to purchase it, if not at all times.  ICTA claims that this arrangement
would promote competition and, consistent with Section 624(i), would avoid damage, cost and
inconvenience to the owner's property.  Building Owners, et al., claim that only owner residents (as
opposed to tenants) should have the right to purchase cable home wiring in the first place.  According to
Building Owners, et al., apartment residents are transient and do not have a long term financial interest in
the property.  In addition, Building Owners, et al., contend that it is essential for the building owner to have
full control over its property, including the wiring, subject only to state property law, a lease or other
contract.  Time Warner claims that Congress did not confer benefits or opportunities on landlords. 
NCTA asserts that the wiring should be available to subsequent residents unless the operator removes the
wiring.

     81.  We tentatively conclude that an MDU owner should be permitted to purchase the wiring
within an individual dwelling unit based on the per-foot replacement cost if the individual subscriber
declines to do so.  This approach would preserve the current subscriber's rights, and still allow the building
owner to act on behalf of future tenants, thus promoting competition and consumer choice.  As with the home
run wiring, if the MDU owner declines to purchase the cable home wiring, the alternative service provider
would be permitted to purchase it.  Except with respect to the building-by-building procedure described
above, we would not require that the building owner or the alternative provider have the opportunity to
purchase the wiring before the subscriber has the opportunity to do so because we believe that Congress
intended for Section 624(i) to promote individual subscriber choice whenever possible.  Our preference is
therefore for the subscriber to control its own home wiring, and only when that is not reasonable or efficient,
for the building owner or alternative provider to control it.

     82.  We propose that the MDU owner should notify the incumbent provider of its election to
purchase or to allow the alternative provider to purchase the home wiring at the same time as the MDU
owner provides the incumbent provider with 60 days notice that it intends to allow head-to-head competition
within its building.  Thus, the MDU owner would be required to inform the incumbent provider one time for
the entire building.  If the MDU owner fails to provide the incumbent with such notice, the incumbent would
be under no obligation to sell the home wiring to the MDU owner or the alternative provider when an
individual subscriber terminates and declines to purchase the wiring.  We request comment on this proposal.

               E.   Alternatives to Procedural Framework

     83.  Recently, RCN argued that some MDU owners do not object to a second set of home run
wires but to the installation of a second set of hallway molding or conduits.  RCN asserts that in some
cases there is room in the molding or conduit for it to install its home run wiring without interfering with the
incumbent's wiring.  We propose to permit the alternative service provider to install its wiring within the
existing molding or conduit, even over the incumbent provider's objection, where there is room in the
molding or conduit and the MDU owner does not object.  We seek comment on whether and how to allow
compensation for the alternative service provider's use of the molding or conduit.  We tentatively conclude
that such a rule would promote competition and consumer choice and would not constitute a taking of the
incumbent provider's private property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.  We seek
comment on these tentative conclusions.  We also seek comment on whether and how this rule would apply
in the situation where an incumbent provider has an exclusive contractual right to occupy the molding or
conduit.

     84.  Several commenters also point out that the current cable demarcation point can be physically
inaccessible.  We tentatively conclude that where the cable demarcation point is truly physically inaccessible
to an alternative service provider (e.g., embedded in brick, metal conduit or cinder blocks, not simply within
hallway molding), the demarcation point should be moved back to the point at which it first becomes
physically accessible.  We seek comment on this tentative conclusion and on how to define "physically
inaccessible."  We also seek comment on the percentage of installations in which the demarcation point
would be deemed physically inaccessible.  Finally, we seek comment on our authority to adopt, and any other
legal implications of, this proposed modification.

     85.  We also seek comment on whether we should adopt a rule requiring video service providers
to transfer to the MDU owner upon installation ownership of the home wiring and home run wiring installed
in MDUs under contracts entered into on or after the effective date of any rules we may adopt.  Such a rule
might increase competition and consumer choice in future installations by permitting MDU owners to control
access to the home run wiring from the start.  We seek comment on the appropriate mechanism for effecting
such a transfer, whether the price for the wiring should be regulated or left to private negotiations, and
whether and how our rules should address the issue of an MDU owner that does not want to own the home
run wiring in its building.  In addition, we seek comment on our authority to adopt, and any other legal
implications of, such a rule. 

     86.  Finally, we seek comment on any other proposals to promote MVPD competition and
consumer choice in MDUs that have not already been previously raised and commented on in the Inside
Wiring Notice and the Cable Home Wiring Further Notice.  In particular, we ask commenters to address the
legal, policy and practical implications of any such proposals. 

     IV.  INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT ANALYSIS

     87.  As required by Section 603 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.  603, ("RFA"), the
Commission has prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis ("IRFA") of the expected significant
impact on small entities by the policies and rules proposed in this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 
Written public comments are requested on the IRFA.  These comments must be filed in accordance with the
same filing procedures as other comments in this proceeding, but they must be have a separate and distinct
heading designating them as responses to the IRFA.  The Secretary shall send a copy of the Further Notice,
including the IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration in accordance
with Section 603(a) of the RFA.  In addition, the Further Notice and the IRFA (or summaries thereof) will
be published in the Federal Register. 
          Need for Action and Objectives of the Proposed Rules

     88.   This Further Notice proposes to supplement the cable home wiring rules with new
procedural mechanisms to provide certainty regarding the use of MDU home run wiring upon termination
of existing service.  In addition, we propose to expand our cable inside wiring rules to apply to all MVPDs
in order to promote parity among competitors.

          Legal Basis

     89.  This Further Notice is adopted pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 201-205, 303, 623, 624, and 632
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 201-205, 303, 543, 544 and 552.

          Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities Impacted

     90.  The RFA directs the Commission to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate
of the number of small entities that will be affected by the proposed rules.  The RFA defines the term
"small entity" as having the same meaning as the terms "small business," "small organization," and "small
governmental jurisdiction," and the same meaning as the term "small business concern" under Section 3 of
the Small Business Act.  Under the Small Business Act, a "small business concern" is one which:  (1) is
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any
additional criteria established by the Small Business Administration ("SBA").  The rules we propose in
this Further Notice will affect MVPDs and MDU owners.

     91.  Small MVPDs:  SBA has developed a definition of a small entity for cable and other pay
television services, which includes all such companies generating $11 million or less in annual receipts. 
This definition includes cable system operators, closed circuit television services, direct broadcast satellite
services, multipoint distribution systems, satellite master antenna systems and subscription television
services.  According to the Bureau of the Census, there were 1423 such cable and other pay television
services generating less than $11 million in revenue that were in operation for at least one year at the end
of 1992.  We will address each service individually to provide a more succinct estimate of small entities. 

     92.  Cable Systems:  The Commission has developed its own definition of a small cable company
for the purposes of rate regulation.  Under the Commission's rules, a "small cable company" is one serving
fewer than 400,000 subscribers nationwide.  Based on our most recent information, we estimate that there
were 1439 cable operators that qualified as small cable companies at the end of 1995.  Since then, some
of those companies may have grown to serve over 400,000 subscribers, and others may have been involved
in transactions that caused them to be combined with other cable operators.  Consequently, we estimate that
there are fewer than 1439 small entity cable system operators that may be affected by the decisions and rules
proposed in this Further Notice.

     93.  The Communications Act also contains a definition of a small cable system operator, which
is "a cable operator that, directly or through an affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than 1% of all
subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any entity or entities whose gross annual revenues
in the aggregate exceed $250,000,000."  The Commission has determined that there are 61,700,000
subscribers in the United States.  Therefore, we found that an operator serving fewer than 617,000
subscribers shall be deemed a small operator if its annual revenues, when combined with the total annual
revenues of all of its affiliates, do not exceed $250 million in the aggregate.  Based on available data, we
find that the number of cable operators serving 617,000 subscribers or less totals 1450. Although it seems
certain that some of these cable system operators are affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues
exceed $250,000,000, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of cable
system operators that would qualify as small cable operators under the definition in the Communications Act.

     94.  MMDS:  The Commission refined the definition of "small entity" for the auction of MMDS
as an entity that together with its affiliates has average gross annual revenues that are not more than $40
million for the preceding three calendar years.  This definition of a small entity in the context of the
Commission's Report and Order concerning MMDS auctions has been approved by the SBA.

     95.  The Commission completed its MMDS auction in March 1996 for authorizations in 493
basic trading areas ("BTAs").  Of 67 winning bidders, 61 qualified as small entities.  Five bidders indicated
that they were minority-owned and four winners indicated that they were women-owned businesses.  MMDS
is an especially competitive service, with approximately 1573 previously authorized and proposed MMDS
facilities. Information available to us indicates that no MMDS facility generates revenue in excess of $11
million annually.  We tentatively conclude that there are approximately 1634 small MMDS providers as
defined by the SBA and the Commission's auction rules.

     96.  ITFS:  There are presently 1,989 licensed educational ITFS stations and 97 licensed
commercial ITFS stations.  Educational institutions are included in the definition of a small business. 
However, we do not collect annual revenue data for ITFS licensees and are unable to ascertain how many
of the 97 commercial stations would be categorized as small under the SBA definition.  Thus, we tentatively
conclude that at least 1,989 ITFS licensees are small businesses.

     97.  DBS:  There are presently nine DBS licensees, some of which are not currently in operation. 
The Commission does not collect annual revenue data for DBS and, therefore, is unable to ascertain the
number of small DBS licensees that could be impacted by these proposed rules.  Although DBS service
requires a great investment of capital for operation, we acknowledge that there are several new entrants in
this field that may not yet have generated $11 million in annual receipts, and therefore may be categorized
as a small business, if independently owned and operated.

     98.  HSD:  The market for HSD service is difficult to quantify.  Indeed, the service itself bears
little resemblance to other multichannel video service providers.  HSD owners have access to more than 265
channels of programming placed on C-band satellites by programmers for receipt and distribution by video
service providers, of which 115 channels are scrambled and approximately 150 are unscrambled.  HSD
owners can watch unscrambled channels without paying a subscription fee.  To receive scrambled channels,
however, an HSD owner must purchase an integrated receiver-decoder from an equipment dealer and pay
a subscription fee to an HSD programming packager.  Thus, HSD users include:  (1) viewers who subscribe
to a packaged programming service, which affords them access to most of the same programming provided
to subscribers of other video service providers; (2) viewers who receive only non-subscription programming;
and (3) viewers who receive satellite programming services illegally without subscribing.  Because
scrambled packages of programming are most specifically intended for retail consumers, these are the
services most relevant to this discussion.  

     99.  According to the most recently available information, there are approximately 30 program
packagers nationwide offering packages of scrambled programming to retail consumers.  These program
packagers provide subscriptions to approximately 2,314,900 subscribers nationwide.  This is an average
of about 77,163 subscribers per program packager.  This is substantially smaller than the 400,000 subscribers
used in the Commission's definition of a small MSO.  Furthermore, because this an average, it is likely that
some program packagers may be substantially smaller.

     100. OVS:   The Commission has certified nine open video system ("OVS") operators.  Because
these services were introduced so recently and only one operator is currently offering programming to our
knowledge, little financial information is available.  Bell Atlantic (certified for operation in Dover) and
Metropolitan Fiber Systems ("MFS," certified for operation in Boston and New York) have sufficient
revenues to assure us that they do not qualify as small business entities.  Two other operators, Residential
Communications Network ("RCN," certified for operation in New York) and RCN/BETG (certified for
operation in Boston), are MFS affiliates and thus also fail to qualify as small business concerns.  However,
Digital Broadcasting Open Video Systems (a general partnership certified for operation in southern
California), Urban Communications Transport Corp. (a corporation certified for operation in New York and
Westchester), and Microwave Satellite Technologies, Inc. (a corporation owned solely by Frank T.
Matarazzo and certified for operation in New York) are either just beginning or have not yet started
operations.  Accordingly, we tentatively conclude that three OVS licensees may qualify as small business
concerns.

     101. SMATVs:  Industry sources estimate that approximately 5200 SMATV operators were
providing service as of December 1995.  Other estimates indicate that SMATV operators serve
approximately 1.05 million residential subscribers as of September 1996.  The ten largest SMATV
operators together pass 815,740 units.  If we assume that these SMATV operators serve 50% of the units
passed, the ten largest SMATV operators serve approximately 40% of the total number of SMATV
subscribers.  Because these operators are not rate regulated, they are not required to file financial data with
the Commission.  Furthermore, we are not aware of any privately published financial information regarding
these operators.  Based on the estimated number of operators and the estimated number of units served by
the largest ten SMATVs, we tentatively conclude that a substantial number of  SMATV operators qualify
as small entities.

     102. LMDS:  Unlike the above pay television services, LMDS technology and spectrum allocation
will allow licensees to provide wireless telephony, data, and/or video services.  An LMDS provider is not
limited in the number of potential applications that will be  available for this service.  Therefore, the
definition of a small LMDS entity may be applicable to both cable and other pay television (SIC 4841)
and/or radiotelephone communications companies (SIC 4812).  The SBA definition for cable and other pay
services is defined above.  A small radiotelephone entity is one with 1500 employees or less.  For the
purposes of this proceeding, we include only an estimate of LMDS video service providers.  The vast
majority of LMDS entities providing video distribution could be small businesses under the SBA's definition
of cable and pay television (SIC 4841).  However, in the LMDS Second Report and Order, we defined a
small LMDS provider as an entity that, together with affiliates and attributable investors, has average gross
revenues for the three preceding calendar years of less than $40 million.  We have not yet received
approval by the SBA for this definition.

     103. There is only one company, CellularVision, that is currently providing LMDS video
services.  Although the Commission does not collect data on annual receipts, we assume that CellularVision
is a small business under both the SBA definition and our proposed auction rules.  We tentatively conclude
that a majority of the potential LMDS licensees will be small entities, as that term is defined by the SBA.

     104. MDU Operators:  The SBA has developed definitions of small entities for operators of
nonresidential buildings, apartment buildings and dwellings other than apartment buildings, which include
all such companies generating $5 million or less in revenue annually.  According to the Census Bureau,
there were 26,960 operators of nonresidential buildings generating less than $5 million in revenue that were
in operation for at least one year at the end of 1992.  Also according to the Census Bureau, there were
39,903 operators of apartment dwellings generating less than $5 million in revenue that were in operation
for at least one year at the end of 1992.  The Census Bureau provides no separate data regarding operators
of dwellings other than apartment buildings, and we are unable at this time to estimate the number of such
operators that would qualify as small entities.

          Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements 

     105. The Further Notice proposes rules to require that, upon termination of existing service, the
MDU operator must provide the incumbent service provider with notice of termination of the incumbent's
access to the building or of the owner's wish to permit head-to-head competition for individual home run
wires.  The MDU operator would have the option of either purchasing the wiring or allowing the alternative
provider to purchase it.  The incumbent service provider would be required to elect to sell, remove or
abandon its home run wiring and would have to complete its sales negotiations or remove its wiring within
the time schedule provided herein or be deemed to have abandoned its wiring.  The Commission's inside
wiring rules would also be expanded to apply to all MVPDs.

     106. The Further Notice requests comment on the adoption of penalties for incumbent MVPDs
that elect to remove their MDU home run wiring upon termination of service and then fail to do so. 
Incumbent providers may choose to maintain records to prove their compliance with the rules regarding
disposition of home run wiring, but we do not believe that they will need additional professional skills to
maintain such records and we propose no requirement for such recordkeeping.

     107. The Further Notice proposes a rule requiring video service providers to transfer ownership
of MDU home run wiring to the MDU owner upon installation.  Video service providers may choose to
maintain records of the home run wiring subject to such a rule, but we do not believe that they will need
additional professional skills to maintain such records and we propose no requirement for such
recordkeeping.

          Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities and
Significant Alternatives Considered:  None.  However, any significant alternatives presented in the
comments will be considered.

          Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict with the Proposed Rules: 
None.
     
V.   PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT OF 1995 ANALYSIS

     108. The requirements proposed in this Further Notice have been analyzed with respect to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (the "1995 Act") and would impose new and modified information
collection requirements on the public.  The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork
burdens, invites the general public to take this opportunity to comment on the proposed information
collection requirements contained in this Further Notice, as required by the 1995 Act.  Public comments are
due 60 days from date of publication of this Further Notice in the Federal Register.  Comments should
address:  (1) whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the
functions of the Commission, including whether the information would have practical utility; (2) the
accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (3) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collected; and (4) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on the
respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

     109. Written comments by the public on the proposed new and modified information collection
requirements are due September 25, 1997.  Comments should be submitted to Judy Boley, Federal
Communications Commission, Room 234, 1919 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554, or via the Internet
to jboley@fcc.gov.  For additional information on the proposed information collection requirements, contact
Judy Boley at 202-418-0214 or via the Internet at the above address.


VI.  PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS

     110. Ex parte Rules - "Permit-but-Disclose" Proceeding.  This proceeding will be treated as a
"permit-but-disclose" proceeding subject to the "permit-but-disclose" requirements under Section 1.1206(b)
of the rules.  47 C.F.R.  1.1206(b), as revised.  Ex parte presentations are permissible if disclosed in
accordance with Commission rules, except during the Sunshine Agenda period when presentations, ex parte
or otherwise, are generally prohibited.  Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that a
memorandum summarizing a presentation must contain a summary of the substance of the presentation and
not merely a listing of the subjects discussed.  More than a one or two sentence description of the views and
arguments presented is generally required.  See 47 C.F.R.  1.1206(b)(2), as revised.  Additional rules
pertaining to oral and written presentations are set forth in Section 1.1206(b).

     111. Filing of Comments and Reply Comments.  Pursuant to applicable procedures set forth in
Sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's Rules, 47 C.F.R.  1.415 and 1.419, interested parties may
file comments on or before September 25, 1997, and reply comments on or before October 2, 1997.  To file
formally in this proceeding, you must file an original plus four copies of all comments, reply comments, and
supporting comments.  If you want each Commissioner to receive a personal copy of your comments and
reply comments, you must file an original plus nine copies.  You should send comments and reply comments
to Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, NW, Washington, DC
20554.  Comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection during regular business hours
in the FCC Reference Center, Room 239, Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M Street NW,
Washington DC 20554.

     112. Written comments by the public on the proposed and/or modified information collections
are due September 25, 1997.  Written comments must be submitted by the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") on the proposed and/or modified information collections on or before 60 days after date of
publication in the Federal Register.  In addition to filing comments with the Secretary, a copy of any
comments on the information collections contained herein should be submitted to Judy Boley, Federal
Communications Commission, Room 234, 1919 M Street, NW, Washington, DC  20554, or via the Internet
to jboley@fcc.gov and to Timothy Fain, OMB Desk Officer, 10236 NEOB, 725 - 17th Street, NW,
Washington, DC  20503 or via the Internet to fain_t@al.eop.gov.


VII. ORDERING CLAUSES

     113. IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 201-205, 303, 623, 624 and 632 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 201-205, 303, 543, 544 and 552,
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN of proposed amendments to Part 76, in accordance with the proposals,
discussions and statements of issues in this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and that COMMENT
IS SOUGHT regarding such proposals, discussions and statements of issues.

     114. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission SHALL SEND a copy of this Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel
for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.


                         FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION


                         
                         William F. Caton
                         Acting Secretary                            APPENDIX A

          Parties That Filed Comments and Reply Comments
      regarding the Issues Discussed in this Further Notice


          Note:     If no abbreviation appears in parentheses following the full name, the full name is used in this
          Further Notice.  Unless noted as being filed solely in MM Docket No. 92-260, all comments, reply
          comments and ex parte filings referred to in this Further Notice were filed in CS Docket No. 95-184.


Comments

CS Docket No. 95-184

1st Lake Properties, Inc. ("1st Lake")
Adelphia Communications Corporation ("Adelphia")
Ameritech
AT&T Corp. ("AT&T")
Building Owners and Managers Association International, National Realty Committee,
     National Multi Housing Council, National Apartment Association, Institute of
     Real Estate Management, and National Association of Home Builders ("Building
     Owners, et al.")
Cable Telecommunications Association ("CATA")
Charter Communications, Inc. and Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. ("Charter/Comcast")
Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company ("Cincinnati Bell")
Circuit City Stores, Inc. ("Circuit City")
Community Associations Institute
Continental Cablevision, Inc. and Cablevision Systems Corporation
     ("Continental/Cablevision")
Compaq Computer Corporation ("Compaq")
Consumer Electronics Manufacturers Association ("CEMA")
Cox Communications, Inc. ("Cox")
DIRECTV, Inc. ("DIRECTV")
GTE Service Corporation ("GTE")
Guam Cable TV
Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association ("ICTA")
Information Technology Industry Council ("ITI")
Marcus Cable Company, American Cable Entertainment, Greater Media, Inc., Cable
     Television Association of Maryland, Delaware and the District of Columbia,
     Cable Television Association of Georgia, Minnesota Cable Communications
     Association, New Jersey Cable Telecommunications Association, Ohio Cable
     Telecommunications Association, Oregon Cable Television Association,
     South Carolina Cable Television Association, Tennessee Cable Television Association,
     Texas Cable TV Association ("Joint Cable Parties")
Liberty Cable Company, Inc. ("Liberty")
MFS Communications Company, Inc. ("MFS")
Media Access Project and Consumer Federation of America ("Media Access/CFA")
Multimedia Development Corp. ("Multimedia Development")
MultiTechnologies Services, L.P. ("MultiTechnologies Services")
National Cable Television Association, Inc. ("NCTA")
NYNEX Telephone Companies ("NYNEX")
OpTel, Inc. ("OpTel")
Pacific Bell and Pacific Telesis Video Services ("PacTel")
People of the State of California and the Public Untilities Commission of the State of
     California ("California PUC")
RTE Group, Inc. ("RTE")
Real Estate Board on New York, Inc.
Residential Communications Network, Inc. ("RCN")
Riser Management Systems, L.P. ("Riser Mgmt.")
State of New Jersey Board of Public Utilities ("New Jersey BPU")
TKR Cable Company ("TKR")
Tandy Corporation ("Tandy")
Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI")
Telecommunications Industry Association, User Premises Equipment Division ("TIA")
Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Communications ("Time Warner")
U S West, Inc. ("U S West")
United States Telephone Association ("USTA")
Wireless Cable Association International, Inc. ("WCA")

MM Docket No. 92-260

Ameritech New Media, Inc. ("Ameritech")
Bell Atlantic Companies ("Bell Atlantic")
Building Owners and Managers Association International, National Realty Committee,
     National Multi Housing Council, National Apartment Association, Institute of
     Real Estate Management, and National Association of Home Builders ("Building
     Owners, et al.")
Cable Telecommunications Association ("CATA")
GTE Service Corporation ("GTE")
Independent Cable and Telecommunications Association ("ICTA")
National Cable Television Association, Inc. ("NCTA")
New York City Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications
     ("New York City")
NYNEX Telephone Companies ("NYNEX")
OpTel, Inc. ("OpTel")
Pacific Bell and Pacific Telesis Video Services ("PacTel")
Time Warner Cable ("Time Warner")


Reply Comments

CS Docket No. 95-184

Ameritech 
AT&T Corp. ("AT&T")
Bartholdi Cable Company, Inc. ("Bartholdi")
Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies ("Bell Atlantic")
Building Owners and Managers Association International, National Realty Committee,
     National Multi Housing Council, National Apartment Association, Institute
     of Real Estate Management, National Association of Real Estate Investment
     Trusts ("Building Owners, et al.")
Cable Telecommunications Association ("CATA")
Consumer Electronics Manufacturers Association ("CEMA")
Cablevision Systems Corporation and Continental Cablevision, Inc. ("Continental/Cablevision")
Cox Communication, Inc. ("Cox")
GTE Service Corporation ("GTE")
Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association ("ICTA")
Marcus Cable, Co., American Cable Entertainment, Greater Media, Inc., TCA Cable TV, Inc.,
     Cable Television Association of Maryland, Delaware and the District of Columbia,
     Cable Television Association of Georgia, Minnesota Cable Communications
     Association, New Jersey Cable Telecommunications Association, Ohio Cable
     Telecommunications Association, Oregon Cable Telecommunications Association,
     South Carolina Cable Television Association, Tennessee Cable Television Association,
     Texas Cable Telecommunications Association ("Joint Cable Parties")
OpTel, Inc. ("OpTel")
Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Communications Holdings, Inc. ("Time Warner")
United States Telephone Association ("USTA")
Wireless Cable Association International, Inc. ("WCA")

MM Docket No. 92-260

Ameritech New Media, Inc. ("Ameritech")
                            APPENDIX D

                          Proposed Rules


Part 76 of title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 76 -- CABLE TELEVISION SERVICE

1.   The authority citation for Part 76 would continue to read as follows:

     AUTHORITY:  47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 153, 154, 301, 302, 303, 303a, 307, 308, 309, 312, 315, 317,
325, 503, 521, 522, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 543, 544, 544a, 545, 548, 552, 554, 556, 558, 560,
561, 571, 572, 573.

2.   Section 76.5 is proposed to be amended by revising paragraph (mm)(2) to read as follows:

 76.5 Demarcation Point.

* * * * *

(mm) * * *

(2)  For new and existing multiple dwelling unit installations with non-loop-through wiring configurations,
the demarcation point shall be a point at or about twelve inches outside of where the cable wire enters the
subscriber's dwelling unit, or, where the wire is physically inaccessible at such point, as close as practicable
thereto so as to permit access to the cable home wiring.

3.   Section 76.802 is proposed to be amended by revising paragraphs (a) and (g) and by adding new
paragraphs (l), (m) and (n) to read as follows:

 76.802 Disposition of cable home wiring.

     (a) (1) Upon voluntary termination of cable service by a subscriber in a single unit dwelling, a cable
operator shall not remove the cable home wiring unless it gives the subscriber the opportunity to purchase
the wiring at the replacement cost, and the subscriber declines.  If the subscriber declines to purchase the
cable home wiring, the cable system operator must then remove the cable home wiring within seven days
of the subscriber's decision, under normal operating conditions, or make no subsequent attempt to remove
it or to restrict its use.

     (2)  Upon voluntary termination of cable service by an individual subscriber in a multiple dwelling
unit building, a cable operator shall not remove the cable home wiring unless it gives the subscriber the
opportunity to purchase the wiring at the replacement cost, the subscriber declines, and the owner of the
multiple dwelling unit building's common areas (referred to herein as the "MDU owner") has not previously
elected to purchase or have the alternative MVPD purchase the cable home wiring when a subscriber
declines, as provided in paragraph (l) hereof.  If the subscriber declines to purchase the cable home wiring,
and, the MDU owner has not elected to purchase or have the alternative MVPD purchase the cable home
wiring, the cable system operator must then remove the cable home wiring within seven days of the
subscriber's decision, under normal operating conditions, or make no subsequent attempt to remove it or to
restrict its use.

     (3)    Upon voluntary termination of cable service for an entire multiple dwelling unit building by
the MDU owner, a cable operator shall not remove the cable home wiring unless it gives the MDU owner
the opportunity to purchase the wiring at the replacement cost, and the MDU owner declines either to
purchase the wiring or to allow the alternative MVPD to purchase the wiring.  If the MDU owner declines
to purchase or have the alternative MVPD purchase the cable home wiring, the cable system operator must
then remove the cable home wiring no later than 30 days, under normal operating conditions, after it is
notified of the MDU owner's decision, or make no subsequent attempt to remove it or to restrict its use.

     (4)  The cost of the cable home wiring is to be based on the replacement cost per foot of the wiring
on the subscriber's side of the demarcation point multiplied by the length in feet of such wiring, and the
replacement cost of any passive splitters located on the subscriber's side of the demarcation point.

* * * * *

(g)  delete the word "business" where provision refers to "seven business days."

* * * * *

     (l) If a subscriber who is not the owner of the premises terminates service and declines to purchase
the cable home wiring under this section, the owner of the multiple dwelling unit building's common areas
(referred to herein as the "MDU owner") may purchase it under the same terms and conditions provided in
subsection (a) hereof, provided that the MDU owner notified the cable system operator of its desire to
purchase the cable home wiring in the event the subscriber declines.  Such notification must occur no later
than the time at which the MDU owner provides the incumbent MVPD 60 days' notice of the MDU owner's
intention to invoke the procedure set forth in Section 76.804(b).

     (m) Where an entire multiple dwelling unit building is switching service providers, the MDU owner
shall be permitted to exercise the rights of individual subscribers for purposes of the disposition of the cable
home wiring under this section.  If the MDU owner declines to purchase the cable home wiring, the MDU
owner may allow the alternative provider to purchase it upon service termination under this section.

     (n) This section shall apply to all multichannel video programming distributors, as that term is
defined in Section 602(13) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.  522(13), in the same manner as it applies
to cable operators.

4.   Section 76.804 is proposed to be added to read as follows:

 76.804  Disposition of Home Run Wiring

     (a)  Building-by-building disposition of home run wiring:  (1) Where an MVPD owns the home run
wiring in a multiple dwelling unit building ("MDU") and does not (or will not at the conclusion of the notice
period) have a legally enforceable right to remain on the premises against the wishes of the entity that owns
the common areas of the MDU ("the MDU owner"), the MDU owner may give the MVPD a minimum of
90 days' notice that its access to the entire building will be terminated.  The MVPD will then have 30 days
to elect, for all the home run wiring inside the MDU building:  (i) to remove the wiring and restore the MDU
building to its prior condition by the end of the 90-day notice period; (ii) to abandon and not disable the
wiring at the end of the 90-day notice period; or (iii) to sell the wiring to the MDU building owner.  If the
incumbent provider elects to remove or abandon the wiring, and it intends to terminate service before the
end of the 90-day notice period, the incumbent provider shall notify the MDU owner at the time of this
election of the date on which it intends to terminate service.  If the MDU owner refuses to purchase the home
run wiring, an alternative provider that has been authorized to provide service to the MDU by the MDU
owner may negotiate to purchase the wiring.  For purposes of this section, "home run wiring" shall refer to
the wiring from the point at which the MVPD's wiring becomes devoted to an individual subscriber to the
demarcation point.

     (2)  If the parties negotiate a price for the home run wiring, they shall have 30 days from the date
of election to negotiate a price.  If the parties are unable to agree on a price, the incumbent must elect one
of the other two options (i.e., abandonment or removal) and notify the MDU owner at the time of this
election if and when it intends to terminate service before the end of the 90-day notice period.  If the
incumbent service provider elects to abandon its wiring at this point, the abandonment shall become effective
at the end of the 90-day notice period or upon service termination, whichever occurs first.  If the incumbent
elects to remove its wiring and restore the building to its prior condition, it must do so by the end of the 90-
day notice period.  If the incumbent fails to comply with any of the deadlines established herein, it shall be
deemed to have elected to abandon its home run wiring at the end of the 90-day notice period.  

     (b)  Unit-by-unit disposition of home run wiring:  (1) Where an MVPD owns the home run wiring
in an MDU and does not (or will not at the conclusion of the notice period) have a legally enforceable right
to maintain any particular home run wire dedicated to a particular unit on the premises against the MDU
owner's wishes, an MDU owner may permit multiple MVPDs to compete for the right to use the individual
home run wires dedicated to each unit.  The MDU owner must provide 60 days' notice to the incumbent
MVPD of the MDU owner's intention to invoke this procedure.  The incumbent MVPD will then have 30
days to provide a single written election to the MDU owner and the competing MVPD(s) whether, for each
and every one of its home run wires dedicated to a subscriber who chooses an alternative provider's service,
the incumbent MVPD will:  (i) remove the wiring and restore the MDU building to its prior condition; (ii)
abandon the wiring without disabling it; or (iii) sell the wiring to the MDU owner.  If the MDU owner
refuses to purchase the home run wiring, the alternative provider may purchase it.  The alternative
provider(s) will be required to make a similar election within this 30-day period for each home run wire
solely dedicated to a subscriber who switches back from the alternative provider to the incumbent MVPD. 


     (2) When an existing MVPD is notified either orally or in writing that a subscriber wishes to
terminate service and that another service provider intends to use the existing home run wire to provide
service to that particular subscriber, an existing provider that has elected to remove its home run wiring will
have seven days to remove its home run wiring and restore the building to its prior condition.  If the existing
provider has elected to abandon or sell the wiring, the abandonment or sale will become effective seven days
from the date it received the request for service termination or upon actual service termination, whichever
occurs first.  If the incumbent provider intends to terminate service prior to the end of the seven-day period,
the incumbent shall inform the party requesting service termination, at the time of such request, of the date
on which service will be terminated.  The incumbent provider shall make the home run wiring accessible to
the alternative provider by the end of the seven-day period or within 24 hours of actual service termination,
whichever occurs first. 
 
     (3)  If the incumbent provider fails to comply with any of the deadlines established herein, the home
run wiring shall be considered abandoned and the alternative provider shall be permitted to use the home run
wiring immediately to provide service.  The alternative provider or the MDU owner may act as the
subscriber's agent in providing notice of a subscriber's desire to change services.  If a subscriber's service
is terminated without notifying the incumbent provider that the subscriber wishes to use the home run wiring
to receive an alternative service, the incumbent provider will not be required to carry out its election to sell,
remove or abandon the home run wiring; the incumbent provider will be required to carry out its election,
however, if and when it receives notice that a subscriber wishes to use the home run wiring to receive an
alternative service.  Section 76.802 of our rules regarding the disposition of cable home wiring will apply
where a subscriber's service is terminated without notifying the incumbent provider that the subscriber
wishes to use the home run wiring to receive an alternative service. 

     (4)  The parties shall cooperate to ensure as seamless a transition as possible for the subscriber. 

     (5) Section 76.802 of our rules regarding the disposition of cable home wiring will continue to apply
to the wiring on the subscriber's side of the cable demarcation point.

5.   Section 76.805 is proposed to be added to read as follows:

 76.805  Access to Molding and Conduits

      A multichannel video service provider ("MVPD") shall be permitted to install one or more home
run wires in an existing molding or conduit where:  (a) sufficient space is present to permit the installation;
(b) the installation will not interfere with the ability of an existing MVPD to provide service; and (c) the
owner of the multiple dwelling unit building does not object to such installation.